Book #1: Religion and State by L. Carl Brown [Archive]

omarali50

09-19-2013, 08:46 PM

I have only reached page 42 (I started reading Wolf Hall, which turned out to be a MUCH more interesting and intelligent book ;)) but until now (and of course, it’s still too early to say much) I am not very impressed. It’s a good summary of some basics, but the approach is too conventional and not “rich” or especially insightful.
Until now. I may change my mind later.
A few minor random observations:
Chapter one is a good quick description of where Muslims live and what sects there are (of course, population figures are out of date). But it may be unnecessary to even bring up the fact that “more Muslims live outside the middle east...” because crucial theological and ideological questions are all being fought out on a middle-eastern basis. To the extent that Islam is an issue in the political life of Muslim countries, it is an issue with an almost exclusively middle-eastern history and background.
Chapter 2: p-20’s description of the “Muslim view of Christianity and Judaism” (that Judaism and Christianity are partial revelations, later completed by Islam) is one way some Muslims may look upon this issue. But others (probably more numerous in the general public, and certainly more representative of the Salafist, Wahabist and Maudoodist view) will place emphasis on the fact that God sent an (in its own way) complete revelation to them too (maybe different in some details, but not “partial”) but they have corrupted it. What they now know as Judaism or Christianity is NOT what God sent them. This last point is crucial.
P-21: West Pakistan’s violent suppression of Bengali nationalism is a very poor example of the “narcissism of small differences” that Brown is discussing here.
P-22. This is extreme nitpicking, but really, the way Muslims see Western power today and the way Christendom saw Muslim power in the middle ages are NOT symmetrical opposites.
P-26. The principle of “no compulsion in religion” was historically NOT the basis for tolerance it is now advertised to be. Tolerance was very real in many periods, but it was pragmatic. When less pragmatic rulers decided to be intolerant, masses of clerics and divines did not stand up to say “but you are violating the principle of X”. The principle is a recent discovery.

Btw, if you are interested in comparing monotheisms, professor FE Peters is your man. Really amazing scholarship. http://www.goodreads.com/author/show/397928.F_E_Peters

jmm99

09-20-2013, 02:26 AM

From p.20:

Jews, Christians, and Muslims worship the same God, believe in revelation, holy scriptures, heaven and hell, and have similar attitudes toward history and the role of humankind in fulfilling the divine purpose.

If I've heard or read the bolded phrase once, I've heard or read it a thousand times. Of course, it's not true. It's impossible to square a Unitarian God with a Trinitarian God. Nonetheless, "we worship the same God" is a common piece of rhetoric for those who want to bridge the faith gap. I suspect that it does more harm than good.

Brown, while apparently oblivious of this at p.20, recognized the faith gap at pp.23-24:

Indeed, the Islamic religious outlook makes it extremely difficult for Muslims to understand the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, even less to view it sympathetically. To Muslims the idea of God-in-man comes across as shirk (literally, association, thus meaning the linking of any person or thing with the ineffable God), and shirk is the gravest of sins in Islam.

Some years ago I sat in on a discussion between an eminent Egyptian ‘alim and an equally eminent Catholic priest famed for his rich, nuanced scholarly study of Islam. An exhilarating atmosphere of mutual respect and mutual understanding reigned, but then the ‘alim raised the issue of the Trinity, bringing in its wake a discussion characterized by misunderstanding and even animosity poorly papered over by scholarly politesse on both sides.

If I, as a "shirker" (say, a traditional Roman Catholic), tell a Muslim that we worship the same God, am I not blaspheming his God ?

That's the major quibble I found in Chapter 2.

Regards

Mike

TheCurmudgeon

09-20-2013, 02:49 PM

Tukhachevskii

09-25-2013, 12:38 PM

[A] Chapter 2: p-20’s description of the “Muslim view of Christianity and Judaism” (that Judaism and Christianity are partial revelations, later completed by Islam) is one way some Muslims may look upon this issue. But others (probably more numerous in the general public, and certainly more representative of the Salafist, Wahabist and Maudoodist view) will place emphasis on the fact that God sent an (in its own way) complete revelation to them too (maybe different in some details, but not “partial”) but they have corrupted it. What they now know as Judaism or Christianity is NOT what God sent them. This last point is crucial.

[B] P-22. This is extreme nitpicking, but really, the way Muslims see Western power today and the way Christendom saw Muslim power in the middle ages are NOT symmetrical opposites.

[A]
Correct, indeed according to Akhtar, Quran and the Secular Mind ( http://www.amazon.com/The-Quran-Secular-Mind-Philosophy/dp/0415437830)

With the coming of Islam, the earlier people of the book are dismissed as a failed spiritual experiment (Q:57:16–17). p. 29

And in Freidman’s words, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Tolerance-Coercion-Islam-Interfaith-Civilization/dp/0521827035),

Islamic tradition Islam is not only the historical religion and institutional framework, which was brought into existence by the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century, but also the primordial religion of mankind, revealed to Adam at the time of his creation. This is intimately related to the conception that Adam was a prophet,16 and to the notion that Ibrahim was a Muslim in this metahistorical sense. The idea that Islam had been the primordial religion of mankind, preached by the prophets of old, created an affinity between the Prophet Muhammad [an excellent legitimating strategy on his part- T] and his predecessors in the prophetic office. Muslim tradition frequently presents the Prophet as a brother, or a spiritual heir, of ancient prophets. Numerous episodes in his traditional sıra reflect this perception. During his visit to the city of Ta’if, the Prophet met a young man from the city of Nınawa (= Nineveh) and described himself as brother of Yünus b. Matta (= Jonah) who hailed from the same city (dhaka akhı kana nabiyyan wa ana nabı). When he reached Medina and was told that the Jews were fasting on the tenth day of the first month (ashüra, corresponding to the Day of Atonement, yom ha-kippurim), because on that day Allah saved the sons of Israel from their enemies and Moses fasted on that day, Muhammad said: “I am more deserving of Moses than you are” (ana a˛aqqu bi-Müsa minkum) and fasted on that day. He is also reported to have said that he was “the person worthiest of Jesus” (ana awla al-nas bi-Isa b. Maryam). The intimate relationship between Jesus and Muhammad is sometimes explained by the belief that no prophet was sent by Allah between them.All these traditions can be subsumed under the general statement according to which “the prophets are half-brothers: their mothers are different, but their religion is one” (… al-anbiya ikhwatun li-fiallat ummahatuhum shatta wa dınuhum wahid). This is understood to mean that the prophets’ belief in the unity of God and in the principles of their respective religions (usül al-dın) is one, but they differ with regard to the particular laws ( furü amaliyyat, fiqhiyyat). This is comparable with certain changes which occurred in the religion of Islam itself: at one time the Muslims were commanded to face Jerusalem in prayer; later their qibla was changed to Mecca. Nevertheless, Islam remained the same religion. Similar developments can be discerned in the development of the prophetic religions in general. For instance, the Children of Israel had been commanded to keep the Sabbath; when Islam emerged, the observance of the Sabbath was forbidden and replaced by Friday. Thus, though particular laws have been changed by Allah in the course of time, the religion of all the prophets is still the same.

In other words, Islam abrogated all previous religions (anything that comes afterward is just madness of course). Of course, with Islam the concept of fitrah ( http://i-epistemology.net/attachments/408_V12N1%20Spring%2095%20-%20Mohamed%20-%20Fitrah%20and%20its%20Bearing%20on%20Islamic%20P sychology.pdf) states that all people are born Muslim and are only perverted from Truth by their non-Islamic parents or the culture they live in. One of the purposes of Jihad (as a subordinate concept [ways] of Dawa [ends]) is to free them from the “shackles of self-imposed immaturity” (if I may pervert Kant). What we call the Islamic conquests were called the futuhaat (the openings) and aimed at freeing the world from Jahilliya and bringing it back to Truth. Sort of like the Yanks making the world safe for democracy and freedom (or, rather their concept of it) or even the Communists.

If I may I’d like to offer a counter-point in the form of an anecdote. In 2008 I was sitting at the library in Brunel “university” researching for an essay on Soviet security policy, sharing a table with a four Pakistani girls, one with a hijab. They were talking about boys so I ignored them for the most part (apart from when they used their mobiles…in the library!) Anyway, somewhere between Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 of Tucker’s, Soviet Political Mind, their conversation had turned to religion. One of the girls said that their father had told them that all religions were equal and that everyone had a heaven to go to. Some of the girls nodded. Except for Hijab-girl. She smiled condescendingly and said (and I paraphrase) “that’s what they say but that’s not what our deen (i.e. religion) says. If you knew Islam properly you would know that. How can the kaffir be equal to a Muslim?” Knowing where that conversation was going (not an untypical conversation for Brunel, or SOAS, or Kings, or even Oxford) I decided to repair to the bar. Sometimes having a permanent tan has its advantages you know (I wouldn’t have heard that conversation otherwise).

[B] An important point often neglected. Many people forget, or don’t even know, that up until the end of the Second Crusade the Crusaders themselves were unaware that they were fighting a rival universalist group and had been calling the Muslims “Hagarenes” up to that point. The whole collision of Europe with Islam is a messy field of, if I may borrow a phrase, perception and misperception.

Tukhachevskii

09-25-2013, 12:39 PM

[C] P-26. The principle of “no compulsion in religion” was historically NOT the basis for tolerance it is now advertised to be. Tolerance was very real in many periods, but it was pragmatic. When less pragmatic rulers decided to be intolerant, masses of clerics and divines did not stand up to say “but you are violating the principle of X”. The principle is a recent discovery. [/url]

[C] Let’s not forget, firstly, that that verse is a meccan verse and was thus, in Islamic theology, abrogated by the following Medinan verses. Of course there will be those who decry recourse to Naksh as hair-splitting. Apparently, Islamic theology is irrelevant and the use of it by Mujahedeen forces globally is nothing more than opportunism (i.e., they’d do what they do anyway). But one tends not to be able to argue with people like that.

As per the Encyclopedia of the Quran, Vol. 5 ( http://www.amazon.com/Encyclopaedia-Quran-Five-Dammen-McAuliffe/dp/9004123563),

Q 2:256, “There is no compulsion in religion . . .” (lā ikrāha fī l-dīni) has become the locus classicus for discussions of religious tolerance in Islam. Surprisingly enough, according to the “circumstances of revelation” (asbāb al-nuzūl) literature (see occasions of revelation), it was revealed in connection with the expulsion of the Jewish tribe of Banū l-Nadīr from Medina in 4⁄625 In the earliest works of exegesis (see exegesis of the Quran: classical and medieval), the verse is understood as an injunction (amr) to refrain from the forcible imposition of Islam, though there is no unanimity of opinion regarding the precise group of infidels to which the injunction had initially applied. Commentators who maintain that the verse was originally meant as applicable to all people consider it as abrogated (mansūkh) by q 9:5, q 9:29, or q 9:73 (see abrogation). Viewing it in this way is necessary in order to avoid the glaring contradiction between the idea of tolerance and the policies of early Islam which did not allow the existence of polytheism — or any other religion — in a major part of the Arabian peninsula. Those who think that the verse was intended, from the very beginning, only for the People of the Book, need not consider it as abrogated: though Islam did not allow the existence of any religion other than Islam in most of the peninsula, the purpose of the jihād (q.v.)against the People of the Book, according to q 9:29, is their submission and humiliation rather than their forcible conversion to Islam.[...]

These tolerant attitudes toward the non-Muslims of Arabia were not destined to last. After the Muslim victory in the battle of Badr (q.v.; 2⁄624), the Qur_ān started to promote the idea of religious uniformity in the Arabian peninsula. q 8:39 enjoins the Muslims “to fight… till there is no temptation [to abandon Islam; fitna] and the religion is God’s entirely” (cf. q 2:193).Once this development took place, the clauses in the _ahd al-umma bestowing legitimacy on the existence of the Jewish religion in Medina had to undergo substantial reinterpretation. The clause stipulating that “the Jews have their religion and the believers have theirs” was now taken to mean that the Jewish religion is worthless (ammā l-dīn fa-laysū minhu fī shay.[...] According to them [spiritualist theologians], q 2:256 is not a command at all. Rather it ought to be understood as a piece of information (khabar), or, to put it differently, a description of the human condition: it conveys the idea that embracing a religious faith (q.v.) can only be the result of empowerment and free choice (tamkīn, ikhtiyār). It cannot be the outcome of constraint and coercion (qasr, ijbār). Phrased differently, belief is “an action of the heart (q.v.)” in which no compulsion is likely to yield sound results (li-anna l-ikrāh _alā l-īmānlā ya_i__u li-annahu _amal al-qalb). Religious coercion would also create a theologically unacceptable situation: if people were coerced into true belief, their positive response to prophetic teaching would become devoid of value, the world would cease to be “an abode of trial” (dār al-ibtilā_; Rāzī, Tafsīr, vii, 13; Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād, iv, 67; see trust and patience; trial) and, consequently, the moral basis for the idea of reward and punishment would be destroyed. This argumentationuses the verse in support of the idea of free will. p.292

Similar was the fate of q 109:6, which was declared abrogated by q 9:5 (āyat al-sayf ) or interpreted as a threat against the polytheists. This new attitude was also expressed in the prophetic tradition according to which “no two religions will coexist in the Arabian peninsula” (lā yajtami_u dīnāni fī jazīrat al-_arab). Despite the apparent meaning of q 2:256, Islamic law allowed coercion of certain groups into Islam. Numerous traditionists and jurisprudents ( fuqahā_) allow coercing female polytheists and Zoroastrians (see magians) who fall into captivity to become Muslims — otherwise sexual relations with them would not be permissible (cf. q 2:221; see sex and sexuality; marriage and divorce). Similarly, forcible conversion of non-Muslim children was also allowed by numerous jurists in certain circumstances, especially if the children were taken captive (see captives) or found without their parents or if one of their parents embraced Islam. It was also the common practice to insist on the conversion of the Manichaeans, who were never awarded the status of ahl al-dhimma. Another group against whom religious coercion may be practiced are apostates from Islam (see apostasy). As a rule, classical Muslim law demands that apostatesbe asked to repent and be put to death if they refuse.
P. 292

As Friedman explains in, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Tolerance-Coercion-Islam-Interfaith-Civilization/dp/0521827035),

Concerning the question of abrogation (naskh), two exegetical trends can be discerned in the Quranic commentaries. According to some traditionists and commentators, Quran 2:256 initially applied to all people, and was one of the “armistice verses” (ayat al-muwadafia).75 Eventually it was abrogated. Quran 9:73 abrogated it with regard to the polytheists, and Qur√n 9:29 did the same with regard to the People of the Book. According to numerous other traditions, it was abrogated by “the verse of the sword” (yat al-sayf ), a term normally used for Quran 9:5. In other words, Quran 2:256 was revealed as universally valid and prohibited religious coercion with regard to all humanity. After the revelation of the two later verses, however, it was abrogated and the ruling included in it has not been in force ever since. This view of the doctrinal development can be supported, at least in part, by the jurists’ perception of the history of Islam during the Prophet’s lifetime: according to this perception, the Prophet fought the Arab mushrikün, forced them to embrace Islam, and did not accept from them anything except conversion. It is inconceivable that the Prophet would have done this if he had been obliged to follow Quran 2:256.

