Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[AmericanPride]

KJ -

According to a speech by President Obama in 2013 (http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120847), the core U.S. interests in the ME are:

o “We will ensure the free flow of energy from the region to the world."

o “We will dismantle terrorist networks that threaten our people."

o "we reject the development of nuclear weapons that could trigger a nuclear arms race in the region, and undermine the global nonproliferation regime"

Secondary interests:

o "we will build the capacity of our partners"

o "respect the sovereignty of nations"

o "work to address the root causes of terror"

In practice, there are many contradictions in U.S. policy in the region as you mentioned. I think one of the major concerns of the Obama administration is becoming roped into another commitment (or the perception of commitment to Iraq). Yes - this is a new phase of the conflict, but the American public does not have a nuanced understanding of the situation; combined with the approaching mid-term election after what continues to be many years of highly bitter partisan politics, there's a heightened sensitive towards these problems.

[Bill Moore]

Certainly an interesting POV and a reminder that ISIS is not new, nor just an extreme form of Islam IMHO:http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/why-does-isis-hate-us-so-much-9664506.html

From the enclose article David kindly posted


despite the SS repeatedly reaffirming at its death camps that "here there is no why", for much of the left there was always a "why".

This underscores much of the debate in SWJ circles. We have those who believe the reason is failed government, economics, etc. Root causes that we can somehow address, and then the world will be all rainbows and unicorns again.

We have others, closer to my school of thought, that often there are no root causes that we can address. We waste our time and money with our various development programs when they're directed to weaken AQ and other extremists.

The left hates to hear this, but sometimes it really does come down to killing those who are trying to kill you. Alternative approaches against sadistic killers have failed us repeatedly. To those who say we can't shoot our way out of this, I offer that the collective we can and we must. BUT, and this is an important but, we must do so in a discriminate manner, and in a way that doesn't mobilize the neutrals to turn against us. The extremists are a greater threat to the majority of Muslims than they are to us, so calls to go war with Islam are frankly unethical and misguided. However, aggressively pursuing and eliminating ISIS is a necessity if value our security and way of life. In Iraq they have formed an Army, if they choose to fight us semi-symmetrically they will make our work that much easier.

These thoughts are directed towards AQ, those who embraced Al-Qaedaism, and their associates and affiliates. Those the author would call fascists. The above is not an approach to deal with insurgents that have valid political issues they're trying to fix.


But let us be clear: the "root cause" of fascism (and what Isis is practicing us clerical fascism) is an absolute rejection of a plural and democratic society. It is our existence, rather than the subtleties of how we behave, that is intolerable to Isis, hence current attempts to exterminate "un-Islamic" religious minorities in Iraq – a genocide-in the making thankfully being thwarted by the United States.

[JWing]

Outlaw

Haven't seen any numbers on how many insurgent forces were deployed in Sinjar but would not be surprised if it was just a few hundred. They have not been using more than that in any of their other ops of this size.

There are still on going ops in northern Babil which continue to fail. The 9th sec op of this year was started in Jurf al-Sakhr in mid-July. 1 day after it was finished and everyone claimed success Babil prov council official said IS had moved right back in. Around 3 days later the 10th sec op started, which is still on-going. Fighting in Diyala is actually pretty low level.

With all the press getting caught up on the attacks upon Sinjar & the Yazidis the insurgents main thrust was actually in Salahaddin which had the most casualties in the first week of August.

Finally Mosul Dam which was under Pesh protection is still under IS control. Was a report that it has asked the workers there to continue with their work and that they'll be paid. Even brought in some engineers from Syria to help!

[JWing]

Bill

I think of the Surge strategy of those you can reconcile with and those that you can't. IS is one of the latter and you have to kill them. At the same time there are plenty of Sunnis and some insurgent groups that you can turn and those are the ones that you need to reach out to with political reconciliation, development projects, etc. That can also hopefully turn away more people from joining IS. I don't think it's an either or.

[JWing]

Here's a link to my latest article (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/08/origins-of-iraqs-ethnosectarian-quota.html) on the origins of the ethnosectarian quota system in Iraq. The country is going through a political as well as a security crisis right now. A new candidate for premier has been named Haider Abadi from Dawa/State of Law and many are wondering how much different or the same he will be from Maliki. That ignores the large structural barriers that the Iraqi govt faces one of which is the ethnosectarian quotas which divide up the govt not by competence but by loyalty to parties. Many blame the U.S. and specifically the CPA for creating these quotas, but their origins are actually with the anti-Saddam opposition movement in the 1990s that created this system.

[KingJaja]

From the enclose article David kindly posted



This underscores much of the debate in SWJ circles. We have those who believe the reason is failed government, economics, etc. Root causes that we can somehow address, and then the world will be all rainbows and unicorns again.

We have others, closer to my school of thought, that often there are no root causes that we can address. We waste our time and money with our various development programs when they're directed to weaken AQ and other extremists.


In Nigeria, where I come from, Western analysts are all over the place about Boko Haram & how poverty and alienation are its root causes - but when you ask them about local Christians who are even poorer and more alienated (because the power structures the British left behind empowered the Muslims in Northern Nigeria) - they are blank.

I suspect Iraqi Christians and Yazidis would feel the same way as African Christians about the way the Western academic elite has chosen to explain away violent Islamism.

In the Middle East, the West can comfortably ignore religious minorities as they aren't likely ever have any political power (all US presidents do so; whether Republican or Democrat). In Africa, the Christians aren't likely to be politically insignificant, but as far as the West is concerned, Africa is a strategic backwater.

So the liberal narrative of Islamist terrorism is likely to persist - as these movements will never be an existential threat to the West like Hitler & Nazis.

[JWing]

Outlaw

Totally forgot IS did launch an operation in Diyala and captured Jalawla from the Pesh. They are launching counter attacks to try to re-take it.

Should also be mentioned that Syrian Turkish and Iranian Kurdish militias are all now involved or were in the fighting in Ninewa.

[KingJaja]

Here's a link to my latest article (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/08/origins-of-iraqs-ethnosectarian-quota.html) on the origins of the ethnosectarian quota system in Iraq. The country is going through a political as well as a security crisis right now. A new candidate for premier has been named Haider Abadi from Dawa/State of Law and many are wondering how much different or the same he will be from Maliki. That ignores the large structural barriers that the Iraqi govt faces one of which is the ethnosectarian quotas which divide up the govt not by competence but by loyalty to parties. Many blame the U.S. and specifically the CPA for creating these quotas, but their origins are actually with the anti-Saddam opposition movement in the 1990s that created this system.

Thank you very much for your wonderful article, but if you overlay ancient societies with a very recent artificial state - this is what you get, no "ifs", no "buts".

A nation is like a family, you cannot just group random people, insist they adopt a common flag & anthem - and then expect them to behave like a nation. That is the problem with a lot of the "nations" that were created post WW2 (after the fall of European empires).

Iraq's fundamental problem is this; it is not a nation. Saddam could have held it together by extreme violence (or another dictator could), but absent that, there was never going to be a basis for nationhood. Shias were smarting under decades of oppression by Sunnis and Sunnis weren't going to take lightly to their diminished status. Kurds had a long-term project - and it wasn't Iraq, it was an independent Kurdish state.

This kind of ethno-sectarianism isn't limited to the Middle-east - it is one of Africa's primary problems - a consequence of poorly thought out "states". You'll see how Boko Haram (and other Sahelian terror groups) bring out the same ethno-sectarian tensions you noticed in Iraq to the open - keep tuned.

Let me add that the great advantage the Far East had over Africa and the Middle East is this - colonial borders coincided more or less with ancient/related societies - there was a historical continuum, not a "disjunction" - not the kind of "cut and join" states one sees in the Middle East/Africa - for example; the Vietnamese had a strong identity, the French didn't create a "Vietnamese identity".

[Bill Moore]

Bill

I think of the Surge strategy of those you can reconcile with and those that you can't. IS is one of the latter and you have to kill them. At the same time there are plenty of Sunnis and some insurgent groups that you can turn and those are the ones that you need to reach out to with political reconciliation, development projects, etc. That can also hopefully turn away more people from joining IS. I don't think it's an either or.

Of course it is, but we fail to pursue killing IS with an adequate level of aggression due to the points KingJaja brings up. Maybe more appropriately borrowing a phrase from a friend of mine, it is "strategic miscalculation" on our part.

Begin with the end in mind, that is a condition we want after we destroy IS, and that requires political engagement before, during, and after the fight. However, it doesn't mean sidelining the fighting effort and making it secondary to economic development when the adversary hasn't been defeated, which has been our default position.

The liberals and neocons have beautiful theories, but theories that tend to fall apart rapidly when they confront reality.

[davidbfpo]

Well The Guardian is now reporting "boots on the ground" on Mount Sinjar, for humanitarian purposes, both US & UK SOF:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/13/us-ground-troops-direct-role-evacuate-yazidis-iraq

I knew Sinjar refered to seized AQ Iraq records, not this - which explains some of the recent aerial activity:
The US ran a military and intelligence base on a now disused airfield at the top of Mount Sinjar for much of the Iraq war and the terrain of the rugged 45 mile ridgeline is well known to special operations units.

[AmericanPride]

This underscores much of the debate in SWJ circles. We have those who believe the reason is failed government, economics, etc. Root causes that we can somehow address, and then the world will be all rainbows and unicorns again.

I'm in this school of thought. But I also believe this:


sometimes it really does come down to killing those who are trying to kill you.

There are definitely problems beyond our capabilities (whether in type, scope, or scale) to solve. And frankly, violence is a legitimate tool of state policy, even within the measured and sometimes narrow parameters we have established for ourselves in the West. I do not look favorably upon the last Iraq war, but I think it's important from a strategy perspective to recognize that situations are dynamic and the status quo is always changing. It may not be politically appealing to re-commit to Iraq's internal security but that does not mean it has not become necessary given current conditions.

This is one of the legacies of the War on Terrorism, and it's not something that can be ignored.

[JMA]

In Nigeria, where I come from, Western analysts are all over the place about Boko Haram & how poverty and alienation are its root causes - but when you ask them about local Christians who are even poorer and more alienated (because the power structures the British left behind empowered the Muslims in Northern Nigeria) - they are blank.

Good you raise this. Prevalent in the NGO community are the preconceived ideas expats arrive in Africa with. They then go on to screw things up further as they control how and where the money is spent. Many NGOs - certainly the Brit ones - have a far left ideology and use their projects to push their agenda rather than empower the people in the areas they work. It is also true that some of the NGO workers are smart enough to see where they are going wrong but are powerless and are swept along by the ideological aims of their organisation. Most don't care as they live a lifestyle they could not dream of back at home and just go with the flow.

In the military it is much the same, as at a point officers commit to a career and subordinate their intellect to doing what they are told regardless of how ridiculous it may be. In the US this was seen in Vietnam and now again in Afghanistan. A military - with its weapons - operating off-track causes more devastation than all the misguided NGOs together.

I certainly don't forgive the NGOs or foreign militaries that have contributed to screwing Africa up to the extent it is... but the world hears no solutions coming out of Africa itself. Even yourself... much criticism but no solutions offered.

All we get coming out of the recent African leaders summit is this crap:

African leaders vote to give themselves immunity from war crimes prosecutions (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/10940047/African-leaders-vote-to-give-themselves-immunity-from-war-crimes-prosecutions.html)

This group includes the Arab states in North Africa and together make "Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves" look like choir boys.

[JWing]

1st week of August turned out to be the deadliest week in Iraq of 2014. Over 1800 casualties. Insurgents launched offensives in Sinjar west of Mosul and in Qaraqosh area to the east in Ninewa, took Jalawla in eastern Diyala as well. Both situations were only stabilized with the arrival of Kurdish forces from Syria, Turkey and Iran. If not for them the peshmerga might have broken like the ISF did before. Insurgents also laid siege to Haditha, Anbar in attempt to take dam there. In Baghdad IS launched latest car bomb wave as militias continued to kidnap, kill and dump bodies of their victims. Babil ISF launched 10th sec op of the year to clear northern section and will probably fail again. Week showed that two months after the fall of Mosul militants still hold the initiative and are choosing the time and place for engagements in Iraq. Baghdad and Irbil completely on the defensive. Here's a link to my article (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/08/first-week-of-august-deadliest-of-2014.html) with extensive charts and figures.

[davidbfpo]

SWJ has id'd a Bing West article:http://www.nationalreview.com/article/385369/how-defeat-isil-bing-west

As I posted on SWJ there is something wrong with his advocacy:
'Muslim ground forces to push the Islamists out of Iraq and Syria' and 'Muslim leaders have failed their people'.

I have read Bing's article twice and wondered whether these two passages negate his whole argument. Which Muslim armies are ready for such a campaign today or tomorrow? Not one I would contend, nor in an alliance of the willing. Then he assumes the very same failed leaders will act. There are few leaders in the local, Arabic-speaking Muslim world who answer to their people


Then there are the "two ladies speaking truth unto power", an article by two ex-USG (CIA) analysts in 'What the U.S. can realistically do in Iraq':http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/14/opinion/bakos-maller-u-s-options-in-iraq-crisis/


The debate generally ignores a key underlying fact: The United States no longer has the ability or the will to shape the outcome in Iraq to the degree that American policy makers would like.

[davidbfpo]

Shashank Joshi, of RUSI, has another article 'Where does the Islamic State's fetish with beheading people come from?':http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/shashankjoshi/100283197/why-are-islamic-state-militants-beheading-people/

He tries to answer this:
What, though, is the purpose of such brutality? The jihadists of the Islamic State (IS) are not, after all, nihilists. .....they are a highly professional military force, more similar to an army than insurgents, and seek a well-administered Islamic state. So why engage in beheadings and crucifixions? (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10933851/Isis-crucifies-nine-people-in-Syrian-villages.html)

First, psychological warfare is a key part of IS’s military strategy.

Second, IS understands that Western governments are, to some extent, dissuaded by the prospect of a British or American soldier meeting with a similar fate.

Third, terrorism is a form of propaganda by the deed. And the more chilling the deed, the more impactful the propaganda.

Now this is unexpected - well for me:
The first is that it can induce your enemies to fight even harder, because surrendering is such an awful option. One academic study shows that (http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=4DirOe72cf0C&pg=PA68&lpg=PA68&dq=%22The+Wehrmacht%E2%80%99s+policy+of+treating+S oviet+POWs+brutally+also+undercut+German+military+ effectiveness+on+the+Eastern+front%22&source=bl&ots=Vo2gbRVOq1&sig=BMb20_dXi1bjoN8mCNLVkhx6xHc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=3rvsU5-WJoHTObzMgYgC&redir_esc=y) “the Wehrmacht’s policy of treating Soviet POWs brutally undercut German military effectiveness on the Eastern front”. Moreover, the Soviets’ own relative brutality to Germans meant that German soldiers fought harder in Russia than in Normandy. The lesson? IS can make its enemies flee, but it would be a foolish Iraqi unit that surrendered – and the net effect is that IS has to fight all the harder.

[Dayuhan]

Looks like Maliki is finally out:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/14/iraqi-prime-minister-maliki-step-aside-abadi

Two questions:

The new guy is a designated successor from the same party; will there be any appreciable difference?

Will the US and Europe be more willing to provide help against ISIS with Maliki gone, or will they press for concrete steps toward the mantra of "inclusive" first?

Bonus hypothetical question:

If the US had jumped straight in against ISIS, would Maliki have agreed to step down?

[carl]

Shashank Joshi, of RUSI, has another article 'Where does the Islamic State's fetish with beheading people come from?':http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/shashankjoshi/100283197/why-are-islamic-state-militants-beheading-people/

He tries to answer this:

Now this is unexpected - well for me:

Don't forget the simple. It's fun, especially for aggressive 20 somethings released from all forms of social and cultural restraint because Allah told them it is ok.

And if I remember what I've read on MahdiWatch correctly, there are parts of the Koran and various other works that set precedent.

This isn't the first time Brits, Yanks and Anzacs have run into this. The Japanese were quite fond of beheading people too.

[KingJaja]

Shashank Joshi, of RUSI, has another article 'Where does the Islamic State's fetish with beheading people come from?':http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/shashankjoshi/100283197/why-are-islamic-state-militants-beheading-people/

He tries to answer this:

Now this is unexpected - well for me:

Don't see how it differs from accounts of King David in the Old Testament or even Cortes in Mexico.

They are following "the book to the letter" - and remember it was only after several centuries of horrible violence that Western Christianity was rid of that sort of stuff.

[Dayuhan]

They are following "the book to the letter" - and remember it was only after several centuries of horrible violence that Western Christianity was rid of that sort of stuff.

They also tend to follow only the parts of the book that support what they choose to do, often ignoring other parts of the book in the process.

Humans have the capacity for very great cruelty, especially when in the grip of absolute belief, whether religious or political. The nature of the belief is less a factor than the extent: when people believe without question, trouble follows.

[SWJ Blog]

ISIS: Public Legitimacy Through the Reenactment of Islam’s Early History (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/isis-public-legitimacy-through-the-reenactment-of-islam%E2%80%99s-early-history)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/isis-public-legitimacy-through-the-reenactment-of-islam%E2%80%99s-early-history) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[KingJaja]

They also tend to follow only the parts of the book that support what they choose to do, often ignoring other parts of the book in the process.

Humans have the capacity for very great cruelty, especially when in the grip of absolute belief, whether religious or political. The nature of the belief is less a factor than the extent: when people believe without question, trouble follows.

But if Islam, not Evangelical Christianity had taken root in Rio's favelas - Brazil would have been a lot different today.

[OUTLAW 09]

Outlaw

Totally forgot IS did launch an operation in Diyala and captured Jalawla from the Pesh. They are launching counter attacks to try to re-take it.

Should also be mentioned that Syrian Turkish and Iranian Kurdish militias are all now involved or were in the fighting in Ninewa.

