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Bourcet
04-19-2006, 08:35 PM
Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs (http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp514.htm)

Jerusalem Viewpoints
No. 514 8 Adar 5764 / 1 March 2004


ISRAEL'S SECURITY DOCTRINE AND
THE TRAP OF "LIMITED CONFLICT"

Colonel (Res.) Yehuda Wegman

The many classic examples of low-intensity conflict - in Indo-China, Malaya, Algeria, Cuba, and Northern Ireland - are irrelevant to the case of Israel. Not a single citizen in Britain, France, or the United States had his daily routine in his native country disrupted as a result of the low-intensity combat conducted by his country's army on a foreign battlefield.

The guerilla and terror actions in Vietnam, Algeria, Ireland, Rhodesia, and other places were not directed against the very existence of the rival nation and its army.

Something about the Western response to a strike on its population centers can be learned from the American reaction to 9/11, with its military operation directed at the heart of Afghanistan as the sender of terror. In this case, the doctrine of limited conflict was cast aside, as the "strong" side under attack undertook to summarily obliterate the "weak" attacker in accordance with the laws of war.



I have a few questions that I'd like more expert knowledge on.

1. Does classic counterinsurgency doctrine apply in the case of Israel?
2. What do you think of Israel's current strategy, is it working or not?
3. What mistakes are Israel making?

I'd only like short answers, but if you want to expand then feel free.

Thanks

Tom Odom
04-20-2006, 01:27 PM
Is Israel's "strategy" working?

First of all there are NO short answers to this and related questions. That said, the answer is NO. If you have any doubts look at the population figures, the surrounding growth of fundamentalism, and the Israeli economy.

Frankly, I am amazed by the number of folks who advocate Israeli strategic thought as a model for us. They either have an agenda or are just poorly informed (or perhaps both).

I would suggest that you also look at the report I posted a link to here concerning the relationship between the US and Israel. It came out of Harvard, Kennedy School of Government.

Tom

Merv Benson
04-20-2006, 09:53 PM
Israel is not going to be able to get a hearts and minds campaign going among the Palestinians. They are a people whose minds have been poisoned on a combination of religious bigotry and ethnic hatred, fortified by a real estate worshipping death cult mentality. This makes the classic counterinsurgency strategy unavailable. Israel has responded by attempting to isolate rather than work with the Palestinians in recent years.

Prospects for an agreement are remote because the Palestinians have nothing to offer the Israelis. The Palestinian Authority can't offer peace for land, becuase it can't deliver peace. It cannot or will not control those who want to explode around Israelis.

While the Israeli economy has suffered from the conflict, the Palestinian's economy has cratered into a true begger status where its "goverment" is scrambing to find donors to pay its police. That is not too surprising when hate and victimization appear to be their main commerce. One reason why this status exist if the 50 plus years of dependency on charity from the UN and others, which has subsidized their war against Israel. Without the subsidies they would have been forced to create a real economy with real jobs instead of haveing a fourth of the male population employed by the "security forces." Can you imagine the size of the US military and police force of a fourth of our population was so employed?

Jones_RE
04-20-2006, 11:00 PM
1) I believe classic counterinsurgency doctrine does apply in the case of Israel. Although its particulars are endlessly mutable, war itself is universal. However, Israel suffers from a terrible case of strategic "cogntive dissonance" regarding Palestinian statehood which prevents it from successfully employing classic doctrine.

One of the essential requirements of classic counterinsurgency doctrine is that the local people be treated with respect, and their interests generally enhanced. Because one of Israel's strategic goals has been (and may still be) the settlement of land formerly occupied by Arab Palestinians by Israelis, this essential requirement cannot be complied with. Palestinians know that no matter how nice an Israeli may seem, ultimately their home is subject to demolition at any time. This fundamental opposition sets up a source of conflict that cannot be defused. Israel would seem to want land more than peace, although this may be realigning.

2) That depends on what you mean by "working." If a constant level of uncomfortable international bad press, continuing low level terrorist attacks and reprisals, with an expensive drain on military age manpower and money is working (keep in mind Israel maintains one of the better economies in its area) then yes. However, this strategy is unlikely to lead to peaceful coexistence or decisive conquest. Personally, I think it's essentially face saving by politicians who don't have the guts to fight or the will to enter real negotiations - they fight just hard enough to maintain the status quo ante.

3) Israel's mistake is in treating the exercise of military force as a coercive tool. Not that it cannot serve as such, but rather it has manifestly failed to coerce very many Palestinians of late. A quid pro quo approach to violence does not defeat your enemy in a small war - it merely helps your enemy's recruiting drives.

Tel Aviv ought to privately determine exactly which end state they are willing to live with as regards the Palestinian people (and the various armed and unarmed factions) and then make a measured judgment as to exactly what role force is to play in achieving that state. It seems most unlikely that any military would recommend the use of ### for tat retaliatory strikes as the best long term way to curb any insurgent or conventional force.

Mike in Hilo
04-21-2006, 02:38 AM
Classic counterinsurgency and Israel: This is a case of the hypothetical. Either the Israelis have decided it cannot work, or they have decided they'd rather do things on the cheap. Whether Thompson's "hold" phase with its separation of the populace from the insurgents through controls which may include mass confinement, or Trinquier's urban surveillance through block leaders, etc., the classical approach requires effective occupation. The Israelis have evidently decided they do not wish to be hampered with the responsibilities of occupation and so, since "Oslo," have left the major population concentrations to languish in an anarchic state (reserving the right, to be sure, to re-enter these areas in force from time to time, or to engage in targeted neutralizations). In the Israeli case, neither the classic approach nor what they are doing appear to be recipes for success.

Tom Odom
04-24-2006, 02:50 PM
Israel is not going to be able to get a hearts and minds campaign going among the Palestinians. They are a people whose minds have been poisoned on a combination of religious bigotry and ethnic hatred, fortified by a real estate worshipping death cult mentality. This makes the classic counterinsurgency strategy unavailable. Israel has responded by attempting to isolate rather than work with the Palestinians in recent years.

Prospects for an agreement are remote because the Palestinians have nothing to offer the Israelis. The Palestinian Authority can't offer peace for land, becuase it can't deliver peace. It cannot or will not control those who want to explode around Israelis.

While the Israeli economy has suffered from the conflict, the Palestinian's economy has cratered into a true begger status where its "goverment" is scrambing to find donors to pay its police. That is not too surprising when hate and victimization appear to be their main commerce. One reason why this status exist if the 50 plus years of dependency on charity from the UN and others, which has subsidized their war against Israel. Without the subsidies they would have been forced to create a real economy with real jobs instead of haveing a fourth of the male population employed by the "security forces." Can you imagine the size of the US military and police force of a fourth of our population was so employed?

Merv,

The bigots live on both sides of the equation. Every argument you make applies to the Israelis as well as the Palestinians. The Israelis have ALWAYS worked to isolate and undermine the Palestinians; their long term stance--and it is still used--is that there are no "palestininans". The Palestinian dependence on UN funds for instance could be rewritten to state Israeli dependence on US funds. As for ethnic hatred, try living in Israel and then decide who hates whom. My take after decades of study and being on the ground, is neither side wears white hats; in many ways they deserve each other.

Tom

Merv Benson
04-24-2006, 04:04 PM
I think there are some major differences. I would first note that the million or so Palestinians who live in Israel as oppose to the territories, rarely explode and kill Israelis. The Israelis target people who are hostile threats while the Palestinians target non combatants. That they cannot tell the difference suggest that they are blinded by their bigotry and strike out at "the other." indiscriminately. The Hamas death cult is clearly an organization of bigots. When faced with that kind of hostility it would not be surprising that the Israelis would hold them in low regard, just as we held the Japanese and Germans in low regard during World War II, but it cannot be argued that we were on the same moral plane with our enemies.

aktarian
04-24-2006, 06:29 PM
I have a few questions that I'd like more expert knowledge on.

1. Does classic counterinsurgency doctrine apply in the case of Israel?
2. What do you think of Israel's current strategy, is it working or not?
3. What mistakes are Israel making?

I'd only like short answers, but if you want to expand then feel free.

Thanks

Short answer: wrong question asked. what Israel is facing on WB (and what it faced on GS) is not insurgency, it's terrorism or at best urban guerilla as promoted by various Latin American groups. There is no guerilla army to combat but rather various terrorist groups with various branches, from armed wings to social services to political wings.

Only case of COIN warfare Israel faced was Lebanon where it made practically all text-book example of mistakes military can make in COIN warfare.

Jones_RE
04-25-2006, 12:22 AM
For what it's worth, Israel's security doctrine appears to call for:

1) Physical separation from Gaza and the West Bank. This is a recent phenomenon, but one that has been fairly effective in reducing internal attacks.

2) Negotiation with various Palestinian entities. This has proceeded largely without results, as we are all aware.

3) Gradual displacement of the Palestinian civilian population. A controversial strategy - not officially pursued by the government at this time. Frequently undertaken by rogue Israeli citizens, with various governments cracking down or turning a blind eye depending upon the current political climate.

4) Retaliation. Not merely military, Israel frequently closes off whole towns to outside access for days at a time. Israel also controls a large portion of the Palestinian Authority budget and other "levers." Certain air strikes and other kinetic operations have been used for this purpose.

5) Limited kinetic operations. "Targeted killings," raids and other operations designed to attack armed enemies directly.

6) Intensive internal security measures. Israel has armed guards posted at shopping malls, along with the world's toughest airport security. A wide aray of checkpoints control movement and commerce throughout the West Bank and Gaza, as well.

Israel's strategy is limited by a number of "non military" considerations. First of all, the West Bank is home to a population of 2.5 million Palestinians (per the CIA World Factbook). It would take 50,000 soldiers in formed combat units to provide the "optimal" ratio of 1 soldier per 50 civilians. This would be just under 1% of Israel's population - for the US to field an equivalent force would require 2.5 million soldiers. Given the existing bad blood and mistrust on both sides (without taking a moral stand either way, simply noting that there are hard feelings here) this would be a very long and difficult operation, involving many casualties on all sides. Israel cannot support such a move economically. Their citizenry will not permit the many casualties that would result. Tel Aviv's unstable, coalition driven governments likely couldn't affect either situation. Additionally, intesnive international scrutiny would be brought to bear. Finally, Israel's neighbors are all Arab countries who would be seriously threatened by such a military expansion, regardless of the motives. In addition to state sponsorship of Palestinian factions, the governments of Lebannon and Syria are both sufficiently corrupt and/or weak that independent actors within those nations would supply considerable outside help.

Given that confluence of factors, a "traditional" counter insurgency will not be sustainable. That is not to say that it would not be effective. Both Israelis and Palestinians are human beings - war is a part of the human condition. Regardless of the brutality, uncivilized tactics or sheer emotion on all sides - the principles of war apply without consideration of the merits of the parties.

So that leaves an interesting question: what can Israel do? I believe the most effective course of action for Tel Aviv is continued withdrawal from occupied portions of the West Bank, and a continuing effort to shore up on or another Palestinian faction. Not only as a fighting force, but as an agency that can deliver governmental services, health and welfare to the Palestinian people with pride and dignity. Such a group does not exist as such, but it might draw considerable support. Given time, it could displace the armed factions in terms of popular legitimacy and ultimately be in a position to negotiate a mutually beneficial relationship with Tel Aviv.

Tom Odom
04-25-2006, 02:11 PM
Israel's biggest problem is the population issue. Time is not on their side when it comes down to looking at numbers of people and available land.

The strategic reality is that Israel is an anomaly in the post-WWII and now 21st Century world. It is very much the equivalent of a colony, implanted for a variety of reasons with and even larger number of agendas.

The situation reference "Palestinian targeting of civilians" versus IDF targeting is one of available means and achieveable effects. And it is also one of where the targeting is done, who is watching, and who is reporting. I can tell you personally that IDF targeting in Lebanon was hardly "surgical."


So that leaves an interesting question: what can Israel do? I believe the most effective course of action for Tel Aviv is continued withdrawal from occupied portions of the West Bank, and a continuing effort to shore up on or another Palestinian faction. Not only as a fighting force, but as an agency that can deliver governmental services, health and welfare to the Palestinian people with pride and dignity. Such a group does not exist as such, but it might draw considerable support. Given time, it could displace the armed factions in terms of popular legitimacy and ultimately be in a position to negotiate a mutually beneficial relationship with Tel Aviv.

The interesting point here is that the current situation is one of lost opportunities compounded by decades. The US has not done Israel a strategic favor through our policies of near total support. Israel and the Palestinians are both practioners of zero sum politics. The US role has never been effective as an honest mediator and both sides see that. Israel's "strategy" has been one of immediate tactical gains that do not necessarily arrive at a desired end state. The Gaza settlement fiasco is a classic case, repeating the Sinai settlement fiasco after Camp David was signed. The West Bank fiasco will be coming to a strategic theater near you at a date yet undecided.

Go back and read the following if you question where I am coming from at http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011 It is worth the effort.

Best

Tom

Tom Odom
04-26-2006, 06:48 PM
Ingathering

Ilan Pappe on the Israeli election and the 'demographic problem'

From left to right, the manifestos of all the Zionist parties during the recent Israeli election campaign contained policies which they claimed would counter the ‘demographic problem’ posed by the Palestinian presence in Israel. Ariel Sharon proposed the pull-out from Gaza as the best solution to it; the leaders of the Labour Party endorsed the wall because they believed it was the best way of limiting the number of Palestinians inside Israel. Extra-parliamentary groups, too, such as the Geneva Accord movement, Peace Now, the Council for Peace and Security, Ami Ayalon’s Census group and the Mizrachi Democratic Rainbow all claim to know how to tackle it.

Apart from the ten members of the Palestinian parties and two eccentric Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox Jews, all the members of the new Knesset (there are 120 in all) arrived promising that their magic formulae would solve the ‘demographic problem’. The means varied from reducing Israeli control over the Occupied Territories – in fact, the plans put forward by Labour, Kadima, Shas (the Sephardic Orthodox party) and Gil (the pensioners’ party) would involve Israeli withdrawal from only 50 per cent of these territories – to more drastic action. Right-wing parties such as Yisrael Beytenu, the Russian ethnic party of Avigdor Liberman, and the religious parties argued for a voluntary transfer of Palestinians to the West Bank. In short, the Zionist answer is to reduce the problem either by giving up territory or by shrinking the ‘problematic’ population group.

None of this is new. The population problem was identified as the major obstacle in the way of Zionist fulfilment in the late 19th century, and David Ben-Gurion said in December 1947 that ‘there can be no stable and strong Jewish state so long as it has a Jewish majority of only 60 per cent.’ Israel, he warned on the same occasion, would have to deal with this ‘severe’ problem with ‘a new approach’. The following year, ethnic cleansing meant that the number of Palestinians dropped below 20 per cent of the Jewish state’s overall population (in the area allocated to Israel by the UN plus the area it occupied in 1948, the Palestinians would originally have made up around 60 per cent of the population). Interestingly, but not surprisingly, in December 2003 Binyamin Netanyahu recycled Ben-Gurion’s magic number – the undesirable 60 per cent. ‘If the Arabs in Israel form 40 per cent of the population,’ Netanyahu said, ‘this is the end of the Jewish state.’ ‘But 20 per cent is also a problem,’ he added. ‘If the relationship with these 20 per cent is problematic, the state is entitled to employ extreme measures.’ He did not elaborate.

The extract above is from an article by, Ilan Pappe, a senior lecturer at the University of Haifa was in this months London Book Review. You can see it at: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n08/papp01_.html



Best

Tom

echoparkdirt
04-29-2006, 11:01 AM
The "Harvard Paper" is an attempt to paint American support of Israel as motivated solely by a dark conspiracy to further the interests of "The Israel Lobby" and The Jews. It is a fairly classic anti-Semitic line of reasoning, which depicts geo-political action as emerging out of Jewish conspiracy. David Duke, former Klansman, has endorsed the paper.

America supports Israel for the same reason America supports Taiwan. We have an interest in supporting democracy around the world against fascist or communist threats. Nobody speaks of a "Vast Taiwanese Conspiracy" motivating American policy. It would be laughable. Yet, when people speak of a "Vast Pro-Israel Conspiracy", that's somehow considered a legitimate argument.

For parallels between the "Harvard Paper" and the classic anti-Semitic forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, click here (http://incontext.blogmosis.com/archives/031962.html#031962)

A short point by point refutation is here (http://www.opinionjournal.com/best/?id=110008117).

Illan Pappe is considered the "Noam Chomsky" of Israel, a former Communist party member that seems to consider Israel as evil and illegitimate as Chomsky finds America. If you wouldn't go to Chomsky for geo-political insight, you probably should skip Pappe as well.

Respectfully

Gary

Tom Odom
05-01-2006, 03:18 PM
Once again, the anti-semetic argument emerges.

Interesting and completely expected.

you can read the pro and con reader responses to the Harvard paper at:

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n08/letters.html the editors there have responded to criticism as well.

The paper hardly matches the Elders of Zion crap. Pappe regardless of affiliation raises points that are never discussed in open forum. And as is the case, here, the immediate respones is to start throwing mud. I put the Harvard paper on here because it is one of the few that actually raises hard issues with regards to US and Israeli ties. Pappe's essay looks at demographics; an issue I would still say is the long pole in the Israeli tent.

Best

Tom

echoparkdirt
05-05-2006, 05:34 AM
It's not just "anti-semitic" to claim that shrewd Jews are using/buying influence over the United States policy-making apparatus against our interests, it's also plain dumb.

By all means, ignore the anti-Semitism inherent in this paper endorsed by David Duke. Note, however, its circular logic (http://www.opinionjournal.com/best/?id=110008117);
its factual errors (http://www.camera.org/index.asp?x_context=7&x_issue=35&x_article=1099)
its lack of original scholarship (http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/research/working_papers/dershowitzreply.pdf)
its mono-causal social science (http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002642.html)
its unsubstantiated generalizations (http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-boot29mar29,0,7274839.column?coll=la-news-comment-opinions)
its selective use of evidence (http://www.americanthinker.com/articles.php?article_id=5342)
its insinuations of dual loyalty (http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/thornton042606.html);
its strawman counterarguments (http://jpundit.typepad.com/jci/2006/03/walt_mearsheime.html).

Basically this is a "Hail Mary" from "realist Arabists". Their "realism" infers that America takes action for its own best interests. But now they must explain why America has been supportive of Israel for decades -- and why we invaded Iraq -- if as they believe, both actions are not in American interests. Why, the answer must be those powerful Jews! Or, to use the more socially acceptable term, "The Lobby".

Also, Tom, you wrote this:

The situation reference "Palestinian targeting of civilians" versus IDF targeting is one of available means and achieveable effects.



Would you explain this statement? Do you see any moral difference in exploding buses and targeting civilians and "targeted killings" of terrorists or retaliation where innocents may die because terrorists insert themselves in civilian areas? If not, is there a difference between the insurgents in Iraq exploding mosques and American use of force which may cause civilian damage? Please elucidate.

SWJED
06-10-2006, 04:51 AM
10 June The Australian - Air Veterans Remember Reactor Raid (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,19417695-2703,00.html) by Abraham Rabinovich.

For a news article this piece provides a fairly detailed account of the IDF's 1981 raid on the nuclear reactor in Baghdad, Iraq.


The pilots were told to prepare for the longest combat mission they had ever flown -- about 1000km to target - but they were not told what the target was or where.

Afterwards, using a string to measure the distance on a map scale, they placed one end on their air base and swivelled the other end in a 360 degree arc. There was little more than desert and sea for most of the arc but to the east the string rested right on Baghdad. There was only one target in that area worth an act of war.

Recently, on the eve of the 25th anniversary of the attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor, a group of Israeli pilots gathered in Tel Aviv to reminisce about the operation that denied Saddam Hussein a nuclear weapon and would, for some of the pilots, make everything that happened in their lives afterwards an anticlimax...

Culpeper
08-16-2006, 04:12 AM
http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=technologyNews&storyid=2006-08-15T192136Z_01_N15405759_RTRUKOC_0_US-ARMS-MIDEAST-USA.xml&src=rss&rpc=22

SWJED
08-16-2006, 07:31 AM
Here is an excerpt from the 15 August Reuters article (http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=technologyNews&storyid=2006-08-15T192136Z_01_N15405759_RTRUKOC_0_US-ARMS-MIDEAST-USA.xml&src=rss&rpc=22):


The Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency has begun working with Israel to help find ways to counter enemy rockets, a much shorter-range threat than the "Star Wars" mission to block ballistic missiles for which is it known, the head of the agency said on Tuesday.

"We have been working with the Israelis ... as they go through with development of their own indigenous capabilities for that threat," Air Force Lt. Gen. Henry Obering told reporters after a speech at a missile-defense conference here.

"That is not mature. That is still in development," he said of the effort to defeat something he likened to mortar or artillery fire...

kaur
10-24-2006, 01:53 PM
This article was published in Jane's Defence Weekly 11.10.2006. Here is download link to that scanned article.

http://www.webfilehost.com/?mode=viewupload&id=3514170

aktarian
10-24-2006, 03:16 PM
Interesting article. Noticed couple of interesting things:
-finding the scapegoat and assigning blame might be more important to some than identifying and correcting mistakes
-continued overreliance on technology, ignoring intelligence
-giving IDF/AF a lot of credit (reminds me of that article about USAF and COIN wars a while back)
-no talk about most serious Israeli flaw, intelligence gathering and analysing (or perhaps this is toos ecret to be talked about?)
-when talking about Deep Command no talk about Egoz unit (or were they disbanded after 2000?)

SWJED
11-13-2006, 11:05 PM
13 November Associated Press - Israel Army to Resume Guerrilla Training (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/13/AR2006111300764.html) by Mark Lavie.


The Israeli military will restore its guerrilla warfare training center following its experience fighting Hezbollah militants in Lebanon, using a distinctly modern method - paintball.

During the 34-day war last summer, Hezbollah guerrillas exacted a heavy toll against the Israelis with ambushes, mortars and anti-tank missiles. While not admitting that lack of guerrilla training was a factor in its shortcomings, the Israeli military is planning to restart the program, according to the current issue of the soldiers' weekly, Bamahaneh.

The Israeli military closed down its guerrilla warfare training facility at the Elyakim base in Israel's north after Israeli forces pulled out of Lebanon in 2000, following an 18-year guerrilla war against Hezbollah.

The military has been harshly criticized for the way it handled the latest fighting in Lebanon, and many soldiers, especially reservists, complained their equipment and training were inadequate.

Soldiers will learn camouflage techniques, navigation by GPS satellite systems, construction of hidden outposts and other skills, Bamahaneh said, and they will test their newly won abilities in paintball maneuvers...

Not sure why the use of paintball. While I have not been part of an urban training program for 7 years, I was impressed with the then state of art simunitions - especially the colored ones that could quickly identify fratricide incidents. You also got a significant reduction in "John Wayne" tactics than you did with MILES - simunitions at least hurt a bit when you got hit.

On Edit: I am assuming the AP actually means paintballs rather than labeling whatever the IDF may be using as such...

jonSlack
11-14-2006, 03:59 AM
Not sure why the use of paintball. While I have not been part of an urban training program for 7 years, I was impressed with the then state of art simunitions - especially the colored ones that could quickly identify fratricide incidents. You also got a significant reduction in "John Wayne" tactics then you did with MILES - simunitions at least hurt a bit when you got hit.


Unlike normal wax bullets, simunitions are not an inexpensive substitute for live ammunition — costs for simunitions cartridges are as much as three times the cost of live ammunition. Simunitions do, however, provide the most realistic training available.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wax_bullets

Besides the rounds, you have to purchase conversion kits for each of the weapons you plan to train with.

Tom Odom
11-14-2006, 03:07 PM
The problem with paintball is that the technology itself creates tactical tendencies that are suited purely for a paintball world.

best
Tom

Steve Blair
11-14-2006, 03:42 PM
The problem with paintball is that the technology itself creates tactical tendencies that are suited purely for a paintball world.

best
Tom

Very much so. Although at least with paintball it is a bit harder to hide behind grass and such, which was a problem with some of the MILES stuff. They may feel it's better than doing nothing.

Tom Odom
11-14-2006, 03:55 PM
True Steve. MILES has its own gamesmanship built into it, a fact we have contended with here for years and still deal with. On the other hand, MILES does reinforce the critical skill of marksmanship and the hide behind grass gamesmanship can be mitigated with a "God gun" in the hands of the OC walking the unit.

I suspect that the IDF will have to--as we have many times and other armies have done--go back and look at its basics, rather than its press (especially the press as the latest Lebanon incursion opened). Paintball may help.

Best
Tom

aktarian
11-14-2006, 05:15 PM
Does anybody knows what happened to "Egoz" unit after 2000? Were they disbanded, used in Gaza and West Bank (not completly their environment but could be usefull) or soemthing else?

Stan Reber
11-14-2006, 05:35 PM
Pain tends to teach us a leason far sooner than a beep or or the CO barking. Growing up in Northern PA and having been shot by a PO'd farmer with rock salt brings back some fond memories. Paintball at least smarts and still gets the job done far cheaper than OUR MILES. Yeah, a lazer is far more accurate and faster than a paintball. Bring back those basic training days when a M2HB was fired over your head to really appreciate just how fast 3000 FPS is and what it really means when the DS says you never hear the round that kills you.
This bit of advice has served me well. Still alive, albeit a little bid of a pain in the ass at times. Right Tom ?

Regards, Stan

Jedburgh
11-14-2006, 07:53 PM
Does anybody knows what happened to "Egoz" unit after 2000? Were they disbanded, used in Gaza and West Bank (not completly their environment but could be usefull) or soemthing else?
Egoz still exists within the Golani Bde and they've operated fairly successfully in the territories. However, they suffered a number of KIA/WIA in the battle for Maroun ar-Ras, in the early stages of the offensive in Lebanon this year.

Jedburgh
12-11-2006, 12:37 AM
Defense News, 20 Nov 06:

Does Technology Undercut War Leadership? Post-War Probes Target Israeli Command Failures (http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2362496&C=thisweek)

....in Lebanon, Israel's first digitized ground war, after-action probes found egregious cases where commanders relied on situational awareness provided by the sensor-fused data streaming into command centers instead of moving forward to assess critical points in the evolving battle.

"This war underscored the limitations of plasma, especially when it is accorded disproportionate priority over training and discipline," said Matan Vilnai, a retired major general and former Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) deputy chief of staff, now a prominent member of Israel's Labor Party.

In post-Lebanon War Israel, "plasma" has become derisive shorthand for the virtual command and control provided through networked operations and the dangers of digital-era interpretations of the Follow Me! principle....

Uboat509
12-11-2006, 04:33 AM
I spent 18 months in the 509th at Polk (that's the OPFOR at JRTC) and I have nothing but the deepest contempt for MILES gear. I watched unit after unit come down there fully trained to fight in a MILES environment. It really does encourage the "John Wayne" mentality. As for SIMS, they are great for short range ie. CQC but they lose accuracy very quickly at ranges greater than, say, 30 - 50 meters. Furthermore, the conversion kits mean that you either have to take the optics off of your own gun and figure out how to mount them on the conversion barrel which may or may not have a rail and in cold weather the rounds have an annoying tendency to stick in the barrel. I have used paint balls a few times and although it does not work the marksmanship aspects, it does a great job otherwise. There is no question of weather or not you got hit. You know it and so does everyone around you, it hurts and pain tends to cut down on the "John Wayne" factor. A more ideal system would be an updated version of SIMS that does not require a conversion kit but until then paint ball is just fine for force on force.

SFC W

Jedburgh
01-28-2007, 09:29 PM
The Economist, 20 Jan 07: It's The Little Things That Make an Occupation (http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8571800)

During 2006, according to B'tselem (http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Index.asp), an Israeli human-rights group, Israeli forces killed 660 Palestinians, almost half of them innocent bystanders, among them 141 children. In the same period, Palestinians killed 17 Israeli civilians and six soldiers. It is such figures, as well as events like shellings, house demolitions, arrest raids and land expropriations, that make the headlines in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What rarely get into the media but make up the staple of Palestinian daily conversation are the countless little restrictions that slow down most people's lives, strangle the economy and provide constant fuel for extremists....

Jedburgh
02-14-2007, 06:49 PM
USIP, Feb 07: From Rejection to Acceptance: Israeli National Security Thinking and Palestinian Statehood (http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr177.pdf)

...findings lead to several conclusions:

- Most Israelis are prepared to accept a withdrawal from most of the West Bank that will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state. This may facilitate future negotiations.

- However, those who want to establish a limited, constrained Palestinian state through a unilateral process will create a self-fulfilling prophecy: a Palestinian state that is irredentist and in continuous armed conflict with Israel.

- The United States and its allies must try to prevent this development, which is detrimental to their interests, by encouraging dialogue between the two parties, and a negotiated settlement. At the very least, the United States should strive to turn a unilateral Israeli process into a cooperative process.

- The United States needs a policy that can accommodate renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations with the reality of Hamas holding public office. A nuanced, cautious policy of engagement may be the best option.

• From the Israeli perspective, the question of Palestinian statehood is deeply intertwined with the following three scenarios:

1. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations resume following a Palestinian national dialogue that leads to positive changes in Hamas policies.

2. Negotiations do not resume, because Hamas does not modify its positions, and Israel pushes ahead with unilateral disengagement from the West Bank. The recent war in Lebanon made this unilateral option less popular in Israel, but it is likely to reemerge.

3. A mixed scenario in which unilateral Israeli steps are carried out in parallel with Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over less than comprehensive agreements. This scenario is more feasible than the first and more promising than the second....

dorsai
07-05-2007, 02:11 PM
What some of you say, regarding use of paintball for training purposes is true, it can teach bad habits, just as MILEs and any other form of training
can. The KEY is having skilled instructors who can distinguish what is right and wrong. Once the proper ROE is adopted, misuse drops. Limited ammo, magazine exchanges and use of specialized pellets (invisible to those being shot at) are all factors which can increase usefulness of paintball. Bottom line, it's useful when put into its proper context. It's also far cheaper, approximately .04 cents (US) compared to other force-on-force alternatives. MILEs uses blanks, which cost .25 cents or more depending on caliber, while Simunitions and UTM options costs range between .45-.65 cents per round. Cost is a huge factor driving the military's move towards paintball, just as anyone who has been to the Mech site at Knox, or through some of the training that's taking place at places like Bragg, Carson and Bliss can atest.

Anyone wanting more detailed information on MIL-SIM paintball is free to contact me.

Sincerely,

Andrew Van Der Plaats
Non Lethal Training Munitions, LLC
sales@nltm.us

goesh
07-05-2007, 03:04 PM
When a hard frost would set in, we played this game as kids where one brother would hide behind some boards leaned against a shed and the rest of us would gather frozen calf turds to use a projectiles. The kid beind the boards had a safe zone about 20' away on each side of the boards and he was fair game in between either safe zone once he sprinted out and away from the board shield. When we switched to using BB guns in warmer weather, we would seldom leave the security of the board shield and sprint for a safe zone. Risk was much higher in 'real war' even though we would cup a hand on the side of the head shielding the eyes. I think the same applies to paint balls - risks and moves will be taken that wouldn't be in real combat.

LawVol
07-05-2007, 04:01 PM
I've trained with MILES gear and, although useful, it doesn't create the lesson that simunitions does. While the ringing of MILES gear may cause you to think a little, it's mostly just fun. However, looking down at a big red splotch of paint plastered right over your heart gives you a wake up call. I thought about that for days afterward. Concealment does not equal cover!

Merv Benson
10-05-2007, 01:17 AM
This post (http://prairiepundit.blogspot.com/2007/10/did-israel-hack-syrias-air-defense.html) suggest that may very well have happened.


...

The technology allows users to invade communications networks, see what enemy sensors see and even take over as systems administrator so sensors can be manipulated into positions so that approaching aircraft can’t be seen, they say. The process involves locating enemy emitters with great precision and then directing data streams into them that can include false targets and misleading messages algorithms that allow a number of activities including control.

...

Meanwhile the Russians who supplied the air defense system to Syria and sold a similar one to Iran are furiously trying to figure out what happened.

Rex Brynen
10-05-2007, 02:15 AM
This post (http://prairiepundit.blogspot.com/2007/10/did-israel-hack-syrias-air-defense.html) suggest that may very well have happened.


To be frank, I'm still rather doubtful at this stage that anyone in the press really knows what happened in eastern Syria.

Rank amateur
10-05-2007, 02:32 AM
There is a reason why Israel is being so quiet. I'm inclined to think it's something new and high tech, but it could just be that after Lebanon they are employing a little ancient wisdom: all warfare is based upon deception.

goesh
10-19-2007, 02:39 PM
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/914887.html

Last update - 16:29 19/10/2007

Report: Syria dismantling facility targeted by IAF

By Haaretz Service

Syria has begun dismantling the ruins of a site that was bombed by the Israel Air Force on September 6, the Washington Post reported Friday......"

SWJED
12-01-2007, 12:18 AM
Moderator's Note

This thread is the result of merged a small number of threads; it was originally about IDF COIN and now has included CT. There are other threads on the wider Middle East conflict and smaller matters (ends).



The attached article was submitted by a former IDF Lt who led an IDF Arab platoon and provides his perspective on Arab culture.

Rex Brynen
01-05-2008, 03:21 AM
In a thread on British policy in Northern Ireland (and parallels or non-parallels to Iraq), Wilf made a passing comment that stuck with me today:


The real benefit of NI to other COIN environments was that the UK has developed a highly effective and professional approach to COIN that most other armies, (exception being the IDF) have lacked.

I think it is an interesting question how "effective" IDF COIN has been. In Lebanon (1982-2000) I would argue that it was a disastrous failure: the PLO survived, efforts to install a friendly government and blunt Syrian influence ultimately failed, and a relatively neutral Shi'ite population (many of whom were happy to see the armed Palestinian presence go) were transformed into one of Israel's bitterest and most effective foes: Hizbullah.

In the Palestinian territories, by contrast, the IDF (and Shin Bet) have clearly very successful at a tactical and operational level in containing and limiting armed activity by Palestinian factions, and indeed maintaining a foreign military occupation for more than forty years. The IDF has certainly shown professional skill, and this has been coupled with extremely effective intelligence collection (a product, I would argue, also of Palestinian vulnerabilities and poor organizational discipline and OPSEC). Whether this has translated into strategic success or failure, however, is rather less clear--in part because the nature of Israeli strategic goals is both unclear and has changed over time. Measured by efforts to blunt the growth of Palestinian nationalism and maintain the position of pro-Jordanian notables, it was a failure. Measured by efforts to disrupt planned attacks, it has been a success. Measured as part of an effort to maintain control over large areas of the West Bank (clearly an aim under Likud governments), its probably a failure. Measured as part of an effort to protect Israel pending a territorial compromise, it is a possible success (if you're Olmert). Measured as an effort to facilitate settlement activity, its a success--but then whether settlements are a national goal or a fundamental national security liability is much debated in Israel. And so forth. (I made an earlier comment of this sort here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=35621&highlight=hamas#post35621).)

This really cuts to a core COIN dilemma: COIN is, in FM3-24 terms, fundamentally political. Yet the political goals are not always clear. And, as a consequence, its very hard to know whether tactical and operational military successes contribute to, or may even undermine, strategic objectives.

On another note--which cuts closer to the original focus of Wilf's post on ROEs, professionalization, etc.--it is interesting to note the vast formal and especially informal differences in IDF rules and behaviour in Lebanon and the WBG. A friend and colleague, James Ron, has written about this in the broader context of state violence (http://www.amazon.com/Frontiers-Ghettos-Violence-Serbia-Israel/dp/0520236572), an interest spurred in part by his experience as an IDF paratrooper in south Lebanon (http://http-server.carleton.ca/~jron/publications/LebanonWithdrawal.pdf).

William F. Owen
01-05-2008, 04:43 AM
The IDF view COIN as being a normal part of what they do everyday. The foundations of the IDF are in both insurgency and counter-insurgency. In 1948 the IDF had 8 tanks and 3 of those they stole from the British! They wanted to steal more but had no one who could drive tanks!

It was far harder for them to learn Combined Arms Armoured manoeuvre, (and still is) than it was to master guerilla or counter guerilla warfare. The IDF is founded entirely pragmatism. Do what works.

However this pragmatism has to be balanced against acceptable forms of conduct, which is further challenged by facing foes who tend to operate normal moral parameters. -EG: how do you conduct ATGM counter-fire into a village full of civilians?

...and do not be lulled into the simplistic idea that somehow the IDF performance in the August War was because of a lack or operational or tactical skill as a product of over investment in COIN doctrine. The failure of the IDF was purely to do with Effects Based Operations, driven by airpower doctrine.

Rex Brynen
01-05-2008, 06:21 AM
...and do not be lulled into the simplistic idea that somehow the IDF performance in the August War was because of a lack or operational or tactical skill as a product of over investment in COIN doctrine. The failure of the IDF was purely to do with Effects Based Operations, driven by airpower doctrine.

Don't get me wrong--I'm not at all arguing that the IDF lacks operational or tactical skill (although I do think that there were a number of tactical and operational weaknesses evident in 2006). Rather, I'm arguing that tactical and operational successes have not always resulted in strategic success--which, in the end, is the purpose of military force. Indeed, they might mask and ultimately exacerbate shortcomings in fundamental political strategy.

The Israel's failure in 2006 was only partially the consequence of airpower doctrine. A shorter and more closely focused set of air strikes, and/or a limited, successful set-piece ground strike, might have delivered more political and strategic gains. An air/EBO campaign with only a belated and half-hearted ground campaign clearly was a strategic failure. A more substantial ground campaign could have been more successful, but at very high risk (and with good chance of also being a strategic failure).

The IDF's major failure COIN in Lebanon--in 1983-2000, following its impressive conventional and semi-conventional victory in 1982--was not the consequence of a reliance on air power, which played little role. It was a conventional COIN military campaign, in which the IDF won almost every small unit head-to-head engagement against Hizballah and other Lebanese resistance groups, but ultimately withdrew under fire and was therefore seen as having been dealt a defeat. (If you've seen the loss ratios from engagements during this period, you'll also know that Hizballah steadily narrowed the gap.)

In the case of the WBG, although neither would put it in these terms, the disengagement strategy of Sharon, as well as Olmert's current diplomatic position, are in many ways based on the notion that Israel was too good at "operational" occupation/COIN, delayed adopting appropriate diplomatic strategies, and as a consequence has placed itself in a position of grave strategic peril (with Olmert in particular pointing to the demographic and political challenges of ruling over a growing non-Jewish population (http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?c=JPArticle&cid=1198517258675&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull)).

Granite_State
01-05-2008, 06:33 AM
...and do not be lulled into the simplistic idea that somehow the IDF performance in the August War was because of a lack or operational or tactical skill as a product of over investment in COIN doctrine. The failure of the IDF was purely to do with Effects Based Operations, driven by airpower doctrine.

Van Creveld, for one, would argue otherwise.

davidbfpo
01-05-2008, 08:38 AM
Having watched the transfer of knowledge from Northern Ireland to the mainland UK, for the police primarily, it is interesting to note the similar process from Israel - primarily I suspect from the IDF, not other bodies.

In the UK context and in the public domain is the methods around what we called Op Kratos, the response to suspected suicide bombers and the preparation to shoot to kill. Which came to the fore with the mistaken shooting of the Brazilian Mr Menendez shooting in London, July 2005.

There have been comments elsewhere on the IDF strategy or tactic of eliminating leaders and its adoption beyond Israel.

davidbfpo

William F. Owen
01-05-2008, 09:21 AM
Van Creveld, for one, would argue otherwise.

...and Ron Tira and many other IDF members would disagree with Van Creveld. My own judgement is based on talking to members of the IDF who were there.

The idea that COIN operations degrades "war fighting" skills is only true if they never existed in the first place or where never practised. 3 Commando Brigade and 5 Brigade managed to fight the Falklands War having all served in Northern Ireland. 5 Brigade had problems because they came off public duties, not lack of knowledge of skills.

William F. Owen
01-05-2008, 09:45 AM
@ Rather, I'm arguing that tactical and operational successes have not always resulted in strategic success--which, in the end, is the purpose of military force. Indeed, they might mask and ultimately exacerbate shortcomings in fundamental political strategy.

@ The Israel's failure in 2006 was only partially the consequence of airpower doctrine. A shorter and more closely focused set of air strikes, and/or a limited, successful set-piece ground strike, might have delivered more political and strategic gains.

@ It was a conventional COIN military campaign.

@ In the case of the WBG, although neither would put it in these terms, the disengagement strategy of Sharon, as well as Olmert's current diplomatic position, are in many ways based on the notion that Israel was too good at "operational" occupation/COIN, ....

@ If tactical and operational success cannot gain strategic success, then it's probably something military force cannot solve.

@ Risk is the coin of warfare. Israel's risk-averse strategy gained far less than it should e.g.- failure! Thus Israel's "failure" is a consequence of on an objective that was not achievable by military means.

@ Show me another COIN campaign where a nation has partially occupied another sovereign nation who is in the midst of a civil war, to create a buffer from diverse and competing terrorist organisations, with external sponsorship (Syria and Iran) that that focussed on attacking a regime (Israel) that is not involved in the civil war that they are supposedly party to. The 1970 US invasion of Cambodia is the only thing I can think of that is even close.

@ It was expressly and explicitly put in those terms, and from talking to those I talk to, that is the consensus amongst the informed public in Israel.

Tom Odom
01-05-2008, 04:02 PM
@ Show me another COIN campaign where a nation has partially occupied another sovereign nation who is in the midst of a civil war, to create a buffer from diverse and competing terrorist organisations, with external sponsorship (Syria and Iran) that that focussed on attacking a regime (Israel) that is not involved in the civil war that they are supposedly party to. The 1970 US invasion of Cambodia is the only thing I can think of that is even close.

Sorry Wilf,

The IDF does not do COIN. They do intimidation based operations. These may be counter-guerrilla counter-terror focused but they are not COIN. They do not seek to gain anyone's support.

Been there and watched it happen up close and personal.

Problems in Lebanon in 2006 have roots going back to 56, 67, and 73. EBO probably did have a dire influence. In the macro sense, the IDF's offensive based strategy has always been based on the idea that they could ultimately intimidate their opponents into quitting. It works in the short term; has distinct issues in the longer term.

Best

Tom

Granite_State
01-05-2008, 04:11 PM
.

Sorry Wilf,

The IDF does not do COIN. They do intimidation based operations. These may be counter-guerrilla counter-terror focused but they are not COIN. They do not seek to gain anyone's support.

Been there and watched it happen up close and personal.

Best

Tom

Would you say that COIN has to be based on a hearts-and-minds approach? Isn't "counter-insurgency" simply seeking to defeat the insurgents? What the Russians in Afghanistan or Israelis in the Territories did may have been brutal, and maybe ineffective, but how is it not COIN?

Rex Brynen
01-05-2008, 05:05 PM
Would you say that COIN has to be based on a hearts-and-minds approach? Isn't "counter-insurgency" simply seeking to defeat the insurgents? What the Russians in Afghanistan or Israelis in the Territories did may have been brutal, and maybe ineffective, but how is it not COIN?

I think its a fair question, whether we define COIN as all military operations aimed against insurgencies, or whether we consider only FM 3-24-type operations to be COIN. I would use the broader definition.

That having been said, Tom points to an important characteristic of IDF operations in Lebanon on the 1980s: they were very much driven by a military security/deterrence/killing the opponent approach, and weren't anything that the modern US or British Army would consider appropriate. The actual, informal ROEs used by the IDF in south Lebanon were very loose indeed, a point that Jim Ron makes in both his academic book and in his op ed account of being an IDF paratrooper. Indeed, I believe that the IDF even shot at Tom on multiple occasions ;)

Practice in the WBG has been rather more constrained for a variety of reasons (including more intense media coverage), and the nature of Israeli operations rather different. No one who has ever seen a checkpoint in operation or been at the back of a collective taxi as young men are hauled out for ID checks would consider it consider it akin to anything the British Army did to the general population in northern Ireland, however (although I'm sure that some elements of the RUC did to Catholics, on occasion--at considerable sectarian cost). Instead, it is all control/occupation, and no hearts-and-minds (which are, frankly, never likely to accept occupation). The few Israeli efforts to preserve, coopt, or cultivate a cooperative Palestinian elite (support for pro-Jordanian notables after 1967, the Village Leagues in the 1980s) were spectacular failures.

Perhaps, therefore, the best distinction is between colonial/foreign occupation-type COIN (where the locals will never really accept the legitimacy of your rule), and support-for-local-authorities type COIN (where a government may indeed be able to win genuine public support).

William F. Owen
01-06-2008, 12:39 AM
.

Sorry Wilf,

The IDF does not do COIN. They do intimidation based operations. These may be counter-guerrilla counter-terror focused but they are not COIN. They do not seek to gain anyone's support.


Don't be sorry. You missed my point. The Lebanon was not COIN. It was a straight fighting buffer zone stuff. That was exactly my point.

In the occupied territories it's a different story and I'd submit that definitely qualifies as COIN, at least in the IDF mindset.

SWJED
01-06-2008, 01:33 AM
CSI Interview: BG (Ret.) Shimon Naveh (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/01/csi-interview-bg-ret-shimon-na/)

William F. Owen
01-06-2008, 01:44 AM
.

In the macro sense, the IDF's offensive based strategy has always been based on the idea that they could ultimately intimidate their opponents into quitting.

How is that not the essence of creating defeat? What other mechanism exists? It worked against for the UK in every war we ever fought, and won.

William F. Owen
01-06-2008, 02:13 AM
CSI Interview: BG (Ret.) Shimon Naveh (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/01/csi-interview-bg-ret-shimon-na/)

Naveh has accurately characterised Hezbollah, and in a way I would agree with, but the rest of this article is, I suspect, about promoting his agendas - which appear fairly obvious and are in line the gossip doing the rounds in IDF military thought at the moment. EG- How were we so stupid as to buy into "Effects Based Operations?"

The idea that the IDF was "unprepared" - which it obviously was - does not, in my view validate his other opinions.

Rex Brynen
01-06-2008, 07:47 AM
Don't be sorry. You missed my point. The Lebanon was not COIN. It was a straight fighting buffer zone stuff. That was exactly my point.

I'm not entirely sure how one distinguishes between the two. After the failure of quite ambitious Israeli efforts to establish a compliant Lebanese government in 1982-83, they certainly gradually fell back to a buffer zone strategy in south lebanon.

However, that buffer zone strategy involved support for a local political-military ally, the South Lebanese Army. Surely combat operations in aimed at supporting the preservation and power of a local (albeit de facto rather than de jure) administration are COIN operations? It certainly involved everything from counter-guerilla operations to financial aid, engineering assistance, intelligence support, PSYOPS, economic integration strategies (the "Good Fence"), engagement (and intimidation) of community leaders, etc. Indeed, Israel was far more involved in the administrative functioning of south Lebanon than it is in contemporary Gaza (in which case, are the IDF's Gaza operations not COIN either?)

I'm not trying to see how many COIN definitions can dance on the head of a pin here. Rather, it seems to me that there are real challenges in learning lessons (or assessing effectiveness) if we can't be clear what cases count as relevant, or what the criteria for "success" are.

William F. Owen
01-06-2008, 08:38 AM
@ I'm not entirely sure how one distinguishes between the two. After the failure of quite ambitious Israeli efforts to establish a compliant Lebanese government in 1982-83, they certainly gradually fell back to a buffer zone strategy in south lebanon. ....

@ I'm not trying to see how many COIN definitions can dance on the head of a pin here. Rather, it seems to me that there are real challenges in learning lessons (or assessing effectiveness) if we can't be clear what cases count as relevant, or what the criteria for "success" are.


I don't think you can. Your final point is exactly right. In my own writing COIN is a word or abbreviation I try and avoid using. I consider it expedient for conversing here, but also intellectually lazy - as I have said many times before, in relation to other bumper sticky definitions that cast about.

The only purpose of the invading and occupying the Lebanon was to make the state of Israel safer from armed aggression. That's it. Fact. It had no other purpose. Call it COIN, call it a better Fence, call it war. In IDF eyes, the desired end state is absolute and not negotiable, and that alone creates pressures and realities that most other armies know absolutely nothing of.

Tom Odom
01-06-2008, 03:09 PM
How is that not the essence of creating defeat? What other mechanism exists? It worked against for the UK in every war we ever fought, and won.

Quite simply that the UK and or the US has had the option of disengagement as a course of action. In the case of Israel that option is not there. For years there was the territory for peace option and in some cases--Egypt for one--it worked albeit with a very large US checkbook for both sides.

The difficulty for Israel is that while it can win decisively in a large scale conflict, its options are strictly short term. The longer term solution as in the case of the 82 invasion proved unsustainable as indeed did the longer term occupation of southern Lebanon and the emergence of Hizballah.

So there is Israel's conundrum: decisive defeat ala 67 is very short-lived thing. Longer term solutions are cast in doubt by demographics. I liked the Israeli general's description of hizballah because he keyed on something most outsiders miss. Hizballah is a nationalist organization with a religious charter. That means that it often operates purely in what it sees as Lebanese interests. Where it really constitutes a threat to Israel is in its ability to absorb punishment and remain intact.

As for the West Bank, the IDF does use limited responses but again what is the objective? They have been in the past to sustain Israeli settlements in the territories and limit Palestinian threats toward the settlements and Israel proper. COIN ultimately has an objective of creating or sustaining some sort of government. The IDF has used a one-sided approach to intimidate and undercut Palestinian leadership for decades. To a certain degree that has worked in that the IDF still has the West Bank. On the other hand it faces a much more robust and threatening enemy.

Tom

William F. Owen
01-07-2008, 01:44 AM
As for the West Bank, the IDF does use limited responses but again what is the objective? They have been in the past to sustain Israeli settlements in the territories and limit Palestinian threats toward the settlements and Israel proper. COIN ultimately has an objective of creating or sustaining some sort of government. The IDF has used a one-sided approach to intimidate and undercut Palestinian leadership for decades. To a certain degree that has worked in that the IDF still has the West Bank. On the other hand it faces a much more robust and threatening enemy.


Territory for peace? Everywhere the IDF withdraws from becomes a base for attacking Israel.

The objective is essentially peace. Easy to say, almost impossible to do, and the goal posts in the occupied territories are pretty fast moving. It's to create an acceptable level of violence, so as other measures can work.

You would be perfectly safe driving around most of the West Bank today, indeed access to most of the West Bank is in no way restricted. Just don't climb over the Road Fence, and slow right down at checkpoint and open your windows.

...undercut the Palestinian Leadership? What Leadership? I agree there is a certain amount of pretty unproductive "divide and rule" but when the leadership is mostly corrupt and ineffective and cannot deliver on an agreement, then what else is there?

Rex Brynen
01-07-2008, 02:44 AM
most of the West Bank is in no way restricted. Just don't climb over the Road Fence, and slow right down at checkpoint and open your windows.

This is hardly the case: every major Palestinian population center in the West Bank is ringed by checkpoints. Vehicular traffic is so restricted that the norm is to exit the taxi on one side, line up at the barrier, and grab another taxi on the other side (I've done it more times than I care to count). Good are rigorously searched. Access to Jerusalem is barred to most of the West Bank population.

There are Israeli-only roads in the West Bank, largely reserved to Jewish settlers. The local population can't use them. Indeed, in some areas (the Jordan Valley) there are movement and permit systems in place for local residents on all roads.

You'll find extensive information on the scope, nature, and impact of Israeli mobility restrictions in the West Bank at the UN OCHA website (http://www.ochaopt.org/). World Bank analysis on the economic and social impact of these restrictions can be found here (http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/WESTBANKGAZAEXTN/0,,contentMDK:21052069~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~t heSitePK:294365,00.html).

Rank amateur
01-07-2008, 02:49 AM
Measured as an effort to facilitate settlement activity, its a success.


"The most pious among them believe that God wants them to have these rocky hills. History has shown that when God becomes involved in politics, guns are brought in while tolerance and compromise are left outside." (http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/05/opinion/edgreenway.php)


What you call failure, is the inevitable result of the most pious getting what they want.

William F. Owen
01-07-2008, 03:17 AM
This is hardly the case: every major Palestinian population center in the West Bank is ringed by checkpoints. [/URL].