Both verses that are said to have abrogated Quran 2:256 speak about jihad. It can be inferred from this that the commentators who consider Quran 2:256 as abrogated perceive jihad as contradicting the idea of religious freedom. While it is true that religious differences are mentioned in both Quran 9:29 and 9:73 as the reason because of which the Muslims were commanded to wage war, none of them envisages the forcible conversion of the vanquished enemy. Quran 9:29 defines the purpose of the war as the imposition of the jizya on the People of the Book and their humiliation, while Quran 9:73 speaks only about the punishment awaiting the infidels and the hypocrites in the hereafter, and leaves the earthly purpose of the war undefined. Jihad and religious freedom are not mutually exclusive by necessity; religious freedom could be granted to the non-Muslims after their defeat, and commentators who maintain that Quran 2:256 was not abrogated freely avail themselves of this exegetical possibility with regard to theJews, the Christians and the Zoroastrians. However, the commentators who belong to the other exegetical trend do not find it advisable to think along these lines, and find it necessary to insist on the abrogation of Quran 2:256 in order to resolve the seeming contradiction between this verse and the numerous verses enjoining jihad. p. 102-3

I am also a fan of Peters work BTW.

Tukhachevskii

09-25-2013, 12:41 PM

If I, as a "shirker" (say, a traditional Roman Catholic), tell a Muslim that we worship the same God, am I not blaspheming his God ?

That's the major quibble I found in Chapter 2.

You’ll be fine if you’re a Nestorian or a Julianist.

The point you’ve made is not just a quibble but a major criticism and one I find recurring in many such texts (usually those with a polemically multi-cultural axe to grind).

The Christianity with which Mohammed was familiar, as were his contemporaries and many of his successors was that of the Arian, Monophysite and more importantly the Nestorian varieties with an admixture of Ethiopian Copt. Arabia and the Levant contained the major and significant (at the time) communities following heterodox variations of the Christian theme/tradition (“Christianity” if there is such a thing, unlike Islam, has a much more complex origin, who, for instance knows anything about the early Jewish Christian movements!). When Muslims speak of Christianity as having become perverted they do so on the basis of the understanding of Christianity that Muhammad himself held. In the Islamic worldview Trinitarian conceptions of Christ elevate him to the status of equality with God and thus approach polytheism(shirk) but only because their own understanding is based on sources inimical to that concept already. After the Islamic conquests many “Christian” communities actually found it easier to live under Islam because Muslims did not persecute them for refusing to tow the Constantinian line of Trinitarianism (but also because in holding such views they did not undermine the foundations of Islamic power given the Trinitarian outlook was associated with Islam’s major rival Byzantium). The role of these early heterodox communities in providing Islam with many of its conceptions of who and what Christ is/should be is interesting in terms of the history of ideas. Of course, Muhammad and Muslims only chose those aspects of these traditions that did not undermine Muhammad’s self concept or his vision for his followers.

The following provides a compressed introduction to this fascinating subject….

Irfan Shahid, “Islam and Oriens Christianus: Makka, 610-622 AD” in Grypeou, “The Encounter of Eastern Christianity with Early Islam” ( http://www.brill.com/encounter-eastern-christianity-early-islam)

“After the fall of the Ethiopian house of Abraha around 570 ad and the occupation of south Arabia by the Persians, the Ethiopians were scattered as communities in western Arabia, and it was in Makka that a strong Ethiopian colony was to be found in the forty years or so that followed the Persian occupation. They fought for the Makkans and protected them from external threats, guarded their caravans, and performed certain menial duties for them. More relevant for the theme of this chapter is to emphasize their assimilation into Arab and Makkan society. Ibn Habib has a chapter on Makkans who married Ethiopian women, and so some Makkans were sons of Ethiopian parents. Even more striking is the Ethiopian participation in the highest forms of Arabic culture in pre-Islamic times—poetry. The Ethiopian community in Arabia produced some poets, including the celebrated ‘Antar, whose Qasida was counted among the famous Mu‘allaqat, suspended odes. With important trade relations between Makka and Ethiopia across the Red Sea, and a strong Ethiopian colony in Makka itself performing various functions for the Makkans and contracting marriages with some of them, it is natural to suppose that the Makkans should have acquired some knowledge of Ethiopic, and that some Ethiopic words entered into the Arabic of the Makkans. It is also natural to suppose that this colony of Ethiopians must have had an Ethiopic Bible and a place where they could conduct their religious services, if not a church at least an oratory, and they must have had a cleric to celebrate their weddings and officiate at their funerals.[...]” p. 13-14
[...]
“great Christian Arab centre to the south of Makka, Najran in south Arabia, the city that was the scene of well-known martyrdoms which led to its rise as the great centre of pilgrimage in the peninsula. Most relevant for our question its emergence as the location of so many non-orthodox Christian denominations which gave the peninsula the reputation of being Arabia haeresium ferax, ‘Arabia the breeding ground of heresies”. P.18
[...]
“The following are the various Christian denominations which flourished in Najran and south Arabia, a region close to Makka and, what is more, Arabic speaking. They shed a bright light on Quranic Christology:

1. In the fourth century, the Emperor Constantius (who was an Arian like his father Constantine towards the end of his life, and like his successors down to Theodosius the Great) sent his emissary Theophilus Indus to convert south Arabia to Christianity. There the latter succeeded in founding three churches. The Arians, as is well known, emphasized the humanity of Christ and rejected his divinity. Although condemned by the Council of Nicea, Arianism lingered long mostly in the Roman occident, and it is just possible that it lingered also in the orient, in south Arabia, until the sixth or seventh century, as it did until that time among some of the Germanic tribes of western Europe.

2. More important are the Monophysites who dominated the entire Red Sea area, including south Arabia and Najran in particular. The moderate form of Monophysitism, that of Severus of Antioch, prevailed, but this could not have been the provenance of the Quranic rejection of Christ’s divinity, since it accepted the epithet Theotokos applied to the Virgin Mary, which also emphasized his divinity. What is relevant in bringing Monophysitism into this
discussion is to give attention to the appearance of a group within this larger Severan mainstream Monophysitism, namely the Julianists, followers of Julian of Halicarnassus, called the Aphthartodocetae, also related to Docetism, which in one of its forms held that before the crucifixion, Judas Iscariot or Simon of Cyrene was substituted for Jesus who thus miraculously escaped death. Docetism is derived from the Greek verb dokein, ‘to seem’, and the Quranic phrase on the denial of the crucifixion and the substitution of someone else for him, in the phrase wa-lakin shubbiha lahum, is practically a calque of the Greek docetic phrase of the substitution; the root of the Arabic shubbiha is identical with the Greek dokein, and this clearly points to a translation of this docetic view into Arabic in the sixth century, known in Najran where the Julianists lived. They and other related groups had flocked to Najran after being ejected from Orthodox Byzantium and it is there that they spread their teachings.

3. Then there were the Nestorians. The church in Najran owed its origin to Hira on the lower Euphrates, when one of their merchants, Hayyan by name, accepted Christianity there and brought it to Najran. Hira was not then Nestorian, but it became later the centre of Arab Nestorianism in the Land of the two rivers and it kept close relations with Najran and south Arabia. When the Nestorians were firmly established in Nisibis and became the great missionaries of Christianity in Asia, Najran was one of their targets (and so was south Arabia) and their presence in that region is established without doubt. To them may be ascribed the most striking phrase that described Jesus in the Quran, namely ‘Isa Ibn Maryam, ‘Jesus son of Mary’, a phrase which implies more than it expresses, that ‘Isa was not so much the son of Mary as that he was not the son of God”. p.19-20

I think when simple-minded apologists or their well meaning religious counter-parts want to try and initiate a dialogue with Muslims they really need to be aware of the subtle, but important differences and the origins of those differences. It’s not enough to say that we all believe in G-d (well, I don’t but that’s beside the point) and that therefore we should all get on with one another. That is not really the definition of a well formed formula. It is the equivalent of saying that we all believe in peace so why can’t we be peaceful? Well, as the late great Hans J. Morgenthau said, we all believe in peace, but what that peace is exactly, and what it means in reality, is why we have wars (or words to that effect). Yes Muslims want peace, but a peace on their terms. Just like we do. “Peace” or whatever word one is trying to find a homologous signifier for becomes meaningless shorn of it’s symbolic meaning within a chain of cultural signification (that didn’t sound so pompous in my head).

Morgenthau’s fifth principle of political realism ( https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm);

Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All nations are tempted-and few have been able to resist the temptation for long-to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe. To know that nations are subject to the moral law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in the relations among nations is quite another. [...] The lighthearted equation between a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence is morally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the Biblical prophets have warned rulers and ruled. That equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable to engender the distortion in judgment which, in the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations and civilizations-in the name of moral principle, ideal, or God himself.

Tukhachevskii

09-25-2013, 12:41 PM

I have only gotten to page 44, but what I find interesting is the connection between religion and nationalism in general. for example, if the colonial powers had not "created" states like Egypt would the connection between religion and government not been created by the Muslim Brotherhood?

Is religious identity politicized in the process of creating a national identity?

My answer is "yes", particularly since values are tied so closely to political legitimacy and religion provides a ready-made set of values to work from or to build on.

That’s a very post-Aquinas view of politics. Politics and the Political were understood by the likes of Aristotle to be the relationship of humans being to one another. That definition of man as Bios Politikos was perverted when Aquinas and his ilk translated it incorrectly (or not, depending on their purpose) into Latin as homo est naturaliter politicus, id est, socialis (man is by nature political, that is, social) thereby turning the relationship between people into something that is purely social whilst politics became merely an administrative function or process divorced from the wider populace (almost said society then, which would have been falling into that trap!). The separation of religion from politics or church and state is a peculiarly Western European, post-protestant phenomena/mania.

Nationalism is a phenomena that occurs, at least if Anthony Smith (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Ethnic-Origins-Nations-Anthony-Smith/dp/0631161694) and his like are to be followed (and I think they are), when ethnic groups want control of a specific territorial space. An ethnie or ethnic group is one which has shared traditions, language, culture, dress, etc (but not race, which is a useless biological fallacy which see here ( http://faculty.washington.edu/charles/562_f2011/Week%201/Jablonski%202004.pdf), here ( http://faculty.washington.edu/charles/562_f2011/Week%2010/Hirschman%202004.pdf) or even here ( http://www.anthro.ucsd.edu/~jmoore/courses/anth42web/CartmillRaceConcept1998.pdf) for instance). To say that Muslims have “conflated” or “perverted” Islam from a religious force into a political one is to ignore Islamic history, philosophy and theology (it is also to ignore how that conceit came to be fixed in our minds too). It also runs fowl of trying to understand or comprehend the Other is terms familiar to the self (ethnocentrism). The role of the Church and Orthodox Christianity in the Byzantine Empire, for instance, (one thinks of the causes of the Council of Nicea) is a non-Muslim/Islamic example of religion as a “political” force (isn’t it interesting how when we say “politics” we “naturally” mentally shear it away from everything else, like when we say religion, or economics, etc. Post-Enlightenment “Political science” really does strait-jacket our imaginations!). Indeed, anything, in Aristotelian terms, that concerns the relationship of beings with one another is political (pace Carl Schmitt, everything is political). The relationship of “religion” to other “spheres” of human existence (if such divisions are to be accepted; a la political “science”) remains a problem to be explained not a phenomena to be taken at face value.

TheCurmudgeon

09-25-2013, 02:47 PM

That’s a very post-Aquinas view of politics.

I am not so sure. As the book mentions, the separation of politics and religion can at least be traced back to Jesus' advice to render onto Caeser that which is Caeser's. This would indicate that at least the religious and the political could be considered separate.

The separation of religion from politics or church and state is a peculiarly Western European, post-protestant phenomena/mania.

I am not so sure that Westerners have actually separated politics from the church; we have only compartmentalized their organizational charts. That was simply the result of dealing with multiple religions. India (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secularism_in_India) had a separation of church and state for two thousand years.

I believe that any complex society that has to deal with multiple religions either has to suppress religions not in concert with the political entities or would have to find a way to tolerate them – a defacto separation if not one sanctified by a constitutional separation. That does not mean that religion, or politics, or any other component of society are separate (or separable) from the human animal or the human condition. They are creations of the human condition and have no life without it; they are immutable from their creator.

The relationship of “religion” to other “spheres” of human existence (if such divisions are to be accepted; a la political “science”) remains a problem to be explained not a phenomena to be taken at face value.

I don't accept it at face value, and I accept the challenge of attempting to explain the phenomena. :D

omarali50

09-25-2013, 03:43 PM

Tukhachevskii, Thank you for your very learned comments. But I just had the thought that very deep learning (which is good, which is just great) is not the level at which everyday practical politics operates.
Its not clear to me (btw, I would guess there is a deeply learned discourse about this topic too, I just dont know much about it) if the profoundest thinkers really influence events or just understand them better and laugh bitterly every night as they go to bed. At the level at which decision makers take decisions, it does not seem to matter that the actual history of Islam (or anything else) is much more complex than this thin book can encompass. So the big question may not be what the book covers and what it leaves out, but whether the WRITER of the book knew much more, understood deeply and then CHOSE (wisely?) to simplify in this manner; for the sake of actually having an impact on everyday decisions? as carefully/subtly crafted stylized facts? or is he really rather shallow and what you see is what you get?
The wise and well informed reviewer (not I; I neither know that much nor have I even read the whole thing yet) will tell us that.
I hope you will. I hope I have conveyed my rather convoluted thought process sufficiently (I know I have not conveyed it very clearly).

jmm99

09-25-2013, 06:21 PM

T:

In your comment, on a multi-culturalist (cultural relativist) hypothesis:

It’s not enough to say that we all believe in G-d (well, I don’t but that’s beside the point) and that therefore we should all get on with one another.

the phrase "...we all believe in G-d ..." is actually an improvement on Brown's statement:

Jews, Christians, and Muslims worship the same God,...

Asserting a widespread belief in an undefined "G-d" (a "higher power" of some kind) is different from claiming worship of the same God.

Your comment:

After the Islamic conquests many “Christian” communities actually found it easier to live under Islam because Muslims did not persecute them for refusing to tow the Constantinian line of Trinitarianism (but also because in holding such views they did not undermine the foundations of Islamic power given the Trinitarian outlook was associated with Islam’s major rival Byzantium).

is spot on; and illustrates (your "...but also ... Byzantium") pragmatism at work - a point made by Omar in his comments and by Brown (in later chapters 3-7).

I'd be interested in hearing from a multi-culturalist (cultural relativist) on how we can "dialog" with Islam, except on matters that can be made a-theistic, a-deistic (pragmatic). Even as to the latter, we have to be able to compartmentalize our hypocracies:

Show me a cultural relativist at 30,000 feet and I’ll show you a hypocrite. Airplanes built according to scientific principles work. They stay aloft and they get you to your chosen destination. Airplanes built to tribal or mythological specifications, such as the dummy planes of cargo cults in jungle clearings or the beeswaxed wings of Icarus, don’t.

Dawkins, p.42 pdf; link (http://www.arvindguptatoys.com/arvindgupta/change-thinking-dawkins.pdf)).

