General Petraeus: collection

[SWJED]

Moderator's Note

I have merged forty three threads and renamed this thread - it reflects my practice when a practitioner's views and consequent debate merit being in one place. A few threads have been excluded, such as those about his departure from USG service, as they are not 'small wars' and some appear to have a wider remit, comparing him with others. Those threads can be id'd by using Advanced Search with his name and searching thread titles (ends).


From Council member MountainRunner's blog - General Petraeus on Goldwaters - Nichols & Private Security Contractors (http://mountainrunner.us/2007/01/petraeus_sasc_hearing.html).


... When asked about the Goldwater-Nichols Act and its implications for improved civilian control and oversight of the military, along with the better coordination within the military establishment, Petraeus answered on the need for the next step of civil-military jointness in counterinsurgency (a not unfamiliar request, see last paragraph here):

The integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been a success. Our military forces are more interoperable today than they ever have been in our nation’s history. This achievement has been remarkable. The next step is to ensure the ability of the military and civilian departments to work closely together. Counterinsurgency warfare requires a total commitment of the government – both military and civilian agencies – and unity of effort is crucial to success.

One of the most pressing needs is for the creation of interagency doctrine for the prosecution of counterinsurgency and stability operations. The State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has taken initial steps toward this end. During a conference hosted jointly by State and OSD, I proposed several actions that could help foster greater interagency capacity, and I recently seconded two majors from Fort Leavenworth (awaiting the start of the next School of Advanced Military Studies course) to the State Department to work this issue. Beyond development of doctrine in this area, there is discussion on creating an interagency Center for Complex Operations, which would be an intellectual clearinghouse for ideas and best practices in the many facets of irregular warfare. This appears to be a low-cost, but high-payoff, action that the Committee should consider supporting...More at the link...

[sgmgrumpy]

And another good read.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF RECONSTRUCTION AND
STABILIZATION AND ITS INTERACTION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
By Colonel John C. Buss, United States Army


In July 2004, President Bush created S/CRS and appointed Ambassador Carlos Pascual as its Coordinator.
The agency was given a broad mandate to develop policy options to respond to failing and post-conflict states.
The organization is staffed with representatives from the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), DOD, Central Intelligence Agency, Army Corps of Engineers, Joint Forces Command,
and Department of Treasury. The S/CRS mission is to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government
civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in
transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market
economy.”

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/09-05-S-CRS-DOD.pdf

[Jimbo]

Well, thats the way everyone ina uniform or the Pentagon read NSPDD-44 read that paragraph, S/CRS is tagged to be the interagency focal point. The State Department, including S/CRS, doen't read NSPDD-44 tha way at all. The problem right now is that State knows how to handle what we would call phase I, II, and III operations.

[Jedburgh]

Received via e-mail:

Headquarters
Multi-National Force - Iraq
Baghdad, Iraq
APO AE 09342-1400

February 10, 2007

Office of the Commanding General

To the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians of Multi-National Force-Iraq:

We serve in Iraq at a critical time. The war here will soon enter its fifth year. A decisive moment approaches. Shoulder-to-shoulder with our Iraqi comrades, we will conduct a pivotal campaign to improve security for the Iraqi people. The stakes could not be higher.

Our task is crucial. Security is essential for Iraq to build its future. Only with security can the Iraqi government come to grips with the tough issues it confronts and develop the capacity to serve its citizens. The hopes of the Iraqi people and the coalition countries are with us.

The enemies of Iraq will shrink at no act, however barbaric. They will do all that they can to shake the confidence of the people and to convince the world that this effort is doomed. We must not underestimate them.

Together with our Iraqi partners, we must defeat those who oppose the new Iraq. We cannot allow mass murderers to hold the initiative. We must strike them relentlessly. We and our Iraqi partners must set the terms of the struggle, not our enemies. And together we must prevail.

The way ahead will not be easy. There will be difficult times in the months to come. But hard is not hopeless, and we must remain steadfast in our effort to help improve security for the Iraqi people. I am confident that each of you will fight with skill and courage, and that you will remain loyal to your comrades-in-arms and to the values our natinos hold so dear.

In the end, Iraqis will decide the outcome of this struggle. Our task is to help them gain the time they need to save their country. To do that, many of us will live and fight alongside them. Together, we will face down the terrorists, insurgents, and criminals who slaughter the innocent. Success will require discipline, fortitude, and initiative--qualities that you have in abundance.

I appreciate your sacrifices and those of your families. Now, more than ever, your commitment to service and your skill can make the difference between victory and defeat in a very tough mission.

It is an honor to soldier again with the members of the Multi-National Force-Iraq. I know that wherever you serve in this undertaking you will give your all. In turn, I pledge my commitment to our mission and every effort to achieve success as we help the Iraqis chart a course to a brighter future.

Godspeed to each of you and to our Iraqi comrades in this crucial endeavor.


//Signed//
DAVID H. PATRAEUS
General, United States Army
Commanding

[SWJED]

That was most certainly worthy of a SWJ blog entry (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/02/general-petraeus-letter-to-mnf/)... Also submitted to Real Clear Politics (http://www.realclearpolitics.com/readerarticles/?period=all) for a vote...

Dave

[Bill Moore]

I have a lot of respect for GEN Petraeus, but this letter really doesn't say much, and perhaps it should not, other than what it does say, we all need to row together in the rough seas ahead, and I'll be here rowing hard with you. Good luck and thank you.

[120mm]

Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force!
You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have
striven these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you. The
hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you.
In company with our brave Allies and brothers-in-arms on
other Fronts, you will bring about the destruction of the German war
machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny over the oppressed peoples of
Europe, and security for ourselves in a free world.

Your task will not be an easy one. Your enemy is well trained, well
equipped and battle hardened. He will fight savagely.

But this is the year 1944! Much has happened since the Nazi triumphs of
1940-41. The United Nations have inflicted upon the Germans great defeats,
in open battle, man-to-man. Our air offensive has seriously reduced their
strength in the air and their capacity to wage war on the ground. Our Home
Fronts have given us an overwhelming superiority in weapons and munitions
of war, and placed at our disposal great reserves of trained fighting men.
The tide has turned! The free men of the world are marching together to
Victory!

I have full confidence in your courage and devotion to duty and skill in
battle. We will accept nothing less than full Victory!

Good luck! And let us beseech the blessing of Almighty God upon this great
and noble undertaking.


SIGNED: Dwight D. Eisenhower

[Jedburgh]

GEN Patraeus' second letter to MNF-I, 15 Mar 07:

Members of MNF-I:

I've been on the ground for about a month now and wanted to share some early thoughts with you.

First, and foremost, I want to note how impressed I have been by your professionalism, skill, and determination. In my vists to units all over Iraq, I have repeatedly seen a true will to win and a sincere desire to help our Iraqi partners achieve success. These observations give me confidence that we and our Iraqi counterparts *will* be able to improve the level of security for the Iraqi people -- though I recognize that it won't be easy or without frustration and setbacks. You know as well as I do how challenging an endeavor this is.

Improving security for Iraq' population is, of course, the overriding objective of our strategy. Accomplishing this missino requires carrying out complex military operations *and* convincing the Iraqi people that we will not just "clear" their neighborhoods of the enemy, we will also stay and help "hold" the neighborhoods so that the "build" phase that many of their communities need can go forward. Helping ensure enduring security in Iraqi neighborhoods not only helps Iraqi official make the most of the opportunity that we and our Iraqi counterparts will create, it also helps ensure that our Iraqi counterparts are fully ready to accept the eventual hand-off of the responsibilities to them.

Operation Fardh al Qanoon -- the Iraqi name for the operation to improve security in Baghdad -- is in its early stages. Success will take months, not day or weeks, and there undoubtedly are many tough days ahead. Nonetheless, because of your hard work with our Iraqi partners, some encouraging signs are already emerging: sectarian murders are down and sectarian displacement appears to have slowed or even stopped, with increasing numbers of families returning to their homes. It already appears that the Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts you are establishing are making their presence felt and helping restore a sense of hope to the Iraqi people, block-by-block.

Your efforts will provide Iraqi leaders an opportunity to resolve the serious political challenges they confront, reconcile their sectarian issues, and forge the way ahead for the new Iraq--thereby giving all Iraqi citizens a stake in their new country. From my vantage point, I believe the Iraqi political leadership is committed to moving in the right direction, despite being pulled in different directions by various political parties, sectarian influences, and ethnic pressures. They are realistic, however, and they recognize, as we do, that resolving the many challenges facing Iraq will not be easy.

Beyond that, although most Iraqis want a future of peace, opportunity, and increasing prosperity, there clearly are some individuals and groups with whom the Government of Iraq will not be able to reconcile--soulless thugs who violently reject the goals of the new Iraq. They will not be won over by Iraqi political action; rather, there appears to be no alternative to Iraqi and Coalition Forces bringing them to justice so that they cannot inflict further barbarism on the Iraqi people.

The environment in Iraq is the most challenging that I have seen in over 32 years of service. Indeed, few soldiers have ever had to contend with the reality of an enemy willing to blow himself up for his twisted cause. In view of that, as you conduct your daily operations, remember that you have every right to protect yourself, even as you attempt to prevent situations from escalating without good reason.

I also want you to be aware of my recognition that our focus on security the population means that many of you will live in the neighborhoods you're securing. That is, in fact, the right way to secure the population--and it means that you will, in some cases, operate in more austere conditions than you did before we adjusted our mission and focus. Rest assured that we will do everything we can to support you as we implement the new plans. This approach is necessary, because we can't commute to the fight in counterinsurgency operations; rather, we have to live with the population we are securing. As you carry out the new approach, I also count on each of you to embrace the warrior-builder-diplomat spirit as we grapple with the demands that securing the population and helping it rebuild will require.

Tom Brokaw spent some time with the unit I was privileged to command in Iraq a few years ago and, after seeing all that our troopers were doing, he said to me: "You know, General, the World War II generation may have been 'the Greatest Generation,' but the soldiers I've seen today surely must be 'the new Greatest Generation'." I agreed with him then, and I agree with him even more now. You should, in short, be quietly proud not just of what you're doing and how you're doing it, but also of the individuals on your left and right with whom you're priviliged to serve.

**Thanks** for the sacrifices that you and your families are making.

//Original Signed//
David H. Petraeus
General, United States Army
Commanding

[goesh]

If I were 30 years younger, I'd be there, no doubt about it.

[SWCAdmin]

I like Round 2. More tangible than Round 1, speaking a good bit closer to the warriors than the world. Although clearly all are watching. It has to be hard to write something under those circumstances.

I just wish he had said years instead of "months, not days or weeks." And that the political apparatus would give him that commitment.

[Stan]

Doesn't the General have somebody checking his letters before they go out ?


I also want you to be aware of my recognition that our focus on security the population means that many of you will live in the neighborhoods you're securing.

[Uboat509]

Doesn't the General have somebody checking his letters before they go out ?

I understand that several LTs were flogged and a CPT spent the day in stocks with PFCs throwing vegitables at him as a result of that error.

SFC W

[Stan]

You bet, Uboat 509 !
He should've had just one good NCO :cool:

[zenpundit]

Think Progress (http://thinkprogress.org/2007/04/01/petraeus-caucus/), Atrios and other Liberal and Left-wing blogs are circulating charges by NBC's Andrea Mitchell that General Petraeus met with the Republican Senate Caucus to " plot" political strategy.

I am somewhat skeptical that this characterization of the particulars of the General's DC visit is accurate. Does anyone have any information on Petraeus' schedule ?

[tequila]

Not sure if the word "plot" should be quoted, since Mitchell does not use that word. Essentially she is saying that the Republican caucus told Petraeus that he has until August to show real progress or else they were going to go with the Democrats and pull funding for the surge.

Interesting that Joe Klein, another veteran Washington insider, didn't appear to agree with Mitchell that the message was given.

I wouldn't be surprised if such a message was communicated, however, given the radical (http://www.galluppoll.com/content/?ci=27022)unpopularity of both the President and the war.

[Jedburgh]

General David Petraeus’ Letter to the Iraqi People, 7 Apr 07:

To the Iraqi People:

Monday, April 9, 2007 will mark the 4th anniversary of the liberation of Iraq from Saddam Hussein's regime. For many in Iraq and around the world, it will be a time for reflection on the early days after liberation in 2003 and on what has transpired since then.

As one of those who was part of the "fight to Baghdad,” I remember well the hopes and dreams of the Iraqi people when coalition soldiers pulled down Saddam’s statue in Firdos Square in April 2003. Looking back, I recall a sense of enormous promise -- promise that, in many respects and for a variety of reasons, has yet to be fully realized. If we are honest with each other, in fact, we will acknowledge that while there have been substantial accomplishments in Iraq since 2003, the past four years have also been disappointing, frustrating, and increasingly dangerous in many parts of Iraq for those who have been involved in helping to build a new state in this ancient land.

On this April 9th, some Iraqis reportedly may demonstrate against the coalition force presence in Iraq. That is their right in the new Iraq. It would only be fair, however, to note that they will be able to exercise that right because coalition forces liberated them from a tyrannical, barbaric regime that never would have permitted such freedom of expression.

Those who take to the streets should recall, moreover, that were it not for the actions of coalition forces in 2003 (and, to be sure, actions by Iraqi, as well as coalition, forces since then), they also would not have been able to celebrate the recent religious holidays as they did in such massive numbers. Nor would they have been able to select their leaders by free and democratic elections, vote on their constitution, or take at least the initial steps toward establishment of a government that is representative of, and responsive to, all Iraqis.

It is particularly important to me that "Najafis,” the citizens of Najaf, recall these facts, for in 2003 I was privileged to command the 101st Airborne Division, the unit that liberated the holy city of Najaf and its sister city, Kufa. The battle of Najaf was, in fact, our first significant combat action in Iraq. Following its conclusion, we went on to defeat the elements of Saddam's army and the Saddam Fedayeen that fought us in Kifl, Karbala, and Al Hillah, before securing and stabilizing southern Baghdad, Haditha, and, eventually, Mosul and Ninevah Province. Our soldiers sacrificed greatly to give the Najafis and millions of other Iraqis the freedoms, however imperfect they may be, that they enjoy today.

While the establishment of the new Iraq has included a number of noteworthy achievements, it has also had its share of setbacks. Indeed, the coalition's efforts have not been without mistakes. I acknowledged a number of them during my appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee in January.

I would add, however, that the coalition has, at the least, consistently sought to learn from its mistakes. And, when those mistakes have involved unacceptable conduct, coalition authorities have taken administrative and legal action against those responsible. The coalition has, despite its occasional missteps, worked hard to serve all Iraqis and to bolster those who support a new Iraq founded on the principles now enshrined in the Iraqi Constitution.

Iraq, four years after liberation, faces serious challenges. The sectarian violence that escalated after the Samarra mosque bombing in 2006 was an enormous setback. Indeed, it tore the very fabric of Iraqi society. The damage done is still readily apparent in various neighborhoods of Baghdad and in many areas outside the capital.

Now Iraqi and coalition security forces are engaged in a renewed effort to improve security for the Iraqi people and to provide Iraq's leaders an opportunity to come to grips with the tough issues that must be dealt with to help foster reconciliation among the people of Iraq and to enable achievement of conditions that permit the withdrawal of coalition forces.

As the commander of the coalition forces in Iraq, and having given some 2-1/2 years of my life to this endeavor, I would like to take this opportunity to call for support of the new security plan. I ask all Iraqis to reject violence and the foreigners who fuel it with their money, arms, ammunition, training, and misguided young men. Beyond that, I ask, as well, for all Iraqis to notify Iraqi or coalition forces when those who would perpetrate violence on their fellow citizens or security forces enter their neighborhoods.
Coalition soldiers liberated Iraq from Saddam's "Republic of Fear." Now Iraqis must reject those who seek to drive wedges between people who have, in the past, lived in harmony in the Land of the Two Rivers. This is a time for Iraqis to demonstrate to the world their innate goodness, their desire to respect those of other sects and ethnic groups, and their wish to stitch back together the fabric of Iraqi society. Only in this way can Iraqis make the most of the opportunity that Iraqi and coalition security forces are striving to give them. And only in this way can the dreams of those who live in a country so rich in blessings and promise be fully realized.
With respect,

David H. Petraeus,
General, United States Army,
Commander Multi-National Force-Iraq

[goesh]

One can only imagine the slaughter and chaos that would ensue if US forces pulled out as fast as they entered Iraq. Poof! Gone in 3 weeks, everything not needed for the pullout and redeployment burned and blown up. With all the security, maintanence and jobs evaported on the spot, I'm sure they would be dancing in the streets for days on end. After a couple of days when the water and electricity quit running for good, they could erect statues of saddam again, make pilgrimages to his grave and long for the good old days. They could have lots of blood, sewage and garbage on their streets but at least the Americans would be gone. Sorry for the bitterness, but on a bad day here on the home front, it's what I would like to see done. On a real bad day, I'd take out all their refineries too.

[T. Jefferson]

Transcript: Gen. David Petraeus on 'FOX News Sunday'



WALLACE: General, you talked briefly before about the fact that you're trying to split off some of the Sunni insurgents from Al Qaeda, especially out in Anbar province, and in fact, you've even gone to the lengths of arming some of the Sunni insurgents to fight Al Qaeda.

How do you know — or do you worry that they are going to end up using those weapons to either attack U.S. forces or to fight their civil war against the Shiites?

And how do you respond — we understand that aides to Prime Minister Maliki objected strongly about arming Sunni insurgents to Defense Secretary Gates yesterday, so how do you respond to that concern?

PETRAEUS: Well, those are legitimate concerns, and we have the same concerns. We have a good discussion going with the government of Iraq.

As I mentioned, the process really is to identify these individuals, try to vet them as best we can. By the way, we do biometric data on all of them. We link that to serial numbers of weapons and so forth.

And then what you want to do is you want to get them linked into legitimate government of Iraq institutions, starting out perhaps as what are called police support units; then, as they prove themselves, getting a ticket to the police academy so they can become full-fledged police, or volunteering for the Iraqi army.

The fact is that over time in any of these conflicts, individuals at some point have had to end up sitting across the table from those who at best tacitly were aware of what was going on against their adversary, and that we perhaps aided and abetted it.

Interestingly, we have a British three-star general — my deputy is the head of our particular effort here, the engagement and reconciliation cell that we have established in part because they've had some pretty tough experience in this regard themselves, having sat down at tables in northern Ireland and other places with individuals who, say, 10 years earlier were swinging pipes against their lads.

That's been instructive for us. We think that it has been carried out with sufficient safeguards in Anbar province. It has certainly completely changed the dynamics of Anbar province.

And now, by the way, you see a bottom-up political activity that is also ongoing, where city councils, neighborhood councils and so forth are getting elected and are gradually tying into the provincial council which, of course, ties into the government of Iraq.

We're even seeing that in some of the neighborhoods in Baghdad where neighborhood councils had ceased to exist because of the security threat, and they are now coming back to life as well.

Again, those are legitimate concerns. They are legitimate discussions with Prime Minister Maliki. He supported strongly what was going on in Anbar province.

It gets much tougher when you get into the mixed neighborhoods near Baghdad in the Baghdad belts, and we're all working together to try to ensure that there are safeguards so that we're not arming individuals who eventually take up arms against the government....

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,283553,00.html

[SWJED]

18 June Washington Post - Petraeus: Iraq 'Challenges' to Last for Years (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/17/AR2007061700830.html) by Karen DeYoung.


Conditions in Iraq will not improve sufficiently by September to justify a drawdown of U.S. military forces, the top commander in Iraq said yesterday.

Asked whether he thought the job assigned to an additional 30,000 troops deployed as the centerpiece of President Bush's new war strategy would be completed by then, Gen. David H. Petraeus replied: "I do not, no. I think that we have a lot of heavy lifting to do."

Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, his diplomatic counterpart in Baghdad, said a key report they will deliver to Washington in September will include what Crocker called "an assessment of what the consequences might be if we pursue other directions." Noting the "unhelpful roles" being played by Iran and Syria in Iraq, Crocker said: "We've got to consider what could happen."...

[SWJED]

19 June Washington Times commentary - Petraeus and Reid (http://www.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20070618-102217-8178r.htm) by Michael O'Hanlon.


Sen. Harry Reid's recent statements questioning the forthrightness of Gen. David Petraeus in reporting on conditions in Iraq are unseemly and unfair. Gen. Petraeus is a remarkable general, one of our best in modern American history, and his bravery and commitment to the nation in Iraq and elsewhere have been exemplary.

There is a legitimate question behind Mr. Reid's statements. How much do we really want to trust the diagnosis of how a war is going to a man hired to go out and win that war, and a man in uniform sworn to obey his civilian leadership, no less? But before getting to that, it is important to take on Mr. Reid's critique, because it is wrongheaded and should be retracted.

First, a word on Gen. Petraeus, whom I have known for 20 years since we were in doctoral studies together at Princeton. Those who also know him will not be surprised to learn that while most of us took the standard five or six years to finish our Ph.D.s at the Woodrow Wilson School, Gen. Petraeus was done in two. He has been a prodigy throughout his career, and admittedly a little lucky too, surviving a bullet to the upper right chest and a failed parachute among smaller mishaps.

Gen. Petraeus' preparation for this job could not have been much better...

Rather than pillory Gen. Petraeus, Mr. Reid might better think of how we can get him some help by September when the big showdown is expected over the next Iraq spending bill. The best idea may be an Iraq Study Group II, led by the likes of former Sen. Sam Nunn and Retired Gen. Tony Zinni, that would help assess trends in Iraq and propose alternatives to the surge if needed (as seems likely). That, rather than a debate over whether Gen. Petraeus should in MacArthur-like fashion be expected to make our Iraq policy for us, would be a more productive avenue for the majority leader to pursue.

[SWJED]

15 July Washington Post - Bush Leans On Petraeus as War Dissent Deepens (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/14/AR2007071401140.html) by Tom Ricks.


Almost every time President Bush has defended his new strategy in Iraq this year, he has invoked the name of the top commander, Army Gen. David H. Petraeus.

Speaking in Cleveland on Tuesday, Bush called Petraeus his "main man" -- a "smart, capable man who gives me his candid advice." And on Thursday, as the president sought to stave off a revolt among congressional Republicans, he said he wanted "to wait to see what David has to say. I trust David Petraeus, his judgment."

With opposition to Bush's Iraq strategy escalating on Capitol Hill, the president has sought, at least rhetorically, to transfer some of the burden of an unpopular war to his top general in Baghdad, wielding Petraeus as a shield against a growing number of congressional doubters. In speeches and meetings, the president has implored his critics to wait until September, when Petraeus is scheduled to deliver a much-anticipated assessment of the U.S. mission in Iraq...

[Merv Benson]

Ricks has uncovered an interesting phenomena. People who have already declared that Gen. Petraeus has failed are claiming that the guy who is trying to give him a chance to succeed is setting him up as the fall guy. This appears to be Washington politics at its worst. If you read what the General is saying about time being the things he needs most and you see that Bush may be the only one in government fighting to give him that time it is cynical to suggest he is doing it to give him time to fail rather than succeed.

[SteveMetz]

Ricks has uncovered an interesting phenomena. People who have already declared that Gen. Petraeus has failed are claiming that the guy who is trying to give him a chance to succeed is setting him up as the fall guy. This appears to be Washington politics at its worst. If you read what the General is saying about time being the things he needs most and you see that Bush may be the only one in government fighting to give him that time it is cynical to suggest he is doing it to give him time to fail rather than succeed.

I suspect Tom didn't uncover this phenomenon, but is promoting it. Plus, I didn't read it as saying that Bush is setting Petreaus up to fail, but would be willing to pin failure on him should it occur. I sat next to Feith while he gave a talk at AEI a few years ago where he was already floating the idea that "mistakes were made, but it was the military that made them, not we civilian policymakers." I am very, very concerned for the impact it will have on civil-military relations if the administration (or its allies in the punditocracy) pursue this line.

But here's my problem with the whole thing: we are still seeing the effort as a military one, and I'm absolutely convinced that the military effort is of secondary importance. I think Crocker, not Petreaus, should be the lead guy at this point.

[Uboat509]

As I have stated elsewhere I've seen nothing from DOS that suggests that they are better prepared to be the lead. There are plenty of Generals who are good diplomats but how many Diplomats are good Generals? Yes, if this conflict is to be won it will be done through civil as well as military action but, by and large, much of that civil action will be done through, with and by the military.

SFC W

[SteveMetz]

As I have stated elsewhere I've seen nothing from DOS that suggests that they are better prepared to be the lead. There are plenty of Generals who are good diplomats but how many Diplomats are good Generals? Yes, if this conflict is to be won it will be done through civil as well as military action but, by and large, much of that civil action will be done through, with and by the military.

SFC W

Since counterinsurgency is won politically and psychologically, if we don't have civilians who can lead a counterinsurgency effort, we'd be better off not doing it rather than miliarizing it. If all you have is a hammer, all the world may LOOK like a nail, but it isn't. How much time to you think Petreaus is spending working with Maliki to try and deal with corruption, a political solution that will placate at least some of the Sunnis without distorting the democratic process, etc?

[Ken White]

Since counterinsurgency is won politically and psychologically, if we don't have civilians who can lead a counterinsurgency effort, we'd be better off not doing it rather than miliarizing it. If all you have is a hammer, all the world may LOOK like a nail, but it isn't. How much time to you think Petreaus is spending working with Maliki to try and deal with corruption, a political solution that will placate at least some of the Sunnis without distorting the democratic process, etc?

Couldn't agree more. Counterinsurgency is not our forte and for all the successes in our past, most were fraught with missteps and the wrong person at the wrong time. Wayne (interesting corollary, that), Miles, Crook and Funston were not the first to attempt what they pretty well accomplished. The acquired patience of the populace and the slowness of news travel in those days is gone, thus our ability to engage in a protracted campaign of any sort is not good. Strategic thinking ought to focus on that because it is important.

With respect to Ricks, I suspect you're correct. I also think he's wrong. I think Bush probably established some rapport with Petraeus (though the reverse may not be true) and thus tends to cite him as one he knows and is inclined to trust. I also suspect he and Crocker would draw sparks at fifty paces... :D

Obviously the 'blame it on the military' mantra will be politically popular (and totally party or personality immaterial). It is virtually a given. Party dependent, the MSM will likely join in. If the Army is smart, they'll pre-empt that by honestly admitting their mistakes and sooner rather than later. Far sooner...

