Political War and Woolly Thinking

[TheCurmudgeon]

BLUF: does the statement “all war is political” add or detract from our understanding of the nature of “organized deadly conflicts” (aka War by any other name) or does the statement lead to sloppy analysis?

As I understand it, this idea originates in Clausewitz’ Remarkable Trinity of the people’s primordial violence, hatred and enmity; the play of chance and probability; and war’s subordination to rational political policy (Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity (http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/1995/1995%20villacres%20and%20bassford.pdf)). There are alternative expressions of the trinity and it has been confused with other Clausewitzian tripartite ideas (the people, the army, and the state), but it appears to be the basis of the idea that all war is political.

I have three general issues with the eternal linking of these three elements with the definition of War. First, it does not allow for the “primordial violence, hatred and enmity” to stand alone. There can be no violence without a connection to a political end. This seems very limiting to me. Second and closely tied to the first, it requires an affirmative political entity (or at a minimum and ideology). A religious or criminal motivation for organized violence is incomplete. Somewhere in the background there must be a political leader pulling the strings. Third, the idea of a “rational political policy” imputes the idea that the both parties to the conflict must be proceeding as rational actors advancing a specific policy. Once we define war as an instrument of policy we immediately attempt to see that policy in terms of our Western frame of reference. The natural outcome of this thinking is that we end up looking for the opposing force’s rational political purpose as well as the rational political actor to attack and/or negotiate with.

This necessity to fit all wars into a neat political package has meant that we are required to paint all motivation as political. The most common problem created by this need is how to deal with religious wars. In modern times these wars have been based on the spread of Islam. The common refrain is that, unlike other religions, Islam does not allow for a separation of church and state. Islam is inherently political. Perhaps, but that does not mean that it is inherently rational.

Continuing with the religion issue what about the Christian Crusades? Were they really motivated by ration political policy or sacred religious edict … or were they really just not war?

The ultimate question is: “Does the idea that all war is political clarify the nature of war or does it force us into a thought process that limits our ability to analyze a problem and therefore potentially make us reach incomplete or erroneous conclusions about the nature of the fight we are in?”

I have been playing with this for a while. I have put together some sophomoric attempts to organize an argument (that is only intended to open a discussion) but each time I do I go farther down the rabbit hole. So I open the question up to the Council.

[slapout9]

Very interesting and timely subject. I have read and re-read CvC since 1972 by several different authors (translations) and for Xmas I received the newest Kindle edition and have been re-reading it since 3 JAN 14. I am more convinced than ever that he has been seriously misunderstood by default or by intention in order to support various interest and points of view.

So to answer your question nore directly "all war is political" is a fundamental misunderstanding of CvC. He means War is part of Politics. It is a lesser included set where the primary is Politics.

[Steve Blair]

Folks always forget that CvC wasn't actually "done" with On War when he died. Only the first couple of books (chapters) were close to finished, with the others existing as drafts.

That said, it's also important to read old Carl in conjunction with Handel (http://www.amazon.com/Masters-War-Classical-Strategic-Thought/dp/0714681326/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392411846&sr=8-1&keywords=masters+of+war)'s masterful analysis of Carl, Sun Tzu, and other strategic thinkers. I have yet to see anyone tackle this subject in such an insightful and useful way.

I also agree with Slap that Carl is often misused, either by accident or by design.

[Bill Moore]

Doctrine and pseudo intellectualism via overly simplified quotes which include all: "all politics are local, " "the populace is the center of gravity, " "improve the economy they'll quit fighting," "hearts and minds," and many more. While well intentioned, these quotes become an excuse to avoid thinking and seeking a true understanding of the situation, which has resulted in many missteps over the past decade.


I have three general issues with the eternal linking of these three elements with the definition of War. First, it does not allow for the “primordial violence, hatred and enmity” to stand alone. There can be no violence without a connection to a political end. This seems very limiting to me. Second and closely tied to the first, it requires an affirmative political entity (or at a minimum and ideology). A religious or criminal motivation for organized violence is incomplete. Somewhere in the background there must be a political leader pulling the strings. Third, the idea of a “rational political policy” imputes the idea that the both parties to the conflict must be proceeding as rational actors advancing a specific policy. Once we define war as an instrument of policy we immediately attempt to see that policy in terms of our Western frame of reference. The natural outcome of this thinking is that we end up looking for the opposing force’s rational political purpose as well as the rational political actor to attack and/or negotiate with.

Excellent observations, and it seems most of our Western leaders are incapable of breaking the chains that tie them to their Western education indoctrination, which includes our very narrow perspective on the nature and character of war. They all too often apply artificial political rationale based on "their" views of legitimacy that has nothing to do with the true nature of a particular conflict. We wasted billions trying to resolve ethnic struggles with economic development in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Diagnosed the problem incorrectly, applied the wrong solution (assuming their is one), and walked away 10 plus years laters with so called lessons from a decade of conflict that simply promote the same approach in the future. I don't see a fix in the near term unless we adjust our education system that encourages critical thinking, and furthermore encourage intellectual debate in the ranks instead encouraging staying on message.

[TheCurmudgeon]

That said, it's also important to read old Carl in conjunction with Handel (http://www.amazon.com/Masters-War-Classical-Strategic-Thought/dp/0714681326/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392411846&sr=8-1&keywords=masters+of+war)'s masterful analysis of Carl, Sun Tzu, and other strategic thinkers. I have yet to see anyone tackle this subject in such an insightful and useful way.

Slap, thanks for the reference. Looks like a great book. Ordered a copy today.

I have too many irons in the fire at the moment to give this the justice it deserves, but I will keep plying away at it.

