Motivation in War

[TheCurmudgeon]

Open question, is anyone working on the motivation underlying conflict. I am working on the idea that group conflict is a natural aspect of human nature and therefore war is just and extension of that (See Gat "War in Civilization" for a basic overview of this idea). Original motivations for conflict were the needs of the group. More modern motivations are also the needs of the group.

In any case, has anyone working on anything similar? Does anyone know of any publications or papers that they felt covered the subject matter?

Thanks in advance.

The Curmudgeon.

[Bill Moore]

Somewhat limited in scope and based on pseudo-social science with a high degree of Western bias, so while being skeptical you can still appreciate their material on motivation.

http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/HumanFactorsS.pdf


Human factors considerations of undergrounds in insurgencies.

http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume5/august_2007/8_07_4.html


Rethinking Insurgency

Explores the topic a little more.

Recommend exploring the motivations behind Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, violent street gangs, ethnic conflict motivations in Bosnia, Rwanda, civil wars in Latin America, Asia, ours, etc. Suspect you'll find multiple factors, but if you find anything on how the factors morph after fighting as started due to establishing new social norms please let me know.

http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/2007/Cornell_SCT.pdf


Paul Collier and his colleagues have argued that many civil wars are caused by economic rather than sociopolitical factors, and by loot-seeking rather than by justice-seeking.5 As Collier and Hoeffler note, this economic approach to understanding civil war differs from political science approaches by focusing on a different motivation for violence—greed, not grievance—and a different explanation for the outbreak of war, atypical opportunities and not atypical grievances.6 The economic approach focuses on the opportunities that arise to belligerents, especially insurgents, during times of civil war. While war leads to great material losses on a societal basis, this does not mean that “war is a disaster for almost everyone concerned.” As David Keen argues, war is not simply the breakdown of order, economy, and social organization, but “the emergence of an alternative system of profit,
power, and even protection.”7 To put it simply, war has functions for some actors. The insecurity and unpredictability of war, coupled with the breakdown or weakening of law and order, implies the turn to a more opportunistic society; an increase in criminality; the disruption of markets; and opportunities for what Collier calls “rent-seeking predation.”8
These consequences are immensely detrimental for society at large, but provide specific opportunities for armed groups to reap significant economic benefits: some people manage to do well out of war.9

[jmm99]

I found this an interesting read, The Origin of War: The Evolution of a Male-Coalitional Reproductive Strategy (http://rint.rechten.rug.nl/rth/dennen/dennen6.htm) (by Johan M.G. van der Dennen; 1995) (over 850 pp. with a huge bib).

Good short review by George Modelski (https://faculty.washington.edu/modelski/Origins.html) (BLUF):


What this particular IR scholar appreciates in particular in this analysis is its facultative aspect. It is good to be shown convincingly that humans are neither inherently bellicose nor innately peaceable. Though it might at time have been opportune, war was not preordained in the long distant past, and it is not preordained in the future. On the other hand, it ought to be pointed out that the male-coalitional strategy has been key not only in war but in all the myriad other cooperative enterprises: business, political, religious, associational and sports, that have marked the evolution of the human race and of the world system. Nor does "reproductive strategy" appear sufficiently convincing as the ultimate cause of modern warfare. Territory remains an important bone of contention but hardly an all-encompassing imperative.

What appears to be missing from this account is sensitivity to evolutionary changes in such a basic political institution as war. Are we to understand that in its basic makeup warfare has remained unchanged for several million years? Or that its basic structure was laid down in the dawn of prehistory, and that all that followed, in the past five thousand years of civilization and of "history", has been nothing but "a nightmare" (p.593)? Has nothing changed in world politics even in the past one thousand years? Arguably, the biological (reproductive) component of the war syndrome is less powerful to-day, and the social (coalitional) more important, and working through social evolutionary mechanisms such as e.g. elections, or innovations, that are analogous to natural selection and genetic variation. That much might indeed be implicit in this account but it could be spelled out more fully if the author looked carefully at modern history as the record of world political evolution.

Regards

Mike

[TheCurmudgeon]

Thanks fo the additional material. I have two books, "Warless Societies and the Origin of War (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0472067389/ref=oh_details_o00_s00_i00?ie=UTF8&psc=1)" and "War Before Civilization: The Myth of Peaceful Savage (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0195091124/ref=oh_details_o00_s00_i01?ie=UTF8&psc=1)" that deal with the subject taking opposite veiws on whether war, which I will define as "morally acceptable collective violence by one group against another group." Also Azar Gat's book, "War in Human Civilization (http://www.amazon.com/War-Human-Civilization-Azar-Gat/dp/0199236631/ref=pd_sim_sbs_b_4)" covers the same material in the first three chapters. I am also in touch with a ethnographer who is conducting a large "N" study of existing Hunter-Gatherers. He expects that he will find that there was war but it was not universal. It is enough for me to say that it was a normal human activity.

I would like mor material on young men as the primary warriors in these groups. I have some, but not enough. One of my ideas is that certain segments of the society require special attention. Young men are prone to become soldiers if for no other reasons than the excitement and status. Therefore they need to be addressed as a seperate demographic when looking at motivations in conflict - they require very littel to engage in a morally acceptable fight.

Anyway, thanks

[TheCurmudgeon]

Bill,

One of my categories is what I call Wars of Personal Gain. In the primitive world these were raids either for stuff or for women (probably more often for both). The motivation is a version of greed, but greed is not easily defined as a independent motivation, so I am having some problems fitting it in. How far that motivation can be used in large scale conflicts is difficult for me to determine. Since my definition includes a moral component (hence making it socially acceptable to the group) personal gain will most likely be tied to some other motivation, like revenge or collective identity. This is a sticky problem and l many not have a complete solution by the time I have something to publish.

[TheCurmudgeon]

The definition of War I plan to use.

"Deadly or potentially deadly organized violence committed by a subset of one group, morally sanctioned by that group, against a politically or otherwise distinguishable group with a specific objective."

[jcustis]

At the final, most basic elemental nature of everything we do as human beings, it comes down to sex, and the pursuit thereof.

I know this has zero to do with your original question, and I don't have much in the way of why I think everything in life comes down to sex, but I just finished a six-day cross-country drive and had the opportunity to ponder a lot during the trip [insert wry grin face here].

I'm sure some anthropologist or feminist has written volumes on the subject, but I think conflict (which is just one permutation of human interaction) eventually comes down to sex. It might be a Six Degrees of Separation from Kevin Bacon sort of deduction, but yeah, it's all about sex.