We all know the reluctance of the institution to tolerate criticism and its reflexive ability to try to cover things up (almost all of which fail miserably) but the Army needs to do some real quick navel gazing and own up to a lot of dumb mistakes.

We are an attack minded nation and Army, we don't do defense all that well. I think there's a message in that...

[Stu-6]

This administration has gone out of their way to say that were listening to/relying on their military commanders since way before Petraus to the top job over there (whether the actually do is another story). To me it has been something of a cop out, sooner or later you have to realize where the buck really stops regardless of how much it has been past. The military has made plenty of mistakes with this but there is still only one commander in chief.

[Ken White]

This administration has gone out of their way to say that were listening to/relying on their military commanders since way before Petraus to the top job over there (whether the actually do is another story). To me it has been something of a cop out, sooner or later you have to realize where the buck really stops regardless of how much it has been past. The military has made plenty of mistakes with this but there is still only one commander in chief.

with only a rare exception in recent years like Eisenhower have little choice but to listen to their Commanders. Most have no military experience at all and if they have a little it may not be relevant to the task at hand. For instance, Bush and Rumsfeld have a teeny bit but they were Aviators with little knowledge of or appreciation for ground warfare. The man rersponsilbe to advise them militarily was the CJCS -- also an Aviator. They were three aviation centric folks and it has shown.

As long as we insist on the PC rotation of the CJCS and Goldwater-Nichols is not modified the problem will continue.

So this administration had no choice but to listen to the Commanders on the ground because the CJCS had no experience to speak to.

Thus, while your statement that there is only one Commander in Chief is sort of correct -- the Commander in Chief of CentCom, downgraded to Commander by Rumsfeld, was the de facto and de jure CinC concerned with the campaign -- may be a politically satisfying approach for you, it will also obscure the flaws that DoD perpetrated or allowed and if we are not to have any repetitions of such errors, those things need to be discussed.

The question I think is not who was overall responsible, that is obvious. The question is was the advice given by the Commanders on the ground correct so that proper policies could be formulated. My perception is that it was not and while I understand why this was so, I think it needs fixing -- and electing a new Commander in Chief or nailing the hide of this one to the wall will not fix the problem.

The domestic political aspects are for another forum, I think. :wry:

[Stu-6]

While there is nothing wrong with a president listening to his generals it does not relieve him of his responsibilities. Yes the president is lacking in military experience but to be fair who has experience in commanding a counter-insurance in Iraq, or anything comparable? If the president is not getting the kind of advice he needs from the generals in command it his responsibility to educate himself enough on the subject or at least find better generals.

Lincoln’s military experience was limited to say the least but he managed to take charge and find generals that could do what he thought needed to be done. Think of how different things might have turned out if he had just listened to thoughts first generals (you know the generals he had not the generals he wanted)?

Goldwater-Nichols may have its problems but ever president has had to deal with the legal constrains and flaws of their time.

[SteveMetz]

While there is nothing wrong with a president listening to his generals it does not relieve him of his responsibilities. Yes the president is lacking in military experience but to be fair who has experience in commanding a counter-insurance in Iraq, or anything comparable? If the president is not getting the kind of advice he needs from the generals in command it his responsibility to educate himself enough on the subject or at least find better generals.

Lincoln’s military experience was limited to say the least but he managed to take charge and find generals that could do what he thought needed to be done. Think of how different things might have turned out if he had just listened to thoughts first generals (you know the generals he had not the generals he wanted)?

Goldwater-Nichols may have its problems but ever president has had to deal with the legal constrains and flaws of their time.

I'm with you. There is "listening" and there is "listening." I think that in the case of Iraq, the administration "listened" to its military commanders, but only in a certain way. It was perfectly clear that the administration was not willing to listen to military advice that in any way challenged the idea that the administration's strategic objectives were unrealistic, or that the costs of attaining them would be significant. Rumsfeld populated the senior leadership with flag officers who would not challenge strategic assumptions.

I do believe Iraq will be seem as a monumental blunder. The administration's die hard apologists will blame the military but I'm convinced that the consensus position will be that we acted with flawed strategic assumptions that no military leader could have turned into success.

[Ken White]

While there is nothing wrong with a president listening to his generals it does not relieve him of his responsibilities. Yes the president is lacking in military experience but to be fair who has experience in commanding a counter-insurance in Iraq, or anything comparable? If the president is not getting the kind of advice he needs from the generals in command it his responsibility to educate himself enough on the subject or at least find better generals.

Lincoln’s military experience was limited to say the least but he managed to take charge and find generals that could do what he thought needed to be done. Think of how different things might have turned out if he had just listened to thoughts first generals (you know the generals he had not the generals he wanted)?

Goldwater-Nichols may have its problems but ever president has had to deal with the legal constrains and flaws of their time.

When you get it you may find out it's not as easy as it looks.

Either to be the Commander in Chief or, given that job, to put the Generals you want where you want them -- Congress has statutorily slammed the door on that option under most circumstances. You might also look at how long it took Lincoln to get the right General in the right place without the laws to preclude him moving them on a whim.

Yes, of course Politicians have to do that. Linclon's solution was to ignore those things that got in his way; far harder to do that nowadays. That sort of begs the fact that Goldwater Nichols has flaws which was my point.

I agree that counter insurance is indeed a a very difficult problem. :D

Presidents come and go, so do Congresses. The Armed Forces were here before any of the current politicians or you or I were born; even those in Congress that have been there far too long. They'll be here long after we're all gone. You can pursue a political fix to the Prez and Congress and talk about it on a poltical blog somewhere, plenty of them out there.

The issue to me is fixing the flaws in the processes, not who did what to who.

[Stu-6]

When you get it you may find out it's not as easy as it looks.
.

Just to be fair I never said it was easy. Little about that job is easy but if it is too hard for him I am sure we can find another canidate for the job.

[BRUZ_LEE]

... I didn't read it as saying that Bush is setting Petreaus up to fail, but would be willing to pin failure on him should it occur.

There is just ONE man ("you know who") responsible for the IRAQ adventure. It is very cheap to try to blame sb else now for the -most probably bad- outcome of it, especially sb who was not envolved in the STRATEGIC decision to go to war. The "you know who" tries to reduce the problem into an OPERATIONAL one, while in fact it is a STRATEGIC one in the first place.

By the way, i like the term "counter-insurance". Is there already a doctrine out for that? :D

BRUZ

[SteveMetz]

Just to be fair I never said it was easy. Little about that job is easy but if it is too hard for him I am sure we can find another canidate for the job.

Have you not seen the billboards in DC: "The Presidency--So Easy a Caveman Can Do It"?

[Hondo76]

15 July Washington Post - Bush Leans On Petraeus as War Dissent Deepens (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/14/AR2007071401140.html) by Tom Ricks.
When the General comes to the Hill in September, whats the Congress going to do if he says "send me more troops"?

Erick was right when he said we needed 500,000 troops and I don't think he was thinking about the PMC'S and all there contractors.

[Granite_State]

http://hughhewitt.townhall.com/Transcript_Page.aspx?ContentGuid=484182dc-bf7c-42a7-ac74-9e270a9ef0f2

Some interesting stuff here, but it does make me a bit worried to see General Petraeus interviewed by a completely partisan hack like Hugh Hewitt.

[Abu Buckwheat]

Ok, here is where I say ... excuse me? Seems the fight is over MNF arming Sunni militias ... Krauthammer's 20% doctirine at play?


Iraqi leader tells Bush: Get Gen Petraeus out (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;jsessionid=IGAHG33FIYEL1QFIQMGSFFOAVCBQ WIV0?xml=/news/2007/07/28/wirq128.xml)
By Damien McElroy, Foreign Affairs Correspondent
Last Updated: 2:44am BST 28/07/2007

Stormy relationship: Nouri al-Maliki and Gen David Petraeus


Relations between the top United States general in Iraq and Nouri al-Maliki, the country's prime minister, are so bad that the Iraqi leader made a direct appeal for his removal to President George W Bush.

Although the call was rejected, aides to both men admit that Mr Maliki and Gen David Petraeus engage in frequent stand-up shouting matches, differing particularly over the US general's moves to arm Sunni tribesmen to fight al-Qa'eda.

One Iraqi source said Mr Maliki used a video conference with Mr Bush to call for the general's signature strategy to be scrapped. "He told Bush that if Petraeus continues, he would arm Shia militias," said the official. "Bush told Maliki to calm down."

At another meeting with Gen Petraeus, Mr Maliki said: "I can't deal with you any more. I will ask for someone else to replace you."

advertisementGen Petraeus admitted that the relationship was stormy, saying: "We have not pulled punches with each other."

President Bush's support for Mr Maliki is deeply controversial within the US government because of the Iraqi's ties to Shia militias responsible for some of the worst sectarian violence.

The New York Times claimed yesterday that Saudi Arabia was refusing to work with Mr Maliki and has presented "evidence" that he was an Iranian intelligence agent to US officials. "Bush administration officials are voicing increasing anger at what they say has been Saudi Arabia's counterproductive role in the war," it reported.

Alongside the firm support of Mr Bush, Mr Maliki also enjoys the backing of Ryan Crocker, the US ambassador and his predecessor, Zalmay Khalilzad, now America's representative at the United Nations.

Mr Khalilzad took a swipe at Saudi Arabia in an editorial published earlier this month that was widely seen as an appeal for a larger UN role in stabilising Iraq.

Mr Crocker, who attends Mr Maliki's stormy weekly meetings with Gen Petraeus, said the Iraqi leader was a strong partner of America.

"There is no leader in the world that is under more pressure than Nouri al-Maliki, without question," he said. "Sometimes he reflects that frustration. I don't blame him. I probably would too."

[SWJED]

Telegraph: SWJ Best Fiction Award Winner of the Week (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/07/telegraph-swj-best-fiction-awa-1/)


Damien McElroy, foreign affairs correspondent for the U.K.’s Telegraph, “headlines” today: Iraqi leader tells Bush: Get Gen Petraeus out...

One problem - the events as reported in the Telegraph never happened. This from COL Steve Boylan, MNF-I CG Public Affairs Officer, in an e-mail he sent earlier today to McElroy...

[Abu Buckwheat]

Telegraph: SWJ Best Fiction Award Winner of the Week (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/07/telegraph-swj-best-fiction-awa-1/)


Well if this is all fiction then the Associated Press's sources are piling on. (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20070728/iraq-hot-tempers/)


Heat Rises Between Iraq PM and Petraeus

STEVEN R. HURST and QASSIM ABDUL-ZAHRA | July 28, 2007 02:05 PM EST

BAGHDAD — A key aide says Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's relations with Gen. David Petraeus are so poor the Iraqi leader may ask Washington to withdraw the overall U.S. commander from his Baghdad post.

Iraq's foreign minister calls the relationship "difficult." Petraeus, who says their ties are "very good," acknowledges expressing his "full range of emotions" at times with al-Maliki. U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who meets with both at least weekly, concedes "sometimes there are sporty exchanges."

It seems less a clash of personality than of policy. The Shiite Muslim prime minister has reacted most sharply to the American general's tactic of enlisting Sunni militants, presumably including past killers of Iraqi Shiites, as allies in the fight against al-Qaida here.

An associate said al-Maliki once, in discussion with President Bush, even threatened to counter this by arming Shiite militias.

History shows that the strain of war often turns allies into uneasy partners. The reality of how these allies get along may lie somewhere between the worst and best reports about the relationship, one central to the future of Iraq and perhaps to the larger Middle East.

We shouldn't be so quick to judge everything the press reports as wrong. They use sources ... and the PAO demanding to be a counter-source is not really journalism, but dictation. Allowing a chance to spin a story will make war supporters feel good but doesn't explain what is happening.

Every Supreme Commander in war has political problems with the host nationals ... Eisenhower v. DeGaulle for example. I am surprised this hasn't broken out into open media before with other commanders.

However, the blow-back that could occur from the PAO's statements and the Rightwing bloggers calling these reports lies when high level Iraqi officials are going on the record and confirming them is that the Iraqis are now going to get defensive at being called liars.

We may regret it if we cross the Respect-Honor line ... as it stands this is going to get VERY big and help no one except for the Insurgents, who are laughing at us all. :confused:

We all want Petraeus to execute his strategy but we should be very concerned about the impact of stoking a "he said-they said" personal integrity war ... the leaks or statements that may come out may not be in the best interest of Iraq or our warfighters.

[SWJED]

... is not a "good thing", I agree. There are times however when a story with "wings" that is indeed fabricated needs to be called-out. I believe now is one of those times. Moreover, I'd hardly categorize the SWJ as a "right-wing" blog. The mere fact you are a blogger there speaks volumes :wry: and we don't much toe any "party-line" - kind of call them as we see them.

Not much to fear though - the IO damage was done as soon as the Telegraph's story hit the 'Net. Google it (news and blog searches) - the "left-wing" blogs are in hog-heaven.

Yep, the AP is "piling on"...

On edit: "Calling them like we see them" by definition for the SWJ means each individual blogger and as many here well know, the SWJ regular and guest bloggers are quite a diverse crowd. As for the SWC, you must admit that different points of view, if presented in a professional manner as well as well sourced or based on personal experience, is not only tolerated - but welcomed.

[Abu Buckwheat]

Moreover, I'd hardly categorize the SWJ as a "right-wing" blog.


Litte error here ... I was referring to the other non-professional, personal bloggers (who actually think rational opinions make SWJ a Leftist site) not the SWJ itself. :D

Heck, this is the only professional scholarly military blog of any merit and thats why I am proud to be a part of it (also because I was given the Hugo Chavez/Raul Castro Comrade's decoder ring when I joined!). ;)

On the other hand I acknowledge that the IO damage was done with the first story and we should whack 'em where we see 'em.

Many of our IO mistakes in theater are so amateur as to be laughable and wiggling about on this one makes the PAO look like an offended school principle's secretary. We should acknowledge that its a superfluous debate, the facts were wrong on that report and move on.

[SWJED]

All this talk of left and right finally made the Norwich Google ad go away (but now probably will be back since I typed Norwich) and an Obama Barak campaign ad appear. Who said big brother isn't watching :eek: ?

[SWJED]

Hat Tip PrairiePundit (Merv Benson) - Paper Backs Off Maliki-Petraeus Row (http://prairiepundit.blogspot.com/2007/07/paper-backs-off-of-malika-petraeus-row.html)


I think they are admitting that the earlier report was based on a rumor.

General Petraeus Rebuts Iraq Row Claim (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/07/30/wiraq230.xml)- London Daily Telegraph (Damien McElroy)


America's top general in Iraq yesterday quashed reports of a breakdown in his relationship with Iraq's prime minister over American support for Sunni Muslim fighters battling al-Qa'eda.

General David Petraeus poured scorn on a claim by an Iraqi politician that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki requested his dismissal after bitter rows. "I don't know where that is coming from," Gen Petraeus said. "He and I have truly had frank conversations but he has never yelled or stood up. This is really, really hard stuff, and occasionally people agree to disagree."...

Col Boylan said Mr Maliki had embraced the policy but dissidents were trying to throw "sand in the gearbox" with claims the two were at loggerheads.
While exchanges between the two had been "direct," the discussions fell a long way short of Mr Maliki telling Gen Petraeus he could no longer work with him...

[Uboat509]

My experience is that the British print media tends to be more overt with their partisanship. I have seen some things printed in Brit newspappers that make the New York Times look like the Weekly Standard. Articles like the one that started this thread seem to be par for the course for some Brit media outlets.


SFC W

[tequila]

Uboat's correct about British media partisanship. Note, however, that the Telegraph is a Tory paper.

[marct]

Hi Tequila,


Uboat's correct about British media partisanship. Note, however, that the Telegraph is a Tory paper.

So? Blair and the current government in the UK are Labour, not Tory. The war in Iaq isn't popular with large segments of the British voters, and this may be seen as a chance to stick it to Labour and win the next election, especially now that Blair is gone.

[tequila]

Hi Tequila,



So? Blair and the current government in the UK are Labour, not Tory. The war in Iaq isn't popular with large segments of the British voters, and this may be seen as a chance to stick it to Labour and win the next election, especially now that Blair is gone.

Except that the Tories are also prowar.

Most likely is that the reporter chose to report gossip as news.

[Nat Wilcox]

Is it true that Brit media are quicker on the draw with rumor and relatively unsubstantiated material?

It would be interesting (and puzzling) if in fact true, because British libel and slander laws are apparently much more friendly to plaintifs than defendants, relative to what we find in the U.S....or at least so Geoffrey K. Pullum, a (very funny) linguist argued in a short but amazing article called The Linguistics of Defamation in Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 3, 371-377.

[tequila]

My experience reading the Brit news media is absolutely, yes. This goes even for better publications as for the national tabloids like the Daily Mail or the Sun.

Even the best British publications like the Financial Times and the Economist are quite open about inserting editorial slant into their news stories. That being said, the FT is still among the best papers in the world.

[Granite_State]

Another Vietnam analogy:

http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w070319&s=kaplan032007

[SWJED]

7 September General Petraeus Letter to Troops of MNF-I (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/09/7-september-general-petraeus-l/)

HEADQUARTERS
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09342-1400

7 September 2007

Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians of Multi-National Force-Iraq

We are now over two-and-a-half months into the surge of offensive operations made possible by the surge of forces, and I want to share with you my view of how I think we’re doing. This letter is a bit longer than previous ones, since I feel you deserve a detailed description of what I believe we have – and have not – accomplished, as Ambassador Crocker and I finalize the assessment we will provide shortly to Congress.

Up front, my sense is that we have achieved tactical momentum and wrested the initiative from our enemies in a number of areas of Iraq. The result has been progress in the security arena, although it has, as you know, been uneven. Additionally, as you all appreciate very well, innumerable tasks remain and much hard work lies ahead. We are, in short, a long way from the goal line, but we do have the ball and we are driving down the field.

We face a situation that is exceedingly complex. Al Qaeda, associated insurgent groups, and militia extremists, some supported by Iran, continue to carry out attacks on us, our Iraqi partners, and the Iraqi civilians we seek to secure. We have to contend with the relentless pace of operations, the crushing heat, and the emotions that we all experience during long deployments and tough combat. And we operate against a backdrop of limited Iraqi government capacity, institutions trying to rebuild, and various forms of corruption. All of this takes place in a climate of distrust and fear that stems from the sectarian violence that did so much damage to the fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and into 2007, not to mention the decades of repression under Saddam’s brutal regime. Tragically, sectarian violence continues to cause death and displacement in Baghdad and elsewhere, albeit at considerably reduced levels from 8 months ago, due, in large part, to your hard work and sacrifice together with our Iraqi counterparts.

In spite of these challenges, our operations – particularly the offensive operations we have conducted since mid-June – have helped produce progress in many areas on the ground. In fact, the number of attacks across the country has declined in 8 of the past 11 weeks, reaching during the last week in August a level not seen since June 2006. This trend is not just a result of greater numbers of Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces; it also reflects your determination, courage, and skill in conducting counterinsurgency operations. By taking the fight to the enemy, you have killed or captured dozens of leaders and thousands of members of Al Qaeda-Iraq and extremist militia elements, you have taken many of Al Qaeda’s former sanctuaries away from them, and you have dismantled a number of their car bomb and improvised explosive device networks. By living among the population with our Iraqi partners, you have been holding the areas you have cleared. By helping Iraqis reestablish basic services and local governance, you have helped exploit the security gains. And by partnering closely with Iraqi Security Forces, you have been strengthening Iraqi elements that will one day have sole responsibility for protecting their population. Indeed, while Iraqi forces clearly remain a work in progree, Iraqi soldiers and police are very much in the fight, and they continue to sustain losses that are two to three times our losses.

We are also building momentum in an emerging area of considerable importance – local reconciliation. Local Iraqi leaders are coming forward, opposing extremists, and establishing provisional units of neighborhood security volunteers. With growing Government of Iraq support, these volunteers are being integrated into legitimate institutions to help improve local security. While this concept is playing out differently in various areas across Iraq, it is grounded in a desire shared by increasing numbers of Iraqis – to oppose extremist elements and their ideologies. This is very significant, as many of you know first-hand, extremists cannot survive without the support of the population. The popular rejection of Al Qaeda and its ideology has, for example, helped transform Anbar Province this year from one of the most dangerous areas of Iraq to one of the safest. The popular rejection has helped Coalition and Iraqi Forces take away other areas from Al Qaeda as well, and we are seeing a spread of this sentiment in an ever-increasing number of Sunni areas. Now, in fact, we are also seeing a desire to reject extremists emerge in many Shi’a areas.

The progress has not, to be sure, been uniform across Baghdad or across Iraq. Accomplishments in some areas – for example, in Ramadi and in Anbar Province – have been greater than any of us might have predicted six months ago. The achievements in some other areas – for example, in some particularly challenging Baghdad neighborhoods and in reducing overall civilian casualties, especially those caused by periodic, barbaric Al Qaeda bombings – have not been as dramatic. However, the overall trajectory has been encouraging, especially when compared to the situation at the height of the sectarian violence in late 2006 and early 2007.

Many of us hoped this summer would be a time of tangible political progress at the national level as well. One of the justifications for the surge, after all, was that it would help create the space for Iraqi leaders to tackle the tough questions and agree on key pieces of “national reconciliation” legislation. It has not worked out as we had hoped. All participants, Iraqi and coalition alike, are dissatisfied by the halting progress on major legislative initiatives such as the oil framework law, revenue sharing, and de-ba’athification reform. At the same time, however, our appreciation of what this legislation represents for Iraqi leaders has grown. These laws are truly fundamental in nature and will help determine how Iraqis will share power and resources in the new Iraq. While much work remains to be done before these critical issues are resolved, the seriousness with which Iraqi leaders came together at their summit in late August has given hope that they are up to the task before them, even if it is clearly taking more time than we initially expected.

In the coming months, our coalition’s countries and all Iraqis will continue to depend on each of you and on our Iraqi counterparts to keep the pressure on the extremists, to help security and strengthen the rule of law for all Iraqis, to work with the Government of Iraq to integrate volunteers into local security and national institutions, to assist with the restoration and improvement of basic services, and to continue the development of conditions that foster reconciliation. For our part, Ambassador Crocker and I will continue to do everything in our power to help the Prime Minister and the Government of Iraq achieve the meaningful results that will ensure that your sacrifices and those of your comrades help produce sustainable security for Iraq over the long term. A stable and secure Iraq that denies extremists a safe haven and has a government that is representative of and responsive to all Iraqis helps protect the vital interests of our coalition countries. A stable and secure Iraq will also benefit Iraq’s citizens and Iraq’s neighbors alike, bringing clam to a region full of challenges and employing iraq’s human capital and natural resource blessings for the benefit of all.

As I noted at the outset of this letter, over the next few days, Ambassador Crocker and I will share with the U.S. Congress and the American people our assessment of the situation in Iraq. I will also describe the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command. I will go before Congress conscious of the strain on our forces, the sacrifices that you and your families are making, the gains we have made in Iraq, the challenges that remain, and the importance of building on what we and our Iraqi counterparts have fought so hard to achieve.

Thanks once again for what each of you continue to do. Our Nations have asked much of you and your families. It remains the greatest of honors to serve with you.

Sincerely,

s/

David H. Petraeus
General, United States Army
Commanding

[MattC86]

I am very nervous about starting this thread and asking this, one because I know many of you are active military (and some have GEN Petraeus in their chain of command), and two because it's pretty politically sensitive, but all the political hoopla surrounding Congress, the White House, the American people, and GEN Petraeus/Ambassador Crocker the last few weeks has made me too curious not to ask. All that jazz about curiousity and the cat. . .

Anyway, is anyone else uneasy about GEN Petraeus and what he is doing in the United States? I personally feel that the administration has ceded it's Constitutional responsibilities as top policy-makers/policy strategists and has, in effect, "hid" behind GEN Petraeus and made the COIN/surge "strategy" (really a tactical reorientation in my mind) Petraeus' strategy rather than what it is, Bush's policy.

By ceding that responsibility, they have also passed GEN Petraeus the buck on "selling" the war. Now this is tricky, because I understand the importance of IO in any COIN situation (and the usual difficulties of fickle popular support for wars in the United States - or any liberal democracy), and I know some responsibility for IO falls to GEN Petraeus anyway. And most of what little I saw from his testimony was excellent - I particularly liked how he did not say whether MNF operations in Iraq are making America safer - but his appearances on Fox or on Katie Couric were cheerleader-esque appearances in some ways, and make me think that he's doing a lot of salesman work while he's here.

What especially bothers me is his op-ed from just before the 2004 election about the Iraqi Security Forces (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49283-2004Sep25.html), which, as shown by events of the next years, was (to my admittedly non-expert perspective) debatable at best and patently false at worst. That editorial from a serving military officer smacked of political salesmanship, and I am worried that he is doing much of the same currently. I wonder what anyone else thinks of this blurring of political and military responsibilites.

I hope this was not too out of line, and if it was, I apologize.

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

Matt,
I don't think most will say you are out of line - you phrased your question as a question and not as an attack or an indictment.

There certainly is a convergence point for policy and strategy, and the higher in the rank structure regarding a policy and the strategy for realizing it, the closer you are affiliated with it.

The very broad and general policy goal is to see Iraq to a point of stability where it can govern its own affairs, provide for its citizens and participate as a responsible state on the regional and international scene. By doing this we also help to prevent further instability in the region (such as Iran expanding a destabilizing influence & Non-state actors such as AQ or other terrorist organizations expanding into ungoverned spaces) and protect access to the strategic energy resources which are so vital across the world.

Certainly the MNF-I CDR bears some responsibility in meeting those "ends" by helping determine the "means" he'll use to do so. He also bears great responsibility for planning and implementing the "ways". The policy makers - really the administration - must approve the strategy as the tool used to realize the ends. The law makers must approve the appropriation and allocation of the "means" or funding and resources needed to pursue the ways. Congress and the President are of course elected officials - so enter in the people to go with the government and the military - the people get their window through the media.

This was all kind of what Clausewitz theorized in his secondary trinity (the people - the military and its leadership - the government) with regard to considering the nature of war. War makes no sense without its political context else why would you go to war if not for some political reason (usually involving fear, interests or honor).

