Taming Pakistan: Modi Effect

[MoorthyM]

As author of Defeating Political Islam: The New Cold War (http://www.moorthymuthuswamy.com), I have spent over 15 years thinking about the threat Pakistan poses to itself and the larger world. Admittedly, being originally from India, I was initially more worried about Pakistan's ability to harm India.

When I wrote my book in 2008-2009 I knew that the US will comprehensively fail to tame Pakistan and that it will also fail to counter the larger threat of violent Muslim radicalism.

This is not the space to go into why US failed etc. However, in my 2009 book, I did specifically call for the West to support Narendra Modi, in part because he can, at least in principle, lead an effort to tame Pakistan. I had explained why and how India can be leveraged to neutralize religious barbarism.

Now an opportunity is being presented with Narendra Modi becoming the Prime Minister-elect.

However, expectedly, American establishment, given the track record, is viewing the emergence of Modi as a threat rather than an opportunity.

This alone tellingly informs us how poorly placed America is in advancing its strategic interests, and further confirms its status as a declining civilization, not withstanding its leadership in science and technology (for now).

As an American citizen, I am doing what I can to slow down this decline, by initiating a discussion that can lead to a paradigm shift in the way we view, for instance, the emergence of the likes of Narendra Modi of India.

[JMA]

This alone tellingly informs us how poorly placed America is in advancing its strategic interests, and further confirms its status as a declining civilization, not withstanding its leadership in science and technology (for now).

As an American citizen, I am doing what I can to slow down this decline, by initiating a discussion that can lead to a paradigm shift in the way we view, for instance, the emergence of the likes of Narendra Modi of India.

The actions of the US are often unexplainable. Perhaps you can help me understand why they view Modi as a threat/risk/whatever while still cozy with Pakistan?

[carl]

Moorthy:

I have a question. Mr. Modi won a fairly decisive victory. Does this mean do you think that India is more united politically and therefore more likely not to turn the other cheek when the Pak Army/ISI strikes India again? I figure they will since that is their nature and their morale will go way up after finish bugging out of Afghsnistan.

Also how much if at all will India increase it's involvement in Afghanistan after we leave?

[davidbfpo]

A short commentary by IISS's South Asia expert, Rahul Roy-Chaudhury and here are two passages:
At the same time, anti-Pakistan rhetoric featured often in the campaign, in marked contrast to Pakistan’s own general elections a year ago, during which there had been little anti-India rhetoric in the political mainstream. On April 19 BJP parliamentary candidate Giriraj Singh reportedly stated that those who opposed Modi should be sent to Pakistan. In response to this ‘hate speech’, legal cases were launched against him, but he was ultimately granted bail.

An unseemly public spat with Pakistan also occurred. In a Gujarati television interview at the end of April, Modi suggested he might consider undertaking cross-border covert action against Pakistan to pursue a terrorist such as Dawood Ibrahim. In response, Pakistan’s interior minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali claimed that Modi had made an ‘irresponsible statement’ and that such action by a prime minister would ‘destabilise’ the region. The BJP subsequently denied that Modi had spoken of attacking Pakistan. In a subsequent interview with a leading English television channel, Modi suggested that talks with Pakistan could not take place if there was cross-border terrorism.



Link:https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2014-b4d9/may-5382/indias-polarised-election-campaign-5e65

[MoorthyM]

Moorthy:

I have a question. Mr. Modi won a fairly decisive victory. Does this mean do you think that India is more united politically and therefore more likely not to turn the other cheek when the Pak Army/ISI strikes India again? I figure they will since that is their nature and their morale will go way up after finish bugging out of Afghsnistan.

Also how much if at all will India increase it's involvement in Afghanistan after we leave?

Carl, that's an easy one.

I do think that instead of merely responding to Pakistan's belligerence, the new govt. will methodically work to defang Pakistan. I do believe there exists political as well as administrative backing for that. Mind you, India knows Pakistan only too well, including its major weaknesses…

Regarding India’s future involvement in Afghanistan, I am unable to venture a guess, although I have some preferences.

[Dayuhan]

I had explained why and how India can be leveraged to neutralize religious barbarism.

Now an opportunity is being presented with Narendra Modi becoming the Prime Minister-elect.

The suspicion of Modri in the West is based largely on the perception that he was complicit in acts of religious barbarism, during the 2002 Gujarat violence. Rightly or wrongly he's perceived as an extremist, largely because of the RSS association, and the West - again rightly or wrongly - is uncomfortable with the idea of fighting extremism with extremism.

Personal opinion: I don't think most westerners know enough about him to have a meaningful opinion one way or another, and therefore the best move is to wait and see, suspending judgment on threat or opportunity until we see what he actually does. I suspect that taming India's gargantuan and corrupt bureaucracy will be a more urgent and likely more difficult task for Modi than taming Pakistan. Like every other nation, India has to accept that ultimately its position vs other regional players and the rest of the world is ultimately defined less by foreign policy than by domestic economic strength.


This alone tellingly informs us how poorly placed America is in advancing its strategic interests, and further confirms its status as a declining civilization, not withstanding its leadership in science and technology (for now).

As an American citizen, I am doing what I can to slow down this decline, by initiating a discussion that can lead to a paradigm shift in the way we view, for instance, the emergence of the likes of Narendra Modi of India.