Back to your regularly scheduled programming... : ^ ]

[TheCurmudgeon]

If you were to look at the limited demographic data for hunter-gatherers you would find that about 95% of same sex murders are male against male and it is either over a women or in revenge for stealing a women. Gat covers this in his book as well as the fact that most warriors are males. You were on the right track - although the idea of being on a long cross country journey thinking about sex makes me wonder where you stopped along the way ...:cool:

[jcustis]

I had the four female members of my clan along, all as part of a relocation to Florida. Finding myself stuck in containment with them for those six days, I spent a lot of time wondering why humans of the opposite sex put up with each other. :wry:

[Bill Moore]

Bill,

One of my categories is what I call Wars of Personal Gain. In the primitive world these were raids either for stuff or for women (probably more often for both). The motivation is a version of greed, but greed is not easily defined as a independent motivation, so I am having some problems fitting it in. How far that motivation can be used in large scale conflicts is difficult for me to determine. Since my definition includes a moral component (hence making it socially acceptable to the group) personal gain will most likely be tied to some other motivation, like revenge or collective identity. This is a sticky problem and l many not have a complete solution by the time I have something to publish.

As you know there is no single right answer, or silver bullet solution based on motivation. Identifying greed as primary motivator for large modern conflicts may be a hard link to make. In this type of conflict we see motivation based on identity (nationalism), fear, pride, hatred, and self-preservation. I'm not sure if Saddam's invasion of Kuwait was based on greed or self-preservation (didn't he believe Kuwait was threatening his oil fields with horizontal drilling?). However, with insurgencies and civil wars greed is often a prime motivator. Using your definition of war, I guess we could consider the conflict between Mexico's government and their cartels war(fare), and there is certainly an element of greed involved. I think in the end several factors motivate people to resort to violence on large scale, but generally believe identity politics is almost always a factor. If you can't identify with a particular group why would you fight with them? Once you start fighting then group dynamics takes on a life of its own, forget the political and economic factors being the main drivers. What you believed at one time becomes subordinate to the group norms and loyalty. That is why I think loyalty to the chain of command in the military can be over done, because personal loyalties replace loyalty to our Constitution and nation.

[Bill Moore]

If you were to look at the limited demographic data for hunter-gatherers you would find that about 95% of same sex murders are male against male and it is either over a women or in revenge for stealing a women. Gat covers this in his book as well as the fact that most warriors are males. You were on the right track - although the idea of being on a long cross country journey thinking about sex makes me wonder where you stopped along the way ...:cool:

I can't buy this Freudian psycho babble, but if there is any truth to it then future wars can be prevented with technology and capitalism. Excellent way to test your hypothesis. If young men can be sexually satisfied with sex robots, that may eliminate the will to fight, but I suspect not, some of the most violent societies are the most over sexed. I don't think it will work, at the end of the day a lot of young men will still give us their girl friends and families to pursue adventures and test their manhood.

http://news.discovery.com/tech/robotics/robot-prostitutes-120423.htm


Robot Prostitutes, the Future of Sex Tourism

[jcustis]

Yeah Bill, but I think young men do that due to an innate compulsion to have better sex. It is subconscious to a great degree, and I didn't mean to say that we fight to have sex. I should have been more thoughtful in the post, but I only ever meant it as a drive-by.

We fight to acquire power and prestige, wealth, influence, control, knowledge, and on and on. We fight as individuals who compromise states, so it is an individual component of a larger dynamic, and although most can control the impulse to sow their oats beyond their betrothed, look at thr number of general officers who can't control the impulse despite having everything they could ever want. For goodness sake just look at Petraeus. If he isn't the poster boy for what I'm talking about then I don't know who is. This stuff goes back to Helen of Troy. What does power and prestige get for the man who holds it? What does money get for the likes of the Trumps and the Welches?

We scratch our heads and ask, why can't these guys keep their wee wees in their pants, but we already know the answer why--they simply can't help themselves and control the impulse. That, or they don't think they will be caught. I know few might offer an opinion on this in polite company, but I think if you sampled 1,000 men if they would have sex outside of their marriage with some dream, perfect female, because they knew they could never be caught, 900+ would probably say they'd do it.

Over-sexed societies were still violent because there was probably this subconscious thing ticking in the heads of the ruling elite that drove them to pursue increasingly outlandish forms of sex. We'd call some of it depraved today, but the only reason why we came to consider it as off-kilter was because it fomented conflict. We suppressed sex and indecency because we wanted to stop conflict. We still liked the sex, as any scandal to befall a priest, minister, or legislator proves, but we tried to keep the conflict down.

When we look at large-scale conflicts, or the reasons behind how dictators and leaders who become aggressors on the world stage are able to come to power, I think you have it right TC. That aggressive, power-grabbing behavior (often explained away as defense of the father/mother-land) is looked at as acceptable because in the subconscious of the men, it's just a state/ruler/industrialist behaving the same way they wish they could on an individual level.

I can't quite put my finger on what drove eunichs of royal courts to behave as they did, but yeah, I did a lot of thinking on this through Utah, Kansas, and Tennessee.

[slapout9]

It is subconscious to a great degree, and I didn't mean to say that we fight to have sex.

:D:D:D JC,
Half the Country Music Industry is based upon that idea!

[TheCurmudgeon]

As you know there is no single right answer, or silver bullet solution based on motivation. Identifying greed as primary motivator for large modern conflicts may be a hard link to make. In this type of conflict we see motivation based on identity (nationalism), fear, pride, hatred, and self-preservation. I'm not sure if Saddam's invasion of Kuwait was based on greed or self-preservation (didn't he believe Kuwait was threatening his oil fields with horizontal drilling?). However, with insurgencies and civil wars greed is often a prime motivator. Using your definition of war, I guess we could consider the conflict between Mexico's government and their cartels war(fare), and there is certainly an element of greed involved. I think in the end several factors motivate people to resort to violence on large scale, but generally believe identity politics is almost always a factor. If you can't identify with a particular group why would you fight with them? Once you start fighting then group dynamics takes on a life of its own, forget the political and economic factors being the main drivers. What you believed at one time becomes subordinate to the group norms and loyalty. That is why I think loyalty to the chain of command in the military can be over done, because personal loyalties replace loyalty to our Constitution and nation.

Bill,

Two points. First, I am not interested in why leaders decide to go to war. There is plenty of material about that. I break the population into four groups, leaders (no interest), warriors (young men who traditionally have a propensity towards combat), patriots (others who do not have a propensity towards combat but who feel compelled to join in), and civilians (who must at least tacitly support the war effort). My interest is in why the other three categories engage in/support wars.

Second, greed is not my primary category, although it is probably going to be more associated with anxiety reducing actions based on what I have found on values. Yes, almost everything in this paper is based on psychobabble. There is a need called relatedness (Deci and Ryan) that is associated with values such as tradition and conformity (group ideals or identity driven motivations). This is one of the needs I identify as being associated with war. Others include autonomy (freedom) and, of course, the basic physiological needs required for survival (food, water, sex). There is another need called security but it is too broad for me to use. It is better looked at as a conglomeration of separate needs. In any case failing to meet your security needs causes anxiety (fear). Not necessarily fear of attack, but fear of not keeping up with the Jones’ or any other self-created ideas. This I associate with greed. There is also the ever-present motivation of revenge. Not a need, it is a cognition (another category of motivation). None the less it is very present as a motivation in war, at least at the very basic level.