Sure it is. I also drive around the West Bank, and specifically the Jordan Valley on a regular basis. Sure, Israeli number plates make a huge difference, and there are some areas off limits, but it is not Afghanistan or Iraq (or even Gaza!). If you know what you're doing, and you're there for the right reasons, then you are pretty safe. I feel a heck of a lot safer on the West Bank than I ever did in Algeria or Sierra Leone, during their security problems. There are parts of Thailand and the Philippines I'd stay the hell away from as well.

Yes, I've seen whole families of Arabs, standing in the winter rain, while their car is ripped apart and I read the Marsom Watch reports and I know members of that organisation, so I am in no way suggesting that there are not substantial problems. A lot of what is done is coercive, unjust and even cruel and unnecessary, but a certain amount contributes to security. How much? Give me a crystal ball, and I'll tell you.

Rank amateur
01-07-2008, 03:25 AM
COIN ultimately has an objective of creating or sustaining some sort of government.

At least some people want the Israeli government in control.

"It would be far more accurate to describe the West Bank and Gaza Strip as "disputed territories" to which both Israelis and Palestinians have claims."
(http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp470.htm)

Israel cannot be characterized as a "foreign occupier" with respect to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Fundamental sources of international legality decide the question in Israel's favor. The last international legal allocation of territory that includes what is today the West Bank and Gaza Strip occurred with the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine which recognized Jewish national rights in the whole of the Mandated territory, including the sector east of the Jordan River (http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_territories_occupied_or_not.php)

In some ways they are.

In 1967, Israel nationalized all West Bank water (http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80859e/80859E08.htm).

Tom Odom
01-07-2008, 04:50 PM
At least some people want the Israeli government in control.

"It would be far more accurate to describe the West Bank and Gaza Strip as "disputed territories" to which both Israelis and Palestinians have claims."
(http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp470.htm)

Israel cannot be characterized as a "foreign occupier" with respect to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Fundamental sources of international legality decide the question in Israel's favor. The last international legal allocation of territory that includes what is today the West Bank and Gaza Strip occurred with the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine which recognized Jewish national rights in the whole of the Mandated territory, including the sector east of the Jordan River (http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_territories_occupied_or_not.php)

In some ways they are.

In 1967, Israel nationalized all West Bank water (http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80859e/80859E08.htm).

Yep

The Israelis considering the source of your post (http://www.freeman.org/index.htm)

The US government position is that the West Bank is occupied territory. That is why US policy was and still is againstthe settlement program.

In any case, the thread was IDF COIN.

Tom

William F. Owen
01-08-2008, 01:32 AM
@ The US government position is that the West Bank is occupied territory.

@ That is why US policy was and still is againstthe settlement program.


I would also call Judea and Samaria, the occupied territories, and not Judea and Samaria. - and so would more Israelis than most US and UK media would ever want to admit.

Which settlement program? The illegal settlements are illegal. No debate, but there are Moshav, and Kibbutz which are perfectly legal. There are also Jewish Communities in the territories that have lived there 100's and even 1,000 of years

Tom Odom
01-08-2008, 01:37 AM
Wilf,

The settlements I refer to are the settlements initiated by Sharon and other hardliners.

Let's agree to disagree and move on.

Tom

Rank amateur
01-08-2008, 01:40 AM
That is why US policy was and still is againstthe settlement program.

In any case, the thread was IDF COIN.


If we were really opposed to them, we wouldn't pay for them.

And an auditing bait-and-switch in which U.S. aid was used to free up billions of dollars for spending on the settlements formally opposed by the United States.
(http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-08-14-israelsettlercosts_x.htm)

Anyway, IDF COIN is achieving somebodies objective, therefore it is - in my opinion - successful. Though, of course, it's fair to say that the objective is highly controversial. I'd also say it is a lot closer to Dr. Metz's Roman COIN than British COIN, but I tend to agree with the good doctor's thesis that Roman COIN is more successful, especially short term.

Ken White
01-08-2008, 02:13 AM
If we were really opposed to them, we wouldn't pay for them.

We wouldn't be giving them and the Egyptians a couple of Bil + a year -- but we are and have been probably since about the time you were born... :D

Good luck finding a US politician who will express any real and meaningful opposition to that aid and the known chicanery that goes along with it. Either party... ;)

William F. Owen
01-08-2008, 02:44 AM
Anyway, IDF COIN is achieving somebodies objective, therefore it is - in my opinion - successful. Though, of course, it's fair to say that the objective is highly controversial. I'd also say it is a lot closer to Dr. Metz's Roman COIN than British COIN, but I tend to agree with the good doctor's thesis that Roman COIN is more successful, especially short term.

There is some common misconceptions at play here. British COIN, prior to Ulster, was characterised by a brutality and severity that most would find hard to stomach. Almost every measure used by the IDF for COIN was a measure previously used by the British during the mandate, including home demolition. Trying to draw parallels between the West Bank and Ulster is idiotic - as proved by Basra.

Yes, IDF COIN is pretty harsh, and even unnecessarily so, but not compared with 99% of other nations on earth (Columbia, India, Sri Lanka, Burma, Indonesia, Syria, Iran, Russia, Georgia, Turkey, Lebanon, Pakistan, etc etc.) and some of the COIN practices in Iraq and Afghanistan are nothing to be too proud of.

Rank amateur
01-08-2008, 03:44 AM
There is some common misconceptions at play here. British COIN, prior to Ulster,

British COIN/Roman COIN aren't my terms but I believe that they are metaphorical for Humane/brutal. I probably should have put them in quotation marks. i.e. The British used "Roman" techniques before adopting "British" techniques.


and some of the COIN practices in Iraq and Afghanistan are nothing to be too proud of.

I've been thinking about starting a thread on that but fear of "the graveyard of the banned" has prevented me from doing so.


Good luck finding a US politician who will express any real and meaningful opposition to that aid and the known chicanery that goes along with it. Either party... ;)

That's my point. If the powers that be are happy, it's meeting objectives. Of course, you can create a lot of destruction and mess up a lot of things while achieving objectives, but then the problem isn't the strategy or the tactics, it's the objectives. I'm not going to debate the objectives.

Ken White
01-08-2008, 04:52 AM
...
... but then the problem isn't the strategy or the tactics, it's the objectives. I'm not going to debate the objectives.

Debate the objectives, I mean. I'd also suggest the no strategy or tactics are involved in that bit -- it's pure politics.


I've been thinking about starting a thread on that but fear of "the graveyard of the banned" has prevented me from doing so.

I don't think that should deter you. Unless you get deliberately provocative, that shouldn't be a problem. Only thing I'd suggest is be real sure of your facts and avoid quoting inflammatory and suspect sources -- or blogs. I think you should post a thread if you wish.

Rank amateur
01-08-2008, 02:12 PM
I don't think that should deter you. Unless you get deliberately provocative, that shouldn't be a problem. Only thing I'd suggest is be real sure of your facts and avoid quoting inflammatory and suspect sources -- or blogs. I think you should post a thread if you wish.

OK. As a sign of respect to an old soldier, I will. But I am a coward, so give me some time to work up my courage and choose my words carefully.

MattC86
01-08-2008, 02:48 PM
CSI Interview: BG (Ret.) Shimon Naveh (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/01/csi-interview-bg-ret-shimon-na/)

Thanks for the link - this was a very eye-opening read. I was particularly interested in Naveh's analysis of Hezbollah, because I think the abilities and powers of nonstate actors, particularly in the Middle East, are going to continue to grow, and I'm not sure anyone has figured out an acceptable political endstate for a conflict with a Hezbollah or Hamas.

I was confused, however, by Naveh's claim that the original idea was to "create conditions which will force him to give up the militant [role of Hezbollah], to stop this duality," yet not focused on decapitation attacks or other forms of leader-elimination campaigns. How would this work? Does anybody have a better idea of what he's talking about? Or did I completely miss something?

Matt

tequila
01-08-2008, 03:01 PM
I think the concept was to totally destroy Hizbullah's military wing on the battlefield, kill off the fighters and battlefield leadership, and essentially leave Nasrallah with nothing but politics as an option in the ongoing struggle in Lebanon. The Israelis are smart enough to know that killing Nasrallah, as charismatic as he is, or other Hizbullah senior leadership would not destroy Hizbullah as a movement because it has achieved the level of a genuine social movement/party within the Lebanese context as the overall representative of the Shi'i, especially the pious middle and lower classes.

MattC86
01-08-2008, 03:37 PM
I think the concept was to totally destroy Hizbullah's military wing on the battlefield, kill off the fighters and battlefield leadership, and essentially leave Nasrallah with nothing but politics as an option in the ongoing struggle in Lebanon. The Israelis are smart enough to know that killing Nasrallah, as charismatic as he is, or other Hizbullah senior leadership would not destroy Hizbullah as a movement because it has achieved the level of a genuine social movement/party within the Lebanese context as the overall representative of the Shi'i, especially the pious middle and lower classes.

I know Hezbollah less resembles an insurgency movement than a nonstate, private army, but doesn't it enjoy popular legitimacy to the point where an effort to destroy their military wing is going to take on the hydra-killing characteristics of counterinsurgency? Or does Hezbollah resemble an army enough in its organization and fighting characteristics to make this a viable concept?

Matt

Rank amateur
01-08-2008, 03:52 PM
I know Hezbollah less resembles an insurgency movement than a nonstate, private army, but doesn't it enjoy popular legitimacy to the point where an effort to destroy their military wing is going to take on the hydra-killing characteristics of counterinsurgency? Or does Hezbollah resemble an army enough in its organization and fighting characteristics to make this a viable concept?

Matt

The answer is a matter of opinion. I think it's the former. Israel hopes it's the later. We won't know for sure until someone tries.

tequila
01-08-2008, 03:59 PM
It is far easier to rebuild military potential than political legitimacy. Hizbullah has the latter in Lebanon. Even if every single Hizbullah commander dropped dead and every supply dump exploded tomorrow, Hizbullah could train new leaders and rearm with Syrian and Iranian aid. The overall strategic picture would not change even given a militarily crippled Hizbullah, because unless its ideology or backers changed, it can always rebuild its military capabilities.

Rex Brynen
01-08-2008, 04:57 PM
I think Israeli strategy (such as it was) in 2006 was to tip the party's cost-benefit analysis, in the hope that the Lebanese population would exert pressure on Hizballah to cease activities that brought Israeli retaliation —-or, otherwise, risk increasing alienation from its popular base.

This worked quite well in the 1970s against the PLO, which went from immensely popular to immensely unpopular in Lebanon. However, Hizballah is an indigenous actor with great reservoirs of goodwill in the Shiite community, and Israeli actions were in any case poorly calibrated to achieve this effect. When Israel started bombing gas stations or bridges in northern Lebanon, for example, many Lebanese bought into Hizballah's position that this was a preplanned Israeli war of aggression, and that Hizballah was once more defending the country as the "national resistance."

I suspect a sustained and extensive ground operation would have backfired in similar ways, and would have likely ended with Israel withdrawing under fire (again).

MattC86
01-08-2008, 05:14 PM
It is far easier to rebuild military potential than political legitimacy. Hizbullah has the latter in Lebanon. Even if every single Hizbullah commander dropped dead and every supply dump exploded tomorrow, Hizbullah could train new leaders and rearm with Syrian and Iranian aid. The overall strategic picture would not change even given a militarily crippled Hizbullah, because unless its ideology or backers changed, it can always rebuild its military capabilities.

Right - this is essentially what I meant. You're saying that this idea was a flawed strategy, then? And, just to be clear, what I was referring to was Naveh's idea of the strategy he and other "heretics" had considered, not what was actually implemented in 2006. You are referring to the same, correct?

Rank amateur
01-08-2008, 05:31 PM
Right - this is essentially what I meant. You're saying that this idea was a flawed strategy, then? And, just to be clear, what I was referring to was Naveh's idea of the strategy he and other "heretics" had considered, not what was actually implemented in 2006. You are referring to the same, correct?

I suppose Navah's idea is that if you punish people severely enough for having weapons, they won't rearm, but it doesn't work in Washington DC, so I don't know why it would work in the Middle East.

tequila
01-08-2008, 05:34 PM
Yeah, I'm disagreeing with Naveh on his concept for a "forcible disarmament" of Hizbullah. As long the Shi'i of Lebanon feel (1) disenfranchised and aggrieved (2) threatened, rightly or wrongly, by Israel, there will always be a constituency in that population for an armed party of their own capable of fighting both Lebanese and Israeli foes. There will have to be a sea change in the strategic context for this to work long-term - either by removing Hizbullah's foreign backers and arms suppliers, or by altering the political calculus of the broader Lebanese Shi'i community. Anything else is blowing smoke and kicking the can down the road, even if successful in the short term.

William F. Owen
01-09-2008, 01:36 AM
Guys, none of this is rocket science.

The Israelis made a bad plan, based on no other objective than trying to convince the Lebanese Govt. and people to turn against HezBollah by second order effects. When the plan didn't work, they tried to fix it, by not doing properly what they should have done. Read Ron Tira, Read their own commission of enquiry.

EBO strays dangerously from proper military thought. Hezbollah can be suppressed and even defeated by methods everyone understands.

Nasrallah saying "we won," means about as much as George Bush declaring victory.

Rank amateur
01-09-2008, 02:41 AM
Hezbollah can be suppressed and even defeated by methods everyone understands.

I understand methods that could suppress them, but I don't understand the methods that could lead to their defeat. If you have the time, I'd appreciate it if you could explain the methods to me.

William F. Owen
01-09-2008, 03:11 AM
I understand methods that could suppress them, but I don't understand the methods that could lead to their defeat. If you have the time, I'd appreciate it if you could explain the methods to me.

If someone can be suppressed (does not act through fear of harm) then he can be defeated because sufficient fear will lead to withdrawal.

So the "methods" used to suppress (which you understand) just have to exploited to their logical conclusion. Obviously they would have to applied within a political context,(as all methods do) and would probably only be successful as a result of other activities - eg: loss of isolation from outside support and funding. Recognition of opportunity remains the key to success.

Sorry to sound vague, but simplistic or erroneous interpretations this type of activity could be misquoted or misused.

Rex Brynen
01-09-2008, 03:33 AM
Hezbollah can be suppressed and even defeated by methods everyone understands.

I'm dubious that this can be done, frankly. The IDF certainly didn't manage it in the 1990s--quite the reverse.

MattC86
01-09-2008, 02:48 PM
Yeah, I'm disagreeing with Naveh on his concept for a "forcible disarmament" of Hizbullah. As long the Shi'i of Lebanon feel (1) disenfranchised and aggrieved (2) threatened, rightly or wrongly, by Israel, there will always be a constituency in that population for an armed party of their own capable of fighting both Lebanese and Israeli foes. There will have to be a sea change in the strategic context for this to work long-term - either by removing Hizbullah's foreign backers and arms suppliers, or by altering the political calculus of the broader Lebanese Shi'i community. Anything else is blowing smoke and kicking the can down the road, even if successful in the short term.

Ok, I completely agree with that. It seems Naveh's touted alternative was really just a tactical shift from what was actually done. The questions that raises, about how to combat a group like Hezbollah or its ilk, seem damn near insurmountable to me.

And Wilf - I see 2006 as nearly as big a victory as Hezbollah could possibly score. The invincible Israelis withdrew, Hezbollah stood and fought in the villages in the south, and then helped clean up the country after Israel (again) devastated the infrastructure, gaining popularity and legitimacy through both their military and political wings. They may not have decisively defeated the IDF on the ground, but they fought very well and the strategic and IO gains for Hezbollah were quite large, IMO. I'd be interested to hear why you (or others) think otherwise.

Matt

William F. Owen
01-09-2008, 03:17 PM
And Wilf - I see 2006 as nearly as big a victory as Hezbollah could possibly score. The invincible Israelis withdrew, Hezbollah stood and fought in the villages in the south, and then helped clean up the country after Israel (again) devastated the infrastructure, gaining popularity and legitimacy through both their military and political wings. They may not have decisively defeated the IDF on the ground, but they fought very well and the strategic and IO gains for Hezbollah were quite large, IMO. I'd be interested to hear why you (or others) think otherwise.


Having talked to several men who actually fought, i would dispute that Hezbollah fought well or successfully. They were never able to hold ground against the units I have talked to. It would be like suggesting the Somalis fought well in Mogadishu or that the Taliban fought well during OP Anaconda.

They lost lots of equipment and about 5-600 dead. On the one occasion I know of where they cornered an entire IDF Platoon (Golani) they killed 6 and wounded everyone except 2, and still the platoon broke contact and recovered to their own forces. I have yet to see anything that would indicate Hezbollah as being widely skilled at the tactical level. - I would judge them to be as tactically proficient as the the Somalis in Mogadishu or that the Taliban fought during OP Anaconda.

Rank amateur
01-09-2008, 04:49 PM
If someone can be suppressed (does not act through fear of harm) then he can be defeated because sufficient fear will lead to withdrawal.

Withdrawal isn't defeat.

The Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, has described the "miracle of deliverance" from Dunkirk (http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/4/newsid_3500000/3500865.stm)


They were never able to hold ground against the units I have talked to.


Aren't they holding all the ground that Isreal used to occupy now?

Ken White
01-09-2008, 06:09 PM
Withdrawal isn't defeat.

