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View Full Version : Countering Lind-dinistas - if the mission is impossible, don't blame me



TheCurmudgeon
04-25-2014, 02:05 PM
I am looking for assistance with a project. Normally I would ask in the RFI section but there is a thread going there that I don’t want to step on, so I make my Request For Assistance here.

I am getting tired of the Lind’s of the world who feel that the fact we could not create a stable democracy in either Iraq or Afghanistan as a failure of Army Leadership. My response is that the military could not create such a political entity because it is impossible to do. You cannot create a stable democracy where the conditions do not exist to support it. You certainly cannot do it by external force of arms.

My basic argument I have. Three points:

1. The requisites for democratization did not exist in either Iraq or Afghanistan.

2. Attempting to create a democracy where one was not possible created instability perpetuating the conflict

3. COIN could not overcome 1 and 2. Pop-Centric COIN is correct, but it cannot create legitimacy. It must adapt to the desires of the population.

The three arguments support the final point that the failure was never on the part of the military. The mission was de facto impossible. Therefore, to look to reform the military based on the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan is folly. The military is good at what it is designed to do. It is not good at social engineering, nor should it be.

What I am looking for is any references or anecdotes to support any of the three arguments.

I am also happy to listen to counter-arguments, as I would like to address them as well.

Thanks

Stan aka the curmudgeon

IwPotentate
04-25-2014, 04:07 PM
Why Nations Fail by Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson. Not a military tomb by any means, but is an easy read with historic examples that do a good job of providing a baseline understanding of conditions required for "democracy" and thus COIN. Good hunting.

davidbfpo
04-25-2014, 05:04 PM
For those who do not read everything published by Small Wars, of late William Lind has appeared on the following:

1) The Continuing Irrelevance of William Lind - a SWJ article, with two comments and is on:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-continuing-irrelevance-of-william-lind

2) Our Debating Military - a SWJ Blog notice, with no comments and on:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/our-debating-military

3) Mr. Lind, May We Focus Our Rage Please?- a SWJ Blog notice, with four comments and on:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mr-lind-may-we-focus-our-rage-please

4) Gardening in a “Barren” Officer Corps- a SWJ notice, with three comments and on:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/gardening-in-a-%E2%80%9Cbarren%E2%80%9D-officer-corps

Yes there are other, older items which mention Mr Lind, these appear to be those that are relevant.

These two SWJ Blog notices appear relevant: COIN's funeral an FP article: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/coin%E2%80%99s-funeral and Next COIN Manual Tries to Take Commanders Beyond Iraq, Afghanistan on:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/next-coin-manual-tries-to-take-commanders-beyond-iraq-afghanistan

Fuchs
04-25-2014, 07:31 PM
A widely defined negative is impossible to prove, so it's impossible to prove that the mission was impossible.
This means it's faulty to use this assertion as a cornerstone of a case.

On the other hand, the burden of proof falls on the other party - but it's impossible to prove that the mission was possible.


The disagreement is no fertile ground for a debate, as both parties are logically unable to prove even only their assumptions. This leaves a huge playing field for unfounded assertions, and basically no potential for a conclusive, decisive argument.


It's much easier to argue that a political effort should be carried by political forces, not by military forces. It's hardly possible to make a conclusive case for the assumption that military forces should execute a political effort that cannot succeed by disarming the opposition alone.
State Dept. 'lost' the Iraq occupation by not throwing its weight into the conflict.

TheCurmudgeon
04-25-2014, 08:03 PM
A widely defined negative is impossible to prove, so it's impossible to prove that the mission was impossible.
This means it's faulty to use this assertion as a cornerstone of a case.

On the other hand, the burden of proof falls on the other party - but it's impossible to prove that the mission was possible.


The disagreement is no fertile ground for a debate, as both parties are logically unable to prove even only their assumptions. This leaves a huge playing field for unfounded assertions, and basically no potential for a conclusive, decisive argument.


It's much easier to argue that a political effort should be carried by political forces, not by military forces. It's hardly possible to make a conclusive case for the assumption that military forces should execute a political effort that cannot succeed by disarming the opposition alone.
State Dept. 'lost' the Iraq occupation by not throwing its weight into the conflict.

I will work in probabilities. How does a 1 in 1,725 chance of success based on the known socioeconomic factors in play in Iraq in 2004. So, yes, I can't prove an impossibility, I can assert that it was highly improbable.

Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq (http://www.lehigh.edu/~bm05/Iraq/IS_33.4.moon.pdf).

In fact, there was almost no known factor (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60276/tony-smith-and-larry-diamond/was-iraq-a-fools-errand)in favor of democracy in Iraq. This quote is from a 2004 article:


Iraq lacks any of the preconditions academics generally accept as being necessary for democratization to succeed. It has no middle class to speak of independent from the state; oil revenues, the life-line of any Iraqi regime, are notorious for their ability to centralize rather than democratize power; the country has no tradition of limited or responsible government; national identity is weak in the face of rival religious or ethnic loyalties; regional neighbors will do what they can to undermine whatever democratizing movements exist; and the democrats themselves lack a figure such as Nelson Mandela or Kim Dae Jung who could give them leadership.

I think I am safe to make the assertion I will make.

Fuchs
04-25-2014, 08:07 PM
After the fact. Our perceptions are now tainted by experience.
This clouds our vision for what was actually in the realm of possibilities.

I suppose a "pre-1982 Lebanon"-style republic was possible. It would have required a balancing of powers, and enough commitment to the folly that the powers in-country believe in the persistence of the balancing.

TheCurmudgeon
04-25-2014, 08:39 PM
After the fact. Our perceptions are now tainted by experience.
This clouds our vision for what was actually in the realm of possibilities.


The factors that were missing were well known in 2004. They were based off a 1959 research paper. They were ignored by the political leadership who choose to believe the "end of history" crowd like Larry Diamond and Francis Fukiyama. The fact that it did not come about meant that it was, for all intents and purposes, outside the realm of probability.

Fuchs
04-25-2014, 08:56 PM
Probability.

I remember some probability estimates, though only vaguely.
They were about the probability of the commies winning the Cold War because of the softness and defensiveness of the West.

I think I read those in the mid-80's. Those probability figures were rather high.

davidbfpo
04-25-2014, 09:26 PM
Curmudegeon's first post cited in part:
My basic argument I have. Three points:

1. The requisites for democratization did not exist in either Iraq or Afghanistan.

2. Attempting to create a democracy where one was not possible created instability perpetuating the conflict

3. COIN could not overcome 1 and 2. Pop-Centric COIN is correct, but it cannot create legitimacy. It must adapt to the desires of the population.


Now a few years ago I attended a conference on the Middle East and a number of Arab speakers stressed to them 'democracy' did not mean first and foremost 'representative democracy'. To them accountability was far more important whether by the rule of law, less corruption etc.

My "armchair" understanding of Afghanistan is that in the rural areas there was a form of direct democracy, mainly exercised by elders and in jirgas. I suspect it helped that the state had very little power or functions beyond the cities - long before Soviet or allied intervention. Carter Malkasian's book covers this well.

I wonder what are 'the requisites for democracy'. One thing for sure in either Afghanistan or Iraq they are not what we have or thought they should have.

slapout9
04-25-2014, 09:53 PM
Curmudgy,
This is a link to a thread I started in 2010 after starting my own assessment of Lind and his concept of 4GW. I started by getting a copy of Lind's book on Maneuver Warfare and reading several of his articles from various sources. This man has been the victim of one of the most vicious slander (Political Correctness) Campaigns that I have ever seen.


http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9484

former_0302
04-25-2014, 09:58 PM
I am getting tired of the Lind’s of the world who feel that the fact we could not create a stable democracy in either Iraq or Afghanistan as a failure of Army Leadership. My response is that the military could not create such a political entity because it is impossible to do. You cannot create a stable democracy where the conditions do not exist to support it. You certainly cannot do it by external force of arms.

My basic argument I have. Three points:

1. The requisites for democratization did not exist in either Iraq or Afghanistan.

2. Attempting to create a democracy where one was not possible created instability perpetuating the conflict

3. COIN could not overcome 1 and 2. Pop-Centric COIN is correct, but it cannot create legitimacy. It must adapt to the desires of the population.

The three arguments support the final point that the failure was never on the part of the military. The mission was de facto impossible. Therefore, to look to reform the military based on the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan is folly. The military is good at what it is designed to do. It is not good at social engineering, nor should it be.

What I am looking for is any references or anecdotes to support any of the three arguments.

I am also happy to listen to counter-arguments, as I would like to address them as well.