There is substantial disagreement over both the nature of American interests and the manner in which they are pursued, and what some see as failure to advance strategic interests may simply be a difference of opinion on what those interests are.

[MoorthyM]

The actions of the US are often unexplainable. Perhaps you can help me understand why they view Modi as a threat/risk/whatever while still cozy with Pakistan?

These are very good questions that touch the very heart of why the US's plans are unexplainable (actually at all levels).

Although I have some ideas on why this is the case, I am respectfully going to take a pass for the time being.

[MoorthyM]

There is substantial disagreement over both the nature of American interests and the manner in which they are pursued, and what some see as failure to advance strategic interests may simply be a difference of opinion on what those interests are.

What constitute American interests are subjected to how the US establishment comes to understand the world we all live in. And this is where the problem starts for America (and others).

There are two major questions (among a few) of interest to us that come to define the civilization we are part of:

Do we understand how functional democracies are built and sustained?

Do we understand what causes Muslim radicalism?

Informed observers would concede that we do not know the answers to both.

Of course, if one asks our political scientists, they would tell you that these are complex issues subjected to various causes and influences.

As a physical scientist I would state a fundamental observation that complex causes are unlikely to lead to prolific and repeatable patterns. In other words, there are likely well-defined processes that might shed light on the above two questions.

The bottom line is that poorly understood phenomena of potential strategic significance lead to "difference of opinion" at every level -- from their perceived extent of significance to what to do about them.

[Dayuhan]

What constitute American interests are subjected to how the US establishment comes to understand the world we all live in. And this is where the problem starts for America (and others).

"American interests" are also defined, and continuously redefined, by competition among divergent interests and divergent perceptions of interest. That competition, and its rather ephemeral outcomes, are often baffling to Americans and utterly incomprehensible to non-Amercians, particularly those who are committed to a particular perception of interest and thus less able to see the possibility of competing interests.


There are two major questions (among a few) of interest to us that come to define the civilization we are part of:

Do we understand how functional democracies are built and sustained?

Do we understand what causes Muslim radicalism?

Informed observers would concede that we do not know the answers to both.

I am not convinced that the origin of Muslim radicalism constitutes a civilization-defining issue. I agree that we don't know the answers to those questions, and I suspect that any effort to propose simple, generic, or universally applicable answers to those questions is going to come up.


Of course, if one asks our political scientists, they would tell you that these are complex issues subjected to various causes and influences.

Yes, and they'd be right.


As a physical scientist I would state a fundamental observation that complex causes are unlikely to lead to prolific and repeatable patterns. In other words, there are likely well-defined processes that might shed light on the above two questions.

It's hard to read much history without observing that prolific and repeatable patterns often do have complex causes. An analogous example might be the spread of communist/socialist revolutionary movements in much of the formerly colonized world in the post WW2 decades. That was certainly a prolific and repeatable pattern, but anyone familiar with any of the movements in question knows the causes in any given case were far from simple or consistent. There were of course consistent patterns on the broadest scale, but attempts to extrapolate universal answers or solutions have rarely been of much use. Attempt to define simple, generic, or universal causes for broad geopolitical events are often satisfying but rarely useful.


The bottom line is that poorly understood phenomena of potential strategic significance lead to "difference of opinion" at every level -- from their perceived extent of significance to what to do about them.

Much confusion arises when people, often people with widely divergent views, assume that their own understanding is correct and everyone else's is flawed.

[Dayuhan]

Getting back to Modi...

Much of the suspicion of Modi in the West runs back to the 2002 Gujarat violence, and the widespread perception that Modi either tolerated or was directly complicit in the violence against Muslims.

Would you say that perception is inaccurate, that it is accurate but shouldn't be an issue, or something else?

If tension between India and Pakistan ratchets up and spills over into internal sectarian violence, would a Modi administration defend the rights of all citizens, or would it take sides?

[JMA]

"American interests" are also defined, and continuously redefined, by competition among divergent interests and divergent perceptions of interest. That competition, and its rather ephemeral outcomes, are often baffling to Americans and utterly incomprehensible to non-Amercians, particularly those who are committed to a particular perception of interest and thus less able to see the possibility of competing interests.

Interesting way of explaining what observers across the world see as wild swings in policy and perceived "interests" with every change of President.

You totaly miss the point that it is the near total lack of policy continuity that serves neither the "national interests" of America nor the interests of the countries and regions on the receiving end of this lunacy.

[MoorthyM]

Getting back to Modi...

Much of the suspicion of Modi in the West runs back to the 2002 Gujarat violence, and the widespread perception that Modi either tolerated or was directly complicit in the violence against Muslims.

Would you say that perception is inaccurate, that it is accurate but shouldn't be an issue, or something else?

If tension between India and Pakistan ratchets up and spills over into internal sectarian violence, would a Modi administration defend the rights of all citizens, or would it take sides?

Please permit me to give you a backdrop:

From every Muslim majority region of South Asia most non-Muslims have been forcibly converted, killed or driven away to India. Many non-Muslim Indians are aware of this data and are apprehensive for the following reason: Indian Muslims, who were 10% of the population in 1947, now constitute around 25% of the Indian children under the age of five and they are being rapidly radicalized.

In the long-term, non-Muslim Indians are likely facing extermination in the hands of Islamist forces.

