Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[TheCurmudgeon]

TC,

Al Baghdadi is well-educated, and after surviving for many years in the insurgency, I agree with you that he is not 'stupid'. But I think you may be over-estimating the importance of "Western approval". What does that mean in practice? That the West is not actively trying to overthrow the government? Iraq and Libya demonstrates that there are states out there who's existence will be quickly called into question as soon as the opportunity arises. The strength of movements like ISIS is not their ability to capture "Western approval" but to know that "Western approval" is a farce that exists by default when the West perceives it does not have the political or military capabilities to effect change.

I think that “Western” approval matters in areas like financial transactions. If you cannot use Western banking systems to conduct transactions of say, selling oil on world markets, then you will always have to go through other entities. As long as they are considered a “terrorist” organization the U.S. and other countries can put considerable restrictions on their finances. That is just one area. Even Lybia and Saddam had those types of connections. The only isolated country I can think of is North Korea and even they do business with China and South Korea.

It was easier when the Soviets were still around. There was an alternative financial network. You could get everything from grain to guns. Now he will have to get someone to help sponsor his activities. I am assuming SA, but I am not sure even they will touch him being a Takfarist. So I am not sure he can make this work in the long term.

He may not think he needs those types of connections. That he can get what he needs with the cash he has stolen and with oil. he may be right, but I have my doubts.

[davidbfpo]

A short comment by Paul Rogers, which I note in particular:
If Balad air base is over-run in the coming days, the extensive munitions and equipment there will add further to ISIL’s stores. That may well be a priority for ISIL’s limited forces, not Baghdad.

ISIL planners are among the most experienced paramilitary tacticians anywhere in the world, let alone the region, including years of experience against western counter-insurgency forces.

Link:http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/middle_east/iraq_crisis_note

There is a third from Hamid Hussain, a SWJ contributor and USA-based analyst has reviewed his earlier work. Alas my IT cannot convert it to a format used by SWC, so standby.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Here is something I can agree with:

13.The greatest short- or medium-term aid to this will be open western military intervention in any form, even if restricted primarily to the use of armed drones.
14.Any such intervention will aid their propagandising the process as the “far enemy” at work again. Such a process would be greatly aided by any Israeli action in Syria – a return to the effective propaganda of 2003-6 when Israeli aid for the US operations in Iraq (little acknowledged in the West but well-known in the region) made it possible to propagandise the “Crusader-Zionist plot” to great effect.
15.ISIL may well act to incite Western military intervention. Any such intervention would be a grave mistake.
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/middle_east/iraq_crisis_note

As the article notes, they can only maintain their territorial gains if they can build an army beyond what they have now (estimated at 10,000). Recruiting through propaganda will be key. We should offer them no moral victory by being the target of western aggression.

[JWing]

Why did the Iraqi Army just quit before giving battle and let the ISIS run amock?

Did the Sunnis stand their ground along with the Shia in the Iraqi army?

Just wanted to know.

Has been reported a lot already. 3 top commanders in Mosul ordered a disorganized retreat and forces broke. When word spread other units broke throughout Salahaddin and Kirkuk. Has nothing to do with the sect of the units or soldiers.

[Ray]

Has been reported a lot already. 3 top commanders in Mosul ordered a disorganized retreat and forces broke. When word spread other units broke throughout Salahaddin and Kirkuk. Has nothing to do with the sect of the units or soldiers.

Thanks.

Not reported where we are.

[carl]

Here is something I can agree with:
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/middle_east/iraq_crisis_note

As the article notes, they can only maintain their territorial gains if they can build an army beyond what they have now (estimated at 10,000). Recruiting through propaganda will be key. We should offer them no moral victory by being the target of western aggression.

Aggressive, expansionist and murderous organizations like ISIS don't require actions by us for either good or ill to score propaganda points. If there is something small there, they'll make it bigger. If there is nothing there they will make it up or they will slaughter innocents as a provocation. This particular group of takfiri killers doesn't want us to leave them alone. They want us-convert, dhimmi or die.

That's what I figure anyway.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Aggressive, expansionist and murderous organizations like ISIS don't require actions by us for either good or ill to score propaganda points. If there is something small there, they'll make it bigger. If there is nothing there they will make it up or they will slaughter innocents as a provocation. This particular group of takfiri killers doesn't want us to leave them alone. They want us-convert, dhimmi or die.

That's what I figure anyway.

So why give them what they want?

[carl]

So why give them what they want?

Good question. Since what they want is to subjugate us, I see no good reason to allow them to do so. We defend ourselves as we must from takfiri killers and if they whine about us nasty crusaders picking on the poor downtrodden Muslims, we've lost nothing since they would whine about that no matter what.

[davidbfpo]

Professor Olivier Roy, a regional expert of some renown, has a short interview on:http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118198/olivier-roy-isis-iraqs-civil-war-and-sunni-shia-rift

Succinct:
The U.S. invasion of Iraq has just destroyed the main Sunni bulwark against Iran, with two consequences: the solidifying of a de facto independent Kurdistan, the secession of a large Sunni populated area in Northern Iraq that shifted from Baathism to Jihadism and straddles the border with Syria. Saudi Arabia, instead of allying itself with the mainstream Sunni organizations (like the Muslim Brothers), wants to crush them, while it supported for decades the very radicals that are now taking the lead in Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria.

Thus Iran is the great beneficiary of the collapse of the dominant order built between 1918 and 1948, with a minimum engagement on the field.


Shashank Joshi, from RUSI, has a short commentary 'Iran and America in Iraq: a Great Rapprochement, or Hot Air? and he concludes (from the sub-title):
The crisis in Iraq appear to have united the US and Iran against the jihadists of ISIS. But claims of a historic rapprochement, let alone collaboration, are wildly overblown.

Link:https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C53A0274764986/#.U6C-qECRcdW

[OUTLAW 09]

This is the first of two pointers. to commentaries by analysts.

First, from Kings of War a new voice:

The link to the summary & podcast, with some surprises which I cite below:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2014/06/isis-the-slow-insurgency-kowcast-vol-1/?

David---I had earlier mentioned that Turkey has supported and sided with ISIS in Syria thus the kidnapping of their Consulate personnel immediately after arriving in Mosul. You will notice absolutely no mention of the 48 in the last several days means to me and knowing Turkey-- money is ready to flow or maybe ISIS will totally break with Turkey and kill the hostages---doubt it as they still need crossing points and I suspect next to money Turkey will quietly "agree" to under the radar crossing points which are not "public" so Turkey can save face.

The main resupply/recruitment rat runs went basically through the Turkish border which Turkey has been shutting down under pressure by the US/Europe over the last four months thus again the recent fighting on their border at the Syrian crossing points.

Iraq is implementing the Iranian /Iraq war experience's ---meaning throwing thousands of limited trained "fighters" as "volunteers" against the ISIS---simply attempting to overrun their positions by sheer manpower---basically a suicide run by the "volunteers" as was conducted in the long Iran/Iraq war. ISIS is getting their Holy War---watch what happens when thousands of Shia remain in Sunni territories after the fighting---it will drive the Sunni insurgency even harder to strike them thus Zarqawi will have in the end his "war". Besides does anyone think Shia volunteers "know" how to deal with Sunni civilians other than killing them since they will be under control of the Shia militias who feel the first ethnic cleansing was not effective?

Turkey was also the main recruitment funnel point for the European ISIS foreign fighters as well and if I recall there was a recent Daily Beast interview with an American Iraqi veteran with Salafist fighters after he crossed over the border.

Balad is a major target as it has a great airfield/a central supply point and a "swimming pool" compliments of the USAF and still used by defense contractors until they were pulled out.

Watch Russia and watch the KSA---KSA has been unusually quiet lately and their recent reported private conversations on oil are not all that dead as reported they were---my link to the Voice of Russia was interesting in that is was relative balanced for recent Russian reporting on Syria and the region which has been pro Syrian in the past.

[OUTLAW 09]

Thanks.

Not reported where we are.

Basically they boarded helicopters and flew out not telling even their immediate staffs and when that got out-the troops not being stupid read the tea leaves and simply attempted to go home but were overrun by the speed of the swarming attacks carried out via "utilities".

If one can find battle videos from the period 2005/2006 of the Sunni's using armed "utilities"--they were makeshift and basic and sometimes the 12.7mms fell off the trucks---these truck attacks are professional to say the least and the trucks well made---almost like watching American Army light recon calvary just with trucks.

[davidbfpo]

Hamid Hussain's contribution is on the attachment, it is around five pages.

[OUTLAW 09]

For those that do not think there is no Russian/KSA conversations going on.

From the Russian Interfax from today:

12:13 Russia, Saudi Arabia draft nuclear cooperation agreement

This might be the indicator why Russian comments on Iraq events "seem" to be actually balanced and the KSA is strangely quiet.

[OUTLAW 09]

Hamid Hussain's contribution is on the attachment, it is around five pages.

David---the article is interesting but think several points are a tad off as events in the last three days have shown---but this quote sticks out as being correct in 2003 and correct in 2014.

The Sunni population as a whole has decided that after nine years of Shia rule there is nothing for them other than to fight. And the Shia are hell bent on the settling of a 1400 year old debate since they are the worlds "only free and fairly" elected Shia government thanks to the US Bremmer and company.

Goes to what my interpreter said in 2006 ---Arabs must fight each other until physically exhausted and laying on the ground bleeding and only then will they negotiate what they knew the solution was to be before the fighting.

Slavs have a similar saying.

"The lesson for everyone from another blood soaked page of Iraqi history is that every effort should be geared towards preserving existing states no matter how imperfect. When these states fragment from internal or external pressures, they leave only death, devastation and tears in its path. On the other hand, once citizens of a country come to a conclusion that they cannot live together as they have nothing in common then they have to make the painful decision of separation to end the war in a generation rather than bestowing these wars to their children and grandchildren."

Even now the Iraqi Army has been unable to retake Fulluja after four weeks of heavy street to street fighting.

Actually the Iraqi Army does not like MOUT fighting and shy away from it and ISIS knows it.

[OUTLAW 09]

Here is another example of an out of touch Malaki who has learned to push responsibility on to others but never on himself---a mark of a good dictator.

In this article from today he talks about everything except, unqualified Shia officers pushing aside qualified Sunni officers, the threatening of quality Sunni officers by claiming they were Baathists, rampant corruption and theft in the Army and security forces, extortion by regular soldiers of Sunni businesses and citizens, summary killing of Sunni's recently by the Iraqi army and Shia militias and worst of all his taking virtual command and control of the military leadership in his drive to implement himself as the sole decision maker so no one could threaten his power position.

The second serious mistake and this goes to the US COIN problem---no one instilled pride of Iraq, the Iraqi flag, and military service into the Iraqi Force---the old term of nationalism does wonders for a Army under attack---but with the army being just an employment agency where was that to come from? IE look at say the current Ukrainian National Guard with three months of training and limited personal protective equipment that all Iraqi wear as a given--and they are dealing with combat experienced irregulars who have a passion similar to ISIS---they have not run and yes they die but at lest for a cause and keep on joining.

http://news.yahoo.com/humiliation-rout-hits-iraqi-military-hard-201712326.html

This article confirms the first article --referencing the failures of Malaki.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqi-premier-maliki-gaining-strength-as-sectarian-strife-tears-nation-apart/2014/06/17/e5d39fa2-f646-11e3-8aa9-dad2ec039789_story.html?hpid=z1

[TheCurmudgeon]

A different take (http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/20199)on events in Mosul. If accurate, ISIS is less a military jugernaut than a group networked with other groups inside Sunni Iraq. They are also not actively administering territory but tying into local groups to manage things.


According to several Mosul residents, three armed brigades took control of the city militarily, administratively, and socially. They are ISIS, the Revolutionaries Military Council, and the Naqshbandiyya movement.

The heavily armed ISIS, which includes Arab and foreign fighters, quickly took control of the city. It confiscated all medium and heavy arms, smuggling them towards Syria through the city of al-Sharkat in Salah ad-Din, close to Tikrit. Being the stronger side, ISIS imposed its decisions and type of administration on Mosul, applying "sharia" like it did previously in Syria. Its strongholds are in al-Anbar, Diyala, Salah ad-Din, and the belt around Baghdad.

The Military Council, based in Baghdad, al-Anbar, and Salah ad-Din, involves a large segment of former officers of the disbanded army. The majority had joined al-Qaeda in Mosul, al-Anbar, and other regions in 2005, 2006, and 2007. Later, several turned against al-Qaeda, joining the uprisings (al-Sahawat) against the organization. However, the most serious threat they imposed was in 2012, when they joined the protests in the Sunni regions. The Military Council hopes to establish a Sunni federation and several of its leaders are calling to break up Iraq into several small states.

On the other hand, al-Naqshbandiyya movement, headed by Saddam Hussein's former deputy, Izzat al-Douri, is the weakest of the three. It promotes the principles of the disbanded Baath party, although several of its members had joined successive Iraqi governments. Failing to rally real support in Anbar, Diyala, and Salah ad-Din, it found its base in Mosul and Arab areas of Kirkuk. The group calls for the overthrow of the new regime by any means and the return to the rule of the disbanded Baath party.

The three organizations agreed that the Mosul coup was a "Sunni revolution" to legitimize the occupation of other cities by ISIS. However, they disagreed on the management of resources and wealth, as well as the type of administration in the city.

In this regard, an informed source from Mosul who refused to disclose his name, said the three organizations disagreed at the beginning. ISIS wanted control of all state property, weapons, and equipment. The Military Council refused to empty the coffers of the state, in addition to a dispute over ISIS taking control of the banks and stealing US$ 340 million

[TheCurmudgeon]

Along same note, story from NPR on Christians displaced from Mosul. Father claims that he had been back to Mosul since ISIS take over. His daughter was able to walk the streets without a head covering and she was even greated cordually by one of the gunman. This would indicate that not every armed individual controling the city is interested in enforcing strict Shria law.

http://www.npr.org/2014/06/18/323166067/christian-village-takes-in-iraqis-displaced-by-latest-violence

[OUTLAW 09]

The problem that the Iraqi senior generals and Malaki are having is they announce they are winning and then ISIS posts via the internet and social media just the opposite with videos and photos depicting just the opposite--there is a great infowar at the tactical and strategic levels going on and the Iraqi government is losing and that in turn is causing unrest within the Shia population as a whole

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/19/world/middleeast/iraqi-oil-refinery-ablaze-as-army-and-militants-clash.html?

The KSA released an interesting PR today.

http://news.yahoo.com/saudis-apparent-warning-iran-dont-meddle-iraq-125538829.html

[omarali50]

I posted Dr Hamid Hussein's article as a blog post at this link:

http://brownpundits.blogspot.com/2014/06/mayhem-in-mosul-old-story-new-chapter.html

[Bill Moore]

Posted by AP


From a structural perspective, the name of the organization is really a matter of semantics. The protracted popular war (PPW) as a model I think is applicable regardless of its origins in Maoist political theory. The value in communist theory is not its ideologically prescriptions for the ills of capitalism, but it's rigorous dialectical materialism which divorces analysis from the subjective normative values that so often cloud assessments. The Islamist movement was born in its current iteration in 1979 - the Iranian Revolution, the attack on the Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We are witnessing today the culmination of an escalating series of events which trace their roots directly to those three events.

Mao was worried people would interpret his broad guidelines as a doctrinal 3 phases, and not apply rigorous analysis and adapt to the local context, so I agree he rejected normative values. On the other hand, as we often do, we embraced excerpts from Mao's writing as a normative way to conduct an insurgency.

The three phases are little more than articulation of the way most insurgencies unfold over time based on interaction the adversary. They rise up, they get hammered, go into a strategic defensive posture, if they can, they move into a strategic stalemate, and if it needed they transition into strategic counteroffensive. Hard to argue George Washington didn't do this long before Mao's writings. Mao's three phases are not a strategy, but we often confuse with it one. Mao also didn't abide by winning hearts and minds as we claim, he was expert at applying terror as we saw in Manchuria to achieve objectives. , but we have a PC interpretation of everything.


That said, I do agree with TC (and with the COIN FM) that the 'insurgency' is most vulnerable when transitioning from one phase of conflict to the next. I do not think ISIS is incapable of governing in the most broad and basic sense - that is, to monopolize violence in its territory and to extract rent from the population. As another poster stated, they have done that already in Syria. Fundamentalist movements have been successful in those basic tasks in Iran (1979), Afghanistan (1996), and Saudi Arabia (~1924). I have no illusions that ISIS will somehow form a Westphalian, bureaucratic, complex state. That's not in their politics.

True about the vulnerability, but that doesn't mean strategic defeat, just means they'll try another way if they're not successful.

[TheCurmudgeon]

More on the Baathist/ISIS (http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/18/someone-is-spilling-isis-s-secrets-on-twitter.html#) connection.


Despite the caveats, @wikibaghdady deserves closer examination—especially at a moment when ISIS’s next moves could lead to a wider conflagration and more carnage. And some of what @wikbaghdady tweeted months ago has already been borne out by facts on the ground. The leaker’s revelations about ISIS’s alliance with Saddam Hussein’s former party, the Baathists, were confirmed by the events of last week, for example. The rapid takeover of Iraqi cities was not a solo effort; the campaign relied on a cultivated network of partnerships between Sunni groups including, critically, ISIS’s pact with their ideological enemies, the Baathists—a repeated theme in @wikibaghdady’s tweets.

If ex-Baathist and other members of the previous regime are in on the game than managing the space will be much easier.

It also means that Maliki's government and military may be fully infultrated and unable to make any moves without ISIS knowing about it.

Also, a few days old (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/15/iraq-isis-arrest-jihadists-wealth-power), but interesting:


Two days before Mosul fell to the Islamic insurgent group Isis (the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), Iraqi commanders stood eyeballing its most trusted messenger. The man, known within the extremist group as Abu Hajjar, had finally cracked after a fortnight of interrogation and given up the head of Isis's military council.

"He said to us, 'you don't realise what you have done'," an intelligence official recalled. "Then he said: 'Mosul will be an inferno this week'.'

Several hours later, the man he had served as a courier and been attempting to protect, Abdulrahman al-Bilawi, lay dead in his hideout near Mosul. From the home of the dead man and the captive, Iraqi forces hoovered up more than 160 computer flash sticks which contained the most detailed information yet known about the terror group.

The treasure trove included names and noms de guerre of all foreign fighters, senior leaders and their code words, initials of sources inside ministries and full accounts of the group's finances.

"We were all amazed and so were the Americans," a senior intelligence official told the Guardian. "None of us had known most of this information."

Officials, including CIA officers, were still decrypting and analysing the flash sticks when Abu Hajjar's prophecy was realised. Isis swept through much of northern and central Iraq over three stunning days, seizing control of Mosul and Tikrit and threatening Kirkuk as three divisions of the Iraqi army shed their uniforms and fled.

[AdamG]

The armour on five of Iraq's M1A1 Abrams tanks was penetrated by anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and six helicopters were shot down between 1 January and the end of May, The New York Times quoted an unnamed US official as saying on 13 June.

The official said 28 Iraqi Army Abrams had been damaged in fighting with militants, five of them suffering full armour penetration when hit by ATGMs. The United States supplied 140 refurbished M1A1 Abrams tanks to Iraq between 2010 and 2012. While they have new equipment to improve situational awareness, they do not have the depleted uranium amour package that increases protection over the tank's frontal arc.

The penetration of a tank's armour by a shaped-charge warhead increases the likelihood of crew casualties, but does not necessarily result in the destruction of the vehicle, especially if it has a dedicated ammunition compartment, as in the case of the Abrams.

However, the US official said the Iraqi Army has problems maintaining its Abrams, suggesting it will struggle to get damaged tanks back into service.

http://www.janes.com/article/39550/iraqi-abrams-losses-revealed

[OUTLAW 09]

More on the Baathist/ISIS (http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/18/someone-is-spilling-isis-s-secrets-on-twitter.html#) connection.

The debate over whether ISS is working with or without former Baathists is a mute point and it indicates just how badly we never did understand the Sunni insurgency from 2003 to 2011. Being a Baathists was like being a SED member in the former GDR ---you had to be one in order to make it up the employment and or social ladder. It was also known in Iraq if you wanted to do business open a business and or get a higher education you had to have the "business card"--Baath Party membership.

So what is so important in that?

All military officers and all Iraqi Intelligence officers were party members-so what---they were at the same time either secular Sunni's or they prayed "often" which was an indicator of a more religious slant.

Many intel offiers were used in the mosche's to monitor the prayer sessions to see if there was any "unusual activities" which meant Salafist. And a majority of the these same officers shifted into the Salafist groups after we decided to liberate Iraq.

The Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) had both types in their group and were the strongest Iraqi Sunni insurgent group on the ground in Baghdad and 10 other cities within three weeks after we arrived in Baghdad.

Fighting broke out between them and AQI when AQI decided to try to rein in the IAI and the IAI fought back killing a number of high AQI cell leaders before a truce was brokered by the overall Sunni insurgency and the AQ mothership. the truce actually held well from 2007 onwards.

Starting in about 2010 one so fewer and fewer IAI battle videos from the IAI-but they maintained until we left their web presence---at the same time in 2010 one noticed the emergence of battle videos showing now al Duri's group.

It is and or was assumed that the IAI merged into the new al Duri group fully in 2011.

then actually all went quiet---it should be noted that initially the IAI started producing HME for use in IEDS and al Duri's group took it to new products height in the tons ranges by 2011 even selling the HME to the Shia as a money making business.

The second article is more interesting---where did it come from? Interesting as one does not in full public view normally reveal a major intel find to your enemy---is just not done and as well reveal the apparent boots on the ground if true of the CIA. If it was a major find the ISIS would have known about the individual having gone missing and normally in their concept of UW they would have delayed the attack until they ascertain whether or not the Iraq Army had adjusted their security measures---the three day gap is the interesting point as normally the Iraqi intel was quicker on the evaluation of captured documents.

Normally if in fact true---the individual would have been tortured by the Iraqi as a normal game and if he was in fact a courier then he knew the importance and probably would have died before talking.

Not so sure the story is true as no single courier in their system is allowed to have say 150 thumb drives---even ISIS is not that weak on internal OPSEC---that is unless he was no courier but an major cell leader but still that is to much on one location.

IMO unless the article carried more details that could be checked it sounds like a boasting article--hey ISIS look we captured all this important stuff and are still in the fight.

A couple of points if the article is true is in fact a major security violation and blunder on the part of how ever wrote it. As ISIS is not dumb and reads news articles as well and their English is quite good.

[Maeda Toshiie]

Even now the Iraqi Army has been unable to retake Fulluja after four weeks of heavy street to street fighting.

Actually the Iraqi Army does not like MOUT fighting and shy away from it and ISIS knows it.

In all honesty, no armed force like MOUT, well training or not. MOUT requires slow and methodological advances, and more importantly, inflict disproportionally heavier casualties on the attackers.


The second serious mistake and this goes to the US COIN problem---no one instilled pride of Iraq, the Iraqi flag, and military service into the Iraqi Force---the old term of nationalism does wonders for a Army under attack---but with the army being just an employment agency where was that to come from? IE look at say the current Ukrainian National Guard with three months of training and limited personal protective equipment that all Iraqi wear as a given--and they are dealing with combat experienced irregulars who have a passion similar to ISIS---they have not run and yes they die but at lest for a cause and keep on joining.

http://news.yahoo.com/humiliation-rout-hits-iraqi-military-hard-201712326.html

This article confirms the first article --referencing the failures of Malaki.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqi-premier-maliki-gaining-strength-as-sectarian-strife-tears-nation-apart/2014/06/17/e5d39fa2-f646-11e3-8aa9-dad2ec039789_story.html?hpid=z1

It is not just the purely military part of COIN. The policy on the political process following the invasion only deepened division. Who is going to bleed for the flag if he knows that his tribe got cut out of the political pie? Tribal identity in the ME is still strong enough that no amount of US trainers can change.


http://www.janes.com/article/39550/iraqi-abrams-losses-revealed

A big enough shape charge will always kill a tank, even with DU inserts. If those ATGMs are big crew served types, I'm not surprised.

[JWing]

A different take (http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/20199)on events in Mosul. If accurate, ISIS is less a military jugernaut than a group networked with other groups inside Sunni Iraq. They are also not actively administering territory but tying into local groups to manage things.

This article misreads the organization of the insurgency. The Naqshibandi RUNS the Military Councils. They are not two separate groups.

[JWing]

Even now the Iraqi Army has been unable to retake Fulluja after four weeks of heavy street to street fighting.

Actually ISF only did probing moves into Fallujah. The main thrust was to secure the suburbs and surrounding villages before entering city. Problem was they never accomplished that and were continuously going in and out of the same areas.

[Ray]

Everything that is happening appears to be very fluid.

What will be the outcome?

Any guesses with rationale?

We, out here, are a bit concerned since there are Indian nurses and ancillary workers out there and some are said to have been taken hostage.

[OUTLAW 09]

There was a battle video posted showing the killing of an Abrams via AT missile and it was accurately guided to the target so it had to have been an optical one similar to the TOW. Impact explosion was indeed big.

It is not just the purely military part of COIN. The policy on the political process following the invasion only deepened division. Who is going to bleed for the flag if he knows that his tribe got cut out of the political pie? Tribal identity in the ME is still strong enough that no amount of US trainers can change.

The problem is when the army is viewed as just a really well paid job -700 USD per month which is good for Iraq standards--- who will in the end die for 700 USDs?

[TheCurmudgeon]

The debate over whether ISS is working with or without former Baathists is a mute point and it indicates just how badly we never did understand the Sunni insurgency from 2003 to 2011. Being a Baathists was like being a SED member in the former GDR ---you had to be one in order to make it up the employment and or social ladder. It was also known in Iraq if you wanted to do business open a business and or get a higher education you had to have the "business card"--Baath Party membership.

So what is so important in that?



In my opinion, the importance lies in the nature of ISIS/ISIL. They are not, as often portrayed, strictly radical Takfiri fighting a religious war. They are pragmatists who know how to use the idea of being a Takfiri group to their advantage. They are organized, networked, and have the assistance of other groups to administer the territory their fighters gain.

I was pretty amazed that a small group of less than 20,000 could hold the territory they had. Occupation numbers usually run in the 20 to 1000 ratio. For a city of 600,000 like Mosul you would have to leave 12,000 insurgents behind to administer/maintain/defend the city. They simply do not have those numbers. So the population must be either so in fear of them as to not react, or see them as a legitimate alternative to Maliki. It is easier to do that if others in the community who already have legitimacy with the population (or their own terror networks) are playing a public role once the territory is taken.

It brings me back to the idea that Al Baghdadi is smart and has thought this through. My guess is he is a staunch supporter of the idea that money and oil are power. That once he controls those resources he can purchase what he needs to survive, including protection and access to other necessities (food, weapons, etc.) through connections in Turkey in order for him to maintain his goals. Heck, he may have taken the refinery as a bargaining chip - "Prime Minister Maliki, I will give you back your refinery if you recognize me and leave me alone." Probably not, but now I think he is capable of that type of long term strategic thinking.

