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View Full Version : Lost Lessons & Fresh Thinking: a challenge for SWC



Morgan
07-29-2013, 03:09 AM
Moderator's Note

The catalyst for this thread's creation comes from the discussion in the re-opened thread 'Recruiting for SWC members because....':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3837

A number of relevant posts have been edited and copied over.

Perhaps this challenge has appeared before in discussions and maybe even a thread, for as one recent poster noted:
Groundhog Day. I felt like I was making the same arguments over and over.
(Ends)



It does seem we're often kicking a dead horse. I also agree with whoever wrote that the quality of the articles overall are going down, and if peer review was mandated SWJ would return to it original quality level articles.

I, too, hope I'm not looked upon as one of "those people" that is less than qualified to add to the discussion on here.

As to the topics being discussed, while some have been discussed at length, some have barely been addressed.

For example I just ran across an article about a proposal to create a new agency....US Office of Contingency Operations. Apparently, Rep. Steve Stockman of Texas has put forth HR 2606 that advocates the creation of an agency that is designed to focus on stabilization & reconstruction operations instead of relying on ad-hoc relationships seen during the last 10+ years. I advocated something similar (Bureau of Strategic Assistance) in an earlier article. I think this proposal is a pretty good idea. Any takers on this new topic of discussion?

Bill Moore
07-29-2013, 03:26 AM
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2606#overview


4% chance of getting past committee.
1% chance of being enacted.

This overall idea is far from new, I only posted the link above to provide "one" perspective on the possibility of it going anywhere.

The following link is more entertaining.

http://www.phibetaiota.net/2010/01/journal-us-office-for-contingency-operations/


“That proposal may be controversial in some circles — particularly in areas the development community, where there’s concern that USOCO might represent a more cumbersome bureaucratic structure. But Bowen’s idea is attracting some powerful allies, like the widely admired former U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker. “I do support the concept,” Crocker, the incoming dean of the George Bush School of Government at Texas A&M University, emailed me. “The current situation requires a perpetual reinventing of wheels and a huge amount of effort by those trying to manage contingencies.”

Don't forget rice bowls (U.S. Dept of State and USAID).

http://www.state.gov/j/cso/releases/other/2013/206410.htm


GOAL #1. Make an impact in three or four places of strategic significance: In 2012, CSO focused 80 percent of its effort on four major engagements – Burma, Honduras, Kenya and Syria. CSO also worked in more than 15 other countries, including Afghanistan, Belize, the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan.

Clearly an argument can be made that all these countries are so much better since CSO has intervened on their behalf; however, I can't make it.

It is a worthwhile topic to resurface, I realize OCO is a new proposal, but it is the same gal we talked about before. She is just wearing a different dress.

My two cents:

Cent one: If we're going to do it, we should of course endeavor to do it effectively.

Cent two: There is no clear linkage between doing reconstruction and stability in areas where the conflict is based on ethnic conflict. So even if we do it get right, which is doubtful, what will it accomplish? That is how I would frame the debate.

John T. Fishel
07-29-2013, 02:42 PM
This is my opinion. As such it is clearly open to challenge. But it is based on a fair historical perspective and so might be worth something. At the height of the COIN revival I was fearful that we would fall back into the default mode of trying to forget about small wars as we did after Vietnam. We also did the same after every single major war we have fought. After the Revolution we fought Indians in the Northwest Territories and Florida but then along came the War of 1812 with a major conventional enemy (and we darn near lost the war). After New Orleans we fought Indians again all over the West. Then along came the Mexican War against a major conventional enemy and Scott, Taylor, and Doniphan led us to victory. After that we had to learn to fight Indians all over again. In 1861 along came the civil war with West Pointers fighting West Pointers. Big armies on the move. Lots of technical innovation. After it was all over and Sheridan had scared the French out of Mexico massing 50,000 troops on the border, we had to learn to fight Indians again. Then we fought Spain in 1898 - it is amazing how many former Confederate generals marched again to the sound of the guns in the blue and khaki uniforms of the US, Fitzhugh Lee and William Oates come to mind. In the aftermath, the dirty little wars in the Philippines and Caribbean raised up and Pershing chased Pancho Villa all over Northern Mexico but we had to learn that these weren't the kinds of wars we were prepared to fight because people were not only not learning the lessons, they weren't even recording them. WWI was followed by the Banana Wars which only the Marines were interested enough to record but they were also preparing for the next big one. They published their Small Wars Manual at almost the same time as their Tentative Landing Operations Manual which was a major influence on conventional operations in WWII.

The point of all this is that neither our political nor our military leaders like the small, nasty, dirty wars. We all want to fight the "big one" (why are we pivoting toward Asia? - not merely for the obvious and real threat of China). As the small wars wind down, interest fall off among both military and civilian national security analysts. This leaves the door open for smart, intelligent challenges to the prevailing wisdom of small wars - challenges like those of Gian Gentile both on these pages and his new book. As for our junior officers, they are looking at being assigned to units planning against conventional conflicts with China (perhaps) and certainly not toward Iraq now seen in the media as a totally foolish effort without any redeeming social virtue or Afghanistan which our president says we are leaving in 2014 regardless of conditions on the ground. The Administration has floated the idea of no residual force of any kind - the zero option. and who wants to be the last casualty of a war we have deemed is not worth fighting anyway? As a result, interest in our broad topic has died down.

This fact - loss of broader interest - makes our forum (Journal and Council alike) all the more important. Here we can not only record the lessons we needed to learn but debate them and, perhaps, allow the next generation to actually learn them and not make the same mistakes that we and previous generations made.

On that note

Cheers

JohnT

Steve Blair
07-29-2013, 04:43 PM
I agree with you, John, and have commented many times here about the similarities I feared (and am seeing) between what the Army (and military generally) did after Vietnam and what they're doing now. It's been something of a historical pattern for the US, and one that is concerning (or should be, at least). Information, knowledge, discussion, and historical context for small wars are all things that need to be preserved and continued. If not us, who?

Fuchs
07-29-2013, 05:56 PM
The pattern which irritates me is that the U.S. returns into the wars of choice business again and again, no matter how poor an investment it is.

I don't care about whether it's a very poor or skilled and thus simple poor investment. Neither should be done.

Bill Moore
07-29-2013, 09:43 PM
I agree with you, John, and have commented many times here about the similarities I feared (and am seeing) between what the Army (and military generally) did after Vietnam and what they're doing now. It's been something of a historical pattern for the US, and one that is concerning (or should be, at least). Information, knowledge, discussion, and historical context for small wars are all things that need to be preserved and continued. If not us, who?

Institutionally yes, at the individual level I still see a high level of interest. Those of us in the SW community have to take some responsibility also, because we have a number of amateurish articles that claim all future wars will be small wars, and there has been too much non-critical comments on our COIN doctrine within our own community. In many ways the Small Wars tribe isn't that much different than the Big Wars tribe.

If we were more self-critical and receptive to non-doctrinal ideas instead of being perceived as COIN doctrine Kool-Aid drinkers (doesn't apply to all, or even most, but it does to many of our most vocal and well known SW advocates), and we provided options that supported achieving the balance between capabilities that SECDEF Gates advocated we may be in a different place. I too share your concerns that we'll throw the baby out with the bathwater, based on the past decade of far less than successful small wars. If our community provides options for future defense policy makers that address all security concerns (and hopefully our diehards in SWJ realize there are more security concerns than Small Wars) then maybe we'll bring the more rational and deep thinkers on war back into the community? SWJ has provided a great service to the national security discussions from the tactical to strategic levels, we just need to realize where our nation is at now and find a way to contribute to that dialogue in way that keeps small wars in the discussion.

Steve Blair
07-29-2013, 10:32 PM
Institutionally yes, at the individual level I still see a high level of interest. Those of us in the SW community have to take some responsibility also, because we have a number of amateurish articles that claim all future wars will be small wars, and there has been too much non-critical comments on our COIN doctrine within our own community. In many ways the Small Wars tribe isn't that much different than the Big Wars tribe.

If we were more self-critical and receptive to non-doctrinal ideas instead of being perceived as COIN doctrine Kool-Aid drinkers (doesn't apply to all, or even most, but it does to many of our most vocal and well known SW advocates), and we provided options that supported achieving the balance between capabilities that SECDEF Gates advocated we may be in a different place. I too share your concerns that we'll throw the baby out with the bathwater, based on the past decade of far less than successful small wars. If our community provides options for future defense policy makers that address all security concerns (and hopefully our diehards in SWJ realize there are more security concerns than Small Wars) then maybe we'll bring the more rational and deep thinkers on war back into the community? SWJ has provided a great service to the national security discussions from the tactical to strategic levels, we just need to realize where our nation is at now and find a way to contribute to that dialogue in way that keeps small wars in the discussion.

Bill,

One of the problems I've seen historically is that this topic is usually viewed as an "either/or" sort of statement. There's too often a tendency to shove one of the topics off the table to make room for the other (or the "flavor of the month"). Obviously there are more security concerns than Small Wars, but small wars are the problem that just doesn't want to go away. I don't vocally advocate for one over the other: obviously they're equally important in a sense, with one or the other getting priority depending on the international situation. But I do worry that (yet again) we'll shed any number of hard-learned lessons (or learn the wrong ones) in our rush away from the current situation. We've done that so well too many times in the past.

Bob's World
07-30-2013, 12:46 PM
I suspect that the SWC was built on several pillars, such as frustration, interest and hope.

Hope came with innocence, and a belief that we could "fix" these problems, or "win" these conflicts on our terms.

That innocence is lost, hope is forlorn, and interest is waning. This is human nature.

Perhaps the members, like the services, are gathering up their lessons learned from this experience and leaning forward for the next, hopefully "better" conflict.

One of the big tactical ideas born of the past decade was that of "population-centric approaches." The idea being that because people are so important in these types of conflicts that we must focus our efforts on understanding each valley, village and person, and then focus our engagement on "fixing" or "winning" them to what it is we hoped to accomplish. That is a very tactical view of populations and their role in these populace-based conflicts.

Applying a strategic lens to this sound concept reveals the reality that one cannot simply bribe, develop or secure a populace to what some illegitimate foreign system of governance wants for them; instead those illegitimate foreign systems must take their understanding of these local populations where they believe their foreign interests to be at stake and ask "how do I tailor my own actions and goals in a manner to be consistent with the fundamental needs of these people my actions will impact, and how do I best pursue those interests in a manner consistent with their culture(s).

It is about changing us, not them. It is about fixing our approach to governance, not theirs. Someday we will learn this, but at the institutional level it is an insight that escapes us.

So long as we continue to cast strategic problems in tactical terms, and recognize, select and promote strategic leaders for tactical prowess in the face of strategic failure this will likely continue to remain beyond our grasp.

Steve Blair
07-31-2013, 02:10 PM
Part of the challenge is getting people to look back. As cropped up in one of the linked blog posts, at least 2-3 generations of U.S. students and "leaders" have been conditioned to value law degrees, engineering, and the like above liberal arts (including history and geography). People like to forget that during the "good old days" of the Powell Doctrine we were scattering penny packets of troops all over the place in humanitarian assistance, advising, and the like. Like it or not, our military has historically been involved in small wars more than they have conventional conflicts. Even the fiction about Afghanistan being our "longest war" doesn't hold up to historical examination. That's absolutely no knock on the folks doing the heavy lifting there, but between 1865 and 1890 the Army was involved in this little thing called the Indian Wars. It may not look impressive now, but it absorbed about 75% of the Army's field strength (either in garrison duties or campaigning). It wasn't popular "at home" (when people even remembered there was fighting going on), there were locals seeking to make a profit of the government's presence, and West Point didn't even bother teaching tactics to match the environment (they were still busy fighting the Civil War).

I could go on, but the short version is that I agree with both Stans. This stuff is important, and if we don't keep up the chatter too many important lessons will slip away again and have to be relearned the hard way.

Madhu
07-31-2013, 05:30 PM
An an outsider to the military, I don't see much difference between some of supposed "retreat into conventional mode" and the "small wars are important" types.