I'll now return to my pork sandwich, named "Lunch"; its suitably sliced sibling, with rice, will be named "Dinner". :)

Regards

Mike

Tukhachevskii

09-27-2013, 01:14 PM

I am not so sure. As the book mentions, the separation of politics and religion can at least be traced back to Jesus' advice to render onto Caeser that which is Caeser's. This would indicate that at least the religious and the political could be considered separate.

My short rebuttal would be to mention ... the Divine Right of Kings. A longer (though still to short) response is...
Like the forgoing passage about coercion in the Quran that saying attributed to Christ has been as misunderstood and abused as it has bandied about for all number of political purposes (usually shorn of its context and transformation over the centuries). The adventure of that particular idea is complex. The meaning of that phrase had changed over the centuries and meant one thing to the Church Fathers (and Augustine), another thing to the pre-modern Princes in their conflict with the Pope and yet another to the post-Lockean generation (and Americans in particular). Its easy to forget the context of the statement and also how it was understood at the time. It has everything to do with Pilate and the attempt to “frame” Christ as a political authority in opposition (and that’s the key) to Rome. That is how St. Paul understood that phrase and how many of the later saints understood it. Once Rome itself became Christian the temporal and spiritual powers are united in the form of the Pope and the Emperor, one a lord temporal and the other a lord spiritual (so to speak). That is not a division of church and state it is a division of powers toward the same end. Again, it is not until Luther and the Reformation that the meaning attributed to that phrase begins to resemble what you Americans (via Locke) understand it to be.
Christian political theory can be said to begin (in terms of its codification) with St. Paul (during the Roman era) and find its ultimate conceptual maturity or culmination with St. Augustine and begins its long, slow unravelling with St. Aquinas. We can divide it, for convenience sake, into three periods; 1) formative, 2) consolidation (and I use that word deliberately), 3) sundering. However, the pre-Christian era needs an honourable mention so I’ll let Robin Osborne (“The Religious Contexts of Ancient Political Thought” in the Blackwell Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Companion-Political-Thought-Blackwell-Companions/dp/1405151439)), do it for me;

“Not only was there no single voice with religious authority, but there was no separate sphere of ‘‘religious’’ matters held to be outside the authority of the state. In the modern western world religious convictions are held to be fundamentally a private matter and in the liberal state religion provides the key example of a private matter in which political interference is regarded as inappropriate. In both Greece and Rome religious life was public life and religious behaviour as proper for political control as any other form of behaviour.”p.119

The formative phase (the periodisations are all mine and for convenience only) lasts from the Roman Empire to its conversion under Constantine (however, Constantine’s belief that the Emperor reigns over the church rather than vice versa is what leads to the next major development in the West, although Eastern Orthodox Christianity virtually accepts that concept especially later, in Russia when it becomes the “third Rome”, but we are getting ahead sidetracked).
I’ll let Carlyle, The History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, Vol. 1 ( http://archive.org/details/ahistorymedival00carlgoog) speak for me,

“The most important passage in the New Testament which is connected with this subject is that in the thirteenth chapter of St Paul's epistle to the Romans. "Let every soul be in subjection to the higher powers : for there is no power but of God; and the powers that be are ordained of God. Therefore lie that resisteth the power withstandeth the ordinance of God: and they that withstand shall receive to themselves judgment. For rulers are not a terror to the good work, but to the evil. And wouldest thou have no fear of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise from the same : for he is a minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is a minister of God, an avenger for wrath to him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be in subjection, not only because of the wrath, but also for conscience' sake. For this cause ye pay tribute also; for they are the ministers of God's service, attending continually upon this very thing. Render to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour." This passage, which is of the greatest importance throughout the whole course of medieval political thought, being indeed constantly quoted from the second century onwards, is indeed pregnant and significant in the highest degree. It defines in the profoundest way the Christian theory of the nature of political society” p.89-90

The central issue in the formative phase is therefore centred around authority over the body and soul of the body politik. Does the soul take precedence or the body? It is not a question of separation of purpose but rather division of labour. With specific reference to the magic phrase “Render unto....”(&c), it really didn’t figure too prominently in writing of the time except polemically.

In a letter to the Emperor Constantine, Hosius of Cordova uses the phrase in its commonly accepted meaning; that temporal powers have no business interfering with God’s representative but that that does NOT apply the other way around (the Church therefore, supervenes, on the affairs of the Empire);
[quote] (from, Francis Young, ‘Christianity’, Cambridge History of Greek & Roman Political Thought ( http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/classical-studies/ancient-philosophy/cambridge-history-greek-and-roman-political-thought)) Intrude not yourself into ecclesiastical matters, neither give commands unto us concerning them; but learn from us. God has put into your hands the kingdom; to us he has entrusted the affairs of his church... It is written, 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's.' p. 658

Bishop Ambrose (of St. Augustine fame) is similarly dismissive in AD386 when, angry at Imperial interference over the question of the Arian heresy, he writes to the political powers in Milan that
'the emperor is within the church, not above the church'. ”p. 658 (my italics, from, Young, “Christianity”, Ibid)

In the consolidation (Early Mediaeval) phase Christian political theory further develops and the theory arises that the church administers to the soul and the state to the body but it is a functional differentiation only. They are both doing the same job, the sheparding of Man (what Foucault in “Security, Territory and Population” ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Security-Territory-Population-Lectures-Foucault/dp/1403986533) called the pastoral mode of government or “the government of souls”). One administers to the transcendent the other to the temporal (the “long arm of the church”) but both as aspects of the same reality and project. If the early church fathers had believed in the separation of church and state the concept of the divine right of kings would never have come into being nor would it have been needed in the first place (the king, as Kantorowicz ( http://press.princeton.edu/titles/6168.html) tells us, had two bodies). Using a British example the relationship between church and state is analogous to that between the Queen and Parliament, or a president and prime minister, there is a hierarchy (in fact, Iran probably represents a homologous case....another thread needed there methinks!). A cavalry squadron and an artillery battalion may be functionally separate but both have the same mission (with God in this schema being the Commander-in-Chief, who has other non-military responsibilities, and the Emperor/Monarch the Chief-of-Staff). To Understand this one needs to understand the imagery, culture, symbolic references and other stuff they thought with (such as the metaphor of the body, hierarchy of spheres, corpus mysticum, which is where we get the phrase “body politic”, etc.). The very role and purpose of a Monarch is derived from and legitimated and regulated by Christian doctrine (a feat modern day doctrine writers can only envy). In Figgis’ words (Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius ( http://www.amazon.com/Studies-Political-Thought-Gerson-Grotius/dp/1107625874)),

“In the Middle Ages the Church was not a State, it was the State; the State or rather the civil authority (for a separate society was not recognised) was merely the police department of the Church. The latter took over from the Roman Empire its theory of the absolute and universal jurisdiction of the supreme authority, and developed it into the doctrine of the plenitude potestatis of the Pope, who was the supreme dispenser of law, the fountain of honour, including regal honour, and the sole legitimate earthly source of power, the legal if not the actual founder of religious orders” p.8
[...]
the medieval mind conceived of its universal Church-State, with power ultimately fixed in the Spiritual head bounded by no territorial frontier; the Protestant mind places all ecclesiastical authority below the jurisdiction and subject to the control of the “Godly prince,” who is omnipotent in his own dominion. It was not until the exigencies of the situation compelled the Presbyterians to claim rights independent of the State, that the theory of two distinct kingdoms is set forth”p.45

Cont/. below....

Tukhachevskii

09-27-2013, 01:15 PM

Or, alternatively, in Gierke’s words (Political Ideas of the Middle Ages ( http://www.amazon.com/Political-Theories-Middle-Otto-Gierke/dp/0521347645)), according to Christian political theorists in the early to mid medieval period (what I have called the consolidation phase),

“the Emperor, and likewise all other Rulers, derive their offices but mediately from God, and immediately from the Church's Head, who in this matter as in other matters acts as God's Vice- Regent-this became the general theory of the Church. It was in this sense that the allegory of the Two Swords was expounded by the ecclesiastical party. Both Swords have been given by God to Peter and through him to the Popes, who are to retain the spiritual sword, while the temporal they deliver to others. This delivery, however. will confer, not free ownership, but the right of an ecclesiastical office-holder. As before the delivery, so afterwards, the Pope has utrumque gladium. He has both Powers habitu, though only the Spiritual Power actu. The true ownership (dominium) of both swords is his, and what he concedes in the temporal sword is merely some right of independent user, which is characterized as usus immediatus, or perhaps as dominium utile. In the medium of feudal law the papal right in the Temporal Power appears as neither more nor less than a feudal lordship. The Emperor assumes the place of the highest of papal vassals, and the oath that at his coronation he swears to the Pope can be regarded as a true homagium". In any case the Emperor and every other worldly Ruler are in duty bound to use in the service and under the direction of the Church the sword that has been entrusted to them'. It is not merely that the Pope by virtue of his spiritual sword may by spiritual means supervise, direct and correct all acts of rulership". Much rather must we hold that, though in the general course of affairs he ought to refrain from any immediate intermeddling with temporal matters, and to respect the legitimately acquired rights of rulers, he is none the less entitled and bound to exercise a direct control of temporalities whenever there is occasion and reasonable cause for his intervention (casunliter et ex rationabili causa).Therefore for good cause may he
withdraw and confer the Imperium from and upon peoples and individuals": and indeed it was by his plenitude of power that the Imperium was withdrawn from the Greeks and bestowed upon the Germans (translation Imperii)”p.14
Let’s not forget too that even as early as the fifth century Pope Leo I (440–61),

had attributed monarchical powers to the popes as successors of St Peter and had attached to the papacy the old pagan imperial title of “supreme pontiff” (pontifex maximus) not long since abandoned by the emperors themselves (in Oakley, Kingship: The Politics of Enchantment ( http://www.amazon.com/Kingship-Politics-Enchantmant-Francis-Oakley/dp/0631226966), p. 111)
That’s not to say the Kings went along with it, their grumbling and contestation of the role of the Papacy would continue until the Treaty of Utrecht (or thereabouts)

However, it is also during this period that we see St. Aquinas (forgetting Tertullian’s admonition 'What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?') tinkering around with Aristotle and once again the adventures of ideas takes centre stage. Says, McClelland A History of Western Political Thought ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/History-Western-Political-Thought/dp/0415119626)
“Thomas’s [Aquinas] problem was to try to reconcile the polis of the Greeks with Augustine’s city of fallen men. Again, it has to be emphasised that ignoring the Politics of Aristotle was out of the question. The reputation of Aristotle was so much a part of the intellectual landscape of Thomas’s time that Aristotle did not even have to be mentioned by name in philosophical treatises. When Thomas’s contemporaries wrote ‘as the Philosopher says’, or even ‘as He says’, everybody knew it meant Aristotle.”p.106
His resolution of that would have profound consequences for political theory and practice during and after the reformation (to which I have alluded in a previous post).

In fact, had the Roman empire not adopted Christianity as the official legitimating discourse and market of belonging (in the Greek and Roman sense, which see opening quote) then the modern concept of separation of church and state we see germinate during the reformation may, I stress, may, have occurred earlier. But it didn’t. It is precisely the concept of divine right of kings that causes the problems we see prior to the reformation and which come to a head with the Thirty Years War. After all it was Luther’s complaint that religion has no business in politics (or being tainted by it) that led him to reformulate the phrase “Render unto Caesar”. Toward the end of the early-modern period (the sundering phase) then the legitimacy (and purpose) of a Monarch rests less on the Papacy and more on a nascent conception of the popular will which is a story for another time/thread. It is with John Locke’s Two Treatise on Government, however, that the legal constitutional formulation for the separation of church and state as it is understood today first arises (especially in the American case). It is, however, false to take that concept and apply it retrospectively. The foregoing is also a gross oversimplification of what is a hugely complicated and confusingly entangled set of processes.

Suffice to say and more to the point,...we can’t simply say “what about Render unto Caesar?” without understanding what the phrase meant to the people who used it or how it changed. Just like the passage in the Quran about coercion. However, unlike Islamic theology which has relatively strict (hermeneutic) rules about how things are to be interpreted (think Hadith, Naksh and Shari’a scholarship in the Islamic case) most conceptual systems tend to suffer from a sort of semantic drift in which meanings can be lost, changed or just perverted. “Render unto Caesar” may be all things to all men which why we need to situate its usage to divine meaning. Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol. 1 ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Visions-Politics-1-Quentin-Skinner/dp/0521589266) calls this process of (deliberate) semantic drift “paradiastolic redescription” (not one for catchy phrases old Quentin) and calls the people who practice this “innovating ideologists” that’s a simplification but I hope you’ll forgive me for it). Skinner uses Weber as an example (please read Skinner in the original, he is worth the effort);

Focusing on the early capitalists, Weber [in the Protestant Ethic] shows how they represented their behaviour in terms of the concepts normally used to commend an ideal of the religious life, emphasising their dedication to their calling and their careful and painstaking lives. As he indicates, this was undoubtedly a rational choice for them to make. Not only were they right to see that, if they could apply such concepts to their own behaviour, this would provide them with a powerful legitimising device. They were also right to see that it was plausible to make the attempt. The Protestant conception of the calling echoed their own worldly asceticism, and there were many affinities between the distinctively Protestant ideal of individual service and devotion to God and the commercial belief in the importance of duty, service and devotion to one’s work. p. 150-1 [...][Another] example is provided by the history of the word commodity. Before the advent of commercial society, to speak of something as a commodity was to praise it, and in particular to affirm that it answered to one’s desires, and could thus be seen as beneficial, convenient, a source of advantage. Later an attempt was made to suggest that an article produced for sale ought to be seen as a source of benefit or advantage to its purchaser, and ought in consequence to be described as a commodity. For a time the outcome of this further effort by the early English capitalists to legitimate their activities was that commodity became a polysemic word. But eventually the original applications withered away, leaving us with nothing more than the current and purely descriptive meaning of commodity as an object of trade. Although the capitalists inherited the earth, and with it much of the English language, they were unable in this case to persuade their fellow language users to endorse their attempted eulogy of their own commercial practices. p.169

I don’t mean to be flippant but time and more importantly, space precludes a deeper discussion of this (in fact I don’t even know if I said what I wanted to say or if I flew off on a tangent! The latter me thinketh). I pray you read the references above. They can explain things better than this mere mortal can! I also have not meant to be condescending in any way either. It’s a hazard of our medium that emoticons just can’t ameliorate:o:confused::eek:. However if you are ever in town we can have a good old pagan symposium and thrash it all out conversationally (always my strongpoint).

I sometimes wonder if that great absconder MarcT wouldn’t be able to do a better, more succinct job.

Tukhachevskii

09-27-2013, 01:19 PM

I am not so sure that Westerners have actually separated politics from the church; we have only compartmentalized their organizational charts. That was simply the result of dealing with multiple religions. India (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secularism_in_India) had a separation of church and state for two thousand years.

I don’t quite know what you mean by that unless you mean Protestantism and Catholicism are two separate religions which is what they meant at the time (I know, strange to our ears though it may be. As for India it hasn’t existed for two thousand years, it is a post-colonial creation. Prior to the Empire the geographical area in question contained kingdoms that were either Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist.