And yes, civil authorities attacks on gang violence would be a war based on my definition. It is even possible that gang violence against the civil authorities could meet the defintion. I think of Al Capone, providing alcohol to the public and using some of the funds to support community activities. Extending the concept more to the military side the FARC would be within my area of interest. It is somewhat difficult to make a bright-line distinction but I am going to expressly avoid that area, mostly because I do not have the time to do the research.

[Dayuhan]

I'm surprised to see so little discussion of fear as a motivator. If we define war as ""morally acceptable collective violence by one group against another group", as above, we have to ask what makes violence morally acceptable. The answer, usually, is a perception of threat, whether justified or not. When leaders try to rally the populace to war, the first thing they try to do is make them afraid, to position the proposed antagonist as a threat. That's typically not been difficult: there's a long human tradition of fearing "them"... the other, the different, those who aren't "us".

Once fear is in play and the perception of threat is entrenched, presenting violence as a morally acceptable option becomes a lot easier. Attacking another group to steal their $#!t and rape their women makes us feel sleazy; killing to protect our own $#!t and our own women makes us feel noble... and of course once violence is in play, if an opportunity for a bit of plunder comes along, to the victor belong the spoils.

[slapout9]

What about Racism as a motive for War. I am sure that has happened once or twice throughout history.

[Bill Moore]

I mentioned fear in post 10, but agree it deserves further exploration. Fear has generated many conflicts in my opinion (both at the state and the conflict between people levels), but it seems TheCurmudgeon wants to focus more on individual motivation to fight. I tend to suspect that even individual motivation to fight in "most" cases are tied to social reasons such as identity groups (collective view of the world, common values, social norms, etc.). Take the KKK as a terrorist group, what motivated them to go out conduct their henious acts? I suspect they fought out of fear that their lifestyle was threatened by the emancipation, but I also think hatred played a key role, and sadly so did a desire to participate in some adventure. Not a comfortable question for soldiers, but are there times when it takes more courage not to fight than to fight? I think most of us would agree, but we also know that can be abused by those who are too cowardly to fight. Why did some groups pursue non-violent means to pursue their ends? Perhaps leadership plays more of role than we give it credit for. If a leader can control a group's desire to act out violent like Martin Luther King, while another leader can compel a group to act out violently are we possibly putting too much emphasis on individual motivation? Don't know, but it is a fascinating topic.

[TheCurmudgeon]

What about Racism as a motive for War. I am sure that has happened once or twice throughout history.

Slap,

I would classify these conflicts based on the Relatedness needs (what I term wars of collective identity) and with Security (fear) or Revenge, depending on what additional justification is given for the attack. Looking at the American west, you could argue that our genocidal attacks on the Native Americans were based on Relatedness (us versus them) and either Revenge (they attacked us first, so we must kill them) or Security (we need their land and resources for our own expansion). Once the motivational mold is set, everything else follows. Bill is also correct that the right leader can chose a different path, but I think this is only possible to a point. I have read some material on the Spanish-American war that basically said that it would have been political suicide to try to stop that war. I am not sure if a President after 9/11, or Pearl Harbor, could have said "let's take a step back and think about this" and survived politically. As Clausewitz point out, part of the trinity is the passion of the people.

As Bill points out, there is always an us-and-them component. This is a basic part of my definition of war – one group using deadly violence against another distinguishable group. This becomes more interesting when you get to wars of individual identity (freedom) because suddenly there is less interest in attacking the population. If you use individual freedoms as your justification you cannot simply kill the other side, you must distinguish who you are killing and justify it as killing to gain freedom for the oppressed. Going out on a limb, I would argue that this is the basis for what some term the Liberal Peace – why certain liberal countries tend not to go to war with each other. It is not that they won’t, they just can’t use individual identity as part of the justification. The Falklands was over territory (a basic physiological need). I am still tweaking…

[TheCurmudgeon]

I found this an interesting read, The Origin of War: The Evolution of a Male-Coalitional Reproductive Strategy (http://rint.rechten.rug.nl/rth/dennen/dennen6.htm) (by Johan M.G. van der Dennen; 1995) (over 850 pp. with a huge bib).

Facinating book. Interestingly I can't find it anywhere else than at the web site.

Do you know what became of the organization that Dennen was a part of when he wrote this. I saw that it merged with another group (The ISHE) but that link does not go anywere.

[davidbfpo]

Slightly different, but have you looked at Ted Gurr's 'Why Men Rebel'. It was a classic political science recommended book thirty plus years ago and all I can recall now is the title:(.

How about honour and miscalculation?

One post referred to The Falklands (1982), when these factors featured on both sides.

Thinking - a little - it is curious how much the British sense of honour has featured in our declaring war in 1914 for "plucky little Belgium", at least that was a long-standing strategic interest; quite unlike Poland in 1939, whose security had quickly became a national interest. I hesitate to look at imperial era wars.

Miscalculation is not confined to decision-makers. How many public's would be so "jingoistic" if told a war could last way beyond Christmas?

[TheCurmudgeon]

How about honour and miscalculation?.....One post referred to The Falklands (1982), when these factors featured on both sides.

Honour ties back to Relatedness. If I figure out how to reduce the size of an image I can demonstrate how the Relatedness need ties in to certain values including Face, Tradition, and Conformity. Face is closely associated with honour.

Miscalculation is not so much a motivation as it is an error in accurately percieving the situation, so I do not go into it.


Thinking - a little - it is curious how much the British sense of honour has featured in our declaring war in 1914 for "plucky little Belgium", at least that was a long-standing strategic interest; quite unlike Poland in 1939, whose security had quickly became a national interest. I hesitate to look at imperial era wars.


Strategic interests would always play into Security.

What I would find more interesting is the "Christmas Truce", where "peace" broke out. Why was it that suddenly the motivation for war no longer mattered to the two sides?

My guess is that they temporarily lost the ability to see each other as seperate groups. Their commonalities (Christian backgrounds and love of soccer) outweighed their perceived differences. They lost the Relatedness motivation and there was not a clear Autonomy motivation at this point in the war (or revenge). I don't have time to go into it, but that would be a facinating flip-side to this question.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Here is my first run at war types.

Categories are first broken down by who I am looking at, then the distinction used to identify the seperate groups, then the Needs, Values, and Themes.

[Dayuhan]

The Falklands was over territory (a basic physiological need).

About territory? I'd have said pride...

[TheCurmudgeon]

About territory? I'd have said pride...

Perhaps, but it was not about liberty. Pride is powerful, as associated with Relatedness, but I am not sure it is enough in itself. I think it is a combination of pride (relatedness) and an offense against that pride (revenge or security) that kicks in the motivation to actually kill.

[jcustis]

Perhaps the Falklands was a confluence of pride, racism, mixed in with other stuff.

The Argentinians were so frequently referred to as "Spics" that perhaps it made the boys shoulder the burden more easily.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Perhaps the Falklands was a confluence of pride, racism, mixed in with other stuff.

The Argentinians were so frequently referred to as "Spics" that perhaps it made the boys shoulder the burden more easily.