I don't believe he is a zealot who is waiting on Allah to grant him his Caliphate because he is Holy. He is a pragmatic political and military leader. Just my thoughts.

[Ulenspiegel]

A very good discussion of the different contributions to the Sunni forces which are uncorrectly labled as ISIL is found on "Sic Semper Tyrannis", the host W.P. Lang, with obviously deep knowledge of this subject, makes very good contributions.

It is IMHO worth not only to read the posts but also the discussion, Lang, Habakuk and other can explain various aspects of US and UK decision making.

[Ulenspiegel]

In my opinion, the importance lies in the nature of ISIS/ISIL. They are not, as often portrayed, strictly radical Takfiri fighting a religious war. They are pragmatists who know how to use the idea of being a Takfiri group to their advantage. They are organized, networked, and have the assistance of other groups to administer the territory their fighters gain.

I was pretty amazed that a small group of less than 20,000 could hold the territory they had. Occupation numbers usually run in the 20 to 1000 ratio. For a city of 600,000 like Mosul you would have to leave 12,000 insurgents behind to administer/maintain/defend the city. They simply do not have those numbers. So the population must be either so in fear of them as to not react, or see them as a legitimate alternative to Maliki. It is easier to do that if others in the community who already have legitimacy with the population (or their own terror networks) are playing a public role once the territory is taken.

The fact that very likely less than 12000 fighter can occupy many cities and towns indicated IMHO that they worked with the active support of locals, i.e. former army and Sunni tribes. ISIL provides the cover and effective propaganda, this includes crimes. The real power and the brain is very likely provided by others which can, as long as the ugly side of the war is linked to ISIL, seperate themselves from ISIL in future without damage.

For me the really interesting question is whether the alliance of three different groups with only a very narrow common interest survives long enough to create a stable state or whether most of the current achievements are lost in infighting.

[OUTLAW 09]

The fact that very likely less than 12000 fighter can occupy many cities and towns indicated IMHO that they worked with the active support of locals, i.e. former army and Sunni tribes. ISIL provides the cover and effective propaganda, this includes crimes. The real power and the brain is very likely provided by others which can, as long as the ugly side of the war is linked to ISIL, seperate themselves from ISIL in future without damage.

For me the really interesting question is whether the alliance of three different groups with only a very narrow common interest survives long enough to create a stable state or whether most of the current achievements are lost in infighting.

What is interesting is---is in fact there a very narrow common interest among the groups---I for one have argued since 2005 the common interest is far deeper than we in the West would like it to be.

Often during complex attacks 3 or 4 different groups would plan, fund and carry out the attacks and the groups were vary different and yet they indeed had a common cause---throwing out the US and Iran---that binds for a long time.

[OUTLAW 09]

Why the WH/Obama thinks we still need Russian support for other things than the Ukraine ie Syria, Iran, and NK---here is an Interfax press release from today---balance that against the supposedly Iraq/Malaki for the US to start bombing the ISIS.

Maybe Malaki needs to talk to Putin and ask the Russians to bomb ISIS but then Putin would more than likely say no since they are no ethnic Russians involved to be "protected" and I seriously doubt he would go to the UN because then the sending of Russian fighters and weapons into say the Ukraine would in theory viewed "as force" used in another country and would that not require UN approval?

16:07 Moscow: U.S. air strike on Iraq and any other use of force must be authorized by UN

[TheCurmudgeon]

Can anyone independently confirm this, or is it a hoax?


ISIS Launches Its Own Satellite Channel from Mosul - ISIS launched their On satlite channel from mosul Frequency is 12341 on Nilesathttp://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2014/06/isis-launches-its-own-satellite-channel-from-mosul/

[OUTLAW 09]

Can anyone independently confirm this, or is it a hoax?

http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2014/06/isis-launches-its-own-satellite-channel-from-mosul/

It exists and is up and broadcasting if one can get the Nilsat which covers the ME regions---comes and goes---not sure of the broadcasting times though.

The look and feel is the same as their informational CDs (had the TV news program feel--just on a CD) that circulated under the counters in video shops throughout the Sunni triangle from 2005 onwards so it looks like they have progressed up the media ladder in their infowar abilities since 2005.

[OUTLAW 09]

How much more did the US military "know" about Malaki and the Shia militias that we the US military did not make public when it could have been "applied" to get reconciliation going and WHY did we not support the actually winner of the 2010 elections before we left ---which would have made a major impact on what is now ongoing?

So as a provocative statement is the US military also behind the ISIS successes because we failed when we had excellent opportunities to actually force reconciliation?

Another question was in fact Bremer and the US civilians in Iraq at fault for allowing the 2005 elections when the question of reconciliation had never even been discussed---we simply "assumed" it would occur? Was actually the 2005 election in fact to early?

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/19/iraq-put-a-death-squad-commander-and-torturer-in-charge-of-mosul-no-wonder-isis-is-winning.html

[TheCurmudgeon]

It would seem to me that ISIS next move would be to begin overtures to the Kurds for a truce with the ultimate intent of seeking independence from their common enemy, Maliki. Anyone hearing rumors of such negotiations taking place?

I may have to eat my words about ISIS not being in control of the territory one year from now.

[TheCurmudgeon]

In the context of my last post, and assuming Turkey is backing ISIS, this story (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/17/turkey-kurdistan_n_5504309.html)begins to make much more sense:


ERBIL, Iraq -- In a statement that could have a dramatic impact on regional politics in the Middle East, a spokesman for Turkey's ruling party recently told a Kurdish media outlet that the Kurds in Iraq have the right to self-determination. The statement has been relatively overlooked so far, but could signal a shift in policy as Turkey has long been a principal opponent of Kurdish independence, which would mean a partitioning of Iraq.

"The Kurds of Iraq can decide for themselves the name and type of the entity they are living in," Huseyin Celik, a spokesman for the Justice and Development Party, told the Kurdish online news outlet Rudaw last week.

The Kurds have been effectively autonomous since 1991, when the U.S. established a no-fly zone over northern Iraq. Turkey, a strong U.S. ally, has long opposed the creation of an independent Kurdistan so that its own eastern region would not be swallowed into it. But Celik's statement indicates that the country may be starting to view an autonomous Kurdistan as a viable option -- a sort of bulwark against spreading extremism within a deeply unstable country.

"The Kurds, like any other nation, will have the right to decide their fate," Celik told Rudaw, in a story that was picked up by CNN's Turkish-language outlet. "Turkey has been supporting the Kurdistan region till now and will continue this support."

Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan have recently forged a strong bond over oil, much to the chagrin of Iraq, which claims that Baghdad has sole authority over oil in Kurdistan. Turkey recently signed a 50-year energy deal with Iraqi Kurdistan’s semi-autonomous government to export Kurdish oil to the north, and Kurdistan has increased its exports this week despite the insurgency by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

[davidbfpo]

A long profile of PM Maliki by Dexter Filkins in The Newyorker (hat tip to a "lurker" recommendation). Note published in April 2014:http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2014/04/28/140428fa_fact_filkins?currentPage=all

One associate's description:
His secret? He is a very intelligent tactician—all politics is short term. He doesn’t have any vision for the state.

Emma Sky, once a senior British civilian adviser to US forces in Iraq:
Did we just get it wrong with Maliki and Karzai—were we that unlucky? No. Maliki wasn’t like that in the beginning. The whole point of these places—of Iraq especially—is that the leaders need to do political deals. We make them so strong that they no longer need to do political deals. So we undermine any chance at stability. It’s destroying Iraq. We’re strengthening the guy who is creating the problem.

What a great choice made for Iraq in 2006!

[davidbfpo]

Professor John Schindler, a historian and observer of events adds his viewpoint. Always worth reading IMHO:http://20committee.com/2014/06/19/facing-americas-failure-in-iraq/

A taster:
When you wind up with your least-bad option being partnering with the Pasdaran, Iran’s feared Revolutionary Guards Corps, listed as a state sponsor of terrorism by our own government, you’ve been doing strategy wrong for some time.

[davidbfpo]

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defence of Democracies and has a short article in The Spectator, which ends with:
Western countries and their regional partners should work together to prevent extremist groups like ISIS from establishing long-lasting states. But they also need to recognise this growing boom-and-bust pattern of instability, and work to address it. Not claiming victory too soon might be a start.

Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9238221/terrors-comeback-kids/

[TheCurmudgeon]

Professor John Schindler, a historian and observer of events adds his viewpoint. Always worth reading IMHO:http://20committee.com/2014/06/19/facing-americas-failure-in-iraq/



Dave, I must disagree with both of your last two articles, but it is Schindler’s that I take the greatest umbrage with. Not his assessment of history. I believe he is dead on. But his assessment that events could have been other than what they were. If we made a mistake, it was not backing Maliki, it was not backing someone even more dictatorial who could have held on to the country.

The article still lives under the illusion that power sharing in a sectarian society can work. I would think that, if we have learned anything from recent history in places like Africa, strong ethnic and religious identities and free and fair elections do not mix. I have said it elsewhere (http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/democracy-in-iraq-the-american-militarys-kobayashi-maru/):


[A] partial democracy, is the most volatile and least predictable form of government known. When all the factors that can be associated with political instability are ranked, being a partial democracy is number one. Certainly elections in Iraq were a triumph of democracy, but elections alone don’t create democracy. Iraqis have voted in large numbers in the past and will certainly do so again in the near future, but as Professor Bruce E Moon observes “… history shows that it has never been the unwillingness to vote that prevented democracy, but rather the failure to honor the results of those elections.” This is particularly true when factionalism — a political system dominated by ethnic or parochial groups that regularly compete for influence — is present. Factionalism tends to limit an interest in power-sharing. You might think that factionalism in any system would be divisive, but it is not necessarily destabilizing. As Professor Jack A. Goldstone and his associates noted in their research on political instability “It is only when factionalism is combined with a relatively high level of open competition for office … that extremely high vulnerability to instability results …”

There are no good options in Iraq. Either we back a dictator who can keep a lid on sectarian violence, ala Saddam Hussein, or you break up the country along sectarian lines … because if you don’t, someone more vicious is going to do it for you.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dave, I must disagree with both of your last two articles, but it is Schindler’s that I take the greatest umbrage with. Not his assessment of history. I believe he is dead on. But his assessment that events could have been other than what they were. If we made a mistake, it was not backing Maliki, it was not backing someone even more dictatorial who could have held on to the country.

The article still lives under the illusion that power sharing in a sectarian society can work. I would think that, if we have learned anything from recent history in places like Africa, strong ethnic and religious identities and free and fair elections do not mix. I have said it elsewhere (http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/democracy-in-iraq-the-american-militarys-kobayashi-maru/)

The issue I have with US policy is as follows--check the 2010 Iraqi election winner who was in fact a secular Shia supported massively by the Sunni and we were still in Iraq.

Who then took the "win"---Malaki--who stood by and did nothing--we did--when did we leave--- 2011--who could have placed the reconciliation on track in 2010 --we could have but walked away and now we have this mess.

[OUTLAW 09]

Finally former General P get's it right somewhat late but right nevertheless.

http://news.yahoo.com/us-must-not-iraq-air-force-shiite-militias-094421950.html

[JWing]

My newest piece "Background To The Fall Of Mosul, Insurgents’ Relentless Attacks Upon Security Forces Set Stage For The Taking Of City" (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/background-to-fall-of-mosul-insurgents.html) ISIS' Soldiers' Harvest campaign launched in July 2013 said that it would relentlessly attack the ISF to weaken them and allow the Islamic State to regain territory it had lost during the Surge. Ninewa was one of the most violent provinces in Iraq and there the ISF were targeted more than in other provinces. Helped set the stage for the ISF collapse in June.

[TheCurmudgeon]

The issue I have with US policy is as follows--check the 2010 Iraqi election winner who was in fact a secular Shia supported massively by the Sunni and we were still in Iraq.

Who then took the "win"---Malaki--who stood by and did nothing--we did--when did we leave--- 2011--who could have placed the reconciliation on track in 2010 --we could have but walked away and now we have this mess.

I wish it was that simple, but I don't think that it really would have made a difference. If anything, I think the results of those elections demonstrate that less than one-third of the population of Iraq believed that a Sunni-Shiite coalition was possible. (http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/03/11/world/middleeast/20100311-iraq-election.html?ref=middleeast&_r=0)
But I suppose we will never know.

Today, I don't think that kind of reconcilliation is possible.

[Firn]

I just stumbled over The Monster of Mosul: How a Sadistic General Helped ISIS Win (http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/19/iraq-put-a-death-squad-commander-and-torturer-in-charge-of-mosul-no-wonder-isis-is-winning.html) while looking up other stuff.


From 2006 to 2008, U.S. military lawyers and commanders pressed Maliki to support sending Al Gharawi to trial, to prove he was serious about weeding out sectarianism in the ranks of his security forces. Those efforts failed. A 2006 diplomatic cable released by wikileaks shows then-U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilizad explaining Maliki’s intransigence. “Mahdi has proven valuable enough to Maliki,” Khalilizad wrote, “that he rebuffed our request that he execute an Iraqi warrant for Mahdi’s arrest.”

A unit called the Major Crimes Task Force, consisting of both American and Iraqi lawyers and investigators, built a strong case against Mahdi. The unit compiled dozens of witness statements about his participation in the systematic torture of detainees along sectarian lines at the height of the violence between Sunni and Shia factions in Iraq in 2005 and 2006. (In 2007, as an American officer in Baghdad, I assisted the Major Crimes Task Force in their efforts to pursue General Mahdi’s arrest and trial.) This investigation augmented a previous Iraqi warrant from 2006. Twenty brave witnesses delivered statements that he ordered the systematic torture of detainees and often supervised it himself.

...


Heated exchanges followed between U.S. and Iraqi officials when Al Gharawi’s charges were dropped. Both U.S. Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus tried to convince the Iraqi government that it had to show its skeptical Sunni citizens that a Shiite government was willing to arrest senior Shiite security officials for sectarian violence. Instead, the predominantly Shia government decided to let Al Gharawi go. Once the accused war criminal was free, the Iraqi government then put him in charge of the largest Sunni Arab majority city in the country, Mosul, where Al Qaeda was still actively resisting the government.

The way Maliki acted there and then fits sadly all-too well into other information about the lenghts he went to purge all which didn't fit into his drive to built up his power. He certainly helped much to make the terrain fertile for ISIS and their deals.

[TheCurmudgeon]

The way Maliki acted there and then fits sadly all-too well into other information about the lenghts he went to purge all which didn't fit into his drive to built up his power. He certainly helped much to make the terrain fertile for ISIS and their deals.

Firn,

I think that is a narrow interpretation of events and a misreading of the nature of the communal/tribal social dynamics. If Maliki did act against prominent members of his own sect he would have been questioned as to his dedication to the tribe and his legitimacy. He would have been thought too weak and not worthy of loyalty. Support amongst his own people would have evaporated and he would have been replaced, usually by someone more sectarian.

[JWing]

Everything that is happening appears to be very fluid.

What will be the outcome?

Any guesses with rationale?

We, out here, are a bit concerned since there are Indian nurses and ancillary workers out there and some are said to have been taken hostage.

A very long and bloody war of attrition

[JWing]

It would seem to me that ISIS next move would be to begin overtures to the Kurds for a truce with the ultimate intent of seeking independence from their common enemy, Maliki. Anyone hearing rumors of such negotiations taking place?

I may have to eat my words about ISIS not being in control of the territory one year from now.

There is on going fighting between ISIS and peshmerga in Diyala and Kirkuk.

[JWing]

In the context of my last post, and assuming Turkey is backing ISIS, this story (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/17/turkey-kurdistan_n_5504309.html)begins to make much more sense:

Kurdistan is not going to become independent until it finds a way to fund itself. 90% of KRG budget comes from Baghdad which Maliki has cut off since beginning of 2014 for all but 2 months. There have been months of protests in Kurdistan by government workers about not being paid. Around 70% of KRG budget goes to public workers. It's estimated that KRG would have to export around 1 mil/bar/day to earn enough money to sustain itself. Currently KRG capacity is only at 400,000 bar/day

[JWing]

Firn,

I think that is a narrow interpretation of events and a misreading of the nature of the communal/tribal social dynamics. If Maliki did act against prominent members of his own sect he would have been questioned as to his dedication to the tribe and his legitimacy. He would have been thought too weak and not worthy of loyalty. Support amongst his own people would have evaporated and he would have been replaced, usually by someone more sectarian.

Iraq is a very divided country. Two of Maliki's most ardent critics and opponents of his 3rd term are the Sadrists and Hakim of the Supreme Council.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Kurdistan is not going to become independent until it finds a way to fund itself. 90% of KRG budget comes from Baghdad which Maliki has cut off since beginning of 2014 for all but 2 months. There have been months of protests in Kurdistan by government workers about not being paid. Around 70% of KRG budget goes to public workers. It's estimated that KRG would have to export around 1 mil/bar/day to earn enough money to sustain itself. Currently KRG capacity is only at 400,000 bar/day

Could they do it with support from Turkey?

Alternatively, does Turkey need something from the Kurds they could not get from Baghdad?

Or, could it simply be a necessary evil as part of support for an independed ISIStan?

[TheCurmudgeon]

Heard a show on NPR just a few minutes ago - interview with an ex-Iraqi Air Force Colonel in Mosul who claims that ISIS is only about 15% of the insurgency. They are the tip of the spear for the fighting but not big in the actual control of the territory. The majority are Sunni groups and ex-Baathist military. The ex-Baathists are running the city. The ultimate goal is to take Baghdad and overthrow the government.

[JWing]

Could they do it with support from Turkey?

Alternatively, does Turkey need something from the Kurds they could not get from Baghdad?

Or, could it simply be a necessary evil as part of support for an independed ISIStan?

Turkey has become one of the main supporters of Pres Barzani and his KDP. It has been supporting Kurds' plans to expand its oil industry. Same time has asked for a deal between Baghdad and Irbil before it will export Kurdish oil. Latest statement by Ankara however said it would back an independent Kurdistan if it happened. Still KRG needs 1 mil/bar/day of oil exports and has nowhere near that capacity right now no matter what Turkey does. Will happen in future.

[JWing]

Heard a show on NPR just a few minutes ago - interview with an ex-Iraqi Air Force Colonel in Mosul who claims that ISIS is only about 15% of the insurgency. They are the tip of the spear for the fighting but not big in the actual control of the territory. The majority are Sunni groups and ex-Baathist military. The ex-Baathists are running the city. The ultimate goal is to take Baghdad and overthrow the government.

Number of ISIS in Mosul has gone down dramatically as moves south. Same time ISIS is running the administration in Mosul. Handed out code of conduct in city, has set up Sharia courts, is destroying shrines that it considers unreligious, etc. so they are definitely in charge.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Number of ISIS in Mosul has gone down dramatically as moves south. Same time ISIS is running the administration in Mosul. Handed out code of conduct in city, has set up Sharia courts, is destroying shrines that it considers unreligious, etc. so they are definitely in charge.

What are your estimates as to ISIS total strength in Iraq?

[TheCurmudgeon]

The NPR interview: http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/06/19/323691052/saddams-ex-officer-weve-played-key-role-in-helping-militants


As they steamrolled across northern Iraq, Sunni militants had important help from an old power in the country — former members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party and his army.

One retired air force colonel said he is a member of a newly formed military council overseeing Mosul, the large city captured last week by ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and its allies from Sunni Arab armed factions.

He spoke in a phone interview from Mosul and agreed to talk only on the condition that he not be named. He said he was worried about being targeted. NPR confirmed through acquaintances that he had served as colonel in the air force during the rule of Saddam, who was ousted in the U.S. invasion of 2003.

The former officer said there were multiple armed Sunni Arab factions that feel marginalized by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Shiite-led government.

"They [ISIS] are not in charge. They are not responsible [for] everything," the officer said.

He described ISIS as one of five armed factions opposing the government. The others are made up of people like himself who previously belonged to the military or the Baath Party.One of the biggest factions is the , ostensibly an order of the mystical Sufi sect but in essence a collection of Baathist holdovers. It's led by Saddam's former crony Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, the King of Clubs on the U.S. military's deck of cards ranking former regime targets.

Other support for ISIS comes from forces loyal to the Baathist former Gen. Mohamed Younes Ahmed, who for years has helped the Sunni insurgency, reportedly from Syria. Assistance is also coming from smaller groupings of Saddam loyalists from the old military and security apparatus — men who are valued for the tactical experience and intelligence-gathering they perfected under Saddam's iron-fisted rule.

"They have got good skill, good experience. They have good training ... and they have good weapons and that's why they got a victory [so] fast."

A key component of the militants' strategy is state-building, not just military victories, he said, adding that he's a member of the ad hoc council that's trying to restore basic services to Mosul.

And although black ISIS flags now fly over the city and ISIS has issued laws based on its extreme ideology, the ex-colonel claims that it is former Sunni military officers, not ISIS, who have been left in control of the city.

"Everything is OK and our people, they decided to continue their operation to Baghdad to change that government," he said.

Of course, there is no way to verify anything he says.

[JWing]

What are your estimates as to ISIS total strength in Iraq?

There are all kinds of numbers bouncing around with nothing definite. Probably 3,000-5,000 fighters with me personally leaning towards the lesser figure. They are the best armed, best organized in the country, and ISIS is the only group that launches car bombs, and can attack just about any province in Iraq. Even with the current fighting it has been putting up a steady stream of bombings and shootings in Baghdad and launched car bombs into southern Iraq. It has a difficult working relationship with the Baathists which it is attempting to dominate. Ansar al-Sunna is a rival due to both being international jihadists and there has been fighting between the two in the past. Those are by far the three largest insurgent groups. There are others but they are really small and many almost cease to exist a couple years ago.

[Ray]

Iraqi militants release 42 hostages
http://www.eaglenews.ph/iraqi-militants-release-42-hostages/

Described as from Turkmenistan and Nepal. Not the Turkish diplomats or Indians.

[OUTLAW 09]

This site is carrying two great articles one on a newly created Shia militia which has been fighting in Syria and now back into Iraq and the second on the Quds Force fighting now in Diyala.

1. Yesterday a high level Turkish Party member stated Turkey could live with a Kurdistan on Iraqi territory and from the PM he is indicating that Iraqi is on the verge of splitting into three units.
2. A Turkish mainline think tank yesterday stated that with the fighting in Syrian and now Iraq new borders were in the process of being drawn in the ME.

http://jihadology.net/

Daily Beast had a good article on the views of Turkey which were similar to what is being mentioned in leading German newspapers.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/19/turkey-gives-up-on-unified-iraq.html

[OUTLAW 09]

There are all kinds of numbers bouncing around with nothing definite. Probably 3,000-5,000 fighters with me personally leaning towards the lesser figure. They are the best armed, best organized in the country, and ISIS is the only group that launches car bombs, and can attack just about any province in Iraq. Even with the current fighting it has been putting up a steady stream of bombings and shootings in Baghdad and launched car bombs into southern Iraq. It has a difficult working relationship with the Baathists which it is attempting to dominate. Ansar al-Sunna is a rival due to both being international jihadists and there has been fighting between the two in the past. Those are by far the three largest insurgent groups. There are others but they are really small and many almost cease to exist a couple years ago.

One should have seen the various IC estimates and so called "studies" going around on the same question in 2005-2006.

If though one takes the simple fact that say the number is estimated currently at 6000 at the high end and say 2000 at the low end---using 2005/2006/2007 US prisoner figures of say 7000 in Abu Ghraib and another 4000 at Bucca by the end of 2006 early 2007 if the studies were correct the US Army had everyone in prison.

Begs the question then who was still fighting---have never put faith in figures.

I really do get tired of the Baathists being mentioned---heck everyone in Iraq to include the Shia were Baathists even in southern Iraq. The only ones that one could say they were not Baathists were the AQI and the foreign fighters.

If you looked at the "resistance" in 2006 by Sunni's it broke into three distinct groups--nationalists who simply did not like be overrun by an outside power, secular Sunni/fundamental Salafists who came out of the tribes and local major city populations , and AQI. And then there were the Iraqi criminals/gangs/smugglers thrown in to the mix.

AQI was and still is the weakest of the three numbers wise inside the Sunni population as a whole.

Would though dispute the fact that now ISIS is the largest---simply because while JSOC damaged badly AQI through to 2011 the rest of the US Army did not beat up that badly on the other Sunni insurgent groupings---the Shia did to a degree but overall the Sunni groupings as a whole still maintained a depth of numbers not matched by ISIS inside the Sunni population as a whole. Right now the Sunni population is greeting ISIS as liberators not occupiers.

Would agree that yes the ISIS is well armed, but it is the tactical knowledge of the Sunni triangle due to the Sunni tribes that are carrying the fight as well as the intel abilities of the former Sunni insurgent groupings that is delivering high grade intel to ISIS.

This is what I would call a "whole of government" approach that we saw in 2005-2008 by both the AQI and the various Sunni groupings in how they divide up military taskings. One has the money, one has the skills in planning (al Duri and the former IAI), one has the foot soldiers, one has a serious reputation as fierce fighters (both the Ansar al Sunnah and ISIS), one had the intel collection abilities (IAI), one has advanced weapons, one has advanced IEDs (IAI) and the list can go on and on.

It was almost like watching the German WW2 blitz krieg unfold---meaning marching in separate columns and striking as a single unit. The key tactic used today by ISIS was seen starting to unveil itself in 2006/2007---it was the "swarming attack" ----multiple fighter groups attacking at the same time from multiple directions of the compass using light and heavy weapons to draw the attacked force to a specific point where they would be then attacked with VBIEDs or heavy mortar attacks. It worked every time--we never did call it what it was---the US military called the attacks "complex" never did understand that concept as it mislead the simplicity behind the swarm attack.

What is though of interest and is largely overlooked is that AQI and the IAI did throughout our time in Iraq--- had "campaign plans" and overarching "strategies" which were never hidden and openly stated along with the goals they were trying to attain with that specific campaign plan.

The US Army simply ignored them as they viewed it mainly as propaganda.

[JMA]

Kurdistan is not going to become independent until it finds a way to fund itself. 90% of KRG budget comes from Baghdad which Maliki has cut off since beginning of 2014 for all but 2 months. There have been months of protests in Kurdistan by government workers about not being paid. Around 70% of KRG budget goes to public workers. It's estimated that KRG would have to export around 1 mil/bar/day to earn enough money to sustain itself. Currently KRG capacity is only at 400,000 bar/day

Does this include what production is available from the area the Kurds claim as their historical homeland and not just from where they were squeezed into by Saddam?

[JMA]

Iraq is a very divided country. Two of Maliki's most ardent critics and opponents of his 3rd term are the Sadrists and Hakim of the Supreme Council.

Divided into what?

Why should the Sunnis, Kurds and Shias be forced into a unitary state of unequal representation?

[OUTLAW 09]

Divided into what?

Why should the Sunnis, Kurds and Shias be forced into a unitary state of unequal representation?