Given this, those who keep on harping Mr. Modi's handling of the 2002 riots in his state, are like those who kept highlighting the acts of some Jews who retaliated against the Nazis, and bypass looking at the methodical Nazi extermination of the Jews.

A competent leader of India must work to liberate India's Muslims from the regressive forces within the community, not to appease or placate them as the previous governments have done.

Do you really think the Indians should worry about others think or say?

[Dayuhan]

Interesting way of explaining what observers across the world see as wild swings in policy and perceived "interests" with every change of President.

You totaly miss the point that it is the near total lack of policy continuity that serves neither the "national interests" of America nor the interests of the countries and regions on the receiving end of this lunacy.

Policy continuity has both positive and negative sides. Leaders often become personally invested in policies and find it difficult to accept that they aren't working. A new administration can be an opportunity to change direction and discard ineffective policies. Of course it doesn't always work that way, but policy continuity is not a universal good, especially if an existing policy involves beating one's head against walls, trying to "install" democracies in foreign countries, or other episodic lunacies.

In recent years at least the policy shifts are often less radical than they are sometimes cracked up to be: politicians of both parties have to play from the same book of options, and that book is often pretty limited, in the real world at least. Certainly the American left expressed vast disappointment with what they perceived as Obama's policy continuities with the previous administration.

In any event, policy discontinuity is a liability inherent in democracy, so we've little choice but to live with it. Whether or not that serves American interests depends on how you define American interests, and those who are deeply attached to their own preferred definitions sometimes find it difficult to accept that competing definitions are equally legitimate, or that the populace the US government is tasked to represent does not share their definitions.

PS: Issue probably best pursued on another thread before David comes along and reminds us (correctly) that it's straying off topic.

[Dayuhan]

Given this, those who keep on harping Mr. Modi's handling of the 2002 riots in his state, are like those who kept highlighting the acts of some Jews who retaliated against the Nazis, and bypass looking at the methodical Nazi extermination of the Jews.

That analogy will be seen by many as strained beyond the breaking point, and would be a tough sell in Western policy circles.


A competent leader of India must work to liberate India's Muslims from the regressive forces within the community, not to appease or placate them as the previous governments have done.

The indiscriminate slaughter of civilians seems a peculiar recipe for liberation, and a less than effective way of fighting radicalism, but that is of course an outsider's view.


Do you really think the Indians should worry about others think or say?

That's up to them. If you want to know why western governments see Modi as a risk and a threat rather than an opportunity, or why they will be less than enthusiastic about joining or supporting a crusade against Pakistan, you have to look at the perceived connection to sectarian violence as a significant factor in shaping that attitude. Whether or not anyone wants to "worry about" it is their own concern. Again, the idea that indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians is a legitimate or effective response to a perceived threat may pass with Modi and it may pass with you, but it's going to be a tough sell in the international public opinion arena. If governments believe that Modi may provoke outright war with Pakistan or that he may deflect anger at Pakistan onto Muslim civilians, they are going to keep his government at arm's length or beyond. Again, whether or not that's something to worry about depends on who's doing the worrying. If India chooses to walk that path, that's their choice. If others choose not to walk that path with them, that's their choice, and it's only to be expected.

Personally, as I said above, I'd suggest waiting and seeing what he actually does before rushing to judgment, but given the past I'd expect that waiting period to be marked by a fair degree of distance.

Also as above, I suspect that Modi's approach to Pakistan and Islam will be less significant in the long run than his response to the challenges of building India's infrastructure, reining in corruption and bureaucratic interference with business, and spreading the benefits of growth outside the urban centers and the urban elite. We'll see what happens.

[MoorthyM]

The indiscriminate slaughter of civilians seems a peculiar recipe for liberation, and a less than effective way of fighting radicalism, but that is of course an outsider's view.

Also as above, I suspect that Modi's approach to Pakistan and Islam will be less significant in the long run than his response to the challenges of building India's infrastructure, reining in corruption and bureaucratic interference with business, and spreading the benefits of growth outside the urban centers and the urban elite. We'll see what happens.

You are putting words in my mouth. I am not even remotely suggesting anything along these lines. No one in their right mind would slaughter civilians when they, too, are victims of radicals.

I can claim to have certain level of bonafides, with a book and a forthcoming academic scholarship in that the radicalization and socioeconomic stagnation of the Muslim communities in many parts of the world (including South Asia) are mostly self-induced. In fact, I believe that we can identify specific processes and entities behind it. Only in this context I used the word liberation. The point is the state has the right to act to secure the rights of Muslim minorities (as with anyone) on the basis of human rights and religious freedom.

That said, I agree with you that Mr. Modi's initial few years of focus is likely to be, and perhaps should be, development. But that alone, obviously, will not make India's growing Muslim radicalism problem go away all by itself.

[Dayuhan]

No one in their right mind would slaughter civilians when they, too, are victims of radicals.

Yes, and that is the problem: the slaughter occurred, and the response of the state government, under Mr Modi's control, was perceived as being either grossly inadequate or actively complicit. That makes people wonder if Modu is, in your words, in his right mind, and it makes governments reluctant to get to close to him.

Sectarian violence can be an opportunity to challenge a radical narrative or reinforce it, depending on how government responds. If government moves in to promptly and effectively restore order, protect the innocent, and punish the guilty regardless of affiliation, the radical narrative is weakened. If government is perceived to be taking sides, the radical narrative is enhanced and given credibility.