I see a comfortable retreat into familiar arguments about familiar topics using overly represented and familiar examples by some proponents of the study of small wars--with no real reflection on what might have happened in the past decade or so and no opening up of the discussion on a theoretical or practical level.

Why the constant retreat to a few examples that seem to keep cropping up, the British in Malaya, Algeria, the Indian Wars, the Phillipines?

For the study of the Afghan campaign, a very careful full-rounded study of various South Asian insurgencies (outside the comfortable frameworks often presented on SA insurgencies here, same old same old, even the Indian General that wrote an article on COIN basically just repeated "hearts and minds") might be interesting.

I feel I spend too much time commenting already and would prefer to read academic papers or books on "small wars areas of interest" to me that don't seem to be covered much here. If I find interesting things, I will post--time permitting.

The moderators are awesome. The commenters and contributors are awesome.

David is absolutely terrific as a moderator.

But if the study of small wars is so important why are those interested always circling around the same few topics in the same way? I see nothing new, just the same old half-conceived notions of American history and practice regarding small wars.

It's a fascinating topic so where is the robust study and argumentation outside a little social science and some tactical discussion?

Best to all.

Stan
07-31-2013, 06:45 PM
Hey Madhu,
Would almost tend to agree with you. However, seems all the lessons learned from the past and our members' vast knowledge of the same has fallen on deaf ears.

We are not always meandering in the past, but sharing what we may feel has indeed been overlooked and deserves a relook or, we feel a need to share what our past revealed.

As duly noted, most of us come from military backgrounds and are in one form or another, still serving.

Not everything herein is Small Wars, but most everything has something to do with what may eventually occur and has often been overlooked by far more intelligent beings.

Regards, Stan

Steve Blair
07-31-2013, 07:02 PM
Why the constant retreat to a few examples that seem to keep cropping up, the British in Malaya, Algeria, the Indian Wars, the Phillipines?

Actually, both the Indian War and the Philippines are poorly-studied here. Brian Linn is one of the few scholars who actually has devoted a great deal of time and attention to the Philippines (at least the period from 1898 through 1910 or so), and his work is outstanding. The Indian Wars tend to be rather spotty, and often the focus is on a specific individual or battle rather than a longer-term view of the conflicts. There are a few outstanding scholars to be sure, but some areas remain very neglected and would certainly repay study. That doesn't mean that they are the "be all and end all" of small wars, but to assume that they've been mined out would be a mistake.

I agree that there is a lot of (misplaced) focus on areas like Malaya and Algeria. There's also little attention paid to things that have happened in both Central and South America.

Bill Moore
08-01-2013, 07:44 AM
For the group at large, many have commented that here we go again, we're going to forget all the lessons learnt about Small Wars just like we did after Vietnam. What lessons do you feel are critical that we allegedly learned since 9/11 that we are at risk of losing?

This is an important question, because so far no one has really addressed it.

I'll challenge some comments I find to be illogical that are offered up by small wars advocates:

1. DOD pushed the "Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific" so they could focus on big wars and ignore small wars. This is wrong on all accounts. The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific was directed by our National Leadership (not DOD) for very sound strategic reasons. It just so happens that there are a number of potential scenarios in the region that could result in a state on state conflict of significant severity. DOD is focused on preventing those, if that fails we have to be ready to fight. The number of U.S. service members that would be killed in a conventional conflict would most likely be significantly higher than those killed in Small Wars. Bottom line we have to be ready for the unlikely, because the unlikely is more important to our national interests than the very often exaggerated threat from small wars to our interests. Second, there are more small wars in the PACOM area of responsibility than any other. There are over 20 separatist, insurgencies and terrorist movements in India along, and the number rapidly increases as you start moving east through Bangladesh, Nepal, Burma, Thailand, etc. The PACOM conducts FID in a number of countries (at different levels), so no one is exactly running away from Small Wars, but at the same time our leaders have an appreciation of the full spectrum of threats and what ones pose significant risk to us, and which ones simply counter some of our interest.

2. There are more small wars than larger state on state wars. That is very true, and lets hope that remains the case. However, in and of itself that is not a strong argument for the U.S. military to focus on Small Wars, because the vast majority of them we have little or nothing to do with. On the other hand, it is important to note that sometimes it is very much in our interests to engage in Small Wars for strategic reasons (not just because there are more of them).

3. We lost our Small Wars knowledge after Vietnam? What small wars skills did we gain during Vietnam that we lost? I admit many in the conventional army and Marines (especially LTCs and below in the 90s couldn't spell insurgency) may have ignored them, but Special Forces and some elements of general purpose forces were constantly engaged in small wars around the globe since the end of the Vietnam until 9/11. I came in during the late 70s and most of my career was focused on so called small wars and irregular warfare.

4. At the tactical and operational level what did we learn since 9/11 that we need to maintain that we're at risk of losing? I don't want to touch policy an and strategy, because we apparently didn't learn much in that regard. I can think of a few things, but want to hear your comments first.

The point of this effort is to move beyond the empty rhetoric of here we go again repeating history and tossing the baby out with the bath water and identify specific skills and knowledge we're at risk of losing. Once identified we can develop recommended ways to preserve these skills/knowledge.

I'm not convinced our military was as ate up as some of you seem to think. Our guys were doing back to back rotations in Bosnia and Kosovo prior to going into Afghanistan and Iraq, and that was certainly a messy small war by definition. 3d Special Forces Group (many of them) deployed to Afghanistan shortly after redeploying from Africa where they were supporting Peace Operations (small wars in this case), we had a long history of conducting counter narcotics missions globally (small wars sort of), and the list goes on. Go back to the 80s the list gets much more extensive. We seemed to do pretty well initially in Afghanistan with a few extraordinary men, local partners, and bombers. It got stupid when the policy got stupid. We did well in Iraq, to include the SF units working with Kurds who played a significant role in the decisive operations to oust Saddam. It was our politicians who denied we faced an insurgency that delayed the military's adaption to the threat. Not saying big Army was prepared for what came, but it wasn't as simple as some here seem to imply it was.

Bob's World
08-01-2013, 10:42 AM
We have learned how to do the wrong things better, but at the same time have somehow convinced ourselves that any strategic failures in the face of that tactical prowess are the fault of others - the host, the congress, the unwillingness to fully commit to a Clausewitzian or Galulaian solution either one, etc.