Funny, we complain that we don't have enough disruptive thinkers but we decry disruptive thinking.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I would like to add a quote to the conversation. This is from "The Changing Character of War (http://www.amazon.com/The-Changing-Character-War-Strachan/dp/0199596735/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1392501041&sr=8-2&keywords=the+changing+character+of+war)"

So, the seminar series at the beginning of calendar year 2004, the first term of the programme's existence, was designed to address the big question of what is war, the better able to address the principal, but necessary second-order, issues. After a series of talks by subject specialists both in areas where the programme lacked research expertise as well as areas in which it possessed it, we agreed on fiver criteria. First, war involves the use of force, although there there can be a state of war in which active hostilities are suspended, and some would argue that the threat of the use of war (as in the Cold War - constitutes war. Fighting is what defines war, a point made by Clausewitz, and echoed in this book by Barkawi and Brighton. Second, war rests on contention. If one party attacks another, the other must respond for war to occur, or else what will follow will be murder, massacre, or occupation. The reaction means that possibly the most important feature of war is reciprocity: part of the problem much operational thought in the 1990's was that it had forgotten that the enemy has a vote and that his response might be 'asymmetrical' or even unpredictable. Third, war assumes a degree of intensity and duration to the fighting: scale matters, and skirmishes and border clashes are not necessarily war. Fourth, those who fight do not do so in a private capacity, and fifth, and consequently, war is fought for some aim beyond fighting itself. Both the last two criteria tend normative to be associated with states and there policies, but they do not have to be defined in these ways, and wars have been pursued -- for example, by Germany and Japan in 1945 -- beyond the point at which they seem able to deliver worthwhile results. (Pages 6-7, emphasis added)

War does not have to be political. It only needs to serve a purpose beyond the violence alone (i.e. it is more than revenge for the murder of your brother - it is not a blood fued).

I would love to hear any thoughts on why this definition is wrong or incomplete.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I offer the following for your consideration.

Assuming that Clausewitz observation that war is used as an instrument of rational political policy is only half right; war can also be used as an instrument of irrational political (or non-political) policy.

If I define "Rational" as "the desire to live to see the policy goal come to fruition", or more simply, that life is more important than the policy goal and that life will only be risked where there is a reasonable expectation of achieving that goal, then I can make the following categorizations:

Rational actors will chose to use either conventional war (direct or proxy) or terrorism to achieve their purpose. This fits with the rational actors concept of bending the enemy to my will. If I have the power I will go directly against my enemy. If I lack the power I may chose to use a proxy, either though a proxy war or via terrorism to achieve my goal. In all of these cases there is the potential for a negotiated solution or even surrender of the policy goal if the rational actor sees his own death as the cost of continuing to military action.

Irrational actors can chose any of the above, but in addition to those they can chose asymmetrical warfare. This is because the ideological zealot is less interested in surviving the conflict than he is in seeing his goal come to fruition. He will continue to attack even when the outcome seems impossible. He will continue to fight until he loses his conviction or he dies. For the religious zealot, death may yield the ultimate reward making fighting, even where the odds of success are low or nil, still worth the effort. Asymmetrical warfare is a tactic unlikely to be chosen by the rational actor since it involves a risk that outweighs the reward. Other options are likely to be explored and asymmetrical warfare only chosen where no other reasonable option exists.

The distinction between rational and irrational policy also helps with another quagmire, enemy combatants. The idea of holding prisoners of war beyond the end of the conflict does not fit with our idea of war conducted by rational political actors but it does if the war is conducted by irrational actors. In a war pursued for rational purposes it is reasonable to expect that, at the end of the conflict all prisoners of war can be released to go home. There is no expectation that any of them will continue the fight. Not so with irrational actors. They will continue the struggle even where there is no hope of success. So they remain a threat even after the hostilities have ceased. In fact, in their minds the hostilities never cease. So they cannot be released.

[Firn]

The 'play of chance' of good old CvC should really be featured more in political science. The rational aspect has been traditionally covered very well, with highly useful tools, but chance is difficult to map into the models. Complexity and additions in general come at a price in science...

CvC worked of course out how war is linked to politics but tried to avoid to get too much into the internal processes. For the sake of simplicity he treated for his work the state/political leadership mostly as a black box, despite noting how private interests, vanity and so forth play a role in politics. The reasons are mostly the same as in science, you often need to black box stuff and keep it as simple as possible.


That policy unites in itself, and reconciles all the interests of internal administrations, even those of humanity, and whatever else are rational subjects of consideration, is presupposed, for it is nothing in itself, except a mere representative and exponent of all these interests towards other States. That policy may take a false direction, and may promote unfairly the ambitious ends, the private interests, the vanity of rulers, does not concern us here; for, under no circumstances can the art of war be regarded as its preceptor, and we can only look at policy here as the representative of the interests generally of the whole community.

Chaptor 8, War as an instrument of policy.

While the rational/irrational division can be helpful it is important to note that rational actors can have bad incentives to inflame a conflict which is clearly irrational for the country as a whole. History is full of examples, perhaps the Falkland invasion is a timely one, considering the current economic problems of the poor Argentines under the great leader Kirchner in her glorious victorious decade.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I received my copy of Handel's "Masters of War" and will start on it this weekend (along with five or six other pressing projects). I also ordered Beinhocker's book since perhaps my "Google deep" review of his ideas may not be sufficient to answer G Martin's infatuation with his theory.

I have expanded the ideas first presented to include a general lamentation of what has been lost in the last twelve years.

... a long time ago, in a doctrine far, far away, there was a FLOT and a FEBA, there was an identifiable rear area where "RACO" was conducted. We have lost all of that in this interminable decent from interstate war into intrastate conflict.

I have not firmed up my ideas, but I would love others thoughts on what we have lost in the last twelve years.:eek: