Modernization Theory is Hokum. [Archive]

Madhu

07-31-2013, 06:14 PM

But governments do it all the time. They do it through inoculation programs that skew the population density. They do it through the tax code that favors married couples or by deciding who can marry who. They do it through any number of rules that regulate your life "for the better". They don't call it social engineering, but the result is the same.

So is the social engineering the Army is directed to do just "the continuation of policy by other means"?

Isn't it our policy to spread democracy?

If it is, isn't it our job to mold the population of our target country/population; to till the soil so that it can accept the seeds of representative government?

While I don't like it, I am not sure I can make a cogent argument against it.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15993

I think you had some nice comments too?

Molding populations on the behalf of the other is a fool's errand, and, no, the military is not always instructed to do this. For instance, the President wanted options that would allow him to draw down in Afghanistan and focus on CT but the Army didn't want to do that.

Even within the "spread democracy" examples the military got off track on theories like RMA which didn't leave enough troops for post conflict stabilization.

How this turned into a conversation about the military building schools as its primary operation or tactical or whatever focus is beyond me.

See, I shouldn't comment because it's too time consuming :)

PS: Supporting the formation of a government is not synonymous with molding populations. Not everything is population-centric in this sense.

Policy changes from administration to administration and according to national mood, so any operational focus on molding populations is doomed to failure. The military has an obligation to make the true costs of this fool's errand known to its civilian oversears which did not always happen in the examples of Vietnam, Afghanistan or Iraq.

How did such collossal intellectual confusion make its way into our collective national security complex psyche?

TheCurmudgeon

07-31-2013, 06:28 PM

How did such collossal intellectual confusion make its way into our collective national security complex psyche?

That is a question that I would like to explore, but that is for another day.

For those of you who want a short history of the modern version of moderinization theory I offer this:

Modernization theory -- the belief that industrialization and economic development lead directly to positive social and political change -- has been a subject of intense scholarly and policy interest for more than half a century. It came back into vogue in Washington during the 1990s, thanks to the global spread of free markets and the third wave of democratization, and continues to inform much of U.S. policy toward the developing world. After decades of derision, moreover, a loose or weak version of it is experiencing a revival in the academy as well -- something that would assuredly delight or appall the bloodied combatants in the field's original theoretical battles. ...

Has links to references.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/readinglists/what-to-read-on-modernization-theory

BTW Madhu, it was your linking Modernization to CORDS that made me think this migh be worth exploring.

Dayuhan

07-31-2013, 10:31 PM

But governments do it all the time. They do it through inoculation programs that skew the population density. They do it through the tax code that favors married couples or by deciding who can marry who. They do it through any number of rules that regulate your life "for the better". They don't call it social engineering, but the result is the same.

I was sloppy; meant to say "any attempt by the US government to engage in social engineering outside the United States..." Social engineering attempts within the borders may not always be well advised, but they aren't entirely ridiculous.

So is the social engineering the Army is directed to do just "the continuation of policy by other means"?

Isn't it our policy to spread democracy?

If it is, isn't it our job to mold the population of our target country/population; to till the soil so that it can accept the seeds of representative government?

This touches on another question. I've often pointed out on these threads that this is a policy that invites failure. People from the military side, not unreasonably, point out that they don't set the policy, they just have to try to implement it as best they can, whether or not it's pointless and self-defeating. Under those circumstances, it makes sense to talk about how best to execute a bad policy. At the same time, though, it's easy to get so deep in that conversation that we forget to mention that, at root, this is simply bad policy. If we lose sight of that, the chances of repeating these policies, perhaps under the guise of "the policy isn't the problem, we just need to do it right", increase.

Part of the problem, to me, is that American policymakers have a real aversion to entering a small war with limited, pragmatic objectives. They want the objectives to sound noble and grand, like "spreading democracy". Limited, pragmatic objectives don't have the same ring to them.

While I don't like it, I am not sure I can make a cogent argument against it.

I try, with limited success.

Re this:

the belief that industrialization and economic development lead directly to positive social and political change

Is to me not entirely unreasonable, though of course the extent, nature and pace of change are not going to be predictable, and "positive" is in the eye of the beholder. Our error, to me, lies in the assumption that "industrialization and economic development" are deliverable goods that can simply be "installed", like a spare tire or a light bulb, in an environment where they did not previously exist. This belief is not consistent with experience or common sense, and needs to be... re-examined, at least.

TheCurmudgeon

08-01-2013, 02:08 AM

This touches on another question. I've often pointed out on these threads that this is a policy that invites failure. People from the military side, not unreasonably, point out that they don't set the policy, they just have to try to implement it as best they can, whether or not it's pointless and self-defeating.

Part of the "point" of this endeavor is to teach military people enough about this theory so they can recognize when it is pointless. Essentially, use the theory to prove that it is not applicable in this situations.

I think I can do it, but I need to have a firm basis in the history of the theory and its evolution to where it is now. Boring background, but necessary.

TheCurmudgeon

08-02-2013, 07:13 PM

Based on my research I have found that Modernization theory dates back to the late eighteenth century. The idea was that industrialization leads to changes in society. These changes are then attributed later with leading to modern democracy.

The problem in my mind is that the industrial revolution seems to start in the mid 1700s while the changes that allowed for democracy can be traced back at least 100 years earlier people like Hugo Grotius and events like the Glorious Revolution. Yet by the time Modernization was reinvigorated in the 1950's it was tied to economics and a pair of symposiums, one of which produced "Some social requisites of democracy (http://media.aucegypt.edu/Pols/final%20cairo%20files/lipset.pdf)", one of the most downloaded articles around. But even from there the theory morphs. The CORDS version of it seems to be tied to Capitalism and Commercialism - the Iraq/Afghanistan version tied to institutional forms. The common thread is that as things get better people want cosmopolitanism and political change. The idea that somehow industrialization and/or capitalism has lead to democracy. But it seems the other way around.

Anyone seen anything different?

Fuchs

08-02-2013, 08:34 PM

Based on my research I have found that Modernization theory dates back to the late eighteenth century. The idea was that industrialization leads to changes in society. These changes are then attributed later with leading to modern democracy.

(...)

Anyone seen anything different?

An excuse for colonialism was to bring civilisation to savages...

TheCurmudgeon

08-02-2013, 09:36 PM

An excuse for colonialism was to bring civilisation to savages...

I guess it's true what they say -- the more things change the more they stay the same.

condottiere

08-03-2013, 02:00 PM

It is possible, but it depends on circumstances, the resistance of natives to imported ideas, and how they perceive the source.

The Vietnamese are quite receptive to new ideas that will improve their lives, they'd resist them if it came from a colonial or occupying force where the intent is to tighten control over their lives, as compared to the present policy of exploiting capitalism to advance the GDP, improve the lives of the proletariat and enrich the elite.

Afghanistan requires a critical mass of urbanization to counter balance the warlords and tribal elders who are protective of the influence they command in their bailiwicks, and the Taliban who tap into a deeply embedded independent minded paranoiac patriarchal culture to justify and sustain their insurgency and eventual power grab. Outside of those who are directly bribed by the Americans (Karzai) and those with the most to lose (educated women), you won't have that required bedrock of support.

In fifty years Afghanistan might be comfortable with accepting the benefits of civilization.

TheCurmudgeon

08-03-2013, 04:31 PM

It is possible, but it depends on circumstances, the resistance of natives to imported ideas, and how they perceive the source.

I am not sure I totally agree with this. Being an outsider, particularly one that has already been demonized by the religious leadership (Infidels) means that you have a harder time selling your ideas where they differ from the ideas of the population. But if the ideas match those of the local population I think your job is much easier.

An example is roads. Building a road is a "Muslim" thing to do. It benifits the Ummah (population in general). I had a local national tell my XO "you can build your road, but we don't want your religion or your culture."

The Vietnamese are quite receptive to new ideas that will improve their lives, they'd resist them if it came from a colonial or occupying force where the intent is to tighten control over their lives, as compared to the present policy of exploiting capitalism to advance the GDP, improve the lives of the proletariat and enrich the elite.

I am not sure about this. Vietnam doesn't like new ideas even if they come from within the country (http://www.bangkokpost.com/breakingnews/362583/outcry-as-vietnam-decree-restricts-social-media-posts).

Vietnam restricts social media posts

"Personal electronic sites are only allowed to put news owned by that person, and are not allowed to 'quote', 'gather' or summarise information from press organisations or government websites,” local media quoted Hoang Vinh Bao, director of the Broadcasting and Electronic Information Department at the Ministry of Information and Communications, as saying.

That is not unique to Vietnam, it is the nature of any like situated society (to a point).

Afghanistan requires a critical mass of urbanization to counter balance the warlords and tribal elders who are protective of the influence they command in their bailiwicks, and the Taliban who tap into a deeply embedded independent minded paranoiac patriarchal culture to justify and sustain their insurgency and eventual power grab.

This "urbanization" myth is exactly what I am talking about. Urbanization has existed for centuries. Most city-states were urban. Yet they were not modern democracies. Urbanization is associated with increased income and GDP, but not necessarily required by it. The changes that bring about a more open society are social.

In fifty years Afghanistan might be comfortable with accepting the benefits of civilization.

I am not sure what you mean by the "benefits of civilization", and no offense to the Afghans, but unless they find a way to harness and sell solar power or we make heroin legal, Afghanistan will look pretty much exactly the way it does not in fifty years. Without a steady source of income and a substantial rise in per capita GDP, nothing there is going to change.

condottiere

08-03-2013, 06:11 PM

While current regimes and their immediate successors aren't irrelevant, when it's clear that they seem ineffectual or passively aggressively resistant to the policies you want to have implemented, the focus should be on winning the hearts and minds of the next generation, which is a rather long term investment.

This may sound trite, but you want to create a consumer society that wants to connect with the rest of the world, where the kids are indoctrinated to want to drink coke and eat at McDonald's. You might even say corrupting the national moral fibre. With it comes the drive to buy electronic toys and consume media especially stuff that turns out to be very relateable and easily pirated. Essentially, you want the populace to be want what the West has and to be able to live that lifestye.

Gandhi disliked railroads for two reasons. It destroyed his non-existent nostalgic concept of how India should be, and identified it as one of the cornerstones of how the British maintained their rule over the subcontinent, and the facilitation of it's economic exploitation. While I wouldn't know of any community that doesn't welcome a better road system, if one is built, it will allow the world to have a deeper impact on rural life, and perhaps on the tactical side, make it difficult or impossible to set up ambushes or plant IEDs without immediately detecting them.

The Vietnamese government might want to keep the lid down without curtailing economic development, but the Vietnamese themselves want everything the world can give them and get rich.

TheCurmudgeon

08-03-2013, 07:56 PM

While current regimes and their immediate successors aren't irrelevant, when it's clear that they seem ineffectual or passively aggressively resistant to the policies you want to have implemented, the focus should be on winning the hearts and minds of the next generation, which is a rather long term investment.

Here we agree. Assuming that non-destructive social engineering is possible it would have to be inter-generational.

I define non-destructive social engineering as things other than genocide, internment camps, re-education camps, or extreme forms of forced change.

This may sound trite, but you want to create a consumer society that wants to connect with the rest of the world, where the kids are indoctrinated to want to drink coke and eat at McDonald's. You might even say corrupting the national moral fibre. With it comes the drive to buy electronic toys and consume media especially stuff that turns out to be very relateable and easily pirated. Essentially, you want the populace to be want what the West has and to be able to live that lifestye.

I think this was the idea behind the Vietnam era modernization theory. They thought commercialism was the cure for communism. I think commercialism comes AS A RESULT of other, more fundamental cultural changes.

Dayuhan

08-03-2013, 11:08 PM

They thought commercialism was the cure for communism.

They were very likely right, in the long run. They misjudged the time frame, and they mistakenly believed that commercialism, or modernization, or industrialization, or development, can be inserted into another country, rather than developing organically.

Industrialization, modernity, commercialism do change societies. I don't think there's much doubt about that. We cannot reliably predict what changes will result or how long it will take them to emerge, and we cannot externally impose or engineer commercialism, modernity, development or industrialization.

I don't think anyone can point to a case, anywhere, where meaningful "development" was engineered from the outside. Countries do develop, but they cannot "be developed" by an external force.

Fuchs

08-04-2013, 12:48 AM

I don't think anyone can point to a case, anywhere, where meaningful "development" was engineered from the outside. Countries do develop, but they cannot "be developed" by an external force.