Joel---had seen that---the Pesh lost 170 KIA and over 500 WIA--Jalawla is an interesting Pesh lost as they controlled this through out the entire US period in Iraq and drove out virtually all Sunni opposition during that period.

PKK is having from what I am hearing an equally tough time of it but on the whole are fighting equally well as IS is--that is an interesting development as it indicates they learned a lot in their Turkish Army fighting days and their internal fights with other Kurdish groups.

Since the Syrain Kurds have entered the fight ---just wondering when IS will apply pressure on the Syrian Kurdish front to relieve the pressure in Iraq.

[OUTLAW 09]

An interesting article on IS written just before Malaki was pushed out---the conclusion paragraphs are interesting and go to what Bill M was mentioning---it must take a full fledged ground war to push out IS but by the current actors on the ground and that appears to not be the case in the coming months.

Some interesting comments on the IS and how it is governing in areas taken over that seems to clash with the standard media take that they are all crazies and brutal.

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-08-12/isis-and-coming-escalation-iraq?page=2

ISIS has attracted an entire generation of radicalized Sunni militants to the region. If one watches interviews with their enemies such as e.g. Peshmerga fighters, one topic that is occasionally mentioned is that they don't seem to fear death much. Combined with their well-known brutality, this undoubteldy makes them a formidable fighting force. However, there is evidently far more to ISIS than that.

In this context, we recommend watching the Vice News report on ISIS filmed in Raqqa, the current capital of the “caliphate”. One impression one comes away with is that ISIS is quite careful not to alienate the population too much, in spite of strictly enforcing the sharia. Along similar lines, since ISIS is running Mosul, a number of Sunnis that have initially fled have returned to the city – which for the first time in an eternity has electricity around the clock. ISIS is a bit like Hitler in that way: it is so to speak making the trains run on time, while mercilessly killing large numbers of its perceived enemies and assorted “apostates” at the same time. The group also runs what appears to be a highly effective propaganda campaign – not only via electronic media, but also on the ground in the areas it conquers (its recruitment drive in Iraq is flourishing).

The Islamic State even has something like a national anthem by now, a jihadist anasheed (a piece of Islamic a capella music with very light or no instrumentation) – “Ummaty Qad Laha Farujn” (My Ummah, Dawn Has Appeared) – which actually sounds quite interesting (never mind the martial lyrics). In fact, the music is probably the only good thing to come from ISIS so far:

The ISIS “anthem” Ummaty Qad Laha Farujn – an interesting sounding a capella piece in the anasheed style

All of the above suggests that it will be exceedingly difficult to effectively destroy ISIS. One method of countering it would in theory be the strategy that has already been successfully employed in almost defeating its predecessor organization AQI (“Al Qaeda in Iraq”). This mainly involved alienating AQI from its local support base. A guerrilla force cannot persist unless it has the support of the local population. However, it seems uncertain whether the same strategy can be used with success again. For one thing, Maliki's suppression of the Sunnis has made ISIS the lesser evil in the eyes of many locals. For another thing, the organization has evolved a great deal and is highly unlikely to repeat AQI's mistakes.

It seems to us that if the goals the president has announced in recent days are to be achieved, nothing short of a full-scale invasion of Iraq (as well as of Syria for good measure) is likely to suffice – and even then, success is by no means guaranteed. Another possibility – a remote one at this stage, but it cannot be ruled out just yet – is that the regional forces arrayed against ISIS actually get their act together for a change.

[OUTLAW 09]

They also tend to follow only the parts of the book that support what they choose to do, often ignoring other parts of the book in the process.

Humans have the capacity for very great cruelty, especially when in the grip of absolute belief, whether religious or political. The nature of the belief is less a factor than the extent: when people believe without question, trouble follows.

Dayuhan--this is the core problem when trying to understand Salafists and or Takfirists vs say the secular Islamists or say the "pure" Islamists.

They all read the same Koran and Sunnahs etc---it is just in how they interpret it. Go to five different mosques on Friday prayers and you will get five different lectures and interpretations---all quoting the Koran, or the Sunnahs and or Hadiths.

Much like Christian fundamentalists vs say secular Christians.

It is just how one interprets the words--they all tend to read the same paragraphs ---they definitely do not pick and choose their paragraphs.

[JWing]

Dayuhan

The last two premiers were both from Dawa Maliki and Jaafari yet could not be more different in terms of leadership. Jaafari didn't consider Iraq in crisis just as the civil war was taking off. He talked people to death about philosophy. For example one time he went to Washington to meet with Bush and instead of talking about the problems going on in his country he went on and on about how much he loved Thomas Jefferson. The general consensus was that Jaafari was a horrible leader who did nothing while Iraq started to burn. Maliki was completely different. Many thought he tried to do too much and centralized too much power in his own hands and was divisive. Who knows what Abadi will be like but just because he comes from Dawa does not mean he will be like Maliki as the Jaafari example shows.

[JWing]

I cannot recommend enough the writings of Fanar Haddad to understand sectarianism in Iraq. Here's one of his new articles "Secular Sectarians"

http://www.mei.edu/content/map/secular-sectarians

Sectarianism in Iraq and the Middle East is not so much about dogma or religious orthodoxy but control of the state and involve ideas about class and regionalism.

[jcustis]

It seems to us that if the goals the president has announced in recent days are to be achieved, nothing short of a full-scale invasion of Iraq (as well as of Syria for good measure) is likely to suffice – and even then, success is by no means guaranteed. Another possibility – a remote one at this stage, but it cannot be ruled out just yet – is that the regional forces arrayed against ISIS actually get their act together for a change.

I'd be very surprised if even that sufficed. If allowed safe haven in an under-governed neighboring state (or a Syria that cannot be completely secured), I think the model that could be applied to the immediate future of ISIS is the Taliban of the '01-'04 era; dispersed but still a simmering and significant problem.

[JWing]

tomorrow's Times of London will report that US will start bombing in and around Baghdad province

[OUTLAW 09]

tomorrow's Times of London will report that US will start bombing in and around Baghdad province

Joel---so we have a lightly meaning rather low number of fighters forcing a northern front fight ---we have the Shia and Shia militia in a layered defense (actually in a circle) of Samarra/Salalladin, and nothing really much going on in Buqubah/Diyala and silence in and around Baghdad.

The dam still under their control and the IS pushing into more towns--and oil fields.

So we see the good ole whip lash strategy used against us being used against the ISF with the same effective.

So what does it tell us about the IS strategy that is not being talked about?

And that does not include the slow but steady push back of recent gains made by the Assad army.

[SWJ Blog]

ISIS Is Paying Attention To What Experts Are Saying About Them (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/isis-is-paying-attention-to-what-experts-are-saying-about-them)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/isis-is-paying-attention-to-what-experts-are-saying-about-them) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[JWing]

My latest report on the security situation in Iraq for the 2nd week of June. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/08/attacks-down-but-casualties-remain-high.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

Joel--have you seen the reporting that Iran has moved a number of armor units and troops to the border crossing points to Iraq?

[OUTLAW 09]

The Russian take on the IS--IS a US covert intel operation.

From the Russian news agency RIA:

http://en.ria.ru/politics/20140813/191982447/Islamic-State-Is-US-Covert-Intelligence-Operation---Law.html

[KingJaja]

How significant is this?

It might not be significant to Christian communities in the West, but I'm wondering about its impact on Christian communities in say, Africa - if the Pope adopts this kind of stance more often in the future.

My native Nigeria comes to mind.


Pope Francis on Monday said efforts to stop Islamic militants from attacking religious minorities in Iraq are legitimate but said the international community — and not just one country — should decide how to intervene.

Francis was asked if he approved of the unilateral U.S. airstrikes on militants of the Islamic State group, who have captured swaths of northern and western Iraq and northeastern Syria and have forced minority Christians and others to either convert to Islam or flee their homes.

"In these cases, where there is an unjust aggression, I can only say that it is licit to stop the unjust aggressor," Francis said. "I underscore the verb 'stop.' I'm not saying 'bomb' or 'make war,' just 'stop.' And the means that can be used to stop them must be evaluated."

Francis also said he and his advisers were considering whether he might go to northern Iraq himself to show solidarity with persecuted Christians. But he said he was holding off for now on a decision.

The pope's comments were significant because the Vatican has vehemently opposed any military intervention in recent years. Pope Paul VI famously uttered the words "War never again, never again war" at the United Nations in 1965 as the Vietnam War raged, a refrain that has been repeated by every pope since. St. John Paul II actively tried to head off the Iraq war on the grounds that a "preventive" war couldn't be justified. He repeatedly called for negotiations to resolve the crisis over Iraq's invasion of Kuwait a decade prior.

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/pope-oks-protecting-iraq-minorities-25024475

[OUTLAW 09]

I had mentioned several times that the IS is not the AQ and had up to and until they were attacked by US bombers and drones not uttered a single aggressive word against the US.

By attacking them in an open and aggressive way we have now unlocked a far greater threat than AQ was ever to us---why---these guys have literally now a world wide pull for young fighters that AQ never did nor could get thus the single one off attack in 9/11 which succeeded due to intel failures of the US and the lack of airline companies willing to pay for 3K USD security doors.

And these young fighters travel legally with valid passports and most are not known to the various national intelligence agencies.

We now see that even Obama realizes in statements that the GWOT that he wanted to get an exit ramp on has now cost us another ten years of confrontations and will in the end still have the same outcome for Iraq as the core issues are not being addressed.

It is the core issue of the resolution of the Sunni Shia clash, and the clash of the regional hegomones Iran and the KSA with a rising hegemon Turkey.

Not to say the issue with a new Kurdish state that even the EU has stated they do not want to occur.

[Dayuhan]

It is the core issue of the resolution of the Sunni Shia clash, and the clash of the regional hegomones Iran and the KSA with a rising hegemon Turkey.

These are indeed core issues, but they aren't issues that the US, or anyone else, is going to resolve any time soon. The Sunni/Shi'a or Saudi/Iran clash has been going on a long time, and is likely to go on a whole lot longer: both sides are going to snipe at each other directly and fight with each other by proxy for a long time, with neither able to win and neither likely to accept a negotiated solution. Does the US really need to take sides in that dispute, or to get involved in it?


Not to say the issue with a new Kurdish state that even the EU has stated they do not want to occur.

That's going to be a problem, because the only way to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish state is to keep Iraq together as a coherent nation. Is anyone willing to commit to that objective, and is anyone likely to achieve it? I certainly don't think it's a suitable objective for the US.

[OUTLAW 09]

These are indeed core issues, but they aren't issues that the US, or anyone else, is going to resolve any time soon. The Sunni/Shi'a or Saudi/Iran clash has been going on a long time, and is likely to go on a whole lot longer: both sides are going to snipe at each other directly and fight with each other by proxy for a long time, with neither able to win and neither likely to accept a negotiated solution. Does the US really need to take sides in that dispute, or to get involved in it?



That's going to be a problem, because the only way to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish state is to keep Iraq together as a coherent nation. Is anyone willing to commit to that objective, and is anyone likely to achieve it? I certainly don't think it's a suitable objective for the US.

Totally correct assumptions.

What is going on in Iraq and Syria--let them settle it and offer as far as possible humanitarian aid and advice and consultations towards and end state---it is just the US does not know what the end state is going to be so it should sit tight and wait---the populations on the ground will work it out.

The hegemons Iran, KSA and Turkey although Turkey is still viewed as the Ottomann empire will need in the end to figure it out which they will and as they do so will the Sunni/Shia problem be resolved.

[OUTLAW 09]

Even the Germans are taken notice of the IS battlefield tactics speed coupled with the aggressiveness of swarm attacks, and we supposedly did not see this development in Iraq starting late 2005?

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/islamischer-staat-die-kriegstaktik-der-is-a-986826.html

[davidbfpo]

Richard Barrett, ex-SIS (MI6) and UN, has been interviewed and is scathing about intervention in Iraq / Syria. I have cited him at length, editing out gaps in the article:http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/08/18/richard-barrett_n_5688484.html?1408440934&utm_hp_ref=uk


....does rather play to the [jihadist] narrative that these bad regimes are being supported by outside powers and, therefore, if you get too close to overthrowing them, the outside powers will come and beat you up.

The people who were "going to fight [Bashar Al] Assad or [former Iraqi prime minister Nouri Al] Maliki are now seeing a broader enemy" in the form of the US and UK governments. "The argument that they could also achieve the same [result] by [conducting] terrorist attacks in Western countries becomes stronger [though] not necessarily inevitable.


If ISIS pull back from Mosul, as a result of air strikes, they're not going to disappear, they'll still be out there...Their justification will be: 'If it hadn't been for air strikes we would be fine, establishing our caliphate .. Why did you mess with us? Now we'll mess with you.


([I]Citing Libya) military intervention without a proper plan to follow up had all sorts of unintended consequences and led to chaos and instability"


He also noted how Cameron has conceded that the struggle against Islamic State and other jihadist groups is ultimately a fight within the Muslim-majority world, between moderates and extremists, but asked: "If that's the case then what are we doing there? Where are the Saudi aircraft? There's a disconnect between what [Cameron's] saying and what's he's doing.


You start with some air strikes then you have a few more, then we need people down there to tell us where targets are [so] we put special forces in, then they're in a pickle and they need force protection, before you know it, we're drawn down this road that has no obvious ending..



Military action, said Barrett, should always be a last resort and isn't the "tool that is going to solve the [Islamic State] problem. Look at Libya, look at Afghanistan, look at Iraq in 2003. It's just reaching for a hammer because it is a hammer and it's to hand."

[JWing]

Outlaw there was a report in a Kurdish paper that the PUK called in Iranian advisers to help it with Jalawla, Diyala. Another story had Iranian mobilization along the border as well.

[JWing]

My latest article on the Shiite militia mobilization in Iraq. Actually started in 2013 in response to renewed insurgency. By Jan 2014 many were pulling their men out of Syria and redeploying them to Iraq. April was major recruitment and Syrian militias started working in Iraq. With the exception of the Sadrists this was all aided and organized by Iran. Shows weakness of Iraqi state which could not protect its citizens, now has Iran running part of its security file, and will not be able to diminish the militias when all is said and done because they have integrated more into government. Also leading to renewed sectarian killings, which Baghdad has said/done nothing about. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/08/militia-mobilization-in-iraq-started-in.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

Interesting article on the IS referencing views of US intel.


http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/08/18/iraq_isis_terror_obama_us_intelligence_islamic_sta te

[jcustis]

James Foley's beheading was different that anything I've seen before in the barbarism used by jihadists to strike home fear.

The open-air murders of kneeling, bound Iraqi civilians and soldiers dates back to 2003, and they follow a common theme that many of us with access to the raw footage have seen before.

Yesterday was very different, and Foley's captors seem to have taken some lengths to achieve a specific impact, based on several things the video shows.

First, they deliberately shaved his head, and have likely kept it shaved for some time. Considering the wooly-haired appearance of most IS fighter's
Foley's bare scalp showed something else. Perhaps they were trying to message frailty and weakness.

Second, the choice of a barren landscape seems chosen to evoke an image of the purity and strength of IS, as well as its dominating power even though it is being exerted over an unarmed man. As I watched the video, I truly felt as if I was right there watching events transpire. There was no clutter, no other IS knuckleheads in the frame touting rifles and wearing the paraphernalia of jihad. There was one masked murderer and one captive. pure black and pure orange. One lone knife.

The breeze blew at their garments, and the images took me back to every day spent underneath merciless suns in Iraq and Afghanistan. I felt my palms begin to sweat.

It was murder, plain and simple, and I felt so sad for Foley's family, friends and co-workers who have held on to hope that he is alive, only to know he suffered an unimaginable death as a pawn in a larger conflict.

This one seemed markedly different.

[JWing]

Yesterday I wrote about the Shiite militia mobilization in Iraq in response to the insurgency, most of which is being directed by Iran. Today I go into the Iranian mobilization which has included advisers, weapons deliveries, bringing in Lebanese Hezbollah advisers, and involves running some of the security portfolio for Baghdad. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/08/iranian-mobilization-in-iraq-in-face-of.html).

[JWing]

Think IS is trying to provoke US into more air strikes which it will use as part of its propaganda that it is the Caliphate standing up to the far enemy.

[davidbfpo]

Here in the UK much ink has been spilt, with a rather hurried political response and some frankly strange US reporters filing reports (WaPo & NYT).

I am unsure what ISIS sought from this murder. It certainly has gained them an ever larger audience in the West, a barbaric intention yes and as Joel suggests seeks a reaction from the USA - with more air strikes.

Having Mr Foley in an orange overall was clever, G-Bay reminder and he was our prisoner.

[KingJaja]

The West keeps creating & reacting to situations in the Islamic World - but the outcome is almost always beyond its control.

Opportunists take advantage of the chaos - we've seen this is Iraq, Libya & only God knows what will happen in Afghanistan.

These people still see a Medieval World - of Christendom against the Muslim Ummah. The West persists in believing that this is not so, but that isn't how these people view reality.

Will non-Western Christians evolve into a political force if they feel threatened by growing Jihadism in the Sahel? Time will tell - but they are more likely to see confrontation with Islam as medieval struggle (ala Charles Martell) than Western academics.

Please note: non-Western Christians are not unaware of the plight of Christians in Iraq.

The IS shouldn't be underestimated. This is a much more dangerous organisation and idea, than Al Qaeda.

I know this might sound ludicrous in 2014 - but an all out religious war between Muslims & Christians could happen in a decade over large parts of Africa - that is why this IS threat has to be dealt with.

[ganulv]

Will non-Western Christians evolve into a political force if they feel threatened by growing Jihadism in the Sahel? Time will tell - but they are more likely to see confrontation with Islam as medieval struggle (ala Charles Martell) than Western academics.

[…]

I know this might sound ludicrous in 2014 - but an all out religious war between Muslims & Christians could happen in a decade over large parts of Africa - that is why this IS threat has to be dealt with.