This is to a large extent what happened in Mindanao in the early 70s: violence initially broke out between rival militias from the indigenous Muslim and settler Christian populations, with plenty of blame on both sides. Government had a brief opportunity to stay neutral. They failed to take it: instead they took the side of the settler population, kicking of a war that's been running sporadically ever since. It was a bad move.


I can claim to have certain level of bonafides, with a book and a forthcoming academic scholarship in that the radicalization and socioeconomic stagnation of the Muslim communities in many parts of the world (including South Asia) are mostly self-induced. In fact, I believe that we can identify specific processes and entities behind it. Only in this context I used the word liberation. The point is the state has the right to act to secure the rights of Muslim minorities (as with anyone) on the basis of human rights and religious freedom.

That said, I agree with you that Mr. Modi's initial few years of focus is likely to be, and perhaps should be, development. But that alone, obviously, will not make India's growing Muslim radicalism problem go away all by itself.

No, it won't but economic opportunity, especially for the critical young male demographic bracket, is always a useful element of any challenge to radicalism. So is a very clear effort to provide equal services and equal access to justice for minorities that consider themselves aggrieved.

What specific policies to you believe Modi will adopt to challenge domestic Islamic radicalism, and what policies would you suggest that he adopt? I'm also curious to see how he'll approach the Naxalite/Maoist insurgencies, but that of course is another topic!

[MoorthyM]

No, it won't but economic opportunity, especially for the critical young male demographic bracket, is always a useful element of any challenge to radicalism. So is a very clear effort to provide equal services and equal access to justice for minorities that consider themselves aggrieved.

What specific policies to you believe Modi will adopt to challenge domestic Islamic radicalism, and what policies would you suggest that he adopt? I'm also curious to see how he'll approach the Naxalite/Maoist insurgencies, but that of course is another topic!

I am afraid that your premise is flawed. Poll after poll (in Pakistan, the UK and elsewhere) have shown that in regions where radicalism is prevalent, educated, resourced and radicalized Muslims form the most potent threat and that the non-radicalized Muslims can do little about them.

Here's a terrorism 101 lesson: The sense of grievance against govt./majority community is cultivated by radicals to shift the blame away from themselves for the Muslim communities' shortcomings.

Without de-radicalizing Indian Muslims, increasing economic opportunities for them would be suicidal for India (the U.S. State Department folks have so far failed to grasp that).

Economic growth, to a large extent, I believe will work to alleviate the Naxal/Maoist insurgencies. My forthcoming scholarship, I believe will help us identify how to neuter Islamic radicalism. Until then, the answer -- from Obama to Putin and from Modi to Jinping -- is the same: who knows what the right policies are!

[Dayuhan]

The sense of grievance against govt./majority community is cultivated by radicals to shift the blame away from themselves for the Muslim communities' shortcomings.

Of course, but it's difficult to cultivate something that didn't exist in the first place. Government needs to starve the cultivators by not fueling or reinforcing the sense of grievance, and by undercutting that sense of grievance where possible. At the very least, minority populations have to know that violence against them will not be tolerated.


Without de-radicalizing Indian Muslims, increasing economic opportunities for them would be suicidal for India (the U.S. State Department folks have so far failed to grasp that).

The point is to compete for those who have not yet been radicalized. Since nobody has yet come up with an effective way of de-radicalizing those already radicalized, it makes some sense to try to prevent radicalization in the first place. It is not a solution in itself (neither is anything else), it's a component of a solution.


My forthcoming scholarship, I believe will help us identify how to neuter Islamic radicalism. Until then, the answer -- from Obama to Putin and from Modi to Jinping -- is the same: who knows what the right policies are!

The "right policies" will inevitably vary according to where, when, and by whom the policies are applied, but I'll certainly be curious to see what you come up with.

When we deal with radicalism (of any description) we often encounter two opposite narratives. One, typically espoused by radicals and their supporters, is that the fault lies entirely with vicious and incompetent governments who have oppressed their people into a radicalized corner. The other, typically espoused by governments and their supporters, is that government is blameless and the whole problem is caused by evil agitators who have corrupted the people. Both, like most polar opinions, are a load of bollocks: there are always elements of both in play. For a government faced by radicalism, objectively assessing its own behavior and getting its own house in order may not be the only part of a de-radicalization strategy, but it's a very important part, especially since the government gets to deal with something it can actually control.

[davidbfpo]

If demography was the key factor whether India's Muslim population became 'radicalised' would be a strategic issue beyond India itself.

In 2001 there were 138,188,240 Muslims, or 13.4% of the population; in comparison Hindus numbered 827,578,868 or 80.5%. From:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_people

India already has a problem with violent radical Muslims who engage in terrorism. Such as in 2006:
More than 160 people have been killed and 460 injured by seven bombs on the train network in the Indian financial capital Mumbai (Bombay), police say.

Certainly when I looked at the issue in 2008 it was clear violent radical Muslims were a tiny minority. For example:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Students_Islamic_Movement_of_India

[JMA]

This is a classic response (and a keeper).

As you live outside the US one would think that you would be able to establish how the world sees American foreign policy actions (or interference).

There is a simple reason why the US 'empire' will last a short 75 years and that is because the US are both unable and unwilling to understand the realities of the world they live and see everything through myopic and parochial eyes.