Sure they can, even without colonization.
It's just not worth the effort, for the self-sustaining indigenous forces for development are almost free by comparison and more powerful by orders of magnitude.

The question is thus not one of how to push a foreign country to modernity, but whether there's a trigger for making it move towards a certain development direction on its own and how to identify and activate it.

Compare *shameless self-promotion* my text about Germany's post-WW2 recovery (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.de/2013/07/national-vitality-growth-military-power.html), for example */shameless self-promotion*.

A trigger for an average African country - say Zambia - could be to find a way how the powers that be can profit of giving women much more relevance in the non-subsistence economy. Add the Japanese custom of wifes managing family finances (an awesome limiter on alcohol and cigarette consumption as well as whoring), maybe through some African-made movies, bank regulations and the like. This could lead to substantial economic growth.

Dayuhan

08-04-2013, 01:10 AM

A trigger for an average African country - say Zambia - could be to find a way how the powers that be can profit of giving women much more relevance in the non-subsistence economy. Add the Japanese custom of wifes managing family finances (an awesome limiter on alcohol and cigarette consumption as well as whoring), maybe through some African-made movies, bank regulations and the like. This could lead to substantial economic growth.

I'm sure it could, but the probability of these changes being successfully introduced or imposed by an outside power approaches zero.

The re-development of Germany and Japan post WW2 may have been supported by external resources, but it would be an enormous stretch to say they were "developed" purely through external intervention, and any comparison to efforts to externally impose development, modernization, etc in environments where these did not previously exist will be strained beyond any possible utility. Re-modernizing and re-industrializing a modern industrial state that has seen the physical basis for modernity destroyed by conflict is a fundamentally different problem than modernizing and industrializing a state that has never known modernity and industry. The former is, essentially, a problem of engineering and finance. The latter is not.

condottiere

08-04-2013, 01:21 AM

Simply put, you have to convince them it was their own idea.

As for Germany and Japan, besides the fact they were well on the road to Westernization and modernization pre-War, the shock of their loss and utter devastation of their respective countries and economies, combined with the determination to recreate themselves, generously supported and protected by the United States with a national culture that enshrined perfectionism and a work ethic, it seems the effort was worthwhile.

This may be less effective in regions that has seen conquering armies transit to more welcoming climes, and the populace with infinite patience can wait out the invader.

Dayuhan

08-04-2013, 01:29 AM

Simply put, you have to convince them it was their own idea.

Good luck with that. It's harder than it sounds, especially if you've got a whole bunch of armed men running around the place at the time.

It's sometimes suggested that outside powers can promote these agendas by finding and supporting local groups that support those agendas. That often backfires: the support invariably becomes publicized, and what might have been perceived as local folks with a progressive agenda come to be seen as agents of foreign powers.

PS: I confess that the thought of Germany being "well on the road to Westernization" amuses me intensely. It was hardly necessary for the West to Westernize Germany; being intrinsically of the West, it was already "Westernized". Speaking of "Westernizing" Germany would be like speaking of "Americanizing" Ohio.

Fuchs

08-04-2013, 01:46 AM

Dayuhan

08-04-2013, 02:09 AM

Actually, Germany and "West" has a special meaning.

Germany (FRG) embraced the "West" under Adenauer as a way of cooperating with instead of confronting France.
Previously, it had been stuck between the post-NapoleonIII bloc of France/UK and the Russians. The West/East talk as we know it today only came into being in the late 40's.

I was thinking of culture, rather than transient political alliance. Hasn't Germany been fundamentally European, hence "Western", at least since 1871?

Granted, these are very loose terms, but their use in discussions of "Westernizing" other countries is equally loose. The context in which the term "Western" was invoked a few posts back appeared to characterize a cultural and economic identity rather than a political alliance. If that interpretation is incorrect I'm sure the author of the post will clarify.

Dayuhan

08-04-2013, 02:17 AM

The question is thus not one of how to push a foreign country to modernity, but whether there's a trigger for making it move towards a certain development direction on its own and how to identify and activate it...

...A trigger for an average African country - say Zambia - could be to find a way how the powers that be can profit of giving women much more relevance in the non-subsistence economy. Add the Japanese custom of wifes managing family finances (an awesome limiter on alcohol and cigarette consumption as well as whoring), maybe through some African-made movies, bank regulations and the like. This could lead to substantial economic growth.

Simply put, you have to convince them it was their own idea.

The comments above seem to take the principle of "social engineering" a step farther, to what might be called "cultural engineering". The obvious question there is whether or not this is even possible. However desirable it might seem (to us) to transplant elements of Japanese culture to Zambia, is this, or anything like it, a realistic option in dealing with the problems of developing economies and cultures, or the problems of economies and cultures that are either not developing or actually regressing? I admit that it's an appealing theory, but is there any remotely realistic way of putting it into practice?

Fuchs

08-04-2013, 02:26 AM

I was thinking of culture, rather than transient political alliance. Hasn't Germany been fundamentally European, hence "Western", at least since 1871?

Granted, these are very loose terms, but their use in discussions of "Westernizing" other countries is equally loose. The context in which the term "Western" was invoked a few posts back appeared to characterize a cultural and economic identity rather than a political alliance. If that interpretation is incorrect I'm sure the author of the post will clarify.

It's been that kind of Western since Charles the Great at least.
The only relevant East-West divide prior to Lenin was the persistence of serfdom (or a similar kind of lower class / caste) in Poland and Russia throughout and after the Enlightening. The Eastern European upper classes and urban population in general were in synch with France, Spain, England, Germany since about Peter the Great.

"Western" isn't a useful description for the pre-Iron Curtain period.

Dayuhan

08-04-2013, 02:42 AM

It's been that kind of Western since Charles the Great at least... The Eastern European upper classes and urban population in general were in synch with France, Spain, England, Germany since about Peter the Great.

That was the point I was trying to make, in response to the suggestion that Germany was "well on the road to Westernization" prior to WW2.

TheCurmudgeon

08-04-2013, 02:37 PM

I think you are confusing cause and effect. Communism and commercialism are both effects, not causes. Industrialization allows for modernization (broadly defined as a free-market economics, cosmopolitan society, and representative governments) but it is not essential. Many small cities and states managed the same thing through trade (Venice, the Dutch Republics). It is a large, stable economy that eventually allows for the general masses to enjoy the freedoms usually reserved for the wealthy in pre-modern societies.

Fuchs raises a good point that serfdom was only recently abolished in Russia at the time of their revolution which allows for communism to take root instead of capitalist republic. Society, or the culture, or however you want to term it (we should probably define some terms) was not primed for capitalism. There was still a strong client-patron relationship amongst the masses and the idea that the state would take care of them in an equitable fashion was easier to take then the idea that you are now free and hopelessly poor. In this case communism was a necessary intermediate stage to allow for modernization, and it only took about 80 years.

TheCurmudgeon

08-04-2013, 02:46 PM

08-05-2013, 12:33 PM

Here is an idea I would like to throw out to the general audience. Individual salvation as a primer for democracy.

I have a paper somewhere that argues that those "uncivilized" countries where protestantism was spread by English ministers were more successful in transitioning to democracy many decades later. I can't remember his argument as to why, but my argument would be that protestantism teaches a very rudimentary form of individualism - you, and only you, are responsible for getting into heaven. Catholicism does the same thing but it is more rule bound, fundamentally more "group" oriented (evangelical), and hierarchical. By implanting the idea of individual salvation it fostered the idea of individual worth and individualism in general.

Just a thought.

At a more fundamental level, I think the notion of salvation is tied to a notion of progress, which is, in turn, connected to how one views history. Folks seem to have two senses of the flow history (or the lack therof).
View one: History (and time) is linear--which tends to be a more Western view. Salvation becomes something that makes sense: one can progress through history and, perhaps, make things better, with salvation being an example of things getting better.
View two: History (and time) is circular. Here salvation makes little sense. If things just happen over and over again, progress is not possible; what you have is what you get. Why bother trying to change things?

Protestantism and Christianity in general subscribe to a linear view of history. However, personal salvation seems to be a red herring in the casual trail, if such casaulity actually exists, I suspect that another point about the apparent success of some colonies' transition to democracy may be more closely tied to the affinity of a colonized population with the so-called Protestant Work Ethic.

TheCurmudgeon

08-05-2013, 02:13 PM

However, personal salvation seems to be a red herring in the casual trail, if such casaulity actually exists, I suspect that another point about the apparent success of some colonies' transition to democracy may be more closely tied to the affinity of a colonized population with the so-called Protestant Work Ethic.

I do believe in causality but not in a simplistic way. I also think that Weber got the causal arrow backwards in "the Protestant Ethic". I think that those peoples who were more industrious preferred Protestantism if for no other reason than it allowed them to keep more of their profits since they did not have to pay the Papal taxes.

TheCurmudgeon

08-05-2013, 07:33 PM

OK, this is going to take a little more effort and will become a long term project.

However, what I have noticed is that each of the colonial powers (including the US) looked at the issue of how to deal with the indigenous population differently. The US had two models, internal and external. Internally we were interested in assimilation – forcing the indigenous population to become good American citizens (over their dead bodies if necessary). Externally, modernization did not become an issue until the start of the Cold War.

The French saw social change through the lens of their own revolutionary period (1789 -1871) and the related social revolution. They expected the peoples of Indochina to go through a smiliar transitional period (yet seemed to fight them tooth and nail when they tried).

The British seemed to simply view the locals as a lower form of life at least until the 1850s but from there on I am not sure. I have a book on sociological theory that talks about the odd dichotomy in British Social theory where there was one theory for them and another theory for everyone else in the world well into the twentieth century.

I am curious if anyone knows how the Germans and the Spanish viewed their colonial subjects in the period from 1850 to 1940. Was there any obligation based on sociological theories, or ethical obligation, to help their colonial subjects modernize?

TTucker54

08-06-2013, 01:06 AM

TTucker54

08-06-2013, 01:18 AM

Also regarding how the Germans might have viewed their colonial subjects. it might be helpful to review the Herero Rebellions and the Maji-Maji Rebellions.
It might also be helpful to re-look Eugene Fishers experiments during this time. For what its worth, the pot calling the kettle black? The British felt the Germans inept in its scramble for Colonial Empire but very effective at its Colonial Administration. I AM NOT agreeing or disagreeing, just offering fodder for you to work with. ))

ganulv

08-06-2013, 05:56 AM

Here is an idea I would like to throw out to the general audience. Individual salvation as a primer for democracy. […] By implanting the idea of individual salvation it fostered the idea of individual worth and individualism in general.

Maybe you are thinking of Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism? Weber was more interested in the origins of capitalism than of democracy, though, so maybe not.

TheCurmudgeon

08-06-2013, 11:33 AM

I am pretty sure I mentioned this somewhere else, but Weber was wrong. Catholics did not magically gain a work ethic because of a change in their confessional habits - those groups that converted to Protestantism because they already had a strong work ethic and wanted to keep more of what they made. They were avoiding Papal taxes. The individualist inclinations were already there. Think of them as the TEA party of the Late Renaissance.

Individual salvation plants the seed of an idea, that you have worth in Gods eyes and you are responsible for your own fate. A radical idea in some more communal societies, especially strongly caste societies where the entire justification of the horribly inequitable system is based (at least partially) on Gods design. Now the Catholics did a better job of using these ideas to justify the inequity - pay now, heaven later - it was all God's plan. There had been dissenters for a long time in Europe but they were always suppressed. The dissent was founded in the Roman Church's corruption and wasteful spending - on worldly matters. Once Luther opened the door people like Henry VIII jumped through it. People like Calvin came up with new ideas about how to please God which matched their own predilections.

Anyway, Weber was looking as a snapshot in time well after the transitional period. He opened a door to an idea that different parts of society may be interrelated, but he was wrong about cause and effect.

condottiere

08-06-2013, 12:04 PM

TheCurmudgeon

08-06-2013, 12:56 PM

My demographics are probably wrong, but northern Germany, Netherlands, England and Scandinavia just screams Anglo-Saxon. (And Danes, Jutes, Geats etcetera.)

Basically, people more used to autonomy and a tribal structure than ruled top down in an Imperial bureaucracy.

Doesn't quite gel with the entrepreneurial spirit of the Phoenicians, the Greeks, the Romans and supposedly the Jews.

I think you have the connection right. It is not the entrapeneurial spirit (See Greenfeld's "The Spirit of Capitalism (the spirit of capitalism)" which ties it to nationalism) but the individualistic spirit. I don't have enough of a background in the nature of the tribal history of that region but I have material that indicates the Brits had individualistic leanings at least back to the tenth century, so you may be on to something.