At the level of war in which GEN Petraeus' operates - policy is part of it. Remember there was a political confirmation process for assigning him to lead MNF-I - politics entered early on. Every General Officer is charged with providing the elected officials their best and most honest military advice to inform policy questions, and although the President is in our Chain of Command - our oath is to preserve the constitution.

Also, I don't think the President has hung him out to dry. Tune in tonight for the President's speech and I think you'll see him take responsibility for the decision to continue the policy.

I hope that helps answer your question. Also for a good read on this pick up any book by Colin Gray.

Best regards, Rob

[skiguy]

Matt, you're not out of line, but I may be because I'm going to attack and indict..so I'll apologize in advance if I offend anyone. (or even get banned) And, yeah, I'm going to draw partisan lines in the sand here, because I'm that disgusted by what I've seen and heard.
By the way, I'm not in the military and I'm not one who blindly thinks the Bush administration has handled the war in Iraq well.

Petraeus and Crocker were attacked by EVERY f-ing democrat with every question they were asked. Yes, it's Bush's policy, but it's the General's and Ambassador's plan that is in effect, so it's perfectly understandable that they will both get a little defensive and try to "sell" it. I thnk it's disgusting how they're being treated. But that may just be me...because I think they are geniuses and nothing less. If anything is "bad" from this, it's the fact that the president handed them a mess. But I can't think of two (actually more, add Nagl, Kilcullen, and many more to the list) better people to fix things.

The democrats called them liars or worse. Those 2 demand respect and it's not given to them..not by the jackasses in Congress, Chris Matthews, Anderson Copper, the NY Times, et al. I'll watch Bush, but I'm not stayin up to watch my Senator Reed's rebuttal. I know it will just be a bunch of garbage because his thick head is already made up and no facts (like those he was given Monday and Tuesday) will change his mind.

What's wrong with this country is there is a certain, and unfortunately, large group that wish nothing more than failure because they hate their own president that much. And it's not just the war. They blame America for terrorists. They say the economy's bad when it's clearly not. I could go on, but I'll stop now before I get myself into more trouble than I probably already have.

[Watcher In The Middle]

Anyway, is anyone else uneasy about GEN Petraeus and what he is doing in the United States? I personally feel that the administration has ceded it's Constitutional responsibilities as top policy-makers/policy strategists and has, in effect, "hid" behind GEN Petraeus and made the COIN/surge "strategy" (really a tactical reorientation in my mind) Petraeus' strategy rather than what it is, Bush's policy.

Uneasy about General Petraeus / AMB Crocker and their actions/testimony?

Not in the least. Look, these guys are the "on the scene" experts. Who Better? Actually, this type of thing happens all the time, just not on such a contentious issue.

Just as a single example, we (the federal government) has an upcoming auction of the 700 Mhz. spectrum (think extreme high speed wireless internet access). There's been tons (and I do means TONS) of testimony over the last few years, and probably more to come. And I can guarantee you that all of that "testimony" provided by all the different experts has all been carefully crafted around different sales pitches. In fact, that's one topic where the issue really should be more contentious, but isn't because the political leadership in both parties doesn't want it to be a contentious issue. That's not the case with Iraq - the leadership on both sides need it to be a contentious issue.

What they are really doing (and actually it's smart politically), is that they want both GEN Petraeus / AMB Crocker out there on the record FIRST, not later. Because if the Congress Critters went first and then the real experts came later, well you'd have a whole lot of evidence laid out there for God & Everyone to see exactly how bright/dumb their elected pol's really are. And we're talking a "Whole Lot of Ugly" here......

Think of it as an avoidance of a congressional replay of "RatherGate". Only this time, it would be all about Iraq if you didn't have both GEN Petraeus / AMB Crocker out there on the record FIRST. Can you imagine the havoc (and the fun) the blogs and the new media would have with a target as big as Congress showing their collective ignorance?

If the WH didn't have both of them report first, Congress (if they were thinking) would have insisted upon it.

So no, it's really unlikely there's a problem here.

[Rob Thornton]

Matt,

Click here for the text of the President's Speech (http://www.charleston.net/news/2007/sep/13/full_text_president_bushs_speech/)

I think the President did a good job of distinguishing the lanes, taking responsibility, articulating the rationale at the different levels.

His speech was more informed I believe as a result of the AMB Crocker/GEN Petraeus report, and the report issued by Gen (R) Jones' commission. This is a responsibility of those who serve to inform policy with their best advice. I think this week's events show how things can work (and work well) when the pieces are linked.

Best regards, Rob

[tequila]

The President's speech, IMO, was pretty much the same pile of horse hockey that has come out his mouth since 2003.

Particularly pathetic portions highlighted:



Anbar province is a good example of how our strategy is working. Last year, an intelligence report concluded that Anbar had been lost to al-Qaida. Some cited this report as evidence that we had failed in Iraq and should cut our losses and pull out. Instead, we kept the pressure on the terrorists. The local people were suffering under the Taliban-like rule of al-Qaida, and they were sick of it. So they asked us for help.

To take advantage of this opportunity, I sent an additional 4,000 Marines to Anbar as part of the surge.

A sad attempt take credit where he is due absolutely none at all. As our very own Cavguy has noted, the surge had little to nothing to do with the Anbar sheikhs.



One year ago, much of Baghdad was under siege. Schools were closed, markets were shuttered, and sectarian violence was spiraling out of control. Today, most of Baghdad"s neighborhoods are being patrolled by coalition and Iraqi forces who live among the people they protect. Many schools and markets are reopening. Citizens are coming forward with vital intelligence. Sectarian killings are down. And ordinary life is beginning to return.

Ordinary life if you count life with no power, no jobs, and few schools reopened. He forgot to mention that much of Baghdad's Sunni population has been killed or has fled the city.



One year ago, Shia extremists and Iranian-backed militants were gaining strength and targeting Sunnis for assassination. Today, these groups are being broken up and many of their leaders are being captured or killed.

Or continuing their careers in the Iraqi security forces or the Iraqi government. If we captured or killed these groups true leaders, we'd end up killing much of the democratically elected Iraqi leadership.



Yet Iraq"s national leaders are getting some things done. For example, they have passed a budget. They are sharing oil revenues with the provinces. They are allowing former Baathists to rejoin Iraq"s military or receive government pensions. And local reconciliation is taking place. The key now is to link this progress in the provinces to progress in Baghdad. As local politics change, so will national politics.

Flat out lies here. No oil law or even agreement. No de-Baathification law. What local "reconciliation"? Reconciliation has to involve Iraqis reconciling with Iraqis, not Iraqis agreeing to stop killing Americans in exchange for duffel bags full of cash.

Skiguy - Your post is quite reasoned compared to what was running through my head watching my CINC sit and lie to my face on national TV. Again.

[skiguy]

I feel for you, Tequila. I do wish Bush just said "Listen to what Petraeus and Crocker said. They know more than I do and will take care of my and Rumsfeld's screw ups."

But since we're talking about lying, let's look at Senator Reed's (Democrat RI) rebuttal. (From this point on, Reed will be referred to as CAN'T-and never-will-Reed-FM 3-24)


When the President launched the surge in January, he told us that its purpose was to provide Iraqi leaders with the time to make that political progress.

But now, nine months into the surge, the President's own advisers tell us that Iraq’s leaders have not, and are not likely to do so.

Yes, 9 months is such a long, long time. (well, apparently it is for a certain U.S. political party). Things are not all fine (and no one is saying that) but there is noted and undeniable progress in ONLY 9 months.


That is why our plan focuses on counter-terrorism and training the Iraqi army.

Our plan??? If this wasn't so laughable I would be sick to my stomach. Their only plan is a complete withdrawal of all troops NOW. Only this, and this alone, will make them happy.



It engages in diplomacy to bring warring factions to the table and addresses regional issues that inflame the situation.

Did he (they) even LISTEN to or HEAR any of Petraeus's and Crocker's testimony?? With this statement, I think the answer is clearly no.

[goesh]

I am not in the least bit uneasy or bothered with General P. talking to Congressional leaders and the rest of the nation in the manner he did. The 'old man' , the Commander of OUR troops, not Bush's troops, not the troops of Congress but the troops of We The People should come home and speak directly to us as he did. There was a time in our history that the people and press didn't expect this but no longer. He stood tall and informed the nation of what the situation is over there. We need alot more straight talk like General P. gave us and considerably less innuendo, perception, pereceived perception, political correctness,opinion polls, punditry, insinuation and general bull s***. I am puzzled why anyone would feel uneasy about a commanding General of any outfit under any circumstances addressing We The People.

[marct]

I've got to agree with Goesh on this one, although for different reasons. First, I thought that their testimony was reasoned, well resented and an attempt to give their best analysis of what was going on. Second, as a Canadian I felt that their reports were a window into their perceptions and, hopefully, an indicator of what would happen. In many ways, I felt that their testimony was a good example of all that is best in your system of government. The same, I fear, cannot be said of some of the other "commentary" that came out surrounding their reports.

Matt, I'm glad you brought this up. I think that discussing the issue is a really good way of examining how your system of government works and what it truly means. I, for one, would far rather hear General Petraeus on the effects than have to rely on media reports or the "expert" opinions of politicians.

Marc

[Ken White]

The President's speech, IMO, was pretty much the same pile of horse hockey that has come out his mouth since 2003.
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .

Flat out lies here. No oil law or even agreement. No de-Baathification law. What local "reconciliation"? Reconciliation has to involve Iraqis reconciling with Iraqis, not Iraqis agreeing to stop killing Americans in exchange for duffel bags full of cash.

Skiguy - Your post is quite reasoned compared to what was running through my head watching my CINC sit and lie to my face on national TV. Again.

sides of the aisle; both Parties are being pretty irresponsible about Iraq in all aspects IMO. I'd also suggest that US (Bipartisan) attempts to impose things like de-Baathification and an oil law are going to be resisted by some due to sheer xenophobia.

The 'not invented here' syndrome is not at all a US peculiarity and our overweening egos trying to tell the Iraqis what to do was always going to be, er, um, problematic...

Politicians lie and obfuscate, it's in the job description. I've lived through 12 US Presidents -- every single one of them has "lied to the American people" on national security issues. I'm pretty sure the next few will do the same regardless of Party.

[Merv Benson]

The Bush administrations policy in Iraq has too often been conflated with the strategies for implementing it by many of the critics of the policy. Thus the Abizaid-Casey small foot print strategy for implementing the policy was criticized as Bush's strategy. When he became dissatisfied with the results of that strategy and adopted the Petraeus, counterinsurgency strategy as a way to implement that policy, critics immediately started attacking the new "Bush strategy."

This is why some of the questioning of Gen. Petraeus was so off the wall. People who oppose the policy were challenging the result of the strategy as way to discredit the policy. I think the result was that opponents of the policy lost the plot in an attempt to discredit results that advances the policy. As someone who has seen a few cross examinations, I would have to say that the General was an outstanding witness and advocate for his strategy. Those who attempted to challenge his integrity were the real losers.

[RTK]

Yes, 9 months is such a long, long time. (well, apparently it is for a certain U.S. political party). .

Hell yes it is! That's 12.5% of a Senator's term!:D

[Jimbo]

GEN P told Congress duirng his confirmation that he would brief them in September, and he did that. If he had not, there would be all kinds of shenannigans going on. I think that the commander on the ground and the COM briefing Congress was great. Some of the aftermath hasn't been good, but they told like it is.

[SWJED]

GEN P told Congress duirng his confirmation that he would brief them in September, and he did that. If he had not, there would be all kinds of shenannigans going on. I think that the commander on the ground and the COM briefing Congress was great. Some of the aftermath hasn't been good, but they told like it is.

... short, sweet, on the point and well said. It would have taken many 'talking heads' 2,000 words in an Op-Ed or twenty minutes on a talk show to say what you just posted...

[MattC86]

Thanks all for the responses (and reassurances I wasn't completely out of line), and especially to Jedburgh for covering my

I want to make clear I don't take issue with any of the testimony given to Congress. That was well done by both GEN Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, performing the necessary duty of reporting to Congress (and, by extension, the American people) even if the clowns in Congress - and frankly the population at large - has already made up their mind.

My issues stem from what I perceived to be an abdication of normal constitutional responsibility on the part of the President. I know in the military community it is considered important that a President listen to his military commanders, but the President is the ultimate policy-maker, not the military officer, no matter how impeccably qualified as he (in the case of Petraeus) may be.

As unfit as the comparison may seem, GEN MacArthur was fired by Truman because he was essentially taking CinC responsibilities and making policy himself. Obviously Petraeus is not in the same vein, but perhaps in reverse - Bush has made his policy entirely dependent upon what Petraeus says. As such, Petraeus has to hit Fox News and Katie Couric to, in effect, sell the war. That's what the 2004 op-ed (linked in my first post) did as well - and I think that op-ed was fairly inaccurate, with full hindsight.

Maybe I'm seeing a difference that doesn't actually exist between reporting the state of the war and selling a policy, because I don't think I'm making it clear in my posts. . . in that case thanks for bearing with me. . .

Matt

[Ken White]

Generals can be called by Congress to testify. So can Staff Sergeants, Privates, Admirals and any other citizen -- and they have been for years, there's nothing new in Petraeus testifying.

I fail to see any abdication of constitutional responsibility by the President. He has no obligation to testify in front of Congress and if the Congroids want more knowledge of an executive branch program, then the appropriate person from the correct Executive agency is sent to testify -- as long as the President agrees that executive privilege is not being violated (and obviously in the case of Petraeus, he did not so believe). Petraeus testifying is Constitutionally no different than the Chief of the US Forest Service or the Deputy Commissioner of the IRS testifying. That's the way the system is supposed to work.

The President is indeed the policy maker. He has the ultimate responsibility for all the executive agencies do or fail to do. There are several thousand programs operation every day in the executive branch of the US government. No one person can ever hope to have detailed knowledge of many, much less most -- and certainly never all -- of those programs; thus the government is a heirarchial organization and the President has to delegate authority. He has done that, the policy and the responsibility remain with the president.

The President is a fomer figher jock, short term type; he has no knowledge of ground warfare. That's the Army's job. They recommend a course of action, the President nods and that becomes his policy. The Army is the executive agent and has been delegated the authority -- not the responibility, that cannot be delegated -- to execute the action. The system generally works and it did in this case.

MacArthur was not fired for making policy himself -- he was fired for vocally, constantly and publicly advocating a policy that was not that of the US government. A quite different thing and well within the President's authority.

Petraeus did not have to go on TV (and should not have, nor should Bush have made his speech last Thursday, both IMO). That he did so is an indicator that he realizes this Administration is the worst in recent history in getting their message out and he tried to help 'em out a bit. That's above and beyond -- even if he did make the tactical error of going on Fox before a more 'neutral' source. No big thing. :cool:

[SWJED]

...to preside over BG promotion board (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/11/next-generation-of-us-army-coi/).

[Rob Thornton]

I know the implication is tied to COIN as a type of qualifier for the decision to bring GEN Petraeus back to CONUS to guide the board’s deliberations, but I’d like to offer up that while the general media uses COIN much in the way it uses “surge”, I’d offer that this board’s importance is less about picking guys with “exact” knowledge of counter-insurgency, but is more about selecting 06s for GO rank who have proven they possess an agile mind and can recognize changes and possibilities and can adapt quickly to deny the enemy options while exploiting opportunities which will gain and retain the initiative on the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war.

I saw where USA MG (Retired) Robert Scales had offered up why this is so important. I have turned to his writing many times because he has thought and written on leadership a great deal, and has so much experience in leadership – and I think he has the crux of it.

Past and current performance offer a window into potential for increased responsibility and authority commensurate to promotion to a higher rank – what GEN Petraeus offers is the perspective of a leader who has proven in every assignment he’s been assigned that he has the qualities required to operate and lead across the full spectrum of operations as defined by FM 3-0 and win.

As a relatively junior field grade what I propose we want from our GOs is agile and adaptive leadership commensurate with the responsibility and authority found in the positions held by GOs under whatever conditions and operational themes the mission commits us to – be they Peacetime Military Engagement, Limited Intervention, Peace Operations, Irregular Warfare, or Major Combat Operations.

The General Officers selected are going to have their hands full – from leading our soldiers in combat today, to anticipating the demands of tomorrow, to educating and informing our political leadership on the best ways to develop, sustain and employ military force where it is required to achieve a political objective – and the risks of doing so. While being grounded in their tactical experiences – they must be thinking on the operational and strategic levels – able to articulate nuances to provide context, while being able to see the inter-relationships and consequences.

I think we must give the board the benefit of understanding that while COIN may be the theme we’ve picked up on, the requirements of ensuring we have the best GOs (and leaders) are deeper and more subjective. The 06s we’ve identified in the original blog and related articles are more then just good COIN officers, they are leaders who have demonstrated that they can identify a problem and think creatively about it, and will resource the means to overcome it. They are full spectrum officers with agile and adaptive minds, and they have sparked creativity in organizations they have been a part of, and inspired the larger community by their ideas and communication skills.

Best Regards, Rob

[SteveMetz]

I know the implication is tied to COIN as a type of qualifier for the decision to bring GEN Petraeus back to CONUS to guide the board’s deliberations, but I’d like to offer up that while the general media uses COIN much in the way it uses “surge”, I’d offer that this board’s importance is less about picking guys with “exact” knowledge of counter-insurgency, but is more about selecting 06s for GO rank who have proven they possess an agile mind and can recognize changes and possibilities and can adapt quickly to deny the enemy options while exploiting opportunities which will gain and retain the initiative on the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war.

I saw where USA MG (Retired) Robert Scales had offered up why this is so important. I have turned to his writing many times because he has thought and written on leadership a great deal, and has so much experience in leadership – and I think he has the crux of it.

Past and current performance offer a window into potential for increased responsibility and authority commensurate to promotion to a higher rank – what GEN Petraeus offers is the perspective of a leader who has proven in every assignment he’s been assigned that he has the qualities required to operate and lead across the full spectrum of operations as defined by FM 3-0 and win.

As a relatively junior field grade what I propose we want from our GOs is agile and adaptive leadership commensurate with the responsibility and authority found in the positions held by GOs under whatever conditions and operational themes the mission commits us to – be they Peacetime Military Engagement, Limited Intervention, Peace Operations, Irregular Warfare, or Major Combat Operations.

The General Officers selected are going to have their hands full – from leading our soldiers in combat today, to anticipating the demands of tomorrow, to educating and informing our political leadership on the best ways to develop, sustain and employ military force where it is required to achieve a political objective – and the risks of doing so. While being grounded in their tactical experiences – they must be thinking on the operational and strategic levels – able to articulate nuances to provide context, while being able to see the inter-relationships and consequences.

I think we must give the board the benefit of understanding that while COIN may be the theme we’ve picked up on, the requirements of ensuring we have the best GOs (and leaders) are deeper and more subjective. The 06s we’ve identified in the original blog and related articles are more then just good COIN officers, they are leaders who have demonstrated that they can identify a problem and think creatively about it, and will resource the means to overcome it. They are full spectrum officers with agile and adaptive minds, and they have sparked creativity in organizations they have been a part of, and inspired the larger community by their ideas and communication skills.

Best Regards, Rob

LOL--we need to have a long talk about General Scales some time.

No question, though, that a war rages between the "big" Army and the "irregular" Army. The use of Petraeus on a promotion board shows that Gates is as interested in shaping this as was his predecessor (what was his name?), but is doing it in a more subtle, less in-your-face, fashion.

[Rob Thornton]

You know – I’ve never met the retired general – but I have read much of what he’s written over the last few years. I was introduced to his writings by two officers who have influenced me greatly, and who I hold in high esteem. Scales’ writings strike me as being from somebody who has reflected on what they have done, and what they might have done – and also as to how we might do them better. When others were focused on defining “transformation” as being hardware related – the pieces I see from him always seem to put leadership and people first – even when as an advocate for FCS as the Army’s major acquisition, he wrote from the point of enabling agile and adaptive leaders.

This is one reason I think we must select leaders for their potential to visualize and anticipate the problems and possibilities that seem to elude others; and to promote those who have the courage and genius to address and take advantage of things that others less inclined, or less capable might overlook or ignore in favor of something which espouses low personal risk.

This is my opinion is what is significant about bringing GEN Petraeus back – it is not so much what the board will look at, but how they will look at it – how the board will weigh “potential” based on who the candidates are, and how their actions have defined them. This is at least a chance at recasting ourselves to look forward instead of over our shoulder.

Best, Rob

[CB]

Sorry for digging out this thread, but I have a question regarding how Gen. Petraeus can influence this promotion board's decisions and, ultimately, GO selection process. I've been until now unable to find accurate and up-to-date information about this process and still don't know if, as a Chairman, Gen Petraeus has a real opportunity to change things by promoting great COIN practitioners, or if he can only put names on a list which has to be confirmed by other board members/service/office, willing or not to promote the same kind of officers.

Please, any information would be extremely welcome. Thanks a lot in advance for any help you could provide.

Best,

CB

[Gian P Gentile]

...Gen Petraeus has a real opportunity to change things by promoting great COIN practicians...CB

Is this what we really want? Is this good for the Army?

A Coin Cabal? There certainly are some indicators that that is what our Army has become. Consider the elevation of relatively lower ranking officers who are members of this Cabal to rock-star status.

We think with these latest moves that Yingling's recommendations are being adopted. However, I see these moves as reinforcing what Yingling railed against in his important piece: a crony dominated system of officer promotions. That may be an extreme view but we should at least look at these latest developments with trepadation and caution before we start falling all over ourselves with high-fives and self-congratulations.

gentile

[SteveMetz]

Is this what we really want? Is this good for the Army?

A Coin Cabal? There certainly are some indicators that that is what our Army has become. Consider the elevation of relatively lower ranking officers who are members of this Cabal to rock-star status.



What alternative would you propose? A renewed emphasis on conventional maneuver warfare?

And, I'm just asking--this is not a leading question. I'm not an advocate of "all COIN, all the time." I think we're preparing to fight the last war. I'm not sure what the appropriate future course is.

[CB]

Well, it wasn't really my point but yes, I believe creating career paths for successful COIN experts is a good thing for the Army. That doesn't mean promoting only COIN experts, of course, but creating a diversified officer corps able to handle both stabilization & COIN ops and waging conventional war. Just look at the kind of conflicts in which the US Army has been involved in the past; couldn't such a change in officer promotion policy have helped the US Army to be better prepared to the kind of missions it would have to face, either in Lebanon, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. ?

[Steve Blair]

Is this what we really want? Is this good for the Army?

A Coin Cabal? There certainly are some indicators that that is what our Army has become. Consider the elevation of relatively lower ranking officers who are members of this Cabal to rock-star status.

We think with these latest moves that Yingling's recommendations are being adopted. However, I see these moves as reinforcing what Yingling railed against in his important piece: a crony dominated system of officer promotions. That may be an extreme view but we should at least look at these latest developments with trepadation and caution before we start falling all over ourselves with high-fives and self-congratulations.

gentile

And this is different from the airborne mafia, armor community, etc., in what real way? It's always cronyism when it's a group that someone happens to disagree with, but forward thinking if it's a group that happens to meet someone's agenda objectives. Just an observation that we've seen this before and seem stunningly incapable of learning from previous bureaucratic mistakes.


And, I'm just asking--this is not a leading question. I'm not an advocate of "all COIN, all the time." I think we're preparing to fight the last war. I'm not sure what the appropriate future course is.

Steve, I agree that the Army's looking to fight the last war again, but it seems that they're always either doing that or fixating on the war that they WANT to fight (here I refer to doctrinal development after the Civil War and, to a degree, the post-Vietnam period). I'm honestly not sure that the institution is capable of preparing for a variety of threats or even meaningfully thinking about those multiple threats. It's all "either/or."

[TROUFION]

You can be more than one thing. You can be an expert in conventional and unconventional war. Officers and senior enlisted of high caliber and flexible mindset are what is needed. In the Marine Corps we have legendary leaders who started out in irregular conflicts and rose to great success in conventional wars. Smedley Butler, Chesty Puller, Dan Daily, to name but a few. Warfighting can be complicated but it is not so difficult that it cannot be understood on its many levels. My opinion on the choice of Petraus is that he is intelligent, talented and he has an eye for spotting talent. He is the flexible officer capable of adapting to his environment. If the Iranians stormed across the Iraqi border in waves of armor and infantry I expect he would deal well with that just as he is dealing well with COIN. Placing a top notch GO in charge of a board is the right thing to do.

[Steve Blair]

You can be more than one thing. You can be an expert in conventional and unconventional war. Officers and senior enlisted of high caliber and flexible mindset are what is needed. In the Marine Corps we have legendary leaders who started out in irregular conflicts and rose to great success in conventional wars. Smedley Butler, Chesty Puller, Dan Daily, to name but a few. Warfighting can be complicated but it is not so difficult that it cannot be understood on its many levels.

Yes, and one of the interesting thing about the Marines is that they have been able to strike that balance. I'm not sure what it is about the Army as an institution that has made them unable (or unwilling) to do so with any great regularity. It's not so much a question of size (as this is something I've seen going back to when the Army's main business was more or less constabulary in nature) as it may be the culture and learned behaviors within the organization.

This isn't a dig at the Army as much as it is me musing out loud (or at the keyboard) about something that has come to interest and puzzle me more and more of late. I'll stop now before I ramble out of control...:eek:

[Shek]

What alternative would you propose? A renewed emphasis on conventional maneuver warfare?

And, I'm just asking--this is not a leading question. I'm not an advocate of "all COIN, all the time." I think we're preparing to fight the last war. I'm not sure what the appropriate future course is.

The officers selected for O-7 from this board will have grown up and been promoted to O-6 by the "conventional" Army based on their proven competence at conventional operations, with some Bosnia and/or Kosovo rotations spriknled in there. Their performance at the O-6 level will by and large be judged by their performance in OIF/OEF, operations that for most part will have a strong COIN component in there.

If the officers that are selected were the best commanders in the COIN environment, does this make them part of a "COIN cabal" or the most adaptable officers who are able to perform well in new operating environments?

On the flip side, if an officer was the best NTC/JRTC/CMTC warfighter but couldn't adapt to a different environment and therefore was only marginal at COIN, should they be promoted to O-7?

I'm afraid that in the conversation over where the future of the Army needs to go, we'll find ourselves trying to put people into one of two boxes, labeled COIN or conventional, instead of looking at those who show the mentile agility to be able to have one foot in both boxes and have the proven potential to adapt to the future challenges that may not be in either box.