If it was only pride and racism we would be killing each other left and right. There has to be a kicker: an event or action that is such an affront that it required action. Invasion of territory is such an event. A massacre might also reach that level. But simply racism is not enough even if tied to pride. Otherwise, there would be a lot more wars.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Kind of long, but I wanted to throw this out for consideration by the group. If wars are actions by one group against another then there must be a way to distinguish the two groups. Historically this has been based on Collective Identity (Tribe, Ethnic Group, Religion, and Nationalism). Recently Individual Identity has been added. Here there is no pre-set group; you are part of this group because you see the individual as supreme. It is the basis of popular sovereignty and representative governments. In any case, here is my section describing the characteristics of these wars.

Any comments would be appreciated.



Characteristics of Wars based on Individual Identity

Wars that use Individual Identity are relatively new and tend to be associated with revolutions against dictators. In modern times the American and French Revolutions as well as a number of guerrilla actions can be tied to this type of war . These conflicts can be less predictable or controllable. The individualistic nature of the need for autonomy makes every person who feels compelled by that drive to act as a potential participant. Revolutions built on autonomy do not always require centralized leadership and events can take on a life of their own with leadership only emerging well after the fighting has started. This means that negotiating a peace or surrender may be much more difficult. Similarly, since there is no natural cohesive structure to the group no single person is going to be able to guarantee that hostilities will cease until the group coalesces around some principles. It is in the nature of autonomy not to be subject to another’s will. This alone can create a very difficult post conflict environment. Third, it is possible that the entire population is acting on this motivation. For example, the initial revolt in Syria may have been about autonomy but, as other groups became involved, segments of the rebels were ethnic or religious groups more likely motivated by Collective Identity.

Interstate conflicts can also be based on Individual Identity. Although generally not seen as such, the first interstate conflict that had the characteristics of Individual Identity was the Napoleonic Wars. France had just passed through the first stages of its revolution and the ideals of freedom and liberty were part of the recruiting propaganda for the war effort. The military had been restructured based on individual merit not birthright. The wars were viewed as being a fight for the liberation of Europe from kings and tyrants. That same idea holds true in modern wars. When America chose to act against Sadam Hussein it portrayed the action as a war to liberation. We were not there to fight the Iraqi citizens; we were there to topple an oppressive regime. The “us” was all freedom loving people (including Iraqis); the “them” were all the oppressors.

Three points are worth noting regarding interstate wars based on Individual Identity. First, certain historically acceptable tactics may no longer be viable. If country A is basing its distinction on Individual Identity then attacks that disproportionally affect the civilian population are not going to be acceptable to the civilians of country A. Salting the earth or laying siege on a city attacks the individuals who are not the target of the war. Second, even though the civilian population may see the war that way, the participants may not. Autonomy is an anxiety-free motivation where there is nothing anxiety-free about combat. It is conceivable that the psychological dynamics will shift a Soldier’s mindset towards Collective Identity and viewing the enemy, including civilians, as a homogonous group. At the extreme this will allow Soldier’s to commit acts that they would otherwise not engage in, like the Mai Lai Massacre. Third, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to have two countries use Individual Identity against each other. If both see the citizen’s of the other country as “just like me” then it is difficult distinguish who I am fighting against. There is no “us-versus-them”; there is only “us”. Any Country whose political system is built on popular sovereignty with a representative form of government is going to fall into this category. This could, in part, account for what is known as the Democratic or Liberal Peace. This does not mean that these countries cannot go to war with each other. It means that the nature of the events must be such that the other side can be characterized as somehow repressive or clearly “not like us”.

[jmm99]

Link (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2231168); not an endorsement.

See page 5 et seq:


B. The Shift toward Cosmopolitan Individualism

A combination of ideological, strategic, and political forces have driven the shift from communalism to individualism in the regulation of wartime behavior. It would be impossible to show which of these forces was most influential, either independently or in connection with a particular issue. Sometimes, military regulations that began as strategic self-interest were later incorporated into the law; at other times, legal norms shaped moral sensibilities, which were then translated into strategic and tactical conduct. These driving forces have been most influential over liberal democracies, and much of the analysis below thus focuses inevitably on the norms that govern — or purport to govern — liberal democracies. ....

Regards

Mike

[TheCurmudgeon]

Many thanks. Its from Harvard, but I can live with it...:D

[wm]

Here is my first run at war types.

Categories are first broken down by who I am looking at, then the distinction used to identify the seperate groups, then the Needs, Values, and Themes.

Stan,
After looking at the table, I think you can push the analysis a little further and categorize all of your Natural Wars as an instantiation of the "fight" side of the "fight or flight" reflex to a threat.
--WoPS are based on a threat to satisfying one's physiological or socvial needs;
--WoPG respond to threats to Security needs;
--WOIL are the fight reaction to threats to autonomy.
I am not sure I completely understand what a WoTPR is but I suspect that the threatened need is autonomy or security at one remove. What I mean is not a direct threat to one's autonomy or security but a perception of a potential threat felt through the threats against someone else's autonomy--something like a domino effect approach. It has the same kind of justification as you will find in David Hume's explanation for why we act morally.


I am not really sure what value the group identifier column has to your analysis. Perhaps you could cash that out more for us.

Having just come back from a visit to the Spotsylvania Court House battlefield, I'd like to understand what motivated those boys in blue and gray to continue the struggle for 20 hours at the Bloody Angle of the Mule Shoe salient. Does the scope of your work include answering the question of why people keep fighting in what seems to be a hopeless cause (in a conflict whose final goal is unattainable, that is, either unwinnable or unloseable)? I am not quite sure that loyalty to the group (or group think) has that power but I am certainly open to be persuaded otherwise

[wm]

If it was only pride and racism we would be killing each other left and right. There has to be a kicker: an event or action that is such an affront that it required action. Invasion of territory is such an event. A massacre might also reach that level. But simply racism is not enough even if tied to pride. Otherwise, there would be a lot more wars.



If I am right in my other post (30) about fight or flight responses to perceived threats, then I think the answer lies in understanding what it is that causes people sometimes to choose fight and sometimes to choose flight.

[wm]

Perhaps the Falklands was a confluence of pride, racism, mixed in with other stuff.

The Argentinians were so frequently referred to as "Spics" that perhaps it made the boys shoulder the burden more easily.

I think you are right about needing to find a way to "shoulder the burden more easily." I suspect that most of us have a pretty deep-seated aversion to killing other people. However, if we can do something to make our targets appear to be something other than people just like us, pulling the trigger becomes a little more palatable. Other comments on this thread about racism as a motivation for war are instances of this "dehumanizing" of one's opponent. Whether the dehumanizing of one's opponent occurs prior to the start of the war or after the war starts and it becomes apparent the troops will not be home before Christmas may well relate to the distinction that Stan made in his table between Natural Wars and Artificial Wars.

[TheCurmudgeon]

First, thanks for taking the time to write.


Stan,
After looking at the table, I think you can push the analysis a little further and categorize all of your Natural Wars as an instantiation of the "fight" side of the "fight or flight" reflex to a threat.
--WoPS are based on a threat to satisfying one's physiological or socvial needs;
--WoPG respond to threats to Security needs;
--WOIL are the fight reaction to threats to autonomy.