Dayuhan

08-06-2013, 01:01 PM

However, what I have noticed is that each of the colonial powers (including the US) looked at the issue of how to deal with the indigenous population differently. The US had two models, internal and external. Internally we were interested in assimilation – forcing the indigenous population to become good American citizens (over their dead bodies if necessary). Externally, modernization did not become an issue until the start of the Cold War.

The French saw social change through the lens of their own revolutionary period (1789 -1871) and the related social revolution. They expected the peoples of Indochina to go through a smiliar transitional period (yet seemed to fight them tooth and nail when they tried).

The British seemed to simply view the locals as a lower form of life at least until the 1850s but from there on I am not sure. I have a book on sociological theory that talks about the odd dichotomy in British Social theory where there was one theory for them and another theory for everyone else in the world well into the twentieth century.

There was often a very substantial difference in views of indigenous peoples between the home front of the colonial power, where there was often much noble and idealistic talk of spreading civilization and modernity, and among those members of the colonizing power who actually ran the colonies.

I am curious if anyone knows how the Germans and the Spanish viewed their colonial subjects in the period from 1850 to 1940. Was there any obligation based on sociological theories, or ethical obligation, to help their colonial subjects modernize?

The Spanish hadn't much empire left by 1850. The Philippines was largely autonomous in actual practice by that time, with the Spanish colonizers managing the affairs of the territory for their own benefit rather than according to any direction from the home country. Sociology, ethics, and modernization were not priorities.

ganulv

08-06-2013, 01:59 PM

The Spanish hadn't much empire left by 1850. The Philippines was largely autonomous in actual practice by that time, with the Spanish colonizers managing the affairs of the territory for their own benefit rather than according to any direction from the home country. Sociology, ethics, and modernization were not priorities.
I haven’t thought about the topic for a long time so my knowledge is rusty, but IIRC the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico were all quite distinct internally and in terms of their affairs with Spain during this period despite all falling under the umbrella term of “colonies.”

TheCurmudgeon

08-06-2013, 02:29 PM

If you have not read it yet, had you considered Reading Samuel Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies? It was written in 1968, updated in 1995 and essentially destroys Modernization Theory. The updated version has a good forward by Francis Fukuyama.

Modernization theory is like a Hydra – you cut off one head and it grows two more. It is based on a fundamental assumption that the West got something right because we “modernized” first. If we could just figure out what we got right we could shove it down the throats of the rest of the world and fix everything. That last sentence was only half in jest – it is a combination of pride in thinking we did it “right” first, hubris that we think everyone else wants what we have, and double-dog-dare hubris in believing we can recreate it at will. It is that base idea that keeps reviving the theory in a new form. The latest was functional-structural; if you create the institutions and allow them to function the rest will follow.

I am trying to show that the entire idea of is off base, but I need to do a lot more research.

TheCurmudgeon

08-08-2013, 08:40 PM

Also regarding how the Germans might have viewed their colonial subjects. it might be helpful to review the Herero Rebellions and the Maji-Maji Rebellions.
It might also be helpful to re-look Eugene Fishers experiments during this time. ))

Thanks for the information. After a little more research it was interesting to see how the attitudes and activities during that period well before WWI were recreated in the Nazi ideology, including conducting medical experiments on a population deemed eugenically inferior. Another country-specific response to how to deal with unruly indigenous peoples.

TheCurmudgeon

08-09-2013, 01:04 AM

This is a short excerpt out of a paper on modernization. What I find interesting is that most of the factors listed at the end of the quote can also be associate with individualistic societies and those associated with "traditional" societies can be associated with collectivist societies.

Most modernization theorists have opted instead for a second method, choosing to set their definitions within the larger conceptual framework provided by the ‘dichotomous’ approach. Nowhere is the influence of nineteenth century evolutionary theory more evident than here. Through the device of ideal-type contrasts between attributes of tradition and modernity, modernization theorists have done little more than to summarize with the assistance of Parsons’ pattern variables and some ethnographic updating, earlier efforts by men such as Maine, Tönnies, Durkheim, and others in the evolutionary tradition to conceptualize the transformation of societies in terms of a transition between polar types of the status-contract, Gemeinshaft-Gesellschaft variety. Modernization, then, becomes a transition, or rather a series of transitions from primitive, substance economies to technology-intensive, industrialized economies; from [political] subject to participant political cultures; from closed, ascriptive status systems to open, achievement oriented systems; from extended to nuclear kinship units; from religious to secular ideologies; and so on. Thus conceived, modernization is not simply a change, but one which is defined in terms of the goals toward which it is moving.

Tipps, Dean C. (1973). “Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 51(2), 199-226 (Citations omitted, emphasis added)

TheCurmudgeon

08-09-2013, 01:17 PM

My working outline.

1. introduction/purpose
2. Modernization Theory and Policy – Why should I care
a. History
b. Types
c. Influence in American Policy
3. Modernization Theory Failures
a. Vietnam
b. Iraq/Afghanistan
4. Modernization – What is really happening?
a. Newer theories – value shifts
b. No magic bullet
c. A perfect world – assimilation.
d. Reality – a long, tough road.
5. What can and can’t be done … or COIN, it’s not just Genocide anymore.
a. The world since WWII
b. The Limitations of Force
c. The Limitations of Assistance

Would be interested in other historical examples of failures, primarily intereted in post WWII time frame.

jmm99

08-09-2013, 05:37 PM

Using Dobbins' multiple monographs as a checklist, I'd pick Haiti as a good example of multiple failures; perhaps also Somalia (although how much "modernization" was actually done there ?). Congo must rank in there somewhere ("Gazing in the Congo (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2129)" certainly gets enough views here).

Some Dobbins RAND stuff:

America's Role in Nation-Building - From Germany to Iraq (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753.html)

After the War - Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG716.html)

The UN's Role in Nation-Building - From the Congo to Iraq (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG304.html)

Europe's Role in Nation-Building - From the Balkans to the Congo (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG722.html)

Building a More Resilient Haitian State (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1039.html)

Regards

Mike

Madhu

08-09-2013, 06:09 PM

My working outline.

Would be interested in other historical examples of failures, primarily intereted in post WWII time frame.

Curmudgeon - you might want to look at the work of Nils Gilman, much discussed here and elsewhere:

Because it provided the dominant framework for "development" of poor, postcolonial countries, modernization theory ranks among the most important constructs of twentieth-century social science. In Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America Nils Gilman offers the first intellectual history of a movement that has had far-reaching and often unintended consequences.

After a survey of the theory's origins and its role in forming America's postwar sense of global mission, Gilman offers a close analysis of the people who did the most to promote it in the United States and the academic institutions they came to dominate. He first explains how Talcott Parsons at Harvard constructed a social theory that challenged the prevailing economics-centered understanding of the modernization process, then describes the work of Edward Shils and Gabriel Almond in helping Parsonsian ideas triumph over other alternative conceptions of the development process, and finally discusses the role of Walt Rostow and his colleagues at M.I.T. in promoting modernization theory during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. By connecting modernization theory to the welfare state liberalism programs of the New Deal order, Gilman not only provides a new intellectual context for America's Third World during the Cold War, but also connects the optimism of the Great Society to the notion that American power and good intentions could stop the postcolonial world from embracing communism.

http://www.amazon.com/books/dp/0801886333

And the outline provided in this Melton paper here at SWJ:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/aligning-fm-3-24-counterinsurgency-with-reality

Aligning FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency with Reality
The “U.S. in the Lead” COIN Approach Usually Fails Where Security Force Assistance Could Succeed

And there are other models discussed here, the SWORD model and I believe jmm99 has attempted to put together an outline of conflict such as the Melton paper.

I also asked on a SWC thread that I started about the origin of the term "capacity building" and when it started showing up doctrinally.

It seems that the "system" cannot think outside a few dated models which entail attempts at reengineering societies and this includes the civilian national security apparatus.

For instance, when did development become the main emphasis of State's diplomacy?

TheCurmudgeon

08-09-2013, 06:11 PM

JMM,

Thanks

I was just on the Rand site today pulling down stuff.

I realized that I needed to add another section on what Modernization was not. Modernization is not Nation-Building as defined in Rand's "The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building” which

…involves the use of armed forces as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors.
That is pretty close, but it is self limiting by only dealing with economic and political reforms. It may be that people assume that those reforms are the triggers to full blown modernization, but I will deal with that elsewhere. Also the intent seems to be stabilization not modernization – you could ensure peace internally and with its neighbors without trying to turn it into a western democracy.

Likewise, it is not Democratization since that only deals with a specific political transition to democracy. Modernization is a complete change in the social structure as noted in one of my earlier posts.

I will dig though the material and see if I find conflict between the claimed definition and the reality of the operations.

TheCurmudgeon

08-09-2013, 06:21 PM

Madhu,

"Mandarins..." in on its way – gotta love Amazon. I hope to have it today and will delve into it this weekend.

I will look over Milton’s piece. I have to admit I have not seen it before. I do like the idea of a lighter footprint where possible.

While my working title was “How to keep Modernization Theory from killing your Soldiers (or Marines, Airmen, and Sailors)” I may actually try to turn it on its head and use it to argue that attempting a limited change to either the economic or political system will not work without a complete realignment of the social structure – therefore limit your effort to what is needed and let the rest take its natural course. This is actually pretty dangerous since only a limited number of transitions have not involved multiple revolts and coups. Perhaps there are ways to limit the damage, but that one is beyond me.

As for your question, I don't think "development" was ever the true aim of the policy. My guess is that it first came about after WWII in response to communism. Development is code for freemarket capitalism first and democracy second. That was largely how Modernization got its big push in America. Reading the stuff on Modernization's application in the US it is almost as if we invented the idea in the 1950's even though it had been part of sociology in Europe since the mid 1800's.

Madhu, chech out "Partner Nation Capacity Building: Setting Conditions for Success (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-23/ch_2.asp)" for a short history of Capacity Building.

Madhu

08-10-2013, 05:46 PM

Madhu, chech out "Partner Nation Capacity Building: Setting Conditions for Success" for a short history of Capacity Building.

Thanks, I ran across that resource when I was searching for the modernization, CORDS, FM3-24 Council post I started. My understanding is that a lot of this stuff about capacity building as a sort of core military objective in preventing instability in states is very much tied to the UN definition from the 90's and 90's era peacekeeping. At any rate, something happened in the 90's to make this language more prominent. I think, I'd love to see a proper study. Maybe I'm wrong.

Another "model" you might be interested in is the following:

By Gian Gentile
Best Defense counterininsurgency critic

In general terms I would deconstruct the manual as it is now and break the singular link that it has with a certain theory of state building (known as population centric COIN). Once broken up I would then rewrite the doctrine from the ground up with three general parts: 1) would be a counterinsurgency approach centered on post-conflict reconstruction; 2) would be a counterinsurgency approach centered around military action to attack insurgent sources of military power (sometimes referred to as counter-terror or CT), but not linked to an endstate of a rebuilt or newly built nation state; 3) would be a counterinsurgency approach -- perhaps call it COIN light -- that would focus largely on Special Forces with some limited conventional army support conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

The trick with this revised manual would be to present doctrinal alternatives for the U.S. Army when it goes about the countering of insurgencies and conducting stability operations with teeth. The trifecta trick would be to treat these three methods of countering insurgencies as operationally equal; that is to say, we would move away from the dogmatic belief currently held that anytime an insurgency is fought it must be of the population centric (FM 3-24, aka state building) persuasion, and that methods of CT and FID are subsumed within it and hence are seen as "lesser" operations. To reemphasize the key here is operational equality of the respective three.

Lastly, with regard to part one and the countering of an insurgency through post-conflict reconstruction which would invariably have the quality of state building to it, I would completely demolish the theory of population centric, hearts and minds COIN that FM 3-24 is currently built on, and update that part of the manual with much more current social science theory and better uses of history. Example is the really quite simplistic chart in FM 3-24 that depicts the population of "ANY" insurgency as 10% hardcore insurgents, 10% on the government's side, and the remaining 80% of the population malleable and shapeable and just waiting to have their hearts and minds won over by the counterinsurgent force. That kind of conception of populations in insurgency has not proven itself in history, nor do I think in current practice. After returning from west Baghdad in late 2006 as a Cavalry Squadron commander and witnessing firsthand Iraq's viscous and bloody sectarian civil war, when I first saw that FM 3-24 diagram I said to myself "shoot, only one line in it should be drawn across the middle with Shia on the top and Sunni on the bottom." The point here is to emphasize the limits of winning hearts and minds of a population at the barrel of a gun and to create a better, more sophisticated understanding of populations and societal motivation and actions in insurgencies and civil wars.