Right now if one looks at the gains of the ISIS---each ethnic region has oil capabilities so in fact the separation would be easier---but to the only 'freely democratically" elected Shia government in the history of the ME compliments of the US---they want the whole pie--power sharing is not a Malaki strength.

[JMA]

U.S. to Send Up to 300 Military Advisers to Iraq (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/us/obama-to-address-nation-on-iraq-crisis.html?_r=0)


Warning that the militants pose a threat not just to Iraq but also to the United States, Mr. Obama said he was prepared to take “targeted and precise military action,” a campaign of airstrikes that a senior administration official said could be extended into neighboring Syria.

The thin edge of the wedge?

[OUTLAW 09]

U.S. to Send Up to 300 Military Advisers to Iraq (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/us/obama-to-address-nation-on-iraq-crisis.html?_r=0)

JMA---seems as if the "no boots on the ground" rule by Obama does not apply to SOF these days as somehow "advisors" are not combat troops.

In my SF advising days ---yes you were an advisor until the first bullet was fired and then you commanded and led by example.

[JMA]

I suggest we are looking at a principle here.

Saddam's Sunnis (up to 20% of the population) ruled the majority Shias (60 plus %) and the Kurds (17%) with murderous brutality. Who gave them that right?

Yes I know about the arbitary borders and all that but like the Russians and their bordering countries by what logic do the Iraqi Sunnis and the Russians have the 'right' to govern other peoples in their own geographic locations (for control of oil and/or for use as a geographic buffer against a hypothetical future invasion)?

Cutting the Sunni part out can be sold on the basis that there will be recognition should the Sunnis assist with the total destruction of radical Islam. The Kurds is more problematic as there will need to be a piece of Syria cut out for consolidation ... with the future demands for the same for pieces of Iran and Turkey. The Shias keep the rest.

And why not?


Right now if one looks at the gains of the ISIS---each ethnic region has oil capabilities so in fact the separation would be easier---but to the only 'freely democratically" elected Shia government in the history of the ME compliments of the US---they want the whole pie--power sharing is not a Malaki strength.

[JMA]

[QUOTE=JMA;157652]U.S. to Send Up to 300 Military Advisers to Iraq (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/us/obama-to-address-nation-on-iraq-crisis.html?_r=0)

JMA---seems as if the "no boots on the ground" rule by Obama does not apply to SOF these days as somehow "advisors" are not combat troops.

More likely it is a case of never, NEVER, being able to trust the word of a politician.


In my SF advising days ---yes you were an advisor until the first bullet was fired and then you commanded and led by example.

As part of the training and advice given to call in a few airstrikes to show them how its done? ;)

[Red Rat]

Advisor/Mentor teams can also be critical enabler teams, especially for providing linkage between surveillance & strike assets. So if the Iraqi military were going to conduct a counter-offensive and you wanted to link their units on the ground with US air & surveillance assets then these teams would be well placed to do it.

Remember the old British Army teaching methodology: Explanation, Demonstration, Imitation, Practice? I suspect the Iraqi Army is about to receive a demonstration on the effective use of airpower in irregular warfare...

[TheCurmudgeon]

I really do get tired of the Baathists being mentioned---heck everyone in Iraq to include the Shia were Baathists even in southern Iraq. The only ones that one could say they were not Baathists were the AQI and the foreign fighters.

If you looked at the "resistance" in 2006 by Sunni's it broke into three distinct groups--nationalists who simply did not like be overrun by an outside power, secular Sunni/fundamental Salafists who came out of the tribes and local major city populations , and AQI. And then there were the Iraqi criminals/gangs/smugglers thrown in to the mix.


I am not an operator (I am an Engineer). My interests have to do with how to make military gains stick politically. ISIS is doing that in spades, at least at the moment. Force ratio numbers vary, and the FM 3-24 did not have a number I saw. Using the most conservative numbers of 3 per 1000 (which really only covers police presence), you would need about 1200 to cover the city of Mosul (assuming a 600K population). ISIS seems to be doing it with less. So I am assuming they are getting local help and that they are not receiving much trouble from the population. From my perspective, this means that they have a relative advantage in regards to legitimacy* – ISIS and its local elements are seen as MORE legitimate than the Maliki government, even if they are not potentially the MOST legitimate form of government. That fight will probably come later.

As for the term “baathist”, it is important not because they represent a specific group. You are correct that most people in the military or civil service would have had to have been a Baathist. However, Baathists are generally considered secular, ISIS is a group which claims a fundamentalist religious ideology. They two should not mix (and may not in the long run). That is why I find the term important.

Now compare to the Kurds (http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/19/this-is-how-you-fight-isis.html#):


The peshmerga are no newcomers to fighting Sunni militants. Prior to the US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq, Kurdish fighters helped American Special Forces evict the fanatical Ansar al-Islam group from a stronghold near the Iranian border. And in 2004, the peshmerga fought alongside US troops when Iraqi police and National Guard units in Mosul failed to contain a Sunni insurgency.

Are they likely to try a repeat of 2004 and assist Iraqi security forces to take back Mosul? “We are fighting a defensive war; not an offensive one,” says a peshmerga commander, who declined to be named for this article. And ordinary fighters don’t seem overwhelmed at the idea of going on the offensive outside Iraqi Kurdistan.

They see the ISIS uprising as part of a general Sunni revolt. Sunni tribes to the south of Kirkuk rebuffed a peshmerga offer of anti-ISIS assistance and were warned to confine themselves to the northern half of Kirkuk province, says Askari.

But he holds out the possibility of a Kurdish offensive outside their territory. “If anyone comes and helps us to confront al Qaeda and ISIS we are ready, and that includes Iran, America, Israel, anyone.”


If ISIS could take territory in Iraqi Kurdistan they would have a fight on their hands.


*Legitimacy defined as a recognition within the population of a group’s right to rule.

[JWing]

My latest article Replacing Maliki No Panacea For Iraq (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/replacing-maliki-no-panacea-for-iraq.html) Pres Obama has called for a more inclusive government in Iraq which some have taken to mean that he wants Maliki out. Replacing him would likely improve the immediate political situation in the Iraq and open up some immediate compromises but would not solve Iraq's institutional problems, win over more Sunnis nor deter the insurgency.

[davidbfpo]

Not a headline I'd expect to see in The Daily Telegraph. The article starts with:
There are three things that the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia strives for above all others: peace, stability and security, for the international community, for our region, and for our country and our people, whether they are old or young, men or women, Sunni or Shia. These are the cornerstones of our government and they lie at the foundation of our thinking.

The author?
Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf Al Saud...Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Court of St James’s(London)

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10911838/US-air-strikes-will-sign-the-death-warrant-of-our-Muslim-neighbours.html

[JWing]

Does this include what production is available from the area the Kurds claim as their historical homeland and not just from where they were squeezed into by Saddam?

The Kurds occupied the Kirkuk oil field. That's only producing at about 300,000 bar/day so the KRG has still not reached that 1 mil/bar/day mark.

[slapout9]

The ratio of 3 per 1000 is an American concept to be used in peace time police operations. During civil emergencies it will be much higher. I don't know that it has any validity at all in war situations in a foreign country.

[TheCurmudgeon]

The ratio of 3 per 1000 is an American concept to be used in peace time police operations. During civil emergencies it will be much higher. I don't know that it has any validity at all in war situations in a foreign country.

You are correct. I wanted to take the lowest number I could. I used this reference: A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency (http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/09winter/goode.pdf)by STEVEN M. GOODE.

There is also: Troop Levels in Stability Operations: What We Don’t Know (http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_02_07_Krause.pdf) by Peter J. P. Krause. It is an MIT pub and is where I took the more robust 20 per 1,000. I would think that this number is more logical if you had to do everything including military and civilian security and providing basic services. Krause includes military and civilian security forces in his number (based on Iraq):


There are currently 169,000 coalition troops (including 152,000 Americans) deployed to Iraq, a ratio of 6.3 per 1,000 if only these forces are counted. If the Iraqi army is added into the mix, then the figure becomes 11.3 per 1,000, and 18.4 per 1,000 if Iraqi police forces are also included.4 The addition of approximately 20,000 U.S. troops would push those ratios to 7.1, 12.1, and 19.1 per thousand, respectively. These figures include non-combat support troops as well as all Iraqi army and police units that are “in the fight” according to CENTCOM, regardless of readiness. When “tooth-to-tail” considerations are included—the number of combat troops to logistical support troops—the number of U.S. combat troops in country drops to about 60,000, and coalition and Iraqi force figures face similar reductions. Therefore, only if these best case figures are used with all support troops and all Iraqi police included does the current figure even begin to approach the 20 per 1,000 believed to be needed for success.

Notibly, the numbers do not include contractor support or civilians helping with the Iraqi Government.

The 3 per 1,000 number is for a U.S. style police department, which is interesting if for no other reason than most people in the U.S. are not likely to challenge police authority or think that the local government and police are illegitimate ... mostly. It would not be a planning factor I would use for an invasion and occupation.

[davidbfpo]

Two commentaries of value IMHO. The first by Ken Pollack, of Brookings, dissects what the 300 advisers could do:http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/06/20-questions-deployment-advisors-iraq-pollack

The socond is 'Why the Iraqi army can't defeat ISIS' on Vimeo. I note it cites several SME from David Kilcullen's company:http://www.vox.com/2014/6/20/5824480/why-the-iraqi-army-cant-defeat-isis

The Iraqi forces and the opposition summed up:
It comes down to two things: training and professionalism. ISIS learned how to fight, while the Iraqi army has long been a weak fighting force. All the weapons in the world won't matter if you don't know how to wield them. And ISIS's victories, not to mention the Iraqi army's repeated failures, tell you a lot about the country's larger crisis.

(Last sentence) But it's far, far too early to count ISIS out on the basis of hypothetical scenarios. Their military record in Iraq proves that they can outperform expectations.

[slapout9]

You are correct. I wanted to take the lowest number I could. I used this reference: A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency (http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/09winter/goode.pdf)by STEVEN M. GOODE.

There is also: Troop Levels in Stability Operations: What We Don’t Know (http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_02_07_Krause.pdf) by Peter J. P. Krause. It is an MIT pub and is where I took the more robust 20 per 1,000. I would think that this number is more logical if you had to do everything including military and civilian security and providing basic services. Krause includes military and civilian security forces in his number (based on Iraq):



Notibly, the numbers do not include contractor support or civilians helping with the Iraqi Government.

The 3 per 1,000 number is for a U.S. style police department, which is interesting if for no other reason than most people in the U.S. are not likely to challenge police authority or think that the local government and police are illegitimate ... mostly. It would not be a planning factor I would use for an invasion and occupation.

A few years ago we had a pretty extensive discussion on this very subject at the SWC. One of the things I uncovered was this article by Lidell Hart from Military review 1960. T.E. Lawrence had wanted Lidell Hart to study this very subject. Here is a link to the article. Not sure how relavent it is to COIN but it does have a lot to say about so called conventional forces.

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p124201coll1/id/705/rec/1

Having seen first hand how gangs take over a neighborhood in America I am very dubious of any magic ratio. It is usually a combination of factors that come together at the right time and place.

[OUTLAW 09]

Advisor/Mentor teams can also be critical enabler teams, especially for providing linkage between surveillance & strike assets. So if the Iraqi military were going to conduct a counter-offensive and you wanted to link their units on the ground with US air & surveillance assets then these teams would be well placed to do it.

Remember the old British Army teaching methodology: Explanation, Demonstration, Imitation, Practice? I suspect the Iraqi Army is about to receive a demonstration on the effective use of airpower in irregular warfare...

Here is the problem--- was that not really what we taught the entire Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Special Forces from 2005 until 2011 so one would think they got it.

Ex General P got it right ---we are not the Shia Air Force because that would be what is being perceived by the Sunni's being struck.

[OUTLAW 09]

Two commentaries of value IMHO. The first by Ken Pollack, of Brookings, dissects what the 300 advisers could do:http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/06/20-questions-deployment-advisors-iraq-pollack

The socond is 'Why the Iraqi army can't defeat ISIS' on Vimeo. I note it cites several SME from David Kilcullen's company:http://www.vox.com/2014/6/20/5824480/why-the-iraqi-army-cant-defeat-isis

The Iraqi forces and the opposition summed up:

Here is something that I got today in a conversation with a German source just out of Iraq.

1. The max number of ISIS that made the run into Mosul was no more than 1000 with a majority being Iraqi's very minimum foreign fighters as they are still majority wise in Syria.
2. A majority of the inexperienced foreign fighters going into Syria are being used as cannon fodder and sent straight to whatever front needed reinforcements---ISIS has at it's heart remained an true Iraqi organization.
3. The number of ISIS that peeled off and went south towards Baghdad numbered only a few hundred in numbers.
4. ISIS's inner circle is comprised of literally former Islamic Army of Iraq and now renamed as the al Duri group Military Council with a large number of ex military officers and intel types
5. A bulk of the fighting in the various towns is being conducted by the former Sunni insurgent groups/Sunni tribes not ISIS.
6. ISIS is using the same exact style of infiltration into towns inside Syria based on what they learned in Iraq --ie small intel cells into the town staying in safe houses, then identification of local leaders, local armed group leaders, and government types then a reign of targeted killings and intimidations begins until they control the town.
7. It appears this was very well planned meaning the local Sunni insurgent groups and supporting tribes knew when to reach for their weapons long before the ISIS units arrived in their areas.

It appears that the ISIS ground units as he mentioned are being used as a type of Waffen SS meaning they lead the charge into a new area---create confusion and terror and then the local Sunni insurgent groups and tribes members take over the area as ISIS moves on---in critical areas/towns or say at the oil refinery ISIS stays and fights due to their experience and their experience with heavy weapons.

Thus if the US is intent on air strikes and hits armed truck utilities thinking they are ISIS it might in fact be local Sunni's which will inflame matters and prove to the Sunni the US supports Shia fighters and Iran.

[JWing]

Two commentaries of value IMHO. The first by Ken Pollack, of Brookings, dissects what the 300 advisers could do:http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/06/20-questions-deployment-advisors-iraq-pollack

The socond is 'Why the Iraqi army can't defeat ISIS' on Vimeo. I note it cites several SME from David Kilcullen's company:http://www.vox.com/2014/6/20/5824480/why-the-iraqi-army-cant-defeat-isis

The Iraqi forces and the opposition summed up:

The Iraqi forces have proven that they can take an area but they have no concept on how to hold anything. They simply raid an area and then leave and insurgents move back in. This is seen again and again in the current fighting in Anbar and northern Babil. Ishaqi in northern Salahaddin was just cleared twice in about one week or two. This will be repeated throughout the country. Iraq is looking to be a very bloody war of attrition that will likely drag on for years.

[OUTLAW 09]

Two commentaries of value IMHO. The first by Ken Pollack, of Brookings, dissects what the 300 advisers could do:http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/06/20-questions-deployment-advisors-iraq-pollack

The socond is 'Why the Iraqi army can't defeat ISIS' on Vimeo. I note it cites several SME from David Kilcullen's company:http://www.vox.com/2014/6/20/5824480/why-the-iraqi-army-cant-defeat-isis

The Iraqi forces and the opposition summed up:

David---this sentence from the Kilcullen SMEs is what I have been saying---the AQI has learned from the IAI which has become al Duri's group and they have fed off of each other---this Iraqi ISIS is now a solid Sunni insurgency block and I seriously doubt they will split as they fully understand this is why they failed the last time.

This SME sees now the trend I have seen since 2005 as well in the battle videos---why analysts have failed to monitor since 2005/2006 these battle videos is beyond me. IE the IAI for example became by 2010/2011 the largest producer of HME for IED usage in the entire ME and it was all in their videos down to the actual production processes and chemical mixtures.

But between 2007 and now, something changed:
When you like at the [ISIS] training videos from the mid 2000s, and compare them to ones from 2010, they're moving from terrorist tactics like how do you create an IED to things that include operations, strategy tactics.. by Nathaniel Rosenblatt, the head of Caerus' Middle East Division

[slapout9]

Another question for all. Would it be a better overall and long term solution to go ahead and partition old Iraq into 3 new and perhaps stable ethic states as opposed to try and force a faux united single state like we are doing now?

[davidbfpo]

Another question for all. Would it be a better overall and long term solution to go ahead and partition old Iraq into 3 new and perhaps stable ethic states as opposed to try and force a faux united single state like we are doing now?

If there was ever a time for Iraqis to decide on such a partition it is not now. Those outside Iraq do not have the capability, will or design to provide such a solution.

If one had a reliable time machine I'd expect Kurdistan to become an independent state; reliant on some odd allies and staying out of the rest of Iraq.

[JWing]

Another question for all. Would it be a better overall and long term solution to go ahead and partition old Iraq into 3 new and perhaps stable ethic states as opposed to try and force a faux united single state like we are doing now?

If it were to happen the Sunnis would be screwed. All Iraqi provinces are dependent upon the central budget for money. Most of that money comes from southern oil fields. Kurdistan is developing its own petroleum industry. There are no developed oil or gas fields in Sunni areas. There is I think only one field which is in Anbar. There are some in Ninewa as well but those are in the disputed areas which the Kurds hold. With no economic base the Sunni areas would become poverty stricken quickly.

I should add outside of ISIS not many Sunnis in Iraq actually want their own country. Some want federalism, but they might even be a minority. Rather most Sunnis actually believe they are the majority and should run the entire country, an idea that comes from the Saddam era.

[Dayuhan]

Another question for all. Would it be a better overall and long term solution to go ahead and partition old Iraq into 3 new and perhaps stable ethic states as opposed to try and force a faux united single state like we are doing now?

Is that a decision to be made by Americans, or anyone other than Iraqis?

Arguably what we are seeing right now is the process of partitioning Iraq. It's not pretty, but I don't know that it would be any prettier if imposed by some external Deus ex Machina.

[JMA]

Iran says Obama lacks will to combat terrorism in Iraq (http://news.yahoo.com/iran-says-obama-lacks-combat-terrorism-iraq-113918303.html)


US President Barack Obama lacks "serious will" to combat terrorism, a top Iranian official said Friday after an Iraqi appeal for American airstrikes went unanswered.

Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian's comments followed a statement from Obama on the Iraq crisis in which he pledged to send military advisors to Baghdad but stopped short of further action at this stage.

He is correct of course and it looks more likely that the token force of advisors the US will deploy is designed to counter the need for Iranian special forces and others to deploy in significant numbers to assist with the defense of Baghdad.

It is not as if there should be any lack of knowledge of Iraq to inform the US Administration in making decisions but is this Administration will probable not be willing to ask those with the - hard earned - knowledge of Iraq for advice. After all we have a new bunch of smart guys now who believe they have all the answers.

[Dayuhan]

I should add outside of ISIS not many Sunnis in Iraq actually want their own country. Some want federalism, but they might even be a minority. Rather most Sunnis actually believe they are the majority and should run the entire country, an idea that comes from the Saddam era.

I'm sure that's true, but do they have the capacity to impose Sunni rule on the rest of the country, especially if the Shi'a are getting active support from Iran?

I'm wondering whether the ISIS/Sunni forces will try to impose control on the core Shi'a regions, where I expect they'd face much more serious resistance. I'm also wondering whether Iranian-supported Shi'a forces would try to push into core Sunni areas, where an Iranian presence would be... provocative, to put it mildly. And I wonder whether either wants to try to impose control on the Kurds.

In short, while there will certainly be areas along the uncertain ethnic/sectarian lines of division that will be contested, I wonder if we're seeing a fight for control of a discrete "Iraq" or a fight over where the lines of an eventual partition will be drawn. It just seems difficult to envision a scenario that would allow any of the parties to establish sustainable control over the others.

That's largely a speculation, would welcome ideas from those with area expertise.

[JMA]

The - minority - Sunnis appear to have another problem and that is adjusting to the loss of hegemony they exercised over the majority of Shia and Kurds in the past. Someone needs to break the news to them that there can be no return to those days and the best they can hope for - as they lack oil reserves in their geographical area - is crumbs from the Shia table if they remain in Iraq or abject poverty if they seek independence.


If it were to happen the Sunnis would be screwed. All Iraqi provinces are dependent upon the central budget for money. Most of that money comes from southern oil fields. Kurdistan is developing its own petroleum industry. There are no developed oil or gas fields in Sunni areas. There is I think only one field which is in Anbar. There are some in Ninewa as well but those are in the disputed areas which the Kurds hold. With no economic base the Sunni areas would become poverty stricken quickly.

I should add outside of ISIS not many Sunnis in Iraq actually want their own country. Some want federalism, but they might even be a minority. Rather most Sunnis actually believe they are the majority and should run the entire country, an idea that comes from the Saddam era.

[JMA]

It just seems difficult to envision a scenario that would allow any of the parties to establish sustainable control over the others.

And so it should be. Who gives the Shia, Sunni or Kurds the right to exercise hegemony over any other group?

Secondly, can anyone really even attempt to make a serious case for the retention of the vestages of the Sykes–Picot Agreement?

[JMA]

If there was ever a time for Iraqis to decide on such a partition it is not now.

Why?

[Dayuhan]

And so it should be. Who gives the Shia, Sunni or Kurds the right to exercise hegemony over any other group?

Agreed... that's why I think we're looking at a partition in progress. I've heard it said that a truly inclusive government could hold Iraq together, but that doesn't seem a realistic aspiration.


Secondly, can anyone really even attempt to make a serious case for the retention of the vestages of the Sykes–Picot Agreement?

Certainly not I. That's why I would not want to see the US investing resources in an effort to hold Iraq together.

[JMA]

Interesting (IMO at least):

Kurdish intelligence officer: British ISIL militants 'will target UK' (http://www.abna.ir/english/service/middle-east-west-asia/archive/2014/06/20/617500/story.html)


He told Sky News: "If only 10% of these people survive, if I know Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (ISIL leader) he will use these people to attack the UK.

"According to the intelligence we have, just Britain alone has around 400 to 450 known people fighting amongst the ranks of ISIL."

Yes the pitch was for military aid for the Kurds... but there may well be some merit in the warning he gives.

In the old days - when the Brits still had a military of consequence - all efforts would have been made to make sure that the maximum number of these UK militants were killed in the pursuit of their jihad in Syria and Iraq (and not wait for them to attempt to return home to continue with the jihad).

Now today's Brits will be wringing their hands over any act contributing to the deaths of UK citizens even if they are jihadis.

But the Brits are saved by the sad fact that they no longer have any significant military reach to do anything about the 450 odd British jihadis. Therefore to do nothing is their only option.

[OUTLAW 09]

Seems as if the Iraqi government cannot even get the internet blockade thing right as well.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/20/iraq-s-internet-blockade-doesn-t-touch-isis-sites.html

[OUTLAW 09]

It still seems that civilians in the WH and DoD still cannot get things rights even after 8 years in Iraq.

Chalabi has American blood on his hands, he basically provided the "false" intel to get the war going and now we turn to him because what he is an expert?---he had initially wanted Malaki's job in 2005 but we did not support him then. We seem never to learn from anything.

Secondly, it looks like that US capped the contact to the key and largest Sunni tribes after 2011 not to "anger" Malaki. Again DoS has always seems to make the wrong moves. Maybe it was their swimming pool that kept them from not traveling around the countryside.

Looks like the Sunni tribes will fight until Baghdad has a "balanced government and no Malaki" and we all know in advance that will not work.

So what have we really learned in eight years of fighting in Iraq--nothing really.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/19/u-s-turns-to-old-frenemies-for-new-iraq-war.html

[JWing]

I'm sure that's true, but do they have the capacity to impose Sunni rule on the rest of the country, especially if the Shi'a are getting active support from Iran?

I'm wondering whether the ISIS/Sunni forces will try to impose control on the core Shi'a regions, where I expect they'd face much more serious resistance. I'm also wondering whether Iranian-supported Shi'a forces would try to push into core Sunni areas, where an Iranian presence would be... provocative, to put it mildly. And I wonder whether either wants to try to impose control on the Kurds.

In short, while there will certainly be areas along the uncertain ethnic/sectarian lines of division that will be contested, I wonder if we're seeing a fight for control of a discrete "Iraq" or a fight over where the lines of an eventual partition will be drawn. It just seems difficult to envision a scenario that would allow any of the parties to establish sustainable control over the others.

That's largely a speculation, would welcome ideas from those with area expertise.

The Sunni protests that lasted for a year in Iraq and none of them talked about creating a new Sunni country. The two main arguments were over a more inclusive government with real power sharing and carrying out reforms both realistic and not so much or decentralization and creating a Sunni federal region.

[JWing]

The - minority - Sunnis appear to have another problem and that is adjusting to the loss of hegemony they exercised over the majority of Shia and Kurds in the past. Someone needs to break the news to them that there can be no return to those days and the best they can hope for - as they lack oil reserves in their geographical area - is crumbs from the Shia table if they remain in Iraq or abject poverty if they seek independence.

Sunni sectarian identity as it has developed since 2003 has a couple main components. One is that they are victims of the Americans, the Shiites and Iran. Many in fact believe those three have worked together in a conspiracy to destroy Iraq and the Sunnis. In turn, a narrative has developed that the new order in Iraq is wrong because they are a majority. They claim that Sunni Arabs are a plurality and with Sunni Kurds they are a majority. This is used for a justification for why they should rule Iraq or at least have a 50-50 split of positions within the government with the Shia. Those believes are actually increasing in Iraq. They already got one hard message during the civil war that the Shiites might in fact be more numerous than they are but that has apparently faded as the majority narrative is even discussed by leading Iraqi parties like Speaker of Parliament Nujafi's Mutahidun.

While your suggestion is very practical it would take a major reformulation of Sunni identity to make any headway.

[OUTLAW 09]

A really good article from the New York Times today on just how effective the ISIS is/has been and how wealthy they are---tends to support my thoughts that we have constantly under estimated them since Zarqawi called for the Caliphate in 2004 in Baqubah at the Green Dome.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/21/world/middleeast/isis-iraq-insurgents-reaping-wealth-as-they-advance.html?

[davidbfpo]

A very different perspective from a human rights activist in Mosul. I say different because nearly all the commentary is from faraway observers and a few in Kurdistan (incl. BBC).

Hat tip to Open Democracy:http://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/qc-icssi/voice-from-inside-mosul

[JWing]

Here's my latest article Security In Iraq’s Anbar Shows Battle Against Insurgents Will Be Long And Often Futile (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/security-in-iraqs-anbar-shows-battle.html) Anbar province shows that the Iraqi forces with the help of tribes can take territory but can't hold it. Used example of Saqlawiya which is just outside of Fallujah. Has been cleared of insurgents then retaken by militants and cleared again three times in just the last month and a half. Shows what fighting will be like in the rest of the country. Iraq is heading towards a long war of attrition with many reversals.