You really expect the world which has been subjected to the ravages resulting from the incompetent foreign policy adventures of the US to be understanding of the US's domestic challenges (which you list)?

These comments are Germaine to this discussion as unfortunately the US still the power to interfere and really screw things up in the subcontinent.




Policy continuity has both positive and negative sides. Leaders often become personally invested in policies and find it difficult to accept that they aren't working. A new administration can be an opportunity to change direction and discard ineffective policies. Of course it doesn't always work that way, but policy continuity is not a universal good, especially if an existing policy involves beating one's head against walls, trying to "install" democracies in foreign countries, or other episodic lunacies.

In recent years at least the policy shifts are often less radical than they are sometimes cracked up to be: politicians of both parties have to play from the same book of options, and that book is often pretty limited, in the real world at least. Certainly the American left expressed vast disappointment with what they perceived as Obama's policy continuities with the previous administration.

In any event, policy discontinuity is a liability inherent in democracy, so we've little choice but to live with it. Whether or not that serves American interests depends on how you define American interests, and those who are deeply attached to their own preferred definitions sometimes find it difficult to accept that competing definitions are equally legitimate, or that the populace the US government is tasked to represent does not share their definitions.

PS: Issue probably best pursued on another thread before David comes along and reminds us (correctly) that it's straying off topic.

[JMA]

Do you really think the Indians should worry about others think or say?

Of course not... They should act in their own best interests regardless (much like Americans do).

Advice from the US is best ignored - probably doing the exact opposite would be the best course of action.

If India has a problem it is that it lacks the necessary aggression to really establish itself as a real Power in the region.

[MoorthyM]

If demography was the key factor whether India's Muslim population became 'radicalised' would be a strategic issue beyond India itself.

In 2001 there were 138,188,240 Muslims, or 13.4% of the population

Certainly when I looked at the issue in 2008 it was clear violent radical Muslims were a tiny minority. For example:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Students_Islamic_Movement_of_India

David:

In every census since India was born the governments tracked religion, except the last one in 2011. That's for a good reason; the Muslim population percentage is said to be surging forward and the govt. in power didn't want the majority community to start worrying about its existence (it has good reason to do so, as Hindus have basically been wiped out from every Muslim majority region of South Asia)

By various accounts and projections, the Muslim population percentage in India now is around 17-18%.

There is this question of what definition one uses to define a Muslim to be a violent radical. By all accounts (including various polls) such percentages are low even in jihadist infested countries such as Pakistan.

But I think what's more relevant is the ability of violent Islamist groups to form and sustain themselves in a community. I have developed a new way of looking at this (this will be published in a 12,000 word academic journal article, due out in July -- for your information, let me tell you that I refer to a lot of data from the Pakistani Muslim immigrant community in the UK).

As someone with considerable exposure to the ongoing violent radicalization of Indian Muslims (as in my 2009 book), I can tell you that, Indian Muslims are now undergoing second generation process of radicalization. The Indian version of Tahreek-e-Taliban (modeled after the famous militant group in Pakistan) has just been formed in the central Indian city of Aurangabad. Few years ago the security agencies unearthed a massive arms haul there, that included extensive light arms, enough to equip a small militant group.

In 2008, India's National Security Advisor admitted that there are at least 800 terror cells operating, presumably in India's Muslim communities, supported by the likes of Pakistan and assisted by the Saudi funding. Indeed, India is primed to have its own version of Boko-Haram very soon. The underlying process are specific to Muslim communities and are assiduously cultivated by external Islamic governments (of course, the Western governments are busy blaming the local government(s) for what are mostly self-induced Muslim community-specific processes).

What this says is that the Western governments should get their act together and help India led by Mr. Modi, and not undermine him, as I believe they are primed to do (by trying to constantly put him on the defensive). That would be a strategic blunder.

Unless the current trends in Islamization are quickly and permanently reversed, we are looking at an India that's also going in the direction of Nigeria and more.

[MoorthyM]

If India has a problem it is that it lacks the necessary aggression to really establish itself as a real Power in the region.

You are so correct about the past. I wrote an article about 10 years ago titled "Slaves, Servants and Rulers." The Indian society now has a ruling class that can and will assert itself. Mr. Modi, I believe, represents them.

[davidbfpo]

Cited in small part:
What this says is that the Western governments should get their act together and help India led by Mr. Modi, and not undermine him, as I believe they are primed to do (by trying to constantly put him on the defensive). That would be a strategic blunder.

Unless the current trends in Islamization are quickly and permanently reversed, we are looking at an India that's also going in the direction of Nigeria and more.

I am not sure what would come from the West acting together to help the incoming, new Indian government - assuming they could act together. Yes there are some simple steps that can be done, although I am unconvinced they actually could undermine him. See this for a US viewpoint:http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-kugelman-india-election-20140519-story.html

From my faraway "armchair" the reported growth of Islamization seems tame alongside India's own 'small wars', none of which to my knowledge are realted to Islamization - if one excludes Kashmir. See:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2248

[MoorthyM]

Cited in small part:

I am not sure what would come from the West acting together to help the incoming, new Indian government - assuming they could act together. Yes there are some simple steps that can be done, although I am unconvinced they actually could undermine him. See this for a US viewpoint:http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-kugelman-india-election-20140519-story.html

From my faraway "armchair" the reported growth of Islamization seems tame alongside India's own 'small wars', none of which to my knowledge are realted to Islamization - if one excludes Kashmir. See:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2248

Public statements by Western high officials about the need to focus away from Mr. Modi's purported acts or in acts in 2002 Gujarat riots and directives to the State Dept. etc to do the same are among the things that should help.