I believe that any complex society that has to deal with multiple religions either has to suppress religions not in concert with the political entities or would have to find a way to tolerate them – a defacto separation if not one sanctified by a constitutional separation. That does not mean that religion, or politics, or any other component of society are separate (or separable) from the human animal or the human condition. They are creations of the human condition and have no life without it; they are immutable from their creator.

A belief is not a statement of fact it is a desire. That sort of constitutional thinking is typical for the heirs of Locke and that “unvarnished Doctrine” (http://www.amazon.com/The-Unvarnished-Doctrine-Liberalism-Revolution/dp/0822314703) splinters a little too much for my liking sir. But I cans ee where you are going (though I don't have to go there:rolleyes:).

I don't accept it at face value, and I accept the challenge of attempting to explain the phenomena. :D
You may want to investigate the Putney debates by the New Model Army during the English Civil war (itself an instructive case) to determine what is political and what religious or even if the distinctions apply. Personally, I gave up on high brow pursuits like that in favour of trying (dismally) to scratch a living so I’ll leave it to fitter minds like yourself to grapple with it.:D

Tukhachevskii

09-27-2013, 01:24 PM

Tukhachevskii, Thank you for your very learned comments.

:confused: All I did was quote people who really are.

But I just had the thought that very deep learning (which is good, which is just great) is not the level at which everyday practical politics operates. Its not clear to me (btw, I would guess there is a deeply learned discourse about this topic too, I just dont know much about it) if the profoundest thinkers really influence events or just understand them better and laugh bitterly every night as they go to bed.
Profound thinkers, a rare breed, often inform the zeitgeist (Hegel! [PBuH]) or have taught people who do go on to influence things; Aristotle and Alexander come to mind, or Leo Strauss’ students although I can’t personally say I’d call him profound. Of course then there are complete train wrecks like Milton Freidman who captured the (tiny) imaginations of Reagan and Thatcher. In Britain the Sociologist Anthony Giddens (whom I had liked up until that point) wrote a treatise called The Third Way. This then became New Labour intellectual property. I doubt what New Labour did with it resembles anything like what Giddens intended. Only Nietzsche (PBuH), IMHO, ever truly understood things and laughed about them too though not bitterly (and then went insane)! Then again, Professor “Sir” Lawrence Freedman, one of my former teachers and an incredibly intelligent man, ghost wrote Tony Blair’s “Doctrine of International the Community” laying down the doctrine for pre-emptive intervention/invasion (or “ethical” foreign policy)...and was awarded a knighthood for his troubles and then.... sat on the Butler Inquiry into the Iraq War fiasco! You couldn’t make this stuff up! Not many people know that either. Then again there’s one of the twentieth century’s greatest thinkers, Martin Heidegger, and his ill-fated flirtation with Nazism. On a more prosaic note I cannot imagine politicians, who unfortunately do seem to affect events more than most people, discussing deep philosophical concepts. That is not what politicians are for. A politician, in the words of Gordon R. Dickson in Way of the Pilgrim (http://www.amazon.com/Way-Pilgrim-Gordon-R-Dickson/dp/0312866623), “is best described as one who seeks the confidence of its fellow beasts, more with words than acts, in order to be voted into a position of power over them” [p.249]. Politicians need to preach at the lowest common denominator which is why politicians never tend to say anything meaningful at all when they speak (which is why I can’t stand presidential or prime ministerial debates). For one, the nature of democracy would not allow a philosopher-king and secondly no-one would vote for someone that way inclined. Think about it. Wouldn’t you be suspicious of someone who actually had two brain cells to rub together asking you for your vote? Would you trust him (or her)?

At the level at which decision makers take decisions, it does not seem to matter that the actual history of Islam (or anything else) is much more complex than this thin book can encompass. So the big question may not be what the book covers and what it leaves out, but whether the WRITER of the book knew much more, understood deeply and then CHOSE (wisely?) to simplify in this manner; for the sake of actually having an impact on everyday decisions? as carefully/subtly crafted stylized facts? or is he really rather shallow and what you see is what you get?

Academics tend to write books for several reasons; 1) because they have to prove they are doing something; 2) and on a related point, to advertise their existence; 3) to make money (a paltry amount BTW); 4) to join in (when certain topics become hot the inevitable cottage industries tend to follow); 5) this could have been written merely as a course book for his students to discuss (more common than you’d think). Had Francis Fukuyama written The End of History (an execrable book if ever there was one) at any other time it would have been derided (and thankfully was later) instead of becoming a hit which spawned numerous copies and rebuttals by people who wanted the spotlight (yes, Academics also suffer from delusions of grandeur). When academics do try and influence the zeitgeist they do so either by writing books that use populist simplistic language or go in the opposite direction and feign profundity through the usage of over-complicated words. There are exceptions to that too. Some Academics often get commissioned by publishers to write on a topic that publisher thinks is going to make them money in some emerging market niche. Some are just the paid mouthpieces of others (i.e., John L. Esposito (http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/09/john_l_esposito_apologist_for_wahhabi_islam.html)) . In my experience the really good stuff hardly ever gets talked about or even mentioned or, if it does, then the author has usually been dead a while so the person ”discovering” them can take all the credit. People who are deeply versed and familiar with a subject, however, often do write introductory texts but also tend not to make sweeping generalisation unless they can back them up with proof. A Professor of mine once lamented that the Academy nowadays was more interested in quantity not quality (he himself has only ever written one book on South Africa but is an expert on International Politics and History!).

Tukhachevskii

09-27-2013, 01:26 PM

Asserting a widespread belief in an undefined "G-d" (a "higher power" of some kind) is different from claiming worship of the same God.

Metaphysics was never my strong point but “higher power” would, to me at least, signify a single entity; Monotheism. Three monotheistic faiths all claiming to believe in a single God are bound to come into conflict.

illustrates (your "...but also ... Byzantium") pragmatism at work - a point made by Omar in his comments and by Brown (in later chapters 3-7).

I beg to differ sirrah. There was nothing pragmatic about it. Islam and Muslims were ordered to treat the People of the Book as protected persons under certain conditions. Islamic treatment of these people was wholly within keeping with their doctrine because, as far as Islam and Muslims were concerned, these people were Christians in the proper sense (as People of the Book; i.e., not Trinitarians). Had they failed the criteria of what Christianity was supposed to be according to Islam then I doubt they would have been so well received. I would understand pragmatism to be something along the lines of Churchill’s alliance with Stalin against Hitler.

TheCurmudgeon

09-27-2013, 02:46 PM

Tukhachevskii,

Thanks for the in depth response. I wish I had the time to review all the references you mention. I am familiar with Skinner having read his Foundations of Modern Political Thought (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Foundations-Modern-Political-Thought-Renaissance/dp/0521293375/ref=la_B000APQ7TS_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1380289386&sr=1-2) and Liberty before Liberalism (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Liberty-before-Liberalism-Canto-Classics/dp/1107689538/ref=la_B000APQ7TS_1_6?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1380289386&sr=1-6). The other references will go onto my “to do” list.

I also agree that over time the meanings of words and statements change to fit the needs and desires of those using them (including us). It is very difficult to put ourselves in the shoes of those who lived in the past and fully comprehend what they meant. The problem is even more pronounced for Westerners as we see European history as the sine qua non of political thinking.

Yes, I do see Catholicism and Protestantism as two separate religions at least from the point of view of political interpretations. They were different enough to go to war over (maby less in the minds of the leaders who were trying to avoid papal taxes but at least in the minds of the followers who fought and died). In my mind that makes then as least as different as as Judaism and Islam - all claiming a common source but diverging in at least a significant enough way to die over.

I wish I had the time to post a more in-depth response. I would start by arguing that the entire idea of a “Divine right” of kings, as opposed to a god king, as some other societies would view their political leaders, creates a defacto separation of church and state. That the passage of two keys (or two swords) was simply a recognition of a belief already prevalent in Roman times that the church and the state represented action in two separate spheres of human activity.

Instead I will ask a question relevant to the thread:

“Why is religion so closely tied to political legitimacy?” Even where there is a separation of church and state many laws are based in religious beliefs. Politicians swear oaths before God. Congress opens with a benidiction. What is the connection? Why is it important to our mortal lives?

TheCurmudgeon

09-27-2013, 04:51 PM

jmm99

09-28-2013, 04:11 AM

Monotheism is a very large tent.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Monotheism (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monotheism/) (First published Tue Nov 1, 2005; substantive revision Fri Sep 6, 2013)

Theists believe that reality's ultimate principle is God - an omnipotent, omniscient, goodness that is the creative ground of everything other than itself. Monotheism is the view that there is only one such God. After a brief discussion of monotheism's historical origins, this entry looks at the five most influential attempts to establish God's uniqueness. We will consider arguments from [1] God's simplicity, from [2] his perfection, from [3] his sovereignty, from [4] his omnipotence, and from [5] his demand for total devotion. The entry concludes by examining three major theistic traditions which contain strands which might seem at odds with their commitment to monotheism—the Jewish Kabbalistic tradition, Christianity, and Shri Vaishnavism. ...

For present purposes, I'll take Islam and Judaism to be strictly "monotheistic" and "unitarian"; and that Trinitarian Christianity meets the Stanford tests (it does according to the SEP article).

However, Christianity has three primary (and different) systematic theologies: Unitarianism, Binitarianism and Trinitarianism.

Thus far, it has not formally espoused "Quadranianism" (though some devotees of the Virgin Mary have approached that theology). Apparently, a small Christian sect, both proximate in space and time to the Quran's revelation, did exactly that.

Shakir trans. (U of Mich) (http://quod.lib.umich.edu/k/koran/index.html)

The Dinner Table

1.[5.116] And when Allah will say: O Isa son of Marium! did you say to men, Take me and my mother for two gods besides Allah he will say: Glory be to Thee, it did not befit me that I should say what I had no right to (say); if I had said it, Thou wouldst indeed have known it; Thou knowest what is in my mind, and I do not know what is in Thy mind, surely Thou art the great Knower of the unseen things.

Maududi (http://www.englishtafsir.com/Quran/5/index.html), snip 5.116 and commentary:

[115-119] Allah answered, "I am going to send it down to you,[129] but whoever among you shall disbelieve after that, I will surely give him such a chastisement wherewith I will not have chastised any other creature in the world." (After reminding him of these favors), Allah will say, "O Jesus, son of Mary, did you ever say to the people, 'Make me and my mother deities besides Allah'?"[130]...

129. The Qur'an is silent as to whether the `tray' was sent down or not and there is no other authentic source of information. Possibly it was sent down, but it is equally possible that the Disciples themselves might have taken back their request after the warning in verse 115.

130. This refers to another error of the Christians. They had made Mary an object of worship along with Christ and the Holy Ghost, though there is not a word or hint in the Bible about this doctrine. During the first three centuries after Christ, the Christian world was totally unaware of this creed. Towards the end of the 3rd century, the words "Mother of God" were used for the first time by some theologians of Alexandria. Though the response which these words found in the popular heart was great, yet the Church was not at first inclined to accept the doctrine and declared that the worship of Mary was a wrong creed. Then at the Council of Ephesus in 431 A.D., the words `Mother of God' were officially used by the Church. As a result `Mariolatry' began to spread by leaps and bounds both inside and outside the Church. So much so that by the time the Qur'an was revealed, the exaltation of the 'Mother of God' had eclipsed the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. Her statues were set up in Churches and she was worshiped, implored and invoked in prayers. In short, the greatest source of reliance of a Christian was that he should obtain the help and protection of the `Mother of God.' Emperor Justinian in the preamble to one of his laws bespeaks her advocacy for the empire and his general, Narses, looks to her directions on the battlefield. Emperor Heraclius, a contemporary of the Holy Prophet Muhammad, bore her image on his banner and believed that because of its auspicious nature it will never be lowered. Though the Protestants after the Reformation did their best to fight against Mariolatry, yet the Roman Catholic Church still adheres to it passionately.

See, Madrid, Collyridianism (http://www.ewtn.com/library/HOMELIBR/COLLYRID.TXT) (1994):

Most of the early heresies were Trinitarian and Christological in nature, but Collyridianism stood alone as a heresy that sought to deify the Blessed Virgin Mary. Little is known about the movement's theology. Not even the names of the group's leaders are mentioned by writers of the time. This sect's excessive Marian devotion developed into the idolatry of Mary worship. This aberration grew out of the Church's rightful veneration of Mary as ever-virgin, Mother of God, and powerful heavenly intercessor, but crossed the line of orthodoxy when certain Christians began to worship Mary as divine. Details about the Collyridians are scanty, but one of the few specifics we know of them is that at their liturgical service bread was offered as a sacrifice to Mary.

See also Epiphanius, Panarion II-III, sect. 78, Letter to Arabia(ca. 374-377 CE) (link (http://uploaded.net/file/vpmv1mzb/9004228411.softarchive.net.pdf)).

Of course, at that time, Arabia (esp. that part in or near Roman-Byzantine borders) had a thriving orthodox, trinitarian Christian Church. That dominant systematic theology is reflected in most Quranic verses dealing with Christians.

The Quran is very clear in its unitarianism; equally clear that God never begat a Son; and that God is not part of "three" - as summed in a magisterial sura:

Shakir trans. (U of Mich) (http://quod.lib.umich.edu/k/koran/index.html)

The Unity

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful.

[112.1] Say: He, Allah, is One.
[112.2] Allah is He on Whom all depend.
[112.3] He begets not, nor is He begotten.
[112.4] And none is like Him.

Attached is a pdf, Quran - One & Son, with several dozen verses to the same effect; as well as the proper place of Isa, son of Marium, in its systematic theology. See also, Stacey, Jesus and Mary in the Qu'ran - A Selection of verses from the Qur’an (http://www.stfrancismagazine.info/ja/MARY%20AND%20JESUS%20IN%20THE%20QURAN.pdf) (2007).

We'll turn to the major Christian systematic theologies in the next post of this multi-part series.

Regards

Mike

jmm99

09-28-2013, 04:27 AM

The three primary Christian systematic theologies: Unitarianism, Binitarianism and Trinitarianism, are addressed in the following references:

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Trinity (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trinity/index.html) (First published Thu Jul 23, 2009; substantive revision Fri Sep 13, 2013)

The traditional Christian doctrine of the Trinity is commonly expressed as the statement that the one God exists as or in three equally divine “persons,”, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Every significant concept in this statement (God, exists, as or in, equally divine, person) has been variously understood. The guiding principle has been the creedal declaration that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit of the New Testament are consubstantial (i.e. the same in substance or essence, Greek: homoousios). Because this shared substance or essence is a divine one, this is understood to imply that all three named individuals are divine, and equally so. Yet the three in some sense “are” the one God of the Bible. ...

Supplement to Trinity - History of Trinitarian Doctrines (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trinity/trinity-history.html)

1. Introduction

This supplementary document discusses the history of Trinity theories. Although early Christian theologians speculated in many ways on the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, no one clearly and fully asserted the doctrine of the Trinity as explained at the top of the main entry until around the end of the so-called Arian Controversy. (See 3.2 below and section 3.1 of the supplementary document on unitarianism.) Nonetheless, proponents of such theories always claim them to be in some sense founded on, or at least illustrated by, biblical texts. ...