Next step after 3-24 is deconstructed and rewritten would be the much more difficult task of delinking the FM 3-24 style of counterinsurgency as it exists today, with its broader permeating effects not only on the Army, but on the greater defense and policy establishment as well.

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/15/gentile_how_i_would_revise_the_armys_counterinsurg ency_manual

Over the years, I've collected various proposals on how to think about counterinsurgency from a third party expeditionary point of view. Some proposals view appropriate responses in a completely different way and somehow this is missed in the conversation. All of these are proposal about countering an insurgency, it is just looked at from a different lens, one where appropriate responses from the US include less maximalist solutions.

I sometimes think this is missed because of discussion on the myth of the Savior General, it's entwined with that myth and a part of it, yet, separate too. This is why I also get irritated when people don't take time to look at US history in South Asia in the immediate post WWII period. After partition or their respective Independence, as India and Pakistan began building their new nations, we and the UK and UN were very much involved. For some reason we keep forgetting. This forgetting was carried forward into NATO's approach toward nation building in Afghanistan, IMO. That is why I say, "hey, if you are interested in nation building why aren't you interested in this very interesting US history of assistance?"

Took me a long time to figure that out, though.

TheCurmudgeon

08-10-2013, 08:05 PM

It was interesting to see that Gentile had anything constructive to say. Almost everything I have seen from his was simply a biased attack on counterinsurgency. It's nice to see a constructive comment.

You should write something. It seems you have collected a fair amount of material. You should write something. I would read it.:D

I think that the American military makes some fundamental errors in trying to define itself and its mission. Most of these are a reflection of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. First, we try to find the biggest threat and prepare for it rather than look to what our political masters are most likely to ask us to do. This leads us to look for near peer competitors even where they really don't exist. Second, we look to history for examples rather than realizing that the world fundamentally changed after the creation of the UN. We don't have the freedom to take certain actions or use certain tactics that were part and parcel of the war prior to that point. Finally, we fail to realize that in many of the far reaches of the world we are the only organization that works. Yeah, democracy is great, but it is not really the best way to conduct operations, or perhaps even run a country.

TheCurmudgeon

08-10-2013, 09:49 PM

By Gian Gentile
Best Defense counterininsurgency critic

In general terms I would deconstruct the manual as it is now and break the singular link that it has with a certain theory of state building (known as population centric COIN). Once broken up I would then rewrite the doctrine from the ground up with three general parts: 1) would be a counterinsurgency approach centered on post-conflict reconstruction; 2) would be a counterinsurgency approach centered around military action to attack insurgent sources of military power (sometimes referred to as counter-terror or CT), but not linked to an endstate of a rebuilt or newly built nation state; 3) would be a counterinsurgency approach -- perhaps call it COIN light -- that would focus largely on Special Forces with some limited conventional army support conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

OK, so I still don't like Gentile. First, number 1 is not COIN. COIN and post-conflict reconstruction are not synonymous. 2. Assumes the insurgency has reached the point of civil war. Afghan insurgency often never gets to this level, although specific operations clearly meet the criteria. Iraq I leave to others to debate. 3. I prefer but... and it is the big but ... none of these attemept to determine why the insurgency is occurring. They are tactical solutions to strategic problems. This puts us right back to where we started. They are no solution at all.

TheCurmudgeon

09-12-2013, 06:12 PM

OK, I am back on this project although it has morphed. The following two paragraphs are critical to understanding my arguments so I am looking for input. I am hoping that they can stand alone, but if you need the build up to them it includes a description of human pre-state (pre-civilization) society and how that society changed after humans were able to produce a surplus of food on a regular basis. The ultimate goal is to show that different forms of government are the appropirate adaptations for differing "environmental" conditions.

It is common to say that society evolved. Tribal societies are seen as “primitive” while “modern” societies are seen as more “advanced”. This is a misnomer. It creates the impression that humans have evolved over the last few thousand years – that the remaining hunter-gatherers and nomads are a lesser form of human being even thought they have passed through the same number of generations as any other group of people on the planet. The truth is that neither society nor the humans who created it have evolved. The humans have adapted to their environment. A resource rich environment allows for a higher population density and provides greater opportunity than a resource scarce environment. The higher population combined with resource availability provides the potential for greater specialization and technological advancement. Technological advances solve the problems of human survival. They meet the needs of the human society. Each of these technological advances creates a new environment for each succeeding generation. Each of these changes results in additional adaptations that are reflected in changes in society. All of these adaptations are intended to help the members of the society meet their needs. The needs of the population do not change, but the ones that are left unfulfilled – the ones that are most important to the population – change with the population density, resource availability, and each technological advance.

Let me provide an example. Two children are born in the year 1990: one to an Amazonian tribal group and one to an American family in Fairfax, Virginia. The Amazonian child will grow up in an environment where food is not consistent, disease is common, the jungle is full of peril, and it is likely that at least one or more of his siblings will not grow to adulthood. Members of the Amazonian tribal group are deeply dependent on each other and the child grows up with an appreciation of that dependence. The needs this child is most concerned with are basic survival and security needs and his society is designed to fulfill those needs. The American child grows up in a world free from want for what he needs to survive. He will most likely never be concerned with his next meal and never thinks that any of his brothers or sisters will not live to a ripe old age. Most of his concerns revolve around his individual identity. He is not truly dependent on anyone other than his parents and does not grow up reliant on anyone. In his environment, individual autonomy is the need he is most likely to be concerned with and his society is designed to fulfill that need. When seen this way it becomes evident that society has not evolved. It has adapted to fulfill the needs that are most important to its population. It has adapted to maximize its need fulfillment of its population based on the environment the society inherits.

condottiere

09-12-2013, 08:38 PM

I think the real difference would be a larger pool of identities that someone from a more advanced society could choose from, singular, multiple or combined, whether it's political, social, ethnic, religious or by association, that could be introduced through family, community, education, military service, internet or travel.

Someone born to an Amazon tribe wouldn't normally have the opportunity to sample that variety, and someone from North Korea would find their choices very carefully curtailed by their government.

ganulv

09-12-2013, 10:16 PM

The American child grows up in a world free from want for what he needs to survive. He will most likely never be concerned with his next meal and never thinks that any of his brothers or sisters will not live to a ripe old age. Most of his concerns revolve around his individual identity. He is not truly dependent on anyone other than his parents and does not grow up reliant on anyone. In his environment, individual autonomy is the need he is most likely to be concerned with and his society is designed to fulfill that need.

You will need to be strict with how you operationalize ‘individual,’ ‘identity,’ and ‘autonomy.’ One of the frustrations you see voiced time and time again in the documentation left by European colonial administrators amounts to a complaint about how individualistic the natives are. As Father Paul Le Juene said in the 17th century in a rant so insightful and hilarious that I refuse to do it damage by translation:

Il n’y a rien de si difficile que de régler les peuples de l'Amérique. Tous ces Barbares ont le droict des asnes sauuages: ils naissent, viuent et meurent dans vne liberté sans retenuë; ils ne sçauent que c’est de bride ni de caueçon; c’est vne grande risée parmi eux de dompter ses passions, et vne haute Philosophie d'accorder à ses sens tout ce qu’ils désirent.

jmm99

09-13-2013, 12:10 AM

Quebec Seminary administrator - oui !

The full context (what your omitted fore and aft of your quote) is provided us in the Jesuit Relations, Vol. XII Qubec 1637 (Thwaites trans. Creighton (http://puffin.creighton.edu/jesuit/relations/relations_12.html)):

[191] CHAPTER XIII.

OF THE ORDER OBSERVED IN THE SEMINARY, AND SOME PARTICULARS RELATING TO THE SEMINARISTS.

HERE is nothing so difficult as to control the tribes of America. All these Barbarians have the law of wild asses,they are born, live, and die in a liberty without restraint; they do not know what is meant by bridle or bit. With them, to conquer one's passions is considered a great joke, while to give free rein to the senses is a lofty Philosophy. The Law of our Lord is far removed from this dissoluteness; it gives us boundaries and prescribes limits, outside of which we cannot step without offending God and reason. Now it is very hard to place this yoke, although it is very mild and easy, upon the necks of people who make a profession of not submitting to anything, either in heaven or upon earth; I say it is very hard, but not impossible. In fact, I am convinced that it is beyond the power and skill of men, but that it is very easy to God. [192] We are astonished to see how wild young men, accustomed to follow their own caprices, place themselves under subjection, with so much meekness, that there seems to be nothing so pliant as a Huron Seminarist.

In 1637-1638, the primary civil administrators (besides the governor and his limited staff) were Nicolas Marsolet, King's Agent at Tadoussac (DCB bio - English (http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/marsolet_de_saint_aignan_nicolas_1E.html)); and Olivier le Tardif, Head Clerk for the Cent-Associes at Quebec (DCB bio - English (http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/letardif_olivier_1E.html)). Their "trick" in administering the Indians was not to administer them. W.W. Rostow "modernization" - or de Lautey-Galliani "colonialization" - would have been quite foreign to them. And, yes, both Marsolet and le Tardif were among my ancestors.

A more impartial view of the French civil regime's generally "hands off" policy is found in Desmond H. Brown, "They Do Not Submit Themselves To The Kings Law: Amerindians and Criminal Justice During the French Regime" (Manitoba Law Journal, vol. 28, no. 3 (http://robsonhall.ca/mlj/content/volume-28-no-3); there used to be a free pdf online), which sums up the situation:

The early progression from participation in the North Atlantic fishery to monopoly in the fur trade and its subsequent rapid and lucrative expansion, caused French dominion in North America to evolve into an empire of trade. But it was an empire that needed few French subjects to function. The bulk of the work was done by the Aboriginal peoples. It was they who gathered the pelts and transported them to the French entrepots, and who also became valued military allies.

This was fortunate for successive trading companies who founded and administered the first settlements, as well as for later royal governments, because the attention of French monarchs was focused on Europe and the endemic Continental warfare of the time. The French were always thin on the ground. They never had the military muscle to overawe the Amerindians and force them to submit to French sovereignty nor, in particular, to French criminal justice. Nor were they able to convince them to comply with it by argument or example.

As a result, there was no change in the legal status of Amerindians during the French regime. They continued to be governed by their own law in all intra-tribal offences and, with the rare exceptions that proved the rule, in crimes that involved Amerindians and French subjects, with restitution as the means for settlement.

The favored method for resolving collisions between French and Indian justice was reparations, particulary after a 1684 case (p.28):

It is thus evident that accepting or making restitution for offences committed by or against Amerindians in French settlements along the St. Lawrence was becoming customary in the mid-seventeenth century. This practice also came to be followed at French military posts in the pays den haut later in the regime. It became the rule after two Natives, a Chippewa and a Menomimee, were executed at Michilimackinic in 1684 for killing two Frenchmen.

The incident is analyzed in detail by R. White who follows the lengthy and tortuous negotiations between the French and the tribal councils. He makes clear the failure of the French to comprehend the imperatives of Amerindian justice and the purpose of restitution on the one hand and, on the other, the incredulity of the tribesmen when they were made to understand that French justice demanded a life for a life, even if the accused was an ally in an ongoing war. In short, the affair came close to sundering friendly relations between the French and the Natives of the area, even after the French made liberal restitution to the tribes when the consequences of their action became clear.

After this, and surrounded by the Native presence, post commanders who dispensed justice to their fellow subjects were not eager to observe the letter of French law in their dealings with the Natives. As White then goes on to demonstrate, French authority in the area subsequently worked to find some middle ground to settle incidents of this kind. Nevertheless, whatever compromises were negotiated invariably conformed to the Amerindian pattern of conflict resolution: restitution rather than retribution.

This seems to have usually worked, with the Colonial Troops acting more as policemen (less as soldiers) and where negotiation had to be their strength. From the Michigan Historical Collection (link (http://www.gbl.indiana.edu/archives/miamis6/M14-22_19a.html)):

Letter from Vaudreuil
(October 12, 1717)
Vaudreuil, "On the Savages of Detroit" in: Michigan Historical Collections, XXXIII, pp. 590-593.

pp. 592, 593.

(page 592) .....