The current metrics that are being used to characterize the onset of the so-called Islamization process are hardly robust IMO. And hence, what conventional wisdom says in this context needs to be taken with a pinch of salt.

As I have shown in my forthcoming work, sharia's popularity is probably by far the most appropriate metric. By this measure growth of radicalism in India is not tame at all. It is a juggernaut trending toward formation and sustaining of Islamist militant group all over India.

[carl]

Moorthy:

When you say Mr. Modi's gov will actively work to defang Pakistan, how do you think they will go about doing that?

It is something that must be done, probably the sooner the better, but it will be tricky.

[Dayuhan]

As you live outside the US one would think that you would be able to establish how the world sees American foreign policy actions (or interference).

What I've been able to establish is that practically everyone in the world "knows" what's best for the US and "knows" what the US ought to do, and that practically everyone in the world is upset that the Americans don't do what they think the Americans ought to do. Of course all of these opinions are different, often widely divergent, and generally completely incompatible. You can hardly walk into a bar or an internet forum on this planet without hearing some blowhard discoursing at length on what the Americans ought to do and how the Americans are such fools for not following the prescription offered by the blowhard. Of course all of the blowhards have different prescriptions and most of them are grossly inconsistent with reality, but one gets used to that. I've occasionally introduced myself as Canadian just to escape the invariable lecture.


There is a simple reason why the US 'empire' will last a short 75 years and that is because the US are both unable and unwilling to understand the realities of the world they live and see everything through myopic and parochial eyes.

Non-Americans also see the world, and America, through their own parochial and often myopic eyes.

I don't think there ever was an "American Empire" in any literal or meaningful sense, and I don't think that American primacy was necessarily a good thing for America or the world. In any event the US no longer enjoys economic primacy (a good thing; a unipolar global economy is a very unstable thing) and a power that does not have economic primacy cannot reasonably aspire to military primacy, so there will have to be adaptation. Those who fail to adapt don't survive.


You really expect the world which has been subjected to the ravages resulting from the incompetent foreign policy adventures of the US to be understanding of the US's domestic challenges (which you list)?

The world can understand the domestic realities of the US or not, as it pleases. Just as it would be silly for India to submit it's policies to American review (or to expect automatic American support for its policies and leaders), it would be equally silly for the US to submit its own policies for foreign review and approval. Those outside the US (and most of those inside it) need to accept that the US government will not always do what they want. That would of course be impossible even if the US tried to do what they want, because they all have different ideas about what the US ought to do... and of course they all "know" that their particular slice of myopia and parochialism is the true and right one.


These comments are Germaine to this discussion as unfortunately the US still the power to interfere and really screw things up in the subcontinent.

The subcontinent also retains the power to screw things up on its own, although when they do somebody somewhere will invariably find a way to blame it on the US. Some things are inevitable...

[Dayuhan]

Public statements by Western high officials about the need to focus away from Mr. Modi's purported acts or in acts in 2002 Gujarat riots and directives to the State Dept. etc to do the same are among the things that should help.

That should help what?

Mr Modi himself could make that process easier by making clear, unequivocal statements to the effect that his government is committed to providing equal protection to all citizens, and that violence against minorities or majorities would absolutely not be tolerated. Of course such statements would have to be backed up with action to mean anything, but statements would be a start.

Expecting other countries to "focus away from Mr. Modi's purported acts or in acts in 2002 Gujarat riots" in the absence of any such effort from Mr Modi would be to effectively ask them to condone mass murder. The world should not pretend that Gujarat didn't happen, any more than they should pretend that Mumbai didn't happen.


As I have shown in my forthcoming work

Bit of confusion in the tenses there. "Have shown" is past, "forthcoming" is future. It's one or the other, not both.


...sharia's popularity is probably by far the most appropriate metric. By this measure growth of radicalism in India is not tame at all. It is a juggernaut trending toward formation and sustaining of Islamist militant group all over India.

Impossible to comment without seeing the work. Would you care to summarize the evidence, arguments, and recommendations?

Just to be clear: I do not think Indians should care what the US thinks, or submit policies for US review. I also do not think the Indians should expect automatic support for their policies or leaders from the US or any Western power.

[MoorthyM]

That should help what?

Mr Modi himself could make that process easier by making clear, unequivocal statements to the effect that his government is committed to providing equal protection to all citizens, and that violence against minorities or majorities would absolutely not be tolerated. Of course such statements would have to be backed up with action to mean anything, but statements would be a start.

Expecting other countries to "focus away from Mr. Modi's purported acts or in acts in 2002 Gujarat riots" in the absence of any such effort from Mr Modi would be to effectively ask them to condone mass murder. The world should not pretend that Gujarat didn't happen, any more than they should pretend that Mumbai didn't happen.

Bit of confusion in the tenses there. "Have shown" is past, "forthcoming" is future. It's one or the other, not both.

Impossible to comment without seeing the work. Would you care to summarize the evidence, arguments, and recommendations?

Just to be clear: I do not think Indians should care what the US thinks, or submit policies for US review. I also do not think the Indians should expect automatic support for their policies or leaders from the US or any Western power.