I for one hope that the primary lesson learned is that we still are not very good at this and that our "new" approaches are no better than our old ones at actually helping some place become more naturally stable; and that forced conditions of artificial stability by our hands are harder to create and less durable to sustain in the emerging environment. They also will remain hotbeds for follow-on insurgencies and recruiting grounds for acts of transnational terrorism.

In the words of Huey Lewis, we "need a new drug."

Dayuhan
08-01-2013, 11:32 PM
In the late 40's and early 50's the Air Force came up with the concept of using an American Air Force and a small force of advosrs(CIA) but let the supporting country supply the needed Army. So I say the biggest lesson lost is that the Air Force cannot fight a Small War.....They can.

Aren't we the supporting country?

That might work in some circumstances, if the country we're supporting has a functional army and the terrain is suitable. There will also be many circumstances in which it will not work, notably those in which the "country" we're supporting has no army, or if we've chosen to disband that army.

The US, it seems to me, has a uniquely persistent habit of entering what might be called "large small wars": conflicts that may be fought on a "small wars" model, but with a scope, duration, and expenditure that are anything but small. Creating a government, building a nation, installing a democracy are not small endeavors. If we adopt goals that require us to do these things, we are moving into a large small war, and that's troublesome territory. In a large small war attrition and political will become major factors, and public tolerance will be limited.

One overlooked lesson, if it was ever learned in the first place, would be to keep small wars small, and to resist the temptation to pursue objectives that push the scale out of hand.

Madhu
08-02-2013, 03:31 AM
Actually, both the Indian War and the Philippines are poorly-studied here. Brian Linn is one of the few scholars who actually has devoted a great deal of time and attention to the Philippines (at least the period from 1898 through 1910 or so), and his work is outstanding. The Indian Wars tend to be rather spotty, and often the focus is on a specific individual or battle rather than a longer-term view of the conflicts. There are a few outstanding scholars to be sure, but some areas remain very neglected and would certainly repay study. That doesn't mean that they are the "be all and end all" of small wars, but to assume that they've been mined out would be a mistake.

I agree that there is a lot of (misplaced) focus on areas like Malaya and Algeria. There's also little attention paid to things that have happened in both Central and South America.

Thanks for the comment too, Stan.

I tend to paint with too broad a brush in order to make a point. It's not a good habit. That's one reason I want to read more academic works. I need to break this habit. If I read more, I would have already known your point....

At least we all agree on one thing, we need more study and to keep the study alive, current and vibrant. I think one area that I have a kind of cultural disconnect from the military (or maybe the blogs I read?) is that I'm not really looking for quick "lessons learned" in the sense of "oh, look at what those guys did."

I have certain curiosities or questions about conflicts and want to read up on the questions because I think that current COIN doctrine oversimplifies the history of some campaigns used as a model. Gian Gentile in his book says that the models are too rigid and prevent a kind of grand improvisation (not minor tactical improvisations) or tailoring of a counterinsurgency campaign toward a specific conflict in all its peculiarities.

I have such a different narrative of colonial small wars in my head because of my ethnic background that sometimes it's like I'm from Venus and you all are from Mars.

Well, naturally that, given that I'm posting on a site about small wars....

Dayuhan
08-02-2013, 06:28 AM
Actually, both the Indian War and the Philippines are poorly-studied here. Brian Linn is one of the few scholars who actually has devoted a great deal of time and attention to the Philippines (at least the period from 1898 through 1910 or so), and his work is outstanding. The Indian Wars tend to be rather spotty, and often the focus is on a specific individual or battle rather than a longer-term view of the conflicts. There are a few outstanding scholars to be sure, but some areas remain very neglected and would certainly repay study. That doesn't mean that they are the "be all and end all" of small wars, but to assume that they've been mined out would be a mistake.

I agree that there is a lot of (misplaced) focus on areas like Malaya and Algeria. There's also little attention paid to things that have happened in both Central and South America.

Even where the history is reasonably well studied, attempts to deduce currently relevant lessons from that history often stray onto very thin ice. I sometimes get the feeling that writers decide which lesson they want history to teach and then go looking for some history to teach it.

I feel like this thread is wandering away from the immediate question of why the traffic here is growing so thin and what can be done to increase it, and toward questions more related to small wars generically.

davidbfpo
08-03-2013, 10:53 AM
The catalyst for this thread's creation comes from the discussion in the re-opened thread 'Recruiting for SWC members because....':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3837

A couple of relevant posts have been edited and copied over.

Perhaps this challenge has appeared before in discussions and maybe even a thread, for as one recent poster noted:
Groundhog Day. I felt like I was making the same arguments over and over.

John T. Fishel
08-04-2013, 12:04 AM
Bill's four points/challenges are at the heart of the issue. Let me tak a stab at each:
1. The shift toward Asia was, in fact, made for perfectly valid strategic reasons. But it also has the effect of reemphasizing the "big one". The issue here is whether the legitimate concern over a potential peer competitor is at the expense of the more constant small wars threats and capabilities. It is an issue of balance and one we have not done well with over time.
2. It is not the fact that there are more small wars than big ones but rather that the history of the military of the US (and the colonies before we were a country) saw much more engagement in both numbers of cases and longer periods than big war engagements. If past is prologue, then we need to keep studying the small wars along with the big ones and be prepared to fight them.
3. The Army as an institution did turn its institutional back on small wars after Vietnam. Although there were pockets where an institutional memory was retained - LTC Don Vought at CGSC (Fort Leavenworth) salvaged all the stuff on COIN in the 70s and stored the documents under the heading of "Terrorism" (which was then in vogue). In the 93 I had a student there who on his deployment to Haiti the next year lamented that he had not paid more attention to what we were giving him with regard to small wars - and he was a good one. My big army counterparts in the 80s did not pay much attention to anything that was going on in SOUTHCOM because it really was not career enhancing. Yet, if that was the whole picture, we would never have had David Petraeus, H.R. McMaster (who was in the CGSC class during my tenure and published his well received book that year),or some of the other leaders of the COIN resurgence. Again, I would argue that the issue os one of balance.
4. Bill, I don't think that you can avoid addressing policy and strategy in any discussion of the application of military power. Saint Carl (aka CvC) made the point that "war is the extension of politik (translates as both politic and policy depending on constext) with the addition of other means." That, to me, means that the "strategic corporal" is not confined to the USMC. What we do at the tactical and operational levels have profound impacts on the strategic and higher levels. A Salvadoran student of mine at Leavenworth stated in class that the decision taken during the FMLN 89 offensive to murder the Jesuit leadership of the U of Central America (and their housekeeper and her daughter) very nearly defeated the Salvadoran government and armed forces. It was a decision taken by a Colonel who happened to command the military academy (not functioning at the time) but gained command of the city because of the attack Clear case of tactical stupidity resulting in strategic and political disaster.

Last point: In my recent review essay in the Journal (w/Amb Ed Corr) we noted the difference between assisting a funtitoning government and military and having to create one because we have destroyed what previously existed and are now the occupying power. We noted that this situation was analogous to what Callwell called Imperial Policing or what the Marines later practiced in the Banana Wars. We agree with Neustadt and May (Madhu, see their THINKING IN TIME) that analogies must be used with great care but we also cannot escape their use. If we are the occupying power then WE must nation build - an obligation under the laws of war. If we are a supporting power then the host government must nation build if it does not want to see an insurgency return. How we and our allies undertake those tasks is a question that is always frought with peril. I would simply add that we did reasonably well in these tasks in both set of circumstances in Grenada, Panama, El Salvador, and Peru between 1983 and 1995. All 4 are reasonably well functioing democracies two or more decades later.

Cheers
JohnT

Bill Moore
08-04-2013, 03:04 AM
Quotes are from JohnT's post:


1. The shift toward Asia was, in fact, made for perfectly valid strategic reasons. But it also has the effect of reemphasizing the "big one". The issue here is whether the legitimate concern over a potential peer competitor is at the expense of the more constant small wars threats and capabilities. It is an issue of balance and one we have not done well with over time.

I'm not sure if anyone is looking at the next "big one", the "big one" is a bit a straw man in my opinion intended to downplay the risk of another war between states in favor for transforming the military into little more than a low intensity conflict force. I hope the military is investing in many able to fight and prevail against another state actor, but not at the expense of maintaining our small wars skills. It seems many of our small wars zealots, are generally our younger officers who didn't serve in the military when our joint war fighting capability wasn't much better than the USSR's as demonstrated in Grenada. They quickly forget, or came in after the initial major combat operations to oust the Taliban and Saddam, that those capabilities are still essential. That leaves all the stuff between those major combat operations that often fall into the realm of small wars. The first question is the military really bad them at them, or is the real issue stupid policies? If the military is bad at small wars, then is it at the tactical or operational level? or both? If we're going to maintain or develop the needed skills, then we need to get into DOTMLPF specifics to address our weaknesses, but before we can do that those weaknesses need to be clarified. Then we can revamp our education, training, manning, organizations, etc. as needed so they're capable of operating in the full spectrum of conflict. We need to avoid the straw man argument of the "next big one". It is a COINdista myth that misrepresents what those opposed to the COINdistas are saying. The COINdistas can't predict the future anymore than those opposed to our involvement in COIN. Our national level leaders are telling us to prepare for a range of new threats in an increasingly unpredictable world. To me that means a force with a wide range of capabilities that is agile and flexible, and can operate effective throughout the full spectrum of conflict. It includes cyber and space domains now, it includes runts like North Korea getting nukes, dangerous transnational criminal organizations, terrorist organizations, dangerous state actors, and in some cases assisting a partner deal with an insurgency. I actually think we a lot of things the legacy force needs to adapt to, and I don't think we're there yet. Small wars is only part of the equation.


2. It is not the fact that there are more small wars than big ones but rather that the history of the military of the US (and the colonies before we were a country) saw much more engagement in both numbers of cases and longer periods than big war engagements. If past is prologue, then we need to keep studying the small wars along with the big ones and be prepared to fight them.

Agreed, see above, but what does being prepared to fight them mean? Why aren't we prepared now? Most importantly, what do we need to do?


3. The Army as an institution did turn its institutional back on small wars after Vietnam. Although there were pockets where an institutional memory was retained - LTC Don Vought at CGSC (Fort Leavenworth) salvaged all the stuff on COIN in the 70s and stored the documents under the heading of "Terrorism" (which was then in vogue). In the 93 I had a student there who on his deployment to Haiti the next year lamented that he had not paid more attention to what we were giving him with regard to small wars - and he was a good one. My big army counterparts in the 80s did not pay much attention to anything that was going on in SOUTHCOM because it really was not career enhancing. Yet, if that was the whole picture, we would never have had David Petraeus, H.R. McMaster (who was in the CGSC class during my tenure and published his well received book that year),or some of the other leaders of the COIN resurgence. Again, I would argue that the issue os one of balance.

SF belong solely to the Army before USSOCOM (SF is still part of the Army, but receives its SOF doctrinal direction and SOF unique funding from SOCOM), and even before USSOCOM stood up SF was still carrying the small wars torch. Regular Army Officers and NCOs attended FID training at our Institute for Military Assistance before they deployed on FID missions (maybe a model worth relooking). However, not all was well in the force, and now I'm going to support you on why we need to be concerned about the future.

There were many powerful officers in the Army who were opposed to SF and Small Wars in general, and we had friends in the big Army like GEN Myers. However, SF leadership felt threatened enough in the early/mid 80s to compel SF to focus on Direct Action and Strategic Reconnaissance (before it became Special Reconnaissance) to keep SF relevant in Big Army's eyes and thus funded. At least that is the rumors we heard on the teams when shifted our focus from UW to conducting DA and SR. I hope our SF leadership didn't embrace these missions for any other reason than to keep SF alive. I definitely don't want to see us go back to those dark days. It almost seems unconceivable that we could go back to those days, but I'm sure many felt it was inconceivable after Vietnam to forget the lessons from that war.

We're on the same side that we maintain these skills and the knowledge gained, but again we have to move beyond broad sweeping statements like we can't afford to lose them and provide solutions that can be acted upon.