Organizing conflict around religious identity doesn’t sound ludicrous at all. And, yeah, there has been a growth over the past decade of those seeking to reestablish the caliphate. But do you seriously think we’re about to see a transnational Crusades-type conflict in the next ten years? How would any attempt to make that happen not get splintered by nationalist and/or more local and/or ethnic identity issues?

I’m not saying that the members of the self-proclaimed Islamic State are not murderous bastards or anything, but even calling them the IS is giving them too much political credit. They need to be taken dead seriously, but there’s a certain Yellow Peril reactionaryism to a lot of the chatter about them.

[KingJaja]

Organizing conflict around religious identity doesn’t sound ludicrous at all. And, yeah, there has been a growth over the past decade of those seeking to reestablish the caliphate. But do you seriously think we’re about to see a transnational Crusades-type conflict in the next ten years? How would any attempt to make that happen not get splintered by nationalist and/or more local and/or ethnic identity issues?

I’m not saying that the members of the self-proclaimed Islamic State are not murderous bastards or anything, but even calling them the IS is giving them too much political credit. They need to be taken dead seriously, but there’s a certain Yellow Peril reactionaryism to a lot of the chatter about them.

I don't know, but political rhetoric in quite of few key nations could lead to serious trouble. The fault lines already exist.

[Bill Moore]

In Jomini's book, "The Art of War" he addresses this in the section in article VII of his book, titled "War of Opinion."

Jomini thinks along the line of Bob's World, when he states ,


religion is the pretext to obtain political power, and the war is not really one of the dogmas. The successors of Mohammed cared more to extend their empire than to preach the Koran,

He then accused the crusaders of thinking more of expanding trade than spreading Christianity.

Final quote


The dogma sometimes is not only a pretext, but is a powerful ally; for it excites the ardor of the people, and also creates a party.

Regardless, we have a security problem on our hands that is expanding. It is unlikely we will be able to address the root political, social, and economic causes of which I'm sure there are many, so our focus IMO is reducing the threat through military action in ways that mitigate further agitating the underlying phenomena that motivates this behavior. No one said it would be easy, but ignoring the problem because we can't address root causes in my view is a dangerous cop out.

[OUTLAW 09]

In Jomini's book, "The Art of War" he addresses this in the section in article VII of his book, titled "War of Opinion."

Jomini thinks along the line of Bob's World, when he states ,



He then accused the crusaders of thinking more of expanding trade than spreading Christianity.

Final quote



Regardless, we have a security problem on our hands that is expanding. It is unlikely we will be able to address the root political, social, and economic causes of which I'm sure there are many, so our focus IMO is reducing the threat through military action in ways that mitigate further agitating the underlying phenomena that motivates this behavior. No one said it would be easy, but ignoring the problem because we can't address root causes in my view is a dangerous cop out.

Bill---you are now starting to see what I comment often about the Iraqi Sunni side--meaning when one fully understands what one is truly seeing then and only then can one move forward---we the US military never did fully understand what we were seeing.

jcurtis's comments are great---why because he fully saw the impact of the video--that is what they want--this group under Baghdadi is far more troubling because he is a thinking adapting and intelligent Amir--spiritual leader, a solid field commander and a great tactician.

That is why I keep going back and asking---what did we miss in Abu G and Bucca---it was there in 2005-2009 to see why did we the IC not see it and still do not see it?

It is also why I warned here to not start a bombing campaign as it would and has caused exactly what I anticipated would happen---they are far different than AQ---they can and will strike Americans--as single targets as that is the COG for the US=--not attacks on the homeland not attacks on towers--but a steady attack against Americans walking do the streets of Helsinki, Berlin, Hong Kong---literally anywhere in the world and no amount of CIA/DIA/NSA/DHS can hinder that. We are so easy to read thus the taking of US hostages long before they crossed the border into Iraq.

Had we not bombed the American would still be alive it is as simple as that as brutal as it sounds---AND now there is talk about more combat personnel into Iraq. And we as the US cannot get a straight policy on a far deeper threat---the new Russia/China which impacts us over the longer haul more so than Baghdadi ever will.

This we the US have not seen before in this "supposedly" GWOT.

There will be no defeating them---it is a long haul now and they are getting better and better at governing--the missing piece.

The former Iraq now is a true satellite of the Iranians and to a degree occupied by the Iranians which is what Baghdadi wanted in the first place--this is his Sunni Shia clash and notice the KSA outside of protecting their borders from returning fighters and hardening the internal security has not uttered a single comment against the Caliphate outside of the first series of comments.

KSA silence is an indicator.

[CrowBat]

Yesterday I wrote about the Shiite militia mobilization in Iraq in response to the insurgency, most of which is being directed by Iran. Today I go into the Iranian mobilization which has included advisers, weapons deliveries, bringing in Lebanese Hezbollah advisers, and involves running some of the security portfolio for Baghdad. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/08/iranian-mobilization-in-iraq-in-face-of.html).
I like your excellent articles on developments in Iraq, and found most of them near flawless so far. But, in this case I feel kind of prompted to offer some commentary - as a co-source of Aviationist, and in certain other relations too.

1.) Tehran was not caught 'off guard' by the fall of Mosul and related developments in Iraq: it was caught while unable to respond. Reasons were multiple, but primarily related to:
- a) preoccupation with Syria, which necessitated immense spending ('rumour' if you like, has it that they were delivering at least US$1 billion in cash to Damascus, every single month since November 2011, plus about US$ 500 million in fuel), and

- b) which, in combination with the latest round of sanctions against Tehran, caused a de-facto bankruptcy of the regime and the IRGC.

The latter is a little known fact, primarily because the internet (and especially the blogosphere) is meanwhile full of supposed Iranian 'security experts' that are feeding it with fake and constructed information and messages creating an image of 'undefeatable' Iran, that is trouble-free and flush with cash. That's why one can read messages like, 'for us it's not about money, but about not abandoning our friends, we're not the USA' (in relation to Syria); or 'our defence sector is flourishing because we're flush with money', and then especially something else that I'm going to mention below.

Actually, for Tehran the spread of the ISIS through eastern Syria and north-western Iraq couldn't have come at a better moment. It directly resulted in a situation where the IRGC was saved by Iraqi money (lent by China).

That all aside... well, simply imagine international reaction in the case Tehran would have had the money and launched a pre-emptive military intervention against the ISIS inside Iraq (which would have been perfectly along its declared doctrine of national defence)...

But, it couldn't, because it didn't have the money, nor the necessary influence and support (whether inside or outside Iraq).

2.) IRGC-QF C-in-C Soleimani... Since he took over as C-in-C of the IRGC-QF's battlefield HQ in Syria, back in mid-2013, and especially since that famous Filkins' article about him for NYT, Soleimani is a kind of star in the Western media. Actually, that's precisely the picture the IRGC wanted to be created about him. Then, in reality he is neither the mastermind, nor as influential or crucial for all the developments with which he's usually connected. Soleimani is warrior, an intelligent, combat-proven commander and officer, no doubt about all of this. But, his primary duty is that of an executor: foremost, he can't farth without permission from Vahid. So, it's not his ideas he's realizing, but those from Khamenei and the clique surrounding him. And neither that clique, nor Soleimani, are as omni-present or as overpowering as usually described. Difference to earlier times (especially those of the Iran-Iraq War) is that his/their actions are usually aiming at much more realistic aims, precisely because that clique now knows to appreciate opinions of such like Soleimani (i.e. because the IRGC now has its own, combat-proven warriors, and is listening to them). Translation: this means you'll not see the IRGC-QF launching operations like Valfajr or Kerbala, aiming to deploy 100,000 Basiji to assault Basra and similar aims. It's working in entirely different fashion nowadays.

3.) I'm getting sick and tired of everybody explaining 'these Sukhois were actually Iraqi': this is simply not truth.

Yes, in 1991, Iraq, in accordance with an agreement between Baghdad and Tehran from August 1990, flew 130+ of its planes to Iran (colloquial 'knowledge' is 124, but I've got a full list of serials from an ex-Brig Gen of the Iraqi Air Force Intel Dept.M; large excerpts from that list - as far as related to specific combat aircraft formerly in service with the IrAF - can be found in the book Iraqi Fighters (http://www.amazon.com/Iraqi-Fighters-1953-2003-Camouflage-Markings/dp/0615214142), authored by Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik and your very own). But, Tehran has officially declared these planes (that is: those that landed safely in Iran, minus few that were shot down or crashed while underway, and minus a few that officially never reached Iran) as impounded and its ownership, in the name of reparations for Iraqi invasion of 1980 - which is a perfectly legal claim, considering that even the USA have acknowledged that Baghdad was responsible for its own aggression. Therefore, these planes are Iranian and no sugarcoating of this is going to change that fact ever.
Accept it, live with it, finally.

4.) Not all of the Su-25s sent by the IRGCASF (IRGC Air & Space Force) are ex-Iraqi. On the contrary, over the time the IRGC has taken every single Su-25 airframe it could put its hands upon. It's a long story (actually, I could discuss the history of every single airframe, should that be necessary), so sufficient to say that only some 3-4 of these seven sent to Iraq are indeed 'ex-Iraqi'.

Whatever: this is a reason more why I would strongly recommend anybody trying to say something of that kind to strictly avoid babbling that these planes were 'actually Iraqi'.

5.) That is: they were Iranian...erm... possession of the IRGCASF - until they were flown to Iraq. And the reason they were flown to Iraq was Iraqi money, plus Russian promises about delivery of additional high-tech weaponry (all paid for by Baghdad) to the IRGC (officially: the IRGC in Iraq; unofficially... well, who can prevent the IRGC taking that weaponry wherever it wants, once it's in Iraq). So, de-facto, the IRGCASF has sold its Su-25s to Iraq - in exchange for a) cash, b) official permission for its presence in Iraq, c) immense Iraqi orders of arms and ammo from the Iranian defence sector, and d) Iraqi orders/payments for Russian arms for the IRGC.

6.) Yes, it's Iranians only that are flying Su-25s in Iraq. Indeed, although the IQAF has few officers that used to fly Su-25s back in the late 1980s, that's a far cry from what's necessary. On the contrary, the IRGCASF and supporting industry have a relatively well-developed support infra-structure for the type at home (good enough to run regular overhauls and even do some upgrades too). Iranians are maintaining and flying even Su-25s recently delivered by Russia too - which, BTW, was another PR-coup: the planes arrived in Iraq in very poor condition, with only a bare minimum of maintenance necessary to make them operational again. Actually, it's the Iranian personnel that has to make them operational...

...though which is possible thanks to Iraqi financing of this IRGC-QF deployment.

7.) Meanwhile, it's not only the IRGC-QF that's deployed inside Iraq, but the regular Iranian military too. Check with US and British SF operators that were in Sinjar who was the actual 'first' there.

8.) Meanwhile #2: and Iranians are happily delivering plane-loads of their arms and ammo to Kurds in Erbil too - 'happily', because 'somebody's' tax-payers are paying for these too. Congrats Obama and Bibi.

Overall, the crisis in Iraq caught the Iranians (and especially Khamenei and the IRGC) unprepared, but it couldn't come at a better moment and they're exploiting it in best possible fashion - although in different ways than usually described.

[davidbfpo]

It is time for a root-and-branch review of the principles of British foreign policy, so that they reflect two essential things: the world as it is and not as we would wish it to be; and the British national interest. Or, to put it another way, don't do nation-building and don't intervene in other people's civil wars - we usually make things worse, as in Iraq, and the waste of blood and treasure is unforgivable.

If this means hobnobbing with dictators, so be it. Only genocide and threats to world order merit military intervention, as with IS. For the rest, nations must be allowed to find their own destinies. After all it took Britain 713 years after Magna Carta, undisturbed by foreign invasion, to give women the vote.

Link:http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/sir-christopher-meyer/iraq-camerons-contradictions_b_5691584.html?&ir=UK

The author is a retired UK diplomat and I cite his last two paragraphs.

[davidbfpo]

A previously unheard of website, so maybe some caution. Their explanation for the data presented:
Vocativ has discovered, collated and tabulated the available data from monthly reports posted in various online forums affiliated with ISIS. The reports detail every ISIS attack in chronological order (see embed below). The ISIS reports were published by what the organization calls its “media ministry.” These reports were provided only in Arabic, which suggests ISIS wasn’t targeting them for Western exposure, but rather to spread news of its achievements throughout the Arabic-speaking world to would-be recruits and supporters. It should also be noted that, as ISIS generated the reports, not all details can be corroborated. Regardless, the organization’s data provides a detailed picture of how ISIS views itself and what its shifting priorities are in the battlefield.

Link:http://www.vocativ.com/world/iraq-world/analysis-isis-quarterly-reports-kill-conquer/?page=all#!bHpDun

[JWing]

I just published an interview with RAND's Ali Nader on what Iran's policy towards Iraq is. I just talked about how Iran is mobilizing its militia allies, and flying in weapons and advisers, in the interview I tried to find out what Tehran's overall goals are in Iraq. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/08/analysis-of-irans-policy-towards-iraq.html).

[davidbfpo]

A short, detailed article based on an interview of Professor John Horgan, a British psychologist now @ UMass-Lowell:http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2014/08/how-isis-seduces-new-recruits.html

A key point:
They’re offering an opportunity for people to feel powerful. They’re making disillusioned, disaffected radicals feel like they’re doing something truly meaningful with their lives.Are we and others ready for this?
Disillusionment is very, very common in every single terrorist and extremist group you can think of. That’s something that can be very toxic if those accounts get out and gather momentum.

Disillusionment is the most common reason why people voluntarily choose to walk away from a terrorist group. People become disillusioned if they feel that the group has gone too far, if they don’t seem to have a strategy beyond indiscriminate killing. Disillusionment can arise from disagreements with a leader, it can arise from dissatisfaction with the day-to-day minutiae. There are many directions from which disillusionment can arise, and it’s only a matter of time before those accounts leak out from ISIS, and I think we would do very well to be on the lookout for those kinds of accounts, because they offer an opportunity to dissuade further potential recruits from being involved.

[OUTLAW 09]

Has anyone seen and or read a coherent explanation of what the current US strategy is for both Iraq and Syria needless to say the IS outside bombing, sending SOF as advisors, sending aid/weapons to the Kurds, calling for an "inclusive" government which is to late, and calling for a summit of the five UNSC members on terrorism in DC?

[Dayuhan]

Has anyone seen and or read a coherent explanation of what the current US strategy is for both Iraq and Syria

It looks to me something like "do enough to look involved, not enough to be committed".

This is not ideal, but given that the US is not in a position to dictate outcomes, I'm not sure what the better options are.

[davidbfpo]

A short article from The Guardian, best explained by the writer's bio:
Ali Khedery is chairman and chief executive of Dragoman Partners, a strategic consultancy. He served as special assistant to five American ambassadors in Iraq and as senior adviser to three heads of US Central Command from 2003-10. He was the longest continuously serving American official in Iraq.

He ends with:
As world leaders now consider a military campaign to confront Isis, they should remember the lessons of America's costly and largely fruitless engagements in Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam. They should understand that no amount of foreign military power can ever make up for the misrule of corrupt, failed governments like those in Damascus, Baghdad, Kabul or Saigon. Unless they want a regional holy war, leaders should especially discount the advice of some who are now calling for an alliance with Assad's genocidal regime – perhaps the single greatest root cause of Isis's rise.

Instead, they should embrace the lessons of Iraq's Sunni tribal awakening, that only Syrian and Iraqi Sunnis can defeat radical militant Sunni entities like Isis. Likewise, they should understand that only the mullahs in Tehran can help quell radical militant Shia entities like Lebanon's Hezbollah, Assad's intelligence operatives or Iraq's militias.


Link:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/22/syria-iraq-incubators-isis-jihad?CMP=twt_gu

[OUTLAW 09]

For those who want to see how the IS drives the internet and social media to support the Salafists.

https://twitter.com/Dawla_NewsMedia?original_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fukra ineatwar.blogspot.com%2F&tw_i=503224827340414976&tw_p=embeddedtimeline&tw_w=467271264835346432

I have been saying here we have to understand the IS battlefield tactics as that has greatly changed since AQI days.

Now look at these series of IS drone video photo coverage of ISF bases---they have really upped their recon/surveillance capabilities.

The #Islamic_State have been using drones to carry out mission planning and raids into enemy bases (Pic: Base 93):

[CrowBat]

...and meanwhile, Kurdish officials are confirming presence of regular Iranian Army troops on Iraqi soil; while - and unsurprisingly - Tehran swiftly denied this: Iran 'sent soldiers to fight in Iraq' (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/iran-soldiers-iraq-islamic-state-2014823161322258630.html)

...Hundreds of soldiers crossed the border on Friday in a joint operation with Kurdish Peshmerga forces to take back Jalawla in Diyala province, an official Kurdish source who asked not to be identified told Al Jazeera.

He said the Iranian forces retreated back across the border early on Saturday.
...
Iranian denial

Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Marzieh Afkham dismissed the reports of any Iranian military presence in Iraq.

According to the official IRNA news agency, she said Tehran "has a close watch on field developments in Iraq sensitively with regards to mutual cooperation and international commitments and takes into consideration cooperation with the Iraqi government".

Jalawla, fewer than 30km from the Iranian border, is a strategic point for both Iraq and Iran.

"Previously there had been Iranian assistance with security advisers and Iranian backed militias, but this does seem to the the first time soldiers have been involved," Al Jazeera's Jane Arraf reported from Erbil, capital of the autonomous Kurdish region.

Kurdish officials said their forces had surrounded Jalawla but have so far been unable to advance because of roadside bombs placed by Islamic State fighters.
...'Translation': about 400 Takavar from the 23rd Commando Division (Iranian Army commandos, originally established and trained with extensive help from the Green Berets, back in the 1960s) deployed to Erbil together with at least 25 tons of arms and ammo (all made by the DIO) for Kurds.