[Griz882]

Warfighting can be complicated but it is not so difficult that it cannot be understood on its many levels.

TROUFION is spot on here. I have heard others rightfully rail against the all-COIN-all-the-time mind set and I see logic in their arguments. I will readily admit that for a short while I was an adherent to the "unconventional warfare is the graduate level of combat" school of thought. I have come to recognize that it might be the graduate level of tactics but too often COIN zealots see the forest but not the trees. For example they see the undeniable value of both civil and military actions working in concert but rarely discuss the logistics required for such an effort. Maneuver, still a critical element in any tactical situation seems to be brushed aside by thoughtless cheers such as "boots on the ground," "hearts and minds," and "constant presence."

We need to remember that the junior officers of the so-called Indian Wars became the staff officers of the Spanish American War and eventually the G.O.'s of WWI - all very different conflicts but all feeding experience to the next.

My hope is that GEN Petraeus will select future generals based on their ability to lead, think, manage, and plan to win in a variety of conflicts. Everything after that is just shooting.

[selil]

Yes, and one of the interesting thing about the Marines is that they have been able to strike that balance. I'm not sure what it is about the Army as an institution that has made them unable (or unwilling) to do so with any great regularity. It's not so much a question of size (as this is something I've seen going back to when the Army's main business was more or less constabulary in nature) as it may be the culture and learned behaviors within the organization.

This isn't a dig at the Army as much as it is me musing out loud (or at the keyboard) about something that has come to interest and puzzle me more and more of late. I'll stop now before I ramble out of control...:eek:

Steve you have something there

The discussions of COIN or NO-COIN aren't an issue in the Marines nor is the concept of doctrinal documents. I think the difference in this case between the Marines and the Army is that in the Marines they think/train (any Marine, any mission, any location), whereas the Army specializes in silos of missions or skills. I know that there are contrary examples but I think it is part of the Army culture.

Look at how people identify themselves here on SWC. They are Armor, they are Intel, they are logistics, and they may have been other things but their current skill set is denoted by their occupation.

It is a fundamental part of the Marine psyche that every Marine is a rifleman, and every other job after that is dessert. The only place I've ever seen strife bent around mission was with an Air Wing (El Toro to be exact), and my Battalion Commander reminded a pilot flying CAS that when he lands he's a rifleman too (it was really a joke more than a censure).

Perhaps that is why Gian P. Gentile sees the conflict with COIN encumbering his Army rather than expanding his role (no disrespect meant Col. Gentile). I'd defer to people much more aware of the roles and culture, but institutionalized silos of concern would create the inter disciplinary strife we see exhibited. MarcT could discuss the organizational issues much better than I.

[Steve Blair]

Steve you have something there

The discussions of COIN or NO-COIN aren't an issue in the Marines nor is the concept of doctrinal documents. I think the difference in this case between the Marines and the Army is that in the Marines they think/train (any Marine, any mission, any location), whereas the Army specializes in silos of missions or skills. I know that there are contrary examples but I think it is part of the Army culture.

Look at how people identify themselves here on SWC. They are Armor, they are Intel, they are logistics, and they may have been other things but their current occupation is denoted by their skill set.

It is a fundamental part of the Marine psyche that every Marine is a rifleman, and every other job after that is dessert. The only place I've ever seen strife bent around mission was with an Air Wing (El Toro to be exact), and my Battalion Commander reminded a pilot flying CAS that when he lands he's a rifleman too (it was really a joke more than a censure).

Perhaps that is why Gian Gentile sees the conflict with COIN encumbering his Army rather than expanding his role (no disrespect meant Col. Gentile). I'd defer to people much more aware of the roles and culture, but institutionalized silos of concern would create the inter disciplinary strife we see exhibited. MarcT could discuss the organizational issues much better than I.

One reason I find it so interesting, Sam, is that it's been such a constant in the Army as an institution. Even going back to the period before the Civil War we find the Army training (when it could...considering that almost 3/4ths of the authorized strength was scattered at small posts throughout the expanding Frontier) for line-against-line Napoleonic conflict. The majority of the skills the troops needed for Indian warfare were learned in the field, while training still focused on European-style warfare. There was no formal effort to retain lessons learned (the majority of what we might now consider doctrinal information came out either in journal articles or privately-published books), and even some moaning about how the constant small-scale warfare detracted from the real business of training men to be soldiers.

It's an interesting situation...and one that doesn't seem to be going away any time soon. That's why I see many more similarities between Vietnam and Iraq on the institutional response side than I do in the field.

[Eden]

It is interesting how the Army can only do one thing at a time. I joined when we were still training for Vietnam, though the war had been over for almost a decade. For the next fifteen years it was all conventional training. Institutionally, there are a couple of reasons for this, I think. First, doctrine is written by branches, and doctrine matters because it leads to money and manpower and material. Therefore, doctrine needs to be consistent and support the other institutional goals of the branch. Second, the schoolhouses have a limited amount of flexibility - this is generally a good thing, by the way - and a limited amount of time to teach. Again, this encourages a single approach to training our future warfighters. Thirdly, it takes twenty years to properly train a brigade commander. If we shift our emphasis on levels of warfare too often, they will be jacks of all trades and masters of none. I'm sure there are more reasons out there.

By the way, in touching on this thread's initial focus, I don't see how we can or why we should avoid promoting our best COIN operators to general. Success in war should be the first consideration for the promotion of generals (and shame on anybody who says otherwise), and counter-insurgency is the only contest in town right now. Does this mean some budding conventional Patton/Manstein/Slim out there will get passed over? Probably.

[Gian P Gentile]

I am not advocating a "conventional only" American army. Clearly, the American Army needs to have the capability to do irregular warfare and counterinsurgency when it needs to (hopefully policy makers when deciding when to commit American ground power, however, will appreciate the limits of that power in what it can accomplish). But what has happened in the American Army over the past two years, and what i have been arguing, is that the American Army has been turned into a counterinsurgency only force which is not good for the Army or the nation. There needs to be a balance.

And with a good deal of humility I can say as a relatively senior officer that I was brought up mostly doing conventional operations but when duty called to do Coin I was not too bad at it (probably about a B to B+ student at it if I had to self-assess).

As to the notion that the Marines are somehow naturals at both conventional warfare and Coin while the army is not; well, that is not a notion based on reality but a myth propagated by the institutional interests of the marines that puts their existence above all else. So when the Army is focused on conventional operations then the marines highlight Coin to show difference. This is what the marines did after Vietnam in trying to show that they were the ones that had figured it all out with Caps; ironically during the war the marines placed very few resources into Caps. Now in Iraq the marines are in effect doing the same mission as the Army so it is in their interests to argue that they can do both well and can easily move back and forth between the two when in this rendering the Army can not hence showing how they are different from the Army.

[Ron Humphrey]

And with a good deal of humility I can say as a relatively senior officer that I was brought up mostly doing conventional operations but when duty called to do Coin I was not too bad at it (probably about a B to B+ student at it if I had to self-assess).



I have had the opportunity to work with, under many different officers during both my service time and continuing at the college. The one thing that I think suprises me the most is how often the concern of special/COIN operations being given a higher precidence with exclude continued excellence in larger operational environments.

This doesn't register with me as from what I've seen it's exactly the opposite.
In any form of warfare the first and foremost lessons are how to fight.
Then there is who to fight , how.
Then what was to fight in order to accomplish what short term / long term, etc

Any General officer no matter if they are the most capable out of the box thinker is still grounded in their original military fighting fundamentals as such I'm not sure I can accept any assertions that the results of inclusion of Gen Patraeus would be anything but beneficial to the process as I thnk he would not only require a good military foundation to the individuals but then also be able to dig a little deeper to assess their abilities to adjust fires.

PS

I,ve read and heard a lot of complaining about the "rock-star " status of certain individuals rather than recognizing soldiers who worked to better their profession and their services.
I think the latter is a better way to address them. Regardless of whether we agree with everything they do or say, if we cannot honestly without a doubt say that their efforts were selfishly motivated then we truly have no right to assert they were just because after the fact they benefitted from it.

I can always learn better and more effective ways of blowing stuff up but regardless I'll still know how to blow stuff up.

[Sargent]

Is this what we really want? Is this good for the Army?

A Coin Cabal? There certainly are some indicators that that is what our Army has become. Consider the elevation of relatively lower ranking officers who are members of this Cabal to rock-star status.

We think with these latest moves that Yingling's recommendations are being adopted. However, I see these moves as reinforcing what Yingling railed against in his important piece: a crony dominated system of officer promotions. That may be an extreme view but we should at least look at these latest developments with trepadation and caution before we start falling all over ourselves with high-fives and self-congratulations.

gentile

Here's the distinction I would draw...

I don't think there is any value in promoting any officer who believes that COIN is the Holy Grail -- same would apply to the unquestioning belief in any doctrine of warfare. However, I do think that there is something particularly challenging about the Iraqi and Afghani battlefields. For an armed force steeped in a firepower intensive model of conventional warfare, the ability of an officer to adapt to the more nuanced situation in which the question is not how to kill the guy, but instead whether to kill or befriend the guy, suggests qualities that might be useful for executive leadership. And these are the very officers who are going to have more than one trick in their repertoire, who can both fight and nurture as necessary, and who will best serve the institution in any form war will take while they're at the helm.

However, I don't think that you need Gen. Petraeus to participate in order to find those people.

Cheers,
Jill

[Ron Humphrey]

Here's the distinction I would draw...

I don't think there is any value in promoting any officer who believes that COIN is the Holy Grail -- same would apply to the unquestioning belief in any doctrine of warfare. However, I do think that there is something particularly challenging about the Iraqi and Afghani battlefields. For an armed force steeped in a firepower intensive model of conventional warfare, the ability of an officer to adapt to the more nuanced situation in which the question is not how to kill the guy, but instead whether to kill or befriend the guy, suggests qualities that might be useful for executive leadership. And these are the very officers who are going to have more than one trick in their repertoire, who can both fight and nurture as necessary, and who will best serve the institution in any form war will take while they're at the helm.

However, I don't think that you need Gen. Petraeus to participate in order to find those people.

Cheers,
Jill

I agree with you that it doesn't require any particular individual it just requires a certain type of process.

I simply meant in regard to this topic I don't see why he would be a bad choice.:D

[max161]

Sorry for digging out this thread, but I have a question regarding how Gen. Petraeus can influence this promotion board's decisions and, ultimately, GO selection process. I've been until now unable to find accurate and up-to-date information about this process and still don't know if, as a Chairman, Gen Petraeus has a real opportunity to change things by promoting great COIN practitioners, or if he can only put names on a list which has to be confirmed by other board members/service/office, willing or not to promote the same kind of officers.

Please, any information would be extremely welcome. Thanks a lot in advance for any help you could provide.

Best,

CB

CB: Depsite all the hype that GEN Petraeus was sent back to choose the next BG's in his (COIN) image it just does not work like that. Promotion boards are run by strict adherence to the regulations. For example none of the board members can discuss anything among themselves. There is no debate. Files are read and each board member makes his vote. Voting discrepancies that are too large among voting members require a revote. Questions as to specific officer qualifications in terms of professional development are addressed to the board recorders who find the answers through the DA Secretariat which administers the board. The bottom line is that all promotion board members make blind votes and are sworn to follow the rules of the board (which includes no discussion of officers considered for selection nor revealing results of the board). The bottom line is that there is way that the president of the board can influence the outcome during the board proceedings. That does not mean that prior politicking does not take place but the promotion boards are not a smoke filled room where the members debate who should be promoted (or blackballed). The Army (and all the services) have gone to great lengths to ensure that promotion boards are as fair as possible in a system that is based on human subjectivity.

Dave

[selil]

Sounds like tenure.

[Ken White]

certain similarities... :o

[SteveMetz]

CB: Depsite all the hype that GEN Petraeus was sent back to choose the next BG's in his (COIN) image it just does not work like that. Promotion boards are run by strict adherence to the regulations. For example none of the board members can discuss anything among themselves. There is no debate. Files are read and each board member makes his vote. Voting discrepancies that are too large among voting members require a revote. Questions as to specific officer qualifications in terms of professional development are addressed to the board recorders who find the answers through the DA Secretariat which administers the board. The bottom line is that all promotion board members make blind votes and are sworn to follow the rules of the board (which includes no discussion of officers considered for selection nor revealing results of the board). The bottom line is that there is way that the president of the board can influence the outcome during the board proceedings. That does not mean that prior politicking does not take place but the promotion boards are not a smoke filled room where the members debate who should be promoted (or blackballed). The Army (and all the services) have gone to great lengths to ensure that promotion boards are as fair as possible in a system that is based on human subjectivity.

Dave

A few years ago someone did a quantative analysis of promotions to try and figure out what qualification was the best predictor of whether a given officer would be promoted or not. Wanna know which one was the most accurate in predicting? Having a square jaw in the official photo. Hence we sometimes get CAT 4 generals.

[CB]

@ Dave: Thanks a lot for these details, this will be very helpful !


...what i have been arguing, is that the American Army has been turned into a counterinsurgency only force which is not good for the Army or the nation. There needs to be a balance.

@ Gian P. Gentile: Well, I totally agree that there should be a balance between different military missions which could potentially be performed by every military service in every armed forces. But I rather see recent reforms / adaptation in the US Army as a way to compensate for a prevailing strong 'conventional warfare' bias, and to promote balanced and adaptive leaders.
You may find too much emphasis on irregular warfare is not good for the Army nor the american nation, however this is precisely the kind of missions the nation's armed forces are involved in right now and will probably still be in the near future. IMHO it would need a tremendous shift in US foreign policy to make these changes totally inappropriate. Exiting Iraq or Afghanistan wouldn't make these changes totally inappropriate, as long as US political leaders still consider military intervention as a useful way to protect US interests abroad. This is not to say that such a policy U-turn cannot happen, just that for now it would be irresponsible to think irregular warfare just as some kind of secondary importance mission.

Corentin

[tequila]

... with LTGEN Odierno to be MNF-I commander (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080423/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_iraq;_ylt=AgoGEFqF08TLiU463yr.sy.s0NUE).

Interesting to see what impact if any this will have on Afghanistan and Iran policy.

[Rob Thornton]

Things I think you might see:

- a comprehensive approach that considers the linkages between the various wars and tensions within the CENTCOM AOR, and effort spent to coordinate with the adjacent GCCs and the Inter-Agency where boundaries matter.

- a great deal of energy spent on persuading Iraq's and Afghanistan's neighbors that they have clear and enduring interests in assisting those two states to succeed, and that the United States succeeds as well - and as such they should be more involved and proactive in ensuring they do.

- a staff that is more focused on a CDR's articulated guidance to support the Iraq and Afghanistan commands.

-guidance passed to those two commands that is not constraining, but empowers and creates unity of effort from a regional perspective

-more energy directed back toward informing and leveraging the whole of government, and on keeping civilian leadership focused on future risks - again with a regional perspective

-regional actions that match a regional and broader U.S. narrative

- a command that lets the commands in Iraq and Afghanistan focus on their campaigns and not on fighting higher

Things I think you will not see:

- micro-management of either Iraq or Afghanistan

- the sacrifice of U.S. regional interests to ensure a legacy associated with Iraq

- a command that does not play well with others - be they GCCs, or the Inter-Agency

- a command that does not consider the strains placed on the force providers and institutions, and as such absolves itself from all risk to the services, or to FP goals outside the CENTCOM AOR.

- a staff that does not enable subordinate commands

It has been my observation that the commanders who excel at any level are those who identify what are the things that only they can do by virtue of position and in some cases by personality – and focus their efforts as such. The broader the responsibilities, the more things that compete for your attention – as such, the art is knowing what is important, and why. They are also ones who consider the broader picture, and can empathize with those below, adjacent and above them. I think at that level you really need some strategic vision as the moves we make today will be with us for some time to come.
Best, Rob

[Eden]

I have read that LTG Odierno, in his first go-round in Iraq, was one of those senior leaders who performed poorly and did much to spark the continuing troubles through a misapplication of force. Recent appraisals indicate that he now 'gets it' and should be an effective MNF-I commander.

Is this a fair assessment? If so, what caused the scales to fall from his eyes? Was it his own experience and reflection, or did he become a disciple of someone else?

If the assessment is fair, it would make Odierno a symbol of the growth and development of the Army as a whole, and would make for a fascinating study.

[SWJED]

... roundup on the new appointments at SWJ (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/04/general-petraeus-gets-centcom/).

[Ron Humphrey]

... roundup on the new appointments at SWJ (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/04/general-petraeus-gets-centcom/).

I simply say this:

Canis timidus vehementius latrat quam mordet (not a response to you in particular but the way I would respond to some who threatens to hurl stones at my head:D)

Carpe Dium:D

AND for the others in the group

Cave ne ante ullas catapultas ambules :cool:

[John T. Fishel]

I thought you were describing GEN Jack Galvin!;) but then I remembered (as if I ever forgot) that GEN Petraeus was mentored by Galvin!

Of all the CINCs I saw in SOUTHCOM, Jack Galvin was the most successful. That was because he practiced the art of the possible as well as it could be done. Seems that Dave Petraeus learned well at the feet of a master - and may well (I hope) have surpassed him.

Cheers

JohnT

[Hacksaw]

Hmmm.... I've thought about this one all day. I think you got it about right, whether encouraged or not, the 4ID has been self-described by some as acting like thugs in OIF I. I also think it fair to say that for any number of reasons, 4ID was not successful.

Just came off a visit to FT Hood, and the damn near unanimous opinion is that LTG O walks on water, is thoughtful, inclusive, and "just gets it man"

Pretty high praise, and tough to argue with results.

As for the appearant shift... whose to say, it'd be a great book. I think you can surmise, however, that the first experience caused him to reflect - consider how he might improve... The man and his family have sacrificed greatly in this war -- makes a smart man think.

I probably was still a skeptic until I talked with the folks who worked for the man. This is a damn good choice, because for all the hulking physical intimidation... He's a known commodity in Iraq with all important personal connections... and the commodity he's best known for is being tough in pinch... a good guy to have in the foxhole when the sh!t hits the fan.

Live well and row

[Cavguy]

Just came off a visit to FT Hood, and the damn near unanimous opinion is that LTG O walks on water, is thoughtful, inclusive, and "just gets it man"

Pretty high praise, and tough to argue with results.


I probably was still a skeptic until I talked with the folks who worked for the man. This is a damn good choice, because for all the hulking physical intimidation... He's a known commodity in Iraq with all important personal connections... and the commodity he's best known for is being tough in pinch... a good guy to have in the foxhole when the sh!t hits the fan.



I was with Hacksaw on this trip to Hood - have to echo. After reading Ricks' books and conversations with a few 4ID OIF 1 friends, I was prepared to find a kinetically minded HQ kept in check by Petraeus, and had to slap myself for preconcieved notions that people other than myself can't learn. :rolleyes: I don't know why it suprised me, I learned/changed alot between my two tours. I don't know what the "Road to Damascus" moment was for LTG O, but whatever Kool-Aid he drank between 2004 and 2006, it was good.

His staff was organized properly for COIN and had the right mindset for action to support/enable the transformation of ops, and it was accomplished through no small amount of force of personality from the commander. My hat's off to him.

[wm]

Any thoughts on the impending change out of the MNF-I C3? Heard the incumbent is headed to be CG at Benning and his replacement is the current Northcom J3, who last saw the AO as a div G3 staff guy in DS/DS.

[William F. Owen]

This just turned up on my e-mail. May be of interest to those here.


PETRAEUS, AFGHANISTAN AND THE LESSONS OF IRAQ

By George Friedman

Gen. David Petraeus, who commanded the surge in Iraq, was recommended April 23 by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to be (CENTCOM). If confirmed by the U.S. Senate, this means Petraeus would remain in ultimate command of the war in Iraq while also taking command in Afghanistan. Days after the recommendation, there was yet another unsuccessful attempt on the life of Afghan President Hamid Karzai on April 27. Then, media reports May 3 maintained the United States might strengthen its forces in Afghanistan to make up for shortfalls in NATO commitments. Across the border in Pakistan, April 25, the first fruits of the Pakistani government's efforts to increase its -- though these talks appeared to collapse April 28. Clearly, there appears to be movement with regard to Afghanistan. The question is whether this movement is an illusion -- and if it is not an illusion, where is the movement going?

Petraeus' probable command in Afghanistan appears to be the most important of these developments. In Iraq, Petraeus changed the nature of the war. The change he brought to bear there was not so much military as political. Certainly, he deployed his forces differently than his predecessors, dispersing some of them in small units based in villages and neighborhoods contested by insurgents. That was not a trivial change, but it was not as important as the process of political discussions he began with local leaders.

The first phase of the U.S. counterinsurgency, which lasted from the beginning of the Iraqi insurgency in mid-2003 until the U.S. surge in early 2007, essentially consisted of a three-way civil war, in which the United States, the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite militias fought each other. The American strategic goal appears to have been to defeat both the insurgents and the militias, while allowing them to attrit each other and civilian communities.

Reshaping the Struggle in Iraq
Petraeus reshaped the battle by observing that the civil war was much more than a three-way struggle. Tensions also existed within both the Iraqi Sunni and the Shiite communities. Petraeus' strategy was to exploit those tensions, splitting both his opponents and forming alliances with some of them. Petraeus recognized that political power in the Sunni community rested with the traditional tribal leaders -- the sheikhs -- and that these sheikhs were both divided among themselves, and most important, extremely worried about the foreign jihadist fighters from al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda ultimately wanted to replace the sheikhs as leaders of their respective communities. It used its influence with younger, more radical Sunnis to create a new cadre of leaders. The more U.S. pressure on the Sunni community as a whole, the less room for maneuver the sheikhs had. U.S. policy was inadvertently strengthening al Qaeda by making the sheikhs dependent on its force against the United States. Similarly, the Shiite community was split along multiple lines, with Iran deeply involved with multiple factions.

Petraeus changed U.S. policy from what was essentially warfare against the Sunnis in particular, but also the Shia, as undifferentiated entities. He sought to recruit elements previously regarded as irredeemable, and with threats, bribes and other inducements, forced open splits among Sunnis and Shia. In doing so, Petraeus also opened lines to the Iranians, who used their fear of a civil war among the Shia -- and a disastrous loss of influence by Iran -- to suppress both intra-Shiite violence and Shiite violence against Sunnis.

The result of this complex political maneuvering coupled with the judicious use of military force was a decline in casualties not only among American forces, but also among Iraqis from intercommunal warfare. The situation has not by any means resolved itself, but Petraeus’ strategy expanded splits in the Sunni and Shiite communities that he tried to exploit. The most important thing Petraeus did was to reduce the cohesion of U.S. enemies by recognizing they were not in fact a cohesive entity, and moving forward on that basis.

The verdict is far from in on the success of Petraeus' strategy in Iraq. The conflict has subsided, but certainly has not concluded. Indeed, we have seen increased attacks in Sunni regions recently, while conflict with radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr’s forces in Baghdad is increasing. In many ways, the success of Petraeus’ strategy depends on Iran continuing to perceive the United States as a long-term presence in Iraq, and continuing to regard suppressing conflict among Shia important so the Iraqi Shia can constitute a united bloc in the government of Iraq. But the strategy is not foolproof; should the jihadists and some of the Sunni sheikhs decide to stage a countersurge in the months ahead of the U.S. election, the fabric of political relations would unravel with startling speed, and the military situation would change dramatically. Petraeus certainly has improved the situation. He has not won the war.

The Afghan Challenge
Applying Petraeus' politico-military strategy to will be difficult. First, the ratio of forces to population there is even worse than in Iraq, making the application of decisive military force even more difficult. But even more important, unlike in Iraq -- where the U.S. effort began purely on a military track -- U.S. involvement in Afghanistan began on a political track much like Petraeus brought to bear in Iraq in 2007.

As we have pointed out many times, the United States did not actually invade Afghanistan in October 2001. That would have been impossible 30 days after 9/11. Instead, the United States made political arrangements with anti-Taliban factions and tribes to use their force in conjunction with U.S. airpower. The payoff for these factions and tribes was freedom from the Taliban and domination of the national government of Afghanistan, or at least their respective regions.

The first level of force the U.S. introduced into Afghanistan was a handful of CIA operatives followed by a small number of U.S. Army Special Forces teams and other special operations forces units. Their mission was to coordinate operations of new U.S. allies among the Northern Alliance -- which had been under Russian influence -- and among the Afghan Shia and Tajiks, who had been under Iranian influence. The solution ran through Moscow and Tehran on the strategic level, and then to these local forces on the tactical level.

Less than an invasion, it was a political operation backed up with airpower and a small number of U.S. ground forces. In other words, it looked very much like the strategy that Petraeus implemented in Iraq in 2007. This strategy was followed from the beginning in Afghanistan. Having forced the Taliban to retreat and disperse, the United States failed to prevent the Taliban from regrouping for two reasons. First, the political alliances it tried to create were too unstable and backed by too little U.S. force. Second, the Taliban enjoyed sanctuary in Pakistan, which Islamabad was unable or unwilling to deny them. As a result, the Taliban regrouped and re-emerged as a capable force, challenging insufficient U.S. and NATO forces on the ground

[Danny]

Less than an invasion, it was a political operation backed up with airpower and a small number of U.S. ground forces. In other words, it looked very much like the strategy that Petraeus implemented in Iraq in 2007.

160 000+ troops is a small number in Iraq?? Maybe George had one too many beers when he wrote that sentence. Why he wants to compare a few hundred Air Force special operators to target JDAMS with a 160 000 man force is quite a bit beyond me. The two campaigns neither began the same way nor look the same way now.

[Tom Odom]

Less than an invasion, it was a political operation backed up with airpower and a small number of U.S. ground forces. In other words, it looked very much like the strategy that Petraeus implemented in Iraq in 2007.

160 000+ troops is a small number in Iraq?? Maybe George had one too many beers when he wrote that sentence. Why he wants to compare a few hundred Air Force special operators to target JDAMS with a 160 000 man force is quite a bit beyond me. The two campaigns neither began the same way nor look the same way now.

Agreed.

[Eden]

I guess Friedman is groping to show how Petraeus may approach the challenge in Afghanistan, but he seems to be laboring under several misconceptions.