4. Bill, I don't think that you can avoid addressing policy and strategy in any discussion of the application of military power. Saint Carl (aka CvC) made the point that "war is the extension of politik (translates as both politic and policy depending on context) with the addition of other means." That, to me, means that the "strategic corporal" is not confined to the USMC. What we do at the tactical and operational levels have profound impacts on the strategic and higher levels. A Salvadoran student of mine at Leavenworth stated in class that the decision taken during the FMLN 89 offensive to murder the Jesuit leadership of the U of Central America (and their housekeeper and her daughter) very nearly defeated the Salvadoran government and armed forces. It was a decision taken by a Colonel who happened to command the military academy (not functioning at the time) but gained command of the city because of the attack Clear case of tactical stupidity resulting in strategic and political disaster.

My point is we can do little to influence policy. The military isn't going to stop Sen. McCain from going to Syria and posing with terrorists and pushing for a policy to arm the anti-Syrian Government opposition and their Al-Qaeda allies. The military isn't going to stop idealist politicians from pushing policies like R2P, and the military won't stop future Bush administrations from creating policies related to building shinning cities on the hill in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our military leadership can advise against it, but at the end of the day we salute and move out. However, we can influence our education and training to better prepare our forces for a broader range of contingencies.

See: http://zenpundit.com/?p=24935


2. Policy is the True Fog of War:

Having a clearly defined, coherently articulated policy based upon vital interests and empirical facts that sets a few realistic objectives in a way that makes possible shared understanding and broad political support is no way to go about losing wars.


Last point: In my recent review essay in the Journal (w/Amb Ed Corr) we noted the difference between assisting a functioning government and military and having to create one because we have destroyed what previously existed and are now the occupying power. We noted that this situation was analogous to what Callwell called Imperial Policing or what the Marines later practiced in the Banana Wars. We agree with Neustadt and May (Madhu, see their THINKING IN TIME) that analogies must be used with great care but we also cannot escape their use. If we are the occupying power then WE must nation build - an obligation under the laws of war. If we are a supporting power then the host government must nation build if it does not want to see an insurgency return. How we and our allies undertake those tasks is a question that is always fraught with peril. I would simply add that we did reasonably well in these tasks in both set of circumstances in Grenada, Panama, El Salvador, and Peru between 1983 and 1995. All 4 are reasonably well functioning democracies two or more decades later.

I applaud the effort you made to further differentiate FID from Occupation Operations. I am an advocate for developing an occupation doctrine regardless of how politically incorrect it is. Hopefully we never have to use it, but it would at least make us think about the possibility and plan for it which we didn't do well in Afghanistan and Iraq. In my view that is the most significant lesson from the last decade at war.

John T. Fishel
08-04-2013, 08:41 PM
that I found so very stimulating when I first found SWJ. thanks Bill.

Perhaps the distinction between FID, SFA, and occupation operations points in the direction of how we should educate and train the force. FID is an SF mission. I find it difficult to see how most conventional unit personnel can undertake the full spectrum of FID but they certainly can undertake parts of the mission. Those parts are what we call SFA (or is that term no longer in use?) In an occupation we have to do many things ourselves and we most certainly need a doctrine for them - concur with you on that Bill (along with much else).

I wonder if the aversion at senior levels (both political and military) to call de facto occupations by that name is related to the desire for a "cleaner" conventional war. (God help us if we ever really have to fight one of those against a peer or near peer competitor because it will be bloodier than anything we have seen in a long, long time.) That said, we need to think about how we prepare for the full spectrum of conflict as well as prepare our officers to provide good advice to the civilian policy makers. We do have some good programs in place. DOS has a number of military officers assigned to the Bureau of Pol-Mil Affairs while DOD has a significant number of current or former DOS people. You may recall ASD-SO/LIC Allen Holmes during the Clinton Administration who was a career Foreign Service officer. More recently, Mike Sheehan (who graduated from Leavenworth in June 1992 as I arrived) went to work for his old grad school prof, Madelaine Albright, at both the US Mission to the UN and then at State. When Mike retired from the Army (he was SF) he went to work at State as a civilian, then NYC, and just retired from DOD where he too was ASD-SO/LIC. Lots of examples and a number of paths of this kind, only some of which are institutionalized by programs like FAO. Seems to me that a good place to start is to research what programs actually exist and see if they prepare officers to think beyond the operational and tactical so that they can provide both appropriate advice and participate fully and effectively in policy debates as they get to positions where those debates take place. I would note that some take place as low as the Ambassador's Country Team in the field and on the Interagency Policy Committees in DC (where military representation can be as low as LTC/CDR on occasion).

Cheers

JohnT

Madhu
08-04-2013, 09:22 PM
Last point: In my recent review essay in the Journal (w/Amb Ed Corr) we noted the difference between assisting a funtitoning government and military and having to create one because we have destroyed what previously existed and are now the occupying power. We noted that this situation was analogous to what Callwell called Imperial Policing or what the Marines later practiced in the Banana Wars. We agree with Neustadt and May (Madhu, see their THINKING IN TIME) that analogies must be used with great care but we also cannot escape their use. If we are the occupying power then WE must nation build - an obligation under the laws of war. If we are a supporting power then the host government must nation build if it does not want to see an insurgency return. How we and our allies undertake those tasks is a question that is always frought with peril. I would simply add that we did reasonably well in these tasks in both set of circumstances in Grenada, Panama, El Salvador, and Peru between 1983 and 1995. All 4 are reasonably well functioing democracies two or more decades later.

Cheers
JohnT

I'm pretty sure the other kind don't eat much and so don't need feeding.

Sorry, bad joke. And the following is not about the SWORD model, but a more generalized comment on the fascination of a British imperial history without a more full rounded study of what other colonial contemporaries said, colonial population histories and viewpoints, and newer research based on declassified materials.


I understand the need for models but what I don't understand is the return to people like Calwell without adding more current information to the mix. Models need to be updated from time to time and reviewed from the vantage point of more current information.

The entire second half of the twentieth century into the twenty-first in South Asia is all about nation building, what is this fascination with British imperial policing? If you are interested in nation building, then you have to understand more about it than models frozen in a point in time.