I couldn't agree more with just about everything you said.

If I were Mr. Modi, I would put it along these lines: Any form of ideological indoctrination that discourages citizens from embracing modern education and incites them into taking law into their won hands and trying to unlawfully enforce/impose rules on an ideological basis will not be tolerated, as are violence acts against all citizens.

I will just list the abstract of my upcoming scholarship:

Many militant groups around the world are purportedly fighting to institute sharia as the governing law of Muslims. However, very few scholars have studied the relationship between sharia and violence, presumably because the former is largely viewed as dealing with internal governance issues. This perspective has likely led to the West’s policy of accommodating political and community groups that seek to promote sharia. In this paper, I argue that public surveys in Muslim communities are ill-prepared to identify the potential links between sharia and violence, especially when the majority of poll respondents identify themselves as peace-loving Muslims who perceive sharia as divine law. Moreover, I identify a radicalized subpopulation of jihadist clerics that benefit from sharia’s popularity. Empirical data is presented regarding the growth of clerical power in Pakistan and elsewhere, aided in part by this popularity, which the clerics themselves have helped to nurture. In particular, the analysis suggests that jihadist clerics and militant groups leverage sharia’s esteem in order to advance a violent agenda.

[Ray]

BJP to invite Nawaz Sharif and other leaders for oath taking ceremony

http://www.google.com/gwt/x?source=s&u=http://www.ndtv.com/elections/article/election-2014/for-narendra-modi-s-swearing-in-bjp-keen-to-invite-nawaz-sharif-other-leaders-528002&hl=en&ei=XV58U6L9CYfamAXi5oDYBw&wsc=tf&ct=np&whp=3252

[Ray]

On taking the Muslim along, I think more than words by Modi, his actions should speak for itself.

Even as a Chief Minister, he did not make any policy religion specific. It was for all.

It maybe interesting to note that there are more Muslim policemen in Gujarat than any State in India!

It is time for Indians to think as being Indians, than live in the old Vote Bank formula that sustained the political parties on issue that divided each other on the basis of religion, caste, community, language etc.

[MoorthyM]

If I were Mr. Modi, I would put it along these lines: Any form of ideological indoctrination that discourages citizens from embracing modern education and incites them into taking law into their won hands and trying to unlawfully enforce/impose rules on an ideological basis will not be tolerated, as are violence acts against all citizens.

The key really is not to let the problem get to this stage, and since it has, understand its ideological basis, and neutralize it at that level. This because the above rhetoric in reality is hardly enforceable, when it has become systemic, like radical Islam has become in India and in many places.

[Ray]

How Modi defeated liberals like me

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/how-modi-defeated-liberals-like-me/article6034057.ece?homepage=true

An interesting commentary that churns the Indian mindset.

The writer is a known Modi basher.

[Dayuhan]

If I were Mr. Modi, I would put it along these lines: Any form of ideological indoctrination that discourages citizens from embracing modern education and incites them into taking law into their won hands and trying to unlawfully enforce/impose rules on an ideological basis will not be tolerated, as are violence acts against all citizens.

Are the freedoms of speech and religion constitutionally guaranteed in India? Efforts to suppress "ideological indoctrination" might run afoul if they are... certainly they would in the US, but India is of course a very different place. While recognizing the impact of indoctrination, I'd be uncomfortable with any effort to treat indoctrination as the equivalent of actual violence if that were proposed in my own neighborhood.


I will just list the abstract of my upcoming scholarship:

Many militant groups around the world are purportedly fighting to institute sharia as the governing law of Muslims. However, very few scholars have studied the relationship between sharia and violence, presumably because the former is largely viewed as dealing with internal governance issues. This perspective has likely led to the West’s policy of accommodating political and community groups that seek to promote sharia. In this paper, I argue that public surveys in Muslim communities are ill-prepared to identify the potential links between sharia and violence, especially when the majority of poll respondents identify themselves as peace-loving Muslims who perceive sharia as divine law. Moreover, I identify a radicalized subpopulation of jihadist clerics that benefit from sharia’s popularity. Empirical data is presented regarding the growth of clerical power in Pakistan and elsewhere, aided in part by this popularity, which the clerics themselves have helped to nurture. In particular, the analysis suggests that jihadist clerics and militant groups leverage sharia’s esteem in order to advance a violent agenda.

Interesting, but again difficult to comment without seeing the actual work. Do you intend to publish it?


The key really is not to let the problem get to this stage, and since it has, understand its ideological basis, and neutralize it at that level.

The big question, of course, is how does one neutralize the ideological basis?

It's not an easy thing to do. Generations of effort to neutralize the Communist ideology, ranging from "winning hearts and minds" to mass murder, accomplished very little: the Communist ideology eventually neutralized itself through its own abject failure to deliver on its promises. How does one "neutralize" the Islamist ideology?

[Dayuhan]

Discussion of Modi and of India in Foreign Affairs:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141430/ira-trivedi/what-modi-cant-give-india?sp_mid=45974987&sp_rid=c3RldmVyb2dlcnM0MkB5YWhvby5jb20S1

This one is subscriber only but some here may have access:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141434/jonah-blank/a-milder-modi?sp_mid=45974987&sp_rid=c3RldmVyb2dlcnM0MkB5YWhvby5jb20S1

Useful mostly as an indication of perceptions among the US foreign policy elite, for whatever that's worth.