Firstly, the 'Taliban' that has re-emerged is not the same organization that we crushed in 2001. In fact, 'Taliban' is little more than a label of convenience for those too lazy or too ignorant to really dig into what is going on in Afghanistan right now. There are at least four major insurgent organizations operating in Afghanistan now, alongside and sometimes in cooperation with criminal traffickers of various stripes. Their motivation ranges from reestablishing the caliphate to creating Pashtunistan to protecting the poppy trade to simply making a living as an insurgent. Their support comes from disaffected tribes, aspirant warlords, criminals, the transport mafia, trans-national terrorists, Pakistani pols and soldiers with a Machiavellian bent, and the huge pool of unemployed young men with no particular homeland, future, or tribal loyalties. In other words, its a Byzantine mess that makes Iraq look like Switzerland by comparison.

Secondly, there is no possibility of a coherent strategic approach to 'winning' in Afghanistan. The current command structure will not allow it; NATO has the unity and command discipline of the French host at Agincourt. Each province is essentially a fiefdom within which the various responsible nations pursue those operations they deem necessary. The non-military side of the house is, if possible, even less coherent.

Thirdly, Petraeus is not in charge in Afghanistan. ISAF is a NATO headquarters; even when an American is commanding ISAF he is (technically) responsible to a NATO Joint Force Commander in Europe. Some may pooh-pooh this as a convenient fiction, but it is not, believe me. Yes, we are running our own separate war in Afghanistan alongside the NATO effort, and McNeil and his successors are likely to listen when Petraeus speaks, but I'm not sure Friedman really grasps the command dynamic in that theater.

[SWJED]

The Petraeus Doctrine (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200810/petraeus-doctrine) by Andrew J. Bacevich, The Atlantic, October 2008 issue.

Iraq-style counterinsurgency is fast becoming the US Army’s organizing principle. Is our military preparing to fight the next war, or the last one?


For a military accustomed to quick, easy victories, the trials and tribulations of the Iraq War have come as a rude awakening. To its credit, the officer corps has responded not with excuses but with introspection. One result, especially evident within the US Army, has been the beginning of a Great Debate of sorts.

Anyone who cares about the Army’s health should take considerable encouragement from this intellectual ferment. Yet anyone who cares about future US national-security strategy should view the debate with considerable concern: it threatens to encroach upon matters that civilian policy makers, not soldiers, should decide.

What makes this debate noteworthy is not only its substance, but its character—the who and the how.

The military remains a hierarchical organization in which orders come from the top down. Yet as the officer corps grapples with its experience in Iraq, fresh ideas are coming from the bottom up. In today’s Army, the most-creative thinkers are not generals but mid-career officers—lieutenant colonels and colonels.

Like any bureaucracy, today’s military prefers to project a united front when dealing with the outside world, keeping internal dissent under wraps. Nonetheless, the Great Debate is unfolding in plain view in publications outside the Pentagon’s purview, among them print magazines such as Armed Forces Journal (http://www.afji.com/), the Web-based Small Wars Journal (http://smallwarsjournal.com/), and the counterinsurgency blog Abu Muqawama (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/).

The chief participants in this debate - all Iraq War veterans - fixate on two large questions. First, why, after its promising start, did Operation Iraqi Freedom go so badly wrong? Second, how should the hard-earned lessons of Iraq inform future policy? Hovering in the background of this Iraq-centered debate is another war that none of the debaters experienced personally - namely, Vietnam.

The protagonists fall into two camps: Crusaders and Conservatives...

Much more at The Atlantic (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200810/petraeus-doctrine).

[Ken White]

political observer and strategist. Alas, I think he also proves yet again that his military strategy and observation capability is somewhat less well refined.

Everyone should be applauding the Army for having this debate instead of wringing their hands in concern over decisions being made by the Armed Forces that will effectively determine national strategy. We tried that once; the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines. How'd that work out?

John Nagl has some good points -- and some, IMO, less good. Gian Gentile has some good points -- and also some, IMO, less good. We need a balanced total spectrum force. Nagl, Gentile, Bacevich, White and the combined brain power of the last four and next three SAMS Courses have no clue what the next war will be like. The Armed Forces have to be ready for all types of current and possible future warfare. The 9/11 debacle and the last few years have proven that, we cannot predict what the civilian masters will direct; what we can do is prepare to cover the total spectrum of warfare, like it or not. It will not be easy and rice bowls will have to be broken but I have no doubt that will occur.

[jmm99]

I've read a lot of Bacevich - my only general criticism is that sometimes he uses loaded terms to make his points - in short, a bit of over-advocacy at times. Of course, his critics on policy can be even more over-loaded. "Wacko Bacevich ... leftist ... socialist" (LOL) was one comment by one of my email correspondents. After a bit more of that "wacko" stuff - on both sides - we decided to play a nice game of chess. He got clobbered - hint, I cheat.

Now, more seriously, I agree with Ken that AB is a bit off here - since I don't see the danger.


AB article
Yet anyone who cares about future U.S. national-security strategy should view the debate with considerable concern: it threatens to encroach upon matters that civilian policy makers, not soldiers, should decide.

It is possible that the choices will default to the military (AB last para.), but that is not a military problem.

Here is my take (very much IMO).

My view is the equation: policy <> strategy <> operations <> tactics -- ideas move up and down the food chain. If they don't, the system breaks down. Note: I am not suggesting micro-manipulation from the top to the bottom. Ken and others can explain better how well that worked in Korea and Vietnam.

My concern is whether the politicians (politics and policy people) are capable of understanding, much less properly applying, the ideas that move up the foodchain to them. When Congress gets a 10-15% positive approval rating, we have a definite competence problem at the policy level. When perhaps a dozen or so (maybe there were more - that is what I recall) read one version or another of the DCI's WMD report pre-OIF, we know we have a problem.

And, yup, I read the public version - and was not impressed (too many lawyerly weasel-words in the bold-faced paragraphs and too many stale facts). I thought (and still do) that the policy behind OIF I was justified for other reasons.

Also read MG Scales article from another thread. Don't know him, only his TV persona (to me, positive). Isolated out his 9 bullet poiints, and thought - how many congresspeople could even begin to understand what he was proposing ? The executive branch may be somewhat more competent.

What our policy makers seem to do too often (IMO) is to buy the flavor of the day - not a recipe for success; and probably a recipe to get too many good people killed.

Expressed policy (morphing critter that it is) does make a difference - since it is the measure by which one determines whether the armed conflict is "won" or "lost".

PS: We won the Southeast Asian "War Games" hands down - based on the expressed policy. You might dwell on that one. That comment is not made lightly, but after considerable decades-long thought.

[Cavguy]

Not as strong as his interview with Moyers.


Gentile does not doubt that counter*insurgencies will figure in the Army’s future. Yet he questions Nagl’s certainty that situations resembling Iraq should become an all-but-exclusive preoccupation. Historically, expectations that the next war will resemble the last one have seldom served the military well.

.....

Embedded within this argument over military matters is a more fundamental and ideologically charged argument about basic policy. By calling for an Army configured mostly to wage stability operations ...


Being easily identified as a "Crusader", I think he mischaracterizes Nagl's arguments. I have never heard Nagl call for what he characterizes above. He has called for more focus on counterinsurgency and a standing advisory corps, which is a long way from Prof. Bacevich's caricature.

Likewise, I disagree with COL Gentile, as many on this board know.

I think it was gross professional negligence that we entered Iraq 2003 with no institutional foundation in COIN. It will be gross professional negligence if we face another conflict (after these have subsided and there is a chance to retrain) and aren't prepared conventionally either.

Prof. Bacevich's argument doesn't advance the ball beyond this binary debate we've been having for months.

As I called for at the Armor conference in May - we must do both. I believe we can. And I call on all sides to stop hyperventilating about coin-only or conventional only focus and propose what we should look like - in structure and education - for full spectrum conflict in the future.

[Ron Humphrey]

Does anyone think if we start a Big Wars Journal/Council some of the consistant concerns might be addressed.

[William F. Owen]

It is possible that the choices will default to the military (AB last para.), but that is not a military problem.

Here is my take (very much IMO).

My view is the equation: policy <> strategy <> operations <> tactics -- ideas move up and down the food chain. If they don't, the system breaks down. Note: I am not suggesting micro-manipulation from the top to the bottom. Ken and others can explain better how well that worked in Korea and Vietnam.

Personally I don't know of many folks who understand the differentiation between policy <> strategy <> operations <> tactics, and I include myself. Little I read today shows me that I am alone. As a I have said before, there is advice for Politicians, and advice for soldiers. Soldiers do what they are told. (compare and contrast the behaviour of Allenby with MacArthur.) Most of what I read relating to grand strategy seems not to want to make that distinction, and seems incapable of grasping the importance of that same distinction.

What is more, I am not really sure the study "strategy" and especially "grand strategy" is a true discipline. Part of me hopes it is, because it seems like an area where you can suggest all sorts of things without having to take responsibility for the outcomes. :)


Does anyone think if we start a Big Wars Journal/Council some of the consistant concerns might be addressed.

Small Wars are the new Big Wars. It's just fashion! (-and this board does an excellent job of addressing both!)

Personally, I am very comfortable with small wars and COIN. Big Wars are real cans of worms.. but... having an Army that is prepared to do both is not hard! It just requires money, and good leadership. Anyone with a 14-year olds reading ability can be trained to do it.

What is more, you don't/won't have a choice. Wars in the 21st Century will contain elements of both, just as "old war" did. Both elements will rise and fall independently of each other and without warning.

I think this is pretty obvious to all the observers who don't have "skin" in the "Future of the US Army game".

[Ron Humphrey]

Small Wars are the new Big Wars. It's just fashion! (-and this board does an excellent job of addressing both!)

Personally, I am very comfortable with small wars and COIN. Big Wars are real cans of worms.. but... having an Army that is prepared to do both is not hard! It just requires money, and good leadership. Anyone with a 14-year olds reading ability can be trained to do it.

What is more, you don't/won't have a choice. Wars in the 21st Century will contain elements of both, just as "old war" did. Both elements will rise and fall independently of each other and without warning.

I think this is pretty obvious to all the observers who don't have "skin" in the "Future of the US Army game".

Knew I could count on you:D

[Ken White]

It is possible that the choices will default to the military (AB last para.), but that is not a military problem.Exactly. A part of the problem is a general lack of military knowledge among the denizens of the Executive Branch (to include DoD) and among Congressional staffrers (Added to which Congresscritters have 'interests' which may be at odds with strategic or military sense...). The Armed forces will do the strategic planning by default much as they picked up the nation building jobs of Agriculture, Commerce, State and USAID due to their inability to do so initially. In the end, the civilian control will still be there...
My concern is whether the politicians (politics and policy people) are capable of understanding, much less properly applying, the ideas that move up the foodchain to them. When Congress gets a 10-15% positive approval rating, we have a definite competence problem at the policy level. When perhaps a dozen or so (maybe there were more - that is what I recall) read one version or another of the DCI's WMD report pre-OIF, we know we have a problem.
. . .
What our policy makers seem to do too often (IMO) is to buy the flavor of the day - not a recipe for success; and probably a recipe to get too many good people killed.Too true...
PS: We won the Southeast Asian "War Games" hands down - based on the expressed policy. You might dwell on that one. That comment is not made lightly, but after considerable decades-long thought.That is a very astute -- and IMO, correct -- comment.

Let me also repost Wilf's comment; it's important:
Personally, I am very comfortable with small wars and COIN. Big Wars are real cans of worms.. but... having an Army that is prepared to do both is not hard! It just requires money, and good leadership. Anyone with a 14-year olds reading ability can be trained to do it.

What is more, you don't/won't have a choice. Wars in the 21st Century will contain elements of both, just as "old war" did. Both elements will rise and fall independently of each other and without warning.

I think this is pretty obvious to all the observers who don't have "skin" in the "Future of the US Army game".

[jmm99]

from wilf
Personally I don't know of many folks who understand the differentiation between policy <> strategy <> operations <> tactics, and I include myself. Little I read today shows me that I am alone.

The equation was my attempt to do at least two things:

1. To distinguish between the primary focus of civilian input (policy) and the rest of the chain (strategy <> operations <> tactics), which IMO should be the focus of military designers, planners and tacticians.

2. To emphasize that there has to be communications between levels; so, the "<>" sign. E.g., policy (what the civilian policy makers want) obviously will control the military designer's design (let's call that strategy). However, the range of designs will obviously be controlled by the then-current capabilities of what the military can do (operations <> tactics). So, strategy will then feed back into policy - we can do A, B and C, but not D and E.

Admittedly, the terms (policy <> strategy <> operations <> tactics) are squishy in each application. E.g., in Vietnam (leaving its policy <> strategy issues on the shelf), we had many, many operations (Operation Dewey Canyon, which just came out of my skull for no special reason, etc.). Each of them had its own planning and tactics (many of which were the same or similar as those employed in other operations).

Now, if we draw back a bit to a larger geographic picture (Southeast Asia), we could look at Vietnam as one operation, Malaya CT as another and the Philippines Huk thing as another. In that sense, Operation Dewey Canyon in Vietnam starts to look more like a tactic in that broader context.

Note that I am not trying to cram these concepts into neat little boxes because that ain't possible. And I don't care what specific terms are used - the equation works in my mind, but to each their own - so long as we can still communicate the concepts.

Another point I was trying to make is that civilian policy makers have to know what they are asking the military to do - and be willling to listen if it can't. There seems a tendency by pols to believe that, just because we have the best military in the world, it can do everything at a moment's notice without failures. And, many times it has done just that.

But, the imposition of policy without consideration of then-current capabilities can kill people. E.g., we had a choice between at least two policies in OIF I:

1. Invade and Leave.

2. Invade and Occupy.

The resultant military design, planning and tactics (strategy <> operations <> tactics) would be quite different in each case - I'd leave it to the military to develop those, within its capabilities.

If that is ignored, we have a truism that is not trite - if we were math types, we might call it an axiom.


from Cavguy
I think it was gross professional negligence that we entered Iraq 2003 with no institutional foundation in COIN. It will be gross professional negligence if we face another conflict (after these have subsided and there is a chance to retrain) and aren't prepared conventionally either.

If we had a legal remedy for that kind of "gross professional negligence" (which we don't - except the ballot box), my legal guns would be aimed much less at the military, and much more at the policy makers - especially those who seem to have morphed the policy in mid-stream.

[Fred Talpiot]

Israel trained it's army to fight counter-insurgency and had trouble fighting Hezbollah.

It's approximately the difference between police work and conventional warfare. Mixing the two jobs in one unit, or mixing the units in one job, tends to be stressful. Loosely, a soldier has to shoot first and maybe ask questions later. A cop has to work in the opposite order and defuse a situation. You can't defuse Hezbollah.

And you can't defuse the Russian troops in Georgia. Although the small wars experts might be of use to the Georgians, as they were to the Afghans not so long ago.

The US military, focused on SOCOM, mixed the immiscible in Iraq. But also think of the Kent State shootings, a case of unfriendly fire. And think of the IDF in southern Lebanon.

The only solution is agility.

[William F. Owen]

Israel trained it's army to fight counter-insurgency and had trouble fighting Hezbollah.

With respect that is slightly simplistic. The conduct of the 2nd Lebanon War had far more to do with non-sensical operational aims than it did with tactical conduct. 90% of what tactical shortcomings there were can be attributed to under-funding of training. The regular infantry units, fresh from their regular training, had far fewer problems than the reserve units.


It's approximately the difference between police work and conventional warfare. Mixing the two jobs in one unit, or mixing the units in one job, tends to be stressful.

The British Army handled it just fine with 1 BR Corps in Germany providing units to Northern Ireland for 38 years. Again it was correctly funded and planned for.


The only solution is agility.

OK, it may be, but I don't understand how.

[Ken White]

two stressful jobs is stressful.

Not that I've figured out what bearing Kent State has on any of this...:confused:

[Tom Odom]

Not that I've figured out what bearing Kent State has on any of this...:confused:

agility=dodge bullets :D

[Hacksaw]

I shall agree with CAVGUY, the framing of this dialogue as an all or nothing issue has really strained my last reserve of patience.:mad: You would think we were in an election year:p

An apt analogy might be the following....

Two neighbors on opposite ends of the street are celebrating the arrival of new year. One is banging pots & pans to create a racket, the other is using fireworks. Each notices the other and in the midst of continuing their racket begin a shouting match ridiculing the other as using an inappropriate form of noise maker for the new year's festivities.... Everyone else on the block just wishes the two idiots would go to bed, the novelty of their disagreement wearing off nearly 10 seconds into the new year.

Or put another way, I don't care that the sky is falling or the earth is rising... the clouds are fluffy and won't hurt anyone.

Or put another way, thank god the war news day has become quiet enough that these issues are hot topics of discussion. Something must be going well.

Live well and row

[Tom Odom]

I shall agree with CAVGUY, the framing of this dialogue as an all or nothing issue has really strained my last reserve of patience.:mad: You would think we were in an election year:p

An apt analogy might be the following....

Two neighbors on opposite ends of the street are celebrating the arrival of new year. One is banging pots & pans to create a racket, the other is using fireworks. Each notices the other and in the midst of continuing their racket begin a shouting match ridiculing the other as using an inappropriate form of noise maker for the new year's festivities.... Everyone else on the block just wishes the two idiots would go to bed, the novelty of their disagreement wearing off nearly 10 seconds into the new year.

Or put another way, I don't care that the sky is falling or the earth is rising... the clouds are fluffy and won't hurt anyone.

Or put another way, thank god the war news day has become quiet enough that these issues are hot topics of discussion. Something must be going well.

Live well and row

fireworks are prettier :

remember skydiving in the rain hurts because you are falling on the pointy end of the drops...

and never forget when stacking angels on pin heads, put the small ones on last...:D

Tom

[wm]

Fred Talpiot, we tend not to like "drive by postings" here. You might do well to introduce yourself. Here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441)


Or put another way, thank god the war news day has become quiet enough that these issues are hot topics of discussion. Something must be going well.Hack, it can't going so well for the media if they need to add this stuff to get enough column inches to satisfy their advdertisers.


and never forget when stacking angels on pin heads, put the small ones on last... I didn't know they taught casuistry at A & M. :D

[Ken White]

I didn't know they taught casuistry at A & M. :Dthat's what it was called so they labeled it 'American Political Speech 101'... :D

[Eden]

Yep, September. Time to beat the dead horse again.

If the Armed Forces can be equally prepared for both COIN and conventional ("it's easy...the clouds are fluffy...the British Army handled it just fine...I believe we can) why did SEC Gates in the latest NDS specifically say we'll have to accept risk by concentrating on the wars we are currently fighting? Why is field artillery broken? Why have we virtually stopped training for conventional warfighting above the company/battalion level?

Look, being prepared for war at any level goes well beyond training in the field or on the ranges. It includes buying the right type of equipment, training staffs, building force structure, allocating time in institutional courses, writing doctrine, allowing senior leaders the chance to move around units larger than battalions, building the right type of logistical pipelines. To say that we can have companies or maneuver battalions trained for both coin and con misses the point. To say that all we need is enough time or money ignores the fact that we have neither.

People say we can be prepared for both. I look around and see that we have apparently stopped preparing for conventional warfighting. I would love to have somebody point out to me how we are keeping our powder dry should a conflict arise with larger stakes than those bet on Iraq or Afghanistan.

I remember in the first Gulf War how the British Army absolutely gutted itself to field a single armored division. Just as one example, whole regiments of operational tanks in Germany had to be cannibalized to provide spares for the Gulf. I'm afraid we are heading toward a similar crunch.

Choosing between COIN and Con is not a false dichotomy. It's moot to say that armed forces can be prepared equally for both; armed forces won't, not in the real world of constrained resources.

[William F. Owen]

If the Armed Forces can be equally prepared for both COIN and conventional ("it's easy...the clouds are fluffy...the British Army handled it just fine...I believe we can) why did SEC Gates in the latest NDS specifically say we'll have to accept risk by concentrating on the wars we are currently fighting? Why is field artillery broken? Why have we virtually stopped training for conventional warfighting above the company/battalion level?

I don't think anyone said it was easy. It's perfectly doable, and you may have to do both. It's not a choice. As to all the problems, these are the result of choices.


To say that we can have companies or maneuver battalions trained for both coin and con misses the point. To say that all we need is enough time or money ignores the fact that we have neither.

Then you have to choose, and the choice must be explicitly recognised as that cause by limited resources and not the US fighting man as being too stupid to achieve the require level of competency.


I remember in the first Gulf War how the British Army absolutely gutted itself to field a single armored division. Just as one example, whole regiments of operational tanks in Germany had to be cannibalized to provide spares for the Gulf. I'm afraid we are heading toward a similar crunch.

A problem that was caused solely by deploying a 1 BR Corps Division, outside the 1 BR Corps area, into a desert. Do something you have never planned for or resourced and problems are sure to occur.


Choosing between COIN and Con is not a false dichotomy. It's moot to say that armed forces can be prepared equally for both; armed forces won't, not in the real world of constrained resources.

I agree. It's not a false dichotomy. It just means you CON army is badly suited to the more prevalent form of conflict and your COIN Army might not/cannot fulfil its actual reason for being. Until I joined this forum it never occurred to me that it was even an issue.

[Hacksaw]

Eden,

You are mixing up the arguement. While in the midst of a war, you prepare for that war and that has nothing to do with the article or this thread...

This thread is about beyond OIF & OEF, and determining the aim point so that it drives DOTMLPF/resource allocation...

The position of those of us who don't think the sky is falling, is the following...

We can have an Army fully competent in conventional/high end , without throwing out the COIN baby with the bath water. This is especially true if you reward/promote those of such traits that have some flexibility of thought (did I hear anyone say well rounded warrior).

Really what is it about what has worked in Iraq that is in direct opposition to successful conventional warfighting, really name the task and tell me how an adjustment of conditions or standards wouldn't update it. Not to mention, exactly which fight can you envision that we win and won't need to transition to stability or other "unconventional" operations.

Now if you want to have a debate no the proper balance/weighting of unit training and DOTMLPF is appropriate given our best guess about the future... OK that is a discussion worthy of the brain cells we'd expend.

However, if a person advocates that the catastrophic threat of a conventional defeat mandates that we return to the good ole days of the mid 80s to early 2000s, then they fail to recognize that Irregular War is the most regular of all other types of irregular activity (unless we include bowel activity).

Speaking of which I must end NOW!

[Argos]

Here is my main criticism of Bacevich's piece:

Classifying the two sides of the debate as Crusaders vs. Conservatives seems remarkably unfair.

In Bacevich's description the "Crusaders" become COIN ideologues instead of what they should be viewed as: COIN innovators. I don't mean innovators in the sense that they have re-invented the wheel here (how groundbreaking the operations and tactics behind the "Surge" strategy are is the subject of another conversation).

Petraeus, Nagl, McMaster, and those like them haven't fought for COIN because its always the right answer- they have argued that a COIN strategy is best for THIS war. None of them strike me as so committed as seeing COIN as the panacea to future conflicts. Moreover, these innovators are as aware as anyone of just how hard and resource intensive COIN can be. To successfully implement a COIN strategy in every future conflict would be expensive, counterproductive, and maybe even dangerous.

Nagl, for example, has recently been pushing to increase US training capacity (more of a FID capability). The COIN innovators dont qualify as COIN ideologues: they are asymmetrically focused, perhaps, but not blinded by a crusade for COIN. To suggest otherwise, as I read Bacevich doing, seems to miss the point: strategic flexibility is the only cure to a rigid adherence to prior assumptions- this will be even more true in the future.

[jkm_101_fso]

Bacevich is a guy that I have incredible respect for. He, more than anyone, has reason to study and understand this era of conflict; not only because of his profession, but also his personal loss. I reference him a lot in my grad school work and was relatively impressed with this article. He left me a little wanting for solutions, but maybe that was his point.


The military remains a hierarchical organization in which orders come from the top down. Yet as the officer corps grapples with its experience in Iraq, fresh ideas are coming from the bottom up. In today’s Army, the most-creative thinkers are not generals but mid-career officers—lieutenant colonels and colonels.

...and CPTs and LTs


Nonetheless, the Great Debate is unfolding in plain view in publications outside the Pentagon’s purview, among them print magazines such as Armed Forces Journal, the Web-based Small Wars Journal, and the counterinsurgency blog Abu Muqawama.

Hey, all right!


First, why, after its promising start, did Operation Iraqi Freedom go so badly wrong?

Where do we start?


The protagonists fall into two camps: Crusaders and Conservatives.

He called us Crusaders. I can live with that.


Typical of this generation is Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, once the top U.S. commander in Baghdad, who in late 2003 was still describing the brewing insurgency as “strategically and operationally insignificant,” when the lowliest buck sergeant knew otherwise.

Amen


After serving in Iraq as a battalion operations officer, Nagl helped rewrite the Army’s counterinsurgency manual and commanded the unit that prepares U.S. soldiers to train Iraqi security forces. (Earlier this year, he left the Army to accept a position with a Washington think tank.)

The think tank is CNAS, who offer a "Bacevich Fellowship", established in memory of the author's son.


It also implies changing the culture of the officer corps. An Army that since Vietnam has self-consciously cultivated a battle-oriented warrior ethos will instead emphasize, in Nagl’s words, “the intellectual tools necessary to foster host-nation political and economic development.”

Not to insinuate that the Army doesn't need Warriors...just ones that are independent thinkers and decision makers, requiring a whole host of abilities. We aren't there yet, but we are getting better.


According to the emerging Petrae*us Doctrine, the Army (like it or not) is entering an era in which armed conflict will be protracted, ambiguous, and continuous—with the application of force becoming a lesser part of the soldier’s repertoire.

Leading to the discussion of the criticality (or not) of diminishing "combat skills" for many in the Army. Particularly guys like me, who have all but forgotten the basics of our jobs; like how to compute manual Artillery safety. Partly my fault, but an epidemic, nonetheless.


All of this forms a backdrop to Gentile’s core concern: that an infatuation with stability operations will lead the Army to reinvent itself as “a constabulary,” adept perhaps at nation-building but shorn of adequate capacity for conventional war-fighting.

I don't know if "constabulary" is the right word. Maybe semantics, but how do we define the role of "constabulary" in COIN. When I think of Constabulary Force, I can only think of post WWII Germany. Iraq and AFG are totally different; kinetic fights exist, we have an actual enemy there, etc. The only similarity would be population control/basic policing, right?


The concern is not idle. A recent article in Army magazine notes that the Army’s National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California, long “renowned for its force-on-force conventional warfare maneuver training,” has now “switched gears,” focusing exclusively on counter*insurgency warfare. Rather than practicing how to attack the hill, its trainees now learn about “spending money instead of blood, and negotiating the cultural labyrinth through rapport and rapprochement.”

But this is the fight right now. If NTC maintained a Force on Force only approach, the Army would be remiss in not training its' units for their missions. It would only make sense this is going on.


The officer corps itself recognizes that conventional-warfare capabilities are already eroding. In a widely circulated white paper, three former brigade commanders declare that the Army’s field-artillery branch—which plays a limited role in stability operations, but is crucial when there is serious fighting to be done—may soon be all but incapable of providing accurate and timely fire support. Field artillery, the authors write, has become a “dead branch walking.”

Note what I said previously. The FA is pursuing other routes to "stay relevant", but it's not easy. I see we've picked up the "EWO" mission for our warrants. Innovations like Excalibur will help us in our fight to stay relevant, as well. I'm an opposer of any advocate of the FA picking up the FID or MTT mission solely. I don't think that would ever happen. Although right now, I'd argue the Army is leaning on the FA pretty heavily to fill Transition Teams. In regards to the COIN fight, I don't think we are as "dead" as other branches, namely the ADA and CHEM Corps. I would argue the point "FA plays a limited role"...maybe from the Schoolhouse view, but FA Soldiers are totally engaged, doing a plethora of jobs, some they are trained for, some not.


Observers differ on whether the Long War’s underlying purpose is democratic transformation or imperial domination: Did the Bush administration invade Iraq to liberate that country or to control it?

Can't we do both?


When Gentile charges Nagl with believing that there are “no limits to what American military power … can accomplish,” his real gripe is with the likes of Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz.

So is mine. It's a fine line. Remember that this is an all volunteer force. If a jingoistic FP becomes the standard, we might not have as many volunteers.


The effect of Nagl’s military reforms, Gentile believes, will be to reduce or preclude that possibility, allowing questions of the second order (How should we organize our Army?) to crowd out those of the first (What should be our Army’s purpose?).

I think there are not only viable solutions to this quandary, but literal comprimises that we can make. What about organizing conventional "war-fighting" divisions or brigades and organize others as COIN units? Why wouldn't this be a legitimate option? Of course, if we are in a long and protracted COIN war, the "conventional" units won't have to deploy, in theory. In a conventional fight, do the COIN units stay home? That is the first red flag I can think of.

Kudos to Bacevich for keeping this flame burning bright for all of us to debate.

[jmm99]

BBC
Page last updated at 13:11 GMT, Thursday, 11 September 2008 14:11 UK
No victory in Iraq, says Petraeus
The outgoing commander of US troops in Iraq, Gen David Petraeus, has said that he will never declare victory there.....
.....
He said he did not know that he would ever use the word "victory": "This is not the sort of struggle where you take a hill, plant the flag and go home to a victory parade... it's not war with a simple slogan."

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7610405.stm

At same link, a one minute video clip.

[mmx1]

I think the article makes a lot more sense when paralleled with the cover article of the same issue:
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200810/mccain
which attempts to continue the Vietnam/Iraq analogy into parallels between McCain and his father, who remained optimistic about Abrams' improvements in Vietnam up until Saigon fell, with the implication that "your father was grossly wrong about South Vietnam, isn't the same true about Iraq?"

[William F. Owen]

I think the article makes a lot more sense when paralleled with the cover article of the same issue:
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200810/mccain
which attempts to continue the Vietnam/Iraq analogy into parallels between McCain and his father, who remained optimistic about Abrams' improvements in Vietnam up until Saigon fell, with the implication that "your father was grossly wrong about South Vietnam, isn't the same true about Iraq?"

The only similarity I can see between the "SE Asian conflicts" people short-hand as "Vietnam" and Iraq is that both involved Americans. Am I missing something? Drawing parallels between the two is not something that any serious student of military history or science should be doing.

...and if they are, is it true and is it useful?

[mmx1]

The only similarity I can see between the "SE Asian conflicts" people short-hand as "Vietnam" and Iraq is that both involved Americans. Am I missing something? Drawing parallels between the two is not something that any serious student of military history or science should be doing.

...and if they are, is it true and is it useful?

Well, it's useful for any number of political reasons, though from the standpoint of the murky American relationship with limited war there are certainly more parallels to be drawn than about the conflicts themselves.

It just struck me reading Goldberg's article that hmm.... I heard this argument before....about 20 pages ago made by Bacevich concerning the tie between "Crusaders" and Vietnam revisionists. I did not mean to say it would make any more sense of his arguments, just place them in the context that I believe he and the editors of the Atlantic intended them to be read.

[yamiyugikun]

Hi,

While I was doing another paper for school out of curiosity, I found this podcast online of a lecture that Gen. Petraeus gave yesterday at Harvard. It's very amazing and I highly recommend checking it out, since I saw a blog here posted on Petraeus and leadership. Please let me know what you think:D

http://www.vamortgagecenter.com/blog/2009/04/23/general-petraeus-speech-at-harvard/


Naomi

[yamiyugikun]

Hi everyone,:D

Here is the link to another lecture that Gen. Petraeus gave a few days ago at KSU. Here it is:

http://ome.ksu.edu/lectures/landon/bio/petraeus.html

Naomi

[IntelTrooper]

This might have been shown earlier, but at the current time (2200 PST) General Petraeus is giving a presentation at the World Affairs Council on CSPAN.

None of his presentation would surprise anyone here, but it's always interesting to watch a master of his trade talk about his topic of passion. He's also incredibly humble and presents the truth, warts and all. I often wonder how he made it so far in the Army. :p

[Greyhawk]

You reminded me of an old story...


E9 to E5: Don't ask why - just do it!

E5 to E9: C'mon - you didn't make E9 by never asking "why"...

E9 to E5: No - but that's damn sure how I made E6.

But yeah, honest leadership is always appreciated. :wry:

[yamiyugikun]

I just watched the entire lecture at the World Affairs site from a link to the full length video on youtube. Here it is: http://wacsf.vportal.net/?fileid=5876

I was very amazed by the presentation, but I'm a civilian and find military things foreign and fascinating.:D

[Eden]

Is it just me, or has General Petraeus completely dropped off the radar scope? The military 'faces' of Afghanistan seem to have become Mullen and McChrystal. Why has Petraeus turned invisible in the debate over troop levels, strategy, and tactics all of a sudden? Any insights from the group?

[MikeF]

Is it just me, or has General Petraeus completely dropped off the radar scope? The military 'faces' of Afghanistan seem to have become Mullen and McChrystal. Why has Petraeus turned invisible in the debate over troop levels, strategy, and tactics all of a sudden? Any insights from the group?

He's probably busy working behind the scenes right now trying to balance the political and military efforts. Once his thinik tank group finishes their work (similar to what many are doing here on SWC), I'm sure he'll go public to start framing and selling the way ahead.

One question that I was considering. Since AFRICOM has stood up, I wonder how well the horizontal communication is between the the two commands, state, and the NSC regarding AQ? I imagine that coordination would be a full time job just coordinating.

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

to fix CentCom? :D

[Hacksaw]

Ever heard of Humpty Dumpty:D

Not enough king's horses and men for that job

[Adrienne]

Why should he publicly weigh in? Do we really need every 4-star in the chain of command joining the public debate before senior leadership has clearly articulated our strategy?

It seems like it's probably more a unity of command issue. The war is in the capable hands of GEN McChrystal; what is the benefit of CENTCOM publicly contradicting anything coming from either CJCS or theater?

[Ken White]

Hacksaw: Accurately and regrettably...:(

Adrienne: Accurately and sensibly. :cool:

[Eden]

Why should he publicly weigh in? Do we really need every 4-star in the chain of command joining the public debate before senior leadership has clearly articulated our strategy?

It seems like it's probably more a unity of command issue. The war is in the capable hands of GEN McChrystal; what is the benefit of CENTCOM publicly contradicting anything coming from either CJCS or theater?

That's sort of my point. McChrystal works for Petraeus - technically - at least when he's not wearing his NATO hat. And Petraeus is the strategic commander, while McChrystal is working at the operational level. If anybody should be articulating the military strategy for Afghanistan, it should be Petraeus. It's as if Omar Bradley was spokesman for our strategy to beat the Nazis in 1944.

I mean, Petraeus was front man for the Surge in Iraq. By most accounts he performed well in that role. Has he been cut out of the picture because the current administration wants McChrystal to be the poster child for Afghan strategy? Or because he is too closely associated in the public mind with Iraq and/or the Bush administration? Or because we've completely lost the bubble on the difference between strategy, operations, and tactics? Or because he doesn't fully agree with the proposed solutions?

Really, I'm just curious, because it seems odd that he has fallen so completely off the radar scope.

[MikeF]

Really, I'm just curious, because it seems odd that he has fallen so completely off the radar scope.

Does Patraeus have a Facebook page yet? If so, we can ask him.:D

v/r

Mike

[John T. Fishel]

question.
Going back to Iraq, Petraeus "worked for" CENTCOM but really never did. When Fallon tried to impose the chain of command he was asked to retire. Today, Odierno works for Petraeus - probably more so than the latter worked for Fallon - but Petraeus is letting odierno run his show, at least in public.
Afghanistan is more complex. On the one hand CENTCOM is the higher HQ; on the other SACEUR. Managing the Petraeus - Stavridis relationship must be interesting to say the least. I'm not even going into the commander/ambassador relationship - we've done that before:confused: Suffice that Petraeus is consistent in his public treatment of his two "subordinates."
My personal view is that the UCP does not serve us well when we set up a 4 star command in a theater. The theater commander is operating above the operational level and is analogous to a GCC with political as well as military responsibilities. We should,I think, treat him as if he were a GCCand make all the GCCs supporting commanders. What we call it is less important than how we do it,

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

My personal view is that the UCP does not serve us well when we set up a 4 star command in a theater. The theater commander is operating above the operational level and is analogous to a GCC with political as well as military responsibilities. We should, I think, treat him as if he were a GCCand make all the GCCs supporting commanders. What we call it is less important than how we do it. (emphasis added / kw)As you know, I'm not a Goldwater Nichols fan though I do acknowledge it did some things that needed doing. Just think like many US Laws, it overdid what it was trying to do. :eek:

That said, I despaired of ever getting it changed but your suggestion placed in bold is mindbogglingy brilliant -- and doable... :cool:

We can work out how to deal with the Stormin' Normans...:D

Hmm. Mayhap some Specified Commands as well... :rolleyes:

[Eden]

My personal view is that the UCP does not serve us well when we set up a 4 star command in a theater. The theater commander is operating above the operational level and is analogous to a GCC with political as well as military responsibilities. We should,I think, treat him as if he were a GCCand make all the GCCs supporting commanders. What we call it is less important than how we do it,

Cheers

JohnT

I've seen it happen again and again. When a commander has to deal with two or three levels of war (strategy, operations, and tactics), he becomes less effective. Invariably, his attention and energy is drawn upward, and the lower levels suffer because of it. This is especially true in Afghanistan, a problem exacerbated by the dysfunctional C2 set-up. In the ideal world, McChrystal would be afforded some top-cover by the guy who is actually responsible for strategy within the region - which leads me to my original question posed at the start of the thread.

[Adrienne]

That's sort of my point. McChrystal works for Petraeus - technically - at least when he's not wearing his NATO hat. And Petraeus is the strategic commander, while McChrystal is working at the operational level. If anybody should be articulating the military strategy for Afghanistan, it should be Petraeus. It's as if Omar Bradley was spokesman for our strategy to beat the Nazis in 1944.

I mean, Petraeus was front man for the Surge in Iraq. By most accounts he performed well in that role. Has he been cut out of the picture because the current administration wants McChrystal to be the poster child for Afghan strategy? Or because he is too closely associated in the public mind with Iraq and/or the Bush administration? Or because we've completely lost the bubble on the difference between strategy, operations, and tactics? Or because he doesn't fully agree with the proposed solutions?

Really, I'm just curious, because it seems odd that he has fallen so completely off the radar scope.


The way I understand it, GEN McChrystal was directly tasked by the Pentagon/White House to prepare his report on the situation in Afghanistan. It went through CENTCOM then to the Pentagon, where his resource requests will be reviewed. I would imagine if there are any significant disagreements between Petraeus/McChrystal they're being worked out before anything is submitted.

I'm sure GEN Petraeus knows there is nothing to be gained by standing in the way of communications between the administration and its theater commander. It's been that way since at least 2007, when Bush stopped trusting what he was hearing from the Pentagon/Tampa and wanted to speak directly to the CG in Iraq. The theater commanders were essentially functioning as GCCs, with direct communications between Baghdad and the Pentagon/White House. When Admiral Fallon got involved it only complicated things, pissed everyone off and made it harder for Petraeus to do his job.

Add to that reports/rumors of tension with the Obama administration during its early days over Odierno and Petraeus's attempt to talk Obama out of the 16-month withdrawal plan for Iraq, and he's probably smart to keep his head down right now.

It's consistent with the way he's treating Iraq, as well. When is the last time you have seen him say anything about Iraq since the aforementioned discussions on withdrawal timelines? Exactly. He trusts his generals and recognizes there's nothing to be gained by taking a public role in these discusisons.

[Pol-Mil FSO]

From a bureaucratic perspective, I think one of GEN Petraeus' roles would be to provide support for GEN McChrystal when the latter has a policy difference with his civilian counterpart (Ambassador Eikenberry) that has to be kicked up to the next level. The CENTCOM Commander is the logical counterpart to SRAP Holbrooke although I sometimes think that it might even require CJCS or SecDef involvement if preparing for bureaucratic combat with Ambassador Holbrooke.

[John T. Fishel]

Got a couple of questions for you:
What authority was given to super ambassadors like Holbrooke and how was it given?
Do you know if the President has given clear authority to either Eikenberry or McChrystal in Afghanistan? (I doubt he has...)

Cheers

JohnT

[Pol-Mil FSO]

Dr. Fishel:

Ambassador Holbrooke is the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP). If asked the Special Representative of whom? I assume (although am not 100 percent sure) that the answer is the President of the United States. Regardless, it is clear to everyone that I have talked to at the State Department (and the NSC) that Ambassador Holbrooke is in charge of civilian decisionmaking regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan. As far as I know, the only persons that Ambassador Holbrooke answers to are Secretary Clinton and President Obama.

In the case of Afghanistan, I think there is an explicit line of authority from POTUS to Ambassador Eikenberry and to GEN McChrystal. As Chief of Mission, Ambassador Eikenberry has a direct line to the President (at least theoretically) as the President's representative to the Government of Afghanistan and has authority over all USG executive branch civilians in Afghanistan (except those directly assigned to CENTCOM). And when wearing his Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan hat GEN McChrystal's chain of command goes up through GEN Petraeus and Secretary Gates to POTUS.

What I find interesting is the new "Integrated Civilian-Military Decisionmaking Structure" in Afghanistan. This structure has five levels and at the top is the "Principals Group" which consists of two persons, Ambassador Eikenberry and GEN McChrystal. (This group seems to me to be an effort to institutionalize the relationship enjoyed by GEN Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker in Iraq.) In addition, the middle level of this structure is the "Regional Integrated Team" (IT-R). This IT-R now exists in RC-East and RC-South and consists of the ISAF Commander and the Senior Civilian Representative. I do not think that it has registered with a lot of people that the RC-East and RC-South Commanders now have civilian U.S. counterparts.

[John T. Fishel]

That is more or less what I expected at the top. But I find the Holbrooke - Eichenberry "relationship" confusing in theory because, in theory, it doesn't exist. In fact, personalities will drive it.:wry:

The institutionalization of the Petraeus/Crocker relationship by replicating the Washington interagency process strikes me as better than what we have had before but much less than it could be. (Back to that in a moment.) I'm glad to see that we have tried to develop coordination mechanisms below the level of Kabul. It should help providing the personalities don't get in the way. What I would really liketo see is a single chain of command in country - I really don't care much if the Ambassador or military commander is in charge but one of them should be. won't solve all problems - pesky personalities again - but if things got too bad the one in charge could send the other one home which might help.

Thanks again. :D

Cheers

JohnT

[yamiyugikun]

Hi,

I managed to find the complete webcast of the interview Gen. Petraeus had with MSNBC's Brian Williams on Oct. 1st. Centcom's facebook page had a link to the Atlantic's page with segments of the webcast but not the entirely.

http://www.videonewslive.com/view/379702/video_one_on_one_with_general_david_petraeus

Naomi

[Garett]

This video is about 60 minutes long, it focuses on Afghanistan and Canadian-American relations.

http://www.cpac.ca/forms/index.asp?dsp=template&act=view3&pagetype=vod&lang=e&clipID=3704

[SWJ Blog]

How Petraeus Has Changed the Afghanistan War; What Happened in Khost? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/01/how-petraeus-has-changed-the-a/)

Entry Excerpt:

How Petraeus Has Changed the Afghanistan War (http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/1231/How-Petraeus-has-changed-the-Afghanistan-war) by Anna Mulrine at the Christian Science Monitor. "Gen. David Petraeus replaced Gen. Stanley McChrystal as head of U.S. forces in the Afghanistan war this year. One change he's made represents something of a gamble to some in the Pentagon."

Afghanistan War: How a Model Province Tumbled into Violence (http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/1230/Afghanistan-war-how-a-model-province-tumbled-into-violence) by Anna Mulrine at the Christian Science Monitor. "Khost Province had been a U.S. success story in the Afghanistan war. But poor local leadership, an influx of insurgents fleeing U.S. pressure elsewhere, and the proximity to Pakistan are stubborn challenges."



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This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[AdamG]

Op-Eds are proto-blogs, right?
So what's the Peanut Gallery think about this?


A Fifth Star for David Petraeus
By Pete Hegseth & Wade Zirkle
The Wall Street Journal
Thursday, January 13, 2011


On a cold December evening in 1783 at Fraunces Tavern in lower Manhattan, Gen. George Washington bade farewell to his staff and resigned his command of the Continental Army. One hundred ninety three years later, on America’s Bicentennial, Congress posthumously promoted Washington to five-star “General of the Armies of the United States.”

Washington led the Continental Army against the British for eight years, the longest tenure for a combatant (wartime) commander in our history to be awarded a fifth star. But David Petraeus, who begins his eighth year as a combatant commander (presently as theatre commander in Afghanistan), will soon eclipse Washington’s tenure. In appropriate recognition of his long and extraordinary wartime service, the new Congress should authorize a fifth star for Gen. Petraeus, thereby promoting him to “General of the Army”—just below Washington’s rank of “General of the Armies” (plural).

After George Washington, the only other five-star “General of the Armies of the United States” was John Pershing, who was promoted to the rank after commanding U.S. forces in World War I. The nine remaining five star generals in our history were branch-specific commanders during World War II: Gens. Dwight Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, George Marshall, Omar Bradley and Henry Arnold were each “General of the Army.” Navy Adms. Chester Nimitz, William Halsey, Ernest King and William Leahy served as five-star “Fleet Admirals.” Each of these officers received the honor during wartime, with the exception of Halsey, who was awarded the fifth star three months after World War II ended, and Bradley, who was awarded his fifth star in 1950.

Like these great leaders, Gen. Petraeus’s breath of experience and outstanding results deserve to be recognized and honored. His wartime tenure began as the Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division, responsible for over 10,000 combat troops during the initial invasion of Iraq. He led the 101st in an airborne assault into northern Iraq and then quieted the city of Mosul.

Gen. Petraeus then oversaw the creation and training of the new Iraqi Army, a Herculean task that was accomplished amid a rapidly deteriorating security situation. By the time he was through, he had stood up, equipped and trained over 100,000 Iraqi soldiers. They would be crucial in winning the peace in the years to follow.

In 2005, Gen. Petraeus led the Army’s command responsible for education and doctrine at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. There he wrote the Army’s manual on counterinsurgency operations. His COIN manual was the blueprint for the upcoming troop “surge,” which saved Iraq from the brink of calamity.

Gen. Petraeus left Fort Leavenworth in 2007 to take his new playbook to Iraq, where he became commander of coalition forces. He engineered one of the most stunning turnarounds in the history of modern warfare. Within 18 months, the general and his troops defeated al Qaeda in Anbar, ended a civil war in Baghdad, sealed porous borders with Iran and Syria, and created a sense of normalcy in Iraq.

After succeeding in the face of near-unanimous doubt, Gen. Petraeus was promoted to commander of Central Command (Centcom) in 2008, where he would oversee a two-front war in Iraq and Afghanistan. His tour at Centcom was cut short, however, when President Barack Obama asked him to replace the dismissed Gen. Stanley McCrystal in Afghanistan. It was a step down on the career ladder for Gen. Petraeus—but he was the president’s last hope to turn around Afghanistan. Demonstrating classic statesmanship, Gen. Petraeus relinquished his more prestigious post at Centcom.

The U.S. war against terrorism is now the longest war in U.S. history, and Gen. Petraeus has clearly distinguished himself as a leader worthy of joining the ranks of Gens. MacArthur, Marshall and Nimitz. A promotion would properly honor his service—and it would also honor the troops he leads and has led. Today’s soldiers have fought as valiantly as any in American history, and they deserve recognition of their leaders. Congressional approval of a fifth star would demonstrate the nation’s commitment to their mission.

David Petraeus is also a soldier-statesmen who works with foreign diplomats and generals in hotspots across the globe. The prestige that would come with a fifth star would also likely help the U.S. in its negotiations with neighboring states—and show the enemies of freedom that we are fully committed to the war against terrorism.

It has been more than half a century since a U.S. general was awarded a fifth star. David Petraeus’s generalship has spanned 11 years, three presidents and seven Congresses. It is time to promote him to “General of the Army” and award him a fifth star. Our military deserves it, and he has certainly earned it.

-- Messrs. Hegseth and Zirkle are directors at Vets for Freedom. Mr. Hegseth served in Iraq with the 101st Airborne Division, and will deploy to Afghanistan in 2011. Mr. Zirkle served two deployments to Iraq as a Marine infantry officer, and is a recipient of the Purple Heart.

Article link: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703791904576076270514563178.html

[Infanteer]

Although I don't agree with some of the flowery statements and would argue that others have put just as much time and effort into these wars, I can't fault the argument of recognizing the stature that Petraeus has achieved - history will likely stick him up there with the other five stars.

[zenpundit]

Is General Petraeus going to also be simultaneously appointed as the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Or will the rank become official upon his retirement?

Because Petraeus will outrank him and/or the Army Chief of Staff otherwise. And all the combatant commanders. Won't that be awkward unless Petraeus is outside the normal chain of command?

Five star ranks were given during WWII partly for protocol reasons as Marshall, Eisenhower, Nimitz and MacArthur had to interact with and command foreign counterparts of higher rank than the prewar Army and American tradition had permitted, excepting General Pershing's special status as General of the Armies ( which he dispalyed as four gold stars) which gave him seniority even above the newly created five star ranks. Or six, had that rank been created, which was discussed but never came to pass.

Another reason was the magnitude of the conflict of WWII where 12 million Americans served in the armed forces. That was war on an epic scale.

Should five star ranks be handed out to dominant commanding generals or admirals in a war who have great successes? Probably, but very sparingly. If Petraeus manages a "win" (i.e. stabilizing ) in Afghanistan, I'd say that he has earned it but some thought needs to be given as to what assignment he will do next once he holds such a rare and exalted rank.

[Cliff]

If I recall correctly 5 stars were also discussed for General Schwarzkopf. Would the same criteria apply to him? Definitely commanded more troops, although not for the same duration... What should the criteria be?

V/R,

Cliff

[William F. Owen]

Although I don't agree with some of the flowery statements and would argue that others have put just as much time and effort into these wars, I can't fault the argument of recognizing the stature that Petraeus has achieved - history will likely stick him up there with the other five stars.
I can fault it. It's nonsense. Patraeus is in no measure even close to military achievements of men who like Abrams, or even the highly dubious George Patton who never got five-stars. To elevate him to the same rank and status as William T. Sherman, and MacArthur, would be a travesty.

If nothing else, Iraq and Afghanistan are minute conflicts compared to the Civil and Second World Wars, so what has he done to deserve even being discussed?

[SteveMetz]

To elevate him to the same rank and status as William T. Sherman, and MacArthur, would be a travesty.

Sherman was not a five star.

I also think the notion is not a good one. I can't see the purpose. Perhaps if there actually is a decisive victory at some point rather than stabilize-and-disengage.

[John T. Fishel]

against awarding GEN Petraeus 5 stars - practical ones. In WW II American 4 stars were clearly outranked by British Field Marshals. Imagine how Montgomery would have dealt with Ike as a 4 star after he (M) had been promoted to FM. Today, that issue does not exist. But who is the senior American officer, a 5 star field commander or the 4 star CJCS (senior officer by law)? Nice sentiment, not practical or necessary.

Cheers

JohnT

[Fuchs]

Ranks should not be rewards.

Give him a Schwartzkopf-like victory parade in NYC IF he wins a war.

Respice te, hominem te memento.

[Bob's World]

We should be discussing how to reduce several hundred collective 'stars' from our current inventory, not how to add one.

[Infanteer]

I can fault it. It's nonsense. Patraeus is in no measure even close to military achievements of men who like Abrams, or even the highly dubious George Patton who never got five-stars. To elevate him to the same rank and status as William T. Sherman, and MacArthur, would be a travesty.

If nothing else, Iraq and Afghanistan are minute conflicts compared to the Civil and Second World Wars, so what has he done to deserve even being discussed?

Oh, I don't disagree with you - Iraq and Afghanistan are minute when compared to other things and they aren't and never were wars of survival. Historically, I'd put him on the level of a Westmoreland or an Abrams - commanded large numbers of U.S. forces in dirty side wars. He just has a better press agent then the others (especially Westmoreland, who gets more bad press then he deserves).

However, he was the central figure of American conflicts in the 2000s. What I'm saying is I can't fault the perception that he was the military figure of the first, conflict-ridden decade of the 21st century. I don't really agree with the common perception that everything he touched turned to gold (it's Lawrence of Arabia-esque) and, like others have said, "stars aren't rewards".


We should be discussing how to reduce several hundred collective 'stars' from our current inventory, not how to add one.