[JWing]

ISIS could be sitting on top of a $2 bil war chest. Earns $8 mil/mo from taxes on trade between Syria and Iraq, $20 mil/yr in oil sales to Syria and Turkish companies, $30 mil/yr from kidnapping foreign aid workers and reporters in Syria. Uses money not only for funding operations but to administer the regions it controls in Syria. Money will now be going to places like Mosul in Iraq.

http://www.npr.org/2014/06/20/323844507/u-s-moves-to-lock-up-isis-s-abundant-war-chest

[Ray]

Govt fears Shia-Sunni tension, issues alert

NEW DELHI: Concerned by reports that the developments in Iraq could lead to Shia-Sunni confrontation in the country, the government has issued an alert after the matter was discussed in the review meeting chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Friday.

Meanwhile, a city-based Shia Muslim organization has enlisted around 19,000 volunteers to travel to trouble-torn Iraq to defend the holy shrines in Karbala and Najaf and provide aid to the suffering Iraqis.

On Wednesday, Shia group Anjuman-e-Haidari distributed forms seeking volunteers to travel to Iraq where several cities have been over-run by Sunni militants under the banner of ISIS.

Shias ran around 50 camps outside mosques across the country on Friday. The volunteers have to sign on a declaration attached to the form which says, "I am against terrorism which I believe is one of the most serious threats to humanity."
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Govt-fears-Shia-Sunni-tension-issues-alert/articleshow/36921774.cms


A very disturbing repercussions that can cause problems in India too.

[Ray]

The lost moral of Islam’s divide
SHAJAHAN MADAMPAT

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-lost-moral-of-islams-divide/article6134190.ece?homepage=true

[TheCurmudgeon]

I feel we are going about this all wrong. We should not be helping the Iraqi government - we should be looking for the moderate elements in the Sunni coalition that we could work with and then sow the seeds of hate and discontent amongst the ruling Sunni coalition. We should be repeating "ISIS is getting all the money while you do all the hard work of controlling the territory." "They have done nothing we could not have done ourselves." and then we need to determine who is at the top of ISIS besides Al Baghdadi. Target someone we could turn, and then kill everyone above him. Old fashion king making. Because the reality is that the tribal politics have more in common with the Western world pre-Westphalia than the Western world now. And if we continue to pretend that the tribal/religious elements who are now in control of Sunni Iraq are willing to work within a power sharing government out of Baghdad then we are fooling ourselves.

[Bill Moore]

A very disturbing repercussions that can cause problems in India too.

Ray,

I think this incredibly important and a lot of folks in the U.S. who work counterterrorism and the strategic implications of terrorism don't grasp the potential scale of the challenge throughout South Asia, but especially India since Al-Qaeda and its various affiliates will target India, probably more so once the jihad ends or scales down in Afghanistan.

Intentional or accidental, and based on my reading of various Islamist doctrine and strategy I believe it is the former, one of the more effective ways for them to create to a high degree of instability they can exploit to spark to an ethnic conflict, either between Shia and Sunni, Sunni and Christian, Sunni and Buddhist, etc.

The Sunni/Shia conflict in Syria and now in Iraq (this has been ongoing, but it is more prominent now in the media, to include Jihadist websites) creates opportunities that can be exploited by both sides.

I brought this up once before to people who have known better and they were briefing senior leaders that were no Shia in India, and for that matter no Shia in the USPACOM region, and they were of course wrong on both accounts. Once they realized they were wrong they defended their position by stating they were only a small percentage.

Let's look at that argument in India alone. India is the second or most populace nation in the world. They have the third largest Muslim population in the world, close to 161 million Muslims. The so called experts are right, Shia are a minority estimated to represent 10-13% of that population, so darn there are only around 16 million Shia in India. That is more than the population of many countries, to include: Mali, Tunisia, Belgium, Cuba, UAE, Sweden, etc. No problem easy to manage for India's security forces right?

I think the assumption that all politics is local is deeply flawed. Global issues may manifest differently in various locales but they're still global issue that often mobilize people regardless of good the local governance is. In fact their issues often have nothing to due with the local governance issues.

Hope India can get to the left of this. Another aspect worth watching is Shia foreign fighters traveling to Iraq now, much like many traveled to Syria to support Assad. I doubt they'll be focused on targeting the West or their host nations when they return, but they could very well continue their civil war against the Sunnis when they return.

I heard yesterday for the first time that the U.S. is only capable of focusing on one thing at a time when it comes to national security, and while I think that is an exaggeration, we do focus on one thing (Al-Qaeda) to the extent that we don't appreciate the significance of other things simultaneously.

[JMA]

I hear what you say and it reaffirms the view that the non-Kurd Sunnis are struggling to come to terms with their change in status in Iraq. I would ask the Kurds whether they would prefer to go it alone or play second fiddle to the non-Kurd Sunnis who even together still comprise a 40-60 minority to the Shias in a unified Iraq. Then of course you need to ask the Shia whether they want to remain in a state with the minority Sunni whose areas produce little oil contribution to the national economy. It could get interesting.


Sunni sectarian identity as it has developed since 2003 has a couple main components. One is that they are victims of the Americans, the Shiites and Iran. Many in fact believe those three have worked together in a conspiracy to destroy Iraq and the Sunnis. In turn, a narrative has developed that the new order in Iraq is wrong because they are a majority. They claim that Sunni Arabs are a plurality and with Sunni Kurds they are a majority. This is used for a justification for why they should rule Iraq or at least have a 50-50 split of positions within the government with the Shia. Those believes are actually increasing in Iraq. They already got one hard message during the civil war that the Shiites might in fact be more numerous than they are but that has apparently faded as the majority narrative is even discussed by leading Iraqi parties like Speaker of Parliament Nujafi's Mutahidun.

While your suggestion is very practical it would take a major reformulation of Sunni identity to make any headway.

[Ray]

Ray,

I think this incredibly important and a lot of folks in the U.S. who work counterterrorism and the strategic implications of terrorism don't grasp the potential scale of the challenge throughout South Asia, but especially India since Al-Qaeda and its various affiliates will target India, probably more so once the jihad ends or scales down in Afghanistan.

Intentional or accidental, and based on my reading of various Islamist doctrine and strategy I believe it is the former, one of the more effective ways for them to create to a high degree of instability they can exploit to spark to an ethnic conflict, either between Shia and Sunni, Sunni and Christian, Sunni and Buddhist, etc.

The Sunni/Shia conflict in Syria and now in Iraq (this has been ongoing, but it is more prominent now in the media, to include Jihadist websites) creates opportunities that can be exploited by both sides.

I brought this up once before to people who have known better and they were briefing senior leaders that were no Shia in India, and for that matter no Shia in the USPACOM region, and they were of course wrong on both accounts. Once they realized they were wrong they defended their position by stating they were only a small percentage.

Let's look at that argument in India alone. India is the second or most populace nation in the world. They have the third largest Muslim population in the world, close to 161 million Muslims. The so called experts are right, Shia are a minority estimated to represent 10-13% of that population, so darn there are only around 16 million Shia in India. That is more than the population of many countries, to include: Mali, Tunisia, Belgium, Cuba, UAE, Sweden, etc. No problem easy to manage for India's security forces right?

I think the assumption that all politics is local is deeply flawed. Global issues may manifest differently in various locales but they're still global issue that often mobilize people regardless of good the local governance is. In fact their issues often have nothing to due with the local governance issues.

Hope India can get to the left of this. Another aspect worth watching is Shia foreign fighters traveling to Iraq now, much like many traveled to Syria to support Assad. I doubt they'll be focused on targeting the West or their host nations when they return, but they could very well continue their civil war against the Sunnis when they return.

I heard yesterday for the first time that the U.S. is only capable of focusing on one thing at a time when it comes to national security, and while I think that is an exaggeration, we do focus on one thing (Al-Qaeda) to the extent that we don't appreciate the significance of other things simultaneously.

Thank you for your post.

At least it indicates some people are thinking beyond the cultural and racial boundaries.

India has been howling blue murder for a long time about the scourge of Islamic fundamentalism, but the world did not care.

It was only when 9/11 happened and Bush went ballistic that the world realised what has struck them and as the years progressed they realised the true horror this fundamentalism is havocking the world.

Shia or Sunni, Islam demands that they maintain their supremacy. Shias maybe the minority amongst them, but their fervour is no less. Sadly both the sect has mindless medieval mindset and one cannot change that because the religion is intense in it fire!

The religion has does not recognise Westphalian boundaries.

Therefore, we can wait and watch.

And hope that some sense prevails.

I hope India is ready for the onslaught.

This time it will not be a cakewalk.

[OUTLAW 09]

Thank you for your post.

At least it indicates some people are thinking beyond the cultural and racial boundaries.

India has been howling blue murder for a long time about the scourge of Islamic fundamentalism, but the world did not care.

It was only when 9/11 happened and Bush went ballistic that the world realised what has struck them and as the years progressed they realised the true horror this fundamentalism is havocking the world.

Shia or Sunni, Islam demands that they maintain their supremacy. Shias maybe the minority amongst them, but their fervour is no less. Sadly both the sect has mindless medieval mindset and one cannot change that because the religion is intense in it fire!

The religion has does not recognise Westphalian boundaries.

Therefore, we can wait and watch.

And hope that some sense prevails.

I hope India is ready for the onslaught.

This time it will not be a cakewalk.

Ray--was not one of the core Kashmir Sunni insurgent groups is in factIndain and one even the Indian government has had problems with and reports are coming in that they have returned in strength back into their home territory inside India with combat experience out of the Kashmir?

Also the Sunni fundamentalists will in fact target India eventually because India was one point in the world where both Shia and Sunni have gotten along exceptionally well over the last 300--400 years.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Thank you for your post.

At least it indicates some people are thinking beyond the cultural and racial boundaries.

India has been howling blue murder for a long time about the scourge of Islamic fundamentalism, but the world did not care.

It was only when 9/11 happened and Bush went ballistic that the world realised what has struck them and as the years progressed they realised the true horror this fundamentalism is havocking the world.

Shia or Sunni, Islam demands that they maintain their supremacy. Shias maybe the minority amongst them, but their fervour is no less. Sadly both the sect has mindless medieval mindset and one cannot change that because the religion is intense in it fire!

The religion has does not recognise Westphalian boundaries.

Therefore, we can wait and watch.

And hope that some sense prevails.

I hope India is ready for the onslaught.

This time it will not be a cakewalk.

Ray, you are taking the same, shallow, biased tact that everyone else is taking. This is not religious. That is just the way it manifests itself. This is Identity Warfare. The same type of identity warfare that caused the religious wars in Europe or the genocide in Rwanda.

It is a combination of three factors. 1st, a social identity. Depending on your specialty this is either Identity Theory or Social Identity Theory. It is derived from the need for self esteem. The second element is limited resources. In a world of limited resources people tend to band together more tightly into the group that they identify with. This is derived from our need for security. The final element is some form of injustice, real or perceived. This causes them to lash out against those they see causing the injustice. The fact that this is an identity war should be clear from the fact ISIS claims Takfiri status - able to decide for themselves who shares their identity as a true Muslim and who does not.

The second and third elements are relative. Resource constraint was far greater 200 years ago. Each group compares themselves with other groups - where do they stand relative to others.

There are three ways to fight an identity war, 1) diminish the identity - you do this by crushing it (Not advised); 2) replace the identity - the idea behind creating a state identity (we are all Iraqis) or an individual identity* (the liberal or democratic peace); or 3) divide and conquer - find the fault lines within the group and exploit them. That is a temporary solution, but it can work.

Besides the fact that we are missing the reality of the situation, as long as we think this is a religious war it will never end ... well, it can end, when you kill off all the "radical" Muslims. But odds are that, the farther you go, the larger the group of "radical" Muslims becomes until you wipe them all out.

*creating a liberal identity requires removing the resource limitation. Once resources are sufficient then people no longer feel the need to band tightly together and begin to accept others for their individual characteristics instead of their stereotypical group identity.

[OUTLAW 09]

Out of an article from Ken Pollack 11 June 2014:


... It is important to understand a few key points about the Sunni militant side of the new Iraqi civil war. It’s a Coalition, not a Single Group. First, ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) is essentially the “lead dog” of a larger Sunni militant coalition—hence my preference for the latter, more accurate description. ISIS has been fighting in conjunction with a number of other Iraqi Sunni militant groups. Effectively the entire rogue’s gallery of Sunni militias from the 2006-2008 civil war have been revived by Prime Minister Maliki’s alienation of the Sunni Arab community since 2011. AQI, the Naqshbandis, the Ba’th, Jaysh al-Muhammad, Ansar al-Sunnah, and all of the rest are back in operation in Iraq, in at least tacit cooperation with a number of Sunni tribes.

These groups are key members of the Sunni militant coalition. They have done a great deal of the fighting, dying and occupying. Often they are indistinguishable from one another to outsiders or even Iraqis who are not themselves Sunni militants.

[JWing]

I hear what you say and it reaffirms the view that the non-Kurd Sunnis are struggling to come to terms with their change in status in Iraq. I would ask the Kurds whether they would prefer to go it alone or play second fiddle to the non-Kurd Sunnis who even together still comprise a 40-60 minority to the Shias in a unified Iraq. Then of course you need to ask the Shia whether they want to remain in a state with the minority Sunni whose areas produce little oil contribution to the national economy. It could get interesting.

The Kurds are definitely moving towards independence. They need to produce enough oil to support themselves, which is still a bit away though. They like the rest of Iraq have created an oil dependent economy with a huge public sector with the government being the largest employer and 70% of the budget going to govt salaries and pensions and imports just about everything.

[JWing]

Ray, you are taking the same, shallow, biased tact that everyone else is taking. This is not religious. That is just the way it manifests itself. This is Identity Warfare. The same type of identity warfare that caused the religious wars in Europe or the genocide in Rwanda.

It is a combination of three factors. 1st, a social identity. Depending on your specialty this is either Identity Theory or Social Identity Theory. It is derived from the need for self esteem. The second element is limited resources. In a world of limited resources people tend to band together more tightly into the group that they identify with. This is derived from our need for security. The final element is some form of injustice, real or perceived. This causes them to lash out against those they see causing the injustice. The fact that this is an identity war should be clear from the fact ISIS claims Takfiri status - able to decide for themselves who shares their identity as a true Muslim and who does not.

The second and third elements are relative. Resource constraint was far greater 200 years ago. Each group compares themselves with other groups - where do they stand relative to others.

There are three ways to fight an identity war, 1) diminish the identity - you do this by crushing it (Not advised); 2) replace the identity - the idea behind creating a state identity (we are all Iraqis) or an individual identity* (the liberal or democratic peace); or 3) divide and conquer - find the fault lines within the group and exploit them. That is a temporary solution, but it can work.

Besides the fact that we are missing the reality of the situation, as long as we think this is a religious war it will never end ... well, it can end, when you kill off all the "radical" Muslims. But odds are that, the farther you go, the larger the group of "radical" Muslims becomes until you wipe them all out.

*creating a liberal identity requires removing the resource limitation. Once resources are sufficient then people no longer feel the need to band tightly together and begin to accept others for their individual characteristics instead of their stereotypical group identity.

Completely agree Iraqi politics were not always about sect, in fact for most of Iraqi history it was not, but since 2003 it has become one about conflicting politics of identity.

For the best book about this check out Fanar Haddad's Sectarianism in Iraq. He argues that sect and identity are constantly changing and based upon the socio-political-economic situation in the country.

http://www.amazon.com/Sectarianism-Iraq-Antagonistic-Visions-Columbia/dp/B00CC7DQ6Y/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1403452446&sr=8-1&keywords=fanar+haddad

Here's an interview I did with Fanar as well:

http://www.musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2013/06/the-changing-face-of-sectarianism-in.html

Another good book is by Harith Hasan's Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-political Conflict in Iraq. Harith's thesis is that Iraq suffers from failed state building and that is what has given rise to the current trend of sectarianism in the country. The state has failed to create a shared sense of identity and history and that's what has given rise to the current wave of sectarianism

http://www.amazon.com/Imagining-Nation-Nationalism-Sectarianism-Socio-political/dp/1906801770/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1403452603&sr=8-1-fkmr0&keywords=harith+hassan+imagining+the+nation

Here's an interview I did with Harith

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/02/a-critical-look-at-iraqi-nationalism.html

Finally here is an article that I wrote about how the current Sunni sectarian identity is in fact a recent creation that came out of the community's inability to deal with the changes in Iraq after 2003

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2013/12/sunni-identity-politics-in-iraq-after.html

[davidbfpo]

Joel,

What I find remarkable is that the incredibly bitter and bloody Iran -v- Iraq war from September 1980 to August 1988, appears to be forgotten by Iraqis. A good number of whom now look to Iran for help, largely as they are Shia co-religionists.

Is there not any lingering distrust, even hatred of Iran and vice ser versa?

[Bill Moore]

Ray, you are taking the same, shallow, biased tact that everyone else is taking. This is not religious. That is just the way it manifests itself. This is Identity Warfare. The same type of identity warfare that caused the religious wars in Europe or the genocide in Rwanda.

It is a combination of three factors. 1st, a social identity. Depending on your specialty this is either Identity Theory or Social Identity Theory. It is derived from the need for self esteem. The second element is limited resources. In a world of limited resources people tend to band together more tightly into the group that they identify with. This is derived from our need for security. The final element is some form of injustice, real or perceived. This causes them to lash out against those they see causing the injustice. The fact that this is an identity war should be clear from the fact ISIS claims Takfiri status - able to decide for themselves who shares their identity as a true Muslim and who does not.

The second and third elements are relative. Resource constraint was far greater 200 years ago. Each group compares themselves with other groups - where do they stand relative to others.

There are three ways to fight an identity war, 1) diminish the identity - you do this by crushing it (Not advised); 2) replace the identity - the idea behind creating a state identity (we are all Iraqis) or an individual identity* (the liberal or democratic peace); or 3) divide and conquer - find the fault lines within the group and exploit them. That is a temporary solution, but it can work.

Besides the fact that we are missing the reality of the situation, as long as we think this is a religious war it will never end ... well, it can end, when you kill off all the "radical" Muslims. But odds are that, the farther you go, the larger the group of "radical" Muslims becomes until you wipe them all out.

*creating a liberal identity requires removing the resource limitation. Once resources are sufficient then people no longer feel the need to band tightly together and begin to accept others for their individual characteristics instead of their stereotypical group identity.

Just because you disagree doesn't mean Ray's comments are shallow are biased. The Indians have lived with this threat within their borders much longer than we have and don't have the luxury of sitting on the sidelines accusing others of being shallow and biased. In fact our political correctness is its own form of bias that often prevents us viewing things as they actually are, instead we interpret events, data, etc. through a very biased perceptional lens, one that hasn't been overly helpful in recent years.


This is not religious. This statement as a standalone statement is ridiculous.

Fortunately you wrote:
That is just the way it manifests itself. This is Identity Warfare. I have been saying this for years, using the same logic with street gangs, insurgents, etc., but the key driver to that identity is religion in this case. Take the religion out of it the identity isn't there for most of these groups we're discussing. Not unlike communism, it can be a global identity and result in mobilizing people globally, which is why the situation in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, etc. is not simply a local issue. How this identity manifests globally will vary based on those who identify with it, some will act locally (spread the conflict between Shia and Sunni), some will travel to the jihad and only act in the field of battle, other travelers will return and continue their jihad in their host or native country. We have seen this happen for decades, yet seem to lack an appreciation of this challenge.

I agree it is certainly more than religion, and I agree with the argument that we can't solve this problem with the military alone. If the Maliki government remains in power there appears to be little chance of reconciliation, so it will be a fight that continues for decades unless one side gains sufficient strength to defeat the other. At best we can defend Baghdad and keep a corrupt government in power, which may be the lesser of two evils for western interests compared to having a Caliphate ran by a group with a vision similar to Al-Qaeda.

You offer three ways to defeat an identity war, but you can't defeat war, so I think you meant take the wind of out the identities that have resulted in war? In other words you're looking at achieving peace, not defeating one identity or the other. I agree you can't crush an identity, any attempt to do so will only make it stronger, which is partly why our GWOT efforts have resulted in an expansion of global AQism. We supported their narrative, which is why I'm a believer in clandestine, covert, low visibility operations to kill off the AQ members that threaten us without the fanfare, but we're well past that point.

We're not capable of replacing the identity with a state identity, in fact the West has attempted that, and that is largely what has led to much of the violence in the world. The Sykes-Picot Agreement is an example, the West drew the lines that latter became states that didn't work, and of course we did the same in Africa and elsewhere. If this isn't a normative model I don't know what is. Individuals decide who they will identify with, we can't replace that. We try to offer alternatives, and in this recent conflict our alternative identities have been rejected, so back to drawing board. As for divide and conquer, how will this work? This reminds me of the Brits leveraging minorities in their territories to help control the territory, which almost always led to major bloodshed after the Brits left, to include the millions killed when India formed East and West Pakistan. If anything this simply strengthens the identity of the opposing groups.

I'm not convinced on the argument that if you remove the resource limitation that people will not band tightly and accept others. I think we're confusing our model in the U.S. which is based on much more than economics with the idea model what will resolve conflict around the globe. We also have a different level and type of education, Judea-Christian based value system, a national norm that promotes equality in opportunity (not in practice always, but it can be pursued through the legal system when it is denied), etc. Attempting to solve the problems in Iraq through economic development alone will not result in the same conditions we enjoy.

We have to be realists while at the same time I hope we continue to be idealists. The situation in Iraq threatens more than Iraq, and each country will perceive that threat differently based on their interests and how it manifests in their country. When it comes to being bias, we are often at the top of that list.

[JWing]

Joel,

What I find remarkable is that the incredibly bitter and bloody Iran -v- Iraq war from September 1980 to August 1988, appears to be forgotten by Iraqis. A good number of whom now look to Iran for help, largely as they are Shia co-religionists.

Is there not any lingering distrust, even hatred of Iran and vice ser versa?


The Shia militias with the exception of Sadr's forces all look towards Iran. All of them from Badr to Asaib Ahl al-Haq were created by Iran so that's to be expected. Sadr however deeply resents Iran and its attempt to take over his movement. That's the reason why he never sent any of his fighters to Syria. Maliki went into exile originally to Iran during the Saddam era, but then left for Syria because again Iran was trying to take over his Dawa party. I think for the majority of Iraqis the relationship with Iran is ambiguous. There is lots of interaction between the two countries with trade pilgrims funding of militias etc, some is seen positively others not so much.

[Bill Moore]

JWing,

Does the PUK still maintain relations with Iran? They were aligned with Iran to some extent when they were fighting Saddam and the KDP was aligned with Saddam to fight the PUK. Pure craziness, but then again that's Iraq.

[JWing]

JWing,

Does the PUK still maintain relations with Iran? They were aligned with Iran to some extent when they were fighting Saddam and the KDP was aligned with Saddam to fight the PUK. Pure craziness, but then again that's Iraq.

Actually both the KDP & PUK fought on the Iranian side during the Iran-Iraq War. What you're referring to was the Kurdish civil war that occurred in the 90s when Barzani asked Saddam to come in to help with advances by the PUK who were backed by Iran.

Iran has connections to both parties today but the PUK is considered closer. The PUK is in disarray because Talabani has been in Germany for months after a stroke so the party is literally ruderless right now.

[JWing]

More stories of ISF collapses today.

After 3 days of fighting in Qaim in western Anbar ISF withdrew from there and several other cities giving most of the western region to insurgents. ISIS now controls all border crossings with Syria and Jordan in Anbar. Reports are that 80-90% of Anbar is now under insurgent control.

ISF also suddenly withdrew from Tal Afar in Ninewa after days of fighting. Just day before people were talking about Tal Afar would be the linchpin of a counter offensive to retake Mosul. So much for that.

[Ray]

Ray--was not one of the core Kashmir Sunni insurgent groups is in factIndain and one even the Indian government has had problems with and reports are coming in that they have returned in strength back into their home territory inside India with combat experience out of the Kashmir?

Also the Sunni fundamentalists will in fact target India eventually because India was one point in the world where both Shia and Sunni have gotten along exceptionally well over the last 300--400 years.


Which core Kashmiri Sunni insurgent groups.

Many return and surrender.

[TheCurmudgeon]

First off, Ray, I want to apologize. I did not realize how much of my first sentence in my last post sounds like a personal attack. It is not. I was just trying to make the point that we have to get past the obvious if we are really going to create a viable, long term solution.

Second, JWing and Dave, I am also fascinated by how mailable the Iraqi identity seems to be. Perhaps it is because Saddam never fully instilled a nationalistic identity in those outside his clan/sect. Maybe it is tied more closely to economic conditions. My personal feeling is that it has to do with the hierarchy of identities. Everyone wants to be associated with, and a part of, whomever is on top. But even that does not seem to explain it. It seems that it takes about ten years to alter an identity. The Sunni's have clearly created a new identity since we invaded. But it was not always anti-coalition either. As Dave notes, it is as if the Iraq-Iran war never happened.

[OUTLAW 09]

The Shia militias with the exception of Sadr's forces all look towards Iran. All of them from Badr to Asaib Ahl al-Haq were created by Iran so that's to be expected. Sadr however deeply resents Iran and its attempt to take over his movement. That's the reason why he never sent any of his fighters to Syria. Maliki went into exile originally to Iran during the Saddam era, but then left for Syria because again Iran was trying to take over his Dawa party. I think for the majority of Iraqis the relationship with Iran is ambiguous. There is lots of interaction between the two countries with trade pilgrims funding of militias etc, some is seen positively others not so much.

The interesting thing about Sadr was and still is---he was never so anti-American until we attacked due to an arrest warrant issued by Malaki regime (pushed by the US) and when we attacked directly the Madhi then he turned against us verbally.

If you noticed in the last couple of days he has openly criticized Malaki for not reaching out to the Sunni side---maybe political opportunism but I do not think so--he diverted into Iran to avoid his arrest and our pressure against Madhi but then came back out of Iran and has been since then been basically avoiding Iranian connections and the Quds. He has as well since the Dec 2013 attacks at the Sunni by Malaki come out often in support of the Sunni both from a political position as well as a religious position.

All forms of Sunni insurgents we captured and their cell leaders as well as from AQI would often tell us the true enemy that we should have been watching was Badr from the very beginning which in those days I found strange when we were dealing mainly with the Sunni insurgent side but then the Shia EFPs started and the Army never took the Shia JAM/SG under as massive an attack as we did the Sunni side-yes we would strike the JAM/SG but never to the extent say of AQI and the IAI or Ansar al Sunnah--a missed opportunity as we were afraid of agitating Malaki even though Malaki used us to attack the Mahdi when he perceived Sadr as a threat.

We as a military never quite got the finger pointing game done by Malaki that would then cause us to attack an opponent of his. In 2006 he would for example send the MoI Special Police Wolf Bde into Diyala without even informing the US Army arrest literally hundreds of Sunni and take them back to Baghdad--this was the initial start of the ethnic cleansing game ---we just did not recognize it as the MoI would claim the hundreds of Sunni's were all either Baathists or insurgents which was the standard Malaki view towards all Sunni in general and still is.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Just because you disagree doesn't mean Ray's comments are shallow are biased. The Indians have lived with this threat within their borders much longer than we have and don't have the luxury of sitting on the sidelines accusing others of being shallow and biased. In fact our political correctness is its own form of bias that often prevents us viewing things as they actually are, instead we interpret events, data, etc. through a very biased perceptional lens, one that hasn't been overly helpful in recent years.