That is true to western eyes -- it is true to middle eastern eyes as well insofar as the conduct of operations and combat are concerned. In western terms, your statement is totally correct. In terms of the ME today when the announced goal is to force westerners and zionists out of the area; then western or Israeli withdrawal in the eyes of the opposition becomes a victory for them and thus a defeat for the west. Even the hint of a withdrawal will be seen as weakness. Given the fact that our perceived weakness is very much why we are there today, withdrawal is bad ju-ju and would bode badly for the future...

They're already winning the info war, they don't need any help... ;)

Rank amateur
01-09-2008, 07:11 PM
That is true to western eyes -- it is true to middle eastern eyes as well insofar as the conduct of operations and combat are concerned. In western terms, your statement is totally correct. In terms of the ME today when the announced goal is to force westerners and zionists out of the area; then western or Israeli withdrawal in the eyes of the opposition becomes a victory for them and thus a defeat for the west. Even the hint of a withdrawal will be seen as weakness. Given the fact that our perceived weakness is very much why we are there today, withdrawal is bad ju-ju and would bode badly for the future...

They're already winning the info war, they don't need any help... ;)

A) I wouldn't limit our ability to maneuver based on UBL's opinion.
B) We already withdrew our troops from Saudi Arabia. I don't think that caused any major geopolitical problems.
C) Isn't it better to be perceived as weak and to be strong than to have our forces physically weakened?

Jedburgh
01-09-2008, 07:32 PM
They were never able to hold ground against the units I have talked to.
To disparage any irregular force because of their inability to "hold ground" against a professional army is to completely miss the point.

Hezballah was able to inflict casualties on the IDF, take out some armor, and continue to launch rockets into Israel until the very end of the conflict. And since Israel withdrew once again - without achieveing its objectives, in the end, that's all that matters.

Regarding the "defeat" of Hezballah, I think Tequila put it quite clearly:

It is far easier to rebuild military potential than political legitimacy. Hizbullah has the latter in Lebanon. Even if every single Hizbullah commander dropped dead and every supply dump exploded tomorrow, Hizbullah could train new leaders and rearm with Syrian and Iranian aid. The overall strategic picture would not change even given a militarily crippled Hizbullah, because unless its ideology or backers changed, it can always rebuild its military capabilities.
The statement "Nasrallah saying "we won," means about as much as George Bush declaring victory." is really a false analogy: President Bush has been roundly mocked for his statement, both here in the US and abroad, while a significant chunk of the region's populace perceives that Israel was humiliated during their summer excursion.

FYI, there is quite a bit of discussion on this subject in the Hezballah TTP (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1034) thread and the Hezbollah: A Win For 'The Best Guerrilla Force in the World'? (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1109) thread.

MattC86
01-09-2008, 08:43 PM
To disparage any irregular force because of their inability to "hold ground" against a professional army is to completely miss the point.

Hezballah was able to inflict casualties on the IDF, take out some armor, and continue to launch rockets into Israel until the very end of the conflict. And since Israel withdrew once again - without achieveing its objectives, in the end, that's all that matters.

Regarding the "defeat" of Hezballah, I think Tequila put it quite clearly:

The statement "Nasrallah saying "we won," means about as much as George Bush declaring victory." is really a false analogy: President Bush has been roundly mocked for his statement, both here in the US and abroad, while a significant chunk of the region's populace perceives that Israel was humiliated during their summer excursion.


Thanks, Jedburgh. I agree with that completely. Although a couple sources I read (some in the info you gave me for my RFI) said that, particularly for a irregular force, Hezbollah stood and fought rather effectively in some villages with a Chechen-type decentralized defense effort.

My question, then, from this, is what is the larger strategy against Hezbollah, Hamas, and other nonstate actors who in many cases have more popular legitimacy and power than weakened states in the regions they operate. If kinetic action (even if better planned and executed than the IDF's in 2006) is non-decisive, and may actually further their political popularity and strength (leading to more military potential in terms of manpower and potential outside support), and the indigenous government is too weak to reign them in - i.e., Lebanon - then what is the approach? Attempts to moderate them or co-opt them diplomatically? A combination?

This seems to lie outside our current COIN thinking. Or at least MY current COIN thinking. . .

Oh, and can we please agree on a universal spelling for Hezbollah? Drives me nuts. Just tell me how to spell it and I'll do it. . .
Matt

William F. Owen
01-10-2008, 01:38 AM
To disparage any irregular force because of their inability to "hold ground" against a professional army is to completely miss the point.

Hezballah was able to inflict casualties on the IDF, take out some armor, and continue to launch rockets into Israel until the very end of the conflict. And since Israel withdrew once again - without achieveing its objectives, in the end, that's all that matters.
[/URL] thread.

I am not disparaging Hezbollah for an inability to hold ground. I am correcting the perception that they successfully defended any villages - and when they did try, they were unable to do it, according to the men I have talked to. There may have been certain areas where they did conduct a successful defence, but I have yet to see that reported by sources I trust.

I am not in any way trying to suggest that the IDF won. The War was a mind numbing fiasco, because of the stupid EBO plan. - and war was only 30 days long!

..how ever the idea that the IDF somehow lacked tactical or operational skill, and was out fought by Hezbollah is also a gross distortion. I do understand that it aids some folks agendas to suggest that.

Rank amateur
01-10-2008, 02:34 AM
I am not disparaging Hezbollah for an inability to hold ground. I am correcting the perception that they successfully defended any villages - and when they did try, they were unable to do it, according to the men I have talked to.

No offense, but I think that the men you've talked to have too short of a time frame. Isreal isn't occupying any villages now.


how ever the idea that the IDF somehow lacked tactical or operational skill

I don't think that is the suggestion.



and was out fought by Hezbollah

That is the suggestion


then he can be defeated because sufficient fear will lead to withdrawal.

To me, it appears as though Hezbollah inflicted sufficient fear to cause withdrawal. Like I said, that isn't necessary defeat, but if the war ends after one side withdraws, it certainly looks like defeat to me. Germany withdrew from France. WWI ended. Germany was defeated.

William F. Owen
01-10-2008, 02:51 AM
Lets cut to the chase here. In the collective opinion, of those on this thread, what should the IDF have done?

William F. Owen
01-10-2008, 02:59 AM
To me, it appears as though Hezbollah inflicted sufficient fear to cause withdrawal. Like I said, that isn't necessary defeat, but if the war ends after one side withdraws, it certainly looks like defeat to me. Germany withdrew from France. WWI ended. Germany was defeated.

Well if that was the case it could be said that the IDF caused sufficient fear to halt rocket attacks from the Lebanon. The fighting may have stopped but the war is ongoing.

IMO withdrawal does not define any aspect of defeat. The sole criteria I use to define defeat is permanent, collective, physical, and psychological withdrawal from combat. And that stands for COIN as well as larger conflicts.

Rank amateur
01-10-2008, 03:11 AM
Lets cut to the chase here. In the collective opinion, of those on this thread, what should the IDF have done?

IMO

1) Realize that Hezbollah can't invade and hold Isreali territory
2) Repel cross border attacks without panic, because Hezbollah can't invade and hold Israeli territory .
3) Retaliate with bombings. (Objective: cause more pain to Hezbollah than Hezbollah inflicted on Israel.)
4) Accept the fact that Hezbollah can't be destroyed.
5) Enjoy the nice weather. Israel is a beautiful country.

Rank amateur
01-10-2008, 03:20 AM
IMO withdrawal does not define any aspect of defeat.

I agree, but IMO when the attacker withdraws it does indicate that the defenders have successfully defended their territory.


The sole criteria I use to define defeat is permanent, collective, physical, and psychological withdrawal from combat. And that stands for COIN as well as larger conflicts.

I fully admit that I don't know the official definitions of many terms, and I appreciate being allowed to contribute even though I don't, but I think there's some problems with the word permanent. Germany's withdrawal from France in 1918 wasn't permanent.

William F. Owen
01-10-2008, 03:56 AM
IMO

1) Realize that Hezbollah can't invade and hold Isreali territory
2) Repel cross border attacks without panic, because Hezbollah can't invade and hold Israeli territory .
3) Retaliate with bombings. (Objective: cause more pain to Hezbollah than Hezbollah inflicted on Israel.)
4) Accept the fact that Hezbollah can't be destroyed.
5) Enjoy the nice weather. Israel is a beautiful country.

1.) No but they can throw rockets and kidnap your people.
2.) Repel, OK, but how about killing them before they rocket and kidnap your people.
3.) What do you bomb? You can't bomb the Insurgents in Iraq so why would you bomb Hezbollah. Besides, the evidence is that this does not work. Other things work much better.
4.) That's asking a lot of the average Israeli, and their physical destruction is not required. Their consistent suppression is.
5.) Can't enjoy the weather if you spend all day in the shelters while the Arabs shoot Kasam at you. Ask the populations of Haifa, Kyriat Shimona, and Sderot.

Rex Brynen
01-10-2008, 05:01 AM
Lets cut to the chase here. In the collective opinion, of those on this thread, what should the IDF have done?

I think we rarely have a collective opinion ;) I'll give it a shot, though.

From the perspective of Israeli national security interests, a very much shorter air campaign, with much less targeting of civilian infrastructure (power station, bridges, gas stations, etc.), and possible a few well-aimed heliborne raids in "rear" areas. Then stop, declare victory, and let it wind down the way it usually winds down.

Hizballah's original snatch-and-grab was something of an uncharacteristic political blunder, which generated little enthusiasm in Lebanon. Indeed, it was striking how much political capital the first few days of the war cost Hizballah, even in the Shi'ite community.

However, as things dragged on and the target set grew, Lebanese opinion shifted almost 180 degrees. The party was thus saved from the folly of its own mistakes by even bigger Israeli blunders (the scope and nature of the IDF response), as well as Hizballah's ability to ride out the punishment.



Complicating things further now--and this properly belongs in a different thread--there are indications that UN cartographic reexamination (http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1184063449109&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull) of the "blue line" (to which Israel withdrew in 2000) has found that Hizballah may have been right, and the Israeli-occupied Shaba Farms area really is Lebanese (and not Syrian) territory. Oops.

Let's say this is true. Under present political circumstances, I don't foresee Israel acknowledging this or offering a Shaba withdrawal for fear that it will look like a Hizballah victory. Yet it also means that Hizballah will remain political resistant to anything the IDF might throw at them.

William F. Owen
01-10-2008, 06:45 AM
From the perspective of Israeli national security interests, a very much shorter air campaign, with much less targeting of civilian infrastructure (power station, bridges, gas stations, etc.), and possible a few well-aimed heliborne raids in "rear" areas. Then stop, declare victory, and let it wind down the way it usually winds down.

I have no real quibble with that, except I would exclude all and any targeting of any civilian infrastructure. I'd have also left the International Airport alone.

...but how would have "declaring victory" stopped the clouds of rockets that would have occurred in the face any direct action - or how would you assess the "rocket threshold"

William F. Owen
01-10-2008, 11:00 AM
Salem Aleikum, and Shalom Abujnoub.

Before we get into your post (and we will) go to his this link, http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441 and give us all some details about who you are and where you are coming from.

Abujnoub
01-10-2008, 12:07 PM
Salem Aleikum, and Shalom Abujnoub.

Before we get into your post (and we will) go to his this link, http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441 and give us all some details about who you are and where you are coming from.

Done.

tequila
01-10-2008, 01:03 PM
@ Of course they can be destroyed. If Syria wanted to destroy Hezbollah, they would, and Hezbollah would never recover, and no one, who was left alive south of the Litani would ever speak the word Hezbollah again. Maybe Bashir isn't the man Hafas was, but I am sure you get my point.


So how exactly did the Mar 14 movement succeed in driving Syrian troops from Lebanon without a shot fired? They may be besieged, but the Mar 14 coalition is still in power in Lebanon, and certainly their names are being spoken quite often in Beirut and throughout the region.

I think you are dramatically overestimating the power of brute force. Even after Hafez Assad smashed the Ikhwan at Hama, the Ikhwan survives in Syria, and the Ikhwan never had anywhere near the strength that Hizbullah commands amongst the Lebanese Shi'i (indeed, it had already largely severed its own support among the larger Syrian Sunni religious community through its violent terrorism against regime targets and several indiscriminate car bombings).

Rex Brynen
01-10-2008, 01:27 PM
I think you are dramatically overestimating the power of brute force. Even after Hafez Assad smashed the Ikhwan at Hama, the Ikhwan survives in Syria, and the Ikhwan never had anywhere near the strength that Hizbullah commands amongst the Lebanese Shi'i (indeed, it had already largely severed its own support among the larger Syrian Sunni religious community through its violent terrorism against regime targets and several indiscriminate car bombings).

I largely agree, Tequila. I do, however, think Hama/1982 does illustrate the utility of massive, raw brute force--when coupled with sustained and effective authoritarian controls. However, the fact that the Syrians couldn't use similar levels of brutality to maintain their position in Lebanon, to eliminate Arafat in Tripoli in 1983 (or to eliminate Fateh in Lebanon thereafter), or even to force their way into Sidon against the PLO/Joint Forces in 1976 highlights the constraints that even highly authoritarian countries face in using it.

No one will be using Hama levels of brutality (2-3% of the civilian population killed per week) in Lebanon (thank goodness!). Given this, I would suggest that "of course they can be destroyed" is an abstract possibility at most. We could also be on Mars in three years. We won't be.

Which gets back to the political puzzle of how best to "moderate" Hizballah's behaviour and gradually shift it away from armed activity. Here we face several problems. The first is that hopes of integration into Lebanese politics (including cabinet participation) leading to greater Hizballah moderation have been challenged both by its recklessness in sparking the war in 2006, and in its subsequent recklessness in trying to bring down the Siniora government (although I'll add that not all of their gripes are without foundation). Second, and as I've suggested before, resolution of the Shaba Farms issue--something that might also facilitate the demilitarization of the movement--is much more remote in 2008 than it was before 2006. Finally, in the absence of a Israeli-Syrian peace deal the Syrians have no interest in a demilitarized Hizballah, and in the current context of Iranian-US relations, nor do the Iranians. Quite the contrary.

Rex Brynen
01-10-2008, 09:25 PM
Unless the Lebanese Armed Forces are the ones to make the attempt, then it doesn't matter....

In order to keep things neat (and since this was originally an IDF COIN discussion), I've posted by response to this Lebanon thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=37710#post37710).

Rank amateur
01-11-2008, 09:11 PM
Their consistent suppression is.


Deterrence is sufficient. The problem is that some people can't accept deterrence. They'll have to learn, or as Abujnoub suggests resort to nuclear weapons or genocide.

dave.anderson4
02-25-2008, 09:40 PM
This is a well-crafted, unique and insightful piece; unfortunately it is addressing an exhausted topic. It may still be worth publication based on the unique perspective of the author...would require the introduction to be cleaned-up--adding clarity to the situational background (stage setting).

Jedburgh
04-11-2008, 02:17 PM
JCPA, Apr 08: Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience (http://www.jcpa.org/text/Amidror-perspectives-2.pdf)

Contrary to popular belief, conventional armies can indeed defeat terrorist insurgencies. This study will detail the six basic conditions which, if met, enable an army to fight and win the war against terrorism, among which are control of the ground where the insurgency is being waged, acquiring relevant intelligence for operations against the terrorists themselves, and isolating the insurgency from cross-border reinforcement with manpower or material. It will also examine the factors that can help drive a wedge between the local population and the insurgent forces seeking its support. The principles of war will also be analyzed in terms of their applicability to asymmetric warfare to show how they still serve as a vital guide for armies in vanquishing terror. Finally, the study warns that if the U.S., Israel, or their Western allies incorrectly conclude that they have no real military option against terrorist insurgencies – out of a fear that these conflicts inevitably result in an unwinnable quagmire – then the war on terrorism will be lost even before it is fully waged......
Complete 42 page paper at the link.

Jedburgh
06-02-2008, 03:03 PM
JFQ, 3rd Qtr 08: Forty Years of COIN: The Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i50/19.pdf)

.....This article assumes that the government’s response to an insurgency plays a predominant role in explaining insurgent success. It examines Israeli government policies toward the Palestinians and observes when there are reductions in the frequency and lethality of Palestinian insurgent attacks. This does not mean that factors other than the Israeli government’s response have had no influence on Palestinian insurgent strength. In fact, the physical and political environment, the insurgency’s level of organization and unity, and insurgents’ strategies have also played a role. Still, “of all the variables that have a bearing on the progress and outcome of insurgencies, none is more important than government response.” This study does not develop a comprehensive explanation for Palestinian insurgent strength, but merely identifies Israeli occupation policies that have coincided with COIN success and failure. Given limited space, it leaves to future research the explanation of why these associations exist.....

William F. Owen
06-02-2008, 04:16 PM
JFQ, 3rd Qtr 08: Forty Years of COIN: The Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i50/19.pdf)

Good article.

However I have serious doubts about the contention that the US can learn from the IDF experience in relation to the West Bank and Gaza, and apply it in Iraq. The circumstances of each are simply too dissimilar.

Ken White
06-02-2008, 04:34 PM
Whole comment.

RTK
06-02-2008, 04:37 PM
Good article.

However I have serious doubts about the contention that the US can learn from the IDF experience in relation to the West Bank and Gaza, and apply it in Iraq. The circumstances of each are simply too dissimilar.

Agreed. It's not an apples to apples scenario. It's more like an apples to Ford Mustang comparison.

Rex Brynen
06-02-2008, 05:11 PM
I had a few problems with the study, to be honest.

First, as the author notes, "tactical success" (insurgents stopped/killed/etc) is far from being the same as "strategic success" (which is what counts in the end). In the IDF's case, it might well be argued that some of its tactical counter-terrorism measures, while enhancing immediate Israeli security, have fanned radicalism in the long term--for example, the election of a Hamas government in 2006, and its subsequent take-over of Gaza.