Supplement to Trinity - Unitarianism (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trinity/unitarianism.html)

1. Terminology

The term “unitarian” was popularized in late 1680's England as a less pejorative and more descriptive term than “Socinian”for Christians who hold God to be identical to one and only one divine self, the Father. It has since been used as a denominational label for several distinct groups, but it is here primarily used in the descriptive, generic sense just stated. (The capitalized “Unitarian” is occasionally used here in the denominational sense.) All these groups have been labeled “antitrinitarian”. Although many unitarians have proudly flown the antitrinitarian banner, others strenuously argued that they expounded the correct trinitarian doctrine, the difference being that the former were promoting rival denominations, while the latter sought to be included in mainstream groups (i.e., traditionally trinitarian churches, or ones which were often assumed to be).

Wiki - Binitarianism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binitarianism#Scholarly_views_of_early_Christian_t heology)

The link jumps to this section, which is material because of its timeframe - before the revelation of the Quran:

Larry W. Hurtado of University of Edinburgh uses the word binitarian to describe the position of early Christian devotion to God, which ascribes to the Son (Jesus) an exaltedness that in Judaism would be reserved for God alone, while still affirming as in Judaism that God is one, and is alone to be worshiped. He writes:

…there are a fairly consistent linkage and subordination of Jesus to God 'the Father' in these circles, evident even in the Christian texts from the latter decades of the 1st century that are commonly regarded as a very 'high' Christology, such as the Gospel of John and Revelation. This is why I referred to this Jesus-devotion as a "binitarian" form of monotheism: there are two distinguishable figures (God and Jesus), but they are posited in a relation to each other that seems intended to avoid the ditheism of two gods" (Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity, William B. Eerdmans Publishing, Grand Rapids, 2003, pp. 52–53).

Hurtado does not cite "binitarianism" as antithetical to Nicene Christianity, but rather as an indication that early Christians, before Nicea, were monotheistic (as evidenced by their singular reference to the Father as God), and yet also devoted to Jesus as pre-existent, co-eternal, the creator, embodying the power of God, by whom the Father is revealed, and in whose name alone the Father is worshiped. He writes,

"The central place given to Jesus…and…their concern to avoid ditheism by reverencing Jesus rather consistently with reference to "the Father", combine to shape the proto-orthodox "binitarian" pattern of devotion. Jesus truly is reverenced as divine." (Ibid, p. 618)....

Before Hurtado's influential work, one classic scholarly theory of binitarianism was that the Holy Spirit was seen as in some sense identical to the Son, or uniquely embodied in him. The Shepherd of Hermas, among other sources, is cited to support the theory. In one of the parables, for example, an angel declares:

The preexistent Holy Spirit, which created the whole creation, God caused to live in the flesh that he wished. This flesh, therefore, in which the Holy Spirit lived served the Spirit well, living in holiness and purity, without defiling the Spirit in any way. … it had lived honorably and chastely, and had worked with the Spirit and cooperated with it in everything.

The classic theory of Christian binitarian theology, assumed by most dictionary definitions of binitarianism, asserts that some early Christians conceived of the Spirit as going out from God the creator, and is the creator: an aspect of God's being, which also lived in Jesus (or from other sources, appears to be thought of as Jesus's pre-existent, divine nature).
...
By the time of the Arian controversy, some bishops defended a kind of dual conception of deity, which is sometimes called "Semi-Arianism". The Macedonianism or Pneumatomachi typifies this view, which some prefer to call binitarian. The Semi-Arian view at that time was the Father and Son were God, but not the Holy Spirit;[citation needed] but none of the Arian views were strictly monotheistic (one being) [JMM: here, "unitarian" seems a better term than "monotheistic"].

All asserted that the God who speaks and the Word who creates are two beings similar to one another, of similar substance (homoiousia), and denied that they are one and the same being, or two beings of the same substance (homoousia) in which two are distinguished, as Nicaea eventually held. Nevertheless, the term binitarian is considered to be a more descriptive term than Semi-Arian, by current scholars, because the latter term has no precise meaning.

The Middle East, before the Quran's revelation, had a bountiful supply of Christian heresies. See, Wiki - List of Christian Heresies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Christian_heresies); and Latourette, A History of Christianity: Beginnings to 1500 (http://www.amazon.com/A-History-Christianity-Beginnings-1500/dp/1565633288/ref=pd_sim_b_1) (1997; 792pp.)

All this background is useful in considering the term "People of the Book" in early Islam; but, I'm not contending that the early Muslims concerned themselves with parsing the varieties of the Christian herd (nor that they should have).

I'll argue, in the next parts, that the early Muslims took the passages material to the People of the Book (which focus on sacred texts, and little on comparative systematic theologies); and then applied them to the Jews and Christians according to the pragamatism called for by the then-current political environment. The early (and later) Muslims were very aware of the basic "we-they" distinction; and they governed the Jews and Christians accordingly.

Regards

Mike

jmm99

09-28-2013, 04:54 AM

Factually, who were the "People of the Book" here on earth ? The Quran also provide answers when the last judgment is made. Were the "Trinitarians" included among Christians in the "proper sense".

Shakir trans. (U of Mich) (http://quod.lib.umich.edu/k/koran/index.html)

The Cow
1.[2.62] Surely those who believe, and those who are Jews, and the Christians, and the Sabians, whoever believes in Allah and the Last day and does good, they shall have their reward from their Lord, and there is no fear for them, nor shall they grieve.

The Dinner Table
1.[5.69] Surely those who believe and those who are Jews and the Sabians and the Christians whoever believes in Allah and the last day and does good-- they shall have no fear nor shall they grieve.

The Jews, Christians and Sabians are classed together in these two verses - "they shall have no fear nor shall they grieve."

On the other hand, those who associate others with Allah have a great deal to fear.

The Cattle
1.[6.22] And on the day when We shall gather them all together, then shall We say to those who associated others (with Allah): Where are your associates whom you asserted?

Jonah
1.[10.28] And on the day when We will gather them all together, then We will say to those who associated others (with Allah): Keep where you are, you and your associates; then We shall separate them widely one from another and their associates would say: It was not us that you served:

The Bee
1.[16.86] And when those who associate (others with Allah) shall see their associate-gods, they shall say: Our Lord, these are our associate-gods on whom we called besides Thee. But they will give them back the reply: Most surely you are liars.
2.[16.100] His authority is only over those who befriend him and those who associate others with Him.

Following is a complicated verse, which I'm parsing for my education with the help of Maududi's commentary. It includes the Muslims ("those who believe"), the Jews, Sabeans and Christians (the other "People of the Book"), the Magians

The Pilgrimage
1.[22.17] Surely those who believe and those who are Jews and the Sabeans and the Christians and the Magians and those who associate (others with Allah) -- surely Allah will decide between them on the day of resurrection; surely Allah is a witness over all things.

Maududi's trans. & commentary (http://www.englishtafsir.com/Quran/22/index.html)

Maududi trans. snip:

[17] As regards those who believed[23] and those who became Jews[24] and the Sabaeans[25] and the Christians[26] and the Magians[27] and those who committed shirk,[28] Allah will judge between them on the Day of Resurrection,"[29] for everything is in the sight of Allah. ... [18]

"As regards those who believed[23]"

23. This means the "Muslims" of every age who believed in the Prophets of Allah and His Books up to the time of Prophet Muhammad (Allah's peace be upon him): they included both the sincere Muslims and the wavering Muslims.

"and those who became Jews[24]"

24. See E.N. 72 of Chapter IV (http://www.englishtafsir.com/Quran/4/index.html) (An-Nisa).

[JMM: For context, we have to consider the text at 44-46 and notes 71-73]

[44-46] Have you ever considered the case of those who have been given a portion of the scriptures?[71] They themselves purchase deviation and wish you, too, to go astray from the Right Way: Allah knows your enemies well and Allah suffices you for protection and for help. Some of those, who have become Jews,[72] pervert[73] words out of their context and twist their tongues in order to malign the true Faith ....

71. About the scholars of the people of the Book the Qur'an at many places has used words to the effect: "They have been given a part of the knowledge of the Scripture". These words have been used because the scholars had actually lost a portion of their Scriptures and had become strangers to the spirit and the real aim and object of the portion left with them. The only interest they took, in these was confined to polemical controversies, minor details of Commandments and philosophical subtleties of creed. That is why they were ignorant of the true nature of religion and were void of its essence, though they were called "Divines" and "Rabbis" and were the acknowledged leaders of their community.

72. The words used are: "who have become Jews" and not "who are Jews," for originally they were "Muslims" just as the community of every Prophet is Muslim. Then afterwards they degenerated and became merely "Jews".

73. They were guilty of perversion in three ways: (1) They effected changes in the words of the Scriptures; (2) they distorted the meanings of the text with false interpretations, and (3) they would sit in the assemblies of the Holy Prophet and his Companions and afterwards make false reports of what they heard there in order to create mischief against them by distortion. They would thus spread misunderstandings about Islam and pervert people from joining the Islamic Community.

"and the Sabaeans[25]"

25. "Sabaeans": In ancient times two sects were known by this title:

(1) The followers of Prophet John, who were found in upper Iraq in large numbers and practiced baptism.

(2) The worshipers of stars, who ascribed their creed to Prophets ####h and Idris (peace be upon them) and believed that the elements were governed by the planets and the planets by the angels. Their center was at Harran with branches spread all over Iraq. These people have been well known for their knowledge of philosophy and science and their achievements in medicine.

Probably here the first sect is referred to, because the second sect was not known by this name at the time the Qur'an was revealed.

See, Gunduz, The Knowledge of Life: The Origins and Early History of the Mandaeans and Their Relations to the Sabians of the Qur'an and to the Harranians (http://www.amazon.com/The-Knowledge-Life-Mandaeans-Harranians/dp/0199221936) (1994); contra, Fratini & Prato, God-Fearers: A Solution to the Ancient Problem of the Identity of the Sabians (http://www.ricerchefilosofiche.it/files/God-Fearers.pdf) (1983)

- to be continued -

Regards

Mike

jmm99

09-28-2013, 05:07 AM

Continuing with Maududi's Commentary (http://www.englishtafsir.com/Quran/22/index.html):

"and the Christians[26]"

26. See E. N. 36 of Chapter V (http://www.englishtafsir.com/Quran/5/index.html) (AI-Ma'idah).

[14] Likewise We bound by a covenant those people, who said,"We are Nasara."[36] But they too, forgot much of what had been taught to them. So We sowed among them seeds of discord, enmity and hatred that shall last up to the Day of Resurrection, and surely the time will come when Allah will tell them of what they had been contriving in the world.

36. It is wrong to presume that the title Nasara pertains to Nazareth, the home of Jesus. In fact, its root is nusrat (help). The Christians have been called ,Nasara (helpers) for the reason that when Jesus asked, "Who will be my ansar (helpers) in the cause of Allah'?" his disciples answered, "We are ansar in the cause of Allah." (LXI : 14). The Christian writers got the wrong impression that the Qur'an contemptuously calls the Christians Nasara because of the apparent similarity between Nasara and Nazarenes, a sect of early Christians who were contemptuously called Nazarites. But the Qur`an makes it clear here that the Christians themselves said, "We are Nasara." It is obvious that the Christians never called themselves Nazarites.

In this connection, it may be noted that Jesus Christ never called his disciples "Christians" or "Messiahites," for he had not come to found a new religion after his own name but to revive the same religion that Moses and the other Prophets before and after him had brought. Therefore he did not form any new community other than that of the Israelites; nor they lived like a new one; nor adopted a distinctive name or symbol for themselves. They used to go to the Temple (Jerusalem) for prayer along with the other Jews and considered themselves to be bound by the Mosaic Law. (Please refer to the Acts, 3: 1, 10: 14,15: 1 & 5, 21: 22).

Later on the process of separation began froth two sides. On the one side St. Paul, a follower of the Prophet Jesus, put an end to the observance of the law and declared that the only thing needed for salvation was belief in Messiah. On the other side, the Jewish rabbis cut off the followers of Christ by declaring theta to be a misguided sect. But in spite of this separateness, at first the sect bore no distinctive name. The followers of Christ called themselves by different names, such as disciples, brethren, believers, saints etc. (Please refer to the Acts, 2 : 44, 4: 32, 9 : 26, 11 : 29, 13 : 52, IS : 1 & 23; Romans, 15 : 45, and Corinthians, 1:12). But the Jews called them Galileans or the sect of the Nazarenes contemptuously and tauntingly (Luke, 13 : 2, The Acts, 24 : 5) because of the Roman Province of Galilee in which Nazareth, the birth place of Jesus, was situated. These satirical names, however, did not become current as the permanent names of the followers of Christ.

As a matter of fact, the disciples were called Christians first in Antioch, when Barnabas and Paul went there in 43-44 A.D. to preach the Gospels. (The Acts, 11: 26). Though this name was also given to them contemptuously by their enemies, yet, by and by, their leaders accepted this, saying, "If ye be reproached for the name of Christ, happy are ye,.....if any man suffers as a Christian, let him not be ashamed." (I Peter, 4: 16). At long last, they lost the feelings that the name "Christian" was a bad title that had been given to them by their enemies.

Thus it is clear that the Qur'an has not called them Christians because of the contempt associated with it, but has called them Ansar (helpers) in order to remind them that they were the name-sake of those disciples of Jesus who had responded to his invitation and said, "We are helpers of Allah." Is it not an irony that instead of being grateful to the Qur'an for giving them their name, the Christian missionaries of today should bear a grievance against it for not calling them "Christians"?

[JMM: but more important for the present discussion]

[17] Indeed they committed blasphemy, who said, "The Messiah, son of Mary, is verily God."[39] O Muhammad, say to them, "If Allah chose to destroy the Messiah, Mary's son, and his mother, and all the dwellers of the earth, who has the power to prevent Him from this? For, to Allah belongs the Kingdom of the earth and the heavens and all that is between them: He creates whatever He wills[40] and has power over everything."

39. The Christians were guilty of blasphemy in regarding Jesus as God and worshiping him as such. This was the result of the error they committed in regarding Jesus as the union of man and God, for it made his personality an enigma, which their scholars have not been able to solve in spite of their verbosity and argumentations. The more they tried to solve it the more complicated it became. Those who were impressed by the human aspect of this complex personality made him the son of God and one of the Trinity, while others, who were impressed by the Divine aspect of his personality, declared him to he the incarnation of God and worshiped him as such. There were still others who tried to adopt the middle course between the two extremes and spent all their abilities to prove the impossibility that Jesus was both man and God at one and the same time and that God and the Messiah were two separate beings, but at the same tune a single being. (Please refer to E.N.'s 212,213,215 of An-Nisa).

40. "He creates whatever He wills" implies that the miraculous birth of Jesus was merely' one of God's countless wonderful manifestations, and that this and his moral excellences and his perceptible miracles should not mislead the Christians to regard the Messiah as God. It was their shortsightedness that they did not consider the other creations of God which were even more wonderful than the creation of Jesus and foolishly made him God. They forgot that His power has no bounds and seeing the miracles performed by a wonderful creation of the Creator they began to regard him as a creator; whereas wise men see the All-Powerful Creator in the wonders of His Creation and get the light of Faith from them.