The trouble which prevented the principal chiefs of the Detroit tribes from coming, to Montreal, was created by an Outaouac of that post and four others from Saguinan. These five men pretended they were going to war against the Flatheads; they proceeded to the river of the Miamis and there slew an Iroquois and his wife, who was a Miami woman, and two children.

This wrongful attack concerns the Iroquois because the (page 593) man who was killed was of their tribe. It also concerns the Miamis, for the man was married and living with them. This matter must be settled, and the Iroquois and Miamis must be prevented from taking vengeance on the Outavois and the other tribes of Detroit.

The Sr. de Tonty has already begun, for his part, to take action with the Miamis through the Sr. de Vincennes to dissuade them from their intention of avenging themselves and to remove every pretext for their pursuing this course which would give rise to a war between them and the people at Detroit and Saguinan, which it would be difficult to stop. He has induced the tribes of Detroit to join him in sending to Saguinan to seize these murderers and deliver them up to the Miamis.

The Outaouacs and Poutouatamis each sent a boat of their men, to which the Sr. de Tonty added a boat of Frenchmen under the command of the Sr. de Bragelongue, a Lieutenant, who brought back the three murderers to Detroit where the Sr. de Tonty had them under guard until he received news from the Miamis, to whom he had taken care, to make known the amends, which it was proposed to make to them.

He hopes that they will be satisfied with this action and will accept as a complete reparation the presents which the tribes of Detroit, and the French also, are preparing to make them, and that this disturbance may be suppressed by this means. I hope so, too; but I shall not be able to get any news about it until next spring.

Unfortunately, I was unable to find the rest of the story. If the reparations offer were accepted, the three Indians would have been freed and a blood feud between four Indian groups would have been avoided. Etienne de Bragelongue was later promoted to capitaine and commanded his own company at Fort Chambly (near Montreal), where he was aide-major.

Adding another arrow favorable to the French civil regime's "hands-off" position: MacLeod, The Exercise of Power by the Amerindians of the Great Lakes during the War of the Austrian Succession, 1744-1748 (http://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/en/bitstream/handle/10393/7596/NN85836.PDF?sequence=1) (1992, 210 pp.).

Regards

Mike

ganulv

09-13-2013, 12:57 AM

were of a piece.

We are astonished to see how wild young men, accustomed to follow their own caprices, place themselves under subjection, with so much meekness, that there seems to be nothing so pliant as a Huron Seminarist.

Struggling to maintain a Jesuit presence amongst the Huron living as permanent guests of the Seneca and with 35 years of hindsight on his side, Father Garneir in his letter in the 56th Relation notes that:

The spiritual interests of these Missions depend largely on temporal affairs, and above all on the state of men’s minds regarding the peace with the French. The elders of the village of Gandachiorágon had declared to me, in a council called for the purpose, that they wished to adopt the custom of praying to God, and indeed some began to do so; and, although I could not yet see therein any great beginnings of faith, yet their example induced the people to give me a hearing, and procured for me entire freedom in visiting and instructing the sick. But rumors of the approach of a French army soon undid these small beginnings. The people’s minds being ill prepared, the demon used the opportunity to make them speak against the faith and against its preachers. An old man who came some years ago from [Cayuga],—a mischief-maker, but a persuasive speaker, able to do what he will with our [Seneca], and passing among them for a prodigy of wisdom,—is wont to demonstrate to them that the faith makes people die. He cites whole families who embraced it in times past, when the late Father Ménard, Apostolic Missionary, was sojourning at [Cayuga]—families, of whom, he says, not one soul is now left. He adds that the black-gowned men are here only as spies, and convey all information to Onnontio,—that is, to Monsieur the Governor; or that they are sorcerers, who effect by disease what Onnontio cannot accomplish by his arms. I know with certainty that my death has been proposed, on the ground that I am a spy, and more or less a sorcerer; and that our host himself, Onnonkenritaoui, the most influential Chief of this great Nation, has often proposed to his sister to kill me as a sorcerer, when she declared to him her great distrust of me because of her daughter’s frequent fits of sickness. As I do not retire as early as is their wont, and as I spend a considerable part of the evening praying in the Chapel, they are persuaded that I cannot be otherwise engaged during that time than in communing with some evil spirit, and plotting with him the ruin of their family. Thus, humanly speaking, my life depends on that little girl’s health; and I would run great risk of losing it, were she to die. I would also have equal cause for alarm if probable tidings reached us of the march of a French army to this country,—a number of men having assured me in advance that, in that case, they would certainly brain me.

TheCurmudgeon

09-13-2013, 02:32 AM

You will need to be strict with how you operationalize ‘individual,’ ‘identity,’ and ‘autonomy.’ One of the frustrations you see voiced time and time again in the documentation left by European colonial administrators amounts to a complaint about how individualistic the natives are. As Father Paul Le Juene said in the 17th century in a rant so insightful and hilarious that I refuse to do it damage by translation:

I will work to clarify that. Autonomy is a specific need, like physiological or security needs. That is clarified elsewhere.

I am sure that, compared to the strict social structure of per-revolutionary France, the Native Americans appeared to be free as birds.

jmm99

09-13-2013, 03:31 AM

You can quote 10,000 statements by Jesuits and other religious administrators about Indians - which boiled down to the difficulties in converting them and keeping them on the "right path".

The French regime's civil administrators in Quebec and the Great Lakes (where civil and military administration were often combined) often disliked the missionaries; and as amply proved, followed a "hands off" policy. That doesn't mean there were no nasty altercations with Indians, the Iroquois being front and foremost until just after 1700. The Fox in the Great Lakes were another avowed French-Canadian enemy. Both were enemies because the French-Canadians formed early alliances with Indian groups that were at war with either the Iroquois or Fox. More than one of my geneological entries has "tue par les Iroquois" for cause of death. Militarily, both sides gave as well as they took.

The Jesuits tended to catch it from both sides. The French-Canadians knew the Jesuits would do anything for the greater glory of God and obtaining converts; and the Quebec civil and military establishments were far down the Jesuits' list of priorities. Many Indians would have shared to some extent the Iroquois sentiments that you quote:

He adds that the black-gowned men are here only as spies, and convey all information to Onnontio,—that is, to Monsieur the Governor; or that they are sorcerers, who effect by disease what Onnontio cannot accomplish by his arms. I know with certainty that my death has been proposed, on the ground that I am a spy, and more or less a sorcerer; and that our host himself, Onnonkenritaoui, the most influential Chief of this great Nation, has often proposed to his sister to kill me as a sorcerer, when she declared to him her great distrust of me because of her daughter’s frequent fits of sickness.

As to Garnier's "rumor of war", a French army advancing, I'm not aware of any French attacks in 1672. An uneasy truce was in effect then. But, I did some research and found this, Temporary Peace (http://susquehannock.net/_engl/history/13_temporary_peace.htm) (by Francis Jennings):

... in 1672 France and England joined in war against the Netherlands. In the same year Canada and New York suppressed the feud between the Mohawks and the Mahicans. When the Mahicans proposed an expedition against the Mohawks, the French rejected it. The Mohawks heard of the proposal and ran to Albany. "We have accepted the peace which has been made by you people," they said. "Speak with the Mahikanders so that they come and do as we do." Albany's magistrates promised to "take care that the peace will remain steadfast" and to "force the Mahikanders to come here," continuing with the promise of explicit sanctions: "if they come to slay one of you, then they will see that they will have to deal with us, and we will revenge it." Peace ensued. It was indeed so reliable a peace that Mohawks could afford to get roaring drunk in Albany and stagger back home along paths formerly overrun by Mahican bushwhackers. On the French side, missionary Father Lamberville thought it was a "baleful peace" that created such opportunities for continued drunkenness, but Governor Frontenac enforced it. Thus the Indian allies of France's colony and England's colony were pacified immediately when the empires leagued.[64]

The alliance between Stuart and Bourbon was not matched by amity between Stuart and Calvert. Intermittent and desultory war continued between James Stuart's Iroquois and Charles Calvert's Susquehannock's, to the apparent disadvantage of the Iroquois. In 1672 a war party of Senecas and Cayugas was routed by equal numbers of Susquehannock adolescents. In 1673 the Iroquois appealed for help from their new friends in Canada; they "earnestly exhorted" Governor Frontenac to assist them against the Susquehannock's because "it would be a shame for him to allow his children to be crushed, as they saw themselves about to be . . . they not having the means of going to attack [the Susquehannock's] in their fort, which was very strong, nor even of defending themselves if the others came to attack them in their villages." Frontenac put them off without a commitment, and the odds are long that he did not arm them covertly: first, because it was no time for the French to be meddling with Indian conflicts deep within English territory; secondly, because Frontenac's government was suffering from an acute shortage of munitions for its own defense, as he reported to France in November, 1674.[65]

This is a significant date. According to the usual sort of comment about the Susquehannock's, they are supposed to have been badly beaten by the Iroquois sometime between 1672 and 1675. We have seen what shape the Iroquois were in until 1672. The French records make it clear that the Iroquois could not possibly have launched a successful attack before July, 1673, when they met with Frontenac; and they could not have obtained any considerable supply of arms from the French thereafter through November, 1674. Even if we suspect Frontenac of wanting to arm the Iroquois clandestinely, we must conclude that he could not have done so through the winter of 1674/1675; because of the winter freeze on the St. Lawrence, it was impossible for Frontenac's appeal for an arms shipment from France to be answered before the spring thaw. The importance of all this arises from the fact that the Susquehannock's abandoned their old village and fort on the Susquehanna River in February, 1675, to retire into Maryland.[66] Assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the retirement had been forced by Iroquois pressure the Iroquois would have had to get arms from somewhere besides Canada. Was it Albany, then? There are excellent reasons for rejecting this possibility also, but they must be seen as part of the whole pattern of events at Chesapeake and Delaware bays.[66]

Notes:

64 Treaty minutes, Albany, 23 July, 1672, Livingston Indian Records, pp. 35-37; Jean Dc Lamberville, "Relation of 1672-73," Jesuit Relations 57: p. 81.

65 Pierre Raffeix, June, 1672, Jesuit Relations 56: pp. 55-57; Frontenac's journal, 17-18 July 1673, N. V. Col. Does. 9: pp. 108, 110-111; Frontenac to Colbert, 14 Nov., 1674, ibid. 9: pp. 116117.

66 Minutes, 19 Feb., 1675, Md. Arch. (Upper House) 2: pp. 428-429.

From all that, we can conclude that Garnier was not in the know about the true state of Quebec-Iroquois civil and military relations in 1672.

Creighton is a good source for the JR in English, The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents 1610 to 1791 (http://puffin.creighton.edu/jesuit/relations/).

Regards

Mike

ganulv

09-13-2013, 05:03 AM

Creighton is a good source for the JR in English, The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents 1610 to 1791 (http://puffin.creighton.edu/jesuit/relations/).

Yes, I know them well.

As for Jennings, whose work I also know well and do respect:

"it would be a shame for him to allow his children to be crushed, as they saw themselves about to be . . . they not having the means of going to attack [the Susquehannock's] in their fort, which was very strong, nor even of defending themselves if the others came to attack them in their villages."I have been to the site of said fort—and anyone who has crossed the Susquehanna on the Wrights Ferry Bridge has come practically within sight of it—and it is an imposing location.

The importance of all this arises from the fact that the Susquehannock's abandoned their old village and fort on the Susquehanna River in February, 1675, to retire into Maryland.I have been to their settlement site on the Potomac, too. It’s visible from the front lawn of Mount Vernon, unbeknownst to almost all of the visitors there.

Assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the retirement had been forced by Iroquois pressure the Iroquois would have had to get arms from somewhere besides Canada. Was it Albany, then? There are excellent reasons for rejecting this possibility also, but they must be seen as part of the whole pattern of events at Chesapeake and Delaware bays.Connecticut is another possibility. Regardless, we are able to say with some confidence via the archaeological record that the Iroquois were in possession of firearms aplenty prior to 1674. The data published in The Rochester Museum and Science Center’s Proceedings of the 1984 Trade Gun Conference makes this clear.

The French regime's civil administrators in Quebec and the Great Lakes (where civil and military administration were often combined) often disliked the missionaries; and as amply proved, followed a "hands off" policy. That doesn't mean there were no nasty altercations with IndiansHands off of the missionaries because they needed them; hands off of the Indians because of resource and manpower limitations.

the Iroquois being front and foremost until just after 1700.La Grande Paix (http://www.pacmusee.qc.ca/en/exhibitions/1701-the-great-peace-of-montreal) was in 1701, to be precise.

As to Garnier's "rumor of war", a French army advancing, I'm not aware of any French attacks in 1672. An uneasy truce was in effect then. […] From all that, we can conclude that Garnier was not in the know about the true state of Quebec-Iroquois civil and military relations in 1672.He certainly knew full well that the de Tracy expedition had burned the Mohawk settlements six years prior, as did his Seneca hosts, and Québec did not mind that the threat hung in the air.

And it was not as if he or the Iroquois had UAVs feeding them intelligence about troop movements, so I would not say that Garnier lacked knowledge of the French/Iroquois relationship so much as that his letter reflects its fraught and fluid nature. (Frontenac assembled an expedition that would burn the Seneca settlements fifteen years subsequent to Garnier’s letter, a second and particularly devastating expedition against the Mohawk six years after that, and another that destroyed the Onondaga and Oneida settlements three years after that one. That he never mounted one against the Cayuga is a testament to their geographic location as much as anything else.) Rumors on the vast and tense colonial frontier are of a different quality than lunchroom gossip. Greg Dowd (http://www.lsa.umich.edu/ac/people/americanculturefaculty/ci.dowdgregorye_ci.detail) has done some excellent work on the topic.

jmm99

09-13-2013, 05:48 AM

because they needed them ..." Well, sort of.

The Quebec civil and military authorities needed the co-operation of the Church. So, the civil and military not only tolerated the missionaries, but put up with them on expeditions, and with their often counter-productive conversion programs. The 1660-1663 expedition to Lake Superior could have done without the headaches caused by the "late Father Menard, Apostolic Missionary" (cited by Garnier). By then, the power of the Church had increased after Bishop Laval was installed in Quebec (1659).

Your last two paragraphs are not material to 1672. Six years before 1672 is not 1672; 15 years after 1672 is not 1672. Garnier wrote bad history for 1672, which is the point I made.

Greg Dowd: I thank him for his services re:

2001-2006. Tribal history research for the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians and Grand Traverse Bay Ottawa and Chippewa. Completed a four-hundred page report on the importance of an 1836 treaty stipulation in preparation for a federal Indian law case. (October, 2004). Completed 70+ page rebuttals of reports of nations‟ adversaries (January, 2005). Submitted to 21 hours of deposition (April, 2005). U.S. District Judge Richard Enslen signed consent decree favourable to tribes on Nov. 5, 2007, in which the State of Michigan agreed that the tribal treaty rights remain intact.

Regards

Mike

TheCurmudgeon

09-15-2013, 12:01 AM

Sorry for the stray comment, but I remember someone once commenting on another thread about good governance NOT being a reason to go to war - that the efficiency of the government was not a critical factor with the populations satisfaction with the government. Does anyone want to admit to that thought or elaborate on it? I think that idea will be most helpful here.

TheCurmudgeon

09-21-2013, 08:05 PM

Another passage - a precursor to the discussion on adaptation versus evolution.

Let me start with a generic discussion. All animals evolve to solve the problems of life. They evolve to be able to survive and reproduce. Evolution sets the basic rules for all animals. It sets out whether they breathe in air or in water, what food they eat, what temperatures they can endure, how they interact with each other. On top of these rules are adaptations – specific ways animals find to solve the problems of survival in their specific environment.

Let us start with an animal that has evolved to be an air breathing, omnivorous, land dweller. It has a set of biological requirements for individual survival like food, water, and a limited tolerance to the elements that requires shelter in certain circumstances. It requires a mate to reproduce. In addition to the mate it has evolved to be a social creature, dependent on other members of the pack for basic survival. It has one additional feature, it has a large brain and has developed the ability to use complex symbols, including symbolic sounds, to represent ideas and transmit information. To use this intelligence the animal has developed a curiosity and a level of independence that it uses to solve problems. So the animal has developed biological requirements, reproductive requirements, pack requirements, and individual curiosity requirement.

Each of these requirements represents a need that must be fulfilled. These animals are “hardwired” to fulfill these needs. That result of that firmware is that the animals are motivated to satisfy those needs. Survival of the species dictates that these needs have a order of precedence with certain needs being far more important than others. The need to survive biologically is more important the need to reproduce (however, the need for the offspring to survive is more important than the need for individual survival). The need to be part of a pack is important but not as important as the need to reproduce. The need to protect the pack is more important than the need to be curious and pursue activities that satisfy that individual drive. There are a number of unique conditions that alter these generalities. Regardless these generalities allow us to begin to see a motivational pattern. Biological needs are more important than reproductive need; reproductive needs are more important than pack; and the need to be part of a pack is more important than the need to satisfy one’s individual curiosity. The result is a need hierarchy. The hierarchy is similar to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.

By now it should be clear that I am referring to man. Humans evolved over millions of years. Modern man appeared about 100,000 years ago. For all but the last 10,000 years or so man lived in small nomadic groups that would hunt and gather food within a home territory. The hardwired motivational scheme served him well and he used his intelligence to identify and employ better ways to survive. But through most of his time he still lived from hunt to hunt with the threat of death from accident, disease and exposure to the elements, other predators, and starvation ever-present. This was not a problem since the motivational scheme man had evolved with was uniquely suited to this lifestyle. Humans had a motivational scheme that had evolved to meet each one of these problems in an order of importance that ensured the survival of the species.

Then things changed. Using that big brain he developed a pair of solutions to his food problem. The first was horticulture, which allowed him to grow the food he needed to survive. The second was domesticating animals. With the advent of these two adaptations humans now had more food than they could use. At first this was not a problem because it was simply allowed for larger size packs. But eventually there was more food than could be consumed and surpluses started to develop. At this point man found himself in an “unnatural” condition. He had adapted to his conditions faster than evolution could keep up. He now lived in a world that required him to adapt his entire pack structure to this change in his environment - a change he created by solving his food problem. He created social structures to decide how to deal with the excess food. Who should control this excess of food and how should it be used. Of course this did not occur all at once. It is doubtful that the humans ever noticed the change. They simply came up with solutions to their problems. None-the -less, the humans were now living in conditions that required adaptation away from their evolutionarily dictated motivational scheme. It now allowed them to no longer be primarily concerned with food. Their hardware programing now jumped to the next most important needs, reproduction and security of the pack.

Fast-forward a few thousand years Greece about 500 BCE. A combination of conditions has created a society capable of meeting most of their biological, reproductive, and pack based survival needs. The land and sea produced more food then they needed. Silver mines yielded wealth that was distributed amongst the citizens. Slaves took care of mining the silver and most of the menial tasks and Athens military might was largely unquestioned leaving her without a realistic enemy. With these lower needs largely satisfied the human population began to concentrate on their individual curiosities. What did they find interesting. Art, theatre, and science became the motivational drives for much of the population. The concentration on satisfying individual motivations found its way into politics. Almost by accident, when a local businessman tried to install a king as the new ruler of the land the population spontaneously revolted. They may not have known what they wanted but they knew a king was not it. The Athenian’s laid siege to the acropolis for three days before the would-be king and his supporters were ousted from the acropolis and banished from Athens. What would result from this spontaneous uprising would be the first well-documented democracy.

That first democracy was as much the result of hardwired motivations designed to satisfy human needs as was our attempts a few thousand years earlier to ensure the security of the pack. Both were the result of our prior success in satiating the next lower level need. Both represented an adaptation - an attempt to rectify what our evolutionarily programmed drives were telling us we must be concerned with at the moment as compared with those needs we had already satisfied. Reproduction and survival of the pack became the primary concern when we no longer had to be concerned with starvation. Likewise, once the needs of pack survival satisfied then next level need, the need to satiate individual desires, became paramount. The government that resulted from that three-day siege was specifically designed to satisfy those needs. It was true of democracy back then ... and it is true of democracy today. Democracy is not the best form of government ... it is the form designed to allow us the greatest ability to satisfy our individual needs.

I know this is a little off the mark for a military discussion but I have to set the stage for my theory as to why democracy cannot (and should not) be universally mandated. This is not to say that it is not in our security interests to spread democracy. But it is not as easily achievable as many expect.

Again, if we in the military do not work to create an understanding of this problem - and the American distinction between the proper role of the military and the proper role of the civilian leadership is not changed - then the only way for us to convince the civilian leadership that attempting to export democracy into society "X" is not feasible is by explaining why.

jmm99

09-22-2013, 02:38 AM

This is an interesting article by Allen MacNeill (an evolutionary psychologist at Cornell), The Capacity for Religious Experience Is an Evolutionary Adaptation to Warfare (http://thegreatstory.org/macneill.pdf) (2004) (his BLUF):

Genes, Memes, or Both?

It is extremely unlikely that any human behavior (or the behavior of any animal with a nervous system complex enough to allow learning) is the result of the expression of any single gene. On the contrary, it is almost universally accepted among evolutionary psychologists that all behaviors show a blend of innate and learned components.

What is interesting to ethologists is not the question of “how much,” but rather the much simpler question of “how”? One answer that has been suggested is that there are two different carriers of information that can be transmitted among humans: genes and memes. According to Dawkins, a meme is “a unit of cultural transmission” corresponding to things like “tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches” (1976, p. 206). Dawkins even addressed the possibility that God Himself might be a meme:

Consider the idea of God…. What is it about the idea of a god which give it its stability and penetrance in the cultural environment? The survival value of the god meme in the meme pool results from its great psychological appeal. It provides a superficially plausible answer to deep and troubling questions about existence. It suggests that injustices in this world may be rectified in the next …. God exists, if only in the form of a meme with high survival value, or infective power, in the environment provided by human culture (p. 207).

Is all of religion simply a meme, or more precisely, a “meme complex”? And does the answer to this question tell us anything about the connection between the capacity for religion and warfare? There are at least three hypotheses for the mode of transmission of the capacity for religious experience:

• Hypothesis 1: The capacity for religious experience might be almost entirely innate; that is, it arises almost entirely out of “hard-wired” neural circuits in the human brain, which produce the sensations, thoughts, and behaviors that we call religious.

• Hypothesis 2: The capacity for religious experience might be almost entirely learned; that is, it arises almost entirely from concepts (i.e., “memes”) that are transmitted from person to person via purely linguistic means, and without any underlying neurological predisposition to their acquisition.

• Hypothesis 3: The capacity for religious experience might arise from a combination of innate predispositions and learning; that is, like many animal behaviors, the capacity for religious experience might be the result of an innate predisposition to learn particular memes.

Both Boyer’s and Atran’s theories of the origin of religion are closest to the third hypothesis. From the foregoing analysis, it should also be clear that my own hypothesis for the origin of the capacity for religious experience is closest to hypothesis 3. However, unlike Boyer and Atran, I have proposed that the specific context within which the human nervous system has evolved has been persistent, albeit episodic, warfare.

This article was presented at a 2003 NEI conference (David Livingstone Smith; The Most Dangerous Animal: Human Nature and the Origins of War (http://www.amazon.com/Most-Dangerous-Animal-Nature-Origins/dp/B002XULWWA), and Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others (http://www.amazon.com/Less-Than-Human-Enslave-Exterminate/dp/1250003830)), "Religion, Cognitive Science and Evolutionary Psychology", and published by Konrad Lorenz Institute in 2004 (link (www.kli.ac.at/download/2004_10-1.pdf)), which presents all the articles presented at the conference.

MacNeill has tackled a political hot potato - for which I give him credit. But, a lot of people, who sincerely believe that religion is peace, will be disturbed by the inferences that can be drawn. And, as were drawn by Jack Miles (the lede to MacNeill's piece):

If we were forced to say in one word who God is and in another what the Bible is about, the answer would have to be: God is a warrior, and the Bible is about victory. —Jack Miles, God, A Biography (1995, p. 106)

Regards

Mike

PS: Also from Allen MacNeill, Evolutionary Psychology II (http://www.oneclickaudio.com/courses_pdf/UT189.pdf) (2011; 122 pp.), a lecture course on the same topics - suggested readings start with Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (http://www.amazon.com/On-Aggression-Konrad-Lorenz/dp/1567311075/)(1974), and include Wrangham, Kelly, Keeley, etc.