If one wonders why the IRIA Takavaran and not 'another' of 'IRGC-QF's outlets': the Army is traditionally maintaining better links with Kurds than the IRGC can dream about.

[OUTLAW 09]

The Independent @Independent

A crowdfunded site may have just exposed Isis using Google Maps http://bit.ly/1qCJctb

Moderator adds: This website is partly founded by "Brown Moses", an open source SME and documented on a thread 'OSINT: "Brown Moses" better than the UN on Syria':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=19471

[OUTLAW 09]

Russian version of the IS complete with Allahu Akbar.

Ukrainian Updates ‏@Ukroblogger

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9sDjspghOw … #Ilovaisk, #Ukraine:'Allahu akbar!'(2:33,5:23) #Putin's ver of #ISIS makes its presence known

pic.twitter.com/6T50RJm01c

[OUTLAW 09]

Can anyone here that comments explain to me that after 9/11 and literally billions spent on the intel community, billions spent in new ISR sensors/aircraft/satellites, billions spent on defense contractors to monitor all of that ISR and the expansion of thousands of defense contractors and civil service intel analysts and not counting the billions spent on the NSA ----we still are not able to do exactly----what?

That was the excuse for the delays in Desert Storm in Kuwait as we only had two intel analysts on the Iraqi desk ---but now--come on there has got to be a better reason for the misspending of literally billions of dollars.

Washington Post from today:
It could take months to build “necessary intelligence architecture” to expand the air campaign already targeting the Islamic State in Iraq, officials say.

We see the same thing in the Ukraine--NATO/US announces Russian artillery and troops are inside the Ukraine--Moscow says no they are not prove it and the US/NATO goes silent---does anyone have an explanation for the apparent true lack of US/NATO intelligence capabilities--or do western leaders just like to hear themselves talk to the media?

Maybe the WH should hire the bellingcat blog site and use open source bloggers --they seem to be at any given moment in time to be better informed than the WH and the entire CIA/DIA/NSA/DHS.

But again maybe they are just trying to lull the IS into believing they have more than enough time to prepared in advance for what is coming---who knows?.

[jcustis]

The collectors, analysts, targeteers are doing exactly what needs to be done, considering a far broader set of constraints that they face. Those constraints are not the fault of the IC.

[OUTLAW 09]

The collectors, analysts, targeteers are doing exactly what needs to be done, considering a far broader set of constraints that they face. Those constraints are not the fault of the IC.


Interesting comment as the above comment concerning Desert Storm was in fact true---two on the desk and no databases to speak of thus the four month delay in targeting which was used to position the troops. All additional analysts had to be first found and then assigned thus no existing databases to speak of even existed.

When I read the same comment 24 years later and I know the depth of the current IC to include the defense contracting side-then the comment is correct regardless of anything else--yes everyone is doing their bit all in the so called targeting cycle --then if in fact the constraints are the political side then it needs to be said--there is an old statement---truth to power which the IC and military leadership tends to forget except for this interview by the JCoS which is blunt and to the point.

The JCoS comments from 21.8.2014 are in fact far more correct than the general public is being led to believe about the IS and I am not sure the public is ready again for an open ended war in Iraq and or Syria for another ten years because that is what it will take since we blew it the first time.

I go back to what I have said a number of times here since Iraq---we never understood what we were seeing and what did we the IC miss with al Baghdadi at Abu G and Bucca? Believe me we missed something and it was there if we had looked hard enough--but then again Abu G and Bucca were driven by numbers--number of detainees talked to per shift down to number of reports per shift per week.

We had young Army/AF/Navy trained interrogators that knew virtually nothing about insurgencies, insurgent tactics down to the use of one time pads and or understood the inherent AQI/IAI, 1920 and ASA organizational structures, or even anything about the Sunni Shia clash--- who struggled using quality interpreters, and simply were going through the motions with little or no support from national in order to get through their year or in the case of the AF/Navy their six months.

Virtually no support came from national--I let the leader of the IAI walk out of Abu G simply because five RFIs went unanswered regardless of follow ups and no biometric support which was asked for --never got responded to. With no evidence no charge, with no charge then parked for 4-12 months and then released out. He was out in three months.

We completely missed a phase two guerrilla war being fought by the Salafists and that included AQI from the mid 90s onward inside Iraq and we the IC never knew that fine point. So I am sorry if I take the IC to task--they blew it.

Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey at a press briefing at the Pentagon in Washington, August 21, 2014.

“This is an organization that has an apocalyptic end-of-days strategic vision that will eventually have to be defeated,” General Martin E. Dempsey, U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on Thursday.

Gen. Martin Dempsey, America's top military officer, told a press briefing this week that the mere existence of ISIS is clearly a problem that had to be addressed.

The question now is how.

Demspey noted that destroying ISIS will require " the application of all of the tools of [U.S.] national power — diplomatic, economic, information, military."

In fact, as counterterrorism expert Brian Fishman explained, truly defeating ISIS would require full-scale war that would involve fighting in both Iraq and Syria.

"Can they be defeated without addressing that part of the organization that resides in Syria? The answer is no," Dempsey told reporters at the Pentagon.

That is where the real challenge lies for the Obama administration, which decided years ago that the U.S. was not going to “get in the middle of somebody else’s civil war.” ISIS has effectively blurred the border between Iraq and Syria, using the eastern Syrian city of Raqqa as a de facto capital while extending the terror group's reach in Iraq.

"The notion that the Iraq war can be separated from the Syrian civil war is pure fantasy," Shadi Hamid, an expert on Islamist groups at the Brookings Institution, told McClatchy. "This is what’s so worrying about the Obama administration’s approach. There is no plan. There is no vision on that front. There is no effort to talk about Syria in a different way."

A senior U.S. defense official also told McClatchy that there "is no policy" to confront ISIS in Syria.

[OUTLAW 09]

Rabat-ISIS beheads group of its top #Intelligence leaders incl Moroccan Ubaida Almaghribi for sharing intel online:https://twitter.com/2kdei/status/503601842883145729/photo/1

[JWing]

Just published my latest security report for Iraq for the 3rd week of August. Continued two week trend of drop in attacks, casualties actually dropped this time as well as fighting settled into a rough stalemate across Iraq for the week. Charts, figures on security incidents, car bombs, etc. across Iraq. Was a dip in car bombs in Baghdad which explains today's wave of attacks as a new by IS starts. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/08/large-drop-in-fighting-in-iraq-3rd-week.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

The UK blogger bellingcat who identified the IS training camp in Mosul via open source materials as well as working the open source location ID for the US journalist killing has been hit by a massive DDoS attack all day---this is interesting for two reasons 1) the IS did not believe open source could be so effective and 2) his work was also used in the MH17 open source materials.

So he has two groups angry at him that has the IT abilities of a DDoS---the IS and the FSB.


bellingcat @bellingcat

Bellingcat is still being DDoS'd by *someone*, if you don't know what a DDoS attack you can learn more here http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack …

[davidbfpo]

Keeping up with the mapping of this conflict:http://static.guim.co.uk/ni/1408899097493/Iraq-Diyala-map-WEB.svg

Note the cited article is about the Shia militia fighters on the frontline, so maybe of interest:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/24/iraq-frontline-shia-fighters-war-isis

[OUTLAW 09]

I have repeatedly said here in SWJ we truly never understood what we were seeing in Iraq from 2003 until 2010 and we wonder now what the heck happened to an "evidently" beaten AQI when it recreates itself as the IS.

Finally just maybe we con bury COIN with all of it's outliers and finally admit as a Force we just blew it as did the political leadership.

Not understanding an insurgency is one thing but not understanding guerrilla warfare is just sad.

This article in the entire length below from the US SOF community about the IS should rise some heads and create some deep questions of where the current civilian leadership together with the US military senior leadership wants to go with IS.

I have also said bombing the IS was and is not the way forward---especially in the light of say Ukrainian forces fighting actively with Russian military personnel who Russian now claims "just got lost". and somehow ended up in a fire fight inside the Ukraine when all along Russia has denied any Russians military inside the Ukraine.

Score one point for the blogging community after the massive release of Russian military IDs, photos, social media data--after that Russia was unable to maintain their blatant lies.

With the Obama White House left reeling from the "savage" slaughter of an American journalist held hostage by ISIS terrorists, military options are being considered against an adversary who officials say is growing in strength and is much more capable than the one faced when the group was called "al Qaeda-Iraq" during the U.S. war from 2003-2011.

ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, has been making a "tactical withdrawal" in recent days in the face of withering U.S. airstrikes from areas around Erbil in northern Iraq and from the major dam just north of Mosul it controlled for two nail-biting weeks, according to military officials monitoring their movements.

"These guys aren't just bugging out, they're tactically withdrawing. Very professional, well trained, motivated and equipped. They operate like a state with a military," said one official who tracks ISIS closely. "These aren't the same guys we fought in OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom) who would just scatter when you dropped a bomb near them."

ISIS appeared to have a sophisticated and well thought-out plan for establishing its "Islamic Caliphate" from northern Syria across the western and northern deserts of Iraq, many experts and officials have said, and support from hostage-taking, robbery and sympathetic donations to fund it. They use drones to gather overhead intel on targets and effectively commandeer captured military vehicles – including American Humvees -- and munitions.

"They tried to push out as far as they thought they could and were fully prepared to pull back a little bit when we beat them back with airstrikes around Erbil. And they were fine with that, and ready to hold all of the ground they have now," a second official told ABC News.

ISIS didn't necessarily count on holding Mosul Dam, officials said, but scored a major propaganda victory on social media when they hoisted the black flag of the group over the facility that provides electricity and water to a large swath of Iraq, or could drown millions if breached.

U.S. special operations forces under the Joint Special Operations Command and U.S. Special Operations Command keep close tabs on the military evolution of ISIS and both its combat and terrorism -- called "asymmetric" -- capabilities, officials told ABC News. A primary reason is in anticipation of possibly fighting them, which a full squadron of special mission unit operators did in the Independence Day raid on an ISIS camp in Raqqah, Syria.

"They're incredible fighters. ISIS teams in many places use special operations TTPs," said the second official, who has considerable combat experience, using the military term for "tactics, techniques and procedures."

In sobering press conference Friday, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said ISIS has shown that it is “as sophisticated and well-funded as any group that we have seen.”

“They’re beyond just a terrorist group. They marry ideology, a sophistication of strategic and tactical military prowess. They are tremendously well-funded,” he said. “This is beyond anything that we’ve seen.”

Prior ISIS’s recent public successes, the former chairman of the 9/11 Commission, which just released a tenth anniversary report on the threat of terrorism currently facing the homeland, said he was shocked at how little seems to be known inside the U.S. intelligence community about the Islamist army brutalizing Iraq as it has Syria.

“I was appalled at the ignorance,” former New Jersey Governor Tom Kean, who led the 9/11 Commission, told ABC News last week.

Kean, a Republican, who with vice chairman Lee Hamilton, a Democrat, recently met with about 20 top intelligence officials in preparation of the commission’s latest threat report, said many officials seemed both blind-sided and alarmed by the group's rise, growth and competency.

“One official told me ‘I am more scared than at any time since 9/11,’” Kean recounted in a recent interview.

A spokesperson for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence defended the intelligence community’s tracking of ISIS, saying officials had “expressed concern” about the threat as far back as last year.

“The will to fight is inherently difficult to assess. Analysts must make assessments based on perceptions of command and control, leadership abilities, quality of experience, and discipline under fire -- none of which can be understood with certainty until the first shots are fired,” ODNI spokesperson Brian Hale said.

Where did ISIS learn such sophisticated military methods, shown clearly after the first shots were fired?

"Probably the Chechens," the one of the U.S. officials said.

A Chechen commander named Abu Omar al-Shishani -- who officials say may have been killed in fighting near Mosul -- is well known for commanding an international brigade within ISIS. Other Chechens have appeared within propaganda videos including one commander who was killed on video by an artillery burst near his SUV in Syria.

Earlier this year, ABC News reported on the secret history of U.S. special operations forces' experiences battling highly capable Chechen fighters along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border since 2001. In addition, for decades Chechen separatists have waged asymmetric warfare against Russian forces for control of the Northern Caucasus.

The Secret Battles Between US Forces and Chechen Terrorists

In the battle against ISIS, many within American "SOF," a term that comprises operators from all branches of the military and intelligence, are frustrated at being relegated by the President only to enabling U.S. airstrikes in Iraq. They are eager to fight ISIS more directly in combat operations -- even if untethered, meaning unofficially and with little if any U.S. government support, according to some with close ties to the community.

"ISIS and their kind must be destroyed," said a senior counterterrorism official after journalist James Foley was beheaded on high-definition ISIS video, echoing strong-worded statements of high-level U.S. officials including Secretary of State John Kerry.

But asked when the Obama administration would attempt to confront ISIS, the official declined to answer.

Ben Rhodes, the President’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, told reporters Friday that Obama is currently focused on protecting American lives, “containing” ISIS where they are and supporting advances by Iraqi and Kurdish forces.

“Our military objectives in Iraq right now are limited to protecting our personnel and facilities and address the humanitarian crisis,” Rhodes said. The “ultimate goal,” Rhodes said however, was to “defeat” ISIS.

“We have to be clear that this is a deeply-rooted organization… It is going to take time, a long time, to fully evict them from the communities where they operate,” he said. “In the long term, we’ll be working with our partners to defeat this organization.”

[JWing]

My latest article is how Mosul, Baiji, Tikrit and Alam fell to the insurgents in June. Could tell that IS building up for a large summer offensive. Started with raids on Samarra, Baquba, and Anbar Univ in Ramadi. June 6 attack on Mosul started. Ninewa Operations Command and Baghdad did not take it seriously. When US tried to warn Baghdad that it was a much bigger attack and Kurds offered to send in peshmerga into Mosul to help Maliki wouldn't act because of his political dispute with Kurds. Were three major generals in Mosul during assault who bugged out which started desertions. ISF then given orders to withdraw but not where or how. Insurgents immediately headed south of after fall of Mosul. ISF in Baiji and Tikrit fled or gave up without a fight because spooked by stories of thousands of IS fighters heading their way. ISF had around 30,000 men in Mosul and another 5,000-6,000 in Tikrit vs maybe around 1000 insurgents. Camp Speicher outside of Tikrit gave up without fighting and most of the ISF there were massacred by IS which was posted by social media. Baghdad offered no defense and no orders to help Baiji or Tikrit. Alam outside of Tikrit only area that fought. Held out for 2 weeks before gave up. Massive failure of leadership by ISF commanders and Baghdad during whole debacle. Here's a link to the article (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/08/how-northern-iraq-fell-to-insurgency.html).

[CrowBat]

Can anyone here that comments explain to me that after 9/11 and literally billions spent on the intel community, billions spent in new ISR sensors/aircraft/satellites, billions spent on defense contractors to monitor all of that ISR and the expansion of thousands of defense contractors and civil service intel analysts and not counting the billions spent on the NSA ----we still are not able to do exactly----what?

That was the excuse for the delays in Desert Storm in Kuwait as we only had two intel analysts on the Iraqi desk ---but now--come on there has got to be a better reason for the misspending of literally billions of dollars.
AFAIK, it's not 'the intelligence'. At least 'not any more', and that 'since long'.

Contrary to what happened in the Ukraine (where there seems to have been a lack of expertise, which resulted in nobody correctly predicting Russian reaction to the Maidan Revolution, see bellow), intel is doing its job in regards of Iraq (and Syria). And quite decently too. Just, and precisely like the military, intel has political masters. And that's where the problem seems to be - which is what I get to hear from a number of (unofficial) contacts in the DC, which in turn are confirmed by what can be read in articles like Saving Syria Is No ‘Fantasy’ (http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/08/mr-president-saving-syria-is-no-fantasy-109923.html?ml=m_ms#.U-rvHqP5Qcs)


...No doubt the president is sensitive to the charge that his rejection of the 2012 recommendation by his national security team to arm and equip nationalist Syrian rebels robustly has contributed significantly, if inadvertently, to ISIL’s growth in both Syria and Iraq. His comments to Friedman implicitly dismiss the 2012 recommendation itself as a fantasy, but as Secretary Clinton’s Syria adviser I was a member of the administration at that time. The recommendation, in one form or another, was offered not only by Clinton, but by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, CIA Director David Petraeus and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Martin Dempsey. Yet the president, ignoring decades of universal conscription and mandatory military service in Syria, persists in characterizing the Assad regime’s armed opponents as a hopeless collection of former butchers, bakers and candlestick makers.
...

Obviously, one can have all means of intelligence on hand, all the necessary info, best advice - and still insist on making wrong decisions. Perhaps being a 'Nobel Peace-Price laureate' makes one 'knows better'...?

Who knows.


We see the same thing in the Ukraine--NATO/US announces Russian artillery and troops are inside the Ukraine--Moscow says no they are not prove it and the US/NATO goes silent---does anyone have an explanation for the apparent true lack of US/NATO intelligence capabilities--or do western leaders just like to hear themselves talk to the media?
That situation was different, and here one gets to hear an entirely different set of comments - usually in following direction: Funding cuts, lack of opportunity leave US without expertise on international hot spots (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/commentary/funding-cuts-lack-opportunity-leave-us-without-expertise-inte). Specifically:


...After the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States acted as though it no longer needed expertise on that region, and top talent drifted to the latest hot account. The abdication of interest in Russia, the attitude that “we solved that problem,” began at the very top of the policy establishment and trickled down to the businesses, government contractors, universities and think tanks that once employed Russia and Eastern Europe experts....

Another 'influential' problem can be found few levels below that one, within circles of various advisers. These are not only lacking the expertise in regards of Russians, but excel at ideas that are 'better' than Startrek and similar, science-fiction productions. For example, one of 'closed doors' discussions in the DC I was able to follow the last few months was characterised by specific (usually rather 'vocal') talking-heads providing ideas like, 'arm Israelis with B-52s, so they can bomb Russia in return for its invasion of the Ukraine' or 'ask Beijing to send troops' (whether to Syria or Ukraine, pick your choice).