At this point of course all is speculative: Modi will have to develop and implement actual policies toward Pakistan, toward the Muslim minority, and (most important) to deal with economic and other core domestic issues. It will not be possible to evaluate what he's doing until we see what those policies are and how they are being implemented. All of them are complicated and intractable problems.

[davidbfpo]

By a ret'd Indian intelligence officer:
It is gratifying that Prime Minister-elect Narendra Modi's first meeting with bureaucrats was with Home Secretary Anil Goswami on 19 May, if press reports are correct. He also met former Intelligence Bureau chief Ajit Doval. This indicates the importance he attaches to internal security despite some "strategic community" fabulists attempting to distract him with foreign issues.

Our internal security problems need immediate attention. No one has paid any attention to it since 1947 except for setting up some institutions that have not performed. As a result, we have growing communalism, a serious ethnic strife in the Northeast, rising domestic religious insurgency and persisting Leftist militancy, while our preventive security machinery shows its inability to anticipate and deal with such situations.

Link:http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/internal-security-needs-modis-attention

[MoorthyM]

By a ret'd Indian intelligence officer:

Link:http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/internal-security-needs-modis-attention

Indeed. Any attempt to "Modi"fy Pakistan has to first start with neutering Pakistan-Saudi axis' attempts to create multiple Pakistans within India itself.

As discussed (and now confirmed in this article) in my book Defeating Political Islam, this Islamization project has blossomed virtually unchecked for several decades now.

[Ray]

It is an incorrect and a most condescending remark to state that - The subcontinent also retains the power to screw things up on its own, although when they do somebody somewhere will invariably find a way to blame it on the US. Some things are inevitable.

Suffice it to say, anyone who has an iota of knowledge of history and is not biased, will observe that whenever the colonial powers quit, they encouraged and then left a legacy for conflicts.

That apart, the scars left behind by the colonials cannot be wished away pronto by any magic wand. It will take time and in the interim anything can happen and then return to normal. Of course, such events with give grist to gleeful condescensions again.

There is no question of any country taming any other country. The very notion is a western concept of imposing superiority over others.

In our parts, it is 'Live and Let Live' as much as possible, till nudged by 'global strategic interests' and that comes not from any specific sector either.

Let us debate on issues and not on preconceived condescensions.

Further, so long as there is the concept of 'minorities' and not looking at all as Indians, there can be no progress. Poverty, social inequalities etc are not solely the preserve of the so called minority. It manifests itself on all divisions of society. What has to be done is uplift the economically backward irrespective of religion. Then, and then only, can India progress.

This minority bogey is a votebank tactics i.e. scare the minority against the majority and vice versa and ensure getting their votes.

It might interest all that unless the minority (who has got wise to this Votebank manipulation)had not voted for Modi (hardline rightwing to the western folks), there was no shadow of hope that such a huge majority would come Modi's way.

It is time for less condescensions and replace the same with serious analysis by poring into reports, and then be equipped to enjoy the smell of the coffee.

In India we say Jago Mohan Pyare.

If the subcontinent retains the power to screw things up on its own, I guess it is suggested that it is the subcontinent which has screwed Ukraine.

For strategic interests, every nation screws thing up. It is not the copyright of any country or a region. Therefore, one should look before one leaps.

In India and Pakistan, we have a saying - Hamam men sab nanga hai.

[Ray]

A short commentary by IISS's South Asia expert, Rahul Roy-Chaudhury and here are two passages:



Link:https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2014-b4d9/may-5382/indias-polarised-election-campaign-5e65


By a ret'd Indian intelligence officer:

Link:http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/internal-security-needs-modis-attention

The strife in the NE is confined to the Bodoland issue with the Muslim minority, the large part having migrated illegally from Bangladesh.


Illegal immigration remains a grey area

The 2012 violence was variously described as having begun over the Bodos' destruction of a mosque or an under-construction mosque in Kokrajhar or as having begun after the killing of some BLT men by Muslims. Either way, public perception was largely that the skewed demographics of Assam, owing mainly to the continuing illegal immigration from Bangladesh -- the Bengali-speaking "settlers" are also called "Bangladeshis" -- were at the root of the ethnic violence. The immigration issue is an important factor, with Bodos believing that the Muslim settlers support illegal immigrants who continue to arrive through the riverine areas. There have also been reports of rampant encroachment of state-owned forest land by Muslim encroachers.

http://www.firstpost.com/india/assam-violence-5-key-facts-about-the-bodo-muslim-conflict-1507865.html

[Dayuhan]

If the subcontinent retains the power to screw things up on its own, I guess it is suggested that it is the subcontinent which has screwed Ukraine.

I did not suggest that the power to screw things up is in any way exclusive to the subcontinent. It is alive and well all over the world.


For strategic interests, every nation screws thing up. It is not the copyright of any country or a region. Therefore, one should look before one leaps.

That's exactly what I meant to suggest when I said the subcontinent has the power to screw things up on its own. That power may or may not be used, but it certainly exists. Being on the cynical side, I generally expect things to be screwed up, and I generally expect that somebody, somewhere (often here at SWC) will find some way to blame the US.

One cannot downplay or eliminate the colonial legacy, nor can one reasonably attribute all things that go wrong to the colonial legacy.

The appropriateness of the reference to "taming Pakistan" you'd have to take up with MoorthyM, who included it in the thread header.