"and the Magians[27]"

27. That is, the fire-worshipers of Iran, who believed in two gods -one of light and the other of darknesses-and regarded themselves as the followers of Zoroaster. Their creed and morals were so corrupted by Mazdak that a brother could easily enter into matrimony with his sister.

"and those who committed shirk,[28]"

28. That is, "The mushriks of Arabia and of other countries, who had no special name like those mentioned above."

29. That is, "Allah will pass His judgment on the Day of Resurrection in regard to all the differences and disputes which take place between different people and different religions and will decide which of them was right and which was wrong. "

In conclusion, the "People of the Book" in the Quran are Muslims, Jews, Christians and Sabians. Each group received a book of God's words from God. They were classified because of those receipts, not because of their degree of monotheism. Only the Muslims kept their book intact.

The Magians and "shirkers" didn't make the cut at all.

The next parts deal with the "canon" in the Quran to determine the sacred texts; and finally, with pragmatic applications of the Quran to governance of the Christian religious group in two tough test cases.

Regards

Mike

Regards

Mike

jmm99

09-28-2013, 05:15 AM

As a framework for which books made the cut, see Wiki - Islamic holy books (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_holy_books):

The Quran mentions at least three main Islamic scriptures which came before the Quran by name.

Tawrat (at-Tawrāt): According to the Quran, the Tawrat was revealed to Moses,[2] but Muslims believe that the current Torah, although it retains the main message,[citation needed] has suffered corruption over the years, and is no longer reliable. Moses and his brother Aaron (Harun) used the Torah to preach the message to the Banu-Isra'il (Children of Israel). The Quran implies that the Torah is the longest-used scripture, with the Jewish people still using the Torah today, and that all the Hebrew prophets would warn the people of any corruptions that were in the scripture.[3]

Zabur (az-Zabur): The Quran mentions the Zabur, often interpreted as being the Book of Psalms, as being the holy scripture revealed to King David. Scholars have often understood the Psalms to have been holy songs of praise.[4] The current Psalms are still praised by many Muslim scholars,[5][6] but Muslims generally assume that some of the current Psalms were written later and are not divinely revealed.[citation needed]

Injil (al-Injil): The Injil was the holy book revealed to Jesus, according to the Quran. Although many lay Muslims believe the Injil refers to the entire New Testament, scholars have pointed out that it refers not to the New Testament but to an original Gospel, given to Jesus (Isa) as the word of God (Arabic الله Allah).[7] Therefore, according to Muslim belief, the Gospel was the message that Jesus, being divinely inspired, preached to the Children of Israel. The current canonical Gospels, in the belief of Muslim scholars, are not divinely revealed but rather are documents of the life of Jesus, as written by various contemporaries, disciples and companions. These Gospels, in Muslim belief, contain portions of the teachings of Jesus, but neither represent nor contain the original Gospel, which has been corrupted and/or lost, which was a single book written not by a human but by God.[8]
...
The Quran also mentions two ancient scrolls and another possible book:

Scrolls of Abraham: The Scrolls of Abraham are believed to have been one of the earliest bodies of scripture, which were vouchsafed to Ibrahim (Abraham),[9] and later used by Isma'il (Ishmael) and Is'aq (Isaac). Although usually referred to as 'scrolls', many translators have translated the Arabic suhuf as "books".[5][10] The Scrolls of Abraham are now considered lost rather than corrupted, although some scholars have identified them with the Testament of Abraham, an apocalyptic piece of literature available in Arabic at the time of Muhammad.

Kitab of Yahya: There is an allusion to a Kitab or Book of Yahya[11] (who is also known as 'John the Baptist'). It is possible that portions of its text appear in some of the Mandaean scriptures such as the Genzā Rabbā or the Draša d-Iahia "The Book of John the Baptist". Yahya is revered by the Mandaeans and by the Sabians.

Scrolls of Moses: These scrolls, containing the revelations of Moses, which were perhaps written down later by Moses, Aaron and Joshua, are understood by Muslims to refer not to the Torah but to revelations aside from the Torah. Some scholars have stated that they could possibly refer to the Book of the Wars of the Lord,[5] a lost text spoken of in the Old Testament or Tanakh in the Book of Numbers.[12]

Footnote texts are omitted in the above quote, but are in the Wiki.

Regards

Mike

jmm99

09-28-2013, 05:47 AM

We now can turn to the "Assurance of Umar". See, Wiki - Siege of Jerusalem (637) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Jerusalem_(637)); and Wiki - Pact of Umar (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Umariyya_Covenant):

Covenant of Umar also known as Pact of Umar (Arabic: شروط عمر‎ or عهد عمر or عقد عمر), is an apocryphal treaty between Muslims and Christians that later gained a canonical Islamic status in Islamic jurisprudence. The pact is traditionally attributed to the second Caliph Umar ibn Khattab.[1] Several versions of the pact exist. It contains a list of restrictive measures and prohibitions on non-Muslims in general, by abiding to them, non-Muslims may enjoy some measure of religious tolerance under Muslim rule as Dhimmis.[2][3][4] The document effectively established a social hierarchy with Muslims on top and the Dhimmis as subordinates.[5][6]

Footnote texts are in the original Wiki. Exactly how apocryphal this assurance is or is not is addressed in the two recent 2012 articles cited below.

This is Tabiri's version (from al-Bushra, below)

In the name of Allah, the merciful Benefactor! This is the assurance granted to the inhabitants of Aelia by the servant of God, 'Umar, the commander of the Believers. He grants them safety for their persons, their goods, churches, crosses - be they in good or bad condition - and their worship in general. Their churches shall neither be turned over to dwellings nor pulled down; they and their dependents shall not be put to any prejudice and thus shall it fare with their crosses and goods. No constraint shall be imposed upon them in matters of religion and no one among them shall be harmed. No Jew shall be authorised to live in Aelia with them. The inhabitants of Aelia must pay the gizya in the same way as the inhabitants of other towns. It is for them to expel from their cities Roums (Byzantians) and outlaws. Those of the latter who leave shall be granted safe conduct... Those who would stay shall be authorised to, on condition that they pay the same gizya as the inhabitants of Aelia. Those of the inhabitants of Aelia who wish to leave with the Roums, to carry away their goods, abandon their churches and Crosses, shall likewise have their own safe conduct, for themselves and for their Crosses. Rural dwellers (ahl 'I-ard) who were already in the town before the murder of such a one, may stay and pay the gizya by the same title as the people of Aelia, or if they prefer they may leave with the Roums or return to their families. Nothing shall be exacted of them.

Witnesses: Khaledb.A1-Walid, 'Amrb.A1-Alp, 'Abdar-Rahmanb. 'Awf Muawiya b. Abi Sufyan, who wrote these words, here, In the year 15 (33).

Here is a current Islamic analysis and a current Christian analysis:

al-Fattah & al-Waisi, Umar's Assurance of Aman to the People of Aelia (Islamicjerusalem): A Critical Analytical Study of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate’s Version (http://idosi.org/wjihc/wjihc2(3)12/1.pdf) (2012).

al-Bushra, The Christian Majority Becomes a Minority Once Again (continuation) (http://www.al-bushra.org/holyland/chapeter2c.htm) (2012)

I view this as a pragmatic deal cut by "Umar" with the "Greek Orthodox Patriarch" (a Byzantine Trinitarian), without consideration of the fine points of the Christian systematic theologies (Unitarian, Binitarian or Trinitarian).

As al-Fattah points out, this document probably tells us more about the later Kaliphates' and Ottomen's dealings with Christians and Jews than with "year 15" Aelia.

Something of the same kind of deal was struck between Saladin and Balian ibn Barzan in 1187 to allow the "Franks" and other Christians to leave the city - and for some to stay. See, Saladin Takes Jerusalem (http://www.ii.umich.edu/UMICH/cmenas/Home/Resources/K-14%20Educational%20Resources/Curricular%20Resources/Crusades%20Secondary%20Ed%20Lesson.pdf) (p.46 pdf)

This account is from Ibn al-Athir after the battles for Jerusalem.
...
Then Balian ibn Barzan asked for safe conduct for himself so that he might appear before Saladin to discuss developments. Consent was given, and he presented himself and once again began asking for a general amnesty in return for surrender. The Sultan still refused his requests and entreaties to show mercy. Finally, despairing of this approach, Balian said:

'Know, O Sultan, that there are very many of us in this city, God alone knows how many. At the moment we are fighting half-heartedly in the hope of saving our lives, hoping to be spared by you as you have spared others; this is because of the nature of horror of death and our love for life. But if we see that death is inevitable, then by God we shall kill our children and our wives, burn our possessions, so as not to leave you with a dinar or a drachma or a single man or woman to enslave. When this is done, we shall pull down the Sanctuary of the Rock and the Masjid al-Aqsa and the other sacred places, slaughtering the Muslim prisoners we hold - 5,000 of them - and killling every horse and animal we possess. Then we shall come out to fight you like men fighting for their lives, when each man, before he falls dead, kills his equals; we shall die with honour, or win a noble victory!'

How to negotiate a surrender when defending a hopeless position - bravado, bluff, bravery, which led to:

Then Saladin took council with his advisors,all of whom were in favor of granting the assurances requested by the Franks, without forcing them to take extreme measures whose outcome could not be foreseen. 'Let us consider them as being already our prisoners,' they said, 'and allow them to ransom themselves on terms agreed between us.' The Sultan agreed to give the Franks assurances of safety on the understanding that each man, rich and poor alike, should pay ten dinar, children of both sexes two dinar and women five dinar. All who paid this sum within forty days should go free, and those who had not paid at the end of the time should be enslaved. Balian ibn Barzan offered 30,000 dinar as ransom for the poor, which was accepted, and the city surrendered on Friday 27 rajab/2 October 1187, a memorable day on which the Muslim flags were hoisted over the walls of Jerusalem. . . .

According to al-Qadi al-Fadil, Balian ibn Barzan also "offered a tribute in an amount that even the most covetous could not have hoped for." Balian had a large military force (mostly Turcopols to whom he was personally commited), with their dependents, whose ransoms were based on "each man, rich and poor alike, should pay ten dinar, children of both sexes two dinar and women five dinar."

Again, a reasonable result was reached via a pragmatic approach avoiding the complexities of religious theologies.

A similar approach was taken with respect to the native Christians of Jerusalem; see, Hadia Dajani-Shakeel. "Some Medieval Accounts of Salah al-Din's Recovery of Jerusalem (Al-Quds)" (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/med/salahdin.asp) (Fordham link):

The Fate of the Native Christians

'Imad al-Din indicates that, after paying their ransom, the native Christians requested Salah al-Din's permission to remain in their quarters in safety. Salah al-Din granted their request, provided that they paid the poll tax (jizya). Some members of the Armenian community also asked to stay in the city and were allowed to do so, provided that they also paid the tax. Many of the poor from both groups were exempted. Rich Christians bought much of the property of the departing Latins, as has been mentioned above. Salah al-Din allowed them to pray freely in their churches, and he handed over control of Christian affairs to the Byzantine patriarch.

'Imad al-Din notes that at first Salah al-Din ordered the closure of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Its future was discussed, and some even advised that it should be demolished in order to sever completely the attachment of the Christians to Jerusalem. However, a majority of the Muslims rejected the idea. They argued that demolishing the church would not help, for it would not prevent Christians from visiting it. According to 'Imad al-Din:

"Those who come to visit it come to worship at the location of the cross and the sepulchre rather than at the building itself. Christians will never stop making pilgrimages to this location, even if it has been totally uprooted."

Those who spoke in favour of preserving the Church of the Holy Sepulchre even suggested that when the Caliph 'Umar conquered Jerusalem, he confirmed the right of Christians to the church and gave no orders to demolish the building.

At least in the "here and now", the "People of the Book" protected status for Christians was recognized in two hard cases. But, that recognition came via pragmatism exercised on both sides. For those Christians who remained under Muslim governance, they had to accept second-class citizanship in Palestine; or convert to Islam - which many did.

Regards

Mike

Tukhachevskii

09-29-2013, 01:47 PM

I wish I had the time to post a more in-depth response. I would start by arguing that the entire idea of a “Divine right” of kings, as opposed to a god king, as some other societies would view their political leaders, creates a defacto separation of church and state. That the passage of two keys (or two swords) was simply a recognition of a belief already prevalent in Roman times that the church and the state represented action in two separate spheres of human activity.

Instead I will ask a question relevant to the thread:

“Why is religion so closely tied to political legitimacy?” Even where there is a separation of church and state many laws are based in religious beliefs. Politicians swear oaths before God. Congress opens with a benidiction. What is the connection? Why is it important to our mortal lives?

It is only right that I explain my premises rather than simply assuming that they are evident at least so that we and others may know what our respective positions are. My rather rakishly rebellious refusal to follow any sort of “criterion of elegance” (as Herbert Blumer termed the over-identification of a researcher with a particular method of research rather than the object of research) has resulted in my thought processes not only confusing others but also myself (there is perhaps something to be said for methodological parsimony).

My issues with the notion of “political” religion / political “religion” require, unfortunately for the reader, a little foregrounding. This will, however, not only help clarify my position but also the premises with which I am working. Everything I write here, of course, is simplistic, general and only skims the surface.

1. The Concept of the Political: The Meaning of Being (Human)

Firstly, I make a distinction between “the political” (la politique/ das Politische), the human condition of being with others (a la Heidegger) and the word politics (le politique/die Politik) itself representing purely administrative issues to do with the management of the state (in this I am largely following lines of thought initiated by Ernst Vollrath ( ‘The Rational and The Political An Essay in the Semantic of Politics [no link avaliable]). The former, then, represents the ontological conditions that make the latter possible; the political is about the very meaning of life itself or in Heideggerian language, the meaning of Being (with others/ Dasein as Mit-Dasein). In those terms what could be more political if not religion?

I think, from my reading of archaeology and anthropology (I had always wanted to be an archaeologist but chose another path instead; a dead end too) that the evidence supports that conclusion. As my brother (pbuh) used to say “religions were the first political theories that could only be disproved when their “Gods” had been destroyed or undermined”. Though discussing sacred relics and the like, Andrew Cowell’s discussion (in The Medieval Warrior Aristocracy: Gifts, Violence, Performance, and the Sacred ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Medieval-Warrior-Aristocracy-Violence-Performance/dp/1843841231)) is apposite in this context;

It is thus not surprising that true power in society should rest with those who have access to these objects, and thus to the resources of the sacred. As Godelier notes, regarding Melanesia, the “big man” is ultimately less powerful than the “great man,” who controls such access to the sacred, kept object (1999:8). Likewise, in the Plains Indian cultures of North America, it is the keeper of the Sacred Pipe who is the ultimate locus of authority in the tribe, not the wealthiest and most generous giver, or the bravest and most successful taker. In a medieval context, Irish kings gained power through performance, but then “assumed a sacred mantle that was central to the legitimization of their rank” (Aitchison 1994:70). More specifically, they were “seeking to formalize and render less challengeable the possession of rank”(Aitchison 1994:73). The efforts of the French monarchy to establish its privileged access to sacred power – especially healing power – as incarnated in the possession of sacred objects such as relics and the crown itself are emblematic of this fact. Access to sacred power marks the ultimate in vertical exchange. It represents not the vertical exchanges downwards between lord and dependents, however, but a vertical exchange upwards between God or gods and those who have access to these exchanges. Such power clearly trumps any possible advantages deriving from horizontal exchanges within the society, and thus allows the recipient a form of integrity which literally transcends the bonds of reciprocity between human individuals and groups. Anyone familiar with the thirst for relics exhibited by medieval society will recognize the validity of these ideas. (p.90)

At this point we may need a definition of religion for the sake of argument if nothing else and why not fall back on old Durkheim for that purpose (The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Elementary-Religious-Oxford-Worlds-Classics/dp/0199540128));

A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church all those who adhere to them. The second element which thus finds a place in our definition is no less essential than the first; for by showing that the idea of religion is inseparable from the idea of a Church, it conveys the notion that religion must be an eminently collective thing. (p. 47 in my 1915 George Allen & Unwin edition)

Aside from Durkheim there are others, as listed in Jack Eller, Introducing Anthropology of Religion: Culture to the Ultimate ( http://chairoflogicphiloscult.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/ellerj-d-_introducing-anthropology-of-religion.pdf) ](p. 7-8);

James Frazer: “a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and human life” (1958: 58–9).