I apologized to Ray. It was not meant as a personal attack. That said, I am not advocating siting on the sidelines, I am advocating getting to the root of the problem. As long as we portray this problem with religious overtones we bring in all sorts of prejudice and bias that do not HAVE to be part of the equation.




You offer three ways to defeat an identity war, but you can't defeat war, so I think you meant take the wind of out the identities that have resulted in war? In other words you're looking at achieving peace, not defeating one identity or the other. I agree you can't crush an identity, any attempt to do so will only make it stronger, which is partly why our GWOT efforts have resulted in an expansion of global AQism. We supported their narrative, which is why I'm a believer in clandestine, covert, low visibility operations to kill off the AQ members that threaten us without the fanfare, but we're well past that point.

Yes, you are correct. You cannot "defeat" war, it is part of the human condition. You can, however, limit the number of groups of people a population is willing to go to war with.

In regards to this situation, you are correct. I would advocate taking the power out of the identity or limiting the number of people who see themselves as aligned with that identity.


We're not capable of replacing the identity with a state identity, in fact the West has attempted that, and that is largely what has led to much of the violence in the world. The Sykes-Picot Agreement is an example, the West drew the lines that latter became states that didn't work, and of course we did the same in Africa and elsewhere. If this isn't a normative model I don't know what is. Individuals decide who they will identify with, we can't replace that. We try to offer alternatives, and in this recent conflict our alternative identities have been rejected, so back to drawing board.

Once again, correct. One of the ideas behind "nation building" (I hate that term) was to create a national identity. If that could be created and you successfully supplant other, more decisive internal factions, then you can build a state.

This idea is a post-Westphalian construct. It assumes too much of the target population. It assumes a individualistic value system that, in most cases, is not present. The value system is communal based on an identity that is either tribal, ethnic, or religious (or a combination of them).

So yes, I am not advocating this idealistic folly.


As for divide and conquer, how will this work? This reminds me of the Brits leveraging minorities in their territories to help control the territory, which almost always led to major bloodshed after the Brits left, to include the millions killed when India formed East and West Pakistan. If anything this simply strengthens the identity of the opposing groups.

I think you are jumping ahead. The first step is simply to weaken the enemy. In this case it is a ISIS/Sunni coalition. There is ISIS, the major threat - and there are other elements of the Sunni coalition. We need to divide these groups. Sow fear, hate, jealousy, whatever works. Once internal fighting begins (and it will eventually anyway unless ISIS consolidates power by killing off its rivals), the whole group becomes manageable.


I'm not convinced on the argument that if you remove the resource limitation that people will not band tightly and accept others. I think we're confusing our model in the U.S. which is based on much more than economics with the idea model what will resolve conflict around the globe.

That one has been proven (at least as far as these things can be). See the worldvaluessurvey.org and the work of Inglehart and Welzel. Also see the meat of my paper "Schizophrenic Doctrine (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/schizophrenic-doctrine)" for a thumbnail sketch of the theory.


We also have a different level and type of education, Judea-Christian based value system, a national norm that promotes equality in opportunity (not in practice always, but it can be pursued through the legal system when it is denied), etc. Attempting to solve the problems in Iraq through economic development alone will not result in the same conditions we enjoy.

I would not begin to believe that we could "solve" the problem of Iraq with economic development. But, economic development, in the form of a population with a middle class independent of the state or religious or ethnic patronage, is the only way to maintain a group of people who are not reliant on that ethnic or religious affiliation to ensure their personal and familial security.


We have to be realists while at the same time I hope we continue to be idealists. The situation in Iraq threatens more than Iraq, and each country will perceive that threat differently based on their interests and how it manifests in their country. When it comes to being bias, we are often at the top of that list.

Hence, I am all for covert disruption of the existing Sunni coalition, probably via contacts in Saudi Arabia.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Completely agree Iraqi politics were not always about sect, in fact for most of Iraqi history it was not, but since 2003 it has become one about conflicting politics of identity.

Thanks for all the references. I wish I had time to read all of this.

Here is one other. It is a thesis by a Wellesly College student but pretty good. It is where I stole the term Identity Warfare, although I am sure she is not the first to use it.

http://repository.wellesley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1061&context=thesiscollection

[Ray]

TheCurmudgeon,

It is fine. I do not take offence, for after all, everyone has their own views and I appreciate those views and glean fresh ideas from contrarian opinions.

[Bill Moore]

That one has been proven (at least as far as these things can be). See the worldvaluessurvey.org and the work of Inglehart and Welzel. Also see the meat of my paper "Schizophrenic Doctrine" for a thumbnail sketch of the theory.

I'll take a look at the model, I'm sure there is some merit to it, but to state that any social science is proven IMO seems to be a stretch, since unlike the hard sciences the social scientists can't control the conditions of the test, so they can't account for all variables. I'll accept there is a strong correlation.

I also don't see how this model applies when many wealthy Muslims join these fights, they have their slice of the pie and then some. Nonetheless it seems logical in theory and worth testing.

[Ray]

Whenever we find such conflicts raging, I am reminded of the phrase, "you can defeat the persons involved, but to win you have to defeat the 'idea' that spurs them on" or words to that effect.

My experience is that it is a long haul since one finds the 'root' to the evil, if one may call it so, is wrapped up with too many layers, many beyond the control to penetrate because of external and powerful influences and protection.

[JMA]

"You can kill a man, but you can't kill an idea." - Medgar Evers

or

"A man may die, nations may rise and fall, but an idea lives on. Ideas have endurance without death." - John Fitzgerald Kennedy



Whenever we find such conflicts raging, I am reminded of the phrase, "you can defeat the persons involved, but to win you have to defeat the 'idea' that spurs them on" or words to that effect.

My experience is that it is a long haul since one finds the 'root' to the evil, if one may call it so, is wrapped up with too many layers, many beyond the control to penetrate because of external and powerful influences and protection.

[OUTLAW 09]

Whenever we find such conflicts raging, I am reminded of the phrase, "you can defeat the persons involved, but to win you have to defeat the 'idea' that spurs them on" or words to that effect.

My experience is that it is a long haul since one finds the 'root' to the evil, if one may call it so, is wrapped up with too many layers, many beyond the control to penetrate because of external and powerful influences and protection.

Bill---this "root" goes back 1400 years and Islam has not had it's own internal "reformation" as the Catholic and Protestants did say during the 100 and 30 years wars on central Europe that left entire areas devoid of human life. Once both sides realized that there were virtually no human life left in the contested regions did they finally come to an agreement.

Right now that single "root" ---the dispute over the killing of Hussein and who was to follow in Mohammad's footsteps will "haunt" the world until they finally settle the issue but in order to do that someone with religious authority on each side has to step up and lead but in Islam there are any number of Mullahs/Imams "wanna be leaders" with countervailing views which was not the case in the Catholic and Protestant wars which tended to singular leadership.

Layer then this deep problem over the issues of power sharing, revenue sharing, regional hegemony and one has the makings for a really long time conflict and the price of oil at 115 USD per barrel which will then slow down a large portion of the world's economy leading thus to other issues.

[OUTLAW 09]

This is an interesting WaPo article and goes to the heart of the problem--the COIN FM cannot instill nationalism into a military, nor the will to fight for a country due to a flag---it is and has been all about governance---which is addressed in the FM but at a certain point even the FM cannot "create" good governance. We gave up the ability to create good governance in 2005 and then it was all over---and that was a civilian decision not covered under the COIN FM.

Seems the ISIS and allies have taken a page out of the US "shock and awe" and al Baghdadi must have read Sun Tsu a few times in his five years at Bucca.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iraqi-military-facing-psychological-collapse-after-losses-desertions/2014/06/22/88ed659a-fa4a-11e3-8176-f2c941cf35f1_story.html?hpid=z1

[OUTLAW 09]

For those that appreciate great messaging (goes to the religious explanation of ISIS) here is a ISIS video linked to by jihadology.net. I have been watching their video messaging since 2004 and this is a slick really slick made video depicting a number of foreign fighters who this time are not hiding their faces as in say 2006/2007.

http://jihadology.net/2014/06/19/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-there-is-no-life-without-jihad/

[Ray]

Bill---this "root" goes back 1400 years and Islam has not had it's own internal "reformation" as the Catholic and \

Ijtihad (Arabic: اجتهاد‎ ijtihād, "diligence") is an Islamic legal term that means “independent reasoning” or “the utmost effort an individual can put forth in an activity.”

As one of the four sources of Sunni law, it is recognized as the decision-making process in Islamic law (sharia) through personal effort (jihad) which is completely independent of any school (madhhab) of jurisprudence (fiqh). As opposed to taqlid, it requires a “thorough knowledge of theology, revealed texts and legal theory (usul al-fiqh); an exceptional capacity for legal reasoning; thorough knowledge of Arabic.”

By using both the Qu'ran and Hadith as resources, the scholar is required to carefully rely on analogical reasoning to find a solution to a legal problem, which considered to be a religious duty for those qualified to conduct it.

Thus, a mujtahid is recognized as an Islamic scholar who is competent in interpreting sharia by ijtihad. Today, there are many different opinions surrounding the role of ijtihad in modern society, and whether or not the “doors of ijtihad are closed.”

Around the beginning of the 900s, most Sunni jurists argued that all major matters of religious law had been settled, allowing for taqlid, “the established legal precedents and traditions,” to take priority over ijtihad

However, the Shi'i Muslims recognized “human reasoning and intellect as a legal source that supplements the Quran and other revealed texts,” thus continuing to acknowledge the importance of ijtihad.

Wiki

[TheCurmudgeon]

I'll take a look at the model, I'm sure there is some merit to it, but to state that any social science is proven IMO seems to be a stretch, since unlike the hard sciences the social scientists can't control the conditions of the test, so they can't account for all variables. I'll accept there is a strong correlation.

I also don't see how this model applies when many wealthy Muslims join these fights, they have their slice of the pie and then some. Nonetheless it seems logical in theory and worth testing.

Bill, very little can be "scientifically proven" when it comes to sociology. I would argue that, we Westerners have done a pretty good job of proving that democracy cannot be forced onto a population that is not "primed" for it. Therefore, any attempt to try to save the situation in Iraq by trying to force a more inclusive government (the democratic solution to divisiveness) is doomed to failure.

I will say that, of all the material I have researched on politics, sociology, and psychology, the work or Inglehart and Welzel comes closest to matching the world I saw in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Unless you believe that Arabs and Persians are somehow biologically different from the rest of the world's population, then the explanation for why they choose a more harshly strict communal social structure has to be based on living conditions including cultural history.

There is nothing uniquely "evil" about Islam. Like our Judeo/Christian history it can be used to justify any number of evils. The question is "why?" While I admit the obvious parallels between the religious wars of our past and the current ones in the ME, I would look to what factors the time frames have in common. Child mortality. Literacy rates. Religion as the source of moral codes. Change these factors and you change the living conditions.

It is a humanistic solution. It is also very time consuming. There is a reason democratic consolidation takes 20 years on average. That is the time for one generation to grow up in a world distinctly different than the one that existed at the time of the transition. Also, interestingly enough, the amount of time someone else noted as necessary to change the culture of the Iraqi military.

The problem is that it cannot be accomplished during the current crisis. Right now stability is the best we can hope for. We are not going to get that by backing an unstable form of government.

I am trying to be realistic and not sound like a New Age guru. But the human psychology at play in the Western world is the same human psychology at play in the ME. This is not good versus evil. Those terms are always relative. What you consider "good" or "evil" is based on the value system you hold. You value system is tied to your living conditions and your cultural history. The interesting thing is that, as your value system changes (based on changes in your living conditions) your interpretation of your cultural history changes. We "reinterpret" history to fit our current conditions. So the living conditions are the only independent variable I can find in what we decide is good or evil.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Intersting.

ISIS Just Attacked Iran (https://medium.com/war-is-boring/isis-just-attacked-iran-8b57b8233af0)


On June 19, militants from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria attacked Iranian border guards near Iran’s border city of Qasre Shirin, according to Iranian social media.

A photograph showed the bodies of at least two Iranian officers apparently killed in the skirmish. Iran’s state-controlled media didn’t initially report the clash at Qasre Shirin, as Tehran routinely censors violent border incidents.

But Iranian officials took an unusual step and eventually talked about this particular incident. The first official to react was Fath Allah Hosseini, Qasre Shirin’s representative in the Iranian parliament. Hosseini insisted that residents were not afraid of ISIS, which has captured much of northwestern Iraq in recent weeks.

Then on June 21, Brig. Gen. Ahmad Reza Pourdastan—the Iranian army’s senior ground force commander—confirmed to the state-run YJC news agency that the incident took place. But Pourdastan said that the attackers were from the Kurdish militant group Party for Free Life of Kurdistan, also known by its Kurdish acronym PEJAK.

[OUTLAW 09]

Intersting.

ISIS Just Attacked Iran (https://medium.com/war-is-boring/isis-just-attacked-iran-8b57b8233af0)

Means that while under the guise of another group the Iranians were attacked---strange then that the initial reporting indicates ISIS and then later a Kurdish group.

Would bet whoever was behind it ---it is due to the Iranian Quds Force fighting now in Diyala province and in Baqubah which has been confirmed. AQI/ISIS and the Sunni insurgent groups have no lost love for Iranian military forces wherever they are in Iraq.

Fighting is in or near Khanaqin which is not far from Muqdadiyah (both towns the Kurds up to 2011 tried to push their green lines into by claiming both to have been Kurdish prior to the Arabization by Saddam) both towns were a strong point for a number of the Sunni insurgent groups and for the then AQI. Al Duri had several safe houses/personal homes near both towns and often came in and out of Syria to them in 2005/2006.

The confusion in group names does not surprise me as group names were often used for opsec measures.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Means that while under the guise of another group the Iranians were attacked---strange then that the initial reporting indicates ISIS and then later a Kurdish group.

Would bet whoever was behind it ---it is due to the Iranian Quds Force fighting now in Diyala province and in Baqubah which has been confirmed.

Fighting it not far from Muqdadiyah which was a strong point for a number of the Sunni insurgent groups and for the then AQI.

Wonder if this was intentional or accidental. If intentional, was it designed to get Iran more involved to make the U.S. less inclined to become actively involved?

[OUTLAW 09]

Wonder if this was intentional or accidental. If intentional, was it designed to get Iran more involved to make the U.S. less inclined to become actively involved?

There is nothing accidental by the ISIS and allied Sunni groups---this was a clear intentional shot across the front of the entire ship letting the Iranians fully understand they will be engaged if they come into Sunni territories and yes the border areas of that crossing point have been under dispute since the end of the 1980-1988 war. It is also a not to subtle warning to Iran about it's fighting in Diyala province---which they are---it leaves themselves open for a multi front campaign all the way up to the major crossing point Mandali as the Sunni insurgents had cells in most of Diyala up through 2011 and fighting has flared there often since 2011.

As a former VN SF vet--the Diyala River Basin is one heck of a pull back region---some of the palm groves in the basin are thicker than any bamboo jungle I saw and experienced on the Cambodian border.

Know that area well---that crossing point was starting in 2006 a rat run for Shia EFP shipments going to the Shia militants JAM and the Special Groups. It was also a crossing point for a bunch of Iranian Quds Froces guys who got picked up by the US Army as well before being sent home out by the Iraqi government once we turned them over to Iraq---Malaki was behind the taking control from the US of the Iranian military.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Perhaps this is the beginning of the inevitable (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/world/middleeast/iraq.html?_r=0)I believe will happen (and that we should encourage), perhaps not.


According to the security official, who was in Kirkuk and spoke on the condition of anonymity, the Sunnis battling ISIS were from the Men of the Army of Naqshbandia, former Saddam Hussein loyalists, or Baathists. The two groups are allies of convenience with very different ideologies; the Baathists’ nationalistic, Sufi philosophy is completely at odds with ISIS’s extreme Islamist beliefs.

The battles reportedly took place in Hawija, one of the strongholds of the Naqshbandia, which was formed by former army officers from the ousted government of Saddam Hussein. The security official said the fighting had broken out when ISIS tried to disarm the Naqshbandia, but a witness from Hawija said they had been fighting over control of gasoline and oil tanker trucks captured from a refinery at Baiji.

The Naqshbandia group has become a major component of the extremist Sunni coalition, at least partly because of its military experience and the Baath Party’s deep roots in the Sunni community.

On its website, the Naqshbandia group denied any problems with its allies. “We deny such news, we are in battle only with the occupiers of Iraq (Iran and the government),” the statement said. “It is clear that the government is doing this to get our army in an internal battle that will take us away from our main goal.”


In a society where power sharing is not the norm, ISIS will eventually have to destroy or subjugate all the other members of the allied Sunni groups. If only we could find a “moderate” Sunni extremist group to back…

[TheCurmudgeon]

I am surprised the Saudi’s don’t see the threat in ISIS. Based on their religious bent and their penchant for oil revenues, I would think that Saudi Arabia would be their next target. It has all of the key religious holy places, it has lots of oil, and from what I can tell its military is abysmal. If I were in the house of Saud, I would be keeping a very close eye on things in Iraq.

[OUTLAW 09]

Perhaps this is the beginning of the inevitable (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/world/middleeast/iraq.html?_r=0)I believe will happen (and that we should encourage), perhaps not.



In a society where power sharing is not the norm, ISIS will eventually have to destroy or subjugate all the other members of the allied Sunni groups. If only we could find a “moderate” Sunni extremist group to back…

TC--the story is a fake concerning the infighting---the comment concerning the fuel dispute is the correct story ---this happened a number of times when smuggling and or critical supplies were in demand.

Right now fuel for vehicles in in demand as they now have a large number of vehicles they must keep fueled and moving either back to Syria or onward towards Baghdad.

[OUTLAW 09]

JWing----I was wondering when the Islamic Army in Iraq would come formally out of the woodwork. Really good interview-worth a read. We recovered the handwritten journal of the actual leader and virtually nothing from it has ever been translated---it was almost like the US IC did not really care in 2006.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10914567/Islamic-Army-of-Iraq-founder-Isis-and-Sunni-Islamists-will-march-on-Baghdad.html

Interview conducted in Erbil---and who controls Erbil?

The problem for the US is that al Dabash was not the actual head of the IAI---was though one of the IAI founding group of Salafists in 2003 before we arrived. We actually picked up the true leader by accident and then let him go six months later---al Dabash was one of their major finance types.
I am though surprised he is still covering for the actual leader ---that indicates to me that they feel we simply still do not know who he is and al Dabash is probably right in that assumption.

From 2006:
July 29: Coalition forces targeted and detained two senior al-Qaeda leaders and three other suspected terrorists during multiple raids in central and northern Iraq. In a separate raid, security forces detained a principal al-Qaeda financial and logistics operative in the northern city of Mosul.

The list goes on as U.S. soldiers in late July and early August rang up terrorist kills and captures like cherries on a Vegas slot machine. But unlike Vegas, luck had little to do with their success. Coalition forces, including the Joint Special Operations Command, whose operatives took out Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June, have acted systematically on a trove of intelligence yielded after the capture of key terror leaders and financiers, according to Multi-National Forces Iraq, headquartered in Baghdad.

For example, the recent detention of an underling led directly to the capture of Ja'far 'Abdallah. And Iraqi and coalition forces nabbed on May 29 Sheikh Ahmed al-Dabash, the money man behind the March 2004 bombing at the Shiite holy city of Karbala that killed 140. Al-Dabash's capture was part of the chain of events leading to the U.S. hit on al-Zarqawi.

But a search on news databases for Abdallah, al-Dabash, turns up very little if nothing at all.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Does anyone have the link to the ISIS video of the attacks and actions, I believe, in Mosul. If I recall, it is about 52 minutes long with subtitles. It shows the targeted "drive by" shootings on the highway followed by a scene in a mosque where a group of men are founded up and "forgiven" by Al Baghdadi “may Allah protect him.” I saw it yesterday but have now lost the link.

That scene in the mosque is really interesting form of psychological conversion. First you kill a few key people around town, then you round up the fighting age men, then you place them in a Mosque. The men in the Mosque already know ISIS will kill them without a thought. Then Al Baghdadi grants the men forgiveness. The relief of not being killed is palpable. From there it looks like scenes from an evangelical Christian meeting of people who have just taken Christ as their savior, except on steroids. It is like watching group Stockholm syndrome. Not only was Al Baghdadi in control of whether they lived or died, he was also tied into their guarantee of life after death. I would guess that some of the people in that room will become active followers.

It had a "cult" feel to it. My guess is that the conversion method used there garners very loyal members of the group.

[TheCurmudgeon]

TC--the story is a fake concerning the infighting---the comment concerning the fuel dispute is the correct story ---this happened a number of times when smuggling and or critical supplies were in demand.

Right now fuel for vehicles in in demand as they now have a large number of vehicles they must keep fueled and moving either back to Syria or onward towards Baghdad.

Oh well. I will stand by my prediction - sooner or later there will be a power struggle. Better for us if it happens sooner rather than later.

[OUTLAW 09]

Oh well. I will stand by my prediction - sooner or later there will be a power struggle. Better for us if it happens sooner rather than later.

TC--really read the article link I just posted on the IAI and watch the interview with one of the founding members of the Islamic Army in Iraq----he is providing an accurate view of the ground reality between the Sunni groups and the ISIS. The IAI is what s being referred to as "The Military Council".

Interview conducted in Erbil and who controls Erbil---gives insight on the position of the Kurds in this ongoing Sunni fight with Malaki.

So if the world thinks the Kurds and Sunni are going to be fighting each other think again--notice how they split Mosul and the ISIS is remaining nicely on the edges of Kirkuk and then the attack on the Iranian crossing point.

He is voicing something that has come up in the Kurdish comments the last few days--they want a federated Kurdish area inside Iraq but that requires the Shia providing a true power sharing/revenue sharing compromise.

[JWing]

Here's my latest article "Moqtada al-Sadr And Iraq's Militia Mobilization" (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/moqtada-al-sadr-and-iraqs-militia.html) Sadr was one of the last Shiite leaders to mobilize his militia to face the insurgency. Sadr's forces and other militias have been integrated into the military, received training from the army and are deployed across Iraq. This is a failure of the state & is another sign that history is repeating itself in Iraq.

[TheCurmudgeon]

TC--really read the article link I just posted on the IAI and watch the interview with one of the founding members of the Islamic Army in Iraq----he is providing an accurate view of the ground reality between the Sunni groups and the ISIS. The IAI is what s being referred to as "The Military Council".

Interview conducted in Erbil and who controls Erbil---gives insight on the position of the Kurds in this ongoing Sunni fight with Malaki.

So if the world thinks the Kurds and Sunni are going to be fighting each other think again--notice how they split Mosul and the ISIS is remaining nicely on the edges of Kirkuk and then the attack on the Iranian crossing point.

He is voicing something that has come up in the Kurdish comments the last few days--they want a federated Kurdish area inside Iraq but that requires the Shia providing a true power sharing/revenue sharing compromise.

I am in full agreement that the Kurds are going to stay out of this as much a possible. If I were to go way out on a limb, I would speculate that the fix is already in, via Turkey, for the Kurds to back a seperation of Iraq into its sectarian components.

Others have made the point that the Kurds really cannot aford this, but I think they may be willing to take a little financial risk for thier own state.

I believe the split will occur in the Sunni - the members of the Military Council.

[TheCurmudgeon]

TC--really read the article link I just posted on the IAI and watch the interview with one of the founding members of the Islamic Army in Iraq----he is providing an accurate view of the ground reality between the Sunni groups and the ISIS. The IAI is what s being referred to as "The Military Council".

Interview conducted in Erbil and who controls Erbil---gives insight on the position of the Kurds in this ongoing Sunni fight with Malaki.

So if the world thinks the Kurds and Sunni are going to be fighting each other think again--notice how they split Mosul and the ISIS is remaining nicely on the edges of Kirkuk and then the attack on the Iranian crossing point.

He is voicing something that has come up in the Kurdish comments the last few days--they want a federated Kurdish area inside Iraq but that requires the Shia providing a true power sharing/revenue sharing compromise.

Outlaw,

Do you believe he would accept American support as he claims at the end of the interview?... or would that kill his credibility within his own faction/tribe?

[OUTLAW 09]

Outlaw,

Do you believe he would accept American support as he claims at the end of the interview?... or would that kill his credibility within his own faction/tribe?

Yes I do--as strange as it sounds he has "aged" and become more mellow with time---and maybe through the detention.

Saw that often meaning they would fight us to the bitter end and then if the detention was fair and correct meaning good food, health care on a regular basis, then visits from family members depending on being in say Abu G vs Bucca and interaction with US types they would tend to mellow out and lose some of their anger towards Americans as a whole.

He sees again strange as it sounds the US to be at the least a partner that one can talk to and negotiate and IMO he also sees the US as a balance against the Iranians and Badr/Malaki.

From the journal he was in the fight since 2002--the date 2002 was before we even got to Iraq so it begs the question who was he fighting against in Baghdad in 2002---namely Saddam.

The key point is why is he so comfortable in Erbil and having an open interview in a major hotel---no fear, and totally comfortable. It also begs the question are the Kurds fully aware of exactly what the Sunni's are up to and do they in fact support them?

The actual leader of he IAI did a similar interview in early 2004 with a Finnish reporter that was about 15-20 minutes long and he did not hide his face either.

[OUTLAW 09]

TC---one of the core reasons that the current ISIS and Sunni insurgent groups will collaborate in the current days and weeks and will not split is due to something that goes back to 2002 and was there for the national level IC and the Army to see but no one paid any attention to it.

A Salafist insurgency in full gear targeting an overthrow of Saddam. If one looks at the organization that led that fight it was in fact the Islamic Army in Iraq.

It was a loose group of individuals who went on to create and lead the Sunni insurgency when we arrived in Baghdad and after we threw out Saddam, and I will go a step further---assisted in creating the lead element that became eventually QJBR.

Check the interview--he references the internal differences that occurred between AQI and the IAI in 2006/2007 when he was sitting in US detention so even in prison he knew exactly what was going on outside the wire.

Inside that loose group of individuals was another group that maintained a close relationship with the IAI--- of Al Tawhid a sub name not often associated to AQI/ISIS but is a major fighting Sunni Brigade currently in Syria ---an interesting use of an older name.

An interesting individual who was a coming and going individual in that 2002/2003 group is now the current leader of the ISIS who got picked up in 2005 as being part of AQI and who when coming out in 2009 eased back into AQI leadership positions and on to ISIS leadership.

So on the surface maybe it seems natural that they will have long term differences but on a personal level they are tightly associated since the 2002/2003 timeframe.

[TheCurmudgeon]

TC---one of the core reasons that the current ISIS and Sunni insurgent groups will collaborate in the current days and weeks and will not split is due to something that goes back to 2002 and was there for the national level IC and the Army to see but no one paid any attention to it.