Overall, I have absolutely no concern about the WH applying 'maskirovka' upon the ISIS. Nor about the functionality of the US intel. It's simply so that crucial advisers and 'the man' in the WH are better at playing golf than at running US foreign politics.

[OUTLAW 09]

AFAIK, it's not 'the intelligence'. At least 'not any more', and that 'since long'.

Contrary to what happened in the Ukraine (where there seems to have been a lack of expertise, which resulted in nobody correctly predicting Russian reaction to the Maidan Revolution, see bellow), intel is doing its job in regards of Iraq (and Syria). And quite decently too. Just, and precisely like the military, intel has political masters. And that's where the problem seems to be - which is what I get to hear from a number of (unofficial) contacts in the DC, which in turn are confirmed by what can be read in articles like Saving Syria Is No ‘Fantasy’ (http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/08/mr-president-saving-syria-is-no-fantasy-109923.html?ml=m_ms#.U-rvHqP5Qcs)



Obviously, one can have all means of intelligence on hand, all the necessary info, best advice - and still insist on making wrong decisions. Perhaps being a 'Nobel Peace-Price laureate' makes one 'knows better'...?

Who knows.


That situation was different, and here one gets to hear an entirely different set of comments - usually in following direction: Funding cuts, lack of opportunity leave US without expertise on international hot spots (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/commentary/funding-cuts-lack-opportunity-leave-us-without-expertise-inte). Specifically:



Another 'influential' problem can be found few levels below that one, within circles of various advisers. These are not only lacking the expertise in regards of Russians, but excel at ideas that are 'better' than Startrek and similar, science-fiction productions. For example, one of 'closed doors' discussions in the DC I was able to follow the last few months was characterised by specific (usually rather 'vocal') talking-heads providing ideas like, 'arm Israelis with B-52s, so they can bomb Russia in return for its invasion of the Ukraine' or 'ask Beijing to send troops' (whether to Syria or Ukraine, pick your choice).

Overall, I have absolutely no concern about the WH applying 'maskirovka' upon the ISIS. Nor about the functionality of the US intel. It's simply so that crucial advisers and 'the man' in the WH are better at playing golf than at running US foreign politics.

Crowbat---here is where we disagree.

1. US in 2003 did not know about the underground Salafist fight against Saddam ongoing since the mid 90s---how did the CIA/DIA/NSA miss that one after Desert Storm?---especially if we were providing assistance to Iraq up to 1988.

2. did the US IC have a full understanding of the various Sunni groups even after 2010---no not really even now they fully do not understand them nor the tribes current positions in relationship to IS---one just needed to see up through 2009 the utterly countless intel reports on what they thought the strengths were for each group and AQI

3. even now the US leadership and that includes the IC seems to not fully understand just how the IS became so successful---that does not lend itself to believing as you do they in fact know a lot via intelligence---this by the way contradicts statements made recently by the JCoS about IS

4. we do not even know the intentions of the current Shia milita leaders and the individual Shia militias and the interconnections--even less on the Iranian involvement via Quds and the SU25s

So the idea that the US IC knows everything is a tad off---do you not think?

And I go back and again ask --just what is the US strategy for both Iraq/and Syria?--there is none for the Ukraine.

And I go back and state again--billions literally billions was spent on new intel equipment/software/drones, ISR sensors/aircraft and thousands of intel defense contractors and what we know nothing in the Ukraine?---come on where--- then where is the failure?

But then if we do know then why the silence?---- because that silence is totally deafening here in Europe.

Check the blogging space --they know more now than does Obama on the current battlefield status in the Ukraine--ask the simple question--how is it possible that social media using 30000000% less in costs ----out reports and reports quicker than the IC can do? But again notice the silence from the IC on the Ukraine---deafening.

[JWing]

Iraq is suffering through one of the most intense car bomb campaigns seen in years. Before the Islamic State would have gaps of up to a week between VBIED series. In August there has only been one day in between the waves. IS probably stockpiled explosives before their summer offensive started, but then their capture of so many ISF bases has probably given them access to a huge new amount of artillery and mortar shells, etc. which helps explain why the car bombs are coming so intensely in recent weeks. Here's a link to the article (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/08/iraq-suffers-through-new-car-bomb-wave.html).

[carl]

Where did ISIS learn such sophisticated military methods, shown clearly after the first shots were fired?

"Probably the Chechens," the one of the U.S. officials said.

A Chechen commander named Abu Omar al-Shishani -- who officials say may have been killed in fighting near Mosul -- is well known for commanding an international brigade within ISIS. Other Chechens have appeared within propaganda videos including one commander who was killed on video by an artillery burst near his SUV in Syria.

Earlier this year, ABC News reported on the secret history of U.S. special operations forces' experiences battling highly capable Chechen fighters along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border since 2001. In addition, for decades Chechen separatists have waged asymmetric warfare against Russian forces for control of the Northern Caucasus.

The Secret Battles Between US Forces and Chechen Terrorists



The Chechens are coming! The Chechens are coming!

I think it is useful to remember that God seems to sprinkle military prowess at random throughout the human race. They are out there waiting to appear and a lot of them don't need much in the way of formal training. Alvero Obregon just sort of knew what to do and there are a whole bunch of others like him throughout history. Maybe IS has a few too. (Old one arm did need help with tech things like artillery though, and that's why God makes guys who will switch sides.)

(The quoted section was not said by Outlaw but apparently comes from another article.)

[CrowBat]

Crowbat---here is where we disagree.Not sure if it's 'disagreement' or simply different POVs.

IMHO, you're talking about the IC as if it would be a stand-alone enterprise. It's not. Like the military, it's doing what its political masters tell it to do, and 'period'. And: from my POV, you're talking about three periods with entirely different priorities.

For example:
- Back in the 1980s, nobody cared if Zia ul-Haq was an extremist Islamist working on getting nukes and training terrorists. He was 'fine' and has got F-16s as 'thanks' for running Mujaheddin in the fight against Soviets in Afghanistan. And in Iraq - which came long after such priorities like Libya of that time - the priority was not 'finding Salafists' (I guess you actually mean 'Wahhabists' here?), but 'what can we do to help them not lose against Iran, but not win that war either'?

- Then came the 1990s, post-Cold-War disarmament because 'we've got no enemies', followed by 'it's the economy stupid' times, and priorities were Saddam's Scuds and Special Republican Guards, helping those plotting against him etc. For example, Clinton could've easily got Ossama back in 1996, but didn't want to do so: not because of any kind of IC failures, but because Clinton said no. Instead, his admin was more interested in obtaining control of Congolese mineral wealth with Rwandan help, than 'war on terror'.

- In early 2001 topic was 'China', by the end of that year 'al-Qaida' & Afghanistan', and in 2002 all the attention returned to 'Saddam', with emphasis on his (supposed) WMDs. With politicians attempting to argument that Saddam was 'collaborating with AQ' in order to find a reason for invasion of Iraq, nobody came to the idea to 'search for Wahhabist opposition in Iraq'. Come on... I doubt anybody wants to seriously recall how much effort was squandered in regards of searching for the WMDs (or on search for the 'smoking gun' in Iran, in subsequent years). And this simultaneously with the 'hunt for Osama's beard'.

All of these ops were dictated by interests of the WH, Congress etc., and not by those 'in the field'.

So, it's not as if the IC is doing mistakes or missing threats all the time: no doubt, the quality of its products is periodically suffering from overreliance on ELINT/SIGINT/SATINT etc., from 'the faster you run through different stations, the faster you're climb the career ladder' (resulting in plenty of 'jacks of all trades and masters of none' in this business), and - even more so - from insistence of its superiors on 'political correctness', but actually the IC knows very well what's going on. That is: its people in the field know what's going on. The question is always: what kind of tasking are they getting, i.e. what kind of information is in demand, and how much of what they report (and exactly what of what they report) is channelled upards.

As next, you're citing various statements from specific high officials. I think here you should not forget the 'typical behaviour of top managers and politicians'. Military or not, bosses of the IC are foremost politicians, and - hand at heart - 'arseholes'. One is not getting into such positions without quite a few 'bodies in the cellar', but also organizational and networking skills, and plenty of 'political manoeuvring', so much is sure.

So, when they make specific statements for the press, there is a question of what kind of message are they actually 'airing' and to what address. For example, their first issue is always 'money': more money means more and bigger departments, and that means power. And 'they' can never have enough money. So, when somebody there is - for example - complaining the IC 'does not fully understand just how the ISIS became as successful', we don't know 100% for sure if:
- a) the official really means precisely and just that (I would be actually surprised if this is the case), or
- b) if his actual message is not something like, 'listen arsehole (in WH), I told you years ago what's going to happen and you didn't listen, perhaps if I babble this in public now, something's going to change', or
- c) or if he simply means little else but the usual, 'gimme more money so I can do this or that'.

We'll know about this only once they all are at least in deep retirement, if not all dead.


4. we do not even know the intentions of the current Shia milita leaders and the individual Shia militias and the interconnections--even less on the Iranian involvement via Quds and the SU25sHere I must ask similar question like in another thread: define 'we', please.


So the idea that the US IC knows everything is a tad off---do you not think?Nope.


And I go back and again ask --just what is the US strategy for both Iraq/and Syria?--there is none for the Ukraine.That's a question for politicians, not for the IC.


And I go back and state again--billions literally billions was spent on new intel equipment/software/drones, ISR sensors/aircraft and thousands of intel defense contractors and what we know nothing in the Ukraine?---come on where--- then where is the failure?With politicians. If politicians insist, 'bring me Osama's beard', then the IC is doing whatever is possible to find that beard. But, that means that the IC is then also doing little else - even more so if the politicians are not asking for anything else.


But then if we do know then why the silence?---- because that silence is totally deafening here in Europe.Ah, Europe is its 'own, special, and extremely dusty' case. The situation here is usually much worse - with few exceptions, where everything is done in rather 'subtle' fashion.


Check the blogging space --they know more now than does Obama on the current battlefield status in the Ukraine--ask the simple question--how is it possible that social media using 30000000% less in costs ----out reports and reports quicker than the IC can do? But again notice the silence from the IC on the Ukraine---deafening.We've got several chaps at ACIG.info forum attempting to disseminate opint from PR-BS and find out what's 'really' going on in the Ukraine, for example. Trust me, no matter how much social media are they scanning, and what classy info are they often extracting, even they are not '100% sure' what's going on but have to cross-examine all the time.

AFAIK, it is a very crude mistake to think the IC - again: IC, not the politicians - is experiencing any kind of similar problems. But, the bottom line is that the politicians have the final word, and if they don't ask for intel, or don't like what they get to hear (keep in mind: 'political correctness')... well, the intel is either not going to be collected, or not going to be used.

[Bill Moore]

The Chechens are coming! The Chechens are coming!

I think it is useful to remember that God seems to sprinkle military prowess at random throughout the human race. They are out there waiting to appear and a lot of them don't need much in the way of formal training. Alvero Obregon just sort of knew what to do and there are a whole bunch of others like him throughout history. Maybe IS has a few too. (Old one arm did need help with tech things like artillery though, and that's why God makes guys who will switch sides.)

(The quoted section was not said by Outlaw but apparently comes from another article.)

I did post a video on what of the forums that reportedly showed Chechen trainers giving pretty decent light infantry training. Mostly demonstrated small unit battle drills. Again reported to be Chechen.

We should also consider the possibility that several members have special forces background that we and others trained. Regardless in today's age both technology and knowledge proliferate at a rate that is difficult to comprehend.

[Dayuhan]

Check the blogging space --they know more now than does Obama on the current battlefield status in the Ukraine--ask the simple question--how is it possible that social media using 30000000% less in costs ----out reports and reports quicker than the IC can do? But again notice the silence from the IC on the Ukraine---deafening.

Bloggers tell what they know, even when they don't really know it: a great deal of what appears in blogs and social media is rumor. The intelligence community is supposed to be silent: they aren't reporters. They pass what they know to their own internal customers, not to us. We obviously don't know what the government does or doesn't know about Iraq, the Ukraine, or anywhere else.

[SWJ Blog]

Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/military-skill-and-terrorist-technique-fuel-success-of-isis)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/military-skill-and-terrorist-technique-fuel-success-of-isis) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

Well today's situation could just mean a coalition of enemies become partners:
In Jeddah on Aug. 24, the foreign ministers (http://www.aawsat.net/2014/08/article55335815) of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Jordan and Egypt gathered to discuss the Syrian conflict and other “challenges, including the rise of terrorist extremist ideology.” In an official statement, they expressed their agreement on “the need to seriously work to deal with these crises and challenges to preserve security and stability (http://www.dw.de/violence-rages-in-iraq-amid-diplomatic-efforts-to-restrict-islamic-state/a-17874733) in Arab countries.” .......On Aug. 25, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, Iran’s undersecretary for Arab and African affairs, paid a surprising visit to Saudi Arabia (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Aug-26/268521-deputy-iranian-foreign-minister-in-saudi-arabia.ashx#axzz3BbAx2Zfi)...

Link:http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/is-region-blocs-cooperation.html?

[davidbfpo]

This BBC report appears to be based on one psuedonym'd tribal leader's words:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28978941

[Bill Moore]

This BBC report appears to be based on one psuedonym'd tribal leader's words:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28978941

If true, and it is always a big IF, then it appear that the U.S. and its partners are dealing with Iraq appropriately and the call for more U.S. intervention sooner will be seen as hyperbole. In my opinion you have to set the political conditions for what will follow the military action, or you end up like we did in Afghanistan (understandable) and Iraq 2003 (inexcusable).

To give anyone credit that this was their intention is probably a stretch, and most likely the cards just fell in place, but there is seldom any merit to rushing in if there isn't an immediate threat. Rush in to do what? Then what?

[carl]

If true, and it is always a big IF, then it appear that the U.S. and its partners are dealing with Iraq appropriately and the call for more U.S. intervention sooner will be seen as hyperbole. In my opinion you have to set the political conditions for what will follow the military action, or you end up like we did in Afghanistan (understandable) and Iraq 2003 (inexcusable).

To give anyone credit that this was their intention is probably a stretch, and most likely the cards just fell in place, but there is seldom any merit to rushing in if there isn't an immediate threat. Rush in to do what? Then what?

It is well to remember that the Sunni tribes tried several times to rid themselves of AQI and were unable to do it until an arrangement was made whereby they were backed up by the US military, then the two working together were able to do quite well. The important thing though is they couldn't do it on their own, they needed us. In the article David linked to they are basically saying exactly the same thing, they can do it but not by themselves.

The real chilling thing about the article is the statement that something has to be done about the IS fast because the ideology is hugely appealing to Muslim young men throughout the world and that appeal is growing extremely fast.

[ganulv]

It is well to remember that the Sunni tribes tried several times to rid themselves of AQI and were unable to do it until an arrangement was made whereby they were backed up by the US military, then the two working together were able to do quite well. The important thing though is they couldn't do it on their own, they needed us. In the article David linked to they are basically saying exactly the same thing, they can do it but not by themselves.

The U.S. was the sheriff back then, though. I hear what you’re saying, but I would think the social and political dynamics are so different at this point that that would be an apples and oranges comparison.

[SWJ Blog]

An Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) First Strategy (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/an-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-syria-isis-first-strategy)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/an-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-syria-isis-first-strategy) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Why ISIS Is Our Problem (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/why-isis-is-our-problem)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/why-isis-is-our-problem) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[JWing]

I just interviewed Christine van den Toorn who has been doing some great reporting for Iraq Oil Report and the Daily Beast in Ninewa. I talked with her about what happened with the Yazidis in Sinjar. They were at first co-opted by the Kurdish parties, then abandoned by them when IS attacked, only to be rescued by Syria's YPG. Now they want out of Iraq. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/the-plight-of-iraqs-yazidis-in-ninewa.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

Joel---heads up about this article that is being reported in the Daily Beast:

US and German Special Forces fighting in Iraq---first at Mosul and then other locations.
It will if true cause a major turmoil in Germany who has repeatedly stated no German troops inside Iraq.

Would also tend to counter Obama's statements as well.

Stuck out in the open with no clear sense of what was occurring in the battle that required us to be stopped, we made contact with high-level Peshmerga ministries, both in Erbil and on the ground in Zumar. “Yes, we want to let you in, but we can’t,” said one high-level Kurdish government official. “We have visitors, you’ll see them,” he stated. As we tried to decipher his cryptic response our answer came: multiple armored Toyotas swept down the mountain, passing within feet of us. The Toyotas were packed with what appeared to be bearded Western Special Operations Forces. I watched the trucks pass and saw for myself the crews inside them. They didn’t wear any identifying insignia but they were visibly Western and appeared to match all the visual characteristics of American special operations soldiers.

Contacts in the Kurdish intelligence service and Peshmerga leadership confirmed what we saw. “Yes,” one commander replied to our questions. “German and American forces are on the ground here. “They are helping to support us in the attack.”

“There are no U.S. troops on the ground in or around Zumar.” The Pentagon told The Daily Beast on Monday night. Captain Rick Haupt, a spokesman for U.S. Central Command, which has control over military operations in the Middle East, denied that U.S. troops were involved in the fighting but confirmed U.S. aircraft “performed one strike destroying several vehicles in the vicinity of Zumar” on Monday.

Kurdish officials told The Daily Beast a different story. Ranking members of the Kurdish military and intelligence service said that one team of U.S. Special Operations was on the ground in Zumar along with several German counterparts, working in conjunction with Peshmerga units. According to the Kurdish sources, U.S. and German special operations teams had taken up positions in Zumar that allowed them to coordinate with U.S. aircraft.

If American troops were active in the fighting in Zumar, as they appeared to be on Monday, and as Kurdish officials stated, it would mark a significant break with U.S. official policy. Even as President Obama has avoided getting the military more involved in Iraq, the mission has gradually expanded. U.S. airstrikes began as a policy to break the siege on Yazidis and prevent ISIS from attacking Americans in Erbil but have grown to “support Iraqi security forces and Kurdish defense forces” in their fight against ISIS.