Second, I'm a little unclear whether the post-2005 data includes rocket attacks from Gaza. If it did, and the data were extended through to the end of 2007, the trend lines would look far more negative than Figure 1 suggests. It certainly doesn't include Israeli external operations related to Palestinian armed groups, notably the 1978 invasion of South Lebanon, or the 1982-2000 occupation of Lebanon. (Also, given that the data is from terrorism database, it presumably should exclude attacks against the IDF and only include attacks against civilian targets.. which again may raise some questions about the utility of the data.)

Third, Figure 3 gives a rather particular view of settlement growth, suggesting that it flattened after the mid-1980s. This, however, is because the chart depicts numbers of "settlements" not the "number of settlers", and most settlement in the 1990s and subsequently has occurred by the expansion of existing settlements or the establishment of satellite settlements (or outposts) rather than "new ones," as the chart below shows:

http://agonist.org/files/active/1/Israeli%20settlers.jpg

(In fact, the numbers are higher than this, since CBS data excludes East Jerusalem.)

Tom Odom
06-02-2008, 05:21 PM
I had a few problems with the study, to be honest.

First, as the author notes, "tactical success" (insurgents stopped/killed/etc) is far from being the same as "strategic success" (which is what counts in the end). In the IDF's case, it might well be argued that some of its tactical counter-terrorism measures, while enhancing immediate Israeli security, have fanned radicalism in the long term--for example, the election of a Hamas government in 2006, and its subsequent take-over of Gaza.

Second, I'm a little unclear whether the post-2005 data includes rocket attacks from Gaza. If it did, and the data were extended through to the end of 2007, the trend lines would look far more negative than Figure 1 suggests. It certainly doesn't include Israeli external operations related to Palestinian armed groups, notably the 1978 invasion of South Lebanon, or the 1982-2000 occupation of Lebanon. (Also, given that the data is from terrorism database, it presumably should exclude attacks against the IDF and only include attacks against civilian targets.. which again may raise some questions about the utility of the data.)

Third, Figure 3 gives a rather particular view of settlement growth, suggesting that it flattened after the mid-1980s. This, however, is because the chart depicts numbers of "settlements" not the "number of settlers", and most settlement in the 1990s and subsequently has occurred by the expansion of existing settlements or the establishment of satellite settlements (or outposts) rather than "new ones," as the chart below shows:

http://agonist.org/files/active/1/Israeli%20settlers.jpg

(In fact, the numbers are higher than this, since CBS data excludes East Jerusalem.)

Same here. I also question his highlighting of Israeli development efforts after the 1967 War. From what I read those development efforts were targeted toward settlements and improvements for the Palestinians were side effects rather than objectives.

Overall it is a good article; it would have been a better article had he broadened his sources. I agree with Wilf's concerns that direct comparisons can be misleading and in all fairness I think the author sort of says that at the end.

Tom

Rex Brynen
06-02-2008, 05:39 PM
Same here. I also question his highlighting of Israeli development efforts after the 1967 War. From what I read those development efforts were targeted toward settlements and improvements for the Palestinians were side effects rather than objectives.

I didn't get into that issue, but you're correct. The primary driver of Palestinian economic growth in 1967-93 was access to the Israeli economy (for both goods and labour), coupled with petrodollar remittances from the Gulf. It was not Israeli development expenditures--indeed, in most years Israel put few net resources into Palestinian development (these were largely financed by Israeli-collected Palestinian tax payments).

Through 1994-present, the economic costs of mobility restrictions more than offset international assistance, as the World Bank constantly reminds donors.

On another note, public opinion survey data shows that there is actually very little linkage between socio-economic conditions, or social class, and Palestinian political attitudes (especially in terms of support for militant groups).

Rank amateur
06-02-2008, 05:50 PM
The study does suggest, however, that building fences around the population works: at least tactically and operationally. And - to address Rex's point - IMO strategic success is really a function of diplomacy as opposed to "boots on the ground."

RTK
06-02-2008, 06:51 PM
The study does suggest, however, that building fences around the population works: at least tactically and operationally. And - to address Rex's point - IMO strategic success is really a function of diplomacy as opposed to "boots on the ground."

I disagree with your last sentence.

While I don't doubt that diplomacy has a lot to do with success, I submit that you can't succeed with a bad tactical campaign and, further, your "boots on the ground" can defeat you faster than anything else, particularly in terms of second and third order effects. Take a look at the "Jesus Coin Marine."

Steve Blair
06-02-2008, 07:05 PM
I disagree with your last sentence.

While I don't doubt that diplomacy has a lot to do with success, I submit that you can't succeed with a bad tactical campaign and, further, your "boots on the ground" can defeat you faster than anything else, particularly in terms of second and third order effects. Take a look at the "Jesus Coin Marine."

Quite so. I could dredge up a number of historical examples to support this. If anything, the trend has accelerated many-fold based on "near real time media." A screw-up on the ground that comes out in almost real time puts higher-up in immediately reactive mode and can snowball into something that cannot be contained (or managed).

Rank amateur
06-02-2008, 07:19 PM
Perhaps diplomacy is the wrong word. What do you think if I replace diplomacy with "hearts and minds" or "political reconciliation" or "the emergence of effective local governance?"

RTK
06-02-2008, 07:31 PM
Perhaps diplomacy is the wrong word. What do you think if I replace diplomacy with "hearts and minds" or "political reconciliation" or "the emergence of effective local governance?"

The issue isn't with diplomacy. This issue is how readily you discount the tactical aspects of such matters.

Ken White
06-02-2008, 07:40 PM
Perhaps diplomacy is the wrong word. What do you think if I replace diplomacy with "hearts and minds" or "political reconciliation" or "the emergence of effective local governance?"in scope and application. Each situation, each nation is different and there is no one size fits all. All those things have a place, as does the tactical aspect.

And just to make your life easier, which item is pre eminent is situation dependent and almost infinitely variable within a given situation. In either Palestine or Iraq (two vastly different scenarios), the esoteric aspects are now of principal importance -- that can change in either nation overnight and the tactical aspect could dominate all other effort. ;)

RTK
06-02-2008, 07:44 PM
And just to make your life easier, which item is pre eminent is situation dependent and almost infinitely variable within a given situation.

To give the copout answer my students like to throw out like chaff, everything is "METT-TC dependent."

Ken White
06-02-2008, 08:02 PM
To give the copout answer my students like to throw out like chaff, everything is "METT-TC dependent."

A. Will set you free.

B. Is rarely obvious.

C. Is always obvious.

D. Is sometimes unpleasant to contemplate.

:D:D:D

You should use the ploy the Tactics guys at Leavenworth use; "What we are about to tell you will work on a pleasant June day in gentle terrain and if you have all your personnel and equipment fully mission capable and will confront a mediocre enemy force. If any of those parameters change even slightly, you'll have to adapt." ;)

Rank amateur
06-02-2008, 08:06 PM
The issue isn't with diplomacy. This issue is how readily you discount the tactical aspects of such matters.

I'm working on an essay that attempts to prove that in a multi factional insurgency with a weak government (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan) strategic success is detached from tactical success: which is not the case in a traditional binary insurgency (like El Salvador.).

(The Israel/Palestinian situation sort of fits - and sort of doesn't - but in that particular case the idea of "strategic failure" assumes that the strategic objective is a political agreement, which is why I used the word diplomacy.)

Back on topic. If you can prove that I'm wrong - and show me why tactical success will lead to strategic success in Iraq and Afghanistan- you'll save me a lot of work. It'd be much appreciate it too; the weather's beautiful and there's cold beer going to waste while I try to find time for the essay.

RTK
06-02-2008, 10:23 PM
Back on topic. If you can prove that I'm wrong - and show me why tactical success will lead to strategic success in Iraq and Afghanistan- you'll save me a lot of work. It'd be much appreciate it too; the weather's beautiful and there's cold beer going to waste while I try to find time for the essay.

As usual, your quest to be contrarian overshadows your ability to read my post completely:

I never said tactical success leads to strategic success. You said that strategic success was "IMO strategic success is really a function of diplomacy as opposed to "boots on the ground."" I think that viewpoint discounts the impact poor tactical operations can have on the strategic outcome and eventual success.

Let me put it this way. If you've never played darts, this won't work, though you could probably substitute blackjack for darts.

Say you and I are playing 501 on the dartboard. Whoever gets exactly 501 points first wins. There are literally millions of ways someone can get to 501 but there are many more ways to lose. Hitting the bullseye 11 times won't win the game; it will make you bust. Tactical indiscretions can be the 11th throw to the bull. My point was that poor tactical operations can define strategic failure sometimes even faster than diplomatic measures (ie. Abu Gharib, the Hit USMC shootings, the Jesus coin distributor, 1-8IN in Balad, etc...)

Either way, I don't have time to do your work or prove you wrong - I have 250 lieutentants I'm training in the next 3 months with 40% of them deploying by Christmas to try and win this thing.

William F. Owen
06-03-2008, 06:02 AM
I submit that you can't succeed with a bad tactical campaign and, further, your "boots on the ground" can defeat you faster than anything else, particularly in terms of second and third order effects. Take a look at the "Jesus Coin Marine."

...and there's the difference between the IDF and the US/UK/NATO Armed force. No one in an IDF platoon is even ever going to mention religion to the Arabs.

Some of the Platoon maybe Muslim, and a lot from families from Arab countries, with grand parents (or even Parents) who speak Arabic as a first language. Some of the platoon may even have been have been borne and grown up on the West bank. A proportion of the Platoon will speak Arabic to varying degrees (some will speak more than one dialect of Arabic), and psychological screening should have kept the fanatics out of the combat platoons.

William F. Owen
06-03-2008, 06:04 AM
"What we are about to tell you will work on a pleasant June day in gentle terrain and if you have all your personnel and equipment fully mission capable and will confront a mediocre enemy force. If any of those parameters change even slightly, you'll have to adapt." ;)

Brilliant!!!

Ron Humphrey
06-03-2008, 05:41 PM
A. Will set you free.

B. Is rarely obvious.

C. Is always obvious.

D. Is sometimes unpleasant to contemplate.

:D

You should use the ploy the Tactics guys at Leavenworth use; "What we are about to tell you will work on a pleasant June day in gentle terrain and if you have all your personnel and equipment fully mission capable and will confront a mediocre enemy force. If any of those parameters change even slightly, you'll have to adapt." ;)

I'd go with C: because its always obvious to someone, somewhere
The catch is what it takes for it to become obvious to those involved in it:wry:

And as to the other, We do occasionally throw in a rainy day on concrete, with lunch served at three rather than 2:cool:

Rex Brynen
07-12-2008, 01:54 PM
ANALYSIS / Two years on, IDF starting to look like an army that can fight a war (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1001006.html), Haaretz, 12/07/2008.


The satisfaction on the faces of the senior officers who came to observe the training exercise of the 7th Brigade in the Golan Heights last week was unmistakable. The Israel Defense Forces is once again starting to look like an army that knows how to deal with a conventional war, a challenge that - due to more pressing troubles - it downplayed during the years between the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000 and the Second Lebanon War, whose opening shots were fired two years ago tomorrow.

...

In Lebanon, says a senior Armored Corps officer, "a situation arose in which the whole chain of command didn't know what the true level of fitness was of all the forces. The philosophy was, 'We'll do our best with what we have.' There had been a prolonged erosion in the army's fitness, and we were all a party to it. When a battalion commander who has never been through a battalion-wide drill goes into a brigade-wide battle in Lebanon, how can anyone with a head on his shoulders expect him to succeed?"

"We're still seeing a lot of rust," said one of the senior officers after the exercise. "The difference is that, a year ago, people weren't even aware of what it was they didn't know. Now they know what they're lacking. But by the end of the exercise, a certain amount of experience is accumulated, capability is built up. It's still a process and it's happening very slowly." The regular units, in his assessment, are gradually returning to their level of fitness from 2000, on the eve of the intifada.

"The reserves are in less good shape. They have too few training exercises. I don't see any reserve brigade successfully completing a drill like the one the 7th Brigade just did, and there's no substitute for that kind of training. It's not the same as a simulation in an air-conditioned room. A tank battalion has to have the real experience of moving a column through the field in difficult circumstances, over the same small bridge. When you don't do it like the real thing, that will show when it has to be done in reality."

Harry Phillips
12-30-2008, 05:10 PM
The Israeli consulate (@israelconsulate) of NY is holding a Twitter "citizen press conference" today between 1-3 EST.
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3646948,00.html

NY consulate counts on Twitter

Israeli consulate uses social networking service as part of Gaza op PR campaign Ynetnews
Published: 12.30.08, 07:06 / Israel News <http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3082,00.html>

Between 1-3 pm (EST) Tuesday, the Consulate General of Israel in New York will hold a live Citizen "Press" Conference on Twitter in order to directly answer the public's questions regarding the current situation in Israel and Gaza in wake of the IDF's operation in the Strip.

Twitter is a fast-growing social networking service, and the consulate's intiative is the first time that a government is holding such a conference via the service

"We are constantly getting questions from the public regarding the situation in Israel and Gaza," David Saranga, Consul for Media and Public Affairs, said. "We are answering the public's call and holding a Citizen Press Conference on the social networking site, Twitter, to answer these questions directly."

Twitter users can take part in the Citizen "Press" Conference by going to: http://www.twitter.com/IsraelConsulate and directing their messages to @israelconsulate and including the tag #AskIsrael.

Questions will be answered on Twitter, with a link to IsraelPolitik if the answer exceeds Twitter’s maximum length of 140 characters.

Also: In addition to the above see www.youtube.com/user/idfnadesk

Rex Brynen
12-30-2008, 06:46 PM
Questions will be answered on Twitter, with a link to IsraelPolitik if the answer exceeds Twitter’s maximum length of 140 characters.

Ahh yes, the Arab-Israeli conflict in less than 140 characters :D

Harry Phillips
12-30-2008, 07:50 PM
Not exactly, but perhaps rather a way to get the Israeli side of the story out in short bursts?

Ron Humphrey
12-30-2008, 08:11 PM
Not exactly, but perhaps rather a way to get the Israeli side of the story out in short bursts?

Have they coordinated with the Palestinian sec forces in the west bank to be able to move in and establish security once they get done breaking down Hamas to a level where thats doable?

Are the Egyptians at least capturing those who seek to get away through the tunnels?

Whats the plan for establishing any sort of order in Gaza post Hamas?

Rex Brynen
12-30-2008, 08:16 PM
Have they coordinated with the Palestinian sec forces in the west bank to be able to move in and establish security once they get done breaking down Hamas to a level where thats doable?

Are the Egyptians at least capturing those who seek to get away through the tunnels?

Whats the plan for establishing any sort of order in Gaza post Hamas?

I doubt that Hamas will damaged enough for any of that to happen. Moreover, for Fateh to reassume of Gaza "on the backs of Israeli tanks" would make them look like the worst kind of collaborators in the eyes of many Gazans.

The Egyptians are angling for Fateh/PA to reassume control of the Gaza border crossings. That *might* be possible.

SWCAdmin
01-28-2009, 12:29 AM
Columbia University Press is pleased to announce the publication of The Israeli Secret Services & The Struggle Against Terrorism (http://www.cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-231-14042-3/the-israeli-secret-services-and-the-struggle-against-terrorism) by Ami Pedahzur, professor of political science and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas.

The book questions Israeli strategy in fighting terrorism, criticizing the use of a "war model," which Pedahzur argues is motivate more by politics than sound strategy.

Please let me know if you would like a review copy of the book.

The author is also available for interviews and to contribute to your site.

Praise for the book:

"Replete with detail, vignettes, and insights, this book provides a unique inside account of the Israeli intelligence and security services' sixty-year-long struggle against terrorism. It is the most comprehensive and authoritative depiction and analysis of this struggle currently available in the English language." — Bruce Hoffman, author of Inside Terrorism

Read more reviews (http://www.cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-231-14042-3/the-israeli-secret-services-and-the-struggle-against-terrorism/reviews).

About the book:

How successful has Israel's renowned intelligence operation been in stopping terrorist attacks?

While Mossad is known as one of the world's most successful terrorist-fighting organizations, Ami Pedahzur shows that Israel's strict reliance on the elite units of the intelligence community is fundamentally flawed and has not decreased the incidence of Palestinian terrorism. In fact, the diversion of funds and manpower to anti-terrorist activities has put Israel in greater danger from its enemies. The "War model" that Israel has employed, Pedahzur argues, should be replaced by a more defensive model.

An expert on terror and political extremism, Pedahzur analyzes and conveys in vivid detail Israel's past encounters with terrorists, specifically hostage rescue missions, the first and second wars in Lebanon, the challenges of the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian terrorist groups, and Hezbollah. He brings a rare transparency to Israel's counterterrorist activities, highlighting their successes and failures and the ways in which politics and in-fighting between various services shape Israeli policy toward terrorism. Pedahzur concludes by outlining a strategy for future confrontation that will be relevant not only to Israel but also to other countries that have adopted Israel's intelligence-based model.

"Ami Pedahzur has written an astute, well-documented, and compelling analysis of Israel's reliance on the 'war model' to combat terrorism. Israel's political and military leaders were consistently unable to resist the temptation of dramatic and costly uses of force when modest defensive or conciliatory measures were preferable. This lesson should not be lost on any national policymaker confronted by terrorism." — Martha Crenshaw, Stanford University

About the author

Ami Pedahzur holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Haifa where, from 2000 to 2004, he served as a senior fellow at the National Security Studies Center. In 2004 he was a Donald D. Harrington fellow at the University of Texas, and in 2005 became an associate professor in the departments of Government and Middle Eastern Studies. In 2007 Pedahzur joined The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs and currently serves as associate editor of the journal Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. His books include Suicide Terrorism and The Israeli Response to Jewish Extremism and Violence: Defending Democracy.