"Fight or flight" is based on a response but "natural war", as I use it, includes purely offensive acts, like raids on other tribes to steal women. There is no real threat, just feels like the right thing to do. So the question is "why does it feel right?" and why does the entire group support such activities. (Heck, they even tell stories and sing songs about them).


I am not sure I completely understand what a WoTPR is but I suspect that the threatened need is autonomy or security at one remove. What I mean is not a direct threat to one's autonomy or security but a perception of a potential threat felt through the threats against someone else's autonomy--something like a domino effect approach. It has the same kind of justification as you will find in David Hume's explanation for why we act morally.

WoTPR is based on Revenge, which has an interesting twist to it. An act of revenge stimulates pleasure centers in the brain (no kidding "Beyond Revenge: Neural and genetic bases of altruistic punishment" NeuroImage 54 (2011) 671-680). The interesting thing is that you don’t have to be the person actually revenging the wrong; an outside observer gets the same feeling of satisfaction. So if you see a wrong committed to a another person (or group) you feel compelled to act to correct it (and others will spur you on so that they get the “rush” when the act is avenged). This motivational construct is what I feel is behind humanitarian interventions.

There has to be a feeling of empathy with the group being attacked but I think that goes to group identification. Horrible acts are committed all the time but if we don't have any affiliation with the group we don't feel compelled to act (although we might feel sorry for them). By using revenge I may have limited the concept too much, but I think that it best represents the spontaneous nature of the motivation to act when there is no direct threat against you or your group.

I am not really sure what value the group identifier column has to your analysis. Perhaps you could cash that out more for us.
My definition has a two part analysis. First, you have to be able to distinguish your group from the other group and then you have to have a reason to fight. Group identifier is how you separate groups. Goes back to the idea of racism. Yes, you can use race as the way you distinguish your group from another, but there has to be more – some motivational drive to make your group decide to act.


Having just come back from a visit to the Spotsylvania Court House battlefield, I'd like to understand what motivated those boys in blue and gray to continue the struggle for 20 hours at the Bloody Angle of the Mule Shoe salient. Does the scope of your work include answering the question of why people keep fighting in what seems to be a hopeless cause (in a conflict whose final goal is unattainable, that is, either unwinnable or unloseable)? I am not quite sure that loyalty to the group (or group think) has that power but I am certainly open to be persuaded otherwise
I am afraid that is beyond what I am trying to do.

The ultimate purpose of this exercise is to determine what motivations cause people to go to war so that you can directly attack that motivation. It is kinda a Psyops idea, but more general. For example, using group identifiers, you have two choices; either you can make your enemy feel your group is so much like them that they no longer feel like fighting (the Christmas Truce); or you make others seem like they are more different or deserving of their hostilities (divide and conquer). If you can satisfy other needs or otherwise reduce their influence you can reduce the odds that a group (nation) will chose to go to war.

While exhaustion (the idea that eventually you no longer see the purpose of fighting) is a concept I have played with, I am not sure I can flesh it out. I do think that, once involved in war, it becomes self-sustaining for the actors, particularly the warriors. Again, I don’t any research material on this issue.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Here is my section on WoTPR. It is still very crude.


Wars of Third Party Revenge are conflicts whose motivation is predicated on a perceived injustice against an individual or group with whom the warring group has some affiliation. When these wars are conducted by a political state and there is no mutual defense treaty they tend to be classified as humanitarian interventions. Not all humanitarian interventions are motivated by revenge. There has to be a perceived injustice. An early example of a WoTPR was the attacks by the British against the Duke of Savoy in response to the massacre of the Vaudois in the mid 1650’s. In this case the massacre was the injustice and the affiliation was religious; the Vaudois were Protestant.

The impulse for Third Party Revenge acts on the individual and can cause people to take action independent of an actual political interest. This can be observed today in calls for jihad against infidel invaders. The perceived injustice is a territorial infraction and the common affiliation is religion. Individuals join the fight without leadership from within their group. In Syria it is not uncommon for foreign fighters to enter the country in order to protect members of their religion.

Much like the perceived injustice the nature of the affiliation required to activate Third Party Revenge is culturally specific and can change over time. For example, in the West “[t]he concept of people deserving protection evolved: from confessional co-religionists, to all fellow Christians, to all human beings.” It is not unconceivable that this list will continue to expand to “all living beings” as environmental activists and animal rights groups feel compelled to act to protect any living organism.

Not all conflict can be associated with a group need. Wars are often initiated by political leaders for strictly political or personal reasons. If war is a natural activity for humans where a group’s needs is threatened, then wars for reasons other than group needs can be termed artificial. These are wars where the leader initiates the conflict for a personal motivation. There is sufficient information available on when and why leaders take their countries to war so no further examination of this topic is made here.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Here is my needs to values image. Outer ring denotes needs. Next ring denotes Anxiety-reducing versus Anxiety-free values (goes to the general concept of Security needs). The inner pie identifies the values associated with the needs.

The purpose of this image is to help identify which needs are motivating the conflict. Look to the propoganda of the enemy for value themes. Connect the themes to the needs.

This image is based on Shalom Schwartz' universal values. I include a chart explaining each of the values. At the moment it is too big.

[wm]

The Hegelian in me wants to see thesis-antithesis pairs in the ring of values in your chart. Just as a case can be made that the middle ring sets anxiety reducing and anxiety free in opposition, in some cases values in the inner ring seem to be opposed to each other, but this does not carry through in any complete way. Can you explain the asymmetry of the values in the inner ring; as a minimum, why the numbers of values that are apprently subordinated to the two middle ring categories are not equal to each other? Or am I just attributing more to the visualization than it is meant to convey?

[TheCurmudgeon]

WM,

The circular design of the inner "ring" or pie comes from Shalom Schwartz Universal Human Values Theory (Are there Universal in the Structure and Content of Human Values (http://dev.crs.org.pl:4444/rid=1K6GFZBH9-255VHHF-GZ/Schwartz%201994%20-%20Are%20there%20universal%20aspects%20in%20the%20 content%20of%20human%20values.pdfhttp://)). The values are set up opposing based on his surveys. He laid out responses to his surveys in a two dimensional form and the result was that value pie.

It is not as much philosophical theory as it is psychological fact (or at least as much fact as you can have with psychology). He has been working on this theory since 1989 and it is pretty robust.

[wm]

It is not as much philosophical theory as it is psychological fact (or at least as much fact as you can have with psychology). He has been working on this theory since 1989 and it is pretty robust.
Hegel would say that they (philosophical theory and psychological fact) are the same thing in different aspects--the Absolute Ideal manifesting itself in the world as the Concrete Universal. (And you thought modern writing in psychology was psychobabble ;) )

Anyway, I also have some cmoments on your explication of WoTPR. It seems to be inconsistent with earlier posts. On the one hand you said

"Fight or flight" is based on a response but "natural war", as I use it, includes purely offensive acts, like raids on other tribes to steal women. There is no real threat, just feels like the right thing to do. So the question is "why does it feel right?" and why does the entire group support such activities. (Heck, they even tell stories and sing songs about them). On the other hand in the same post you say

WoTPR is based on Revenge, which has an interesting twist to it. An act of revenge stimulates pleasure centers in the brain (no kidding "Beyond Revenge: Neural and genetic bases of altruistic punishment" NeuroImage 54 (2011) 671-680). The interesting thing is that you don’t have to be the person actually revenging the wrong; an outside observer gets the same feeling of satisfaction. So if you see a wrong committed to a another person (or group) you feel compelled to act to correct it (and others will spur you on so that they get the “rush” when the act is avenged). This motivational construct is what I feel is behind humanitarian interventions. Implicit in this second quote seems to be a denial that WoPTR are a response to threats to the group initiating the WoTPR. Rather they are motivated by pleasure seeking, which, unless one is masochistic, is probably not associated with being threatened.*
Then in the discussion of WoPTR in the next post you note that artifical wars are those wars that are not response to a threat to a group.
If war is a natural activity for humans where a group’s needs is threatened, then wars for reasons other than group needs can be termed artificial.
However, you classified WoTPR as a category of Natural War in your table.
Just sayin' . . . :)

* I am not sure of this point because so-called "action junkies" (think Evel Knievel, for example, or folks who visit haunted houses at carnivals) do seem to get a positive stimulus/pleasure from the feeling of being in danger. Perhaps the warriors you mentioned earlier in the thread: "warriors (young men who traditionally have a propensity towards combat)" fit into this same category.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I understand.

Not all war is based on revenge. For example, if I just want to steal your women, I just go and do it. That is an offensive, first strike. Revenge, by its nature, is retribution for another act (like me stealing your women). I may have confused the two in my comments.

As for revenge and pleasure, I suppose that is a poor way of saying it (although interesting). If war is a natural act for humans and not a cultural adaptation that only came into being once we became "civilized” then there will be drives that cause us to act in the same way there are drives that motivate us to eat. You feel good after a satisfying meal … and you feel good after vanquishing an enemy or taking revenge. It is not sadism; it is an adaptation that humans (and chimpanzees and other apes) have “hardwired” (for lack of a better term) into our brains. With that as the basis of my ideas on war as a natural act, the question is what triggers these impulses or drives?

Natural wars are deadly conflicts where a group need is threatened and the group reacts. Artificial wars are initiated by the group leadership and may or may not have anything to do with the needs or desire of the group. Most modern wars are artificial (although even artificial wars will need to play to one of the aspects of a natural war to get the group to willingly participate). Spontaneous revolutions and revolts and/or some insurgencies I would consider being closer to natural wars.

Finally, yes "action junkies" would probably be close to the idea behind the warriors. The idea that sports in high school are used to channel these natural aggressions found in most young males (OK, I am being sexist, but the data supports the idea) is along the same lines. Makes me wonder if the first thing we did in Afghanistan was to organize inter-valley cricket competitions, there would have been a smaller insurgent population. Cricket seems to be the only thing the British managed to leave in Afghanistan (except for a lot of Enfields and bayonets).

One other point, above I mention that war is a deadly act that is the result of a group need being "threatened". That was a poor choice of words. There may not need to be a direct threat, only an unfulfilled drive. Going back to stealing women. Reproduction is part of our nature - our species dies without it. There may be women in our group but we feel we want more so we go and take them from another group. Same for food or anything else that we have a drive to have. It is based on anxiety - a fear of not having enough (the second ring), but it does not necessarily involve an actual threat.

[TheCurmudgeon]

OK, here is my classification system. Description of the Motivation/Needs is in the text box.


The second most important motivational component of the definition of war is a goal or objective.

5.2.1 Physiological needs

When hunter-gatherers fought “wars” they generally involved physiological needs. Physiological needs, those required to sustain species, are the most powerful. For the most part these wars occurred in a period of time before recorded history where humans survived as hunter-gathers. These were mostly conflicts for access to resources needed for basic survival like food and water or raids for mates but there is one aspect that carries over readily to modern war, territorial integrity. Humans, as well as our closest evolutionary relative chimpanzees, are territorial. We see incursions onto our territory as a threat and will deal with them accordingly. This motivation is as true today as it was 50,000 years ago.

5.1.2.2 Safety-Security needs

Safety-Security needs, or Security for short, are a broad category that covers most of the justifications that have been the purpose of war in the past. These have been wars to access resources, preemptive response to threats of potential attack, to gain territory, or otherwise ensure the group’s survival. They are not tied to a specific need but connected to a category of needs associated with fear or anxiety. From a motivational perspective they are associated with self-protection anxiety-avoidance values. This category may be too broad to be useful without further dissection. The specifics of each situation will need to be examined.

5.1.2.3 Liberty

These wars are not as easy to associate with a particular need. This is because Relatedness needs and may push a group to seek independence while havening nothing to do with Autonomy needs or Self-Direction. I will use a biblical story to illustrate this. Moses fought the Pharaoh to free his people. He was seeking liberty for the Israelites. But he was not seeking self-direction on an individual basis. When the Israelites decided to exercise their freedom of religious choice, Moses got rather pissed-off. The conflict was not for individual liberty but for freedom of the group subjugation by a different group. This motivation is behind conflicts like the Basque movement in Spain. However, Liberty can also act as an individual motivation. The American and French revolutions are examples of this. This is where the distinctions in the group type can help identify which motivations are likely to be important to ending a dispute.


5.3.1 Revenge

Revenge is a concept that everyone is familiar with. At some point in your life you have felt the powerful drive to retaliate against someone who has wronged you or a person close to you. Revenge is not a need, it is a cognitive adaptation. As a cognition revenge is culturally specific. For an event to trigger the revenge impulse must be a “wrong” in your culture. For example, drawing a cartoon that lampoons the prophet Muhammad may be perfectly acceptable in one culture yet creates an automatic motivation for vengeance in another. That powerful drive for vengeance is often part of the motivational calculus in wars, if not at the beginning, then certainly at some point after hostilities commence as each side tries to portray the other as committing atrocities.

Two points are important with thinking of revenge as a motivation in war. First, revenge does not stand alone as an independent motivation. It must be tied to an event or act that initiates the drive. The attack on Pearl Harbor was an unprovoked killing of American’s as well as a territorial infraction. This assailment of our most primitive needs led to war in a matter of days. Second, the injustice need not be on you individually but it does need to be against someone with whom you have some affiliation. Your relative may not have died in the attack on Pearl Harbor but a fellow American did. Further, the person who actually takes revenge is not the only person who receives satisfaction from the act. Other members of the avenging group also receive satisfaction. That connection can vary with the culture. In some cultures it is perfectly acceptable to treat outsiders differently while in other cultures there is no distinction between in-group members and out-group members. However, this drive for revenge based on injury to a third-party can be the cause of conflict.

5.1.3.2 Third Party Revenge


It is possible that a war involved more than on classification (i.e. Collective Identity Revenge and Collective Identity Security). Thoughts are welcome.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Getting near the end.

Here is one last paragraph I want to through out to for consideration.

Thanks to all that sent me links and commented on my ever evolving thoughts on this matter.


7.2 Should strategy be tailored to address the motivation(s) of the enemy?

This idea presents perhaps the most interesting question generated by this exercise; does your strategy have to match the type of war your enemy is fighting in an insurgency/counterinsurgency fight? For example, our COIN strategy is built on Individual Identity. It sees civil rights and representative government associated with popular sovereignty as integral to pop-centric warfare. Meanwhile, our enemy in Afghanistan, the Taliban, was fighting motivated by their Collective Identity as Muslims. That motivation appeared to allow them to pull patriots from the population. That Collective Identity and the values associated with it was clearly a motivating factor among the insurgents. Once we realized the power of Collective Identity as a motivating factor in the target population should we have adjusted our COIN strategy? A similar question can be asked about legitimacy. If, in the target population, our efforts are seen as illegitimate, can we ever win? These questions can best be examined in relation to the motivational force Collective Identity and Legitimacy have. Unfortunately, I can only ask the question.

[jmm99]

The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish … the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor turning it into something that is alien to its nature.[2]

[2] Quoted in John T. Fishel & Max G. Manwaring, Uncomfortable Wars Revisited, Norman: (2006) Univerity of Oklahoma Press, p. 9 from Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: (1976) Princeton University Press, pp. 88-89.

From brother Fishel's book review, Thinking and Writing About COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/thinking-and-writing-about-coin).

In any given instance, the materiality (weight to be given) re: the enemy's policy and strategy has to be determined. IMO: e.g., we blew it in Vietnam by not recognizing the kind of war Ho-Giap et al were fighting, compounding by supporting a series of failed SVGs - all determined by trying to force the war into the mold desired by the USG.

In a much simpler (and non-lethal) context, your last section's questions apply to any lawsuit - decide what is material and what is not. IMO: that's largely a matter of experience and intuition.

Regards

Mike

[TheCurmudgeon]

JMM,

Funny, upon concluding this project I have determined that there is really nothing new under the sun. It is a different perspective on a problem that has vexed men since before recorded history.

It was very long in the end (almost 10,000 words). I had to edit out a lot while still trying to keep the central ideas -- so if it does get accepted here I apologize to anyone whose ideas I did not get a chance to expressly include.

Thanks to all who sent me links and ideas. ;)

[Dayuhan]

Meanwhile, our enemy in Afghanistan, the Taliban, was fighting motivated by their Collective Identity as Muslims. That motivation appeared to allow them to pull patriots from the population. That Collective Identity and the values associated with it was clearly a motivating factor among the insurgents. Once we realized the power of Collective Identity as a motivating factor in the target population should we have adjusted our COIN strategy? A similar question can be asked about legitimacy. If, in the target population, our efforts are seen as illegitimate, can we ever win?

I wonder about this. It is said that war is the continuation of politics by other means. It's also said that all politics are local. I have to wonder how many of those who fought - the actual fighters, not the leaders - were motivated by "collective identity" and how many were motivated by grievances or issues specific to their locality.

I do not think there's much point in trying to compromise with or reach accommodation with the leaders of these movements: they are too ideological and too deeply invested in goals that can only be achieved through violence. It may, however, be possible in some cases to disaggregate leaders from followers by addressing and resolving the concrete local issues that drive individual fighters to fight. I may be excessively attached to this idea because I've seen it work, and I certainly don't think it automatically applies everywhere. It's certainly worthy of consideration, though. I don't think we should ever assume that the motivations of the individuals carrying the rifles are the same as those of the leaders, or that a single set of motivations applies across any given movement.

It's certainly worth asking whether we can ever "win" in a place where our presence and efforts are seen by the populace as inherently illegitimate. Since "winning" is achieving one's objectives, we might be well advised to assess our objectives more carefully, and to determine before we start whether those objectives are compatible with local perceptions of legitimacy. The idea that a bit of "winning hearts and minds" can persuade a populace to accept and embrace the presence and agendas of an occupying army was always a bit optimistic.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I wonder about this. It is said that war is the continuation of politics by other means. It's also said that all politics are local. I have to wonder how many of those who fought - the actual fighters, not the leaders - were motivated by "collective identity" and how many were motivated by grievances or issues specific to their locality.

Collective Identity does not "motivate" or more correctly, initiate action -- it is how they defined themselves versus the enemy. The motivational trigger is something else, like a greivance or revenge. You can try to minimize the motivational affect of either one, but both need to be present for war.


I do not think there's much point in trying to compromise with or reach accommodation with the leaders of these movements: they are too ideological and too deeply invested in goals that can only be achieved through violence. It may, however, be possible in some cases to disaggregate leaders from followers by addressing and resolving the concrete local issues that drive individual fighters to fight. I may be excessively attached to this idea because I've seen it work, and I certainly don't think it automatically applies everywhere. It's certainly worthy of consideration, though. I don't think we should ever assume that the motivations of the individuals carrying the rifles are the same as those of the leaders, or that a single set of motivations applies across any given movement.

Agreed.


It's certainly worth asking whether we can ever "win" in a place where our presence and efforts are seen by the populace as inherently illegitimate. Since "winning" is achieving one's objectives, we might be well advised to assess our objectives more carefully, and to determine before we start whether those objectives are compatible with local perceptions of legitimacy. The idea that a bit of "winning hearts and minds" can persuade a populace to accept and embrace the presence and agendas of an occupying army was always a bit optimistic.

Be careful, that comment only applies to counterinsurgencies. Obviously our presence in Germany during WWII was seen as illigitimate by the Germans, none the less we won the war.

[Dayuhan]

Collective Identity does not "motivate" or more correctly, initiate action -- it is how they defined themselves versus the enemy. The motivational trigger is something else, like a greivance or revenge. You can try to minimize the motivational affect of either one, but both need to be present for war.

Agreed to an extent. We should not assume a generic "collective identity", though. Are the people we call "Taliban" necessarily identifying themselves as Taliban, or are they people with a localized grievance against government and the attitude that the enemy of the government is their friend? Maybe one, maybe the other, likely a bit of both, but the assumption that those we fight necessarily have a common definition of themselves vs the enemy is not always going to be valid.


Be careful, that comment only applies to counterinsurgencies. Obviously our presence in Germany during WWII was seen as illigitimate by the Germans, none the less we won the war.

I wouldn't say it applies only to counterinsurgency. Maybe better to say it applies to any situation in which the acceptance of the populace is either the goal in itself or a necessary element in achieving the goal. The point is that since "winning" is achieving the goal, the goal defines what "winning" is. If we want to "win", the first step is to start with a realistic goal.

[Bill Moore]

Getting near the end.

Here is one last paragraph I want to through out to for consideration.

Thanks to all that sent me links and commented on my ever evolving thoughts on this matter.