TheCurmudgeon

09-22-2013, 03:40 AM

I am not a big advocate of the theory of memes. By attempting to recreate genes in a societal setting it creates the false impression that societies evolve - a fundamental precept of modernization theory. I have always viewed society as more of a virus than a evolving independent life form. It cannot exist without its human host. If it changes it does so based on the requirements of its human host. So to create the impression that it can take on a life of its own creates a false impression that its host is a passive player in its "evolution". I find that idea ridiculous.

jmm99

09-22-2013, 05:50 AM

They are "transmitted" (but the mechanism is different from transmission of genetic material - obviously). They are created and published by their authors; and then accepted or rejected by their recipients. What we are doing right now is swapping memes. Like everything in the universe, memes arise from the interaction of matter and energy.

If someone wants to call them something else, that's fine with me - "culture unit", for example. And, if you think the concept is "ridiculous", that's also fine with me. We can pass as two ships in the night - far apart.

But, as this little exchange proves, memes are not handled passively by their human publishers and recipients (or rejectors).

Memetics has its share of good science and junk science. Here's a 1680 page compendium on memes - in the military context: Finklestein, A Memetics Compendium (http://www.semioticon.com/virtuals/memes2/memetics_compendium.pdf) (2008; prepared for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency).

Its suggested working definition for a meme is (p.15):

We developed a pragmatic definition to distinguish a meme from other sorts of information (such as common daily utterances):

A meme is information which propagates, persists, and has impact.

To distinguish memes from other kinds of information, an elaboration of the definition invokes a threshold for propagation and persistence and employs Shannon‘s definition of information as that which reduces uncertainty.

Here's the basic flow chart (p.17):

1747

Figure 2: Meme Transmission Replicates Claude Shannon’s Iconic Schematic of a General Communications System.

To those who think all of this is ridiculous, then they should ignore it and continue on in bliss.

Regards

Mike

TheCurmudgeon

09-22-2013, 01:24 PM

I don't think the concept of memes is ridiculous, I think the way it is applied is.

Lets look at the definition offered in the Compendium:

A meme is information which propagates, persists, and has impact.

I am good with it being propagated. I am OK with it persisting - and in fact my interest is in why a particular idea (like the idea of God) persists? What need does it fulfill? How does it help the human animal survive or find more satisfaction in its life.

The last part I tend to find disturbing (or ridiculous), it "has impact". This is a euphemism that transfers the action from the humans transmitting the meme to the meme itself. A meme can have no effect, no "impact", outside its human host. Humans may realize the truth or the utility of the meme, but the meme does nothing in and of itself. It has no impact.

I realize that I may be making a very fine distinction to the point of sounding ridiculous myself, but it is very easy to start down the road of seeing memes as having an existence separate from their human host. By giving memes the power to have an "impact" they become independent components of something outside the people transmitting them. They become the genes of society creating the impression that society also exists as a separate entity. That societies evolve. That social evolution means that modern societies are more advanced than primitive ones - that they are "better" because they are more advanced. Hence, the basic foundation of modernization theory.

You see this same thinking in ideas about bureaucracy. There is the belief that once a bureaucracy is created it becomes self sustaining and impossible to get rid of. People believe that it "takes on a life of its own". Ridiculous! The bureaucracy does nothing that its human masters do not want. It survives because those who created and maintain the bureaucracy like it. It provides for them. It is comfortable. People who then argue about changing the bureaucracy are arguing the wrong point and probably won't win. You have to change the people ... and that probably ain't gonna happen.

Societies cannot and they do not evolve. It is not a living being. At best society is a parasitic virus that can only survive within its host. Even that is going too far.

jmm99

09-22-2013, 05:57 PM

TheCurmudgeon

09-22-2013, 06:26 PM

is more the way I'd express it, if I were trying to define memes - which I'm not. The point, whether one uses "impact", "materiality" or some other such term, is to suggest that there is a treshhold quantitative value of horizontal propagation, below which we disregard the meme.

I think that the key to the usefulness of the meme concept is in the "threshold quantitative value" or what I would say is the "threshold qualitative value". What is it that causes the meme to be above that threshold? What is it about how the meme is digested by the receiver that makes it useful?

However, it's possible for person An to reach an influential position, which would allow MemeA to be widely propagated horizontally - let's say among 300 million Americans, who say "Why didn't we think of that before ?" That would be an example of a pre-adaptative or exaptative meme - to steal terms from evolutionary genetics.

Here is the key. It is not in the nature of the meme but in the nature of how the meme is received - in the "why didn't we think of that before?" - that makes a meme useful.

Is a human host necessary for transmission of memes ? Am I transmitting my present meme, or is the SWC server transmitting it. Isn't there a lot of difference between tutor and pupil sharing a common log, eyeball to eyeball, and what we are doing here ?

The message versus the medium, or in the case of the diagram - the message versus the signal.

Also, think about dead societies, like the ancient Egyptians. Their messages were all over the walls of their tombs and temples but they were just images until we learned to decipher them. The memes were there, they had been transmitted, but until they were received they were just images on a wall. Its not about the medium, its about the message, and in particular, the utility of that message to the receiver.

Finally, I'd suggest that selection (random and non-random) can occur at multiple levels - the individual and the group being two. E.g., societies and bureaucracies can evolve. However, there is little point in us beating that horse - if they evolve, I win; if they don't evolve, I lose; but by the time that's decided, I'll be dead. :)

I guess I can see no situation where a society received a message. Individual members of the society receive the message, but the society only exists as an extension of its individual members. It has no life on its own. Besides, I don't see this as a win lose proposition ... and there is still time while you are alive to learn (or maybe for you to teach me) :D

jmm99

09-22-2013, 07:42 PM

was not my incapacity or your incapacity to learn within a finite time period.

Rather, it was that the debate about multi-level selection has been going on for the last 50 years, without the various sides (there being more than two) coming out clearly ahead. I don't expect any sort of scientific eureka moment about multi-level selection in the remaining years of my life.

Of course, the issue of group vs individual selection can always be argued out (ad infinitum) politically, libertarian vs collectivist, etc. But that's not what I was getting at.

Regards

Mike

TheCurmudgeon

09-22-2013, 09:28 PM

Rather, it was that the debate about multi-level selection has been going on for the last 50 years, without the various sides (there being more than two) coming out clearly ahead. I don't expect any sort of scientific eureka moment about multi-level selection in the remaining years of my life.

I guess you are right. I can offer nothing more on the matter. I can say that I have a position, that I have articulated that position without total success. I can understand that others have differing views. I guess I see a danger in these differing views. Now that does not mean that they are wrong, only that they can be used to justify the wholesale destruction of other cultures - replacing them with the more advanced version. Perhaps that is the nature of mulit-level selection - that the human hosts are only hosts and must die along with their defective or non-selected social or cultural structures. I guess I find that thought somewhat disturbing. So I cannot argue that I am right scientifically, only that I "ought" to be right.

Feel free to rebut, but lets move on to other lines of inquiry.

jmm99

09-23-2013, 02:02 AM

Just to be very clear, I've been talking about science and its proper uses. I'm not advocating its misuse, which you have summed as follows:

I guess I see a danger in these differing views. Now that does not mean that they are wrong, only that they can be used to justify the wholesale destruction of other cultures - replacing them with the more advanced version. Perhaps that is the nature of multi-level selection - that the human hosts are only hosts and must die along with their defective or non-selected social or cultural structures.

One example of misuse that I see is Social Darwinism (a meme) with its collection of associated memes: eugenics, master races, over and under men. etc. We also have some less obviously malign memes: Manifest Destiny, the New Frontier and Walt Rostow's modernization construct. All these memes attempt to use (but in fact misuse) scientific evolution and selection.

Here's how Social Darwinism was viewed by one of my favorite lawyers in the Monkey Trial, William Jennings Bryan - the other is his opponent Darrow. A good 5 minute Youtube, Monkey Trial: William Jennings Bryan and Social Darwinism (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lqnnTcNrhn0). I accept Bryan's views on Social Darwinism, but not on Creationism.

The longer course on William Jennings Bryan and Social Darwinism is Lee, Inherit the Myth: How William Jennings Bryan's Struggle with Social Darwinism and Legal Formalism Demythologize the Scopes Monkey Trial (http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=fac_sw) (2004).

Herbert Spencer's Social Darwinism did not evolve from Darwin, but had its own (prior) origins, as well as a different construct. How did Darwin differ from Spencer ?; from Lee (p.9):

Against this view [JMM: Spencer's], Darwin argued that evolutionary change serves no transcendent moral purpose. Its goal or end is not the metaphysical good or right. It is simply survival of the species through adaptive advantage. Darwin viewed natural selection as merely a force tending to bring about greater adaptation of a species to its environment. He was even reluctant to call his theory of descent with modification a theory of "evolution" because he feared that the progressive implications of the term would be misleading. In the end, however, he reluctantly adopted the term, in part because Spencer had already popularized it.

Footnotes omitted; all are from Steve Gould's, Ever Since Darwin: Reflections in Natural History (http://www.amazon.com/Ever-Since-Darwin-Reflections-Natural/dp/0393064255) (1977) - I also accept what is said by Lee based on Gould.

Thus, genetic selection (like memetic selection) is not necessarily good or bad as a scientific process - nor is it usually predictive of a "better society". They (especially memetic selection) can be used for malign purposes.

As to which, Lee (p.10) quotes Steve Gould (same source):

This discredited theory [JMM: Spencer's Social Darwinism] ranked human groups and cultures according to their assumed level of evolutionary attainment, with (not surprisingly) white Europeans at the top and people dwelling in their conquered colonies at the bottom. Today, it remains a primary component of our global arrogance, our belief in dominion over, rather than fellowship with, more than a million other species that inhabit our planet. The moving finger has written, of course, and nothing can be done; yet I am rather sorry that scientists contributed to a fundamental misunderstanding by selecting a vernacular word meaning progress as a name for Darwin's less euphonious but more accurate "descent with modification."

All of this discussion is about memes - and how they can be misused.

So, I think the topic of memes is very material to this thread - and a many others involving cultural evolution in its vulgar sense.

Regards

Mike

PS: For those with an interest in the Monkey Trial on Youtube, The Scopes Monkey Trial Full Documentary (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZuDWy7Vr3mQ) (1hr 17min)

TheCurmudgeon

09-23-2013, 03:30 AM

I understand. It is not the science that I think is the problem. It is the application of unproven theories that I dislike primarily because my own theories run contrary to them. While many people are perfectly content to see society as a living organism and the meme as an equivalent to a gene, I do not. There is no multi- level evolutionary system because only individual organic creatures can evolve. We use that analogy to try to explain how social systems change over time but it is an inaccurate and incomplete analogy. Societies are not organic life forms.

When we apply this inaccurate analogy to cultural studies we get the social Darwinism ecxept applied to entire societies instead of individuals.

I have a more Spencerian approach but it is still applied at the individual leve and then aggregated to create a society wide result. Even then it is not truly society wide since all large societies are not homogenous. Still, in the aggregate, it becomes more likely than not that the society will act in a certain way.

I realize that may not be helpful, but it is as accurate as I can make it.

TheCurmudgeon

09-23-2013, 11:22 AM

I guess my strongest argument against multi-level, or at least societal evolution is that societies devolve along predictable patterns, life forms continue to evolve. When any great society collapses it splinters along predictable lines. If resources continue to dwindle towns are abandon and people take to the country returning to their tribal ways. When resources become plentiful they again build a society along the same patterns as they had before. Similar patterns occur in societies that have not had contact.

This does not occur in evolution. Once a fish left the sea and evolved into a mammal, when mammals returned to the sea they did not become fish. They maintained their genetically mammalian aspects.

Humans have a hardwired list of needs. Which needs Human seek to satisfy change depending on security and resources. The pattern that they follow as security and resources remain abundant are predictable because nothing has changed in the basic list of wants and needs of the population. This is not evolution, this is adaptation based on changing needs.

09-23-2013, 12:57 PM

I realize that I may be making a very fine distinction to the point of sounding ridiculous myself, but it is very easy to start down the road of seeing memes as having an existence separate from their human host. By giving memes the power to have an "impact" they become independent components of something outside the people transmitting them.

What happens if one replaces the word "meme" with the word "gene" in the above quotation?