William James: “the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine” (1958: 34).

Émile Durkheim: “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set aside and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them” (1965: 62).

Paul Radin: “it consists of two parts: the first an easily definable, if not precisely specific feeling; and the second certain acts, customs, beliefs, and conceptions associated with this feeling. The belief most inextricably connected with the specific feeling is a belief in spirits outside of man, conceived as more powerful than man and as controlling all those elements in life upon which he lay most stress” (1957: 3).

Anthony Wallace: “a set of rituals, rationalized by myth, which mobilizes supernatural powers for the purpose of achieving or preventing transformations of state in man and nature” (1966: 107).

Sherry Ortner: “a metasystem that solves problems of meaning (or Problems of Meaning) generated in large part (though not entirely) by the social order, by grounding that order within a theoretically ultimate reality within which those problems will ‘make sense’” (1978: 152).

Clifford Geertz: “(1) a system of symbols which act to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” (1973: 90).

Or as per Emilio Gentile (quoted in Richard Shorten, “The status of ideology in the return of political religion theory” ( http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569310701285016?journalCode=cjpi20#.UkgfM1OaLTo) , Journal of Political Ideologies, 12:2, 2007) religion is,

a system of beliefs, myths and symbols which interpret and define the meaning and the goal of human existence, making the destiny of an individual and of the community dependent on their subordination to a supreme entity. p.177

But, and it’s a big Jennifer Lopez but, the modern concept of religion is nothing more than an ideal-type,

If by religion is meant a matter of belief, separable from forms of action and political organization, signified by one’s assent to a creed and enacted in certain ritual behaviours (i.e., worship), then even in Latin the modern term “religion” has no equivalent. ( The New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Volume 5 ( http://www.amazon.com/New-Dictionary-History-Ideas-Volume/dp/0684313774), p.2408, my italics)

Tukhachevskii

09-29-2013, 01:51 PM

Also, as Winston King states in the Encyclopaedia of Religion, 2nd Ed., Vol. 11 ( http://ebookee.org/Encyclopedia-of-Religion-PIUS-IX-RIVERS-VOLUME-11-_403412.html),

“Many practical and conceptual difficulties arise when one attempts to apply such a dichotomous pattern [ sacred / profane ] across the board to all cultures. In primitive societies, for instance, what the West calls religious is such an integral part of the total ongoing way of life that it is never experienced or thought of as something separable or narrowly distinguishable from the rest of the pattern. Or if the dichotomy is applied to that multifaceted entity called Hinduism, it seems that almost everything can be and is given a religious significance by some sect. Indeed, in a real sense everything that is is divine; existence per se appears to be sacred. It is only that the ultimately real manifests itself in a multitude of ways—in the set-apart and the ordinary, in god and so-called devil, in saint and sinner. The real is apprehended at many levels in accordance with the individual’s capacity.” p.7692, my italics)
Of course, I would argue that the so called “Western” phenomena is of recent and local provenance and hardly universal.

Seeing religion as a subset of la politique or “the political” also gives new meaning to Easton’s famous description of politics as “the authoritative allocation of values” (The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science ( http://www.questia.com/library/66100622/the-political-system-an-inquiry-into-the-state-of), p. 117). The question for me then isn’t so much why religions become political but rather why isn’t religion considered a political force in the first place (at least according to my idiosyncratic schema)? To borrow a quote from Carl Schmitt (Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Political-Theology-Chapters-Concept-Sovereignty/dp/0226738892)) I would argue that

“the political is the total and as a result we know that any decision about whether something is unpolitical is always a political decision” (p.2)
My real gripe, therefore, is that religion has come to mean something non-political (like economics) when IMO the reverse is true. It is from that PoV then that I take issue with theorists of “political religion” and I might be in good company (the complicated debate is excellently set out and explored in Norris & Ingelhart, Sacred & Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide, 2nd Ed. ( http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/sacred-and-secular-religion-and-politics-worldwide-2nd-edition)). The indistinguishable religion / politics matrix is explained by Paul Radin, Primitive Religion: Its Nature and Origin ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Primitive-Religion-Its-Nature-Origin/dp/1406746541) in connexion with early societies,

”Where there is little trace of a centralized authority, there we encounter no true priests, and religious phenomena remain essentially unanalysed and unorganized. Magic and simple coercive rites rule supreme”.p.21
George Simmel is also instructive in his “Contribution to the Study of Religion”[no link available], The American Journal of Sociology, 60: 6, 1955, (his portion was excised due to length and I’m sure many of you wish more had been).

This begins to change with complex societies that display social stratification and a division of labour. Says Jack Eller, Introducing Anthropology of Religion (Op. Cit.)

“Civilizations are characterized by large and/or interconnected communities which are socially heterogeneous. Social relationships cannot remain personal but become “practical” and “rational.” (Weber said the same thing about modern societies, as we will consider in the next chapter.) Kinship as an organizing principle gives way to “politics,” in the shape of formal government, contractual relations, and the stratification of power and wealth. Specialization and differentiation within the society comes to include religion itself, which becomes an institution among other social institutions, albeit one that supports the political institutions. In the process, religion becomes more “professional,” with religious specialists, and more reflective, self-conscious, and systematic”. (p.190)

The process of religion becoming universalist and thus un-tethered from a particular community is a complex but not unrelated factor. However, I would still see that as part of a political process with an admixture of other causes (usually persecution). There are also more prosaic reasons. Witness the relative ease with which the Roman Empire was able to pacify larges areas. When a legionary confronted his opposite defeated number he would ask “who is your God”. The phrase “your God” does not mean what entity outside of the world and its affairs do you personally, on an individual level, believe in. It means what God represents your existence, what God defines who you are as a people....&c? “What?”, says the Legionary ,“Oh, that sounds like Mithras to my ears. Brother! We have the same god but by another name in our pantheon! (And thank the gods below they did have a pantheon). Come, brother, join the Empire”. The mirroring of the divine stage upon the earth (Caesar as God Emperor) is obvious (and, again, later appropriated by Catholic political philosophy). Michael Mann in The Sources of Social Power, Vol. 1 ( http://www.amazon.com/The-Sources-Social-Power-Beginning/dp/1107635977) has an excellent overview of these issues (I just couldn’t find the book for an actual quote; you’re welcome!). His IEMP (Ideology, Economics, Military, Political) model is also pregnant with possibilities. In sum, as religions form a social function, by regulating the affairs of man, they are at base political. In Islam, for instance, one does not see political factions without also seeing religious sects.

2. Religion dethroned: The de-sacralisation of the Political: Man becomes God

Political thought (and scientific thought I might add) from the late 17th century onward is an attempt to grapple with a disentangling of religion from social life in an age in which (pace Nietzsche (pbuh)) “God is Dead”. This is evident in the work of explicitly Catholic political thinkers like de Maistre or his nineteenth century “secular” Catholic compatriot Durkheim. Indeed, aping Schmitt we can say that all sociological concepts are merely an attempt to fathom the absence of a transcendent moral centre in human life. Concepts such Marx’s alienation ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marx%27s_theory_of_alienation) and Durkheim’s anomie ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anomie) are the fruits of such a process. The great age of political thought is great precisely because of the innovative new ways that the relationship of man to man was rethought in the absence of a transcendent lodestar. The Liberals satisfied themselves with the rather queer notion of a social contract drawn up between free, sovereign individuals (which found fertile soil in the U.S. again, via, Locke and his ilk) where as in Europe where ethnic and territorial states had already developed a nascent sense of nationalism fell back on that (racism is a perversion of nationalism, attributable to trends in nineteenth century biology, not a logical outgrowth).

Secular politics, so called, thus replaces the transcendent vision with an immanent one; the nation, or the people or the law, or the constitution now becomes the ultimate regulating principle. What is a politician doing if not promising a paradise on earth? Thus Nazism’s manic “faith” in “race” is a form of religious politics (in which the divine is replace with the immanent sanctity of the genome). As is America’s Manifest Destiny an expression of a supposedly Chosen People (but by whom?). We can see the same set of theological reasoning underpinning Communism in the idea of dialectical materialism. As Carl Schmitt once said in Political Theology ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Political-Theology-Chapters-Concept-Sovereignty/dp/0226738892/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1380458976&sr=8-1&keywords=political+theology+schmitt),

“All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularised theological concepts‟ (p. 36)
or again in The Concept of the Political ( http://www.amazon.com/The-Concept-Political-Expanded-Edition/dp/0226738922) that

“The juridic [sic] formulas of the omnipotence of the state are, in fact, only superficial secularisations of theological formulas of the omnipotence of God‟ (p. 42).

Hobbes’ Leviathan ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Leviathan-1-Thomas-Hobbes/dp/1463649932), then, is perhaps rightly designated as the first truly modern (secular) vision of politics in which the state itself becomes God (for later Liberals it is the sovereign Man which takes the place of the transcendent as the pole around which politics revolves). Not for nothing did Nietzsche (pbuh) call the state the “new idol” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Spake-Zarathustra-Wordsworth-Classics-Literature/dp/1853267767), p. 48). Now it is not so much in the name of god but in the name of the people or even, humanity (gulp!). What is nationalism but each people declaring itself to be “the chosen people”? (more so in America I find). Indeed, the logical corollary is the need for a messianic figure (a Fuhrer, or President, or Supreme Leader) to lead them.

Tukhachevskii

09-29-2013, 01:55 PM

Before Hitler, there was Napoleon. On the 13th October 1806 following the defeat of Russia and Prussia by Napoleon’s forces Hegel wrote that

“I saw Napoleon, the soul of the world, riding through the town on a reconnaissance. It is indeed wonderful to see, concentrated in a point, sitting on a horse, an individual who overruns the world and masters it” (quoted in C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Parliamentary-Democracy-Studies-Contemporary-Thought/dp/0262691264), p. 105n7);
To this end, as de Maistre pointed out -though, admittedly in a different context-

“institutions are only strong and durable to the degree that they are, so to speak, deified” ( Considerations on France ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Maistre-Considerations-Cambridge-History-Political/dp/0521466288), p. 80, my italics)

Durkheim would seem to agree (from Elementary Structures),

“in the present day just as much as in the past, we see society constantly creating sacred things out of ordinary ones. If it happens to fall in love with a man and if it thinks it has found in him the principal aspirations that move it, as well as the means of satisfying them, this man will be raised above the others and, as it were, deified. Opinion will invest him with a majesty exactly analogous to that protecting the gods. This is what has happened to so many sovereigns in whom their age had faith: if they were not made gods, they were at least regarded as direct representatives of the deity. And the fact that it is society alone which is the author of these varieties of apotheosis, is evident since it frequently chances to consecrate men thus who have no right to it from their own merit. The simple deference inspired by men invested with high social functions is not different in nature from religious respect”. (p.213, 1915 Ed.)

What I think we see from the renaissance onward is the gradual de-sacralisation or secularisation of the political in Western Europe (Eastern Europe and Orthodox Christianity present a different kettle of fish) with the rise of humanistic, rationalistic and post-Reformation political philosophies. It is also a period that Eric Voegelin describes exhibiting the “secularisation of history”. In Voegelin’s words from ‘Secularised History: Bossuet and Voltaire’, in (From Enlightenment to Revolution ( http://www.amazon.com/From-Enlightenment-Revolution-Eric-Voegelin/dp/0822304783)) this trend

“becomes revolutionary by its implication that the sacred history' the "theology;' is unimportant and that profane history has the monopoly of determining the relevance of peoples and events. The centre of universality is shifted from the sacred to the profane level, and this shift implies the turning of the tables: that the construction of history will, in- the future, not be subordinated to the spiritual drama of humanity, but that Christianity will be understood as an event in history. Through this shift of the centre of interpretation the dualism of sacred and profane history disappears. The profane history is profane only as long as sacred history is accepted as the absolute frame of reference and when this position is abandoned, the two histories merge on the level of secularized history. By secularization we mean the attitude in which history, including the Christian religious phenomena is conceived as an inner worldly chain of human events, while, at the same time, there is retained the Christian belief in a universal, meaningful order of human history”. (p. 7)

The consequence of this is a liminal vacuum described by Weber (‘Science as a Vocation’ (http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-Science-as-a-Vocation.pdf)) as stemming from a “disenchantment with the world”. As Clifford Porter explains regarding Voegelin (‘Eric Voegelin on Nazi Political Extremism ( http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jhi/summary/v063/63.1porter.html), Journal of the History of Ideas, 63:1, 2002)

”With spiritual reality denied or obscured, something must take its place to respond to the human need to express the feeling of being created. Voegelin argues that modem philosophy had gradually attributed to the state the redemptive power that belongs to God”. (p.160) .
Your correspondent agrees with Voegelin. The loss of the central Metanarrative of human existence provided by religion (as a part of “the political”) resulted in what Karl Jaspers (in the Origin and Goal of History, I think, but can’t be certain) identified as the age of totalitarian ideologies each of which vies to replace lost certainties (metanarratives) with appeal to a deified humanity (either that of the liberal individual, the nation or the race, etc.) beginning with the French Revolution. All of these are Western European phenomena (encompassing its offshoots). But the key point is this process of de-sacralisation never occurred in the rest of the world with such intensity if at all except, perhaps, where European empires made their mark. What we see with Islam is merely a continuation of a process which we in Europe abandoned long ago. Islam and Muslims, then, have not re-discovered or perverted their religion but merely sloughed off the secular ideologies that they believed failed them (i.e., pan-Arab nationalism, communism, etc.,) and reverted to type (as it were). As Khomeini put it (Velayat-e Faqih ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guardianship_of_the_Islamic_Jurists)) before the revolution of 1979;

“The colonialists have spread the insidious idea that religion should be separated from politics and that men of religion are not qualified to act in political and social matters. In the Prophet’s times, was the church separate from the state? Were theologians distinct from politicians?” (p. 190 in my bootlegged copy)
It wasn’t that Islam became political but rather that the failed revolutionaries, and those who had been marginalised because they insisted on Islam-centric action, rediscovered Islam was political (the Islamic reformation you all fantasise about has already occurred, but not in the way you hoped). The consequence of this kehre for us, and our ability to understand our foes, is profound. It means we are confronted with a language and a system of meaning that we only rarely comprehend (especially when we try and translate it into similar but ultimately different systems of thought). And that may have been deliberate.