A thought or two on this. I sat in several joint planning groups where the group leader would identify the adversary's will to fight as the center of gravity. I didn't find this very useful, but it seems to parallel your proposal that perhaps we should consider targeting the adversary's motivation. I think this should always be considered, and of course most militaries have employed various forms of psychological operations in an attempt to achieve this, but usually based on my observations and in my studies these efforts largely fail. Identity politics seem to be more powerful than any carrots and sticks we can offer. Furthermore one person may have multiple reasons for fighting, and when examine the motivations of an Army, an insurgency, a counterinsurgent force, a gang, etc. I suspect you'll find multiple factors that interact to provide the motivation to fight. I have almost completely dismissed the idea that good governance (after an insurgency starts) will be sufficient in itself to bring an insurgency to an end. I also see absolutely no correlation with our nation building efforts to effectively "counter" an insurgency, yet we blindly assume if we provide jobs the insurgents will quit fighting despite the wealth of empirical evidence to indicate this assumption is not valid.


This idea presents perhaps the most interesting question generated by this exercise; does your strategy have to match the type of war your enemy is fighting in an insurgency/counterinsurgency fight? For example, our COIN strategy is built on Individual Identity. It sees civil rights and representative government associated with popular sovereignty as integral to pop-centric warfare. Meanwhile, our enemy in Afghanistan, the Taliban, was fighting motivated by their Collective Identity as Muslims. That motivation appeared to allow them to pull patriots from the population. That Collective Identity and the values associated with it was clearly a motivating factor among the insurgents. Once we realized the power of Collective Identity as a motivating factor in the target population should we have adjusted our COIN strategy? A similar question can be asked about legitimacy. If, in the target population, our efforts are seen as illegitimate, can we ever win? These questions can best be examined in relation to the motivational force Collective Identity and Legitimacy have. Unfortunately, I can only ask the question.

I'm not sure what COIN strategy you're referring to, because frankly I am not aware of one in Afghanistan. I definitely don't see any focused on individual identity, but rather trying to create a largely non-existent identity of an Afghan national. To offer an answer to your question, once we realized the power of the "various" collective identities in Afghanistan should we have adjusted our strategy? If our goal remains to build a national identity, then I our strategy definitely requires us to be aware of the various collective identities, but then we would need a way (I'm not proposing one exists) to convince them that first and foremost they should value their value as an Afghan national. In my opinion we tend to treat most of these insurgencies as a bilateral event between the government and its disaffected people, yet in reality it is normally a multilateral event with different views within the government (not unlike ours), and definitely multiple groups of combatants fighting for different reasons, so the ideal state of a "legitimate government" accepted by all seems to be unreachable in many cases. When we realize that, then we need to adjust our strategy to pursue an achievable end that is better than when we first intervened, but far from perfect. We don't do that, we simply get tired of trying to achieve the impossible and go home.

I completely dismiss the idea that all politics, thus motivation for fighting, are local. That disregards the many incidents of foreign fighters throughout history, to include the number of Americans who participated in the Spain's civil war (also Russians, Germans, Italians, etc.). Lots of folks are motivated to fight to pursue wealth (greed), a global political idea, spread their religion, etc. Like you said not much has really changed over the past few centuries when it comes to human nature.

[TheCurmudgeon]

A thought or two on this. I sat in several joint planning groups where the group leader would identify the adversary's will to fight as the center of gravity. I didn't find this very useful, but it seems to parallel your proposal that perhaps we should consider targeting the adversary's motivation. I think this should always be considered, and of course most militaries have employed various forms of psychological operations in an attempt to achieve this, but usually based on my observations and in my studies these efforts largely fail. Identity politics seem to be more powerful than any carrots and sticks we can offer. Furthermore one person may have multiple reasons for fighting, and when examine the motivations of an Army, an insurgency, a counterinsurgent force, a gang, etc. I suspect you'll find multiple factors that interact to provide the motivation to fight.

Bill,
Somewhere in the final version I mention that, while what psychologically motivates us to go to war may be a prime mover or first cause, I don’t advocate it as being the center of gravity in a war. It presents an opportunity to reduce the enemy’s success by helping to break their will or by dividing them against themselves, but these are nothing new.

What I did find interesting was that, by examining war in a pre-state society you find that identity is a necessary antecedent for war, not a cause. In modern times we look at war as the province of states so we don’t need to examine the question of how the population divides itself into side: how we determine who is “us” and who are “them”. If you take away the “us versus them” war becomes crime. If I murder a fellow American to take their land I am a criminal. If I kill a (fill in the blank with any indignant population that we colonized) to take their land (or “conquer” it), society accepts that. So while identity politics looks like it is the motivator, it is not. It in simply the way we determine who are the in-group and who is the out-group. Something else has to be added to the mix. Some other motivational trigger like revenge (honor) or greed (power).

This brought out another interesting observation that as Westerners adopt the idea of human rights and begin to see all people as being the same, the people who we decide we can go to war for, the "us", has expanded exponentially. Suddenly ideas like R2P make sense because one of the “us”, defined as all humans, is being attacked by one of the “them”, humans who act unjustly against another human. “Them” is now defined as the members of an unjust government. It is defined in terms of action, not in terms of ethnicity, nationality, or religion. See Dayuhan's comment in post 46 as an illistration of this idea.


I have almost completely dismissed the idea that good governance (after an insurgency starts) will be sufficient in itself to bring an insurgency to an end. I also see absolutely no correlation with our nation building efforts to effectively "counter" an insurgency, yet we blindly assume if we provide jobs the insurgents will quit fighting despite the wealth of empirical evidence to indicate this assumption is not valid.

I agree. Good governance does not really go to any of the motivations that I found. There are certain aspects of a good government, without which you can sustain the motivation to fight (or create new ones), but those are separate from the idea of good governance.



I'm not sure what COIN strategy you're referring to, because frankly I am not aware of one in Afghanistan. I definitely don't see any focused on individual identity, but rather trying to create a largely non-existent identity of an Afghan national. To offer an answer to your question, once we realized the power of the "various" collective identities in Afghanistan should we have adjusted our strategy? If our goal remains to build a national identity, then I our strategy definitely requires us to be aware of the various collective identities, but then we would need a way (I'm not proposing one exists) to convince them that first and foremost they should value their value as an Afghan national.

Funny, we kinda did that by putting infidels amongst them.


In my opinion we tend to treat most of these insurgencies as a bilateral event between the government and its disaffected people, yet in reality it is normally a multilateral event with different views within the government (not unlike ours), and definitely multiple groups of combatants fighting for different reasons, so the ideal state of a "legitimate government" accepted by all seems to be unreachable in many cases. When we realize that, then we need to adjust our strategy to pursue an achievable end that is better than when we first intervened, but far from perfect. We don't do that, we simply get tired of trying to achieve the impossible and go home.

Social engineering by force is a bad idea to start with. Not to say you can’t do it. I don’t have an answer for this one.


Like you said not much has really changed over the past few centuries when it comes to human nature.

I don’t think human nature has changed for the last 40,000 years. I think that the conditions humans find themselves in have changed, and that has caused humans to behave differently.