Steve Blair
01-28-2009, 03:33 PM
I'd be interested in this one as well, as I did some work on the West German terrorist groups back in the 1980s and it's always been an area of interest. Again, I'll defer to a more specific subject specialist if one wants to take on the book (Jed, for example....:cool:).

SWJ Blog
01-29-2011, 05:01 AM
The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/01/glory-restored-the-implication/)

Entry Excerpt:

Glory Restored? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/gloryrestored.pdf)
The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict

By Dr. Russell W. Glenn, A-T (Anti-Terrorism) Solutions (http://www.a-tsolutions.com/).

This study, sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command (http://www.jfcom.mil/) Joint Irregular Warfare Center (http://www.jfcom.mil/about/abt_jiwc.html), has been approved for public release. To the best of our knowledge, Small Wars Journal is the first organization to publish this study on the Internet. This material is based on work supported by USJFCOM and the JIWC under Contract No. N00140-06-D-0060/065. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of USJFCOM or the JIWC.

From the preface:


The closing of the July–August 2006 Second Lebanon War left the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) an introspective organization. Once an example looked to by much of the world for lessons on martial prowess, the nation’s military—indeed, the country at large—found its performance against the Hezbollah enemy a far more punishing and less effective experience than expected. Some of that outcome was attributable to the foe’s preparations. Yet there were also self-admitted deficiencies in the areas of leadership, intelligence, inter-arms cooperation, decisiveness, and other areas that political and military leaders alike recognized had to be addressed. It was more than a matter of pride. In a region none too friendly, reestablishing the reputation of the IDF was felt to be a deterrent against further assaults.
Twenty-eight months later, the IDF attacked into Gaza after rocket attacks on Israel originating there spiked late in 2008. It was an attack made after a number of adjustments over the two-plus years since the Second Lebanon War. Operation Cast Lead, the designation for the undertaking, demonstrated renewed confidence blended with improved tactics, leadership, and joint cooperation.
This document reviews those adjustments, analyzes their effectiveness, and considers Israel’s performance in Gaza more generally. The report concludes with 12 recommendations pertinent to future U.S. operations in what has emerged as an era of persistent conflict.
This document will be of interest to individuals in the government, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, and the commercial and academic sectors whose responsibilities include the study, planning, policy, doctrine, training, support, or conduct of insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, or other forms of stability operations in both the immediate future and longer term.Glory Restored?: The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/gloryrestored.pdf)

During his 22-year career with the U.S. Army, Dr. Russell W. Glenn served in Korea, Germany, the United Kingdom, and locations throughout the United States in addition to a combat tour with the 3rd Armored Division during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Iraq. Dr. Glenn was a senior defense analyst with RAND from 1997 to early 2009 after which he joined his current organization, A-T (Anti-Terrorism) Solutions. Dr. Glenn has a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy and Masters degrees from the University of Southern California (MS, Systems Management), Stanford University (MS, Civil Engineering and MS, Operations Research), and the School of Advanced Military Studies (Master of Military Art and Science). He earned his Ph.D. in American history from the University of Kansas with secondary fields of military history and political science. His military education includes Airborne, Ranger, and Pathfinder qualifications. The author’s publications encompass some 50 books and reports in addition to over 20 articles regarding counterinsurgency, urban operations, counterterrorism, and other fields. This research was conducted within the Global Security Solutions division of A-T Solutions, Inc.



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/01/glory-restored-the-implication/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
08-23-2011, 04:40 PM
Hat tip to Zenpundit for his new thread 'Alice’s Wonderland Battlespace', which potentially gives rise to several issues, including MOUT and intellectual issues of mapping for example:http://zenpundit.com/?p=4280

The article cites a 2005 academic article by an architect and opens with this citation (in part):
The maneuver conducted by units of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in Nablus in April 2002 was described by its commander, Brigadier General Aviv Kokhavi, as inverse geometry, the reorganization of the urban syntax by means of a series of microtactical actions. During the battle, soldiers moved within the city across hundred-meter-long “overground-tunnels” carved through a dense and contiguous urban fabric. Although several thousand soldiers and several hundred Palestinian guerrilla fighters were maneuvering simultaneously in the city, they were so “saturated” within its fabric that very few would have been visible from an aerial perspective at any given moment. Furthermore, soldiers used none of the streets, roads, alleys, or courtyards that constitute the syntax of the city, and none of the external doors, internal stairwells, and windows that constitute the order of buildings, but rather moved horizontally through party walls, and vertically through holes blasted in ceilings and floors. This form of movement, described by the military as “infestation”, sought to redefine inside as outside, and domestic interiors as thoroughfares.

I have not linked the cited article due to SWC rules on Scribd.

I know MOUT was the springboard for SWC, but on a quick search could not find a suitable thread.

davidbfpo
08-23-2011, 04:46 PM
In July 2009 on another thread I found Mike Innes referred to the author:
Eyal Weizman In Hollow Land: The Architectures of Israeli Occupation (Verso, 2007), he writes about the various spatial contortions that can be read into and physically observed of the Israeli-Palestinian experience. Terms like "prosthetic sovereignties" and "politics of verticality" feature prominently.

Rex Brynen
08-25-2011, 03:36 AM
Hat tip to Zenpundit for his new thread 'Alice’s Wonderland Battlespace', which potentially gives rise to several issues, including MOUT and intellectual issues of mapping for example:http://zenpundit.com/?p=4280

To be perfectly honest, the piece(s) slightly annoy me because I think much of it falls into the perennial old wine/trendy bottles category.

First (as both Cameron and Weizman note) "mouse-holing" one's way through the three dimensions of urban terrain is as old as urban terrain itself. All the complicated words used by Weizman just obscure what is a fairly obvious process, and probably say more about the need to make obvious things sound clever than they reveal anything new about MOUT.

Indeed, I just watched my son undertake "reorganization of the urban syntax by means of a series of microtactical actions" some twenty minutes ago in a popular video game. He didn't know he was "involved a conception of the city as not just the site, but the very medium of warfare — a flexible, almost liquid medium that is forever contingent and in flux" ... he just thought it made sense not to walk out in the open where he would get shot, and to make best use of both the cover and fields of fire that an urban environment offers. He'll be pleased to discover, however, that his virtual "reversal of our normal understanding of space is both audacious and brilliant."

Second, while Weizman's writing on the politics of verticality in the occupied Palestinian territory is quite accurate, again i don't think it comes as any particular revelation. It's an interesting think-piece for those unfamiliar with the setting, but its well known by those who work there--and somewhat deficient in its focus on static spatiality with no reference to either the control of movement or the intricate network of intangible legal controls and overlapping jurisdictions.

SWJ Blog
09-11-2011, 12:33 AM
A Wider Siege of Israel? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/a-wider-siege-of-israel)

Entry Excerpt:



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SWJ Blog
11-14-2012, 08:21 PM
Video: 14 Nov IDF Pinpoint Strike on Ahmed Jabari, Head of Hamas Military Wing (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/video-14-nov-idf-pinpoint-strike-on-ahmed-jabari-head-of-hamas-military-wing)

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SWJ Blog
11-21-2012, 06:34 PM
Hamas and Israel Agree to Cease-Fire, Clinton Says (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/hamas-and-israel-agree-to-cease-fire-clinton-says)

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bourbon
02-25-2013, 08:02 PM
This film looks very good. Six former heads of Shin Bet site down for a The Fog of War style documentary.

http://www.thegatekeepersfilm.com

Trailer Link (http://trailers.apple.com/trailers/sony/thegatekeepers/)


Short Synopsis

For the first time ever, six former heads of Israel’s domestic secret service agency, the Shin Bet, share their insights and reflect publicly on their actions and decisions.

Since the Six Day War in 1967, Israel has failed to transform its crushing military victory into a lasting peace. Throughout that entire period, these heads of the Shin Bet stood at the center of Israel's decision-making process in all matters pertaining to security. They worked closely with every Israeli prime minister, and their assessments and insights had—and continue to have—a profound impact on Israeli policy.

THE GATEKEEPERS offers an exclusive account of the sum of their successes and failures. In the process it sheds light on the controversy surrounding the Occupation in the aftermath of the Six Day War.

bourbon
02-25-2013, 08:06 PM
Israeli ex-security officials largely favor peace (http://bigstory.ap.org/article/israeli-ex-security-officials-largely-favor-peace), by Aron Heller. Associated Press, Feb. 20 2013.

JERUSALEM (AP) — Israel's Academy Award-nominated documentary "The Gatekeepers" has won rave reviews for the candid soul-searching of its chief protagonists — the six living former directors of the country's shadowy domestic spy agency — and their somewhat surprising conclusion: That force has its limits and Israel must ultimately take advantage of its military superiority to seek peace.

It's no surprise, though, in Israel. Top security officials have a long history of favoring dovish political parties and criticizing government policies toward the Palestinians after their retirements. Those who have battled Palestinian violence with the harshest methods possible are oddly those often most amicable to compromise.

Granite_State
02-26-2013, 01:39 AM
Saw it in LA a couple weeks ago, highly recommended. Great interviews with the Shin Bet heads, all of whom are incredibly candid. Some good info in particular about the Rabin assassination and what preceded it. The filmmaker could have been a bit more artful with some of the stuff that brackets the interview, the re-enacted stuff was a little hoky, but that's a minor quibble.

Wyatt
02-26-2013, 03:58 AM
Trying to find a sowing somewhere in north carolina. Looks like a good time

bourbon
02-27-2013, 05:30 PM
Saw it in LA a couple weeks ago, highly recommended. Great interviews with the Shin Bet heads, all of whom are incredibly candid. Some good info in particular about the Rabin assassination and what preceded it. The filmmaker could have been a bit more artful with some of the stuff that brackets the interview, the re-enacted stuff was a little hoky, but that's a minor quibble.
Thanks, that is good to hear. They don't by any chance get into Shin Bet's role in the creation and cultivation of Hamas do they?

bourbon
02-27-2013, 05:40 PM
Trying to find a sowing somewhere in north carolina. Looks like a good time
You should see if the studio could arrange a screening at Ft Bragg. It would be free PR for them because the Washington Post can then run a “Army Screens Controversial Israeli Peace Documentary” type article.

ganulv
02-28-2013, 04:56 PM
Director Dror Moreh is going to be the guest on Fresh Air (http://www.npr.org/programs/fresh-air/) today (28 February 2013).

ganulv
03-31-2013, 06:26 PM
I caught The Gatekeepers at a matin&#233;e yesterday and much enjoyed it. I would not have minded it being a bit shorter but I did not find it tiresome. And it is not just a collection of talking heads as some reviews have suggested.

parvati
04-01-2013, 04:37 AM
Great documentary. Very talented!!!

They must be connected to Goldman Sachs and the Israel Lobby...what you say?

ganulv
04-01-2013, 05:02 AM
They must be connected to Goldman Sachs and the Israel Lobby...what you say?
FWIW, I do believe I was the only goy in attendance at the showing! ;) There were thirteen of us in the theater for a 1:40 showing in a rural New England town. Not a bad crowd for that kind of film under the circumstances, if you ask me!

I thought the decision to hold off showing any blood and guts visuals until near the end (with the photos from Yahya Ayyash's funeral and the aerial view of the bombed bus full of mangled bodies) had an interesting effect as opposed to showing some of that upfront and letting it set the tone. But Israeli and Palestinian viewers are so inured to that sort of footage that I have to assume it made little difference to them.

parvati
04-01-2013, 05:12 AM
Seriously the Israelis and the Palestians in the East Coast seem numb to that - minus some Hassidums I've met(but several of even the the Hassidumu seem antiwar pro Palestiinian rights--- does that make any sense to you?). Like seriously Ive met Hassidum jews working for anti-occupation Palestinian rights? Hmmm.... What can I say?

The documentary was ok? People around you seem pretty liberal, yeaH?

bourbon
04-01-2013, 05:31 AM
Seriously the Israelis and the Palestians in the East Coast seem numb to that - minus some Hassidums I've met(but several of even the the Hassidumu seem antiwar pro Palestiinian rights--- does that make any sense to you?). Like seriously Ive met Hassidum jews working for anti-occupation Palestinian rights? Hmmm.... What can I say?
I believe there are some ultra-orthodox sects that are anti-zionist.

ganulv
04-01-2013, 05:33 AM
Seriously the Israelis and the Palestians in the East Coast seem numb to that - minus some Hassidums I've met(but several of even the the Hassidumu seem antiwar pro Palestiinian rights--- does that make any sense to you?).
There's Matisyahu (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matisyahu#Career), so it makes a little sense, I guess!


The documentary was ok? People around you seem pretty liberal, yeaH?
Solidly Democratic, for sure. But some Dems are vicious pro-Israel hawks and sometimes you get anti-Israel conservatives (I won't say that all of them are anti-Semites, but some of them do give that impression).

parvati
04-01-2013, 05:47 AM
Mr. Bourbon...that is an oxymoron right there...but I guess people are complex!

parvati
04-01-2013, 05:50 AM
ganulv,

This guy seems like an amazing artist. Will be exploring his music for the next few days. Ill let you know :-)

bourbon
04-06-2013, 08:20 PM
but I guess people are complex!
People are complex = Essentially why subjects covered on this forum occur.


oxymoron?
Debatable. It is unpopular to say, but I wouldn't necessarily say that anti-Zionism means anti-Semitism - though some certainly wish to frame it that way.

bourbon
04-06-2013, 08:25 PM
This guy seems like an amazing artist. Will be exploring his music for the next few days. Ill let you know :-)
Matisyahu is great. I'm not as into his newer stuff, but his first "Live from Stubb's" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dsFpUW48Tnc) was awesome.

TV-PressPass
04-11-2013, 10:29 PM
I really want this film to have a wider release. My room-mate spotted the trailer a few months ago when I was reading A High Price (http://www.amazon.ca/High-Price-Triumphs-Failures-Counterterrorism/dp/0195391829), for US customers: http://www.amazon.com/High-Price-Triumphs-Failures-Counterterrorism/dp/0195391829and immediately turned me onto it.

If it delivers on half of what the trailer promises: I'll be buying it for sure.

davidbfpo
07-04-2013, 12:19 PM
The gatekeepers is being shown in Birmingham (UK) next week for three days, a rare showing I expect beyond London:http://www.macarts.co.uk/event/the-gatekeepers--15

I will add a review next week.

ganulv
07-04-2013, 01:21 PM
The gatekeepers is being shown in Birmingham (UK) next week for three days, a rare showing I expect beyond London:http://www.macarts.co.uk/event/the-gatekeepers--15

I will add a review next week.

I’ll be anxious to see what you think! It can be difficult to keep up with some of the names and incidents. I did get the sense that the director made an effort to not bore a domestic audience who knew all the names with foreign audiences getting an introduction.

TV-PressPass
07-04-2013, 07:12 PM
Ah damn!

This came to my home town, I went and saw it, and I never posted a review here!

I found it immensely interesting. I appreciated that the interviewer was willing to ask tough questions, and definitely put some of the subjects on the spot. It's always tempting to slide past poor choices or failures, but that didn't happen here.

I found the 3D animation pretty enough, but largely unnecessary. There were a few times where "recreated footage" could have been slightly mis-represented as original source footage. It was vague to the viewer, which I'm not a fan of.

Most valuable of all: my girlfriend, who has only the vaguest idea of the middle east and its organizations, was able to watch, follow, and thoroughly enjoy the film.

For her: the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin was a surprise twist.

Overall, its something that I would buy and re-watch. Definitely.

davidbfpo
07-10-2013, 09:31 PM
The Gatekeepers is superb, well worth watching and it is amazing that six Shin Bet (internal security agency) directors agreed to be interviewed on film. Several times being pressed gently, notably over two PLO prisoners being murdered a long time ago.

Yes the reconstruction(s) of incidents, like the murder, are hard to quickly distinguish from actual footage - some of which is grim, notably of blown-up buses in 'The Second Intifda'. The use of overhead imagery, slides, file cards, maps etc is well done, although could be disconcerting - are you watching real images.

Fascinating remarks on the post-1967 Six Day War situation, with 1m Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank to monitor. Conduct a census and obtain a 'richer picture', supplemented by informants and arrests etc.

The morality of Shin Bet, if not Israeli actions is a constant theme. One director starkly stated "There is no morality dealing with terrorism".

The unexpected murder of Prime Minister Rabin by a Jewish extremist was a great institutional shock; the then director resigned and IIRC was replaced by an outsider, a senior naval officer. I'd forgotten the bombing campaign by Jewish extremists; those convicted effectively being released quickly after public and political pressure.

HUMINT was the key factor at the start, but after the Oslo Agreement gave the Palestinians Gaza and much of the West Bank Shin Bet became far more desk-bound watching screens.

At the end several directors admitted Israel was in a far more insecure position, one agreed it was fulfilling a "worst case" prediction as an "occupation state".

TV-PressPass
07-16-2013, 07:21 PM
At the end several directors admitted Israel was in a far more insecure position, one agreed it was fulfilling a "worst case" prediction as an "occupation state".

Most of the directors interviewed seemed eerily willing to admit certain failures and how things had shifted away from what they wanted.