A Salafist insurgency in full gear targeting an overthrow of Saddam. If one looks at the organization that led that fight it was in fact the Islamic Army in Iraq.

It was a loose group of individuals who went on to create and lead the Sunni insurgency when we arrived in Baghdad and after we threw out Saddam, and I will go a step further---assisted in creating the lead element that became eventually QJBR.

Check the interview--he references the internal differences that occurred between AQI and the IAI in 2006/2007 when he was sitting in US detention so even in prison he knew exactly what was going on outside the wire.

Inside that loose group of individuals was another group that maintained a close relationship with the IAI--- of Al Tawhid a sub name not often associated to AQI/ISIS but is a major fighting Sunni Brigade currently in Syria ---an interesting use of an older name.

An interesting individual who was a coming and going individual in that 2002/2003 group is now the current leader of the ISIS who got picked up in 2005 as being part of AQI and who when coming out in 2009 eased back into AQI leadership positions and on to ISIS leadership.

So on the surface maybe it seems natural that they will have long term differences but on a personal level they are tightly associated since the 2002/2003 timeframe.

It may be that they can get along, but I will believe it when I see it.

I have to admit that, I would prefer the US talk to al Dabash than work with Maliki. I personnally think it is the smarter play.

But I still see trouble ahead. There are fundimental ideological differences and there is a lot of money floating around. Plus, it seems clear that al Dabash wants to be the face of events. I am not sure how al Baghdadi's going to feel about that.

[OUTLAW 09]

It may be that they can get along, but I will believe it when I see it.

I have to admit that, I would prefer the US talk to al Dabash than work with Maliki. I personnally think it is the smarter play.

But I still see trouble ahead. There are fundimental ideological differences and there is a lot of money floating around. Plus, it seems clear that al Dabash wants to be the face of events. I am not sure how al Baghdadi's going to feel about that.

TC---notice how Dabash speaks about ISIS--in moderate form and he is always calm and self confident---something I have not seen outside of a particular Ansar al Sunnah leader I dealt with.

This is the thing one hears all the time lately the name Ansar al Islam which was originally Sunni Kurdish which in 2005 became Ansar al Sunnah and now the older name which I do not believe they in fact changed back to.

Now ASA is in fact back into the game and an active member along side IAI and the fact that they were originally Kurdish in the early days should not be overlooked.

There is way to much "suddenly" appearing out of the woodwork to be just a causal thing.

I had wondered from 2011 to now why it was so quiet inside the Sunni insurgent side and AQI now ISIS appeared to be the singular active group outwardly---but what if internally the Sunni insurgency was reestablishing ties to the tribes which we had cut as long as we were in Iraq and that appears to be the case as the tribes have a long memory of what they suffered under with AQI but they did have good relations with IAI.

ISIS simply does not have the manpower to hold territory so they are dependent on the other coalition partners to make it work---back in 2006 when the fighting broke out between AQI and IAI ---IAI was on the verge of badly damaging AQI but for the sake of the fight with the Shia and the US backed off of their threat against AQI.

al Baghdadi definitely remembers as does Dabash thus ISIS will openly lead but inwardly it will be IAI/al Duri/tribes---will there be short fights and disagreements--that is just Iraq being Iraq--- but the overall goal for them is a federated Sunni triangle with a revenue stream in a power sharing mode.

Al Baghdadi (Iraqi)came out of the IAI personal circle in 2002/2003 Zarqawi (foreigner) never did--that is a major plus.

Notice Dabash is not in the least "threatened" by the Shia mobilization---in fact he warns the Shia Sheiks not to attack Sunnis.

[JWing]

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10914567/Islamic-Army-of-Iraq-founder-Isis-and-Sunni-Islamists-will-march-on-Baghdad.html

Interview conducted in Erbil---and who controls Erbil?

From a source that's close to the insurgency the Islamic Army has been dead on the ground and only alive on the internet for the last two years while this guy has been sitting around collecting checks from wealthy Gulf donors.

[OUTLAW 09]

From a source that's close to the insurgency the Islamic Army has been dead on the ground and only alive on the internet for the last two years while this guy has been sitting around collecting checks from wealthy Gulf donors.

JWing---that is what I would have said although the net has little to nothing from them outside of older meaning up to 2011 with the main one being the 65 minute victory video--- even al Duri's group went quiet. Mentioned was the working with the Sunni demos in the last of 2013 up to the Iraqi Army attack on their protest camps which would mean even if 50% correct the Sunni insurgents minus ISIS had been working the tribal card far earlier than is being reported.

Again if the reporting from an recent interview with one of the really leading Sunni tribes which was pro US is correct--he voiced literally the same message as Dabash-independent of each other and where thy interviews were given-which indicates to me there has been an ongoing discussion.

Secondly---we got Dabash who we thought was AQI (but then we was released as was al Baghdadi by the Iaqi's) but not the rest of the inner circle of IAI and if one looks closely at reports coming out of Mosul--- tanks and helicopters were flown and or driven---not many of the current ISIS fighters are tank or copter qualified which points to former Iraqi military members.

Then if the figure is correct of 1000 fighters with several hundred peeling off and heading towards Baghdad then where are the rest coming from that is holding on and fighting against the Iraqi army/Shia militia in areas initially taken. ISIS doe not have that high of a foreign fighter flow in order to support multiple fighting fronts.

Then in the interview is something that only those in the inner planning circle fully understand and which the US Army never got in Iraq---when one area is under pressure then open up a new offensive in another totally different direction and then move the offensive around the battle space---we chased our tails like this forever from 2005 thru to 2007.

If one takes the interview as correct then in fact Mosul was a relief offensive to assist those in Anbar.

Appears to me someone does not like Dabash living well in Erbil---again the question if he was such a former AQI/IAI member then why is he being tolerated by the Kurds who might be a tad mad about the past due to AQI attacks on the Kurds/Peshmerger in Muqdadiyah and the surrounding areas in Diyala.

Just my opinion.

[OUTLAW 09]

From a source that's close to the insurgency the Islamic Army has been dead on the ground and only alive on the internet for the last two years while this guy has been sitting around collecting checks from wealthy Gulf donors.

JWing---this is the current problem when we speak or others speak about the Sunni insurgency and or ISIS. This individual who is "close" to the insurgency is not nor was evidently close enough to Dabash and the IAI inner circle to understand that he was the main money funneler to both IAI and al Tahwid starting in 2002 with monies flowing from Qatar and Bahrain which is still flowing through him which makes him quasi still the go to guy in this business.

He picked right back up when he came out of prison so I am not sure why someone is jealous of his collecting checks when those checks make him important and he funnels them onwards instead of pocketing them as does Malaki on the other side. Evidently Qatar and Bahrain seem to still trust him after 12 years and US prison in between.

[OUTLAW 09]

If the reporting is correct that the ISIS and the Sunni insurgency is moving in a mobile fashion ---meaning taking towns and then forcing the Iraqi Army to respond then disappearing and then coming back---this is similar to Ghanis Khan style swarming attacks on horse while the ISIS and it's allies are using utilities and American 114s.

If then as reported this morning in Berlin the US is set to unleash a bombing campaign then in fact it will be openly perceived by the Iraqi Sunni's and Sunni tribes as aimed at them thus undermining any voice the US will use in the coming weeks to get them to moderate and pull back. I am not so sure we can tell from a Reaper and or F18/F16 from 4K feet the difference between a 114 driven by angry Sunni insurgents or from the angry Sunni tribes who have been brutalized/systematically killed by Malaki's security forces since 2012 from ISIS driven vehicles especially if they are not flying the black battle flags.

If I remember correctly US foreign policy basically has been since the Sunni killing spree by Malaki's security forces started in 2012-and the protest camps were destroyed in 2013--silence was heard out of Washington---abject silence.

It has be now decided by the Sunni tribes to include those that helped the US that the US speaks with a "forked tongue" something US Indian tribes said a long while ago. When any thing we say is totally false in the end.

If one remembers it was only when the US received assistance from the Sunni tribes (it was not through US military power alone that reigned them in) that AQI was reigned in so how is now the US going to convince the Sunni tribes to change sides and with what promises (what again promises of an inclusive governance?) especially since it was announced today the US is going ahead with the bombing campaign because the Iraqi government cannot institute the necessary governance changes in time.

So again the US foreign policy simply does not get it.

Seems the DoS is screaming the Iraqi Army is in full rout and bombing must start soon.

Again Malaki is playing the US as he will never give up his power position---we have fallen repeatedly for this line of argument from him since 2005, again in 2010 and now--- and when we have the single thing he wants most to save his power position ie airpower then it can and should have been used to achieve political compromises on the ground immediately--was that not what Obama talked about at West Point as the heart of his new FP---meaning there must be something in it for the US to act outside of it's interests?

Remember what retired General P stated recently---"we are not the Shia Air Force"', and that will be the actual perception by Sunnis if we start bombing regardless if we never hit a single Sunni civilian which is virtually impossible to prevent.

It does not bode well for the Iraq entire population as a whole, nor future US foreign policy as it makes us look like we absolutely do not understand the game of foreign policy and besides "who" would "trust" us again on the things we "promise or say"?---the was the same message recently repeated by the Polish FM in a secret recorded conversation.

http://news.yahoo.com/us-special-forces-face-complex-challenge-iraq-045033796.html

[OUTLAW 09]

A provocative question---is there in fact now in both the Sunni triangle and in the Kurdish region a truly new reality on the ground and Iraq has been effectively divided into three regions nullifying the borders drawn by Sykes -Picot?


http://news.yahoo.com/kurdish-leader-cites-reality-iraq-085154980--politics.html

[OUTLAW 09]

Here is the answer to the demands in the US to drop bombs on something and or somebody---Iran transferred 88 former Iraqi fighter bombers back to Iraq equipped and ready to drop bombs---question is who will be flying them Iranian pilots and or Iraqi pilots?

If Iranian will the Sunni tribes together with ISIS view this as an Iranian invasion and strike when and where possible against Iranian targets?

http://www.iraqinews.com/iraq-war/iran-transfers-88-russian-sukhoi-fighter-planes-iraq/

[TheCurmudgeon]

CNN interview with President Barzani - "Iraq is falling apart anyway ..."


Kerry met with Iraqi Kurdish President Massoud Barzani shortly after his arrival.

"We are facing a new reality and a new Iraq," Barzani said as the two men sat down.

In an exclusive interview with CNN's Christiane Amanpour, Barzani said "Iraq is obviously falling apart."

"And it's obvious that the federal or central government has lost control over everything," Barzani said Monday. "Everything is collapsing -- the army, the troops, the police."


http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/24/world/meast/iraq-crisis/

[OUTLAW 09]

This bombing was blamed on the AQI and AQI claimed it but was it really AQI--- and it led to the massive follow on ethnic cleansing attacks by Shia militia on Sunni's and vice versa.

So was Casey correct---he was the MNF-I Commander then so maybe he might have had other intel reporting---cannot track down the original source of the reporting on the Casey comments though so maybe just RUMINT.

http://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-politics/iran-denies-casey-s-accusations-over-being-involved-in-bombing-holy-shrine-of-imam-askari/

[JMA]

Do yank kids learn this? :

http://www.aussiechildcarenetwork.com/printables/images/reading_skills/nursery_rhymes/Humpty_Dumpty_printable_nursery_rhymes.gif

Iraq ia broken. It can only be fixed - if by fixed means maintaining a unitary state - by the three parties: Shia, Sunni and Kurd. If they want it (or need it) they will find a way to do it.

ISIS is the problem for the West - especially the foreigh fighters - and the potential use of Sunni dominated areas of Iraq being used as a springboard for international terrorism.





CNN interview with President Barzani - "Iraq is falling apart anyway ..."



http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/24/world/meast/iraq-crisis/

[OUTLAW 09]

Do yank kids learn this? :

http://www.aussiechildcarenetwork.com/printables/images/reading_skills/nursery_rhymes/Humpty_Dumpty_printable_nursery_rhymes.gif

Iraq ia broken. It can only be fixed - if by fixed means maintaining a unitary state - by the three parties: Shia, Sunni and Kurd. If they want it (or need it) they will find a way to do it.

ISIS is the problem for the West - especially the foreigh fighters - and the potential use of Sunni dominated areas of Iraq being used as a springboard for international terrorism.

JMA--here are the Kurdish demands on the Malaki government in order for them to participate which the Sunni's mirror to a degree. 1)implement the Constitution changes giving the Kurds everything they view as Kurdish which is also portions of the current Sunni triangle, 2) oil revenue sharing and a 3) power sharing scheme.

Do not see Malaki giving in to them as he then loses then his Shia constituents especially on the revenue sharing side/granting more Iraqi territory to the Kurds, and I do not think the Shia militias are going to be prone to power share as well.

This is headed to a long term fight and a short term split up.

[TheCurmudgeon]

A different take on why one fighter joined ISIS.


The story of K. resembles that of many Syrians who have taken up arms, even with the most radical groups, only to be disillusioned and disappointed. But not all have had the same ending. Indeed, for many Islamist fighters, Sharia means much more than law and order. M. is also 28 and joined another unit I accompanied for some time in early 2014. Before the uprising, he explains, he was a handyman at a five-star hotel.

"On May 8 [when the Carlton Hotel was bombed] I was celebrating. For all my life, I've been a servant to scum who earned lots of money just through kinship, friendship, bribes. That was Syria. My mother died from a cancer that we couldn't afford to treat. … And those guys were living in luxury without ever working," he says. His war is different from K.'s. "Assad is only a fragment of the problem. That's why I joined ISIS. We want a different society. A society where you don't waste on wine and whores the resources you need to treat the sick."

In the areas under its rule, ISIS has been denounced by Syrians as a new regime that shows no tolerance and no mercy for dissidents and minorities. Its strict interpretation of Islam revives corporal punishment. Its violence is so brutal that even al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri disowned the group. But M. rejects these accusations.

"You look only at the executions. But every war has its executions, its traitors, its spies. We set up soup kitchens, we rebuilt schools, hospitals, we restored water and electricity, we paid for food and fuel. While the UN wasn't even able to deliver humanitarian aid, we were vaccinating children against polio. It's just that some actions are more visible than others. For every thief we punish, you punish a hundred children with your indifference."

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/syria-iraq-isis-aleppo-mosul-war-radical-terrorism.html?utm_source=Al-Monitor+Newsletter+%5BEnglish%5D&utm_campaign=2510ef7187-June_24_2014&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_28264b27a0-2510ef7187-93069393

One wonders, if these stories are accurate and not just propaganda, how much effort it would take to convert these fighters to a less radical ideology.

On the other hand, there is this (from the same article):


Unlike K., M. is still a fighter. When ISIS withdrew eastward, he withdrew, too, speaking to Al-Monitor via Skype from Al Bab. Aleppo's countryside is scattered with ISIS gunmen.

I asked M. if his movement was bent on redrawing the map of the Middle East, to which he replied, "There is no map. … Where you see borders, we see only your interests."

M., embodying the ISIS ideology, railed against the aspirations for democracy in the Arab world.

"Look at Egypt. Look at the way it ended for Muslims who cast their vote for [deposed President] Mohammed Morsi and believed in your democracy, in your lies. Democracy doesn't exist. Do you think you are free? The West is ruled by banks, not by parliaments, and you know that. You know that you're just a pawn, except you have no courage. You think of yourself, your job, your house … because you know you have no power. But fortunately, the jihad has started. Islam will get to you and bring you freedom."

[JWing]

My latest article "Iraq’s Central Front Attacks Upon Baghdad Continue While ISIS Fights In Rest Of Country" (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/iraqs-central-front-attacks-upon.html). ISIS attacks in Baghdad had shown no decline since offensive in north. Avg. number of attacks per day same as last few months and casualties some of the highest in 2014. Shows that ISIS is not overstretched and its networks in Baghdad belts & capital province itself still going strong. Next up street fighting in Baghdad probably sooner rather than later.

[OUTLAW 09]

My latest article "Iraq’s Central Front Attacks Upon Baghdad Continue While ISIS Fights In Rest Of Country" (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/iraqs-central-front-attacks-upon.html). ISIS attacks in Baghdad had shown no decline since offensive in north. Avg. number of attacks per day same as last few months and casualties some of the highest in 2014. Shows that ISIS is not overstretched and its networks in Baghdad belts & capital province itself still going strong. Next up street fighting in Baghdad probably sooner rather than later.

JWings---a really good article---even on the US side I am not sure the national level IC even understands the ISIS/Sunni moves and has no idea of their combined strength.

Watch the fighting in Diyala ----it is designed to suck the Iranian Quds and Shia militias into a protracted fight as it is a perfect area to go full guerrilla sucking in large numbers of conventional forces while small numbers of guerrilla keep the fight going. We had one BCT in FOB Warhorse just to cover Diyala and it was not enough. When the IAI/AQI stood up and fought in the Diyala River Basin during the Thunder Runs---it was brutal and the IAI/AQI fought well against US armor--so a Quds Force and Shia militia do not scare ISIS---especially since they have built over the last years NVA style fighting camps and bunker complexes in the palm grooves.

The Iraqi will automatically defend Diyala as it is a perceived hop skip and a jump to Baghdad thus they will assume that is where the attacks on Baghdad will be coming from.

They are in fact trying to come in via the southern route---their cells have been since 2002/2003 emplaced in Baghdad and we never rooted all of them out.

Besides a number of Shia running around Baghdad are actually converted Sunni's who have worked for years with IAI and AQI and float between the fronts.

[JWing]

My new article today "Precarious Relationship Between The Islamic State of Iraq And The Baathist Naqshibandi" (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/precarious-relationship-between-islamic.html). The Baathist Naqshibandi and ISIS have been cooperating for years but it's a rough relationship. ISIS wants JRTN units pledge allegiance to it, which has been resisted and resulted in several gunfights both before and during the current offensive. As ISIS attempts to assert administrative control over regions of Iraq these clashes will likely increase.

[JWing]

Outlaw agree insurgents if they get into Baghdad are going to come through the south. Northern Babil area of Jurf al-Sakhr is under ISIS control. Repeated offensives there have failed and ISIS destroyed tons of police stations and checkpoints in the area with cranes and bulldozers in plain sight with no response by the ISF.

[OUTLAW 09]

Ongoing events

1.In Europe reports are coming out concerning Iranian military movements and buildup on Iraqi border near Manadli next to Diyala province.
2. It appears that now ISIS has closed the ring around Baghdad with their troop movements being mobile forcing the ISF to not fully understand the battle space and making it harder to react to --basically it seems the ISF is just setting up checkpoints after checkpoints actually in effect creating new targets as the IAI/ISIS have 8 years of target practice against any form of checkpoint there is.
3. It now appears that the Syrian Air Force is actually bombing inside Iraq and the Iraqi's initially claimed it was US drones in order to cover up the Syrian involvement.

http://news.yahoo.com/syria-sends-warplanes-iraq-killing-dozens-targeted-isis-134145404.html

4. And this is extremely important if true to any degree---some European news reporters in the KSA are indicating a very quiet KSA military alert for selected armored and AF units and some movement of units towards the Iraqi border.
5. Turkey is claiming they have stopped a total of 5300 recruits attempting to flow into the ISIS in Syria over the last six months.

Things are getting now out of control and a momentum is building that if it continues will expand into a Holy War as the three regional hegemones are getting involved-Syria, Iran and the KSA.

[OUTLAW 09]

1. The ISIS has now taken the roving battle space tactic into Lebanon---this was a tactical concept of multiple engagements and if one has pressure applied to it then withdraw and reengage in another location as it forces the defending counter insurgent to constantly be on the move.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/25/isis-may-open-a-third-front-in-lebanon.html

2. ISIS probing is now occurring in and around Balad AF base and has been the last week or so-- ISIS is after the hundreds of gun trucks stored there as well as the 114s-if I recall they were used by JSOC---if Balad goes so goes strategically the entire Iraqi Army.

And we somehow believe ISIS and Sunni insurgents a minority do not have a strategy on how to defeat a majority?

Watch now for a flare up of fighting inside Syria that would make a total of four fronts effectively keeping the ISF on the move and the Iranians stuck in Diyala and the Hezbollah and Syria off guard.

[JWing]

Outlaw Iraqi press reports that IRGC are in Diyala, Kirkuk, Baghdad already. Probably in Samarra area as well.

[OUTLAW 09]

Outlaw Iraqi press reports that IRGC are in Diyala, Kirkuk, Baghdad already. Probably in Samarra area as well.

Noticed the ISIS and coalition are momentarily quiet---believe they are collecting intel to see exactly where the Quds are maneuvering to and or from.
And you are correct the car bombings are still continuing as a background drumbeat---it is their long range artillery.

Normally after a massive push they tended to go into an intel collection phase to check/detect security holes.

What is surprising me is the lack of ISIS and coalition to use their truck based 12.7s and heavier MG as a AAA against air attacks---they might in fact be using them but do not see the reporting of their use. They also have to have MANPADs as a few have been used in Syria.

Noticed as well first indications of Iranian drones being flown over Iraq.

KSA and the Sunni Gulf States have been unusually quiet---in fact too quiet for my taste--outside of a few public statements by Jordan --Jordan is too quiet as well.

Noticed as well the Iraqi government "played" down the amount taken from the Mosul Central Bank---they are "pitching" a lot of misinformation towards their own Shia population--probably to keep panic from breaking out in Baghdad and cover up the fact that the Iranians are the ones fighting on the ground against ISIS.

It appears some of the ongoing ethnic cleansing killings going on in Baghdad are being covered up by claiming their are ISIS---old habits never seem to die with the ISF.

[JMA]

Outlaw Iraqi press reports that IRGC are in Diyala, Kirkuk, Baghdad already. Probably in Samarra area as well.

Is this unexpected or a bad thing?

[JMA]

What is surprising me is the lack of ISIS and coalition to use their truck based 12.7s and heavier MG as a AAA against air attacks---they might in fact be using them but do not see the reporting of their use. They also have to have MANPADs as a few have been used in Syria

Do they know how? Been watching all the video on TV and YouTube etc and to be honest have yet to see the sights being used on these vehicle mounted HMGs when fired. Also there may well be a limitation on the elevation and ease of rotation on these home made mounts which make it impossible to engage aircraft.

MANPADS. Where did they get them from?

[JMA]

ISIS probing is now occurring in and around Balad AF base and has been the last week or so-- ISIS is after the hundreds of gun trucks stored there as well as the 114s-if I recall they were used by JSOC---if Balad goes so goes strategically the entire Iraqi Army.

I am still unable to understand... to comprehend how the Iraqi army has and continues to collapse. Surely there are those who worked with and/or trained these Iraqis who have an explanation for this... and whether this pattern will follow in Afghanistan?

[OUTLAW 09]

Is this unexpected or a bad thing?

A bad thing as the Quds guys were also on the ground during the ethnic cleansing in the past and worked together with the Shia JAM/Special Groups guys---we picked up eight of them but Malaki was adamant that we turn them over which we did because "we felt we could not damage the relationship"---basically we were played by Malaki.

This was being reported out of Baghdad but carried in the Saudi Online news---two things stuck me---the claim that al Duri is the mastermind between the current offensive and the killing of the Iraqi Kurdish judge who sentenced Saddam to death. That will not set well with the Kurds although it appears he was killed in Baghdad not in the north.

Noticed that al Duri has his own Facebook page.

Baghdad: Iraqi militant group ISIL has killed the judge who ordered Saddam Hussain’s verdict of death-by-hanging in 2006, several Arab news media reported on Tuesday.
Reports claim that Kurdish judge Raouf Abdul Rahman was executed by the militants in retaliation to Saddam’s hanging.
The judge was earlier reported to have been kidnapped by the militants last week on June 16.
Although the Iraqi government has not confirmed the news, several media reports cited at least two important Facebook posts, confirming the report.
One of the FB posts cited, is that of Jordanian MP Khalil Attiehq who wrote that Judge Rahman, who had headed the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal during Saddam’s trial in 2006, was arrested and sentenced to death in revenge for the tyrant’s death.
The Jordanian MP added in his Facebook post that the judge attempted to escape by donning dancers’ uniform but was caught and killed by the ISIS fighters.
Another Facebook post confirming the judge’s execution by militants is that of Izzat Ibrahim Al-Douri, who was Saddam’s former deputy and later emerged as a key figure among the militants.
Al-Douri is reportedly one of the masterminds behind the latest ISIS offensive in Iraq.
Judge Raouf Abdul Rahman was born in the Kurdish town of Halabja, and was appointed the head of the five-member bench overseeing Saddam’s trial in 2006 after the previous judge Rizgar Amin was criticized for being soft on the dictator.

[OUTLAW 09]

Do they know how? Been watching all the video on TV and YouTube etc and to be honest have yet to see the sights being used on these vehicle mounted HMGs when fired. Also there may well be a limitation on the elevation and ease of rotation on these home made mounts which make it impossible to engage aircraft.

MANPADS. Where did they get them from?

JMA---the newer utilities they are using allows for a full swing and evaluation plus they have the heavier 14.5s with seats for the gunners---(saw in one video 23mm with gunner seats as well)---also mounted in a similar fashion.

They did shoot down several US types with the 12.7s before we left so the Mi-8 should not be a problem as it is slower at lower levels and a bigger target to shoot at----the Iraqi's do not have yet the new Russian Mi-35s which Russia was going to export to them.

The few that have been fired in Syria and shown in online videos were earlier models of Russian MANPADS which if reporting is correct is unusual as they were long past they expiration dates.

[Biggus]

Do they know how? Been watching all the video on TV and YouTube etc and to be honest have yet to see the sights being used on these vehicle mounted HMGs when fired. Also there may well be a limitation on the elevation and ease of rotation on these home made mounts which make it impossible to engage aircraft.

MANPADS. Where did they get them from?

JJe83kz7SgI
That's a ZU-23-2 in a very nearly standard mount welded into a light truck. Many of these things aren't nearly as modified as you might expect. I've seen DShKM MGs using the vast majority of their normal AA mounts welded into truck beds, too.

As to the more important (IMO) question, weren't there rumours that some of the MANPADS came from old Libyan stocks?

[OUTLAW 09]

I am still unable to understand... to comprehend how the Iraqi army has and continues to collapse. Surely there are those who worked with and/or trained these Iraqis who have an explanation for this... and whether this pattern will follow in Afghanistan?

JMA---this article from Tom Ricks over on FP gives some explanations----basically the Iraqi Army became an employment agency for the Shia at 700 USD per month which by any standards in Iraq is a solid salary, the corruption was rampart and the maintenance side was poor to begin with.

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/06/25/comment_of_the_day_it_isn_t_just_that_maliki_is_a_ jerk_tom_it_is_also_that_he_ouste

Malaki created a military in the end that did not nor could not threaten his position via a coup and many Shia commanders took their orders directly from him in direct violation of the Iraqi Constitution. Just as he had the US trained Iraqi SF units answering directly to him---he used both the Army and the Iraqi SF as weapons to beat down the Sunni population.