3. The re-sacralisation of the Political; Or, on the Fuzziness of “Political Religion

Political religion as a notion (is it coherent enough to be a concept?) - usually taken to mean that a religion has come off the reservation allotted to it and is meddling in affairs that don’t concern it -isn’t the stable signifier we assume it is either given the multiplicity of meanings attached to it. If you have access to the Journal Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions ( http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/ftmp20/current#.UkgiZVOaLTo) you’ll see what I mean.

Tukhachevskii

09-29-2013, 01:55 PM

The only possible usage for the phrase political religion, as far as I am concerned, would be to signify a pseudo-religious phenomena (I know, that’s even more than less than unhelpful), i.e. one that does not refer to the supernatural but one that rather takes as its referent a non-supernatural entity and deifies it (such as the state, the race, or a class). Hence communism, liberalism and Nazism can be described as politically religious. I think I might be veering off here (only here!?) but I’ll let it stand. In this I stand side by side with Albert Piette whose phrase ‘religion potentielle’ captures what I want to say about the phenomena in two words (eloquent bastard!). I think I may also have been inspired by Ernst Nolte’s Three Faces of Fascism ( http://www.amazon.com/Three-Faces-Fascism-Francaise-Socialism/dp/0030522404) (it was a question of not disturbing my piles of books for a quote, its messy enough in my room). I would also agree with Emilio Gentile (“Political religion: a concept and its critics - a critical survey” (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14690760500099770?journalCode=ftmp20#.UkgiolOaLTo) , Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 6:1, 2005), when he states,

“Personally, I would easily renounce the use of this term and other terms alike, such as civil religion or secular religion. But even after banishing these terms, the historical phenomenon from where they originated still remains, the phenomenon which in my study I defined as the ‘sacralisation of politics’. However it may be defined, I do not consider it possible to deny that in the modern age, politics, after conquering its institutional autonomy toward traditional religion, at certain important moments of contemporary history, starting from the American Revolution until the present day, has acquired the aura of sacredness up to the point of asserting, in an exclusive and complete way, as was the case with the totalitarian movements of the twentieth century, the prerogative to define the ultimate meaning and the fundamental goal of human existence on earth. This concept does not refer to the political mobilisation of traditional religions, but to the modern political ideologies and movements which adapted religious habits to secular ends. The sacralisation of politics is manifest in the way the ideal of politics was conceived, experienced and represented by its supporters, in their style of life as well as in their attitudes towards the adversaries and opposing ideals. Modern political movements are transformed into secular religions when they: (a) define the meaning of life and ultimate ends of human existence; (b) formalise the commandments of a public ethic to which all members of these movement must adhere; and (c) give utter importance to a mythical and symbolic dramatisation in their interpretation of history and reality, thus creating their own ‘sacred history’, embodied in the nation, the state or the party, and tied to the existence of a ‘chosen people’, which were glorified as the regenerating force of all mankind. The sacralisation of politics occurs all the time by virtue of the fact that a political entity, for instance, the nation, the state, race, class, the party, assume the characteristics of a sacred entity, that is, of a supreme power, indisputable and untouchable, which becomes the object of faith, of reverence, of cult, of fidelity, of devotion from the side of the citizens, up to and including the sacrifice of life; and as such it lies in the centre of the constellation of beliefs, of myths, of values, of commandments, of rites and of symbols” (my italics, p.29).
Though taking an opposite tack, Mathias Behrens makes similar arguments in “Political Religion – A Religion? Some remarks on the concept of religion”, in Totalitarianism and Political Religions, Vol. II: Concepts for the Comparison of Dictatorships ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Totalitarianism-Political-Religions-Comparison-Dictatorships/dp/0415447054). Hans Maier, “‘Political religion’: The potentials and limitations of a concept” (in Op. Cit.) in a different vein writes that,

“The concept of ‘political religions’ might provide an inadequate label for all this, but – as I see it – it is still indispensable, at least provisionally. It reminds us that religion does not allow itself to be driven from society at will”. p.282.

Let’s end on that as I fear I may have wandered away from our original dispute about whether or not Islam was perverted by the MB to serve nationalist ends (i.e., religion is not political or something).

I have said my peace and await eagerly for the thread to refocus on some aspect of the book we are reading. What was that again?

Tukhachevskii

09-29-2013, 01:57 PM

If the religious beliefs of a group are distinctive enough to act as a distinguishable factor in defining an ethnic group …. and that group distinction is capable of being the basis of a political or national identity; or could be the basis of an in-group/out-group distinction that allows that group to be a viable enemy in a war ... then for my purposes it represents a separate religion.

No disagreement from me there. That was never my quibble; (are you code-switching?) I thought we were arguing about the supposed perversion of religion into its opposite, politics (&c.) :confused:

I’m dizzy, I want to get off.:rolleyes:

jmm99

09-29-2013, 06:19 PM

Regards

Mike

TheCurmudgeon

09-29-2013, 09:15 PM

T,

Fully understand and agree with your position. Did not realize that was what you were going for. From my perspective, a practitioner of social instability needs to understand things at the level you are talking. To say that one group believes the the trinity and one group does not is interesting from a historical perspective. To say that one group does not easily separate religion from politics (and why that is the case for many people) helps to understand the issues at hand at a very basic level. To say that those who have separated it do so in definition only and some of the actual social functions performed by religion is now part and parcel to the political I believe helps some of us understand why things are as they are. I know I bastardized what you said, and I like the elegant way you said it, but I hope I got your point right this time.

Thanks for taking the time to explain it. I am sure I am not the only council member who felt that way.

Tukhachevskii

09-30-2013, 12:20 PM

Tukhachevskii

09-30-2013, 12:36 PM

It seems a little (a lot?!) redundant now but as I have just found my copy of Hegel (Philosophy of Right ( http://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-Right-Dover-Philosophical-Classics/dp/0486445631)) (when I had given up looking; always the way!) and as I had intended to include him previously I shall do so as a footnote of sorts to my previous post as his comments are well worth mulling over;

“The state is the march of God in the world ( Es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt, daas der Staat ist); its ground or cause is the power of reason realizing itself as will. When thinking of the idea of the state, we must not have in our mind any particular state, or particular institution, but must rather contemplate the idea, this actual God, by itself.” (my italics, §258A)
and

“We must hence honour the state as the divine on earth, and learn that if it is difficult to conceive of nature, it is infinitely harder to apprehend the state. That we in modern times have attained definite views concerning the state in general, and are perpetually engaged in speaking about and manufacturing constitutions, is a fact of much importance. But that does not settle the whole matter. It is necessary further that we approach a reasonable question in the mind of rational beings, that we know what is essential, and distinguish it from what is merely striking. Thus, the functions of the state must indeed be distinguished; and yet each must of itself form a whole, and also contain the other elements. When we speak of the distinctive activity of any function, we must not fall into the egregious error of supposing that it should exist in abstract independence, since it should rather be distinguished merely as an element of the conception”. (my, italics, §272A)

In “The Relationship of Religion to the State” (url= http://www.amazon.co.uk/Hegel-Political-Writings-Cambridge-History/dp/0521459753]Political Writings[/url]) Hegel elaborates further and is a text which repays careful reading (in many ways it is a distillation of themes begun in the Philosophy of Right,

“In general, religion and the foundation of the state are one and the same thing – they are identical in and for themselves. In the patriarchal condition and the Jewish theocracy, the two are not yet distinct and are still outwardly identical. Nevertheless, the two are also different, and in due course, they become strictly separated from one another; but then they are once more posited as genuinely identical. [That the two have then attained] that unity which has being in and for itself follows from what has been said; religion is knowledge of the highest truth, and this truth, defined more precisely, is free spirit. In religion, human beings are free before God. In making their will conform to the divine will, they are not opposed to the divine will but have themselves within it; they are free inasmuch as they have succeeded, in the [religious] cult, in overcoming the division [die Entzweiung aufzuheben]. The state is merely freedom in the world, in actuality. The essential factor here is that concept of freedom which a people carries in its self-consciousness, for the concept of freedom is realised in the state, and an essential aspect of this realisation is the consciousness of freedom with being in and for itself. Peoples who do not know that human beings are free in and for themselves live in a benighted state both with regard to their constitution and to their religion.– There is one concept of freedom in religion and the state. This one concept is the highest thing which human beings have, and it is realised by them. A people which has a bad concept of God also has a bad state, a bad government, and bad laws”.(my italics in bold, p.225-226)

However, standing as Hegel does at an epochal moment where religion has almost completely been separated from the political (de-sacralised) and confined into a distinct realm with distinct functions Hegel also notes that,

“the state and religion [B]can also be divorced from one another and have different laws. The secular and the religious spheres are distinct, and a difference of principle may also arise. Religion does not simply remain in its own distinct sphere, but also affects the subject, issuing precepts with regard to the subject’s religiosity and hence also to its activity. These precepts which religion issues to the individual may be distinct from the principles of right and ethical life which obtain within the state.(my italics in bold, p.228)

On a different tack does the book club have a formal structure or do we simply flag up issues that concern us about Brown's Religion and State as we encounter them?

jmm99

09-30-2013, 05:26 PM

On a different tack does the book club have a formal structure or do we simply flag up issues that concern us about Brown's Religion and State as we encounter them?

Initially, I skim the ToC and look for interesting chapters to skim or read; after that, I'll slog through the book from start to finish, if it seems worth it. I've never learned how to read through a book backwards :o; so, I'd have to pass on that methodology. :)

Other than that, I'm flexible in how you decide we should discuss Brown's book. So far as I'm concerned, you can take the lead in setting the framework for us to "follow".

cowboys herding cats (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pk7yqlTMvp8) (1 min)

Regards

Mike

omarali50

10-08-2013, 12:30 AM

I am almost done with the book. Not bad at all. The following post is in some ways based on this book
http://www.brownpundits.com/2013/10/07/end-of-the-muslim-brotherhood/

graphei

10-23-2013, 06:39 PM

I apologize for my extended absence. Work has been rather treacherous and the purchasing of a new car was a stressful endeavor. I hope not to do that again for a very long time.

I will do my best to address issues and questions, but first a question.

Every time I encounter a new book I do two things: I always flip to the page with the copyright year on it and read the back cover. Did any of you do this?

If you didn't, it's a good habit to get into. Here's why. From that information, I can see and figure out three very important things.
1. Who it is geared toward;
2. When it was published; and ultimately,
3. Where this book is going to fall in terms of larger conversations the author is responding to or addressing.

So, in the case of our current selection, I flip and I see "Copyright 2000". Ahh, pre-9/11 when if you said the word 'jihad' Americans either had no clue what you were talking about or they thought you were referencing 'Dune'. I think we can all agree the discussions regarding Islam on September 10, 2001 and on September 11, 2001 were vastly different.

Then, I flip to the back. I see a few big names, so I know this isn't the author's first dance, so to speak. This is someone seasoned who has a generally good reputation. I see reviewers are from places like Foreign Relations and 'Discourse'. That piques my interest. In their platitudes, they drop words like "overview" and "students", and talk a lot about history, and I make mental note of each. I read the little blurb at the top and from it confirms what the reviewers have said. This is going to be a basic historical overview suitable for students and people who don't know their shura from their shari'a. Then, I remember it was written and reviewed by people outside of the Religious Studies/Islamic Studies realm. So, I know the author isn't going to delve into the nitty-gritty theological issues because he or she isn't equipped to do so. Plus, it wouldn't really be suitable for the audience now would it?

So, if you've been disappointed by the lack of rigor, bleeding edge research, or a definitive treatise on some hot-button issue, it makes sense because this book isn't designed to address those topics. Also, concept that most Muslims don't live in the Middle East would not have been well known at this point in time. Within the US, it’s still not a well known fact.

In short, before you read one word of the introduction, I cannot impress upon all of you how important to do that quick check. You'll approach the book differently, which results in you asking different questions and expanding your frame of reference. It’s not just about reading the words on the page and then applying to to your current frame of reference. Instead, it’s about learning how to situate the book in its larger context, both in terms of the larger (scholarly) discussion and history. From there, more nuanced and accurate analysis can occur.

Second, the concept that Jews, Christians, and Muslims worship the same God. Where did that belief come from and why does it persist? The belief comes from the religions themselves. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are categorically referred to as the Abrahamic traditions because all three trace their theological lineage to Abraham, and the God he interacted with. Torah, Bible, and Qur'an all remind their followers they are following the God of Abraham. That is why we, (those of us in Religious Studies) say Muslims, Christians, and Jews follow the same God. Why does this thought persist? Generally speaking, because it is true.

Islamic thought generally takes issue with the concept of Jesus as the Son of God. The other third of the trinity, the Holy Spirit, they have no issue with. The Holy Spirit is mentioned numerous times in the Qur'an. As for Jesus, the virgin birth and all of the miracles Christ performed throughout his life are mentioned in the Qur'an and the Virgin Mary even has her own Chapter. Refer to Christ as God or the Son of God, then you're getting into contested turf. Another sticking point is the Crucifixion, but that's for another time. Of course there will be Jews, Muslims, and Christians who say they do NOT follow the same God as the other two. With that said, just as you'll find Messianic Jews, there are Muslims who take no issue with the Trinity.

A professor of mine in grad school said one day, "There are as many Islams as there are Muslims"(It was Zebiri, Tuck), and that lingered with me. The simple fact that no two people believe or practice in the same way is too often forgotten. It seems trite and naive, but when you're attempting to understand belief patterns in any group of people- let alone 2 billion- it is unequivocally true. Islam, much like Judaism and Christianity, has an enormous corpus of theological and legal literature surrounding it. There are a millennia worth of voices commenting on issues.

Speaking of cherry picking, I see you're quoting Maududi, jmm. While it’s awesome you’ve found a treasure trove of his work, I’d stay away from him and Qutb for now. As one of the founders of Islamist Thought, he uses his background in Islamic theology to string together some very interesting opinions. I promise, we will cover both of them, but I am attempting to figure out a way to condense my research on tafsir into something easily digestible for all of you so he’s not only more accessible, but you can see how the thought evolved- and I’m using the world evolved loosely.

Unfortunately, the difficult part of working on extremist thought is you need to know their tradition better than they do. Doesn’t matter what religion they are. They all roughly pull the same ‘scholarly’ tricks. Heaping praise on an intellectual giant of a religious thinker in the 15th Century C.E. in a fatwa? It really helps to know said individual wasn’t qualified as an ulema (religious scholar), but was just a jurist, and his opinions were viewed as ‘too extreme’ in his day. A group releases a message they’re quoting a hadith of Muhammad as justification? If you know where to look, you can find the isnad (chain of transmission) and you can see, Oops, the chain was broken and that hadith has been discredited since the 1870s. You did a little more and then you find it persists in one specific region. Either that group is from that region, or some extremists had a mini-conference and someone who is from that region passed through.

But before you can do all of that, one must see the forest for the trees. Some of you have a decent background in the area, but what I hope to do is show you a different approach to that material.

I’ll check in again on Sunday. Saturday, I’m driving out to my alma mater and I plan on doing some research. I will have a more structured approach for the next book!