You see this same thinking in ideas about bureaucracy. There is the belief that once a bureaucracy is created it becomes self sustaining and impossible to get rid of. People believe that it "takes on a life of its own". Ridiculous! The bureaucracy does nothing that its human masters do not want. It survives because those who created and maintain the bureaucracy like it. It provides for them. It is comfortable. People who then argue about changing the bureaucracy are arguing the wrong point and probably won't win. You have to change the people ... and that probably ain't gonna happen.
As a counterpoint to the above, consider the Abilene Paradox (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abilene_paradox) or the Prisoner's Dilemma (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/)

Societies cannot and they do not evolve. It is not a living being. At best society is a parasitic virus that can only survive within its host. Even that is going too far. Evolution is a rather value-laden term. It suggests a positive change. Were this not the case, then, I submit, we would not also have the term "devolution." As suggested in my comment on the first quotation above, what happens when some simple word changes are made? "Societies cannot and they do not change" for example. Now that is at some level true, but then a similar claim can be made for the biological system of systems (SoS) that we call a human being. In fact, I think we can agree that a SoS does not change except insofar as its component systems change. And the component systems do not change except insofar as their parts do. But then we are faced with a variation on the the paradox of the ship of Theseus (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus). At the first change of a component, do we still have the same system or SoS? If not, when do we decide that the system or SoS is different?

If one wants to be consistent, then one must accept a lot of baggage that comes along with adopting the concept 'evolution' and its normative correlative, 'progress.' And, I think that this baggage includes memes and unchangeable bureaucracies. To discuss progress one needs some form of measurement. How does one measure "progress" without an unchanging baseline? We need some basis of comparison in order to say "we are better than X" where X is that prior baseline. I think that baseline might well be composed of the structures of societies, AKA bureaucracies, and the lexicons, AKA memes, used to refer to them.

TheCurmudgeon

09-23-2013, 04:24 PM

What happens if one replaces the word "meme" with the word "gene" in the above quotation?

I am not sure that it would, which is the problem. You walk away with the impression that the two are interchangeable.

As a counterpoint to the above, consider the Abilene Paradox (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abilene_paradox) or the Prisoner's Dilemma (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/)

I am not sure that either one are applicable. The Abilene Paradox would assume that bureaucracy is not in the best interest of the group. I would argue that it is. Likewise, the Prisoner's Dilemma assumes that the first one out of the bureaucracy has slight advantage but his best option is to let it remain. Again, I see bureaucracy as filling a need. But even if it was only self sustaining, there could be no advantage in being the first out of the system.

Let me throw a counterproposal at you - a prisoner's dilemma so to speak. If you live in a world that is based on a client-patron relationship then your basic needs are fulfilled by that relationship. As the client you get your food, shelter, and protection as part of the bargain for your unwavering support of the patron. As long as that is all you need there is no reason to alter this relationship. But if your needs change, if after generations of having your basic needs satisfied your needs change, then the relationship no longer works. You will fight to get out of it - you will seek the freedom that you have been lacking. The rules of the game have changed. I can think of no paradox like that.

Evolution is a rather value-laden term. It suggests a positive change. Were this not the case, then, I submit, we would not also have the term "devolution." As suggested in my comment on the first quotation above, what happens when some simple word changes are made? "Societies cannot and they do not change" for example. Now that is at some level true, but then a similar claim can be made for the biological system of systems (SoS) that we call a human being. In fact, I think we can agree that a SoS does not change except insofar as its component systems change. And the component systems do not change except insofar as their parts do. But then we are faced with a variation on the the paradox of the ship of Theseus (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus). At the first change of a component, do we still have the same system or SoS? If not, when do we decide that the system or SoS is different?

I agree, but you have to look at which parts of the system are active and which parts are passive. The human being is the only active system in this system of systems.

If one wants to be consistent, then one must accept a lot of baggage that comes along with adopting the concept 'evolution' and its normative correlative, 'progress.' And, I think that this baggage includes memes and unchangeable bureaucracies. To discuss progress one needs some form of measurement. How does one measure "progress" without an unchanging baseline? We need some basis of comparison in order to say "we are better than X" where X is that prior baseline. I think that baseline might well be composed of the structures of societies, AKA bureaucracies, and the lexicons, AKA memes, used to refer to them.

Here is my problem, I don't want to be consistent. I reject out of hand the idea that societies evolve. Societies are passive, not active. They reflect changes in the motivations of their active hosts, the human beings.

I am offering a different paradigm. One where there is not progress, but a change in the objective of the game.

In this case no system is better than any other. The system that the Yanamamo natives of the Amazon have developed is just as "good" as the tribal systems of Afghanistan or the capitalist systems of the United States. The difference is the objective, the goal each system is trying to achieve. That change is based on changes in the needs of the humans who make up the system. That idea is difficult to swallow, but it is what I believe is actually happening. The society, and all its cultural components, represent a solution set to designed to satisfy the needs of the human population. As the needs change, so does the solution set. It is not "progress" or "evolution", it is a change in the rules of the game, in the goals of the system. in the needs of the human hosts from basic survival to group supremacy to individual supremacy.

09-23-2013, 09:06 PM

Let me throw a counterproposal at you - a prisoner's dilemma so to speak. If you live in a world that is based on a client-patron relationship then your basic needs are fulfilled by that relationship. As the client you get your food, shelter, and protection as part of the bargain for your unwavering support of the patron. As long as that is all you need there is no reason to alter this relationship. But if your needs change, if after generations of having your basic needs satisfied your needs change, then the relationship no longer works. You will fight to get out of it - you will seek the freedom that you have been lacking. The rules of the game have changed. I can think of no paradox like that. Not a counter example as the rules have changed. Your proposal above commits the "fallacy of swapping horses" as in swapping horses in the middle of the stream.

I agree, but you have to look at which parts of the system are active and which parts are passive. The human being is the only active system in this system of systems. Not if you adopt the position of those who espouse the "selfish gene (http://www.amazon.com/dp/0199291152/?tag=googhydr-20&hvadid=2674028095&hvpos=1t1&hvexid=&hvnetw=g&hvrand=1192419230353108213&hvpone=11.56&hvptwo=&hvqmt=b&hvdev=c&ref=pd_sl_85bt4jjj91_b)."

Here is my problem, I don't want to be consistent. I reject out of hand the idea that societies evolve. Societies are passive, not active. They reflect changes in the motivations of their active hosts, the human beings.

I am offering a different paradigm. One where there is not progress, but a change in the objective of the game.

In this case no system is better than any other. The system that the Yanamamo natives of the Amazon have developed is just as "good" as the tribal systems of Afghanistan or the capitalist systems of the United States. The difference is the objective, the goal each system is trying to achieve. That change is based on changes in the needs of the humans who make up the system. That idea is difficult to swallow, but it is what I believe is actually happening. The society, and all its cultural components, represent a solution set to designed to satisfy the needs of the human population. As the needs change, so does the solution set. It is not "progress" or "evolution", it is a change in the rules of the game, in the goals of the system. in the needs of the human hosts from basic survival to group supremacy to individual supremacy.
Consistency is not a requisite, but it is considered to be a significant piece of the sine qua non of being human, i.e., rationality. So you could redefine the essence of humanity if you wish. But, we tend to have some set usages for language, which allow us to engage interactively. Similarly yopu could reset the denotation/connation for 'evolution.' This Humpty Dumpty approach to language (see chapter six of Alice's Adventures Through the Looking Glass by Lewis Carroll/C. L. Dodgson) is one way of resolving discussions, but once you fall off the wall, remember that all the king's horses and men may well be unable to help you as they may not be able to understand what you are requesting.

TheCurmudgeon

09-23-2013, 09:24 PM

Not a counter example as the rules have changed. Your proposal above commits the "fallacy of swapping horses" as in swapping horses in the middle of the stream.

You have caught me with my fallacious trousers down! :D

It is always a pleasure to trade barbs with you. But here I have to make a clear distinction between evolution and adaptation. To me, this is very important. But I am glad to have your (and others) attacks as they allow me to hone my arguments.

Not if you adopt the position of those who espouse the "selfish gene (http://www.amazon.com/dp/0199291152/?tag=googhydr-20&hvadid=2674028095&hvpos=1t1&hvexid=&hvnetw=g&hvrand=1192419230353108213&hvpone=11.56&hvptwo=&hvqmt=b&hvdev=c&ref=pd_sl_85bt4jjj91_b)."

I am familiar with the selfish gene. I think I have it somewhere on the bookshelves behind me (ask my wife and she will tell you I have it inside me). But it is only half an answer and no answer at all when dealing with a social animal. If selfishness were the answer, we would not be social.

Consistency is not a requisite, but it is considered to be a significant piece of the sine qua non of being human, i.e., rationality. So you could redefine the essence of humanity if you wish. But, we tend to have some set usages for language, which allow us to engage interactively. Similarly yopu could reset the denotation/connation for 'evolution.' This Humpty Dumpty approach to language (see chapter six of Alice's Adventures Through the Looking Glass by Lewis Carroll/C. L. Dodgson) is one way of resolving discussions, but once you fall off the wall, remember that all the king's horses and men may well be unable to help you as they may not be able to understand what you are requesting.

I am not redefining the essence of humanity, I am clarifying it. Let us suppose for a minute that I am right - that the needs of humanity change based on the conditions they exist in - ... nope, I guess that it is, lets just suppose that I am right.

I am not trying to redefine humanity. I am trying to explain why what appears to be evolution is in fact adaptation. That by using evolution as your model you allow for all sorts of horrors. To do this; to have a xenophobic view of other cultures, is natural (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0312532725/ref=oh_details_o00_s00_i00?ie=UTF8&psc=1) for humans. It is something we have to work to avoid.

I will try to clarify myself further, and I realize that I go against the tide of current opinion on the matter, but if I am to discredit modernization theory I must offer an alternative. That alternative is that societies do not evolve, they adapt to the changing needs of the human population.

jmm99

09-24-2013, 04:37 AM

Attached is a pdf with snips from a number of online articles dealing with Groups, Individuals and Altruistic Behavior - based on Sober and Wilson's 1998 book, "Onto Others ...", which "updates" the "Selfish Gene" mentioned by wm.

Regards

Mike

TheCurmudgeon

09-24-2013, 11:22 AM

Mike,

As always, many thanks ...

09-24-2013, 07:56 PM

So many points to comment on in this post but I'll limit myself to a response to this:

I will try to clarify myself further, and I realize that I go against the tide of current opinion on the matter, but if I am to discredit modernization theory I must offer an alternative. That alternative is that societies do not evolve, they adapt to the changing needs of the human population.

I'm not sure why you need an alternative to modernization theory in order to discredit it. Unless you are erecting a straw man of modernization theory, it does a good job of discrediting itself by assuming that change is evolutionary and, therefore, that modernization is progress through evolution.
As you have pointed out in your posts, societies and organisms adapt. Adaption is not a normative term; so adding in "better," "improved," and other such normative words is not necessarily warranted. When I take three steps to the right of my current position, I have changed locations. But that does not mean I have moved to a better location. In fact, if I changed my location to protect you by lying on the hand grenade that the terrorist just threw in the room, I would say I have changed my position to my detriment.

jmm99

09-24-2013, 10:18 PM

you need (IMO) the added, bolded text in your syllogism:

... by assuming that change is evolutionary; and that all evolutionary changes are progressive; and, therefore, that modernization is progress through evolution.

Of course, all change is not evolutionary; and evolutionary changes may be progressive (whatever that means; presumably, "improved", "better", "higher", etc.) or non-progressive.

The grenade story is a nice altruistic touch. :)

Regards

Mike

TheCurmudgeon

09-24-2013, 11:34 PM

WM,

I suppose I don't need an alternative, it just so happens that I have one. That is probably enough for me to make my argument today. But modernization, built on the deceptively simplistic idea of social evolution, keeps coming back around like a bad penny. It coddles us with the belief that we are the best system and that we have earned that position by being the most evolved. As you point out, evolution is a word laden with certain beliefs.

There are other reasons why I am going out of my way to make these arguments. The primary one is because I believe it is right. Societal, and in particular, political change is not evolutionary. When a society moves from a political systems built on a centralized power base (i.e. a King) to one built on a decentralized power base (i.e. a democracy) it is not because they have evolved, it is because what the population's needs changed. It changed from the need for security and group identity to the need for autonomy and individual identity. This idea has huge repercussions for counterinsurgency. For example, the 5-34 uses good governance and things like electricity as the lines of effort that lead to legitimizing the government. But while the population may like good governance and electricity it is not why they fight and die. It will not identify what legitimizes the government. They fight and die because the government is not meeting more important needs. The need to validate their communal identity, to acknowledge its primacy (or at least equality). When you confront that communal identity with values that oppose it (like freedom for women) you end up in direct opposition to the populations needs.

Anyway, it is not critical to replace social evolution in order to discredit modernization, but it is a necessary element in making my more complete argument.