Thanks

Stan aka the curmudgeon

I have a bit of a counter-argument for you. In general, I agree with most of your points... but I cannot understand how you do not view this as at least a partial failure of our military leadership. Particularly in light of the other points you make, specifically calling the mission "impossible."

1. Accepting your premise that the mission is "impossible," the question that naturally arises to my mind is who is it that should know what constitutes an impossible mission for the military?

2. If you do not know that an impossible mission is, in fact, impossible, whose fault is that?

3. If you do know that a mission you are given is impossible, but you decide to give it the old college try anyway, as opposed to, say, resigning in protest that your boss is about to spend a lot of blood and treasure in pursuit of something that you know to be impossible, whose fault is that?

The answer to all of the above is Army and Marine leadership. The answer to (1) is simply a matter of employing your troops in line with their capabilities. If you willingly employ your troops out of line with their capabilities, you should expect either failure or a miracle, the former being significantly more likely. The answer to (2) has to do with professional competence. If you don't understand that a mission is impossible, why not? Should (a) the fact that it is impossible have been obvious to you from the outset, or (b) is it that what you were doing was so far outside of both your own and others' past experience that you could not reasonably have been expected to understand the enormity of the endeavor? The answer to (3) has to do with moral courage. If you did understand the impossibility of your task, why didn't you fall on your own sword to prevent it from happening?

Personally, I think that the right answer is probably mostly in line with 2(b). However, even if that's the case, it doesn't absolve our senior leadership in totality, though more so than the other cases. In the case of 2(b), I'd say it makes them guilty of extreme over-optimism. As in, the sort of optimism which would lead someone to believe that they can cross the Pacific Ocean in a single bound...

If it's not 2(b), but one of the other cases, that leads to significantly different conclusions...

TheCurmudgeon
04-25-2014, 10:28 PM
Curmudegeon's first post cited in part:

Now a few years ago I attended a conference on the Middle East and a number of Arab speakers stressed to them 'democracy' did not mean first and foremost 'representative democracy'. To them accountability was far more important whether by the rule of law, less corruption etc.

My "armchair" understanding of Afghanistan is that in the rural areas there was a form of direct democracy, mainly exercised by elders and in jirgas. I suspect it helped that the state had very little power or functions beyond the cities - long before Soviet or allied intervention. Carter Malkasian's book covers this well.

I wonder what are 'the requisites for democracy'. One thing for sure in either Afghanistan or Iraq they are not what we have or thought they should have.

The definition of "Democracy" causes many problems.

The original article is here (http://homepages.wmich.edu/~plambert/comp/lipset.pdf). Essentially, they were income level (wealth), education, industrialization, and urbanization (from memory). Much more study had been done particularly in the 1990s to explain why democracy beat out communism. In any case, most of this was well known.

Isolated localities often use some form of "democracy" in that the heads of the local households get together to decide matters that concern all. But this is not the liberal democracy as we know it with universal human rights. :eek:

Rule of Law is problematic, because that translates into procedural legitimacy, which simply means that you are following the social norms and rules of the society . Stoning a women for being raped may represent the appropriate action. Interfering with that stoning may be seen as failing to uphold the rule of law. To often these vague terms are tossed around like they have a common meaning. They do not.

TheCurmudgeon
04-25-2014, 10:33 PM
Curmudgy,
This is a link to a thread I started in 2010 after starting my own assessment of Lind and his concept of 4GW. I started by getting a copy of Lind's book on Maneuver Warfare and reading several of his articles from various sources. This man has been the victim of one of the most vicious slander (Political Correctness) Campaigns that I have ever seen.


http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9484

Slap, while Lind is my current target, he is simply a representative of a wider group of civilians who want to place the blame for the failures of the last 12 years squarely on the military. I don't care if they choose to blame us for their failures. Just don't tell me I need to fix what is not broken.

We have problems, don't get me wrong. But looking at why we failed to create a democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan is not our problem. It was beyond the capabilities of the resources and time put against the problem.

TheCurmudgeon
04-25-2014, 10:39 PM
I have a bit of a counter-argument for you. In general, I agree with most of your points... but I cannot understand how you do not view this as at least a partial failure of our military leadership. Particularly in light of the other points you make, specifically calling the mission "impossible."

1. Accepting your premise that the mission is "impossible," the question that naturally arises to my mind is who is it that should know what constitutes an impossible mission for the military?

2. If you do not know that an impossible mission is, in fact, impossible, whose fault is that?

3. If you do know that a mission you are given is impossible, but you decide to give it the old college try anyway, as opposed to, say, resigning in protest that your boss is about to spend a lot of blood and treasure in pursuit of something that you know to be impossible, whose fault is that?

The answer to all of the above is Army and Marine leadership. The answer to (1) is simply a matter of employing your troops in line with their capabilities. If you willingly employ your troops out of line with their capabilities, you should expect either failure or a miracle, the former being significantly more likely. The answer to (2) has to do with professional competence. If you don't understand that a mission is impossible, why not? Should (a) the fact that it is impossible have been obvious to you from the outset, or (b) is it that what you were doing was so far outside of both your own and others' past experience that you could not reasonably have been expected to understand the enormity of the endeavor? The answer to (3) has to do with moral courage. If you did understand the impossibility of your task, why didn't you fall on your own sword to prevent it from happening?

Personally, I think that the right answer is probably mostly in line with 2(b). However, even if that's the case, it doesn't absolve our senior leadership in totality, though more so than the other cases. In the case of 2(b), I'd say it makes them guilty of extreme over-optimism. As in, the sort of optimism which would lead someone to believe that they can cross the Pacific Ocean in a single bound...

If it's not 2(b), but one of the other cases, that leads to significantly different conclusions...

Former, first, thanks for the counterargument.

There were certainly high ranking members of the military who should have known that the plan had holes. GEN Franks high on that list. I will address that towards the end of the article.

But is War is an extension of policy, then we rely on our politicians to lay out the policy. Democratizing the middle east with a Pollyanna view of what that was going to take, and then blaming the failure to succeed on the military, I have a problem with.

We are not trained as political scientists or sociologists. We learn the art and science of war. We depend on the politicians to get the political science right. We are not in a position to tell them they got it wrong. As I have been told many times, my only option is to resign. That does not fix the problem.

TheCurmudgeon
04-25-2014, 11:01 PM
Probability.

I remember some probability estimates, though only vaguely.
They were about the probability of the commies winning the Cold War because of the softness and defensiveness of the West.

I think I read those in the mid-80's. Those probability figures were rather high.

I never saw any probability estimates of success of creating a democratic Iraq or Afghanistan. If you find any, let me know. All the ones I have found, dating back to 2004, say it was not possible.

If you find anything saying that it was possible, I would love to see it.

Essentially, what I am finding is that every academic said it was not possible, but the administration ignored that and gave the military their marching orders. If you find anything counter to that let me know.

Fuchs
04-25-2014, 11:54 PM
Very quick google search
http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:22383/eth-22383-31.pdf

There are always at least a few optimists.

TheCurmudgeon
04-26-2014, 12:27 AM
Very quick google search
http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:22383/eth-22383-31.pdf

There are always at least a few optimists.

How do I translate this?

Dayuhan
04-26-2014, 12:35 AM
State Dept. 'lost' the Iraq occupation by not throwing its weight into the conflict.

I can't agree with that. State has no more capacity for "nation-building" than the military does. As far as I can determine the US Government has no such capacity, which is why the job got dropped on the military.


Slap, while Lind is my current target, he is simply a representative of a wider group of civilians who want to place the blame for the failures of the last 12 years squarely on the military. I don't care if they choose to blame us for their failures. Just don't tell me I need to fix what is not broken.

We have problems, don't get me wrong. But looking at why we failed to create a democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan is not our problem. It was beyond the capabilities of the resources and time put against the problem.

I couldn't agree more, been chanting this mantra for over a decade: asking an army to build a nation is like asking an engineer to perform surgery. Trying to remake the army into a nation-building force is going to get you an inadequate nation-building force and is also likely to compromise the army's ability to perform its core functions, which could be a real problem if we ever actually need an army.

Even the best hammer in the world makes a very lousy screwdriver. That's not the fault of the hammer, it's the fault of those who choose to deploy the hammer because they forgot that they don't have a screwdriver in their kit.

As you say, none of this means the army has no flaws: every institution has flaws and problems, and every institution can improve. Blaming the failure of "nation-building" on flaws in the army, though, is to me both irrational and dangerous, the danger being that efforts to reshape the army to correct those hypothetical "flaws" could render the army less able to perform the functions for which it is actually intended.

Fuchs
04-26-2014, 12:54 AM
How do I translate this?

Give the 2nd page a try... :D


I can't agree with that. State has no more capacity for "nation-building" than the military does. As far as I can determine the US Government has no such capacity, which is why the job got dropped on the military.

Nation-building takes decades.

The establishment of a political system and quasi-consensus on the other hand can be largely accomplished in two years. State Dept. could have drawn together the various factions through diplomacy -with many career diplomats and politicians- towards such a quasi-consensus.

The military was fighting symptoms of political failure, not doing policy itself until it was too late. Bremer et al treated the challenge as an administration challenge when it was in fact a challenge of drawing diverging parties towards a quasi-consensus on how to run the country (how to distribute the spoils).

TheCurmudgeon
04-26-2014, 01:17 AM
Fuchs,

Read "Schizophrenic Doctrine: Why We Need to Separate Democratization Out of Stability and COIN Doctrine" It was simply not possible to create a democracy in Iraq or Afghanistan.

I know people in the West want to believe that. They want to believe that everyone wants freedom. That is not the case. Sometimes they just want to survive.

I wish the answers I keep coming up with were different. But blaming the Army for the failures of the political elite is not going to change human nature.

Oh yeah, the second time I got the English. Thanks

Fuchs
04-26-2014, 01:36 AM
You do know you sound apologetic?


Let's assume for a while that the mission was impossible.
That would be an even bigger failure than failing in a possible mission!

The top brass' job was to understand the limits of the own institution (to recognize that the mission is impossible) and to inform the political (civilian) leadership about its findings.
Said leadership surely insisted, but that's the moment when a non-failing institution would proceed to simply sacrifice its top brass one after one, as they insist on the finding.
They didn't for career reasons, and the army surely enjoyed all that growth in budget and numbers (all bureaucracies do) - and failed its nation by consuming a huge budgets, inflicting huge long-term costs, sacrificing lives and limbs and achieving close to nothing.


And you surely recognize that the alternative criticism above is not beyond the 3GW crowd's established repertoire, right?


The army cannot escape the blame for its failure; pointing at retired politicians doesn't deflect anything.

TheCurmudgeon
04-26-2014, 02:39 AM
Fuchs. I am not apologizing, only offering condolences.

To blame the military is to absolve the civilians ... And those who believe that democracy was possible.

Worse, using it as justification to attack the military is simply unforgivable.

former_0302
04-26-2014, 02:43 AM
But is War is an extension of policy, then we rely on our politicians to lay out the policy. Democratizing the middle east with a Pollyanna view of what that was going to take, and then blaming the failure to succeed on the military, I have a problem with.

War is certainly an extension of policy, but the two are not separable IMO. It makes no sense for a nation to set as policy something which it knows is not achievable militarily, and it is incumbent upon the professional military to 1) know what is and is not militarily achievable, and 2) to explain it to the policy makers in no uncertain terms. Kim Jong Whoever is in charge of NK now could set as his policy tomorrow that it was necessary for NK to conquer China (a task similarly impossible for NK, in my view, as us democratizing Afghanistan). It's his military leaders' job to explain to him that it's a REALLY bad idea. In that country, they might get shot for saying something that the boss doesn't want to hear. Over here, they might have to take their pension a bit earlier than they had planned, and then go get a cushy job at some think tank making six figures and thinking big thoughts. My sympathy doesn't exactly overflow.


We are not trained as political scientists or sociologists. We learn the art and science of war. We depend on the politicians to get the political science right. We are not in a position to tell them they got it wrong. As I have been told many times, my only option is to resign. That does not fix the problem.

No argument as to our training. We weren't even really prepared for COIN, never mind nation-building. While you're right that the military is not in a position to tell pols they're wrong with the political science part, it is certainly within the military's purview to explain its own capabilities and limitations to them. Thereby letting them know, among their policy options, which ones they can actually expect to succeed. The distance between "overthrow the Taliban" and "make Afghanistan a functioning democracy" is so vast in scope that you could measure it on a galactic scale. One is achievable, the other...

Maybe if enough people resigned, it would send the right message... Because frankly, those who have stayed in haven't fixed the problem either. Unfortunately, I haven't seen anything that indicates that the problem is getting solved. Only that we have a sexual assault epidemic, that women should be able to do any job men do in the military, and budget, budget, sequestration, budget... none of which addresses the problems we are discussing. I'm not confident that the solution can come from within the belly of the beast.

TheCurmudgeon
04-26-2014, 03:32 AM
Former 302,

First off you assume that the military understood not just Nation Building but Democratization theory? Yeah, right.

I am sorry, but all this arguing that the "military should have known" only goes to let the politicians, the people who REALLY should have known, off the hook.

It would have been one thing if they would have let it go with "you guys suck cause you keep losing." It is another whey they say "not only do you guys suck cause you keep losing, but you are broke and you need to fix yourself before we give you another stupid mission." Sorry, not waiting for the next shoe to drop.

Perhaps what needs fixing is the civil-military relationship.

Fuchs
04-26-2014, 03:40 AM
Worse, using it as justification to attack the military is simply unforgivable.

Hardly. The military is held in much higher regard in the United States than usual in most developed countries. A dent in its image is hardly unforgivable.

In fact, criticism and questioning the performance, capabilities and ways is very useful. Even criticism that misses a point can be useful in fostering an environment in which actual deficiencies are quickly exposed and remedied.

An army is an armed bureaucracy, and bureaucracies need constant oversight and pressure, or else they go astray on their autopilot which maximises their budget, personnel, and their leadership's comfort.

It's also very typical of bureaucracies to expect and demand respect for their work, and to react appalled to external criticism.



An army is supposed to serve its country (or its dictator).
The U.S.Army has evidently not served the interests of its country in the Iraq occupation, though it fooled itself into believing so and superficially it "served" (just to what end?).
It didn't serve by achieving an outcome better than no war nor did it accomplish its mission nor did it protect the country from the wastefulness of warfare by forcefully insisting on the impossibility of the mission.
It was in no way useful.

A trillion to three trillion dollars, thousands of KIA, ten thousands of cripples and nothing to show for it.


It would be an interesting sociology/psychology research project to identify what it takes to believe that the army did not fail its country grossly in that whole affair.

TheCurmudgeon
04-26-2014, 04:02 AM
Hardly. The military is held in much higher regard in the United States than usual in most developed countries. A dent in its image is hardly unforgivable.

In fact, criticism and questioning the performance, capabilities and ways is very useful. Even criticism that misses a point can be useful in fostering an environment in which actual deficiencies are quickly exposed and remedied.

An army is an armed bureaucracy, and bureaucracies need constant oversight and pressure, or else they go astray on their autopilot which maximises their budget, personnel, and their leadership's comfort.

It's also very typical of bureaucracies to expect and demand respect for their work, and to react appalled to external criticism.



An army is supposed to serve its country (or its dictator).
The U.S.Army has evidently not served the interests of its country in the Iraq occupation, though it fooled itself into believing so and superficially it "served" (just to what end?).
It didn't serve by achieving an outcome better than no war nor did it accomplish its mission nor did it protect the country from the wastefulness of warfare by forcefully insisting on the impossibility of the mission.
It was in no way useful.

A trillion to three trillion dollars, thousands of KIA, ten thousands of cripples and nothing to show for it.


It would be an interesting sociology/psychology research project to identify what it takes to believe that the army did not fail its country grossly in that whole affair.

Can you restate all that into a rational counterarguement?

slapout9
04-26-2014, 04:48 AM
Slap, while Lind is my current target, he is simply a representative of a wider group of civilians who want to place the blame for the failures of the last 12 years squarely on the military. I don't care if they choose to blame us for their failures. Just don't tell me I need to fix what is not broken.

We have problems, don't get me wrong. But looking at why we failed to create a democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan is not our problem. It was beyond the capabilities of the resources and time put against the problem.

You might want to recheck your Targeting. Lind was one of the first to openly oppose Nation Building. One of his famous quotes was "We are trying to turn Afghanistan into Switzerland" or something close to that. If you get the chance listen the radio interview from 2007 I think he starts with a discussion about Somalia.
Here is the link http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hjQOMlpH9A

former_0302
04-26-2014, 05:00 AM
Former 302,

First off you assume that the military understood not just Nation Building but Democratization theory? Yeah, right.

Not at all. Rather, I assume that they knew that they DIDN'T understand it, and therefore should know to stay in their lane. How successful is any large organization at coming up with a way to do something that basically no one's ever done before and no one is trained how to do under fire? You might as well try to run a tank/infantry integration range with a bunch of civilians who are picking up a rifle for the first time. The result is predictable.


I am sorry, but all this arguing that the "military should have known" only goes to let the politicians, the people who REALLY should have known, off the hook.

All I'm arguing for is that the military should have known its own capabilities and limitations, and have delivered potential COAs to the policy makers which were in line with them. If the military says that it can do something that it can't, whose fault is that? If, on the other hand, they are ordered to do something while protesting that they can't do it, that's a different situation. It seems to me the former, and not the latter, is what actually occurred though. I may be in error.

In any event, I'm not excusing the politicians; they are a breed of people permanently divorced from reality. If those advising them are equally divorced from reality, however, it's something of an exponential effect of bad.


It would have been one thing if they would have let it go with "you guys suck cause you keep losing." It is another whey they say "not only do you guys suck cause you keep losing, but you are broke and you need to fix yourself before we give you another stupid mission." Sorry, not waiting for the next shoe to drop.

Perhaps what needs fixing is the civil-military relationship.

I'd agree that the civil-military relationship is indeed what is broken. I could write a novel about why I think it is, but to keep it short, it seems to me that our instant-information age and sensationalist media have made the military's job infinitely more difficult. I never let my boys take personal cameras outside the wire, precisely so that no videos or pictures ever found their way into the interwebs. But what do you do about youtube videos of Marines pissing on TB corpses? There would have been little if any rage about such an incident in WWII. Probably would have been in VN, were it possible, but it wasn't. Nowadays, the President of the US has to be concerned about what a Lance Corporal is doing. Think FDR ever gave much thought to the political ramifications of what some E2 somewhere was doing? We have so much oversight that we pay attention to all the things we can't get caught screwing up, instead of all the things that we're actually out there to do...

I'm rambling now... but to end, I just want you to understand that I'm mainly playing devil's advocate here. As I said initially, I agree with your points in the main.

Fuchs
04-26-2014, 12:24 PM
Can you restate all that into a rational counterarguement?

It wasn't so much a counterargument as some pushing against a pro-institution bias. The problems with your conclusions begin with your narrative.

TheCurmudgeon
04-26-2014, 02:13 PM
I'm rambling now... but to end, I just want you to understand that I'm mainly playing devil's advocate here. As I said initially, I agree with your points in the main.

I appreciate devil in you. :wry:

I need to see where I am lacking.

TheCurmudgeon
04-26-2014, 02:16 PM
It wasn't so much a counterargument as some pushing against a pro-institution bias. The problems with your conclusions begin with your narrative.

If what you are seeing is institutional bias then you are missing the point of the argument. No one could have accomplished that mission. Period. With that said, why are you now attacking the military for failing to do the impossible (OK, improbable)?

I could understand an argument to re-look the civil-military relationship. Perhaps give the military the power to say "No", or give them the ability to go directly to the public with the failings of the administration. But I don't really like either of those, In the end we are a tool of the administrations policy.

Fuchs
04-26-2014, 02:31 PM
Humans are still hardcoded for social interaction in clans.
If someone attacks your clan - that's an attack on you.
Someone criticizes your institution - that's (perceived as) a critique of yourself.
The typical reaction is that the clan members rally and fight back.

Critique can be useful even if it's inaccurate, though. It is necessary to tolerate and embrace critique in order to overcome the partisanship and to improve (the own clan).



Here's what you did:

(1) Someone criticised your clan with the allegation of failure.

(2) You respond that your clan is free of guilt because some other clan failed allegedly.



Here's what would be useful:

(1) Someone criticised your clan with the allegation of failure.

(2) You respond by exploiting this reminder about clan imperfection to push for clan improvements, to foster beginner's interest in clan improvement and to create/maintain an environment in which both is standard.

TheCurmudgeon
04-26-2014, 03:50 PM
Humans are still hardcoded for social interaction in clans.
If someone attacks your clan - that's an attack on you.
Someone criticizes your institution - that's (perceived as) a critique of yourself.
The typical reaction is that the clan members rally and fight back.

Critique can be useful even if it's inaccurate, though. It is necessary to tolerate and embrace critique in order to overcome the partisanship and to improve (the own clan).



Here's what you did:

(1) Someone criticised your clan with the allegation of failure.

(2) You respond that your clan is free of guilt because some other clan failed allegedly.



Here's what would be useful:

(1) Someone criticised your clan with the allegation of failure.

(2) You respond by exploiting this reminder about clan imperfection to push for clan improvements, to foster beginner's interest in clan improvement and to create/maintain an environment in which both is standard.

Your assumptions are twofold. First, that I believe the criticism is valid. It is not. Second, that I am defending a specific institution. I am not.
:)

Fuchs
04-26-2014, 05:12 PM
The first assumption is not necessary, nor did I want to imply it.

The second "assumption" is not an "assumption", but an observation - a description of a fact. You are defending the U.S.Army/U.S.Military against Lind's (and similar) critiques.


I am getting tired of the Lind’s (...) as a failure of Army Leadership. My response is that the military could not create such a political entity because it is impossible to do.
(...)
The three arguments support the final point that the failure was never on the part of the military.

Now if that's not the axe you have to grind, what is it? Aversion against Lind? That would be an even lesser reason for a counter-critique.


My impression is that your counter-critique is a gut-level reaction, even though you attempted to make it look logic-driven with your three points.



Here's a technique for how to avoid such an impression and still provide a rebuttal:
(1) Proclaim that Lind cannot prove that the mission was ever possible and how this undermines his case,
then
(2) point out ineffectiveness of last three decades of Lind critique as evidenced by his repetition of old points,
then
(3) point at better opportunities for critique, and need for improvement that (in your opinion) deserves more attention and justifies greater effort and urgency.

(3) would signal a honest interest in improvement and it would signal that the reaction is not simply partisan defensive.

TheCurmudgeon
04-27-2014, 01:45 AM
It was a gut level reaction, but not in defense of the Army, or really an attack on Lind. It was a gut level reaction to the continuing fallacy that you can create democracies. That if we had just understood or implemented COIN better or had followed the dictates of 4GW. Its all bunk. The problem was the mission was not feasible.

I would not care if Lind was attacking State or the UN, he is still wrong to place blame on an organization for failing to do what is, for all intents and purposes, an impossibility. As the fictional character Dr. Manhattan points out in my favorite quote, you can't change human nature.

BTW, as long as that fallacy exists, the same one that was behind the idea of modernization in Vietnam, we will get involved in this stupidity again.

Fuchs, I get the feeling that you disagree with my base proposition, that it was a practical impossibility to create a functioning stable democracy in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Dayuhan
04-27-2014, 02:07 AM
Here's what you did:

(1) Someone criticised your clan with the allegation of failure.

(2) You respond that your clan is free of guilt because some other clan failed allegedly.

I have nothing to do with the any of the clans in question, and in my view the failure was primarily at the policy level, in selecting utterly unrealistic objectives and pursuing them with tools poorly suited for the purpose.

I do suspect that the military, at the senior leadership, could and should have explained these things to the policymakers much more aggressively. Since I'm not privy to the discussions at that level, I don't really know what was said and what the reaction was. At the operational level, of course, the officers and men involved would have had little input or choice.

Part of this whole discussion, of course, is the nature of "mission creep"... at the early stages of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq the military leadership may not have recognized the extent to which the military would have the nation building task dumped on the military. Again, though, an honest analysis would require detailed knowledge of the discussions that took place at that time.

TheCurmudgeon
04-27-2014, 02:45 AM
Dayuhan, while the historical story of how the military ended up with the mission to create democracies might be interesting, I am not sure it is germane to the issue at hand. The fact is that creating a stable, democratic Iraq was part of our mission.

Our mission:

A Stable and Democratic Iraq: Now that coalition military forces have ousted Saddam Hussein's regime, the United States will work side-by-side with the Iraqi people to build a free, democratic, and stable Iraq that does not threaten its people or its neighbors. Our goals are for Iraqis to take full control of their country as soon as possible and to maintain its territorial integrity. We will assist the Iraqi people in their efforts to adopt a new constitution, hold elections, and build a legitimate government based on the consent of the governed and respect for the human rights of all Iraqis. We will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, but not one day longer.

http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm

We fell into it after it did not happen on its own.

wm
04-27-2014, 02:54 AM
The definition of "Democracy" causes many problems.

Also problematic, by the way, is the scope of application of the term. As was pointed out, at some level, some inhabitants of parts of Afghanistan may have had democracy. However, the so-called nation state Afghanistan did not (and I suspect probably never will) have democracy. I say so-called nation state because it and many other problematic nations in the world today, had their nationhood handed to them (or forced upon them) by their former imperial masters/colonial overseers/occupiers.

In what follows I am taking a lead from what Fuchs pointed out in post 32,

The West has managed to ensure a mess in a lot of the so-called 3rd world by the way it realigned the world after the last 2 world wars. Now they are trying to defend their bad past by trying to fix their mistakes. But, surprise, surprise,they are using almost the exact same means as they used to create the first problem.

First, the West told folks, rather forcefully in many cases, what nation they were by telling them where their boundaries were, rather than letting them figure that out for themselves. Now the West is telling them, again rather forcefully, what kind of governments they must have.

This seems like two failures in observing the principle of self-determination. I suspect each is derived from some sense of guilt for having caused problems in the first place and now trying to assuage that guilt by "fixing" things. But why we do it is less important than that we do it and will not stop.

I seem to remember that the definition of madness is doing the same thing twice and expecting different outcomes. :eek:

So, perhaps the 1st world nations could stop telling people outside their own borders where to draw their boundaries or what kind of governments to have. If enough of those other people can get their act together long enough to create a self-governing entity that seems to have staying power (what counts as self-governing and for staying power for how long are as yet to be determined), then viola, we have a legitimate nation that may ask for help from the "stable" first world nations and expect to receive it. Any other form of invitation should be politely declined. Any impulse to intervene without an invitation should be immediately suppressed, hopefully by the citizens of the nation whose leadership has the impulse. If the majority of the nation has succumbed to lunacy, then the other first world nations must intervene, just as any family would with when Uncle Wally starts dancing in the street naked.

Dealing with non-state actors who are not attempting to engage in nation building is a job for police forces, not the military. So is dealing with would be nation builders who use terrorism outside their own planned national boundaries as a technique for trying to get what they want.

The devil, of course, is in the details--like what happens if/when the Pashtuns want part of Afghanistan, part of Iran, and part of Pakistan. But even details need a basic framework to contain them, first, don't they?

How does this respond to Lind? I suggest he is just one of those crazies who try to get different outcomes with the same method.

Bill Moore
04-27-2014, 11:23 AM
Stepping back and looking at the bigger picture if strategy is aligning ends, ways, and means using all elements of national power and our stated ends were stable democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan what exactly did our military fail to do when it comes to the use of military power to set conditions for this to happen?

I think most agree those ends are laughable, but that is what they were. I will be the first to self criticize and critic my military, but for criticism to be valuable it should be constructive. If our military did what differently exactly, then how would it have changed the outcome?

TheCurmudgeon
04-27-2014, 09:49 PM
Stepping back and looking at the bigger picture if strategy is aligning ends, ways, and means using all elements of national power and our stated ends were stable democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan what exactly did our military fail to do when it comes to the use of military power to set conditions for this to happen?

I think most agree those ends are laughable, but that is what they were. I will be the first to self criticize and critic my military, but for criticism to be valuable it should be constructive. If our military did what differently exactly, then how would it have changed the outcome?

That is the basic statement I would like to make.

TheCurmudgeon
04-27-2014, 09:54 PM
Also problematic, by the way, is the scope of application of the term. As was pointed out, at some level, some inhabitants of parts of Afghanistan may have had democracy. However, the so-called nation state Afghanistan did not (and I suspect probably never will) have democracy. I say so-called nation state because it and many other problematic nations in the world today, had their nationhood handed to them (or forced upon them) by their former imperial masters/colonial overseers/occupiers.

In what follows I am taking a lead from what Fuchs pointed out in post 32,

The West has managed to ensure a mess in a lot of the so-called 3rd world by the way it realigned the world after the last 2 world wars. Now they are trying to defend their bad past by trying to fix their mistakes. But, surprise, surprise,they are using almost the exact same means as they used to create the first problem.

First, the West told folks, rather forcefully in many cases, what nation they were by telling them where their boundaries were, rather than letting them figure that out for themselves. Now the West is telling them, again rather forcefully, what kind of governments they must have.

This seems like two failures in observing the principle of self-determination. I suspect each is derived from some sense of guilt for having caused problems in the first place and now trying to assuage that guilt by "fixing" things. But why we do it is less important than that we do it and will not stop.

I seem to remember that the definition of madness is doing the same thing twice and expecting different outcomes. :eek:

So, perhaps the 1st world nations could stop telling people outside their own borders where to draw their boundaries or what kind of governments to have. If enough of those other people can get their act together long enough to create a self-governing entity that seems to have staying power (what counts as self-governing and for staying power for how long are as yet to be determined), then viola, we have a legitimate nation that may ask for help from the "stable" first world nations and expect to receive it. Any other form of invitation should be politely declined. Any impulse to intervene without an invitation should be immediately suppressed, hopefully by the citizens of the nation whose leadership has the impulse. If the majority of the nation has succumbed to lunacy, then the other first world nations must intervene, just as any family would with when Uncle Wally starts dancing in the street naked.

Dealing with non-state actors who are not attempting to engage in nation building is a job for police forces, not the military. So is dealing with would be nation builders who use terrorism outside their own planned national boundaries as a technique for trying to get what they want.

The devil, of course, is in the details--like what happens if/when the Pashtuns want part of Afghanistan, part of Iran, and part of Pakistan. But even details need a basic framework to contain them, first, don't they?

How does this respond to Lind? I suggest he is just one of those crazies who try to get different outcomes with the same method.

Boundaries are another part of the problem, and the unwillingness to redefine them. Look at the mission statement: "Our goals are for Iraqis to take full control of their country as soon as possible and to maintain its territorial integrity." Territorial Integrity is code for keeping the borders where they are.

TheCurmudgeon
04-27-2014, 10:03 PM
I am also looking for attempts to "solve" Iraq and Afghanistan via constructive or destructive attempts to "fix" the Army or its doctrine. There is the long running fight between Gentile and Nagl over COIN, the concept of Disruptive Thinkers, and Lind's latest attack. Can anyone think of others?

Dayuhan
04-27-2014, 11:54 PM
Stepping back and looking at the bigger picture if strategy is aligning ends, ways, and means using all elements of national power and our stated ends were stable democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan what exactly did our military fail to do when it comes to the use of military power to set conditions for this to happen?

It would be interesting to have opinions on what conditions would have allowed those ends to be achieved, and whether those conditions were at any point achievable through the application of military force.

AmericanPride
04-28-2014, 04:44 PM
Stepping back and looking at the bigger picture if strategy is aligning ends, ways, and means using all elements of national power and our stated ends were stable democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan what exactly did our military fail to do when it comes to the use of military power to set conditions for this to happen?

I'll throw out a few ideas:

(1) Not emphasizing to the political leadership the military resources that would be required to conduct such a mission; one general did that in his testimony to Congress and was promptly fired. Everyone else subsequently cowered.
(2) Not having a long-term plan of occupation; in Iraq, the plan was to push the regime out of power and hope for spontaneous democratization, which failed to materialize after the whole Iraqi government was dismantled indiscriminately. And in Afghanistan, the reliance on the Northern Alliance and ANSF proved equally problematic in a state with very little history of centralized political control. Notwithstanding the political policies aimed at making good politics instead of good strategy, someone somewhere in the military bureaucracy should have placed a contingency plan of some kind on the shelf rather than wait until orders from their political masters.
(3) The ad-hoc and troublesome pattern of 6-18 month rotations that destroyed any operational continuity in whatever plan that was visualized.
(4) Focusing on the political end-state (democratization) at the expense of the military end-state (disarmanent and/or defeat of the opposition). Victory on the battlefield comes before the collection of the spoils of war!
(5) Minimizing the enormority of the conflicts at hand while gathering all the benefits (i.e. budget, new powers, etc) that came with it. Institutionally, DoD was never put on a 100% war-footing - there was still competing priorities with the "small wars" (i.e. in procurement) that shaped strategic decisions. Following procedures and future force visions were never completely subordinated to the war effort.

AmericanPride
04-28-2014, 05:01 PM
Just some other thoughts on this conversation:

If war is policy by other means, then military officers, at least general officers, are also to some extent responsible for policy. GOs are not simply managers of a large military enterprise only concerned with how military resources are managed, thus absolving them of all responsibility when policy fails, but also have significant input into how those resources should be managed, and towards what ends they are utilized. We should be careful about constructing a myth with the 'stabbed-in-the-back' theme between the military and the political leadership.

And, as many have mentioned in this thread already, since the war effort is subordinate to the political ends, the concept of the 'strategic corporal', et al, is not a perversion of political-military relationships, but that relationship taken to its logical extreme in an era of satured information where now tactical decisions have a direct impact on the political ends itself. But this is also to some extent the nature of 'small wars' that focus on combating non-state actors embedded in the social and political fabric of the operating area; securing local alliances or providing services and infrastructure can shape the battle as much as eliminating key leaders or capturing enemy equipment.