[CrowBat]

In relation to supposed deployment of German special forces there....

I would not take such statements literally, or at least take them - but with a pinch of salt.

Germany agreed to deliver assault rifles, anti-rank 'rockets' (i.e. missiles or similar) and ammo to Iraqi Kurds, and to train them in the use of these - 'whether in situ or at a suitable place abroad'. That means: 'sure', German SF are there, but not with the purpose of getting involved in combat operations. They're there to train Kurds in use of German-supplied arms.

Namely, doing something like secretly deploying German SF into combat in Iraq, would be a political suicide for any German chancellor. And Angela is really not renowned for committing these 'all the times' (if at all, then quite on the contrary).

[carl]

The U.S. was the sheriff back then, though. I hear what you’re saying, but I would think the social and political dynamics are so different at this point that that would be an apples and oranges comparison.

Perhaps, but the main point is they needed powerful backup. They could not do it on their own. Now, they are not any stronger than back then and the IS is very, very much stronger that AQI ever was. And, if I read the article right, the people interviewed basically asked for our help again.

[OUTLAW 09]

In relation to supposed deployment of German special forces there....

I would not take such statements literally, or at least take them - but with a pinch of salt.

Germany agreed to deliver assault rifles, anti-rank 'rockets' (i.e. missiles or similar) and ammo to Iraqi Kurds, and to train them in the use of these - 'whether in situ or at a suitable place abroad'. That means: 'sure', German SF are there, but not with the purpose of getting involved in combat operations. They're there to train Kurds in use of German-supplied arms.

Namely, doing something like secretly deploying German SF into combat in Iraq, would be a political suicide for any German chancellor. And Angela is really not renowned for committing these 'all the times' (if at all, then quite on the contrary).

By the way the German SF were there long before any weapons shipping was approved and you do know how closely Us and German SF have been working together over the last years right--especially at the International SF Training Center here in Germany?

[JWing]

Latest security report on Iraq breaking down violence for August. Was a decided dip in reported attacks but casualties remained extremely high due to IS massacres and a report on Peshmerga losses in Ninewa. Actual numbers are probably far far higher as govt has stopped reporting on ISF & peshmerga losses. When they do come out they are always high. Here's a link to the article (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/attacks-drop-across-iraq-but-casualties.html).

[CrowBat]

By the way the German SF were there long before any weapons shipping was approved and you do know how closely Us and German SF have been working together over the last years right--especially at the International SF Training Center here in Germany?
I know about cooperation, but about their deployment in Iraq 'long before'.... one is left to hope that the Bundestag has authorized this.

Otherwise, not only the SPD is going to rip Angela & Co apart... :D

[CrowBat]

...namely, from what can be found from sources like:

- Sddeutsche (http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/kampf-gegen-is-deutschland-liefert-waffen-in-den-nordirak-1.2110964)
- DW (http://www.dw.de/deutschland-liefert-irakischen-kurden-waffen/a-17891717), and
- Die Zeit (http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2014-09/irak-kurden-bundeswehr-waffen)

Germany is about to supply the following arms to Kurds:

- 30 Milan systems
- 500 Milan missiles (variant unknown)
- 16.000 G3 and G36 assault rifles
- 8.000 pistols
- 240 Panzerfaust 3 AT-rocket launcher
- 40 machine guns
- 10.000 hand grenades
- an unknown number of Jeeps and Unimogs
- 5 Dingo 1 armoured vehicles

as well as

- 4000 bulletproof vests and steel-helmets
- 700 radios
- 680 night-vision goggles

A team of six soldiers is already in Erbil, setting up a military liaison post that should coordinate deliveries and distribution. Crew-training on Milans is to be undertaken at the Hammelburg grounds in Germany.

So, if there are any SFs there, and if they are involved in fighting... that's gonna be 'ein Skandal 1. Ranges'.

[davidbfpo]

We know Milan ATGW have been frequently used in Syria against the Bashir Assad regime and the UK liberally used them in Afghanistan before their "life" ended. So almost a "glad to go" gift.

Now the '240 Panzerfaust 3 AT-rocket launcher' are slightly different, as they can be fired within buildings - so have an extra value in urban fighting - where the Peshmerga will have to fight tomorrow and after. For details:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panzerfaust_3

[carl]

I just interviewed Christine van den Toorn who has been doing some great reporting for Iraq Oil Report and the Daily Beast in Ninewa. I talked with her about what happened with the Yazidis in Sinjar. They were at first co-opted by the Kurdish parties, then abandoned by them when IS attacked, only to be rescued by Syria's YPG. Now they want out of Iraq. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/the-plight-of-iraqs-yazidis-in-ninewa.html).

In reference to the interview, to what extent has the IS re-instituted slavery and who are they enslaving mostly?

[JWing]

Hi Carl,

Reports are that IS is selling Yazidi women that it captured in Sinjar in Mosul. Have not heard them do that to any other group. Likely result of their extreme prejudice against Yazidis as a religion. Even more despised then Shia and considered devil worshipers. Actually many have a negative view of Yazidis, even Kurds who claim them as their own.

[JWing]

Outlaw, here's something you'll probably be interested in. Interview with a member of the Islamic Army of Iraq. Here's a link (http://www.aymennjawad.org/2014/09/islamic-army-of-iraq-interview).

[OUTLAW 09]

I know about cooperation, but about their deployment in Iraq 'long before'.... one is left to hope that the Bundestag has authorized this.

Normally German media would have pickedthis up but it must have survived under the radar or the German media is simply not commenting on it due to the political fallout if it became common knowledge--not even the Left Party picked up on it.

[OUTLAW 09]

JWing---appears from social media that the Assad AF and the US AF are both flying their own drones in the same air space these days--wonder if they are using the same targeting sheet.


The Syrian Arab air force and the @usairforce are flying aerial missions over #Raqqa side by side now.

pic.twitter.com/JZNeXyN6Tq

[JWing]

Germany sending those assault rifles appears confusing to me. Will not help supply and logistics for KRG. Everyone else is sending AKs, Germany couldn't do the same?

[JWing]

Here's my latest article analyzing car bombs in Iraq in 2012 to track the rebirth of the Islamic State. 2011 was the nadir for the group with much of its leadership dead or in prison. Estimates were that it could only carry out one major attack every 4-6 weeks. CIA estimated only 1,000 fighters left and many were speculating that it would devolve into a criminal gang. U.S. withdrawal relieved military pressure on group and Syria allowed a new battlefield for it to expand and rebuild in. Its rebirth shown in car bomb attacks throughout 2012. Jan and Feb had one day each of multiple car bombs across several provinces likely for propaganda purposes to show that it was still around after Americans left. By summer 2012 able to launch 2-4 car bomb waves a month and announced its Breaking Walls Campaign to restart the sectarian war marking the group's return as a fully reformed militant organization in Iraq. Here's a link to the article (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/the-islamic-states-rebirth-in-iraq-in.html). Here are charts I put together for all the car bombs in Iraq in 2012, date, location, targets, casualties. Jan-March 2012 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/car-bomb-attacks-in-iraq-2012-pt-i.html). Apr-June 2012 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/car-bomb-attacks-in-iraq-2012-pt-ii.html). Jul-Sep 2012 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/car-bomb-attacks-in-iraq-2012-pt-iii.html). Oct-Dec 2012 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/car-bomb-attacks-in-iraq-2012-pt-iv.html).

[CrowBat]

JWing---appears from social media that the Assad AF and the US AF are both flying their own drones in the same air space these days--wonder if they are using the same targeting sheet.
Syrians flying their UAVs over ar-Raqqa?

Where are photos of these?

The link you provided is showing one of two Su-24s involved in the strike on ISIS HQ in the municipality building of Ghariba village (outside ar-Raqqa), two days ago. Damascus later claimed to have killed 18 Jihadists there and that the damage caused to a nearby prison was sufficient to enable some of people abducted by the ISIS to run away too.

Read: the strike was flown for show purposes, 'for the Americans to see' the regime is 'fighting ISIS'...

[Biggus]

Germany sending those assault rifles appears confusing to me. Will not help supply and logistics for KRG. Everyone else is sending AKs, Germany couldn't do the same?

I'm not aware of the specifics of what they're sending, but is it possible that there are still East German AK variants in storage?

[OUTLAW 09]

Syrians flying their UAVs over ar-Raqqa?

Where are photos of these?

The link you provided is showing one of two Su-24s involved in the strike on ISIS HQ in the municipality building of Ghariba village (outside ar-Raqqa), two days ago. Damascus later claimed to have killed 18 Jihadists there and that the damage caused to a nearby prison was sufficient to enable some of people abducted by the ISIS to run away too.

Read: the strike was flown for show purposes, 'for the Americans to see' the regime is 'fighting ISIS'...

CrowBat:

Again: The Syrian Arab air force and the @usairforce are flying aerial missions over #Raqqa side by side now.

pic.twitter.com/JZNeXyN6Tq

https://twitter.com/MiddleEast_BRK/status/508247151928160256/photo/1

[CrowBat]

OK, let me 'draw' it:

- You wrote, 'Assad AF and the US AF are both flying their own drones in the same air space these days'...

- I asked: 'Syrians flying their UAVs over ar-Raqqa?'

Namely, what can be seen on the photos provided on the link you posted is:

- a) what looks like Predator (and if it is one, it's either US- or Turkish-operated), and
- b) one of two SyAAF Su-24s that flew the strike on Ghariba.

I.e. no 'Assad AF...own drones'.

Furthermore, meanwhile I've checked with few of my contacts 'close' to the SyAAF, and they don't have any kind of UAVs that could reach the area.

On the contrary, in the course of one of relevant e-mail exchanges, one of messages that ended on my PC contained an observation the essence of which was something like (I'm just citing here), '...stupid....[specific representative of the regime in Damascus]... is wasting resources necessary for supporting troops elsewhere for flying "airshow for Americans"...'

EDIT
Meanwhile I've checked with my Iranian sources (the quality of the same can be assessed with help of articles like this one (https://medium.com/war-is-boring/like-it-or-not-iran-is-a-drone-power-e9899c954a3f)), and it turned they're not flying UAVs over ar-Raqqa either.

So, sorry, but I remain a little bit confused: what kind of UAVs is 'Assad AF' flying there...?

[OUTLAW 09]

OK, let me 'draw' it:

- You wrote, 'Assad AF and the US AF are both flying their own drones in the same air space these days'...

- I asked: 'Syrians flying their UAVs over ar-Raqqa?'

Namely, what can be seen on the photos provided on the link you posted is:

- a) what looks like Predator (and if it is one, it's either US- or Turkish-operated), and
- b) one of two SyAAF Su-24s that flew the strike on Ghariba.

I.e. no 'Assad AF...own drones'.

Furthermore, meanwhile I've checked with few of my contacts 'close' to the SyAAF, and they don't have any kind of UAVs that could reach the area.

On the contrary, in the course of one of relevant e-mail exchanges, one of messages that ended on my PC contained an observation the essence of which was something like (I'm just citing here), '...stupid....[specific representative of the regime in Damascus]... is wasting resources necessary for supporting troops elsewhere for flying "airshow for Americans"...'

EDIT
Meanwhile I've checked with my Iranian sources (the quality of the same can be assessed with help of articles like this one (https://medium.com/war-is-boring/like-it-or-not-iran-is-a-drone-power-e9899c954a3f)), and it turned they're not flying UAVs over ar-Raqqa either.

So, sorry, but I remain a little bit confused: what kind of UAVs is 'Assad AF' flying there...?

CrowBat---then let's restate your comments for clarity?

1. you have deep experience and can tell the difference between a Pred and and Reaper at say 3500 ft?

2. why would Turkey be flying anything over Syria---not the northern Kurdish portion and northern Iraq--and since they supported IS then fly one at all?-explain that one to us

3. and your Iranian "contacts" are willing to tell you 1) they do not own drones capable of this and or 2) did they not several months ago claim to a have reengineered the R180 and are flying it?--which is it?

4. your Assad AF contacts are what "willing to state on record they do not neither own drones nor use drones-what about the series the Russian recently supplied to them?---that is like claiming we the Assad AF do not drop "barrel bombs" or bomb civilian positions to you not think---so what is it?

Not wanting to rain on your parade of excellent "sources"---these photos were in fact posted to the blog sphere and roughly six individuals who look at such air identification phootos came to the same conclusion--- and in fact your claimed SU24 you hang on is in fact a Iranian drone and yes they fly them over Syria and currently Iraq as well if my "sources" are correct.

Or are you telling us there are no Iranian "contractors" or militia or Quds fighting either in Syria and or Iraq?

Come on CB

[OUTLAW 09]

CB---concerning Iranian drones not capable of the distance you claim they cannot do---what keeps them from being launched inside Syria?

And are these two Iranian long range UAVs simply non existent and the Iranians are what lying?


In his news conference on Sunday, IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali “Aziz” Jafari told reporters that Iran has produced a new generation of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), named ‘Shahed 129’ capable of 24-hour non-stop flight.

“Shahed 129, which can carry out combat and reconnaissance missions with its 24-hour nonstop flight capability, is IRGC’s latest achievement in this field,” Gen. Jafari said.

IRGC commander added that Shahed 129 is armed with Sadid missiles that can hit “long-distance” targets. (ISNA, 17 September)

In August 2010, Iran unveiled domestically manufactured long-range Karrar Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV). Karrar is a 4-meter long Jet-powered drone reportedly capable of delivering a military payload on bombing missions against ground targets, with a 1,000 KM range and a maximum speed of approximately 1000 kph. The specifications of the new Shahed 129 and its differences with Karrar have not been made public.

[OUTLAW 09]

CB--you need to learn to doubt your "sources" inside the SAF. They should have known this.

New screenshots coming from Syria give a better view of the Shahed 129 spotted over Damascus on Apr. 10.

And it is not what "flying" inside Syria---come on CB

Noteworthy, such photos show that the version used by the Syrian Armed Forces of the made-in-Iran UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle), is sensibly different by the one unveiled in September 2013 in Tehran.

[CrowBat]

In order of appearance...

1. you have deep experience and can tell the difference between a Pred and and Reaper at say 3500 ft?
Nope.

But then: I never said I can. On the contrary, I only want to know what kind of 'Assad AF UAVs' can you tell us are flown around ar-Raqqa?

Wherever I asked, there is no trace of anybody there - whether the SyAAF or the IRGC-QF - doing so. And, although you said this is the case, it seems you can't either.

That said, this doesn't mean that neither has UAVs. On the contrary, the IRGC-QF has deployed 'even' its Shahed-129s in Syria. It's just not flying them over ar-Raqqa.


2. why would Turkey be flying anything over Syria---not the northern Kurdish portion and northern Iraq--and since they supported IS then fly one at all?-explain that one to us
This is actually two questions, so you'll get even two replies (and, since it seems you've got a major problem with understanding what I write, I'll draw it if necessary):

a, which is my answer to your second question) Turkey is not supporting the IS; and

b, which is my answer to your first question) because Turkey has a small garrison of about 20 troops protecting a memorial for Suleiman Shah. This is an area inside Syria, about one square kilometre of soil declared as Turkish.

The ISIS is threatening to overrun this place since early this year, and the THK is not only flying UAVs over this area, but its F-16s have destroyed several ISIS vehicles there. For details, see reports like this one: Turkey threatens retaliation if historic Syria tomb attacked (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/140314/turkey-threatens-retaliation-if-historic-syria-tomb-attacked).


3. and your Iranian "contacts" are willing to tell you 1) they do not own drones capable of this and or 2) did they not several months ago claim to a have reengineered the R180 and are flying it?--which is it?
1.) Yup, they don't see any special problem about getting quite frank.
2.) This is not something claimed by 'my' Iranian sources, but by specific talking-heads and wannabes in Tehran.

Sorry, I'm not of sensationalist sort, so you'll not find any corresponding article of mine.


4. your Assad AF contacts are what "willing to state on record they do not neither own drones nor use drones-what about the series the Russian recently supplied to them?---that is like claiming we the Assad AF do not drop "barrel bombs" or bomb civilian positions to you not think---so what is it?The latter is bull ####.

And regarding the former:
a) They didn't say that, and
b) I didn't ask them about that. But, again: they said they're not running any kind of UAV ops over ar-Raqqa.

EDIT
...just like at earlier times, they've provided transcriptions of original orders issued by the Ba'ath Party HQ in Damascus, for specific SyAAF units to strike civilian population in specific places.

So, now you can go on complaining they're admitting attacks on civilians, and whatever else, but are just as beasty as to refuse admitting the sensationalist idea of the SyAAF operating UAVs next to US ones over ar-Raqqa.

Works fine with me. ;P


Not wanting to rain on your parade of excellent "sources"---these photos were in fact posted to the blog sphere and roughly six individuals who look at such air identification phootos came to the same conclusion--- and in fact your claimed SU24 you hang on is in fact a Iranian drone and yes they fly them over Syria and currently Iraq as well if my "sources" are correct.
You can attempt to belittle me as much as you like.

Simple fact is that you refuse to understand that you've babbled nonsense when stating 'Assad AF...UAVs' being run parallel to US (or whatever) UAV ops over ar-Raqqa.

Now, I'm following this war since more than three years and in all of that time I haven't heard about any kind of SyAAF UAV ops over ar-Raqqa. Thus, your commentary about 'Assad AF...UAVs' took me by surprise and I asked what is the basis for it. I've checked this, and there are no 'Assad AF...UAVs' where you said there are (obviously, basing your statement on that Twitter link).

Sorry if it turns that it's your own mistake that caused this misunderstanding, and that you're now attempting to act as if you didn't cause this.


Or are you telling us there are no Iranian "contractors" or militia or Quds fighting either in Syria and or Iraq?
Come on - yourself. Where did I say anything of that kind?

BTW, when it comes to IRGC-QF, you're wrong again: it's neither 'contractors' nor 'militia'. It's regular IRGC-QF personnel. Most are from 8th Armoured Najaf Division, there is a battalion of IRGC's SFs too, and then quite a few others. Let me know if you would like to hear details. And if you're too shy to ask, wait for slightly over a month longer, then grab yourself a copy of Syrian Conflagration (http://www.casematepublishing.com/title.php?isbn=9781910294109). Everything is nicely listed there.


CB---concerning Iranian drones not capable of the distance you claim they cannot do...Bull #### again. I nowhere said 'they're not capable'.

I said: not operated over that part of Syria.


---what keeps them from being launched inside Syria?Where did I say that?


And are these two Iranian long range UAVs simply non existent and the Iranians are what lying?Where did I say they're non-existent?

But since you asked: the Shahed Aerospace Shahed-129 is presently one of most successful Iranian UAV projects (together with the shorter-ranged Shahed-123, which is an even bigger success, with at least 274 pressed into service so far), that's sure. But, indeed, Jafari is lying about the UCAV capability of the Shahed-129: they were planned to get armament in form of Sadid missiles, but the company proved unable to realize this project - for lack of necessary technology.

And Karrar is (presently) just a PR-project.


CB--you need to learn to doubt your "sources" inside the SAF. They should have known this.You only need to learn to answer questions.

For example: what kind of evidence can you provide for your 'Assad AF...UAVs' being operated 'along' whatever other kind of UAVs over ar-Raqqa?


New screenshots coming from Syria give a better view of the Shahed 129 spotted over Damascus on Apr. 10.Did I ever say Shahed-129s were not deployed in Syria?

So, now, 'come on Outlaw': what kind of 'Assad AF UAVs' can you show us as operated over ar-Raqqa?

Anyway, I would like to express my gratitude to you in this place: experiences of this kind with you make me start to understand (and appreciate) the meaning of 'knowledge is power'. :D

[OUTLAW 09]

CB--then I would appreciate your answers to the following--if you are up to it?

Did I ever say Shahed-129s were not deployed in Syria?

No--but you did state did you not that Iranian drones did not have the range---come on my friend 1700kms is not enough?

Since you are so tight with your Syrian AF "sources"-why not answer for us the following--Syrian AF using chemical bombs--yes or no?

I can help you if you want to see the link before you answer--your answer will be interesting.

Now answer those questions my friend.

[OUTLAW 09]

For those that want to see what weapons are making it into the Syria opposition here is a whole series of videos from a YouTube link.

https://www.youtube.com/user/as3addaraa/videos

This link is for CB as well --so you CB can get more informed about the opposition as you are about Assad and the Iranians.

[OUTLAW 09]

CB--in your rant about your deep contacts to Iran and the Syria AF---you failed to respond did you not to my question---what can your provide to us from your Syrian AF or Iranian contacts about improvised chemical bombs being dropped on Syrian civilians?

Here is a link that is easy for you to read.

https://bellingcat.com/news/mena/2014/09/01/reports-of-new-improvised-chemical-weapons-used-by-the-syrian-air-force/

[CrowBat]

CB--then I would appreciate your answers to the following--if you are up to it?I'm all your's, hon.


Did I ever say Shahed-129s were not deployed in Syria?

No--but you did state did you not that Iranian drones did not have the range---come on my friend 1700kms is not enough?
You're either completely confused and mixing two different of my statements, or simply have immense problems of comprehending what you read.

I said:

a) contacts 'close' to SyAAF say they don't have any kind of UAVs that could reach the area, and

b) Iranian sources say they're not flying UAVs over ar-Raqqa.

That's implying anything else BUT what you manufactured out of my statements, namely that I should've said 'the IRGC didn't deploy UAVs to Syria' or 'Iranian UAVs in Syria lack the range to reach ar-Raqqa' etc.


Since you are so tight with your Syrian AF "sources"-why not answer for us the following--Syrian AF using chemical bombs--yes or no?
Officially, it's SyAAF, standing for Syrian (and) Arab Air Force.

And yes, back in 2013 they did fly several attacks (think the total was about 7-8) with chemical weapons. Don't have any details for this year, because I was preoccupied with various publishing projects (including the one mentioned above), but I'll get back to this topic next year and then find out, don't worry.


This link is for CB as well --so you CB can get more informed about the opposition as you are about Assad and the Iranians.Thanks for all attention. I'm at least as well-informed about them as I am about any other party there.

Why do you ask: need any specific info?


CB--in your rant about your deep contacts to Iran and the Syria AF...Why 'rant'?

If at all, then 'bragging'.

Yup, I'm guilty of having my contacts 'there', in certain corners of the world, and that since ages - which should be no secret for anybody who might have read such publications like this one (http://www.harpia-publishing.com/index-IRIAF.html) and/or this one (http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/1841767875?*Version*=1&*entries*=0).

You have my most humble apology, but one can't prepare such publications without proper research, and decent research works only with help of contacts.


---you failed to respond did you not to my question---what can your provide to us from your Syrian AF or Iranian contacts about improvised chemical bombs being dropped on Syrian civilians?No clue. Never asked them because there's ample evidence of this.

Did I make myself guilty of something now? :rolleyes:

[JWing]

I'm not aware of the specifics of what they're sending, but is it possible that there are still East German AK variants in storage?

No they're sending German G35 Assault Rifles

[JWing]

I just interviewed Governor Dulaimi of Anbar. We discussed talks with Baghdad and the security situation in his province. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/between-rock-and-hard-place-interview.html).

[JWing]

My latest piece on the Islamic State's systematic campaign to destroy the Yazidi community of Ninewa. Early August IS swept into Sinjar area of northern Ninewa. When entering towns would divide men from women and girls. Men were executed and women taken to several locations across province. Documentation of massacres in at least four villages. Other men have been taken prisoner. Some have been forced to convert to Islam. Women have been raped, forced to marry IS fighters, unconfirmed stories that some have been sold into slavery. No other group has gone through this experience under IS. Islamic State sees Yazidis as devil worshipers likely cause of treatment. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/islamic-states-destruction-of-iraqs.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

ISIS has killed the top leaders of Ahrar a-Sham in a car bomb in #Idlib, including the movement's leader Abu...

http://fb.me/1mVoFt1IK

[OUTLAW 09]

My latest piece on the Islamic State's systematic campaign to destroy the Yazidi community of Ninewa. Early August IS swept into Sinjar area of northern Ninewa. When entering towns would divide men from women and girls. Men were executed and women taken to several locations across province. Documentation of massacres in at least four villages. Other men have been taken prisoner. Some have been forced to convert to Islam. Women have been raped, forced to marry IS fighters, unconfirmed stories that some have been sold into slavery. No other group has gone through this experience under IS. Islamic State sees Yazidis as devil worshipers likely cause of treatment. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/islamic-states-destruction-of-iraqs.html).

AQI attacked them as well in the period from 2005 thru 2008 via car bombs and targeted assassinations.

[CrowBat]

ISIS has killed the top leaders of Ahrar a-Sham in a car bomb in #Idlib, including the movement's leader Abu...

http://fb.me/1mVoFt1IK
The leader of the Ahrar ash-Sham was Hassan Aboud, and yes, it appears he was killed in this bombing.

Though, meanwhile, it's anything but sure this was an attack by the ISIS.

The meeting was held in an underground 'bunker'. AFAIK, it might be hard to kill anybody inside an underground facility with help of a car bomb.

On the contrary, there are reports that the bomb was planted inside that bunker before the meeting.

Rumours (and there are always plenty of these in Syria, no doubt) have it that the leadership of Ahrar ash-Sham met to decide whether to officially side with the revamped FSyA, in exchange for 'US support' (or whatever of this is provided), possibly in reaction to reports that the (official) Saudi support for insurgency is slackening. But, majority of insurgents in that group - and many other of Syrian insurgents - are meanwhile so fed up of Americans, that they opposed this and would have seen this as treachery.

Overall, this version sounds at least 'logic', and if it's true, I wouldn't be surprised to see the Ahrar - or at least large parts of it - defecting from the IF and siding with the ISIS as next...

...and should that happen, it would be a major 'PR victory' for the ISIS.

Now, Ahrar is important as a relatively big, well-organized and -supplied organization of Syrian Salafists, that's sure. But, overall, it's not even 10% of the IF in total (and the IF totals something like 50% of all the insurgency).

Nevertheless, if even a chunk of the Ahrar would defect to it, the ISIS could claim it is including Syrians, and then Syrian Salafists too - which so far was simply not the case (Syrian Salafists and Wahhabists of all sorts, but especially such idiots like the ISIS are at odds with each other).

In total, this might be another tragic consequence of absurd and sadistic US policy towards Syrian insurgency...

(BTW, this is actually all Syria-related, i.e. going off topic in regards of Iraq.)

[JWing]

Iran contributed 200 vehicles, 700 fighters which was a mix of regular Iranian army and volunteers and 24 military advisers to help peshmerga and militias relieve town of Amerli in Salahaddin earlier this month says Niqash (http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=3530).

[OUTLAW 09]

BreakingNews Syrian rebels take one of the last #Assad regime bases in northern #Quneitra.

Heavy use by the rebels of TOWs against Assad tanks and hit even an MI8.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gPhKMCVwIvA

Syrian rebels control Kufer Shamis, linking #Quneitra and #Daraa provinces.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-WIjzq9lWf4 …

TOWs in use.
#TOW vs. #Assad in #Quneitra. Same hill base.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WaGl

Syrian rebel #TOW vs. #Assad regime position in #Quneitra.
Another one bites the dust.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d27uJvrenjs …

#TOW vs. #Assad in #Quneitra.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HBj7Lzv-DSo …
#Syria

Syrian rebels destroy another two #Assad regime tanks in #Quneitra province.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qzgxCwJVYa4

[OUTLAW 09]

Falaq-2 based IRAM in Iraq

September 10, 2014 By ARES

http://www.armamentresearch.com/falaq-2-based-iram-in-iraq/

By Michael Smallwood. Header image displays a Falaq-2 type launcher in a two-tube configuration mounted on the rear of a pickup truck.

Photos emerging from Iraq purport to show members of the Islamist militant group Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) in possession of 333 mm Falaq-2 artillery rockets and improvised launchers. In the photo below, a substantially larger payload has been affixed to the forward portion of the rocket, in what is known as an ‘improvised rocket-assisted mortar’ (IRAM) – more accurately described as an improvised rocket-assisted munition. It is unclear whether this replaces or is in addition to the standard 117 kg high-explosive (HE) warhead that the Falaq-2 possesses. The maximum range of the Falaq-2 is 10.8 km, though this is sure to be reduced dramatically by the addition of such a large improvised warhead.

It is unclear how many such IRAMs have been produced based around the Falaq-2 in Iraq. The Falaq-1 and Falaq-2 systems have been documented in use in Syria previously, and it is likely to be from here that systems seen in Iraq have originated. For a comprehensive background on the Falaq-1 and Falaq-2 system, and the use of IRAMs with these systems, you can read ARES Research Report No. 2: Iranian Falaq-1 and Falaq-2 Rockets in Syria.

[JWing]

My latest security report for 1st week of Sep in Iraq. Attacks have been declining since August but casualties remain high mostly because IS carrying out mass executions in northern Iraq in areas under its control. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/attacks-remain-low-in-iraq-1st-week-of.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

Interesting that the Russian BM30 ends up in the Assad Army.

Jury's out: Seems like a BM-30 Smerch launcher rocket. Here's one from Syria via @Brown_Moses (thx @rConflictNews)

pic.twitter.com/ScFeyBi1Nz

[SWJ Blog]

Why Reasoning with ISIS is a Useless Concept (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-reasoning-with-isis-is-a-useless-concept)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-reasoning-with-isis-is-a-useless-concept) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Defeating ISIS and Their Complex Way of War (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/defeating-isis-and-their-complex-way-of-war)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/defeating-isis-and-their-complex-way-of-war) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[JWing]

My latest article on how IS has been able to rebuild its manpower after its nadir in 2011. At that time the CIA estimated that it only had 1,000 fighters left in Iraq. Now CIA says 20,000-31,000. Others say 50,000 or more. Read more about how its been able to increase its resources and draw in more recruits here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/islamic-state-rebuilds-its-manpower-in.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

#Breaking #Exclusive pic. of Arkan-1 rocket used by #Katiba_Sayad_Al_Shohahda, #ISF auxiliary force. Loc : Basora pic.twitter.com/xgNW3cpCz9

More Iranian involvement:

[JWing]

My latest security report for 2nd week of Sep 2014. Attacks have been going down across Iraq since the beginning of August. However casualty figures remain extremely high as IS continues to carry out mass executions in areas under its control. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/islamic-state-continues-mass-killings.html).

[JWing]

The Islamic State has been carrying out executions and mass killings since it took northern Iraq. Some of these are to eliminate opponents, others are to assert its control over the population, and there are some cases where the IS has attempted to wipe out groups like the Yazidis. Almost 3,000 people have died in these acts so far since June. Here's a link to the article (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/islamic-state-mass-executions-in.html).

[Bill Moore]

The Islamic State has been carrying out executions and mass killings since it took northern Iraq. Some of these are to eliminate opponents, others are to assert its control over the population, and there are some cases where the IS has attempted to wipe out groups like the Yazidis. Almost 3,000 people have died in these acts so far since June. Here's a link to the article (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/islamic-state-mass-executions-in.html).

JWing,

Do you have stats on how many Iraqi security forces have been killed since ISIS started attacking Mosul? I would like to see a comparison between Iraqi security force casualties and Iraqi civilian casualties if available.

[JWing]

Yes I've been tracking security incidents. I can get the numbers to you later today when I get a break from work.

[JWing]

Sep 13 new Iraqi premier Abadi ordered the Iraqi security forces to stop hitting civilian areas. This had been going on for months since fighting first broke out in Anbar in Jan. 2014. The ISF continues shelling Fallujah however pointed to Abadi's announcement being more for propaganda. Here's a link to the article (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/government-shelling-of-civilian-areas.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

JWING---whose supplying a vast number of tows and who provided the training?

Based on the tow shooter videos the gunners have had extensive training and are even hitting fast moving targets something US military types always had problems with.

It is having a severe impact on the Assad military right now as they are losing armored vehicle after vehicle and one MI8 along the way.

Syrian rebels destroy a fast moving #Assad regime BMP with the TOW.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qTTeFxtwCCs …

[OUTLAW 09]

So again is the Obama "red line" being used as it was intended to be a reason for bombing or again just another repeat of doing nothing in Syria?

Agence France-Presse ✔ @AFP
#BREAKING Syria's Assad has violated chemical arms pact by using chlorine gas: Kerry

Here comes the bombing:
Breaking: #SecDef Hagel tells Congress military leadership has signed off on strike plan for #ISIS targets in #Syria, awaiting POTUS ok

More IS "successes" and we are sending arms right?
#BREAKINGNEWS AN EXODUS OF KURDISH PEOPLE HAS STARTED TODAY AS #IS TAKES 21+ VILLAGES AROUND #KOBANE

[OUTLAW 09]

Interesting cooperation between the IS and Turkey:

pic.twitter.com/uozL7ItYWl

+ dozens of reports, #IS may use #Turkey for transfer + medevac

[OUTLAW 09]

JWings--ever see reporting in this direction?

From the UK bellingcat blog site.

Who is Killing Iran’s Elite Revolutionary Guards?

September 15, 2014

By Robert Caruso

For the past few weeks, a string of curious and deadly events has been taking place in Eastern Kurdistan.

Salafi extremists have long been rumored to be operating inside Kurdistan with Iran’s support.

It came as no great surprise to long-time observers, either, when Iran sent tanks across the border.

This is standard fare for Iran–disruption, diversion, and deception.

No, of greater importance are the spate of killings in Urmye, Bokan and Jwanro. These areas are either squarely inside Iran or Kurdistan, depending on who you ask. Starting in September, members of the moderate Kurdish opposition reported five members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) “wearing Kurdish cloths” had been shot. A week prior, a member of IRGC reportedly operating in Urmye also lost his life. This is notable in that Iran’s clandestine services are adept at counter-surveillance.

So what’s happening in Rojhelat, as the Kurds call it? It is likely these IRGC personnel were being surveilled by the moderate Kurdish opposition before their death. How interesting.

In August, reports surfaced Iranian Pasadran were deployed to Kirkuk, territory regarded as Kurdistan by Kurds and ‘disputed territory’ by everyone even before Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) advances.

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, or PUK, under Jalal Talibani is notoriously preferential to Iranian interests. While not representative of all Kurdish sentiments, the PUK unfortunately exercises significant control in Kirkuk and ‘disputed’ Iraqi provinces just outside Kurdistan. Therefore, it is unlikely they were killed by the PUK.

To the moderate Kurdish opposition forces of PJAK, the Free Life Party of Kurdistan, and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, or PDK-I, make no mistake: this is definitely Kurdistan and if you are Persian, you are not welcome. In fact, PDK-I regularly draws comparisons between ISIL and Iran on social media.

Iranian backed Shia militias beheading their opponents in Iraq. No difference between ISIS and #Iran & its cronies: https://t.co/21E6sobiXD — PDKI (@PDKIRAN) September 6, 2014

Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian recently proclaimed Iran “would not wait for any international coalition to fight against terrorism”. Additionally, Amir-Abdollahian stated the international summit to combat the threat of ISIL being held in Saudi Arabia this past Sunday “a show”.

Iran maintains a sizable paramilitary presence in Eastern Kurdistan, to include political warfare and alignment elements of Qods Force. Alignment is not Farsi but a euphemistic reference to what Qods does worldwide: align the unaligned, to Iran’s preference.

Also present inside Iraq but lesser known are Iran’s IRGC-Saberin, the special operations forces of IRGC Ground Forces (IRGC-GF). Saberin are a highly agile and flexible force, capable of executing cross-border operations lasting weeks at a time with a limited logistical tail. The first Iranian casualty inside Iraq in engagements with ISIL this fall was a member of a Saberin unit.