The same Constitution that now Malaki says will not allow him to form a "unity government".

[OUTLAW 09]

JJe83kz7SgI
That's a ZU-23-2 in a very nearly standard mount welded into a light truck. Many of these things aren't nearly as modified as you might expect. I've seen DShKM MGs using the vast majority of their normal AA mounts welded into truck beds, too.

As to the more important (IMO) question, weren't there rumours that some of the MANPADS came from old Libyan stocks?

There was some evidence and the US will not admit to it but when the air strikes started over Libya the Spectre C130s/A10s were held outside Libyan airspace out of fear of the SAM-6/8s and the Russian MANPAD threats.

US/NATO used hunter/killer (Reapers/Preds) drones against 6/8s and actually got kills on them.

For some strange reason the Libyan Army which had a truck mounted Russian MANPAD system never actually engaged with them.

Estimates where that Libya had over 24,000 of them at the start of the air campaign ---never heard if they were hit in their storage bunkers but seriously doubt it although the bunkers were hit hard a number of times---yes there have been rumors that a large number left Libya via smuggle routes--there was strangely a video carried on a Russian TV station claiming that the proRussian Ukrainians had shot down a M8 with a MANPAD but it turned out to be a battle video from Syria----they just used it in their infowar side and did not even taken out the ISIS logo.

If they were not destroyed in their bunkers then they are out there somewhere for the right price I am assuming.

[Biggus]

They did shoot down several US types with the 12.7s before we left so the Mi-8 should not be a problem as it is slower at lower levels and a bigger target to shoot at----the Iraqi's do not have yet the new Russian Mi-35s which Russia was going to export to them.

I believe that a number have been delivered (http://www.janes.com/article/29741/iraq-starts-taking-delivery-of-russian-mi-35-helicopters) and have been active (http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/watch-iraqi-mi-35-hind-attack-choppers-take-the-fight-t-1591207906) in the conflict.

I'm not entirely sure whether the Mi-28s (http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_01_05/13-Russian-Mi-28NE-helicopters-arrive-in-Iraq-1885/) have been flying sorties, though I assume they have been.

[Biggus]

If they were not destroyed in their bunkers then they are out there somewhere for the right price I am assuming.


Probably a reasonable assumption. But why buy secondhand when you can purchase new (http://brown-moses.blogspot.com.au/2013/03/chinese-manpads-in-syria-does-2-2-fn-6.html)?

[OUTLAW 09]

I believe that a number have been delivered (http://www.janes.com/article/29741/iraq-starts-taking-delivery-of-russian-mi-35-helicopters) and have been active (http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/watch-iraqi-mi-35-hind-attack-choppers-take-the-fight-t-1591207906) in the conflict.

I'm not entirely sure whether the Mi-28s (http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_01_05/13-Russian-Mi-28NE-helicopters-arrive-in-Iraq-1885/) have been flying sorties, though I assume they have been.

That is why ISIS has been probing Balad Airbase as that is the point where the Mi8s/35s were being flown into by Russia and then prepped. Balad was going to be the point as well for the F16s the US was going to be sending in---due to the length of the airfield runways.

Also the reason it appears that ISIS is gearing up to attack the base---would give them indirectly their own airforce.

But think they are really after the several hundred gun utilities and 114s used by JSOC before they pulled out.

Also taking Balad would be icing on the cake and a major strategic defeat of the ISFs ability to hold onto Sunni cities/towns.

ISIS and coalition have already taken FOB Speicher a really big airfield and major ISF supply depot and FOB Speicher when the US was there was always a Division headquarters FOB.

[OUTLAW 09]

Interesting Iranian drone/military forces article in the gulfnews.com from today quoting the New York Times.

Bahrain and KSA online news media sites have been rather quiet on Iraq ---actually way too quiet for my tastes outside of KSA reporting that Kerry arrived in the KSA for Iraqi talks.

http://gulfnews.com/news/region/iran/iran-secretly-sending-drones-and-weapons-to-iraq-1.1352494

[JWing]

My new article "Iraq’s Western Front Is Anbar Next To Fall?" (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/iraqs-western-front-is-anbar-next-to.html). Dec. 2013 is when the current fighting started in Iraq due to a rash decision by PM Maliki. He turned an offensive against ISIS as an attack upon the protest movement there. The insurgents immediately took advantage of the situation and Fallujah quickly fell. Since the June offensive started the ISF has collapsed in Anbar just like in northern Iraq and the entire province may fall in the coming days.

[JWing]

Is this unexpected or a bad thing?

Expected. After the massive Iranian mobilization for Syria it wasn't going to let Iraq right on its border go down too. Might be interested in reading my interview with Phillip Smyth about Iranian and Shia militia mobilization that's currently going on in Iraq

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/iran-and-its-shiite-militias-mobilize.html

[JWing]

According to a report by Jane's Defense Weekly insurgents have shot down 6 Iraqi army helicopters and have damaged helicopters 60 other times. In the on going assault upon Beiji refinery in Salahaddin ISIS has deployed truck mounted AA guns to keep away helicopters from re-suppling and re-enforcing the ISF unit that is holding onto the facility.

[JWing]

I believe that a number have been delivered (http://www.janes.com/article/29741/iraq-starts-taking-delivery-of-russian-mi-35-helicopters) and have been active (http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/watch-iraqi-mi-35-hind-attack-choppers-take-the-fight-t-1591207906) in the conflict.

I'm not entirely sure whether the Mi-28s (http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_01_05/13-Russian-Mi-28NE-helicopters-arrive-in-Iraq-1885/) have been flying sorties, though I assume they have been.

Iraqi Army Aviation has been putting all the new Russian copters into service shortly after their arrival. There is plenty of video on youtube of their use.

[JWing]

report of the judge that sentenced Saddam being killed turned out to just be a rumor. He's alive and well.

[OUTLAW 09]

According to a report by Jane's Defense Weekly insurgents have shot down 6 Iraqi army helicopters and have damaged helicopters 60 other times. In the on going assault upon Beiji refinery in Salahaddin ISIS has deployed truck mounted AA guns to keep away helicopters from re-suppling and re-enforcing the ISF unit that is holding onto the facility.

JWing-
Make that one more crash landing after the airborne assault in Tikrit with one staying on the ground after coming under heavy fire---the third one made it off the ground.

Any idea how the Tikrit fighting is going?---reports I have seen say it is heavy fighting with the Iraqi SF types surrounded in some areas and pinned down.

It is the MOUT fighting outcome that will be interesting as that is where the ISF bogs down every time.

[Bill Moore]

I am still unable to understand... to comprehend how the Iraqi army has and continues to collapse. Surely there are those who worked with and/or trained these Iraqis who have an explanation for this... and whether this pattern will follow in Afghanistan?

In simple terms it is a failure of leadership. We saw the same thing during Desert Storm and OIF 1 when they hit their breaking point. I had lunch with an Iraqi LT shortly after we secured our area in 2003, and I asked him through my terp why he didn't fire on us. He was very frank, he said he would fight for his country, but not a chair (implying Saddam). I suspect we're seeing the same now, why would they want to fight for Maliki? The senior Iraqi officers appointed by Maliki must be buffoons and completely non-inspirational. Leadership is decisive at the tactical level, and if they had warrior leaders they were more than capable of holding the line I suspect.

In comparison why do ISIS/ISIL fighters fight so hard?

Can troops with low morale, regardless of well armed they are in comparison, defeat highly motivated and aggressive troops? I know there are a lot of variables and no simple answer, but I think we underestimate the power of morale.

[JWing]

Update on the security situation in Salahaddin "Iraq’s Northern Front Stalemate In Salahaddin" (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/iraqs-northern-front-stalemate-in.html). After Mosul the insurgent turned southwards and took half of Salahaddin. Were stopped in Tuz Kharmato in the west by Kurdish and Turkmen forces, while ISF held onto Baiji refinery Samarra and Balad. Fight there has now turned into a war of attrition, which the entire war in Iraq will be like. No more big maneuvers by insurgents, but ISF incapable or holding any area it retakes, plus Baghdad has no strategy for reversing the security situation.

[slapout9]

Recent radio interview of Retired Air Force Stratagist John Warden on solving the Iraq crisis.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DjyFlNtzh0&feature=youtu.be

[Maeda Toshiie]

In simple terms it is a failure of leadership. We saw the same thing during Desert Storm and OIF 1 when they hit their breaking point. I had lunch with an Iraqi LT shortly after we secured our area in 2003, and I asked him through my terp why he didn't fire on us. He was very frank, he said he would fight for his country, but not a chair (implying Saddam). I suspect we're seeing the same now, why would they want to fight for Maliki? The senior Iraqi officers appointed by Maliki must be buffoons and completely non-inspirational. Leadership is decisive at the tactical level, and if they had warrior leaders they were more than capable of holding the line I suspect.

In comparison why do ISIS/ISIL fighters fight so hard?

Can troops with low morale, regardless of well armed they are in comparison, defeat highly motivated and aggressive troops? I know there are a lot of variables and no simple answer, but I think we underestimate the power of morale.

Are there any figures on the proportion of Sunni/ Shia/ Kurd within the ranks? That may play a role in the lack of motivation.

I think it is a toxic mix of army recruitment amounting to a jobs program, senior command turning tail, apathy or even lack of faith in the de jure government in Baghdad, and a lack of an national identity overriding tribal and/or religious identity.

Speaking of the tactical level, I am reminded of what de Atkine wrote about Arab armies.
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_17/articles/deatkine_arabs1.html

[JMA]

There are always national characteristics which come into play in time of war.

Here we need to understand more about Arabs in time of war:

Why Arabs Lose Wars (http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars)


It is a truism of military life that an army fights as it trains, and so I draw on my many years of firsthand observation of Arabs in training to draw conclusions about the ways in which they go into combat.

and

The influence of Arab culture on Arab military effectiveness (http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/11219)



The results of this study demonstrate that certain patterns of behavior fostered by the dominant Arab culture were the most important factors contributing to the limited military effectiveness of Arab armies and air forces from 1945 to 1991.

: tks for the heads up Mike.

[davidbfpo]

A succinct analysis by Charles Lister, from Brookings; which starts with:
Since capturing Iraq's second city of Mosul on 10 June, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isis) has marched south towards Baghdad, seizing a number of towns, military bases, and resource-rich assets on the way. But what is the group's long-term game plan?

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28053489?ocid=socialflow_twitter


http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/75818000/gif/_75818776_iraq_isis_control_20140625_624.gif

[OUTLAW 09]

JWing/David---this is a really interesting article as I tend to agree that the Sunni insurgency and tribes will in the end turn on ISIS---the Sunni as a whole are secular and have been since Saddam days ---we just never got it when in Iraq. Even the IAI which was religious to a degree had their secular and Baathist officers in the group with no clashes.

http://www.newsweek.com/iraqs-sunnis-will-kick-out-isis-after-dumping-maliki-ex-cia-official-256270

What many fail to remember is that the Kurds are as well conservative Sunni thus have a certain affinity towards the more "moderate" Sunni insurgent groups and tribes-especially if you notice how the two have worked for the last several years.

The number of Sunni insurgents/tribe fighters that he quoted is something I have myself often estimated and feel is accurate- if one fully understood who was fighting us and the reasons for their fighting us in the 2006/2007 period-- the national IC could never get the estimates right especially in the 2006/2007 timeframes.

The numbers could actually be higher due to the younger Sunni juveniles coming of age in the last several years who were cheering when ISIS arrived in Mosul and Tikrit.

I also do not think the foreign fighter numbers in Iraqi are as high as many think they are---some indications that really only around 350 have come out of Europe over the last few years at least based on Facebook and Twitter analysis. So the reported numbers stopped as reported by the Turks of 5300 seems to be way to high.

The ISIS/Sunni coalition has been able to raise the overall fighter numbers by the various prison breakouts that have contributed almost 5500 instant fighters especially since they were all Sunni's in those prisons and a number have been tortured by the prison guards so they have a major beef with the Shia.

What is interesting is that the numbers quoted were able to in fact checkmate the entire US Army strength at the height of the surge---granted the Shia fought us as well but the Sunni was the main US enemy.

What is also interesting in the article is the reported lack of Iraqi Shia motivation to take the fight to ISIS.

Ramadan is coming up on Saturday/Sunday---will be interesting to see if the Shia continue fighting and if ISIS/Sunni coalition also fights during Ramadan.

The Sunni have fought historically at times during Ramadan ie Mohammad fought during Ramadan to take Mekka.

This is going to be brutal over the coming days and weeks,

[OUTLAW 09]

Update on the security situation in Salahaddin "Iraq’s Northern Front Stalemate In Salahaddin" (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/iraqs-northern-front-stalemate-in.html). After Mosul the insurgent turned southwards and took half of Salahaddin. Were stopped in Tuz Kharmato in the west by Kurdish and Turkmen forces, while ISF held onto Baiji refinery Samarra and Balad. Fight there has now turned into a war of attrition, which the entire war in Iraq will be like. No more big maneuvers by insurgents, but ISF incapable or holding any area it retakes, plus Baghdad has no strategy for reversing the security situation.

JWing---while the Shia/ISF appear to be defending Samarra due to the "perceived" threat to the Shia shrine---is this what the ISIS/Sunni Coalition in fact wants as it is freezing them effectively in place.

The Sunni's have swung around Samarra and headed for the Diyala River Basin and are now focusing on the Muqdadiyah and Baqubah areas where the fighting has intensified the last several days---it would appear that the ISIS/Sunni coalition wants to cut the LOCs to Samarra as the Army had a massive time trying to keep the roads then clear of IEDs which they never did fully succeed in doing.

This area is a counter insurgent's nightmare and a guerrilla's paradise from terrain and cover and the support base of Sunni tribes there that were never a big supporter of the US.

[davidbfpo]

A short item missed I suspect by many and officialdom may prefer we don't know:http://2paragraphs.com/2014/06/isis-has-control-of-saddam-husseins-wmd-in-iraq/?se_id=


Last week ISIS took control of the Iraqi Army military base at Al Muthanna, 45 miles NW of Baghdad, which houses the remnants of Saddam Hussein’s chemical weapons stockpile..... The UN stored tonnes of highly deadly nerve agents like sarin and VX and blister agents like mustard at Al Muthanna between 1994-96 – and sealed the compound to be dealt with later. But still intact are two huge bunkers with the WMD in them. The bunkers are sealed with reinforced concrete, but they are in the hands of ISIS. The nerve agent in the bunkers will by now have degraded to a toxic ‘sludge’ but the mustard will be viable.....Can ISIS access the bunkers? Yes, probably, in time.The author 100% knows this field:
Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, OBE, is the COO of SecureBio, a CBRN consultancy headquartered in the UK. He is a former Commander of British Military CBRN Forces.His website is:http://www.securebio.co.uk

On this BBC News clip he says we should not panic:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LTVK8mwXnNE&feature=youtu.be&a

A little more:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10913275/Isis-storms-Saddam-era-chemical-weapons-complex-in-Iraq.html

[ceg1000]

So can we all here at SWJ now finally declare COIN dead and buried--because the last time I checked a "total failure" in a delivered doctrine tends to in fact signal the doctrine was not valid?
Sounds similar to what was observed from 2007 to mid 2011. Accept responsibility for nothing and portray the conventional forces as conducting COIN. Let's not forget what actually occurred. The primary emphasis by the conventional forces was 'whack a mole' and the primary metric was SIGACTS. The primary training emphasis was training the ISF in a like image to the US conventional forces.

There was zero understanding of the realities on the ground, the conventional forces always had AQI/ISI 'on the run' and any deviation from the 'party line' coming from USF-I was ignored.

COIN was never implemented. The conventional forces treated it as a conventional fight. They were/are poorly trained, poorly disciplined, and poorly motivated for this type of fight. They did not/do not possess the intellectual capacity to grasp the situation and simply ignored indicators that did not fit the 'party line'.

What the situation indicated as far back as 2007 is do not attempt to implement a strategy with forces incapable of execution. I would expect more of the same (i.e. the US military attempting to shift any responsibility for the current situation) away from themselves and onto anything they believe the US public will buy.

[OUTLAW 09]

Sounds similar to what was observed from 2007 to mid 2011. Accept responsibility for nothing and portray the conventional forces as conducting COIN. Let's not forget what actually occurred. The primary emphasis by the conventional forces was 'whack a mole' and the primary metric was SIGACTS. The primary training emphasis was training the ISF in a like image to the US conventional forces.

There was zero understanding of the realities on the ground, the conventional forces always had AQI/ISI 'on the run' and any deviation from the 'party line' coming from USF-I was ignored.

COIN was never implemented. The conventional forces treated it as a conventional fight. They were/are poorly trained, poorly disciplined, and poorly motivated for this type of fight. They did not/do not possess the intellectual capacity to grasp the situation and simply ignored indicators that did not fit the 'party line'.

What the situation indicated as far back as 2007 is do not attempt to implement a strategy with forces incapable of execution. I would expect more of the same (i.e. the US military attempting to shift any responsibility for the current situation) away from themselves and onto anything they believe the US public will buy.

An example of what you are saying is as follows---check how each BCT and each Division Staff just rolled in on the previous campaign plans and LOEs of the previous BCT or Division---and after about three or four months might start to change something if they changed anything at all. Some say the BCT in 2009 was seeing what the BCT in 2007 started with----with little to no changes over the three years

Another example---we would get a week long series of attacks on the police checkpoints in Baqubah once a month---when asked by the BCT S2 what I thought about the attacks--I responded it was simple the insurgents were going through a series of live fire graduation exercises since all they could do in their safe houses was dry fire training---at some point they needed to shot at something and it was the police---Sunni insurgents simply did not have a NTC for training.

He then said but a few get killed or wounded---my response that is the guerrilla Darwinian principle ---the fittest survive and continue fighting and building new cells.

The S2s' response was "that is to simple but it makes sense but I cannot tell that to the Division G2".

[OUTLAW 09]

JWing---a good report on potential Baghdad strategy of the ISIS.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/28/why-isis-won-t-take-baghdad.html

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Red Rat for spotting this long report on the sectarian killing spree underway in Iraq. The focus is on ISIS and what appear to be new, local allies - following the Syrian model - and the murders in jails before ISIS arrived:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10932689/Iraq-What-it-feels-like-to-be-on-the-receiving-end-of-Isiss-pickup-truck-killing-party.html

[OUTLAW 09]

Hat tip to Red Rat for spotting this long report on the sectarian killing spree underway in Iraq. The focus is on ISIS and what appear to be new, local allies - following the Syrian model - and the murders in jails before ISIS arrived:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10932689/Iraq-What-it-feels-like-to-be-on-the-receiving-end-of-Isiss-pickup-truck-killing-party.html

“We feed them and keep them healthy and if the ISIL managed to free them, they will immediately resume fighting us,” the police captain who acknowledged the executions in Hilla said.
“We have to defend ourselves by executing those criminals.”

I heard this often from members of the Special Police Wolf Brigade in 2005---it seems to never die out under the Shia.

The second Hilla police officer said summary executions were routinely carried out by army and police forces.
“First thing we do is to shoot them in foot and then take their confessions. Then we kill them and write in report they were killed in action,” he said, also on condition of anonymity.

We were seeing multiple forms of Sunni torturing by Shia police/Shia military already in 2005 and still could not get it under control by 2011. We never did stop the illegal prisons being run by the Shia starting in 2005.

http://www.arabnews.com/news/593291

This type of summary killings and torture of accused Sunni’s by Shia ISF has been a major problem for the last two years under Malaki and one of the main reasons for the Sunni uprising.

The problem I have with current US policy is that by continuing to support Malaki it appears we the US approve of the Sunni killings and torture especially because we have absolutely nothing in compromises by Malaki.

By the way these types of killings and torture of Sunni by Shia began by the ISF even before the 2005 elections and we never did fully stop it although we were fully aware that it was going on.

[JMA]

Here we go...

Thousands of Indian Muslims signing up for Iraq (http://www.arabnews.com/news/592516)


Thousands of Muslims in India have signed up to defend Iraq’s shrines and, if need be, fight militants in the country where the civilian death toll from the Sunni insurgents’ advance is estimated at least 1,300.

Denouncing the militants of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as terrorists, these Indian Muslims have filled out forms, complete with passport-size photographs and photocopied identification documents, to travel to Iraq.

... still waiting for a mea culpa from the guys who insisted there would be no spill over from Syria.

[davidbfpo]

Here we go...Thousands of Indian Muslims signing up for Iraq (http://www.arabnews.com/news/592516).

JMA,

This week I read, but cannot now find, a UK-based Shia cleric has given a sermon that British Shia do not need to volunteer to serve in Iraq. The leading Iraqi Shia leader, Sistani, has also stated his plea for Shias to defend their shrines etc was for Iraqis only and they are to serve under government orders.

[OUTLAW 09]

Here we go...

Thousands of Indian Muslims signing up for Iraq (http://www.arabnews.com/news/592516)



... still waiting for a mea culpa from the guys who insisted there would be no spill over from Syria.

There will always be spill over until the Sunni and Shia finally settle their heretical differences from 1400 years ago.

Believe the Indian Shia should though pay more attention to Modi than the ISIS as he s closer to them than is ISIS.

[davidbfpo]

This week Richard Barrett, ex-diplomat (UK & UN posts) and now with the Soufan Group, commented that trained Saudi military personnel are defecting to ISIS. He drew attention to the oddity in a February 2014 statement by the King that fighting abroad meant a five year prison sentence for citizens and seven and half years for those who serve in the military.

His estimate, based on visits to Saudi Arabia, was that 2,500-3,000 have gone to fight; with three hundred in rehab centres (maybe intercepted before leaving or returned).

In my background reading this week I found suggestions that the Saudi army were deploying to the northern border (maybe easier to defect then?).

There is a thread on Saudi Arabia, so this will be copied there.

[JMA]

Believe the Indian Shia should though pay more attention to Modi than the ISIS as he s closer to them than is ISIS.

They probably will once they return from Iraq with some military experience...

[Red Rat]

I have seen reports on blog sites that both Saudi Arabia and Jordan have mobilised armoured divisions and moved them to their respective borders with Iraq. It would be highly unusual for them not to do considering the current situation. The issues for both Saudi Arabia and Jordan are:

1) How reliable are their armed forces?

2) Whether to contain or actively get involved.

Saudi Arabia military on highest alert (http://riyadhconnect.com/saudi-arabia-goes-on-highest-alert-king-sacks-deputy-defence-minister/)

[davidbfpo]

Elsewhere on SWC we have discussed the possible reaction from China (PRC) to loss of its investments abroad and the impact of "kith & kin" with Chinese nationals working abroad:
State media say more than 1,200 Chinese workers who had been trapped in the embattled northern Iraqi city of Samarra have been evacuated to Baghdad.....China Machinery Engineering Corporation employed the workers at a power plant construction site in Samarra.....More than 10,000 Chinese are in Iraq, many of them employees with Chinese firms.

Link:http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20140628p2g00m0in025000c.html

[davidbfpo]

A fascinating report on the finances of ISIS, using captured records, the Harmony Database:
The records reveal that previous incarnations of ISIS have shown an extraordinary ability to regroup even after military defeats....That’s the direct result of ISIS’s aggressive and diverse fundraising arm.....the intercepted documents show, outside donations amounted to only a tiny fraction _ no more than 5 percent _ of the group’s operating budgets from 2005 until 2010.

(Citing Charles Lister, of Brookings) ...there was no evidence that foreign donors such as Gulf nations became any more important to the group after 2010....

Link:http://www.sacbee.com/2014/06/23/6505731/records-show-how-iraqi-extremists.html#storylink=cpy

[OUTLAW 09]

A fascinating report on the finances of ISIS, using captured records, the Harmony Database:

Link:http://www.sacbee.com/2014/06/23/6505731/records-show-how-iraqi-extremists.html#storylink=cpy

david---did not know you knew about the Harmony Database?

For those that want a really good background on research done on Harmony records/documents---check the Combatting Terrorism Center of West Point.

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/about/mission/we-research

They have released some of the best research on Harmony documents out there right now. The problem with Harmony is that any captured documents, videos, photos etc that go into it are classified until an agency say the CTC gets specific records declassified---also another problem is most of the documents have never been fully translated or simply scan translated or not translated at all.

[davidbfpo]

Outlaw09 asked:
david---did not know you knew about the Harmony Database?

Yes, but is awhile since I've read a CTC report based on them.

[davidbfpo]

A "lurker" who follows ISIS affiliates on Twitter remarked that fighter obituaries have included several officers up to Captain rank from the Saudi military.

[OUTLAW 09]

I have seen reports on blog sites that both Saudi Arabia and Jordan have mobilised armoured divisions and moved them to their respective borders with Iraq. It would be highly unusual for them not to do considering the current situation. The issues for both Saudi Arabia and Jordan are:

1) How reliable are their armed forces?

2) Whether to contain or actively get involved.

Saudi Arabia military on highest alert (http://riyadhconnect.com/saudi-arabia-goes-on-highest-alert-king-sacks-deputy-defence-minister/)

Saudia armored unit officers have been trained over the last seven years on an yearly basis at the NTC---actually quite good on the armored recon side of things. They grasp well the use of armor in desert environments.

Jordanian army SF trained by US SF for a long number of years.

Would be more interested in if the KSA AF goes to alert status as well as the Jordanian AF.

[OUTLAW 09]

Outlaw09 asked:

Yes, but is awhile since I've read a CTC report based on them.

CTC has done extensive harmony work and released some really good papers.
Many do not tend to follow their work because they see West Point and think the military does not get things.

[OUTLAW 09]

Outlaw09 asked:

Yes, but is awhile since I've read a CTC report based on them.

David---two CTC reports on AQI in the period 2006 to 2009 each report has the related Harmony documents which make great background reading since AQI has not changed much of their Iraqi internal structures since 2009.

Now Iran is fully inside Iraqi this older CTC report on Iran is interesting to see what the analysis was then versus now.


https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/iranian-strategy-in-iraq-politics-and-%e2%80%9cother-means%e2%80%9d

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/bombers-bank-accounts-and-bleedout-al-qaidas-road-in-and-out-of-iraq

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaidas-foreign-fighters-in-iraq-a-first-look-at-the-sinjar-records

[OUTLAW 09]

This seems to confirm the fact that Malaki has a way of blaming everyone for problems in Iraq other than those created by himself.

Seems that since we did not deliver the F16s scheduled for delivery in the fall of this year we the US are responsible for the ISIS successes.

"The announcement follows a comment by al-Maliki that militant advances might have been avoided if Iraq had proper air power, in the form of fighter jets that Iraq has been trying to get from the United States.

"I'll be frank and say that we were deluded when we signed the contract" with the United States, al-Maliki told the BBC in the interview last week, which was released Friday.

Iraq has now turned to Russia and Belarus to buy fighter jets, he said. "God willing, within one week, this force will be effective and will destroy the terrorists' dens," he said.

U.S. officials were quick to reject al-Maliki's complaints. U.S. fighter jets have not been slow in coming, Pentagon spokesman Rear Adm. John Kirby told CNN. The first two promised F-16s "weren't expected to be delivered until the fall, which is still months away," Kirby said. "And we were in the process of working towards that delivery."