I also disagree that understanding war is exclusive or independent of political science or sociology; we have already agreed that war is a political act, and it is also intensely human endeavor, which places it firmly within both fields of study. There is no excuse in the modern, complex world for senior military officials to be ignorant of either science; this only reinforces the argument that military leaders bear responsibility to some extent for the failures of the wars.

Perhaps the problem is that our generals are managers, not leaders.

TheCurmudgeon
04-28-2014, 05:34 PM
AP, just a quick reply. My intent would not be to claim anyone "stabbed us in the back", only that claims that better tactics or promotion system would have changed the outcome.

I am on the fence about what a general "should" know about sociology and political science versus what they probably did know based on the training they received prior to 9/11. I think we learned that we need a better understanding of the human domain. Not sure if complaining about how things should have been is helpful. But I do plan to emphasis the positive changes that are occurring as a result of this experience.

You could add micro economics to the things generals should know. Luckily at least one General in theater understood the economic consequences of our actions. He was ultimately recognized and moved up. Whether he is a hero of a false demagogue is now a matter of debate.

slapout9
04-28-2014, 10:12 PM
Look at South Korea..... the Captain is in jail and the prime Minister resigned...we need that here. Look what happens when the Generals Phuc-Dup and loose and they did loose.... look what happens....... they get promoted and a gold plated pension.

Every General Officer should be fired and loose his pension if he looses a War. In fact ALL PENSIONS AND BENEFITS SHOULD STOP IMMEDIATELY. I participated in a study in the early 70's either Army or DOD don't remember which one but here was the NEW MILITARY DEAL 6 years you get 60 thousand when you ETS. 10 years 100k, 20 years 200k. No permanent pension and no medical benefits unless injured on active duty.

If you want to fight then you better win and at the end you get a bonus and a well deserved thank you. Accountability it works because it will help create Honor and Respect something that is sadly missing in Government Institutions including the Higher Ranks of the Military.

Fuchs
04-28-2014, 10:54 PM
There is a critical problem in your proposal:

It would motivate the generals whose reputation is at stake to push harder and harder, again and again for some more Friedman unit (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedman_Unit) in order to avoid punishment.

What you're proposing is essentially a bonus system, after all: The pensions turn into a bonus system the moment the general becomes responsible for the war. High performance - high bonus. Failure - no bonus.

I know a governmental agency tasked to support high tech start-ups with equity capital for loans or economic policy purposes.
Its management board also gets bonuses.
Some of the start-ups supported are zombies. They keep getting fresh money in order to avoid that the management board needs to write off previous investments in these failures.



I wrote reputation on top because they wouldn't necessarily lose money. Many flag rank officers (especially those who really lead a campaign) will later 'earn' money with books, speeches, 'consulting' or from the arms industry directly.

wm
04-28-2014, 11:19 PM
I should like to point out here that those in command . . .had no right to exercise a decisive influence on the conduct of the war, but . . . [a senior commander], being responsible for the execution of orders, could make representations if he found the conditions imposed on him too disadvantageous . . . . This is from the memoir of Admiral Reinhard Scheer, commander of the German High Seas Fleet at the Battle of Jutland in WW1. In the chapter from which this quotation is taken, he is discussing the German leadership's deliberations regarding unrestricted submarine warfare.

Sounds like he is advocating a remonstration by the military regarding the paucity of resources (ways and means) to achieve the required end, but he is also suggesting that commenting on the ends is not with the military's brief. But that was a senior officer from Imperial Germany, not from the US Army of the 21st century. Still, I submit that the principle of civilian control may be so ingrained in the US military that senior officers may well have a similar point of view as that expressed by Admiral Scheer.

Folks should be careful what they wish for. Without this deep seated respect for civilian control found in the US Military, the country's changes in government might not have been as stables as they have been.

AmericanPride
04-28-2014, 11:53 PM
wm,

I appreciate your concern, however I wonder if the division in civil-military relations is either artificial or too stringently policed. Do civilians really control the military?

First, 32 of 43 presidents (74.4%) had military service prior to becoming president. Twelve (27.9%) were generals. While these experiences can be separated institutionally, I don't think they can be demarcated on a personal level, meaning that their military experiences, perspectives, skills influenced their policy decisions. On a lower level, the military already influences policy through political actions as a bureaucracy (i.e. the timely announcement of delaying a carrier's refit during the sequestration debate; selective intelligence reporting, etc) or through the revolving door of retiring officials, lobbyists, think tanks, and corporate executives. The military may not decide which country to attack next, but it exercises significant influence on nearly every other policy decision. Is that civilian 'control'?

Second, what about the 'insurgent' approach to influencing civil-military relations and policy decisions? I.e. social media mobilization of veterans to effect a political decision. I think it's now possible that this relationship can be usurped from the bottom-up given the right conditions; i.e. strong moral outrage and mass action mobilized through social media.

Third, it's in military action that the President exercises the most unrestrained executive power contingent only on the cooperation of the military leadership. In this sense, the designation of the President as a 'civilian' is really rather arbitrary insofar he simply does not hold a military rank, but for all other intents and purposes his power is as absolute as any king or dictator restrained only by the increasingly subjective constraint of "lawful orders". The President can invade a country without a declaration of war, detain and surveil US citizens without warrant, and even order their deaths -- all by military actions. By most accounts, the invasion of Iraq was illegal but the military did not object - so where does that leave the assignment of accountability and responsibility?

So, I question the practical realities of the extent of civilian control and wonder where it's boundaries ought to be drawn to optimize military effectiveness and protection of democratic integrity. In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, did the protection of the norm of 'civilian control' exercise such a decisive impact on the senior leaders' incentives that they simply failed to object to bad policy and/or strategy? Or did they perceive opportunities for advancement from a parochial and/or institutional perspective when presented with the policy?

wm
04-29-2014, 04:18 AM
wm,

I appreciate your concern, however I wonder if the division in civil-military relations is either artificial or too stringently policed. Do civilians really control the military?

First, 32 of 43 presidents (74.4%) had military service prior to becoming president. Twelve (27.9%) were generals. While these experiences can be separated institutionally, I don't think they can be demarcated on a personal level, meaning that their military experiences, perspectives, skills influenced their policy decisions. On a lower level, the military already influences policy through political actions as a bureaucracy (i.e. the timely announcement of delaying a carrier's refit during the sequestration debate; selective intelligence reporting, etc) or through the revolving door of retiring officials, lobbyists, think tanks, and corporate executives. The military may not decide which country to attack next, but it exercises significant influence on nearly every other policy decision. Is that civilian 'control'?

Second, what about the 'insurgent' approach to influencing civil-military relations and policy decisions? I.e. social media mobilization of veterans to effect a political decision. I think it's now possible that this relationship can be usurped from the bottom-up given the right conditions; i.e. strong moral outrage and mass action mobilized through social media.

Third, it's in military action that the President exercises the most unrestrained executive power contingent only on the cooperation of the military leadership. In this sense, the designation of the President as a 'civilian' is really rather arbitrary insofar he simply does not hold a military rank, but for all other intents and purposes his power is as absolute as any king or dictator restrained only by the increasingly subjective constraint of "lawful orders". The President can invade a country without a declaration of war, detain and surveil US citizens without warrant, and even order their deaths -- all by military actions. By most accounts, the invasion of Iraq was illegal but the military did not object - so where does that leave the assignment of accountability and responsibility?

So, I question the practical realities of the extent of civilian control and wonder where it's boundaries ought to be drawn to optimize military effectiveness and protection of democratic integrity. In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, did the protection of the norm of 'civilian control' exercise such a decisive impact on the senior leaders' incentives that they simply failed to object to bad policy and/or strategy? Or did they perceive opportunities for advancement from a parochial and/or institutional perspective when presented with the policy?

As you note correctly, POTUS is the US military's Commander-in-Chief. From that perspective every US military member is a subordinate to the POTUS. At the GO/FO level, some are subordinate commanders, and some are staff officers. Staff officers' first rule of conduct is to do everything in their power to find the best course of action and then convince the boss to take that course. However, once the boss makes a decision, the next rule of conduct for the staff is to back that decision to the hilt and make sure it is executed as well as it can be. Subordinate commanders have a similar relationship with their next higher.

Should it turn out that officers are not able to support these two rules of conduct, then they ought not continue to serve. One would hope that they would end their service voluntarily, but sometimes, as in MacArthur's case, they must be removed. Some others may take what I call the Speer defense (after German Armaments Minister Albert Speer) and stay because they believe that their replacements would do even more damage.