Not common in most western intelligence agencies according to the docs I've seen.

ganulv
07-17-2013, 12:01 PM
Bibi apparently refuses to watch the film (http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.530580) (which may actually mean that he refuses to acknowledge having watched it). Par for the course. :rolleyes:

TheCurmudgeon
08-20-2013, 01:45 AM
I finally had a chance to watch it tonight as my wife, who generally controls the TV, was out for the night.

First, I would say that every 2LT ought to watch it for no other reason than to see how sometimes the military and security forces have to find solutions without clear guidance from the politicians - and those choices can have long range ramifications.

Second, I was reminded at the end of the documentary of one of the culminating lines of the first "War Games". It created a feeling that the War on Terrorism is a lot like Global Thermal Nuclear War - "the only winning move is ... not to play".

Wyatt
08-20-2013, 03:26 AM
Im still trying to find it, is it online now?

TheCurmudgeon
08-20-2013, 11:18 AM
Got it through NetFlix

TheCurmudgeon
08-20-2013, 06:27 PM
Its also available through Amazon.com

The Gatekeepers (http://www.amazon.com/Gatekeepers-Ami-Ayalon/dp/B00AZMFM3I/ref=sr_1_2?s=movies-tv&ie=UTF8&qid=1377020768&sr=1-2&keywords=the+gatekeepers)

davidbfpo
08-22-2013, 12:04 PM
A remarkable Australian interview with the film's director, with splices of the film (10 mins):
....here's an ABC Radio National interview with the director Dror Moreh, spliced with some footage from the film. Quite remarkable that the film-makers captured all six living directors of Shin Bet calling for peace with the Palestinians....

Hat tip to Lowy Institute:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/08/22/Two-films-about-Israel-and-Palestine.aspx

ganulv
08-31-2013, 03:07 PM
I happened upon a September, 2012, interview of director Dror Moreh by one of my favorite authors, Mark Danner. Good stuff. [LINK (http://www.markdanner.com/articles/show/163)]

uwew
09-03-2013, 08:53 PM
Moreh will publish a book with the text of the interviews and additional material
in Germany in January 2014.

SWJ Blog
10-14-2013, 06:51 AM
Review Essay: The Israel Air Force and the Evolution of Arab-Israeli Warfare (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/review-essay-the-israel-air-force-and-the-evolution-of-arab%E2%80%92israeli-warfare)

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davidbfpo
10-26-2013, 01:33 PM
Behind the story a Druze officer is to command the IDF's Golani brigade is a surprising aspect:
According to figures from the IDF, the number of young Druze who serve in the IDF stands at 83%, which is higher than the percentage among the Jewish population. The relative number of Druze officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers serving in the regular army is very high in proportion to the relative size of their community within the country’s total population. Most young Druze consider enlistment in the IDF as more than just an obligation and a necessary expression of their national loyalty. They see it as the sine qua non for advancement and integration into the country’s civil society.

There is a downside to this commitment:
While these young Druze have proved their loyalty to the state and fulfilled their responsibility with integrity, the state of Israel responds with ongoing prejudice, expressed mainly in discriminatory practices surrounding the distribution of development and infrastructure funding for their settlements.

Link:http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/israel-idf-druze-discrimination-alliance-golan-heights.html

This report cites a 2012 short IDF press release, which has more figures on senior officers:http://www.idf.il/1283-15853-en/Dover.aspx

I have long had an interest in the participation of minorities in civil-military service to a nation that is either not their own - in the imperial era - and today.

Somewhere I read that a large number of the Israeli Border Police, which has a national paramilitary role, are from minority groups and some recent footage showed a significant minority of black personnel (ex-Ethiopian Jews I expect).

davidbfpo
12-05-2013, 01:56 PM
Taken from an email referring to an Israeli diplomat speaking:
Since Israel’s founding, Bedouin have tended to have better relations with the state than have their Arab brethren – every year 5 to 10% of the army-age male Bedouin population volunteer for the IDF.

This loyalty maybe under pressure, following Israeli government proposals for rehousing 40k Bedouin in formal settlements:
And yet the government’s relocation plan has provoked pushback – not just from some Bedouin, but from Israel’s other Arab citizens and from Palestinians, who see the move as a land grab and an infringement on the Bedouin’s herding lifestyle. Last week protests against the plan, some of them violent, erupted across Israel and in several capitals worldwide, including London.

(Added) A NYT report gives some background:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/08/world/middleeast/in-an-israeli-plan-bedouins-see-a-threat-to-their-way-of-life.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_ee_20131208&_r=0&pagewanted=all (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/08/world/middleeast/in-an-israeli-plan-bedouins-see-a-threat-to-their-way-of-life.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_ee_20131208&_r=0&pagewanted=all)

I do recall a few references to Bedouin IDF soldiers, IIRC when an American protester was shot / run-over.

Firn
12-05-2013, 06:04 PM
It seems that elements of the specific skill-set of the Bedouin tribes have been highly attractive for the IDF, especially tracking. Manpower is also always scarce and was even more so in the past. It is also likely that the Bedouins see themselves as a quite distinct entity from other Arab groups which in turn made it possible for the Israeli state to initiate and conserve close military ties. Which has of course the additional benefit of denying the opponents to tap their potential.

In Italy as far as I recall the number of serving men from the ethnic minorities in the northern regions are low in propotion to their relative numbers. In general their standard of living is higher then the national average and they suffered under Italian nationalism so there are few incentives for them to volunteer. On the other hand considering the very small percentage of the minorities it was never deemed necessary to reach out to them. Overall the southern regions are greatly overreppresented in the lower ranks, which has of course to due with the economic circumstances in the last ten years.

For Italy the (military) integration of the immigrants should be a bigger topic, but military topics other than casualties suffered and spectacular hardware are hardly discussed in the Italian press. One might add the recent discussion about 'golden' retirements for senior figures to that list.

davidbfpo
02-16-2014, 07:35 PM
Oddly there is not a thread on Israeli counter-terrorism and this appears to be the most appropriate place for this.

Via an alert on Twitter a book review of Daniel Byman's 'A High Price. The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism', which was published in 2011:http://warstudiespublications.wordpress.com/2014/02/15/a-high-price-the-triumphs-and-failures-of-israeli-counterterrorism/

The author is Olivier Schmitt, a Frenchman @ Kings College London (War Studies), who gives a bio on:http://olivierschmitt.wordpress.com/about/

The first paragraph:
This excellent work of synthesis proposes to return to the fight against terrorism led by Israel since its inception. To a large extent, Israel was the laboratory of terrorism in the twentieth century, many tactics (hijackings, suicide bombings, etc.). Having first been applied against its people before spreading internationally. Daniel Byman offers and to study in detail how the Israeli services have managed multiple threats they faced, in an attempt to draw broader lessons. The result is a balanced book, which hides nothing as Palestinian Israeli errors, and thus may irritate both the proponents of Greater Israel and extremist supporters of the Palestinian cause, but worth reading for its detailed analysis and complete the challenges posed by terrorism to a democratic society.

Link to Amazon UK, where it has several good reviews:http://www.amazon.com/High-Price-Triumphs-Failures-Counterterrorism/dp/0195391829/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1392575617&sr=1-1&keywords=A+High+Price.+The+Triumphs+and+Failures+o f+Israeli+Counterterrorism

davidbfpo
02-16-2014, 07:46 PM
In a moment I will merge the small thread on 'The Gatekeepers' documentary, which featured several directors of Shin Beth (internal security). Another four small threads have been merged; left alone are those threads on war fighting and more general matters.

davidbfpo
03-08-2014, 08:10 PM
Israel has attacked missiles in transit from Iran in Sudan before. This week's naval action in the Red Sea has yet to get mainstream media reporting here. IIRC it was an air strike last time in the Sudan.

Two IDF-sourced reports:http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20627/E_043_14_140612868.pdf and http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/03/07/mystery-surrounds-intercepted-iranian-missile-shipment/

Even for covert transport crossing through Sudan, Egypt and into the Sinai is a logistical problem. Lots of questions arise.

ShelaghD-B
03-09-2014, 04:56 AM
Unfortunately from what I have witnessed over time, is that the ONLY time Israel is every mentioned in the main stream press is when it is being vilified. Any mention of arms for Hamas or Iran, etc, is left out unless they can somehow twist the story to show either in the light of somehow being victimized by the evil Israel!
This piece of news, not looking good for Hamas or Iran will not make the rounds.


:rolleyes:

Firn
09-13-2014, 01:11 PM
Israel’s Unit 8200 refuseniks: ‘you can’t run from responsibility’ (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/12/israel-unit-8200-refuseniks-transcript-interview)


Did you feel your were violating people’s rights?

N: Definitely. In Israeli intelligence regarding Palestinians, they don’t really have rights. Nobody asks that question. It’s not [like] Israeli citizens, where if you want to gather information about them you need to go to court.

A: The only limitation is the limitation of resources. There’s no procedural questions regarding who can and cannot be surveilled. Everybody is fair game.

N: An 18-year-old soldier who thinks: “We need to gather information on this or that person” – that 18-year-old kid [in Unit 8200] is the one that decides.

A: It is well known that the intelligence is used. People are arrested in the Palestinian territories. Sometimes without trial. And even when they are taken to trial it’s often with evidence that can’t be exposed [in court] because it is classified. And the intelligence is used to apply pressure to people, to make them cooperate with Israel. These are all things that are known.

....


A: I should say there are a lot of people who, when they leave the military service they start seeing Palestinians as people not just as sources of information, and getting a bigger picture of what’s happening and a lot of people … there’s very different levels of commitment and enthusiasm in doing the reserve service and a lot of people taper off.

D: It was clear from the beginning we wanted to do everything legally. We went to a lawyer and said we don’t want to commit an offence or say anything not allowed to can you help us figure out what we would be allowed to say.

N: We’re not telling secrets about what we did or the way the unit works. We don’t want to do that. We don’t want to hurt national security, we just want to say what is wrong with the things we did and the unit does.

We want people to know that being in intelligence is not clean, and to control a population of millions you can’t just do counter-terrorism and hurt the people who want to hurt you.

It matches some of the issues raised in 'Gatekeepers' and casts another light on the difficult situation of citiziens willing to serve and protect their country but also playing their part in oppressing other:


A: I think we have said that some of the things that the IDF does really does deserve the title defence forces, but there is a significant proportion of what it is doing that does not deserve this title. It’s in the interests of perpetuating a regime that is oppressive. That is not democratic. It is these things we are trying to bring to the attention of Israeli public first and foremost. To create a discussion and think critically about it.

davidbfpo
12-04-2015, 04:17 PM
Without doubt an opinionated article on the IDF and politics; on a previously unheard of website:http://972mag.com/what-does-it-say-when-the-idf-is-the-sanest-voice-in-israel/114514/

SWJ Blog
01-27-2016, 07:43 AM
Why is Israel so Cautious on the Islamic State? A Recent War Game Explains Why. (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/why-is-israel-so-cautious-on-the-islamic-state-a-recent-war-game-explains-why)

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davidbfpo
02-29-2016, 10:12 PM
A new book, 'The True Story of How Israel Left Lebanon (May 2000) Code Name “Dawn” ', has been published in Hebrew, so the Meir Amit Centre has a useful summary. It ends with:
Gilboa sums up the insights pertaining to intelligence, saying: “There is no doubt that the primary function of intelligence is to point out the risks. This is its duty, and it did so. The problem with the assessments by Military Intelligence was that they failed to point out the prospects".
Link:http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20961

SWJ Blog
03-05-2016, 06:56 AM
From Maneuver to Attrition: The Transformation of the Israel Defense Forces’ Approach to Warfare (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/from-maneuver-to-attrition-the-transformation-of-the-israel-defense-forces%E2%80%99-approach-to-war)

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OUTLAW 09
08-12-2016, 09:05 PM
Amazing footage

Watch an Israeli air-force pilot land an F-15 with only one wing — via @WeAreTheMighty
http://read.bi/2b4lCaX

davidbfpo
01-07-2018, 02:01 PM
A BBC report:
Fauda, the Israeli television thriller that portrays the murky world of Israeli undercover army units and Palestinian militants during the Second Intifada (Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation)...The Israeli border police have an undercover unit called Yamas which has been operating for 25 years but had never been filmed before we gained exclusive access to them.Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-42566284

Azor
03-29-2018, 08:41 PM
From The Jerusalem Post: http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Report-Israeli-stealth-fighters-fly-over-Iran-547421


Two Israeli F-35 fighter jets entered Iranian airspace over the past month, Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Jarida reported on Thursday. The act is a signal of heightened regional tensions, especially in light of recent Israeli military attacks in Syria, including against Iranian bases in the country.

Sources quoted in Al-Jarida stated that two stealth fighters flew over Syrian and Iraqi airspace to reach Iran, and even targeted locations in the Iranian cities Bandar Abbas, Esfahan and Shiraz.

The report states that the two fighter jets, among the most advanced in the world, circled at high altitude above Persian Gulf sites suspected of being associated with the Iranian nuclear program.

It also states that the two jets went undetected by radar, including by the Russian radar system located in Syria. The source refused to confirm if the operation was undertaken in coordination with the US army, which has recently conducted joint exercises with the IDF...

CrowBat
04-05-2018, 06:36 PM
Since Begin's lie about some Kuwaiti newspaper citing Saddam Hussein's statement about 'developing nukes to burn Israel', back in 1981, I'm extremely cautious about any Israeli reports citing some 'Kuwaiti newspapers'.

davidbfpo
04-07-2018, 08:09 PM
Might this help to explain the claims?

Taken from an IISS Strategic Comment (mainly behind a paywall) and refers to the drone incident on 10 February 2018:
The Israeli response was apparently spring-loaded. In a large-scale operation, the Israeli Air Force immediately struck the base – Tiyas, or T-4 – from which the drone had been launched and claimed to have destroyed Syria’s main command-and-control bunker at the same time. Simultaneously, it carried out a sweeping attack against Syria’s air defences, resulting in the destruction or incapacitation of half of Syria’s air-defence infrastructure, according to Israeli sources. Iranian installations were also targeted. Israel, for its part, lost an F-16 fighter jetflying at high altitude to a Syrian S-200 anti-aircraft missile over Israeli airspace. This was the first loss of an Israeli aircraft to enemy fire in 38 years, and can perhaps be ascribed to pilot error: the crew evidently failed to take evasive measures, perhaps owing to overconfidence.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tried to clarify the stakes by declaring that henceforth, Israel would not be content with responding to Iranian provocations by striking its facilities in Syria. He stated that next time, Israel would take the fight to Iran itself. Tehran denied that it had launched any drone, describing Israel’s account of the incident as ‘ridiculous’.
Link:https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections/2018-f2a0/rising-israeli-iranian-tensions-4410

davidbfpo
09-28-2018, 04:34 PM
Via the Australian think tank blog (ASPI) and a short article. Here is a key sentence:
Israel has taken a more organic, holistic approach to CT that relies on innovation and creativity and is aimed at deterring and creating divisions within terror groups, and between the groups and their constituencies through coercion and/or persuasion.
It ends with:
What Israel has shown is that terrorism is not something that can be defeated, but it is something that one can learn to live with. If Israelis are to move towards a world in which they needn’t worry about terror attacks and the continued cycle of violence, a solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict must be found.

Authors bio:https://www.aspi.org.au/bio/isaac-kfir
Link:https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-israeli-approach-to-counterterrorism/

(https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-israeli-approach-to-counterterrorism/)

davidbfpo
10-15-2018, 08:41 PM
An insight into the underground war between the IDF and the Gaza tunnel diggers. It starts with:
Based in three trailers near the Gaza border, with advanced computers and technologies, is 'the lab': 10 soldiers—some of whom finished their physics degree in high school—who already found 15 terror tunnels, the latest neutralized this week; when the need arises, they go out to the field and under the ground; 'finding a tunnel is not a scavenger's hunt. It's a game of chest against Hamas,' says one.
Link:https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5370114,00.html

I thought there was a thread on the underground war, the search function does not help; perhaps earlier posts are here?

davidbfpo
12-19-2018, 08:07 PM
An article from the Jerusalem Post on the IDF -v- tunnellers; topical as the IDF are working right up to the Lebanese border to dismantle tunnels that came south.
Link:http://https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Tunnels-and-terror-How-terror-organizations-got-a-PhD-in-tunneling-574660

For details on Operation Northern Shield there are four reports via:https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/c/hezbollah/

davidbfpo
12-26-2018, 09:22 PM
A SWJ article, which I missed:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/israel-winning-underground-fight

The author also has a book 'Underground Warfare', published in January 2018, for details:https://global.oup.com/academic/product/underground-warfare-9780190457259?cc=us&lang=en&

Reviews are on the previous link; there is only one on Amazon. Her bio:https://www.ict.org.il/Worker.aspx?ID=13#gsc.tab=0

There are three post-publication video talks by her via Google / YouTube.

AdamG
12-30-2018, 11:37 PM
In the night of December 25th, The Israeli Air Force (IAF) delivered its first clandestine strike on Syrian targets after President Trump announced the withdrawal of U.S. troops. As assessed in our latest policy impact analysis and recently reinforced by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, the U.S. withdrawal will force Israel to ramp up its counter-Iran operations in Syria. The “Christmas raid” is as much a political statement as it is a continuation of the over 100 Israeli covert airstrikes in Syria. The Syrian Air Defense Forces (SADF) showed a mixed performance, but managed to intercept the majority of Israel’s air-launched missiles.

https://t-intell.com/2018/12/30/israels-christmas-raid-in-syria-target-assessment-and-russian-reaction/?fbclid=IwAR1udL_-eqBwXmuRM9Ccbsqq09iFacusdB2rtP05isS_1DyA9BJSLEw6Nb o