Start with LCol/Col to get rid of inflationary pressure from the bottom. For some reason, Americans more then others have loved to over-promote. When we send guys internationally, we generally have to promote them 1 rank higher to do the same job in a NATO (American) setting.

[DVC]

Dumb idea. GEN Petraeus is serving the country superbly but the scale of forces involved does not compare to those under the command of Ike, Brad, and Mac. We don't make good company commanders colonels just because they are doing a good job commanding a company.

Or a compromise, if dumb idea gives a hint of being too judgemental and not inclusive of other points of view :D. If Afghanistan turns out well, make GEN Petraeus a 5 star after a 193 year interval like we did with G. Washington.

[Sergeant T]

The fifth star hasn't always had a stellar pedigree. William Manchester's American Caesar doesn't exactly paint a flowery portrait of MacArthur. Fleet Admiral's Leahy and King were political creatures whose fifth star was largely a reward for proximity to power. Halsey made some fairly large mistakes, the largest of which was sailing his fleet into a typhoon and killing a lot of his men. I'm hard pressed to find an exemplary reason for Hap Arnold's fifth star.

A decent argument could be made that a fifth star is more political reward than merit based. As Zen points out, the only functional way Petraeus could wear a fifth star would be as CJCS, the most political position in the military. While I can respect the purist's views that these wars have not been wars of national survival, they've been wars nonetheless.

[91bravojoe]

If the criteria is a 'win' in Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan, then Petraeus should be giving back some tarnished metal.

On the other hand, if you like sycophantic knob polishing, he's your guy:

http://www.pierretristam.com/Bobst/07/wf100507.htm

[Gordon Smith]

Op-Eds are proto-blogs, right?
So what's the Peanut Gallery think about this?


A Fifth Star for David Petraeus
By Pete Hegseth & Wade Zirkle
The Wall Street Journal
Thursday, January 13, 2011



Article link: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703791904576076270514563178.html

Just to note, it is incorrect to refer to any person holding the grade of ''General of the Armies of the United States'' as a ''five star general''. No official insignia for the grade was ever established. The only persons who can be reasonably referred to as ''five star generals'' are the five officers who actually held the grade of ''general of the army''.

Also, to note, it is incorrect to refer to Pershing and Washington as the only persons to ever hold the grade of ''General of the Armies of the United States''. Ulysses S. Grant. William Sherman and Philip Sheridan also held the grade. The legislative act of 1866 which established the grade of ''General of the Army of the United States'' referred to it as a revival of the office previously established for Washington. The grade held by Grant, Sherman and Sheridan is entirely distinct from, and senior to, the ''four star'' rank of modern full generals, and being equivalent to the grade held by Washington and Pershing, is senior to the ''five star'' grade of ''general of the army''.

As for the merits of the proposed promotion, I see no grounds for that. Petraeus has performed well in two relatively small-scale COIN-centric wars but no decisive victory yet has been obtained in either conflict. Promotion to a rank held by senior leaders in a global-scale war hardly seems merited. And frankly, the implied comparison between Washington, a man leading a newly forming nation in a desperate struggle for independence, and Petraeus, a theater commander fighting terrorists and insurgents in far-off lands is entirely absurd.

[SWJ Blog]

FT Interview Transcript: General David Petraeus (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/02/ft-interview-transcript-genera/)

Entry Excerpt:

FT Interview Transcript: General David Petraeus (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2e77d09e-32f4-11e0-9a61-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1DNHLvKdm): General David Petraeus, the commander of NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan, spoke to Matthew Green, the Financial Times Afghanistan and Pakistan correspondent, at his headquarters in Kabul on February 6.



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This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Talking to General Petraeus (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/02/talking-to-general-petraeus/)

Entry Excerpt:



In an exclusive interview with NATO TV, ISAF (http://www.isaf.nato.int/) Commander General David Petraeus (http://www.isaf.nato.int/about-isaf/leadership/general-david-h.-petraeus.html) says he expects violence to increase again this year as he continues his counter-insurgency campaign across Afghanistan but he is seeing signs of discord appear within the Taliban.



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/02/talking-to-general-petraeus/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

General David Petraeus is expected to leave his role as commander of US and Nato forces in Afghanistan as part of changes to be introduced by the Pentagon. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8327632/General-Petraeus-to-quit-as-Afghanistan-commander.html)


. . . speculation on his next role has also included becoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the post from which Mike Mullen is expected to retire in October. There have also been suggestions that he could become Defence Secretary.

Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary said: "I can assure you General Petraeus is not quitting as ISAF commander, but nor does he plan to stay in Afghanistan forever. Obviously he will rotate out at some point, but that point has not yet been determined and it will not occur anytime soon. Until then, he will continue to ably lead our coalition forces in Afghanistan."

"Quit" is not the best word to describe this.

[Tukhachevskii]

Apparently his deputy Rodriguez may also step down. If so what would that do for unity of command (and the stragey laid out for the theatre)? And, perhaps more pertinently, who would replace Petreaus if/when he does go and what efefct would that have on the war effort?

[82redleg]

Apparently his deputy Rodriguez may also step down. If so what would that do for unity of command (and the stragey laid out for the theatre)? And, perhaps more pertinently, who would replace Petreaus if/when he does go and what efefct would that have on the war effort?

"Quit" and "step down" are totally inaccurate characterizations, and LTG Rodriguez is not GEN Petraeus' deputy, he is a subordinate commander.

I think that, after 16 months in theater (on this tour), GEN Petraeus will become the CJCS when ADM Mullen retires in Oct.

I think that, after 24 months in theater (again, on this tour), LTG Rodriguez will get promoted, but I don't know where he will go.

There are a number of options to replace both officers. For GEN Petraeus, top choices include GEN Odierno (currently CG, JFCOM, which is going away) and GEN Austin (currently CG, USF-I, which is also going away, although the timing for GEN Austin doesn't work.

As far as LTG Rodriguez is concerned, they have already announced that LTG Scaparotti (currently CG, I Corps) will take over
http://www.nwguardian.com/2011/01/06/9278/i-corps-begins-preparations-for.html
Since LTG Scaparotti followed LTG Rodriguez as CG, 82nd ABN (and CG, RC-East), including serving as RC-East under LTG Rodriguez, I don't see that there will be too many issues.

[Tukhachevskii]

"Quit" and "step down" are totally inaccurate characterizations, and LTG Rodriguez is not GEN Petraeus' deputy, he is a subordinate commander.

I think that, after 16 months in theater (on this tour), GEN Petraeus will become the CJCS when ADM Mullen retires in Oct.

I think that, after 24 months in theater (again, on this tour), LTG Rodriguez will get promoted, but I don't know where he will go.

There are a number of options to replace both officers. For GEN Petraeus, top choices include GEN Odierno (currently CG, JFCOM, which is going away) and GEN Austin (currently CG, USF-I, which is also going away, although the timing for GEN Austin doesn't work.

As far as LTG Rodriguez is concerned, they have already announced that LTG Scaparotti (currently CG, I Corps) will take over
http://www.nwguardian.com/2011/01/06/9278/i-corps-begins-preparations-for.html
Since LTG Scaparotti followed LTG Rodriguez as CG, 82nd ABN (and CG, RC-East), including serving as RC-East under LTG Rodriguez, I don't see that there will be too many issues.

Thanks for the clarification redleg.

[Bob's World]

These guys have both served long and well. It is time for a more civilian-led strategy that is more able to take down the sanctuary that we have built around the Karzai government (per the COlonial INtervention Mannual, FM 3-24) and put the hard pressure where it really needs to be. Not drone strikes into the FATA, but rather 'striking" at the drones in Kabul who designed and run this government behind the protection of the Coalition.

More likely a Marine will be named, and he will continue the same focus, but with more emphasis in killing that element of the populace that feels greater afinity with the Taliban than with their own government; and press for a "decent interval" of suppression that allows us to declare "victory" and slip away...

[carl]

More likely a Marine will be named, and he will continue the same focus, but with more emphasis in killing that element of the populace that feels greater afinity with the Taliban than with their own government;

Don't they try to limit the killing of elements of the population with great affinity for Taliban & company to those who shoot at us, plant bombs and send night letters-or have they loosened the rules of engagement lately?

[Bob's World]

Don't they try to limit the killing of elements of the population with great affinity for Taliban & company to those who shoot at us, plant bombs and send night letters-or have they loosened the rules of engagement lately?

They do try, but they are all afghan civilians. How much of one's populace must one kill, or have some foreign military kill on one's behalf in order to gain their support?

No nuance of ROE changes the nature of the combatants. All are civilians, and only a portion take up arms. Those with arms are the surface of the iceberg of those who share the same perspective but that take less agressive roles, or choose to wait and see. The problem with an ROE that focuses on blowing the top off of the iceberg is that it merely enables more of the iceberg to emerge, while adding ice to the water, making the base larger.

[carl]

How much of one's populace must one kill, or have some foreign military kill on one's behalf in order to gain their support?

Couldn't this question be turned around to apply to Taliban & company in that they often resort to savage terror to gain and maintain control of areas, there are a number of Pakistanis in their ranks and they are supported heavily by a foreign military (the Pak Army/ISI)?

[Bob's World]

Couldn't this question be turned around to apply to Taliban & company in that they often resort to savage terror to gain and maintain control of areas, there are a number of Pakistanis in their ranks and they are supported heavily by a foreign military (the Pak Army/ISI)?

Sounds like we are in the middle of a big messy family squabble, aren't we?

The Taliban do not have "clean hands" and no one here argues that they do. Nor does anyone argue that a border was drawn by white men that breaks the Pashtun populace into those who are "Afghan" and those who are "Pakistani" (much as if someone came and painted a line through the middle of your home and divided your family.) Neither of those lines mean much to the divided party.

Does Pakistan support the Taliban cause? Of course they do, it is in their interest to do so. Does the U.S. support the (formerly pro-Russian) Northern Alliance cause? Of course we do, it is in our interest to do so; or at least was in those heady days post 9/11.

But if this is about the interests of the people of Afghanistan perhaps we should take a more neutral role and promote solutions that serve the entire populace, not just the half we jumped in bed with (against the half we were in bed with when the Soviets were the occupiers).

US interests are best served by stability; and stability is best served by finding common ground and shared governance that represents the entire populace equitably. Sure in the past we have jumped on various sides of the problem to swing results to favor specific results we desired. Once to oust the Soviets, and against to oust AQ. Time to shift our efforts to become more centrist and equitable if it is truly stability that we seek.

Reasonable minds can differ of course, but this is how I see it.

[wm]

Reasonable minds can differ of course, but this is how I see it.
Not sure that my mind counts as reasonable, but I do differ, to some degree, with the following


US interests are best served by stability.

I think a more accurate assertion would be that nation states' interests in general, and those of the US in particular, are best served by predictability. Stability may well be one category of predictability, but I'm not so sure it is the only one. Some forms of instability are also predictable (like radioactive decay). A quiesant populace may appear to be stable, but that could be quite a distortion, as I think recent events in Egypt have pointed out. One would prefer to know,I think, whether a current level of stability (or instability) is likely to persist, and if so, for how long.

The US political process is predictable but it is rather far from stable, what with the potential turnover of significant portions of the governing elite at all levels every 2-6 years.

One optimizes one's interests by minimizing one's risks. The best way to minimize risk is to have a high level of certainty (that is, predictability) regarding future outcomes and consequences deriving from current actions.

[carl]

Sounds like we are in the middle of a big messy family squabble, aren't we?

No, it sounds more like we are in a violent civil war with lots of innocent people being killed, sometimes because they don't to do what some pathological teenager wants them to do fast enough or because a village mullah has decided he knows God's will better.


The Taliban do not have "clean hands" and no one here argues that they do. Nor does anyone argue that a border was drawn by white men that breaks the Pashtun populace into those who are "Afghan" and those who are "Pakistani" (much as if someone came and painted a line through the middle of your home and divided your family.) Neither of those lines mean much to the divided party.

The border is a reality that is recognized by both sides, grudgingly maybe on the Afghan side but it isn't seriously contested. I would guess the Pakistanis are rather more concerned about maintaining it as it is more than anybody.

The point of your Pashtun comment is to suggest that the Pakistanis aren't foreigners coming over to Afghanistan to kill locals on behalf of Taliban & company. From what I read, the Afghans know full well who is a Pakistani coming over to mess around in somebody else's neighborhood, not to mention various volunteers from over the ocean who show up from time to time.

You might want to change your "white men" reference to "europeans". My auntie was a missionary for decades in Pakistan. She was as fair skinned as the daughter of an Irishman could be. The Pakistanis always used to ask her if she was a Pathan.


Does Pakistan support the Taliban cause? Of course they do, it is in their interest to do so. Does the U.S. support the (formerly pro-Russian) Northern Alliance cause? Of course we do, it is in our interest to do so; or at least was in those heady days post 9/11.

But if this is about the interests of the people of Afghanistan perhaps we should take a more neutral role and promote solutions that serve the entire populace, not just the half we jumped in bed with (against the half we were in bed with when the Soviets were the occupiers).

You suggest "this" is about the interests of the Afghans. And you mention the Taliban & company's cause. That cause is from what I read an Islamist Afghanistan ruled by Kandaharis, not much evidence that it will be much different from what it was pre-2001. Most of the Afghans disliked that intensely and don't want it to come back.

You also say the Pak Army/ISI supports the cause of Taliban & company. Now, the Pak Army/ISI supports a cause which most Afghans view as inimical to their interests, and since you say we should promote solutions that serve the entire populace, shouldn't we therefore oppose the Pak Army/ISI's support for Taliban & company? This might possibly dovetail with our interests, since the Taliban was in charge of most of Afghanistan they hosted a group that killed 3,000 of our people and have never renounced that group.

In your parenthetical I think you are slanting things a bit. We, by deferring to the ISI, backed with most of the money the most religious muj groups. Gulbuddin and the boys comes to mind. And I believe Ismail Khan over there in Herat killed a lot of Russ. The Taliban doesn't like him at all. Also I might add that Massoud was the key leader in the Northern Alliance. He was not pro-Russian either judging by the number of their bodies he left on various battlefields. Not simple these things.

[Bob's World]

The "predictability" we carefully crafted over the past few generations in the Middle East arguably is the principal motivation for young men from a wide range of Muslim countries to act out violently against the US, but that on 9/11 or to travel to Iraq to fight us there, etc. A forced predictability sounds nice, but it comes with consequences.

As to stability, actually, as I think about it, I will clarify my position. It is not stability in Afghanistan that is important to the US, it is stability between Pakistan and India that is important to the US. That is arguably the biggest problem with our approach to Afghanistan, is that it has created a tremendous disruption of the uneasy stability that existed prior to our mucking around chasing terrorists.

Reconciliation that incorporates all Afghans equitably in the governance and opportunity of their country is best, but otherwise a homegrown solution that excludes either side is preferable to a US forced solution that excludes the Taliban side. A homegrown solution will achieve a stability that is maintained by that side; a US forced solution will require the US to keep it stable. Frankly, we have bigger fish to fry.

AQ is everywhere and nowhere, they can plan, organize and launch attacks from virtually anywhere. Events such as are occurring in Tunisia and Egypt, and rumbling in several other countries promises to rob AQ of much of the rationale that they have been able to leverage to motivate attacks on the US. Even if the Taliban gain control of Afghanistan and are willing to openly (which is highly unlikely) support AQ it will be a simple matter to launch strategic raids against such targets as they develop.

Bottom line is that there are people out there working to whip up a lot of very irrational fears; and as Churchill reminded a London populace being submitted to German terror attacks, "we have nothing to fear, but fear itself."

Our fears have launched us on some fools errands. Time to stop taking counsel of our fears and to start focusing on what is really important. Pak-India stability is important. An improved US-Iranian relationship is important. Getting our military re-postured so as to be a more effective deterrent of state activity that is counter to our interests is important. Defeating the Taliban or denying any particular piece of dirt to AQ? Not so much.

Others think similarly. George Friedman's "the Next Decade" takes a very similar stance for slightly different reasons. He does a good job of laying out the history of the geopolitics as well.

[Dayuhan]

The "predictability" we carefully crafted over the past few generations in the Middle East arguably is the principal motivation for young men from a wide range of Muslim countries to act out violently against the US, but that on 9/11 or to travel to Iraq to fight us there, etc.

The extent to which despotism is predictable is debatable: many despots (Saddam Hussein for one) have been less than predictable, and the time and manner of their inevitable fall is often less than predictable.

The extend to which "we crafted" the pattern of despotism in the Middle East is also highly debatable. Most of these governments were not installed by us and their form is dictated less by us than by local habit and tradition. We've been quite willing to deal with it (not that we could do anything about it in most cases) but "crafted by us" is a huge overstatement. I realize that some may perceive it that way, but managing a perception is very different from managing a reality. If we believe that the stats quo was "crafted by us" when in fact it was not, we are tempted to try to re-craft it to suit our current beliefs. That's a recipe for trouble.

The extent to which foreign fighters are trying to "act out" against US control in the homeland is highly debatable and not fully consistent with evidence. Foreign fighters are regularly recruited from countries such as Libya and Syria, where no US control or even influence exist. Foreign fighters are not limited to fights against the US: they have been very successfully recruited for fights against other powers that have no influence in home countries (the Soviet Union in Afghanistan). Evidence and Occam's razor suggest that the driver for foreign fighter recruitment is the simple "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" narrative, and that this is not US-specific or a reaction to US action in source countries.

This study of foreign foghter recruitment and motivations:

http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00023

does not cite desire to diminish US influence in the homeland as a significant motivator.

It's dangerous and inappropriate to assume that the US is simply an innocent victim of terrorism and that evebts have nothing to do with our past. It is equally dangerous and inappropriate to assume that it's all about us, and that everything that happens is a reaction to something we did or are doing. Even where our history is a causative factor, we can't always correct it with assertive action: the antidote to dumb intervention isn't smart intervention, it's less intervention.

It's all to easy to assume that now we understand all the mistakes we made before, and now we can correct them because now we know what everybody wants and needs. Worth remembering that our conviction was every bit as strong back when we were making all those messes. hen you think you know what's best for others it's a good time to be think again and be very careful. When you know you know what's best for others it's a good time to lock yourself up until sanity returns.


Reconciliation that incorporates all Afghans equitably in the governance and opportunity of their country is best

Best for us, no doubt. Burt can we dictate - and impose - what we think is "best" for Afghanistan? What if the various Afghan factions don't trust each other, don't think joint governance sufficiently protects them, and don't trust the US to determine what's "best"?


but otherwise a homegrown solution that excludes either side is preferable to a US forced solution that excludes the Taliban side. A homegrown solution will achieve a stability that is maintained by that side

The last "homegrown solution" didn't work out all that well, certainly not for us. Why should we think the next will do better? Just because we aren't there doesn't mean a solution is "homegrown", either: the Pakistani Army and ISI will still be backing their chosen side.


Even if the Taliban gain control of Afghanistan and are willing to openly (which is highly unlikely) support AQ it will be a simple matter to launch strategic raids against such targets as they develop.

Didn't we try that before, with all that cruise missile drive-by shooting stuff? Did it accomplish the purpose? Will it if we do it again?


Our fears have launched us on some fools errands. Time to stop taking counsel of our fears and to start focusing on what is really important. Pak-India stability is important. An improved US-Iranian relationship is important. Getting our military re-postured so as to be a more effective deterrent of state activity that is counter to our interests is important. Defeating the Taliban or denying any particular piece of dirt to AQ? Not so much.

I agree. It wasn't just our fears, though, it was also our domestic need to translate punitive action into something benevolent, hence the efforts to "install" democracies in places where we have no business meddling in governance at all.

Unfortunately we have largely committed ourselves to a course we never should have taken. If you fire off an effective punitive raid and leave while you're on top and everyone fears you, you've accomplished a purpose and delivered a message: people will remember and be deterred. If you stay around until your vulnerabilities are clear and the other side is ascendant, leaving becomes defeat, and that delivers a message too. Unfortunately we selected goals that we haven't the capacity to achieve, and that makes failure, with all the perception-related baggage that goes with it, a very likely possibility. As far as I'm concerned we should never have tried to govern Afghanistan or to dictate how it will be governed, because these are things we haven't the capacity to do.

It would be lovely if we could bring all the competing factions into a functioning inclusive government with balanced powers and constitutional protections respected by all... but it's a pipe dream. Afghanistan is not the 51st state and we cannot impose an American solution to an Afghan problem.

[carl]

As to stability, actually, as I think about it, I will clarify my position. It is not stability in Afghanistan that is important to the US, it is stability between Pakistan and India that is important to the US. That is arguably the biggest problem with our approach to Afghanistan, is that it has created a tremendous disruption of the uneasy stability that existed prior to our mucking around chasing terrorists.

Why, apart from a humanitarian standpoint, is stability between the two countries so important to us? There is not likely to be a war to the death between the two since they both have nukes. Neither country is likely to let us influence the status of their nukes so we have no power to affect that equation either way.

What do you mean by stability anyway? I don't understand. Their existence is already insured by the nukes.

The continued tensions between the two is caused by three things (among others), Kashmir, the Pak Army/ISI support for violent young men who periodically go to India and slaughter Indian civilians and the disagreement between the two countries over who will have the greater say in Afghanistan. We can influence two of those things, maybe. Kashmir they will have to work out between themselves but we have some influence on the other two. What I can never understand is why your position normally seems to favor the Pak Army/ISI. It seems to be fair to tell them stop supporting LeT killers and you guys can share Afghanistan in that neither will control the place.

I will anticipate you answer. You normally respond by saying we must be sensitive to the Pak Army/ISI desire for strategic depth because anything that threatens that depth will set the Pak Army/ISI off on a march down the road to nuclear Armageddon, or it is implied. Why? I don't think they are insects programmed to react to stimuli in only one way. They may find it advantageous to make us think that, it pays; but they dealt with an Afghanistan they didn't control in the past and they will in the future.

The whole thing about strategic depth is a sham anyway. For strategic depth to be useful, there must be some sort of resource base to fall back upon. There is nothing in Afghanistan the Pak army can use to rebuild itself. Yet they insist that it is of value. It seems mindless adherence to something that isn't. That is only of value if it is part of a grift. They sort of remind me of the sheriff in Blazing Saddles threatening to shoot himself if the lynch mob didn't back off.

Your last sentence mentions how we disrupted an "uneasy stability" by going after some people who killed 3,000 Americans. That period of stability included lots of fighting in Kashmir by people dispatched, trained and sponsored by the Pak Army/ISI. It also included the Kargil conflict. That doesn't seem so stable to me.


Reconciliation that incorporates all Afghans equitably in the governance and opportunity of their country is best, but otherwise a homegrown solution that excludes either side is preferable to a US forced solution that excludes the Taliban side. A homegrown solution will achieve a stability that is maintained by that side; a US forced solution will require the US to keep it stable. Frankly, we have bigger fish to fry.

What you are saying here is the Taliban & company's interests trumps those of the other Afghans and ultimately, it may be easier to just let them have the place and that wouldn't be so bad. Please correct me if I am wrong.

I would point out that any stability the Taliban could maintain would be that of a repressive police state. Isn't that something akin to a "forced predictability"?


AQ is everywhere and nowhere, they can plan, organize and launch attacks from virtually anywhere.

I've heard that very often and it always sounds good in theory, connectivity, virtual training, the miracle of the internet and all that. What I observe is they seem to hang out in Pakistan, near the mountains and most of the attacks on us seem to go through there. From this I conclude there is an advantage to being there that surmounts the discomforts. If they could do what they want to do from a seaside resort in Belgium, why don't they? The roads are better and the cheese is good.


Even if the Taliban gain control of Afghanistan and are willing to openly (which is highly unlikely) support AQ it will be a simple matter to launch strategic raids against such targets as they develop.

If it is so simple, how come we haven't been able to find AQ 1 & 2 and MO in a decade, 10 years, of trying? Strategic raids sounds really cool but I can't think of one that paid off since maybe Pizarro.


Bottom line is that there are people out there working to whip up a lot of very irrational fears; and as Churchill reminded a London populace being submitted to German terror attacks, "we have nothing to fear, but fear itself."

FDR said that in 1932 or 1933 and I believe he was referring to the domestic economy. If Churchill had said that in 1940 or 41 people would have thought him odd since bombs were falling on their heads at the time.

[Bob's World]

Ok, I concede the FDR / Churchill mix up. Otherwise I simply refer Carl and Dayuhan to each other for a group hug. I recommend you both read Friedman's "next decade," not that it agrees with me on all points or disagrees with you all, but I think you'll find it an interesting read. I don't think he takes into account role of today's info technology to the degree he should when he makes his argument on the US being a reluctant empire and needing to act like one along the lines of Rome and Great Britain, but otherwise there is a lot of good information and clear thinking. I don't think certain TTPs that were viable then would work today.

I will ad for Carl, the US and the Soviets came within a C-hair of launching on each other a few times as I understand it. Deterrence is always a delicate balance of provocation and restraint, and we are disrupting that balance in Pak-India. That could cause a tragic miscalculation. I didn't say it was most likely, on that it was the only real danger that we need to focus on in that region currently, and it is the one we seem to focus on least.

[carl]

Deterrence is always a delicate balance of provocation and restraint, and we are disrupting that balance in Pak-India.

Saying it don't make it so. How are we disrupting the balance?

I thought deterrence was basically a matter of the other guy knowing he won't get away with, thereby causing restraint. Where does provocation fit in?

[Dayuhan]

Otherwise I simply refer Carl and Dayuhan to each other for a group hug. I recommend you both read Friedman's "next decade," not that it agrees with me on all points or disagrees with you all, but I think you'll find it an interesting read. I don't think he takes into account role of today's info technology to the degree he should when he makes his argument on the US being a reluctant empire and needing to act like one along the lines of Rome and Great Britain

Carl seems a nice guy but I'm not sure I want to hug him. Not really my style.

I do not at all agree with anyone who says the US is an empire, reluctant or otherwise. Unless we're radically redefining the word, it's not a supportable contention. The thought of "acting like an empire" invokes a particular shudder. No point in acting like something we're not, especially when it's something we don't want to be, something that we haven't the capacity to be, and something it's not in our interests to be.

To get back to the point, which I think is being to some degree evaded... this seems to be your prescription for Afghanistan:


Reconciliation that incorporates all Afghans equitably in the governance and opportunity of their country is best

A lovely idea, really, and I think we'd all love to see it happen. I just don't see any realistic way that we can make it happen, and I think that pursuing a goal that we haven't the capacity to achieve - something we've done all too often lately - is a very dangerous thing to do.