The US military may not choose to override the decisions of the President. To do so would be to violate their oath to support and defend the Constitution. Military members may just like any other citizen try to convince those with that power to impeach the President They may testify before Congress as well. But they may not take the law in their own hands as we find in the book "Seven Days in May."

Two things about your discussion of prior Presidents' military service:
1. The fact of their service should have made them aware of the principle of civilian leadership (which they could have used to their advantage as President--I'm not sure that any did however).
2. I find your assertions about the military service of past Presidents to be largely a red herring. Only 3--Washington, Grant and Eisenhower--had experience at a level that I would consider as developing a meaningful understanding of the skills required by the country's chief executive. Of the rest of those who reached GO rank--Arthur, Garfield, both Harrisons, Hayes, Jackson, Johnson, Pierce, and Taylor--only Jackson and Taylor demonstrated significant independent command leadership with continued success. WH Harrison had some success against Indians but failed miserably during the War of 1812. With the possible exception of Benjamin Harrison, the rest were either largely undistinguished in their service or served only at a relatively low level of tactical command (regiment or 19th century brigade). Of this last group, all but one (Pierce) served in the Civil War, a war notable for the number of inept "political" generals.

slapout9
04-29-2014, 04:53 AM
There is a critical problem in your proposal:

It would motivate the generals whose reputation is at stake to push harder and harder, again and again for some more Friedman unit (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedman_Unit) in order to avoid punishment.

What you're proposing is essentially a bonus system, after all: The pensions turn into a bonus system the moment the general becomes responsible for the war. High performance - high bonus. Failure - no bonus.

I know a governmental agency tasked to support high tech start-ups with equity capital for loans or economic policy purposes.
Its management board also gets bonuses.
Some of the start-ups supported are zombies. They keep getting fresh money in order to avoid that the management board needs to write off previous investments in these failures.



I wrote reputation on top because they wouldn't necessarily lose money. Many flag rank officers (especially those who really lead a campaign) will later 'earn' money with books, speeches, 'consulting' or from the arms industry directly.

1-It isn't my system, it was real a study that was done.

2-The time issues you bring up could be dealt with. Warden in particular teaches that there must be a limit on time as well as money and bloodshed.

3-I agree about the book contracts, speeches, etc. but at least that would not be Tax Payers money.

Bottom line until there is some form of accountability with some real sanctions nothing much will change IMO. Why should there be? It is a gravy train if you happen to be on it. We have created a Military 1%.

AmericanPride
04-30-2014, 09:38 PM
wm,

My point is there is more than one dimension in analyzing the conditions of civil-military relations and the appropriate boundaries for the behaviors of senior military officers.


Should it turn out that officers are not able to support these two rules of conduct, then they ought not continue to serve. One would hope that they would end their service voluntarily, but sometimes, as in MacArthur's case, they must be removed. Some others may take what I call the Speer defense (after German Armaments Minister Albert Speer) and stay because they believe that their replacements would do even more damage.

They 'should' but why don't they? As it appears, they attempted to fulfill your two 'rules of conduct' without regard for the consequences. And with the exception of a few senior officers relieved for one reason or another, they all benefited handsomely from their activities irregardless of the outcomes. Is this a question of incentives? Opportunities?

wm
04-30-2014, 10:18 PM
wm,

My point is there is more than one dimension in analyzing the conditions of civil-military relations and the appropriate boundaries for the behaviors of senior military officers.


Should it turn out that officers are not able to support these two rules of conduct, then they ought not continue to serve. One would hope that they would end their service voluntarily, but sometimes, as in MacArthur's case, they must be removed. Some others may take what I call the Speer defense (after German Armaments Minister Albert Speer) and stay because they believe that their replacements would do even more damage.

They 'should' but why don't they? As it appears, they attempted to fulfill your two 'rules of conduct' without regard for the consequences. And with the exception of a few senior officers relieved for one reason or another, they all benefited handsomely from their activities irregardless of the outcomes. Is this a question of incentives? Opportunities?

AP:
Your initial sentence speaks to more than one dimension in analysis. What are the dimensions you have in mind? Your ultimate paragraph seems to suggest that "it is all about the Benjamins" for these senior folks, which is a single dimension.

I am willing to acknowledge that this may be true for some of them. However, based on my experiences with many senior leaders, a variation of the Speer Defense that I mentioned before seems much more the case. If it were really just about money and power, then I submit that most of these leaders would have left before the magic 10 year mark, when many officers realize they are half way to a chance to get a pretty nice pension. Or, they would not have joined at all because they could have made much more in the private sector. BTW the pension piece , in my day, was still iffy until 18.5 years of service. You could be bounced at 18yrs, 5 months and get nothing after a third passover for promotion.

TheCurmudgeon
05-01-2014, 01:10 AM
I am a horrible example, but I don't think you can find a single answer. There were those who stayed for the Benjamins, and there were those who stayed based on the Speer defense. Many of us simply stayed because we knew the nation needed leaders and the bench was not deep. We knew that many of those on the bench sucked. We may not have been the best players on the field, but we had the interests of those who worked for us and those at home who paid our salaries at heart.

But I don't think that answers the question. It might be best if we move further comments to the "William S Lind and the US Officer Corps" thread on how to deal with the problems our current system presents to the officer corps. ;)

Moderator adds: discussion thread referred to is:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=20590

AmericanPride
05-01-2014, 05:22 PM
wm,

I don't think it's "all about the benjamins" for all of them (maybe not even most of them). Some may be driven by your so-called "Speer effect" - others because they perceive they have no other options within or outside the Army. Some might genuinely agree with the prescribed policy despite significant public or institutional criticism. In the specific case of Iraq, I think after Shinsheki was fired, a combination of passivists and opportunitists subordinated themselves to Rumsfeld's wizardry about a fast, quick, and cheap war.

If something is known to be 'impossible' beforehand by the technical experts designated to implement it, and the cost of implementation is measured in human lives, is there not an ethical responsibility to protest?

TheCurmudgeon
05-01-2014, 06:03 PM
If something is known to be 'impossible' beforehand by the technical experts designated to implement it, and the cost of implementation is measured in human lives, is there not an ethical responsibility to protest?

Some, although not in the administration, did protest. The quote in post #5 is from one voice arguing against Larry Diamond, one of the architects of the Bush administration’s plan. But that plan was built largely on the belief that we won the Cold War because democracy is the best system in existence and everyone wants to be like us, not that Communism had inherent economic detriments. It was largely blind faith*:


Pundits, policymakers, and presidential candidates have offered opinions on the pace of political change in Iraq, but they have cited neither wellestablished theories of democratization nor rigorous social science evidence to
support their views.4 Scholars have an obligation to address such policyrelevant questions as how long it will take for Iraq to democratize, but thus far comparative, theoretically informed empiricism has been notably absent.

The result is confusion about both Iraq’s present accomplishments and its future course. Elections are lauded as symbolic of the arrival of democracy, but every democratic theorist agrees that there is far more to democracy than elections.
The voter turnout of the courageous Iraqi people is said to signal the triumph of democracy, but history shows that it has never been the unwillingness to vote that has prevented democracy, but rather the failure to honor
the results of those elections.5 An Iraqi-headed government may embody sovereignty, but scholars of democracy are unanimous that the tricky part of maintaining the monopoly on the legitimate use of force lies not in creating instruments
of power, but in constraining its illegitimate exercise. That requires a web of respected institutions, mobilized interests, and deeply rooted values, not foreign armies. Immediate problems—forming a government, holding an
election, or maintaining security—have been addressed as if their resolution would be decisive in engineering a democratic Iraq, without consulting the historical record of democratization elsewhere.

Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq (http://www.lehigh.edu/~bm05/Iraq/IS_33.4.moon.pdf)

I suspect that if there were those in the adminstration that disagreed with the potential for success they met the same fate as GEN Shinseki.

*Interestingly, it is the same blind faith that people everywhere think and act just like Americans are currently using when examining the crisis in the Ukraine or how to deal with Syria. For some Americans, the idea all people are created equal equates to all people have the same morals and values we do. It is part of the American myth.

slapout9
05-01-2014, 07:13 PM
So eveything about Lind no matter what is supposed to go to the other thread? Is that correct? Cause I got some stuff I want to say:)

TheCurmudgeon
05-01-2014, 07:20 PM
Slap,

Yes please.

Bob's World
05-01-2014, 07:25 PM
Much of what the military has been asked to do, and how the military has opted to do it clearly fails the "Acceptable, Suitable, Feasible" test.