The advance of the al Qaeda splinter group "couldn't have been stemmed through the use of two particular fighter planes," he said.

Al-Maliki's statements about the need for air support came as American and Arab diplomats told CNN that the United States is unlikely to undertake any military strikes against the militant group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and its allied fighters before a new government is formed in Iraq.

[OUTLAW 09]

Seems that while the Iraqi Army leadership is claiming today on Iraqi News they control Tikrit there are a number of online YouTube videos taken at the same time that indicate no Iraqi Army personnel in the main streets of Tikrit. YouTube videos seem to be released by the Sunni tribes controlling Tikrit not from ISIS.

The closest they seem to be is in a village 25 kms away after being driven out from the first initial assualt----the Iraqi SF that assaulted in via copter seem to be encircled in the university.

Again reports indicate that the relief column is still bogged down with IEDs and have not moved much from Samarra.

Seems every time the Iraqi Army makes an announcement on successes the ISIS releases social media reporting evidently the direct opposite.

[OUTLAW 09]

Now the question begs to be asked---(with the new Obama foreign policy in place, the US foreign policy for Syria in tatters and virtually non existent, and Russia not being punished for basically doing nothing to end the Ukrainian irregular war)----can anyone explain to me in a sentence or two why we need Russian assistance in anything now or in the future?

Escalating Iraq-Syria war now pits Iran-Russia-Assad/Maliki v. ISIS, other extremists. US effectively on sidelines. http://nyti.ms/1muwI46
5:15 PM - 29 Jun 2014

Seems the Russians have effectively placed themselves on the side of Shia Islam and against the Sunni Islam---will be interesting to see how the Gulf States and the KSA now respond with basically an Iranian invasion supported by Russia of Iraq under the guise of combatting ISIS.

For Russia it has been in the ME always about the oil and naval ports tied to that oil.

[OUTLAW 09]

It seems that the Iraqi government still does not get it that it is not about the number of aircraft that will make the difference.

This attitude that if I have a large number of weapons then I will win is I believe part of what we created--they looked at the US military and assumed the same thing would work for them---thus never really believing they needed a political solution.

Appears that the IS new name for the ISIS has held Tikrit and shot down another copter in the process so now the Iraqi Army think Abrams tanks will dislodge the insurgents but that means placing Abrams tanks directly into a narrow MOUT environment which will not work out well and fail as well.

"Earlier on Sunday, Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Hussain Al-Shahristani, one of Iraq’s most senior politicians, faulted the US for not doing enough to bolster the country’s military.
“Yes, there has been a delay from the Americans in handing over the contracted arms. We told them, ‘You once did an air bridge to send arms to your ally Israel, so why don’t you give us the contracted arms in time?’” he told Al-Hurra television. (NOTE: again the complaint from the Shia this time from Iraq--hey you Americans support the Jews but not the Shia---similar argument from the previous Iranian President) In a sign of Iraq’s attempts to bolster its lackluster air force, five Russian Sukhoi jets were delivered to Baghdad late on Saturday, which state television said “would be used in the coming days to strike ISIL terrorist groups.”

[JMA]

Isis rebels declare 'Islamic state' in Iraq and Syria (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28082962)


Islamist militant group Isis has said it is establishing a caliphate, or Islamic state, on the territories it controls in Iraq and Syria.

It also proclaimed the group's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as caliph and "leader for Muslims everywhere".

And importantly:

In the recording, the rebels also demanded that all Muslims "pledge allegiance" to the new ruler and "reject democracy and other garbage from the West".

The question is whether to disparate Sunni groups will fall into line behind ISIS and if they do for how long?

[JWing]

Here's my latest article "Tracking Al Qaeda in Iraq's Zarqawi Interview With Ex-CIA Analyst Nada Bakos" (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/tracking-al-qaeda-in-iraqs-zarqawi.html). I interviewed former CIA analyst Nada Bakos who was part of the Counterterrorism Center tasked with following bin Laden. She went to Iraq May 2003 to track Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's network.

[OUTLAW 09]

Here's my latest article "Tracking Al Qaeda in Iraq's Zarqawi Interview With Ex-CIA Analyst Nada Bakos" (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/tracking-al-qaeda-in-iraqs-zarqawi.html). I interviewed former CIA analyst Nada Bakos who was part of the Counterterrorism Center tasked with following bin Laden. She went to Iraq May 2003 to track Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's network.

JWing--an interesting interview---reference point five---I one had a an insurgent draw me the linkage concept of the Sunni insurgency (Emir of the ASA Baqubah cell who led a group of 70 fighters).

It was actually a spider web with concentric circles and at each point where a part of the spider web cell touched another section of the web there was a physical cell and at the center of the spider web it was the core founders of the Sunni insurgency who had been together since 2002.

What is interesting when I attempted to write it up no one wanted to hear it nor read as everyone was hung up on the hierarchy thing that was alluded to in the Manchester AQ document.

When I drew it for someone in DC in 2008 he was totally surprised and asked where I had gotten it as it was news for him.

So much was reported but never read nor analyzed by national---- it was all about the numbers generated not the information as no one really thought we were in a deeply developing guerrilla war.

[davidbfpo]

A brief article in the popular scientific weekly magazine, with details that I'd not read about before and with links:http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn25788#.U7HaRkCRcdV

[carl]

Now the question begs to be asked---(with the new Obama foreign policy in place, the US foreign policy for Syria in tatters and virtually non existent, and Russia not being punished for basically doing nothing to end the Ukrainian irregular war)----can anyone explain to me in a sentence or two why we need Russian assistance in anything now or in the future?

That one is easy. Mr. Obama is a Red Diaper baby. Red diaper babies grew up believing that the only reason there was trouble between the USSR and the rest of the world was the US being mean to them, if only we had seen that and engaged in sincere dialog and cooperation, all would have been well. That world still exists in Mr. Obama's mind and nothing short of a nuke going off over Omaha will change that. So no matter what or where, we have to cooperate with the Russkis.

Sorry, that was 4 sentences.

[carl]

Outlaw 09:

Why did we blow up Zarqawi instead of catching him? If I recall right there were sufficient forces very close by but we blew him up instead. Why we did that always puzzled me.

[TheCurmudgeon]

A brief article in the popular scientific weekly magazine, with details that I'd not read about before and with links:http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn25788#.U7HaRkCRcdV

Interesting. The more I look at ISIS the more I come to realize that, contrary to Outlaws assertion, Pop-centric COIN is not dead but dead-on. ISIS has taken and now controls territory without the armor that Gian Gentile believes is necessary for an army. They have done it without the air power that COL Warden believes is necessary to win. They have done it by convincing key elements of the population that they are the lessor of two evils. They won the hearts and minds of key Sunni leadership as well as potential insurgents from around the world. Too bad we don't believe these tactics can work.

[OUTLAW 09]

Outlaw 09:

Why did we blow up Zarqawi instead of catching him? If I recall right there were sufficient forces very close by but we blew him up instead. Why we did that always puzzled me.

Honest answer?---there was a massive reward on his top dead or alive---no one ever stopped to ask was it paid out and did the individual leave Iraq---yes to both.

There was a second source indicating the exact location at the same time---some said it was to kill him so the second person's identify was not revealed as everyone would be looking at person one---which is what happened the second one drifted into cyper-space somewhere still in Iraq.

[OUTLAW 09]

Interesting. The more I look at ISIS the more I come to realize that, contrary to Outlaws assertion, Pop-centric COIN is not dead but dead-on. ISIS has taken and now controls territory without the armor that Gian Gentile believes is necessary for an army. They have done it without the air power that COL Warden believes is necessary to win. They have done it by convincing key elements of the population that they are the lessor of two evils. They won the hearts and minds of key Sunni leadership as well as potential insurgents from around the world. Too bad we don't believe these tactics can work.

TC---have never said pop centric is dead as it has been at the heart of every guerrilla war in the last 300 years---what is dead is COIN as it was never designed to fight an aggressive UW/IW war which Iraq was even in 2003.

Many never did want to hear my constant remarks about the effective inforwar being carried out by AQI and the other Sunni groups---for a vast majority of Army officers it was all "propaganda" thus they would right rite refuse to even look at the internet infowar materials that were streaming almost daily from over six internet sites---now IS and the related Sunni groups have moved on to twitter and youtube which is in my personal opinion not as effective but it sure sidesteps the NSA.

[OUTLAW 09]

Honest answer?---there was a massive reward on his top dead or alive---no one ever stopped to ask was it paid out and did the individual leave Iraq---yes to both.

There was a second source indicating the exact location at the same time---some said it was to kill him so the second person's identify was not revealed as everyone would be looking at person one---which is what happened the second one drifted into cyper-space somewhere still in Iraq.

carl---there was a third rumor going around---the tipper was close to Zarqawi for awhile and was killed as well in the airstrike---so the humor was "we saved ourselves the reward money intentionally".

There was no interest in capturing him alive---- based on his reputation he would have been just as valuable to the insurgency and AQ in prison.

[OUTLAW 09]

Now Russia is flying in Iraq and maybe NK pilots in Syria?

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/01/exclusive-putin-s-pilots-set-to-fly-over-iraq.html

[OUTLAW 09]

Sunni's and Kurds walk out of the first Parliament meeting after the recent elections---so much for a "negotiated" inclusive new government minus a Malaki.

Even A. Chalabi who got us into the war with false intel is talked about as a possible replacement for Malaki---now how would a US government deal with a Chalabi who was at one time under an arrest warrant issued by the US.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/world/middleeast/iraq.html?

[AmericanPride]

I think it's clear by now that the Obama administration is not entirely concerned with the survival of the government in Iraq. The administration requested $500 million to train and equip the rebels in Syria - the same government the Obama administration has condemned for attacking ISIS in Iraq to the applause of the Iraqi government. Both US and Saudi Arabia have warned Iran about coming to the aid of Iraq, and most recently, the purchase of Russian fighters by Iraq after US refusal for any substantial support. The US priority is the overthrow of the Assad regime - which means less pressure on ISIS and the virtual isolation of Iraq - and it seems like the assumption is that ISIS can be dealt with at some undetermined point in the future.

[JWing]

AmericanPride the Obama administration is unlikely to act in Iraq until a new government is formed. They're putting pressure on Iraqi politicians to get rid of Maliki and using the little influence they have i.e. air strikes to push that point. As for the aid to Syrian rebels, part of that is to actually boost the groups that are fighting ISIS so it is also supposed to help the situation in Iraq by diverting resources back to Syria.

[JWing]

My latest interview "Update On Iraq’s Insurgency Interview With Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi" (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/07/update-on-iraqs-insurgency-interview.html) Tamimi is one of the top researchers on the Iraqi and Syrian insurgencies. I go through each one of the contested provinces in Iraq with him and which groups are active there. It is readily apparent that the Islamic State is spearheading the vast majority of operations in Iraq right now and pushing out many other organizations across the country.

[OUTLAW 09]

This was a comment by Tom Rick's on his Best defense Blog over on FP---kind of goes to the heart of the new COIN FM.

"Hey kids, looking for a good dissertation topic?: How about Iranian intervention in Iraq as a model of a modern training and advisory campaign? Low profile, high impact: Compare and contrast."

[TheCurmudgeon]

TC---have never said pop centric is dead as it has been at the heart of every guerrilla war in the last 300 years---what is dead is COIN as it was never designed to fight an aggressive UW/IW war which Iraq was even in 2003.

You are correnct, my apologies.

I am not sure it is dead even in aggressive cases, but I believe aggressive cases require greater attention to what is causing the deeply held convictions that make it an aggressive UW/IW war. Any/all wars amongst the people are fed by something. I would argue that the "something" is a combination of a clearly distinguishable identity that seperates the insurgents from the greater population (or at least the population who controls the power) and a deeply held feeling of injustice. You will have to address one or both of those factors eventually. If you don't, then you just kick the can down the road.

[OUTLAW 09]

My latest interview "Update On Iraq’s Insurgency Interview With Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi" (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/07/update-on-iraqs-insurgency-interview.html) Tamimi is one of the top researchers on the Iraqi and Syrian insurgencies. I go through each one of the contested provinces in Iraq with him and which groups are active there. It is readily apparent that the Islamic State is spearheading the vast majority of operations in Iraq right now and pushing out many other organizations across the country.

JWing--an interesting article and it raises two questions that seem to be unanswered by many pundits reporting in the last few days.

1. Just how many fighters and armed sympathizers does the Sunni coalition ie
JRTN, Ansar al Sunnah, Jayish M, and the Islamic Army have and how deep into the tribes do they extend and exactly which Sunnni tribes are supporting the Sunni coalition.

2. Exactly how will the Caliphate announcement target the mothership AQ---the announcement was a general call to young Muslim men to join the global fight against the West and that in itself targets the AQ at it's core.

The reason I say that is that AQ has lost the overall "Islamic" messaging months ago to the IS, AQ use to be the general funder and that has disappeared, AQ use to recruit and funnel fighters---that has all but disappeared as well so are we seeing the overall "replacement" of AQ by the IS because if one really reads the IS messaging releases the last few days they are basically saying that to the face of AQ.

We are starting to see the oath of allegiances' to IS come in from around the world plus a number of great "wishes" as well coming in from the various jihadi groups.

What I think is occurring and we see no comments by the pundits---the jihadi movement is splitting into a radial wing ie based on the Koran and what I would call a moderate/"secular" wing that is driven by a political instinct.

What strikes me in the article is that while IS goes for the political messaging the Sunni coalition goes for the weapons which makes sense if one is arming far more individuals than currently "seen" on the surface so indirectly the comments indicating the Sunni coalition could if need be hold IS in check might actually be true.

Keep similar articles coming---they are far better than what the general media is putting out there.

[OUTLAW 09]

You are correnct, my apologies.

I am not sure it is dead even in aggressive cases, but I believe aggressive cases require greater attention to what is causing the deeply held convictions that make it an aggressive UW/IW war. Any/all wars amongst the people are fed by something. I would argue that the "something" is a combination of a clearly distinguishable identity and a deeply held feeling of injustice. You will have to address one or both of those factors eventually. If you don't, then you just kick the can down the road.

TC-that is the point we started in 2008 kicking the can down the road in Iraq in the name of the COIN FM---meaning every BCT or Divison would roll into their new AO and go through the RIPTOA process and that meant taking over the same campaign plan and the same LOEs as the previous unit and usually if at all there was little to no major change by the incoming unit for say about six months then the changes were small as all were afraid of jiggling the campaign plan.

Thus say from 2008 to until 2011 one could see the same basic LOE tenets with little change to reflect as you correctly state a recognition of what the "triggers" are.

[JWing]

Outlaw,

Thanks for the compliment on the interview. I'm trying hard.

When Anbar first blew up in Jan I tried to write a little bit about the tribes there. It seemed like they were split almost 50-50 on whether to back the govt or insurgents. The problem is I haven't really seen anything else in the rest of the country other than just passing mentions of the generic "tribe" so no idea how it's playing out right now. Zaid al-Ali is an Iraqi constitutional scholar with family & friends in Tikrit and said many tribes there are standing on the sidelines waiting to see who has the upper hand and then will jump on the bandwagon. He said one tribe stopped the ISF from crossing its territory during the current fighting in Tikrit.

As for the IS vs AQ dynamic I think the Islamic State has continuously built up its brand and gained the advantage all the way back to its origins with Tawhid wal Jihad as Nada Bakos pointed out in her interview. Al Qaeda central was doing very little after 9/11 while Zarqawi was burning up Iraq and gaining more and more followers. Obviously that wasn't a consistent trajectory as IS was reduced to a small terrorist group by 2012 but has now made a huge comeback.

[OUTLAW 09]

JWing---seems like the ISF have stalled in Tikrit and in Anbar and other than appearing to be building a defensive line around Baghdad and to the north/west/east there is not much happening.

In some aspects this defensive line is in fact a de facto division of Iraq along the Sunni/Kurdish regions.

Also appears that Iran is getting nervous about the split being seen and is trying to verbally impress the Kurds---the Kurds have their own region now and I think in the long term they will be clashing with Iran whose Kurdish population are not that small.Baghdad

(IraqiNews.com) The Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for the Arab-African Affairs Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said on Sunday that the wise Iraqi Kurdish leaders are not thinking about autonomy, adding that certain parties that speak of splitting Iraq, are not aware of the consequences.


"A statement by the Iranian News Agency (IRNA) received by IraqiNews.com quoted Abdollahian, as saying “Iran underlines respecting Iraq’s independence, national sovereignty and solidarity and territorial integrity in line with the country’s Constitution.”

“Wise Iraqi Kurdish leaders do not consider autonomy and adhere to the country’s Constitution, he said,” he added.”

“The remainder of Saddam and Takfiri terrorists will not be allowed to put the Iraqi and regional security at risk,” he concluded.

This last sentence shows me that have bought the Malaki line that is all about the "Baathists/IS" and them seem to be overlooking the serious underlying Sunni grievances with Malaki to led to the uprising.

[Bill Moore]

You are correnct, my apologies.

I am not sure it is dead even in aggressive cases, but I believe aggressive cases require greater attention to what is causing the deeply held convictions that make it an aggressive UW/IW war. Any/all wars amongst the people are fed by something. I would argue that the "something" is a combination of a clearly distinguishable identity that seperates the insurgents from the greater population (or at least the population who controls the power) and a deeply held feeling of injustice. You will have to address one or both of those factors eventually. If you don't, then you just kick the can down the road.

Pop centric has been around for centuries, the terrorist targets the population very publically and the population gets the message, and they cooperate with the terrorist. The idea that ISIS won through a U.S. like pop centric approach is simply wrong headed. By most accounts the ISIS is using pretty severe tactics to coerce the population, while simultaneously some elements are offering a little kindness which most recognize it for what it is.

Pop centric as a strategy in and of itself isn't dead, it never existed in the first place. The population was one aspect of the environment combatants had to manage one way or the other, unfortunately the other way (coercion) tends to work best for rapidly establishing tactical control, and it is very effective at countering the hearts and mind approach, since personal security will normally rank over nice to have items. Still at the end of the day controlling the population through either method is not decisive.

[OUTLAW 09]

It really seems that all members of the current Iraqi Malaki government cannot fathom just why they lost the Sunni triangle or exactly why thye Sunni's rose up against them.

this comment from the Iraqi US Ambassador is just another step in the please, please, please fight for us (when they ask for assistance it really means fighting for them) and this is not the time to demand from Malaki an inclusive government.

We fell for it all the time from 2005 to 2011 and even now US politicians seem to forget we carried the bulk of the fighting in Iraq and we sill got no influence over Malaki---he even ignored our repeated warnings.

So really why now support him---let him figure out whether the fair weather friends of Russia, Iran and Syria in the end keep Iraq together or cause it to split up.

"Faily said that "because of the urgency on the ground," this was the wrong time for Washington to make U.S. support for Iraq dependent on Maliki either stepping down or truly reaching out to Iraq's Sunni and Kurdish minorities."

Note: With the exact reason for the Sunni uprising staring them in the face they still look for a way out to protect the sheer amounts of money they are racking in via corruption, extortion, and bribes---so the Shia are really no different than the funding raising practiced by the IS.

"Sunni leaders in Iraq's heartland are so angry with Maliki that they are backing the brutal ISIS, who they believe is willing to take the fight to the Iraqi leader and his Shiite allies. "Don't condition it," Faily said. "The risk is too immediate. The threat is too important for us to think about conditionality."

Note: Again once the Sunni are put down who really believes Malaki will create an all inclusive government?

Malaki personally simply hates anything Sunni---that is his core belief system so why is he to compromise?

[TheCurmudgeon]

Pop centric has been around for centuries, the terrorist targets the population very publically and the population gets the message, and they cooperate with the terrorist. The idea that ISIS won through a U.S. like pop centric approach is simply wrong headed. By most accounts the ISIS is using pretty severe tactics to coerce the population, while simultaneously some elements are offering a little kindness which most recognize it for what it is.

While I won't disagree on the brutality (at least in our eyes) of ISIS, I believe you are wrong in your assessment that ISIS is not fighting a Pop-centric war. It is exactly what they are fighting. ISIS is not using coercion to control other Sunni groups. They are using the shared identity and the recent history of oppression by the Maliki government to foster an alternative to that government. They are fighting a war of legitimacy, plain and simple. They can win with such small numbers exactly because they do not need coercion to maintain control over the population. Most of the population either supports the idea of separation from the Maliki government or overthrowing it. Either way, ISIS is offering a path to those goals.

As for their repressive tactics, that all depends on who the victims are. If they are primarily Shiites or Sunni collaborators the population will be right behind them, because it is exactly what they want to do. Just like Nazi collaborators after we liberated France and Belgium. It is justice in their eyes. ISIS is setting the world right, getting retribution for prior injustice.


Eventually the Sunni people will have to deal with ISIS and their ultra-conservative religious views, but that time is not now. The truth is ISIS does not have the personnel to enforce that view. They can sing their religious imperatives from the minarets but that is about all for now. The fight is elsewhere. If they succeed in creating a separate Sunni state then the real fight for control will begin. They will need significant numbers for that fight. I am not sure they have them.

If my assessment is right, it means that ISIS has probably hit a wall. They cannot offer legitimacy in Kurdish territory nor can they offer it to the Shiites. They will have to use good ole coercion to win in those places. I will bet that they will not succeed in either place.

[Bill Moore]

I don't see identity politics as population centric insurgency or COIN. It is irregular warfare so it almost goes without saying the combatants will have an identity to rally around. Street gangs also have an identity, as do prison gangs etc., so. Identity is a factor but the decisive element is warfare. Being able to mobilize your base is important whether you're a state or irregular actor, but then you have to employ it, which brings us back to warfare.

It all matters so I'm not discounting your points, but I don't agree they have run out of steam yet, and I definitely don't agree they don't need weapons to defeat their adversaries. The army didn't collapse because the people rose up, there was much more to it than this. Saddam demonstrated tanks and armies are very effective at suppressing popular uprisings. Maliki lost control of his military.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I don't see identity politics as population centric insurgency or COIN. It is irregular warfare so it almost goes without saying the combatants will have an identity to rally around. Street gangs also have an identity, as do prison gangs etc., so. Identity is a factor but the decisive element is warfare. Being able to mobilize your base is important whether you're a state or irregular actor, but then you have to employ it, which brings us back to warfare.

It all matters so I'm not discounting your points, but I don't agree they have run out of steam yet, and I definitely don't agree they don't need weapons to defeat their adversaries. The army didn't collapse because the people rose up, there was much more to it than this. Saddam demonstrated tanks and armies are very effective at suppressing popular uprisings. Maliki lost control of his military.

Fair enough. I can see how these can be seperated.

I don't believe they have run out of steam, I think they have run out of allies. They will not be able to depend on other insurgent or Baathist to help them in other parts of the country. It will not be so easy to take territory against groups that feel Sunni's are not welcome there. They will not be able to hold it without the support of the local population. If they do take territory they will end up fighting an insurgency against their insurgency.

I suppose time will tell, but I think they will have to transition to a more traditional form or war from the revulitionary style they have been fighting. They will not be seen as liberators in the rest of Iraq. They certainly have the moral and the financial resources. I don't think they have the orginizational structure or the logistical capabilities to allow them to take the rest of Iraq.

[JWing]

My latest article "Deaths In Iraq Return To Civil War Levels In June 2014" (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/07/deaths-in-iraq-return-to-civil-war.html). All the major organizations that track Iraqi deaths had June return to figures not seen since 2007 when the civil war was still raging.

[OUTLAW 09]

Iranian SU-25s being flown by possible Quds pilots.

http://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-politics/video-iran-sends-iraq-sukhoi-su-25-jets/

[OUTLAW 09]

Looks like the ethnic regional separation into three regions is already in the minds of the Kurds.

Saw somewhere today a new map redrawn to show the separation of the Kurds/Shia/Sunni/Alewites together with the Christian regions---basically it has redrawn Sykes-Picot as many wanted it years ago.

The most important development, however, was obviously what KRG President Masoud Barzani told the BBC on July 1. Fresh from his rather de-Gaulle-in-Paris tour of the Iraqi city of Kirkuk, which the Kurds consider their “Jerusalem” – and which peshmerga militia wasted no time in seizing and securing following ISIS’s incursion into Mosul last month – Barzani said that Iraq was “effectively partitioned” and that his semiautonomous government planned to hold a referendum on independence within months. “Everything that’s happened recently shows that it’s the right of Kurdistan to achieve independence. From now on, we won’t hide that that’s our goal.”

Read more: https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/554144-554144-the-genies-out-of-the-bottle#ixzz36LR7NMaD

This was also today sent by the Kurds to al Sistani that indicates to me that if al Sistani does not make the right moves over the next few days the Kurds are headed to an independent country thus fulfilling really what the IS wants as a main political goal for the entire ME--the elimination of Sykes-Picot. If Sykes-Picot is removed then AQ is dead and will never recover as it will be viewed as a IS success in "defeating" this "western creation".

Baghdad (IraqiNews.com) The President of Kurdistan, Masoud Barzani sent on Wednesday a message to the Supreme Religious Authority Ayatollah, Ali al-Sistani, over the updates of the Iraqi situation.

Member of Kurdistani Democratic Party, Mahdi Haji, said to IraqiNews.com “The message talked about the threats that target Iraq due to the wrong policies of the Premier, Nouri al-Maliki, who spent 8 year in office without presenting services according to the Kurds’ views.”

“Barzani wanted al-Sistani to be aware that Iraq is facing the danger due to the lack of adherence to the constitutional timings and the accords among the political blocs,” he added.

“At the end of the message, Barzani said that Iraq should be divided into three Sunni, Shiite, Kurdish regions along with a Central Government that adheres to the constitution,” he concluded

[OUTLAW 09]

JWing---it appears that the IS and the Sunni Coalition has apparently moved around the outside of Baghdad in enough of a force to "motivate" the White House to send more "non boots on the ground".

So really what are the current IS and Sunni Coalition numbers on the ground?

"We have seen them reinforce themselves around Baghdad enough to convince us more troops was the prudent thing to do."

[Bill Moore]

Fair enough. I can see how these can be seperated.

I don't believe they have run out of steam, I think they have run out of allies. They will not be able to depend on other insurgent or Baathist to help them in other parts of the country. It will not be so easy to take territory against groups that feel Sunni's are not welcome there. They will not be able to hold it without the support of the local population. If they do take territory they will end up fighting an insurgency against their insurgency.

I suppose time will tell, but I think they will have to transition to a more traditional form or war from the revulitionary style they have been fighting. They will not be seen as liberators in the rest of Iraq. They certainly have the moral and the financial resources. I don't think they have the orginizational structure or the logistical capabilities to allow them to take the rest of Iraq.

Do they desire control of all of Iraq? Seems like the best option for them is to sustain pressure on Bagdad to force a deal to divide Iraq into three states. They can then consolidate their gains. If they keep pushing they'll reach their culminating point.