How is this not an American solution to an Afghan problem? How can we get to this point, short of dictating an outcome and trying to impose it? Do we even have the capacity to dictate or impose outcomes in Afghanistan? Do the various Afghan factions trust each other (or us) enough to make this possible? It sounds wonderful to us, but is this compatible with existing Afghan political culture and the various parties' perceptions of their own interests and goals?

Inquiring minds want to know...

[Ken White]

...... :) ......

[Dayuhan]

..... looking for the "chastened" emoticon .....

[Ken White]

that can be used ; \ on occasion. :D

OTOH, if yet again in pursuit of the ever elusive definitive answer, perhaps "chastened" (chastenity? Nah, probably not...) is not indicated... :wry:

[SWJ Blog]

David Petraeus deserves to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs... (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/david-petraeus-deserves-to-be/)

Entry Excerpt:

... says the Wall Street Journal (subscription required) in an editorial titled "The President's Generals (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703580004576180861857866794.html?m od=WSJ_Opinion_AboveLEFTTop)". "...Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen's term ends September 30... Names under consideration include the current vice chairman, General James Cartwright, supreme commander in Europe Admiral James Stavridis, and General David Petraeus... By broad consensus, the most accomplished general officer of his generation is General Petraeus..."



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/david-petraeus-deserves-to-be/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[AdamG]

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Gen. David Petraeus, in his first appearance in Washington since taking over as the top war commander in Afghanistan, is laying out a mostly upbeat assessment of military progress that should allow the United States to begin withdrawing forces this summer, despite predictions that the wounded Taliban insurgency will mount an especially bloody fight this spring.
No one is calling it the Taliban's last stand, but U.S. officials say this is the year that the insurgency will be tamed on the battlefield and at the bargaining table.

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_AFGHANISTAN?SITE=FLTAM&SECTION=US

[tequila]

Tom Ricks reports rumors (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/10/best_defense_exclusive_petraeus_to_be_succeeded_by _marine_gen_john_allen)that USMC LTG John Allen will succeed Petraeus in Afghanistan.

[SWJ Blog]

Coalition Has Momentum in Afghanistan, Petraeus Says (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/coalition-has-momentum-in-afgh/)

Entry Excerpt:

Coalition Has Momentum in Afghanistan, Petraeus Says (http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=63170) by Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service.

WASHINGTON, March 15, 2011 – The Taliban’s momentum has been reversed in most areas of Afghanistan, but the progress achieved there is fragile and reversible, the commander of NATO and U.S. forces said here today.

Army Gen. David H. Petraeus told the Senate Armed Services Committee that much dangerous work remains ahead for coalition and Afghan government forces in the country.

“Nonetheless, the hard-fought achievements in 2010 and early 2011 have enabled the joint Afghan-NATO transition board to recommend initiation this spring of transition to Afghan lead in several provinces,” he said. The progress also will factor into his recommendations in drawing down the number of U.S. forces in the country, now at around 100,000, the general added.

The progress, Petraeus said, has put the NATO-led effort on the path to turn over security responsibility for the country to Afghan forces by 2014.

The effort in Afghanistan is more than simply a military campaign, Petraeus told the senators. Support and resources the United States and the 47 other troop-contributing countries have provided has allowed the civil-military campaign to work, he said.

And, Petraeus noted, the Afghans themselves are shouldering an increasingly larger share of the defense burden.

“More than 87,000 additional NATO ISAF troopers and 1,000 additional civilians have been added to the effort in Afghanistan since the beginning of 2009,” the general said. “In Afghanistan, security forces have grown by over 122,000 in that time as well.”

Getting the inputs right has enabled all forces to conduct the comprehensive campaign, he said.

“Our core objective is, of course, ensuring that Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary for al-Qaida,” Petraeus told the panel. “Achieving that objective requires that we help Afghanistan develop sufficient capabilities to secure and govern itself, and that effort requires the execution of the comprehensive civil-military effort on which we are now embarked.”

The effort has enabled a stepped-up tempo of precise, intelligence-driven operations to capture or kill insurgent leaders, the general said.

“In a typical 90-day period, in fact, precision operations by U.S. special mission units and their Afghan partners alone kill or capture some 360 targeted insurgent leaders,” Petraeus said. “Moreover, intelligence-driven operations are now coordinated with senior officers of the relevant Afghan ministries, and virtually all include highly trained Afghan soldiers or police, with some Afghan elements now in the lead on these operations.”

Combined ISAF-Afghan operations have cleared the Taliban from important safe havens, and the forces are holding these areas, allowing governance and development to take root, Petraeus noted.

“ISAF and Afghan troopers have, for example, cleared such critical areas as the districts west of Kandahar city that were the birthplace of the Taliban movement, as well as important districts of Helmand province,” he said.

These operations have resulted in the gradual development of local governance and economic revival in the growing security bubbles, the general said, pointing out that in Marja in Helmand province – once a Taliban stronghold – 75 percent of registered voters cast ballots in recent city elections.

“As a result of improvements in the security situation there,” Petraeus said, “the markets -- which once sold weapons, explosives and illegal narcotics -- now feature over 1,500 shops selling food, clothes and household goods.”

Safe havens in Pakistan also are receiving attention, as ISAF has troops in place to interdict these corridors, the general told the senators, and ISAF and Afghan troops are cooperating with Pakistani forces across the border to trap Taliban forces between this hammer and anvil.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai will announce which provinces will transition to full Afghan control next week, Petraeus said. “In keeping with the principles adopted by [NATO’s] North Atlantic Council to guide transition,” he said, “the shifting of responsibility from ISAF to Afghan forces will be conducted at a pace determined by conditions on the ground with assessments provided from the bottom up so that those at operational-command level in Afghanistan can plan the resulting battlefield geometry adjustments with our Afghan partners.”

The transition, he continued, will allow NATO to take some troops out of the country, and will enable a bulk-up of troops in other areas.

“Similar processes are also taking place as we commence transition of certain training and institutional functions from ISAF trainers to their Afghan counterparts,” Petraeus said.

It’s important to ensure the transition process is irreversible, the general said.

“As the ambassadors of several ISAF countries emphasized at one recent NATO meeting,” he said, “we’ll get one shot at transition, and we need to get it right.”

Since the surge of forces into Afghanistan reached its peak eight months ago, the progress is undeniable, Petraeus told the panel. The Taliban have lost safe havens, many insurgent leaders have been killed or captured, and hundreds of reconcilable mid-level leaders and fighters have been reintegrated into Afghan society, he said.

Meanwhile, Petraeus added, Afghan forces have grown in numbers and capabilities, and security improvements have meant real progress in governance and the economy.

“None of this has been easy,” the general said. “The progress achieved has entailed hard fighting and considerable sacrifice. There have been tough losses along the way, and there have been setbacks as well as successes. Indeed, the experience has been akin to that of a roller coaster ride. The trajectory has generally been upward since last summer, but there certainly have been significant bumps and difficult reverses at various points.”

The Taliban will try to regain momentum this spring, Petraeus said.

“We believe that we will be able to build on the momentum achieved in 2010, though that clearly will entail additional tough fighting,” he added.



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[AdamG]

WASHINGTON (AP) -- The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan insists the military can boost Afghan security forces to fight the Taliban, begin a troop drawdown this summer and fulfill President Barack Obama's goal of a long-term partnership with the Kabul government.

Facing a skeptical Congress and a war-weary public, Army Gen. David Petraeus is trying to build support for the continued and costly U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, telling lawmakers the conflict is turning around despite concerns about the viability of President Hamid Karzai's government and the dedication of neighboring Pakistan to root out terrorism.

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_US_AFGHANISTAN?SITE=FLTAM&SECTION=US

[SWJ Blog]

Petraeus, Polls Disagree On Afghan War Progress (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/petraeus-polls-disagree-on-afg/)

Entry Excerpt:

Petraeus, Polls Disagree On Afghan War Progress (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/16/petraeus-polls-afghanistan-war_n_836298.html) by David Wood, Huffington Post. BLUF: "Petraeus argued that a substantial number of American troops will be needed well after this July, while the Afghan government, at the national and local levels, is prodded and encouraged and trained. While the Post-ABC poll found that nearly 80 percent of respondents wanted a "substantial'' withdrawal of troops this summer, Petraeus said many of those who are withdrawn from secure areas may be reassigned within Afghanistan rather than brought back home."



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[AdamG]

WASHINGTON (AP) — Challenged by a congressman to "be honest" about how long American troops might have to fight in Afghanistan, Army Gen. David Petraeus revealed that he has a personal stake in ensuring that the U.S. war objectives are met — his son, Stephen, whose recent combat tour was kept "very quiet."

In an emotional exchange with Rep.Walter B. Jones, R-N.C., Petraeus said "if I ever felt that we couldn't achieve our objectives," he would be "very forthright" not only with his superiors in the military chain of command but also with President Barack Obama and members of the Congress.

http://www.wtkr.com/news/military/wtkr-petraeus-son-served,0,702929.story

[Bob's World]

I'll never fully understand why congress always plays the detached role of either cheerleader or victim; depending on where they think the majority of their constituency stands on issues like Iraq and now Afghanistan.

The President defined the Ends; and the military is the means the the president sent to address those ends. The military in turn came up with (surprise) a military solution to the President's Ends; and the Congress then resourced all of the above.

To Congress, please, stop being a detached cheerleader or victim either one, and stand up and take responsibility.

The Ends defined by the President are far too broad and far too tied to one specific region of he globe to be Feasible, Acceptable, or Suitable to the goals of promoting US interests in South Asia, or the more specific interest of protecting the US from AQ inspired acts of terrorism coming out of the greater Middle East.

The Ways derived and being implemented by the Military are wildly disconnected from the Ends identified by the President and for different reasons are equally infeasible, unacceptable and unsuitable to the larger goals as well.

I always have to stop and remind myself that it is the genius of our Constitution that ensures that the US government remains so wonderfully dysfunctional and inefficient so as to keep the President, the Congress and the Military from all deciding some day to gang up on "we the people." But damn, sometimes its frustrating.

Man up Congress. Stop watching the world go by while you wring your hands or wave your pom poms and write rubber checks to pay for it all. The power of the purse is in your hands, but only if you are willing to pull the strings. Instead you write a blank check to USAID and add it to the blank check already given to Defense. Is it any wonder this just keeps getting bigger? Cut some funds, and watch it get smarter instead. Rich people can afford to be wasteful and stupid; people on a budget have to get smart and efficient.

[RJ]

Looks like the majority agrees - No 5th Star for David Petraeus!

I agree. the stage is too small to support the weight that honor would grant.

[SWJ Blog]

AP Sources: Panetta to Pentagon, Petraeus to CIA (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/04/ap-sources-panetta-to-pentagon/)

Entry Excerpt:

Associated Press unnamed sources (http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/04/ap-panetta-to-pentagon-petraeus-to-cia/1) say Panetta (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leon_Panetta) to Pentagon, Petraeus (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Petraeus) to CIA, Crocker (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ryan_Crocker) to Kabul and Allen (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_R._Allen) to ISAF.



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[SWJ Blog]

Petraeus Confident as He Leaves Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/07/petraeus-confident-as-he-leave/)

Entry Excerpt:

Petraeus Confident as He Leaves Afghanistan (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/11/world/asia/11petraeus.html?ref=world) by Carlotta Gall, New York Times. BLUF: "... the general said signs of progress were beginning to appear. Insurgent attacks were down in May and June compared with the same months in 2010, and July is showing the same trend, he said... But he warned that there would still be tough fighting in the next 15 months before 33,000 surge troops are brought back to the United States, according to the schedule that President Obama laid out in a speech on June 22..."



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[SWJ Blog]

General David H. Petraeus (USA, Ret.) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/general-david-h-petraeus-usa-ret)

Entry Excerpt:



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[SWJ Blog]

Can Petraeus Handle CIA’s Skepticism on Afghanistan? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/can-petraeus-handle-cia%E2%80%99s-skepticism-on-afghanistan)

Entry Excerpt:



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[davidbfpo]

Just located this article, sub-titled on the web version: 'How good a general was David Petraeus?' which was published five weeks ago in The Spectator by Professor Andrew Bacevich:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/7141093/how-good-a-general-was-david-petraeus.thtml

Following my practice he concludes:
In the meantime, however, the infatuation with Petraeus does real harm. It contributes to an abiding American (and perhaps more broadly western) misunderstanding of war. The illusion that generalship determines war’s outcome — call it the cult of the commander — clouds our judgment. We persuade ourselves to think that however disappointing the last war, installing the right general — someone like David Petraeus — will ensure a better outcome next time. It obscures one of history’s central teachings: that war by its very nature is unpredictable and uncontrollable, a leap into the dark certain to yield consequences other than those predicted. Nothing in Petraeus’s record overturns that core truth.

There are other, earlier pithy comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Petraeus Orders Increased Military Role in CIA Analysis (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/petraeus-orders-increased-military-role-in-cia-analysis)

Entry Excerpt:



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[SWJ Blog]

Book: Petraeus almost quit over Afghan drawdown (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/book-petraeus-almost-quit-over-afghan-drawdown)

Entry Excerpt:



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[EffectsDiaspora]

David Petraeus has resigned his post as director of the CIA, citing an extra-marital affair in a letter to the white house...

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/11/09/david-petraeus-cia-resign-nbc/1695271/

[slapout9]

Link to NBC news on the Petraeus situation.



http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/11/09/15054517-cia-director-david-petraeus-resigns-cites-extramarital-affair?lite&ocid=msnhp&pos=1

[SWJ Blog]

CIA Director Petraeus Resigns, Cites Extramarital Affair (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cia-director-petraeus-resigns-cites-extramarital-affair)

Entry Excerpt:



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[ganulv]

If you can’t keep things on the down-low, D/CIA really isn’t the job for you.

[jmm99]

but admittedly, that is not the current "standard of practice". It is an interesting juxtaposition to the demise of "don't ask; don't tell".

Regards

Mike

[TDB]

What the hell? I come home from the pub and this the first thing I see. Dumbfounded. It's a loss, it really is. Though fair play to him for coming out with it before the media exposed him.

[jmm99]

and thanks for mentioning the media. By "standard of practice", I meant the current "I gotcha" culture of the media, politicians, etc.

Regards

Mike

[carl]

I am skeptical that this has anything at all to do with an affair.

[Ken White]

However, it probably removes a potential 2016 candidate from contention. :wry:

Which may or may not be why the FBI was accessing his e-mails...

[jkm_101_fso]

Good work, Paula. Looks Like the GEN was "All In".

SMH. What a disappointment.

[carl]

Ms. Broadwell has been hanging around with the general for years. And by golly, just today, a few days after the election, a few days before the secret hearings, a few months after 4 Americans were unlucky in Benghazi, a few weeks after the CIA said THEY never held up help and what do you know, it's a Friday; why just today this story breaks. Ain't life just full of coincidences.

[Fuchs]

I am skeptical that this has anything at all to do with an affair.

I am as well, but I seem to differ from the others here in suspecting that he probably failed at reforming the bureaucracy and preferred an early exit.

[SWJ Blog]

Keane on Petraeus (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/keane-on-petraeus)

Entry Excerpt:



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[jcustis]

Although the impact of his departure from the CIA will have a significance that goes well beyond the sphere of that seat, it looks like he had simply behaved as he shouldn't have.

The 'net is raging with speculation on why this wasn't picked up on a polygraph, how many knew about it but didn't let it out or confront him with it until he refused to go along with a narrative for "Benghazigate", Broadwell was a plant by the Democratic Party, and on to this being the first of many purges in a second-term administration. I even saw someone post elsewhere, with a degree of self-assurance, that he was resigning over a flap about the White House not embracing the CIA timeline for Benghazi.

Despite the striking coincidences and my disappointment that this happened to a man I considered a solid leader, it seems all so simple as well. The fact that he'd stuck his wick where it didn't belong was about to get out, and he wasn't going to lie about it.

Sometimes, things just need to be taken for what they are, and not what we want them to be.

It will be interesting to see what Ralph Peters, Tom Ricks and Bing West have to say when the stunned mullet sensation wears off.

[gute]

"Just Name Me a Hero and I'll Prove He's a Bum" - Pappy Boyington

[R A B]

About a week ago I saw an article that read: "General Petraeus thows Obama
under the bus." My immediate thought was, of course, he would not be a party to the deception that is taking place. Please do not ask where I saw the article. Probably better to not say even if I could remember. (a senior moment). I sincerely hope that in sharing my thoughts I have not offended the enemy. Best regards to all. R A B
PS I rarely share my thoughts, but enough is enough.

[The Cuyahoga Kid]

A real shame, but also a display of character. Petraeus could've stayed on as DCIA despite the affair, past Directors certainly have.


Good work, Paula. Looks Like the GEN was "All In".


Damn it sir, now I've got coffee on my screen.

[carl]

"Just Name Me a Hero and I'll Prove He's a Bum" - Pappy Boyington

He ought to have known. He looked at one in the mirror every day of his life.

It always pains me just a little that many people know who Boyington was but they don't know who Joe Foss, John Smith and Marion Carl were.

[carl]

About a week ago I saw an article that read: "General Petraeus thows Obama
under the bus." My immediate thought was, of course, he would not be a party to the deception that is taking place. Please do not ask where I saw the article. Probably better to not say even if I could remember. (a senior moment). I sincerely hope that in sharing my thoughts I have not offended the enemy. Best regards to all. R A B
PS I rarely share my thoughts, but enough is enough.

Here is the article of which you spoke.

http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/petraeus-throws-obama-under-bus_657896.html

The press release that prompted that article probably sealed Gen Petraeus' fate. I speculate the administration already knew of the affair prior to that and had it ready to use. Using personal things against political enemies is something that the people in the administration have done in the past I've read. So this fits.

What strikes me about this is the vindictiveness involved. Mr. Obama and minions could have just had a word with Gen P and forced him out. Easy enough. But they went after his family. Somehow, someway they got him to announce publicly the affair knowing that would reflect upon his domestic life. Bringing in domestic life brings in family. They know that. It wasn't enough for them to ease Gen P out, they made sure his family was hurt too.

That ain't right.

[gute]

He ought to have known. He looked at one in the mirror every day of his life.

I believe that was his point - last sentence of his autobiography.

[carl]

I believe that was his point - last sentence of his autobiography.

I think you are right and I stand corrected.

[slapout9]

Stop looking at the General and start looking at who benefits and that will lead you closer to the truth.

[davidbfpo]

I was wondering as a non-American observer whether anyone has commented in the US MSM on the implications for the CIA as an internationally active intelligence agency with partners?

Secondly, on the impact of such a resignation as a former general, with a till now intact reputation as a "winner".

Here we know that the CIA and the US military are far more than one man. And realise that human relationships matter, especially when one to one meetings are necessary.

[Ken White]

Stop looking at the General and start looking at who benefits and that will lead you closer to the truth.You're a good cop... ;)

[Polarbear1605]

...the game is afoot...and it smells of all politics...IMO

[carl]

Stop looking at the General and start looking at who benefits and that will lead you closer to the truth.

I am too dense to figure that. What do you mean?

[ganulv]

I am too dense to figure that. What do you mean?
It's like Lenin said (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dHyGCCZzG2o), Carl. ;)

[gute]

It's like Lenin said (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dHyGCCZzG2o), Carl. ;)

That is funny.

[gute]

Patraeus is the distraction from the real story and that's what was going on at the annex in Benghazi. Was it a spontaneous demostration? A terrorist attack? or a rescue mission? To refer to it as a "flash mob" never made sense to the sensible. What was to be gained by not calling it a terrorist attack? But there is something to be gained by not acknowledging that it may have been a cover for CIA ops. What's to be gained by outing the Patraeus affair? He is still going to testify before Congress. IMO it's timing and never letting a crisis go to waste.

[bourbon]

I was wondering as a non-American observer whether anyone has commented in the US MSM on the implications for the CIA as an internationally active intelligence agency with partners?
Haven't seen any such comments yet, David. I think our partners probably have strong opinions about our secret keeping ability, and this only reinforces such opinions.

I recall reading a book by a Cold War era DGSE chief who held a very poor opinion of the US governments ability to keep something secret.

[slapout9]

I am too dense to figure that. What do you mean?

The greatest chemical attack known to man is still.......CHANEL No.5 :eek:

This is all still unfolding and more will come to light I imagine. But in the meantime the General has essentially been neutralized. No matter if he testifies about Benghazi or run for President in 2016.......he is now damaged goods. This smacks to much like a Political Operation for me to just believe it was spontaneous combustion. The General is a lightening rod and he is drawing and will draw tremendous heat for this. That gives a lot of Political cover for the WH with respect to many items on their agenda.

[carl]

Slap:

Very good. I thought it was mostly revenge and didn't get that this manuvere (sic) has the effect of turning Gen P into a black hole that will draw everything associated with Benghazi into it and make it disappear.

He was a dead man walking the second the FBI found out about this during the summer. They had something that would prove useful and something came up where it could be used. The revenge angle was only a little bit of extra fun they could have while using this for the main purpose.

Ken was right, you is a sharp officer.

[SWJ Blog]

Top U.S. Commander in Afghanistan Is Linked to Petraeus Scandal (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/top-us-commander-in-afghanistan-is-linked-to-petraeus-scandal)

Entry Excerpt:



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[Fuchs]

Whatever officials did against Petraeus is hardly the gist of the story in my opinion.

What's happened is that his rise was tolerated, but considered questionable, by many. He's a public relations genius officer like MacArthur or Rommel, and success-wise rather in MacArthur's league than in Rommel's (who was still a poor strategist, poor logistician and an utter failure as a political person).


Petraeus is falling deep and hard not because he rose so high, but because nobody appears to slow his descent; instead, they appear to accelerate it by distancing themselves from him.
This happens usually to people who rose high with more style than substance. Germany experienced recently how this happened to a federal minister after a quick political rise with lots of good (if not devotional) press.


I therefore second gute's hint about how there are no or few true heroes who deserve as much praise as they get.

[Dayuhan]

I see no need to assume a conspiracy: sometimes people do stupid stuff and sometimes it blows up in their faces. Benghazi was dropping off the headlines and the public radar on its own well before this started; the populace has a short attention span and the media know it.

The story does reveal a few oddities, though... what on earth is an "unpaid social liason", and why does a military base need one?

[Ulenspiegel]

Whatever officials did against Petraeus is hardly the gist of the story in my opinion.

What's happened is that his rise was tolerated, but considered questionable, by many. He's a public relations genius officer like MacArthur or Rommel, and success-wise rather in MacArthur's league than in Rommel's (who was still a poor strategist, poor logistician and an utter failure as a political person).


Petraeus is falling deep and hard not because he rose so high, but because nobody appears to slow his descent; instead, they appear to accelerate it by distancing themselves from him.
This happens usually to people who rose high with more style than substance. Germany experienced recently how this happened to a federal minister after a quick political rise with lots of good (if not devotional) press.


I therefore second gute's hint about how there are no or few true heroes who deserve as much praise as they get.

The guy who runs Sic Semper Tyrannis and his readers can contribute some details:

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2012/11/petraeus-agonistes-ii.html#comments

[Fuchs]

At least I have evidence that I didn't fall for his PR:


(Forget about Rommel; he was more a talented self-promoter like MacArthur and Petraeus than a military genius.)
(Too bad; Wayback Machine had not archived it so in theory I might have edited this text. Well, at least google cache has a Nov 4 version, so yes, I did not edit it. :) )

[tequila]

Good to see that the crazed conspiracy-theorizing has even reached SWJ. Awesome.

So many have idolized Petraeus for so long that the idea that he just might have screwed up badly and gotten caught out simply does not compute. No, he must be the victim somehow in all this! He is not the one who wrecked his family and reputation - the evil President and his dastardly political machine must have done it, no doubt to escape yet more evidence of their treasonous activities in selling out America.

[Fuchs]

Tequila, come on; every time you read anything remotely political in the internet written by Americans you gotta be prepared to see that attitude. This right wing stuff can be considered to be persistent anglophone internet background noise by now.
_______________________

Related to Petraeus downfall:

How I Was Drawn Into the Cult of David Petraeus (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/petraeus-cult-2/)
By Spencer Ackerman


Like many in the press, nearly every national politician, and lots of members of Petraeus’ brain trust over the years, I played a role in the creation of the legend around David Petraeus. Yes, Paula Broadwell wrote the ultimate Petraeus hagiography, the now-unfortunately titled All In. But she was hardly alone (except maybe for the sleeping-with-Petraeus part). The biggest irony surrounding Petraeus’ unexpected downfall is that he became a casualty of the very publicity machine he cultivated to portray him as superhuman.


As I think I mentioned before, this fall is not only determined by the height to which he rose, but also by the way how he did it and why.
It's the kind of downfall reserved for "more style than substance" idols.

Compare http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl-Theodor_zu_Guttenberg

[Ken White]

The story does reveal a few oddities, though... what on earth is an "unpaid social liason", and why does a military base need one?Excellent question, scary answer...

Tequila:

I'm not a Petraeus fan or a conspiracy theorist nor a am I a right wing ldeologue. In fact, I believe ideologues on both sides are slightly deranged and Hanlon's razor rules.

Fuchs is right, Petraeus was a self seeker. You're also right; he screwed up (no pun intended). However, while I certainly do not believe that Petraeus is a victim or was set up, I'm cognizant of the fact that a lot of folks in DC play strange games and are quite adept at this: LINK (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1yeA_kHHLow). ;)

As Slapout said, Qui Bono...

A potential threat to one party in 2016 is removed or at least neutered a bit, an outsider is removed from a position of power -- anyone at his level is fair game for many reasons to include nothing more complex than personal jealousy or an over zealous media and our system will pounce on any screw up. That isn't conspiracy theorizing, that's just reality. It's also a feature, not a bug. It helps to keep the system a little honest. Deserved falls from grace are not a bad thing...

[Fuchs]

There's a humorous side to it apparently:

http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-november-12-2012/spyfall

http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-november-12-2012/spyfall---david-petraeus-resigns

[ganulv]

I say yes (http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/10/01/janet_napolitano_s_cybersecurity_strategy_don_t_us e_email_.html).

[Wyatt]

As far as Broadwell and Petraeus, two Massengales dont seem to make a Damon.