I believe the following position is on point:

“Democracy, good governance and modernity cannot be imported or imposed from outside a country.”Emile Lahoud, President of Lebanon, 1998-2007

TheCurmudgeon
05-03-2014, 03:00 PM
Paper completed, submitted to WOR.

Bill Moore
05-04-2014, 06:41 PM
I'll throw out a few ideas:

(1) Not emphasizing to the political leadership the military resources that would be required to conduct such a mission; one general did that in his testimony to Congress and was promptly fired. Everyone else subsequently cowered.
(2) Not having a long-term plan of occupation; in Iraq, the plan was to push the regime out of power and hope for spontaneous democratization, which failed to materialize after the whole Iraqi government was dismantled indiscriminately. And in Afghanistan, the reliance on the Northern Alliance and ANSF proved equally problematic in a state with very little history of centralized political control. Notwithstanding the political policies aimed at making good politics instead of good strategy, someone somewhere in the military bureaucracy should have placed a contingency plan of some kind on the shelf rather than wait until orders from their political masters.
(3) The ad-hoc and troublesome pattern of 6-18 month rotations that destroyed any operational continuity in whatever plan that was visualized.
(4) Focusing on the political end-state (democratization) at the expense of the military end-state (disarmanent and/or defeat of the opposition). Victory on the battlefield comes before the collection of the spoils of war!
(5) Minimizing the enormority of the conflicts at hand while gathering all the benefits (i.e. budget, new powers, etc) that came with it. Institutionally, DoD was never put on a 100% war-footing - there was still competing priorities with the "small wars" (i.e. in procurement) that shaped strategic decisions. Following procedures and future force visions were never completely subordinated to the war effort.

AP,

First off apologies for the delay in responding. I don't think any of the above comments reflect on our professional military education. Not to defend the numerous military errors that were made by an excessively conventional military whose leaders at the operational level failed to adapt to their environment, we ultimately failed at the strategic level and even if our officers were better at the operational level (and they need to be) I believe we still would have failed because our strategic aims were unrealistic and our civilian leaders as you stated above didn't mobilize sufficient forces or ask Americans to pay for the war (war tax). It was a half hearted effort politically.

Taking your points one by one,

1) Some uniformed leaders spoke up, and as you said they were not listened to by the likes of Rumfield. This doesn't represent a failure of our military education system. Other factors point to where our education should be improved, but this isn't it.

2) Absolutely, but I suspect if we dug into this we didn't have a plan based on civilian guidance. Also hard to develop an occupation plan when you didn't have the forces to facilitate effective occupation operations.

3) Different schools of thought on this, but according to some studies soldiers begin losing their combat effectiveness if they're in combat more than 6 months at a time. This may not apply to the non-combat arms types, and the conclusion of these studies may be flawed, but at least there was a reason for it. Also doubt we could have retained our recruitment levels if Joe, Mike, Bob, etc. thought they were going to be deployed for multiple years without a break. The professional force has a lot of advantages, but also some disadvantages if you think you need to employ them like conscripts. I think the real argument isn't so much the annual rotations (quicker for SOF), but the lack of continuity in approach/objectives between the different units.

4) Agree that we pursued a very politically correct doctrine that didn't address the reality of the enemy has a vote, and the reality that not everyone in the world desires to be like us. I still it is imperative that the political objective be supreme and that all military operations ultimately support achieving that objective. If the political objective was flawed and I believe it was critically flawed and couldn't be achieved, then our military operations were doomed to fail before they started. I also think you may be under estimating how much fighting we did, but to what end? The same can be said about our aid projects, a lot done, but to what end? Both were executed based on false assumptions. Our biggest fault was not admitting it sooner. We kick ourselves for pulling out of Beirut and Somalia after minor set backs, but maybe in hindsight we should applaud the strategic decision makers that realized the limited utility of military force in these situations and decided to cut our loses? I don't know, but being stubborn is not the same as being courageous, and in fact it can be cowardly.

5) Generally agree, but the reality is we are/were the global cop and the security interests/threats we had prior to 9/11 never went away, so based on the scope of our self-imposed responsibilities we couldn't afford to focus entirely on OIF and OEF-A, but we definitely could have done more and should have in my opinion. We executed both wars on the cheap relying our asymmetric advantage in kinetic fight, while forgetting that advantage would do little for us once we transitioned into the occupation phase. We shocked and awed ourselves more than our adversaries. On the other hand, I disagree with Secretary Gates comments about the Pentagon not purchasing the mine resistant vehicles quick enough. I think they're were good reasons for doing so, because those vehicles were hardly decisive and simply reinforced our bad tactics of drive by COIN. If you want to defeat IEDs you need to control the populace and terrain, and that means sending in sufficient forces to do so. We never had the political will or wisdom to do this, and instead passed blame to the Pentagon for not wanting to dedicate limited funds (again no war tax) on a vehicle that had limited utility.

AmericanPride
05-05-2014, 08:13 PM
1) Some uniformed leaders spoke up, and as you said they were not listened to by the likes of Rumfield. This doesn't represent a failure of our military education system. Other factors point to where our education should be improved, but this isn't it.

I think it raises some important issues regarding the dynamics of the civil-military relationship and the actions available to military officers who find themselves in this situation. I don't think military education is the fix for this - though perhaps better institutional communication and civilian education (on both sides) would facilitate more functional relationships.





Absolutely, but I suspect if we dug into this we didn't have a plan based on civilian guidance. Also hard to develop an occupation plan when you didn't have the forces to facilitate effective occupation operations.

I'd be interested to know what plans, if any, existed before 2003 or 2001 regarding executing an occupation of Iraq. And this goes back to point one - this a political question or a military question?


I think the real argument isn't so much the annual rotations (quicker for SOF), but the lack of continuity in approach/objectives between the different units.

Let me clarify that I do not mean that individual soldier rotations should be extended. But there has to be a way organizationally to maintain continuity - I don't know what that looks like or what we've done in the past. Maybe that means small unit formations (battalion and below) rotate in theater as a unit on a regular schedule (6-12 months), while headquarters formations remain in place and rotate servicemembers individually.

Just a few random thoughts.

Bill Moore
05-06-2014, 04:24 AM
AP,

Overall it is a policy question and then the strategy (whole of government) to achieve the policy goals. I can't describe what I was privy to until I validate it is now unclassified (I assume it is, and has already been written about), but overall I think our strategy was based on an assumption that the Iraqi people would embrace us, embrace democracy, and that the transition would be easy because this is the natural drift of civilization. We just needed to remove Saddam to let it blossom. If that was the underlying assumption then we didn't need a plan, we just needed to remove Saddam:D.

There is no excuse for poor officership in combat, but my point remains no matter how great our officers could have been it wouldn't make a difference if the policy objective and underlying assumption were deeply flawed from day 1. GEN Petraeus has a famous quote that goes along the line of "tell me how this ends" which indicates he experienced similar frustrations with the policy goals.

TheCurmudgeon
05-06-2014, 05:48 PM
Link to finished product.

http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/democracy-in-iraq-the-american-militarys-kobayashi-maru/

JMA
05-06-2014, 07:46 PM
Well done Stan, good article. I responded as follows:


Mark May 6, 2014 at 2:28 pm ·
Rather than add the task of achieving “political objectives by other means” to the already long list of skills required by the officer corps would it not be more intelligent – in the light of near universal failure of national building efforts – to just accept it is not a military task?

A significant contributing factor in the demise of the British military has been the 'can do' response to any challenge by the military to the politicians when it was quite clear the objective could not be achieved. Is the same problem happening in the US?


Link to finished product.

http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/democracy-in-iraq-the-american-militarys-kobayashi-maru/

TheCurmudgeon
05-06-2014, 08:16 PM
Well done Stan, good article. I responded as follows:



A significant contributing factor in the demise of the British military has been the 'can do' response to any challenge by the military to the politicians when it was quite clear the objective could not be achieved. Is the same problem happening in the US?

I am not sure if the conditions that existed in this country from 2002-3 were unique or if that 'can do' response is just inherent in the attitude of the American military. Certainly, at other times, less drastic courses of action prevailed. We did not invade Iran when our Embassy was taken. We also did not nuke China during the Korean War. Those were probably as much a result of the civilian leadership at that time as it was the military advice given.

I do think that it is important that senior military leaders understand the nature of political legitimacy and democratization at least at the level I discuss in the piece if for no other reason than to temper the ambitions of those who might want to try this kind of action again.

I don't think that, if anyone in the military had told the civlian leadership that democracy in Iraq was not possible, that the leaderhip would have accepted that answer or would have passed it on up the chain of command. If they had they would have met the samd fate as General Shinseki.