It's hard to build a nation when its educated classes are sometimes targeted for assasination and some of this too via some proxy effort that is ignored for a variety of reasons.

There is current research that taps into a broader range of information on the subject of nation building and, yet, the models discussed here seem frozen in time.

I listened to Rufus Phillips on the John Batchelor show once (I think it was him) and the understanding of the region sounded like the 1980's.

When the strategic endstate is viewed differently by at least one ally in the mix, you can't just outsource some of your counterinsurgency work through that very military. And, the history shows that attempts to change the national calculus fails time and time again. That was the point of the Komer quote I included to your article.

The literature is rich on the subject of nation building in South Asia, it's gone far beyond 90's era peacekeeping literature and all I'd like to see is some of this included in the discussion.

Occupations, colonial imperial policing, wars of conquest (Indian wars), how do these relate to the medium sized wars of Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan?

The models shove too many different types of conflicts together, we can't do some of the things we did during the Indian wars or during colonial times. That doesn't mean we don't study them, but it does mean you understand their limitations as models for contemporary conflict.

And you have to first know something about the world into which you are introducing the model. Ignorance of the basic strategic set up is not a good way to go. That's why I say the discussion becomes thin. People are not interested in this and yet it is vitally important.

As Ken White said, we do small and large wars pretty good, it's our history with medium wars as an expeditionary third party that are problematic.

The models should make this distinction. Maybe they do.

Madhu
08-04-2013, 10:00 PM
I was only supposed to check in for a few minutes as a break from writing something else, and now look what you've all done?

I really don't mean my comments to sound hostile, I love the direction this conversation is taking and in that spirit I will try and post articles that support what I mean about different ways of looking at nation building.

For instance, I had posted an article from India Review about how the internationalization of Kashmir may have contributed to its intractibility as a conflict (although regional powers are responsible).

I think a neglected area of study is the way in which our own post WW2 security structure has reached its limits and is contributing to instability and preventing nation building, or at least, impeding it.

That is the value of looking at newer research and the questions it asks.

Good comments, all.

TheCurmudgeon
08-05-2013, 12:37 PM
Here are a few ideas to offer up.

1. One size does/doesn't fit all. Taking SF FID out of the mix, can you really do stabilization with a hunter/killer Army? When pushed, won't they just revert back to their initial training and kill everything in sight. Is that what you really want?

2. Is soft better? In the early days of Iraq we ran over looters cars with tanks and woke everyone up at 0200 with Bradley’s firing into nothing as a “show of force” and we were loved (or maybe we weren’t). Was that a better model? Is it really better to be feared than loved?

3. An American Foreign Legion. Should we be picking up some of the “best and the brightest” military officers and interpreters from Iraq and Afghanistan and putting them in an American Foreign Legion of sorts to advise on future operations? Not a full blown force, more an advisory element. About one per company plus staff personnel at the BN/BDE level for those units regionally aligned.

davidbfpo
08-05-2013, 05:37 PM
Only one of three points made
Here are a few ideas to offer up.

3. An American Foreign Legion. Should we be picking up some of the “best and the brightest” military officers and interpreters from Iraq and Afghanistan and putting them in an American Foreign Legion of sorts to advise on future operations? Not a full blown force, more an advisory element. About one per company plus staff personnel at the BN/BDE level for those units regionally aligned.

Sometime ago now SWC have discussed this idea, in 2007 ' Create a U.S. Foreign Legion':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2510 and in 2006 'All-Mercenary service?', which is one of many threads on the PMC option:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=474

You will see an American Foreign Legion didn't get much support and since then we know PMCs have taken on an even greater role for the USG. In the UK there is a greater use of PMC, although we don't call them that, just contractors - mainly IIRC for logistic roles, not combat.

There is IMHO merit in having a small, if not larger, non-American element in your regionally aligned brigades - if only to provide language and cultural expertise. Immense difficulties I expect, notably who would, under what conditions and basing not in the USA.

With due respect to Madhu, who has reservations over looking at British Imperial practices, there was a long-standing practice of integration of British and Indian units - notably at brigade level. I'm about to read an article on the inter-war practice of an Indian machine gun platoon, plus mules, being part of British infantry battalions 1921-1938.

Personally for the USA IMO what is needed are American individuals and formed units willing to serve abroad under foreign command - away from NATO and other alliances.

jmm99
08-05-2013, 06:29 PM
Personally for the USA IMO what is needed are American individuals and formed units willing to serve abroad under foreign command - away from NATO and other alliances.

Lloyd George and Douglas Haig still live on :) - and, one must concede, they did pick up two US divisions (incl. my WWII dad's 30th) to put under Monash's command.

That being said, I think your idea will be shot down by any number of modern day Pershings - IMO: I give the edge to Pershing's arguments (vol. 1 (http://www.amazon.com/My-Experiences-World-War-Military/dp/0830640061), vol. 2 (http://www.amazon.com/Experiences-Volume-Military-Classics-Series/dp/0830694072)).

Regards

Mike

davidbfpo
08-05-2013, 08:11 PM
New times needs new alliances!

If the USA is going to get involved in future 'small wars', especially in new areas of conflict, amidst Muslims and those unused to them it needs to change. Call them advisers, regional brigades, SOF or whatever.

My point is that beforehand Americans serving with others has far more benefit, yes under foreign command. It is highly unlikely anyone can predict where those 'small wars' will be. Let alone which ones American politicians will decide warrant their "blood & treasure".

TheCurmudgeon
08-05-2013, 11:19 PM
Personally for the USA IMO what is needed are American individuals and formed units willing to serve abroad under foreign command - away from NATO and other alliances.

I would volunteer for Australia.

Actually, it was the Australians that made me think seriously about this. While I was at CGSC they were recruiting Majors to join their ranks. I thought they were joking but they weren't. So why not us.

As for us working under another country, I don't think you could ever sell that to the US and I wonder if we would really be accepted by any other country.

jmm99
08-06-2013, 02:39 AM
Of course, that's my personal negative view of coalitions and alliances, new world orders, nation-building and global force projections. However, within those constraints, everything is on the table - from FID and SFA to nuclear weapons. So, I can't avoid addressing your proposal, which in WWI terms was "amalgamation".

I'd tender the argument that support or opposition to amalgamation depends on one's biases for or against alliances and coalitions, trust or distrust for allies and partners, and the variant endgoals of the parties. In my world, biases are not a sin, but are essential to playing the game - and taking them into account is essential to winning. Biases determine the "facts" and the "rules".

Continuing with WWI and the AEF, we had three major sets of players: Lloyd George - Haig (amalgamation), Clemenceau - Foch (amalgamation) and Wilson - Pershing (non-amalgamation). Each set was outstandingly ruthless (despite soaring rhetoric) in securing its nation's political endgoals.

Now contrary to my conclusion (pro-Pershing in applying military ways and means to reach the ultimate political end - BTW I reject it, the Wilsonian New World Order; but it wasn't Pershing's province to question that - life was easier for him because he largely believed in it) is David Trask's 1993, The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918 (Modern War Studies) (http://www.amazon.com/Coalition-Warmaking-1917-1918-Modern-Studies/dp/070060619X).


Underscoring an emerging revisionist view of the American Expeditionary Forces, David Trask argues that the performances of the AEF and General John J. Pershing were much more flawed than conventional accounts have suggested. This can best be seen, he shows, by analyzing coalition warfare at the level of grand tactics--i.e., campaign military operations.

The AEF didn't perform well in France, Trask contends, because it was committed as an independent force before it had time to train and gain experience. President Wilson and General Pershing's initial insistence on an independent American force rather than an integration with existing French and British armies resulted in costly delays and bitter victories in the decisive Allied counteroffensives against Ludendorff and the Central Powers.

Using a tactic uncommon in previous studies of the AEF, David Trask views the campaign of 1918 through the eyes of the highest-ranking of field commanders, including Pershing, Marshal Ferdinand Foch of the Allied and Associated Powers, and General Erich Ludendorff of the Central Powers.

Trask's portrayal of Pershing reveals a self-righteous leader who was unwilling to correct initial misconceptions that marred the doctrine and training of the AEF. Consequently, Trask demonstrates, Pershing's stormy relations with Allied military and civilian leader seriously undermined the AEF and its efforts to conduct coalition warfare.

No surprise (given Trask being the author) that this book is simply outstanding in its research and depth. It also was written just after Gulf I, when alliances and coalitions, new world orders, and military arts revolutions were all the rage. Thus, I detect a positive bias for alliances and coalitions - and for a more "cosmopolitan" than "national" approach.

Why bring up this case study of a century-old "Large War" (with 1000+pp. in reading both sides - which is a requirement to learn from it) in a modern "Small Wars" thread on Lessons Learned ? Because its lessons apply to every war involving partners - and the material is excellent.

Regards

Mike

davidbfpo
08-06-2013, 01:59 PM
Perhaps the USA and its main allies can encourage regional coalitions, with a joint command with US / allied contributions before combat. I appreciate AFRICOM has spent considerable time supporting such regional training and exercise packages.

I have stressed before combat simply as regional only combat / peacekeeping operations should be preferable to a direct US / allied action, shades of Mali and Somalia.

A number of nations, not only in Africa, have a clear political position on limiting partnership with the USA and some allies. Those nations also face a potential, if not actual threat from AQ plus, but appear to be reluctant to use their "treasure" and risk their blood.

All this ignores the missing dimension - countering the jihadist message.

davidbfpo
08-06-2013, 07:56 PM
An ex-CIA analyst of some note, but unknown to me, Nada Bakos commented on the current situation:
I have never thought of AQ as down and out or part of a resurgence, it's a metamorphosis. An ideology has tentacles, that's why it's hard to predict how or if it will grow. Each of these regional groups all share the same ideological platform that central al Qaida has propagated since the 1990s. It’s time to re-evaluate the United States’ definition of victory against the War on Terror. Is defeating al Qaeda’s central leadership considered a victory when the ideology fosters a following of lone individuals and loose networks? Given my experience following Zarqawi, it’s my opinion that we need to step back from the reality we came to terms with right after 9/11 and evolve with the extremism we hope to combat.

Link:http://www.twitlonger.com/show/n_1rlp8i9

Her bio:https://espionneanalyst.wordpress.com/about/

Stephen Tankel, who I do know, chimes in with an article full of choice quotes; here is one:
...the fundamental question of how we adapt our counter-terrorism architecture to nest within, rather than drive, our security policy.

Link:http://warontherocks.com/2013/08/not-another-al-qaeda-article/

selil
08-06-2013, 11:11 PM
An ex-CIA analyst of some note, but unknown to me, Nada Bakos commented on the current situation:

Link:http://www.twitlonger.com/show/n_1rlp8i9

Her bio:https://espionneanalyst.wordpress.com/about/

Stephen Tankel, who I do know, chimes in with an article full of choice quotes; here is one:

Link:http://warontherocks.com/2013/08/not-another-al-qaeda-article/


Nada Bakos is a tiger. She knows her stuff.

Bill Moore
08-07-2013, 08:51 AM
Perhaps the USA and its main allies can encourage regional coalitions, with a joint command with US / allied contributions before combat. I appreciate AFRICOM has spent considerable time supporting such regional training and exercise packages.

I have stressed before combat simply as regional only combat / peacekeeping operations should be preferable to a direct US / allied action, shades of Mali and Somalia.

A number of nations, not only in Africa, have a clear political position on limiting partnership with the USA and some allies. Those nations also face a potential, if not actual threat from AQ plus, but appear to be reluctant to use their "treasure" and risk their blood.

All this ignores the missing dimension - countering the jihadist message.

This is already part of the U.S. strategy, but operationalizing it requires buy in and commitment from regional partners. It works when it works, but in many cases this approach isn't currently doable due to internal or regional politics.

davidbfpo
08-08-2013, 03:46 PM
There are already a number of thread titles which include the word 'lost' and today whilst merging:wry: I came across one which may warrant reading today. It is from May 2008: 'Lost Lessons of Counterinsurgency' by CavGuy (aka Niel Smith, who incidentally dips in occasionally these days), which had 7k views and 49 posts, including some by Gian Gentile:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6247