In 2009, local Iranian media reports said the Ayatollah [Khamenei] ordered the formation of Saberin units in the late 20th century, with a specific mandate to go on the offensive against Sunni elements, even boasting Saberin would be operationally postured “to hunt the enemy outside [Iran’s] borders.” Iran is petrified of the situation on the ground, as evidenced by this BBC Persian report:

this new situation has fueled an unprecedented new cosmetic particularly among the various forces in the four countries, Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran […] resistance units with Kurdistan Regional Government consent entered into battle with forces of the Islamic State.

Traditionally, IRGC’s subordinate ground units in concert with autonomous elements of Qods Force have focused on practicing to seize key terrain, airfields, storage and fuel facilities, and capturing or killing adversaries of Iran.

Saberin personnel have conducted offensive operations against PJAK, the moderate Kurdish opposition group on Iran’s western border. Saberin and MOIS [intelligence] personnel are also rumored to be combating the People’s Resistance Movement of Iran, on Iran’s eastern border.

Mohsen Karimi has commanded the Saberin for approximately 18 months. Before assuming command of the Saberin, Karimi’s area of responsibility were the Diyala, Wasit, and Maysan provinces inside Iraq. Recent events along the eastern border of Kurdistan could be a sign Iran is a taking a more active role in shaping conditions than previously believed. Iranian information warfare and paramilitary activities inside Iraqi Kurdistan could endanger US and NATO personnel in or on their way to Kurdistan. From a human rights standpoint, there’s a long history of Iranian forces capturing and killing Kurds in what Kurds call Rojhelat.

Clandestine actions perpetrated by Iran would complicate efforts to unify and sustain a moderate Kurdish opposition. The introduction of IRGC-GF—Ground Forces, not unlike America’s 82nd Airborne, as opposed to the plainclothes and nominally clandestine Qods Force, or IRGC-QF—could be a precursor to conventional Iranian military activities inside Iraq. This would be a significant escalation particularly in light of the ongoing nuclear talks and Iran’s history of targeting US and UK personnel for death by assassination.

Policymakers, observers, and media organizations should be aware IRGC maintains a robust military deception capability, and will not hesitate to disavow and deceive to maintain operations security. In other words, even flat-out denials from Iran are rarely a denial; it is a deception cycle, running in perpetuity, intended to deceive heads of state and journalists alike. Is Iran sending paramilitaries into Kurdistan to spur destabilization, as its partner has done in Ukraine? It is unlikely we will know until Iranian personnel are captured by the moderate Kurdish opposition.


@PDKIRAN only the Kurds can bring down the murderous Mullahs of Iran!! Long live Peshmergas from All of Kurdistan! — Ibo (@Ibrahim_Ariyan) August 16, 2014

[OUTLAW 09]

This is an interesting take---is in fact the massive support to the development of Shia militias by Iran just as large a threat as is the IS --especially coupled with the recent Iran threat against the US to stay out of Iraq and the Russian threat that US bombing in Syria is an act of aggression seconded by Iran as well.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/18/all_the_ayatollahs_men_shiite_militias_iran_iraq_i slamic_state

[JWing]

JWing,

Do you have stats on how many Iraqi security forces have been killed since ISIS started attacking Mosul? I would like to see a comparison between Iraqi security force casualties and Iraqi civilian casualties if available.

Here are the numbers I've collected by going through the papers each day. Started in Jan 2014 when fighting broke out in Anbar to give context to those post-Mosul.

NOTE: The figures for the ISF are MUCH higher than what gets in the press. When the summer offensive started both Baghdad and Irbil stopped reporting casualties. All those firefights with IS get virtually no casualty reports. Only the regular drive bys, car bombs, IEDs etc. get regular reporting on ISF casualties.

Jan. 2014
Killed 427 ISF, 69 Sahwa, 2 Asayesh
Wounded 646 ISF, 48 Sahwa

Feb 2014
Killed 516 ISF, 58 Sahwa, 2 Peshmerga
Wounded 702 ISF, 93 Sahwa, 3 Peshmerga

Mar 2014
Killed 567 ISF, 48 Sahwa, 2 Asayesh
Wounded 631 ISF, 47 Sahwa, 1 Asayesh

Apr 2014
Killed 538 ISF, 46 Sahwa, 1 Asayesh
Wounded 806 ISF, 53 Sahwa, 5 Peshmerga, 1 Asayesh

May 2014
Killed 506 ISF, 77 Sahwa, 1 Peshmerga
Wounded 719 ISF, 50 Sahwa

Jun 2014
Killed 1,424 ISF, 31 Sahwa, 62 Peshmerga
Wounded 750 ISF, 47 Sahwa, 198 Peshmerga, 1 Asayesh

Jul 2014
Killed 426 ISF, 28 Sahwa, 60 Peshmerga
Wounded 738 ISF, 24 Sahwa, 175 Peshmerga

Aug 2014
Killed 281 ISF, 65 Sahwa, 299 Peshmerga
Wounded 466, 20 Sahwa, 608 Peshmerga

Sep 1-7
Killed 38 ISF, 4 Sahwa, 6 Peshmerga
Wounded 70 ISF, 3 Sahwa, 41 Peshmerga

Sep 8-14
Killed 83 ISF, 24 Sahwa
Wounded 61 ISF, 12 Sahwa

[JWing]

Outlaw another article on the fighting between Kurdish groups and Iranian security forces

http://basnews.com/en/News/Details/Intense-Clashes-Rage-Between-Peshmerga-and-Iranian-Army-/34533

[CrowBat]

On the 'funny' side of this conflict...

- The French flew their first strike against the Daesh, earlier today. Two Rafales were involved. According to official Paris, they hit their targets in northern Iraq and returned unmolested (no surprise here).

Almost immediately, the Daesh claimed one Rafale shot down: actually hit appears to have been some sort of an UAV: it remains unclear if Iraqi or somebody else's.

Anyway, reports about 'ISIS killed a Rafale' spread quite fast - so also to some of RSAF ready rooms... where there was a celebration... :rolleyes:

- Below are few photos of ex-IRGCASF Su-25s (some of them ex-Iraqi Air Force), now operated by the Iraqi Air Force... According to the C-in-C Ir...erm...I'Q'AF, they've flown 535 combat sorties since entering service in July this year.

Ironically, all are camouflaged in a pattern known as 'Asia Minor', originally developed by the USAF for McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom IIs sold to Iran in late 1960s (and still in use on IRIAF Phantoms).

[Bill Moore]

Here are the numbers I've collected by going through the papers each day. Started in Jan 2014 when fighting broke out in Anbar to give context to those post-Mosul.

NOTE: The figures for the ISF are MUCH higher than what gets in the press. When the summer offensive started both Baghdad and Irbil stopped reporting casualties. All those firefights with IS get virtually no casualty reports. Only the regular drive bys, car bombs, IEDs etc. get regular reporting on ISF casualties.

Jan. 2014
Killed 427 ISF, 69 Sahwa, 2 Asayesh
Wounded 646 ISF, 48 Sahwa

Feb 2014
Killed 516 ISF, 58 Sahwa, 2 Peshmerga
Wounded 702 ISF, 93 Sahwa, 3 Peshmerga

Mar 2014
Killed 567 ISF, 48 Sahwa, 2 Asayesh
Wounded 631 ISF, 47 Sahwa, 1 Asayesh

Apr 2014
Killed 538 ISF, 46 Sahwa, 1 Asayesh
Wounded 806 ISF, 53 Sahwa, 5 Peshmerga, 1 Asayesh

May 2014
Killed 506 ISF, 77 Sahwa, 1 Peshmerga
Wounded 719 ISF, 50 Sahwa

Jun 2014
Killed 1,424 ISF, 31 Sahwa, 62 Peshmerga
Wounded 750 ISF, 47 Sahwa, 198 Peshmerga, 1 Asayesh

Jul 2014
Killed 426 ISF, 28 Sahwa, 60 Peshmerga
Wounded 738 ISF, 24 Sahwa, 175 Peshmerga

Aug 2014
Killed 281 ISF, 65 Sahwa, 299 Peshmerga
Wounded 466, 20 Sahwa, 608 Peshmerga

Sep 1-7
Killed 38 ISF, 4 Sahwa, 6 Peshmerga
Wounded 70 ISF, 3 Sahwa, 41 Peshmerga

Sep 8-14
Killed 83 ISF, 24 Sahwa
Wounded 61 ISF, 12 Sahwa

Much thanks for diving into this. I didn't realize the numbers were so high for the first 7 months of the year, so I have to assume the wounded are at least twice that? How long do you think they can sustain casualty rates like this? I should know this, but I don't. Do they have a draft or is it a volunteer army?

[OUTLAW 09]

Purported #Hezbollah drone as it hits an #IS base somewhere in #Lebanon.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQJ5LrEX90o

[OUTLAW 09]

Finally the NSA is good for something especially since they have the tools ie Snowden ---it has been reported that a massive number of IS twitter accounts have been either blocked and or closed down and hashtags usage stopped as well.

This has been the IS primary line of global communication and radicalization for months and years after they shifted off of online uploaded videos--they may well shift back to that mode as it is easier to sidestep the NSA. It is though not as fast as twitter for spreading their info.

Wonder why it took so long?

We have seen the Russian trolls on the Ukrainian side effectively limit twitter, Facebook and YouTube accounts by pro Ukrainian and western social media types. The usage of that blockage technique started about ten days by Russian trolls.

It is an effective info war tool these days.

[JWing]

Outlaw,

After the summer offensive started Ayatollah Sistani made a call for men to join the security forces. Supposedly tens of thousands signed up. The militias also mobilized and had been recruiting since around April of this year. I don't think the manpower is the issue, its the lack of training and competent officers to lead them. A recent U.S. military report said around half the army units were filled with militiamen showing their penetration into the ISF as well.

[JWing]

My latest article on the futile 13 security operations launched in northern Babil this year by the Iraqi forces with no apparent affects. In fact the Islamic State has expanded its operations to other regions of the province and hit southern Baghdad province as well. Babil like Anbar shows the lack of strategy on the part of the government. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/thirteen-security-operations-later-and.html).

[CrowBat]

After reading that, I'm not surprised Iraqi officials are happy to announce arrival of additional IRGC-QF troops in the country.

According to this report (http://islammemo.cc/akhbar/arab/2014/09/22/209056.html), 1,500 IRGC-QF arrived in Iraq via Basra, the last two days. They should be in the process of deploying on 'vital positions near Samarra, north of Baghbad and in Babylon.

With this contingent, the total of IRGC troops in Iraq should have been increased to 3,600. About 50 were KIA in the last two months, 'many were injured'.

[JWing]

My weekly security report for 3rd week of Sep. Reported attacks remain low but casualties have stayed high. The cause this week was the collapse of an army base in Saqlawiya outside of Fallujah which was under siege for a week by IS. Supposedly 300 soldiers were killed in the fighting. Total fiasco by the ISF. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/collapse-at-army-base-in-iraqs-anbar.html).

[SWJ Blog]

The Best Strategy to Handle ISIS: Good Old Containment (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-best-strategy-to-handle-isis-good-old-containment)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-best-strategy-to-handle-isis-good-old-containment) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

'Brown Moses' is cited in the Canadian story:
The air strikes against al-Nusra – one of the most effective anti-Assad forces – threaten to drive the group into an alliance with Islamic State, while marginalising the “moderate” Free Syrian Army. The two Islamist groups had previously been fighting each other. “They’re bombing for the Iraqi government without thinking about the consequences it’s going to have for the Syrian opposition....The only person who’s really happy so far is [Syrian President Bashar] Assad,” Mr. Higgins said.

Link:http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/uk-approves-air-strikes-in-iraq/article20799177/

[davidbfpo]

A short comment, which is sub-titled 'Why bombing Syria could turn out to be a disasterous mistake' by Clints Watts:http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/did-obama-just-unify-americas-enemies-111347.html#ixzz3ESZPFEwU

A taster:
In other words, the United States could win some tactical victories by hitting both groups hard in Syria, but might be committing a massive strategic blunder by uniting a jihadi landscape it desperately sought to fracture over the past decade.

[OUTLAW 09]

It seems that the US bombing is in fact driving the more "moderate" Islamists into the IS cam further isolating the SFA.

Does anyone in the WH understand the ME or better yet does anyone understanding the Islamist movements?

Seems US has already lost the narrative on the ground in Syria in less than a week. ‘Moderate’ rebels condemning bombings + pro-JN rallies.

[OUTLAW 09]

This is one of the first breakouts I have seen on social media about the numbers of foreign fighters broken down by the country they come from.

Notice who leads in provided foreign fighters into Syria---Russia by far.

https://twitter.com/Ukrainian_State/status/515834481585184769/photo/1

[davidbfpo]

This is one of the first breakouts I have seen on social media about the numbers of foreign fighters broken down by the country they come from.

Notice who leads in provided foreign fighters into Syria---Russia by far.

https://twitter.com/Ukrainian_State/status/515834481585184769/photo/1

Outlaw09,

I'd say every fortnight a chart appears on SM. Most depend on the figures collected by ISW, ICSR and a few others. Recently I saw one that emphasised the numbers from Arab nations, I don't recall Russia figuring very high.

[OUTLAW 09]

Outlaw09,

I'd say every fortnight a chart appears on SM. Most depend on the figures collected by ISW, ICSR and a few others. Recently I saw one that emphasised the numbers from Arab nations, I don't recall Russia figuring very high.

David---would normally tend to agree but there have been slowly emerging reporting about the flow of Russian Islamists into the ME and then drifting back into Russia.

If one watches on a daily basis Interfax releases you will see an average of one report every other day on "suppressing terrorists" somewhere in the RF Islamic regions.

Then today there was a video/picture released via twitter indicating a fight breaking out between Moscow police and Muslims near local city buses.

Clashes between police and Moscow's muslims
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qjaguxKwkyo …

pic.twitter.com/JFYukK6UFt

Tensions are slowly rising between the Muslim portions of the RF and the security forces.

Secondly one of the best tacticians training IS before he was "allegedly" killed came from Russia as well as a large number of fighters together with him since the beginning in Syria.

[OUTLAW 09]

#Iraq New batch of russian MI-35s combat helicopters delivered to Iraqi Army (some sources say 10 Mi35s !)

http://mod.mil.iq/news/2014/9/27/254.html …

[OUTLAW 09]

It seems Russia is being agitated again by the US as they attempt to maintain Assad as an client state for their naval porting rights in the Med.

Noticed the Russians did not back up their threats against the US as a blatant act of aggression for bombing Syria without "asking Russia and Syria". After all their hype of the word "aggression" in the global media not even a whimper out of Russia..

Now with a no fly zone being talked about against the SAF in the north--not so sure Assad is "winning" with US support.

BREAKING: US informs #Syria it will strike #ISIS for 3 years – Syrian FM http://on.rt.com/m2cn0k
pic.twitter.com/ywj9rml6YV

[Dayuhan]

Interesting look at the threats and opportunities ISIS presents for the Kurds...

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/fight-lives

Key paragraph:


Obama has spoken carefully in public, but it is plain that the Administration wants the Kurds to do two potentially incompatible things. The first is to serve as a crucial ally in the campaign to destroy ISIS, with all the military funding and equipment that such a role entails. The second is to resist seceding from the Iraqi state. Around Washington, the understanding is clear: if the long-sought country of Kurdistan becomes real, America’s twelve-year project of nation building in Iraq will be sundered. Kurdish leaders acknowledge that the emergence of ISIS and the implosion of Syria are changing the region in unpredictable ways. But the Kurds’ history with the state of Iraq is one of persistent enmity and bloodshed, and they see little benefit in joining up with their old antagonists. “Iraq exists only in the minds of people in the White House,” Masrour Barzani, the Kurdish intelligence chief and Masoud’s son, told me. “We need our own laws, our own rules, our own country, and we are going to get them.”

[OUTLAW 09]

Merging of various Shia militant groupings:

There's now a greater merger&mutualisation of resources am/ Iraqi groups. #Katiba_Hezbollah, #Imam_Ali
pic.twitter.com/4h89BWnin2

#Iraq #Sarya_al_Khorasani 107mm #IRAM factory near Baghdad - most Iraqi groups name it #Ashtar
NOTE: definitely improved versions of what they fired at US troops.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2o6NPgTyhgA …

Reports emerging of another [big] FSA-YPG agreement being signed to combat ISIS across all Kurdish regions of northern #Syria.

[JWing]

My latest article covering the fall of Camp Saqlawiya in Anbar. Was the biggest military disaster since fall of Tikrit back in June. Leadership of Iraqi forces didn't seem to care that base was surrounded and under siege for five days. Showed that insurgents still able to mass forces and take military target despite increasing western airpower. Also shows that IS still holds initiative in parts of the country. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/09/the-latest-military-fiasco-in-iraq-fall.html).

[JWing]

Forgot to mention that I was interviewed for the Middle East Week Podcast about the political and security situation in Iraq. Here's a link (http://middleeastweek.org/home/2014/9/21/update-on-the-conflict-in-iraq).

[JWing]

Dayuhan

When Mosul fell the Kurds were actually celebrating. They were able to seize Kirkuk and other disputed areas. They were talking about a referendum for independence, about how IS was a better neighbor than Baghdad, etc. The press was full of reports about how Kurdistan was going to benefit from the IS surge and how it was going to be considered the stable part of Iraq and this would all help with its oil industry and move towards independence. That was all BS to me. IS turned their attention north and east when the drive to Baghdad was blocked and took Jalawla in Diyala and Sinjar in Ninewa and threatened the Kurdish capital of Irbil. The peshmerga ended up abandoning both areas with little to no fight. Most of the oil companies pulled out their staff as well.

Kurdistan is going to get independence one day but it's not going to be anytime soon. It depends upon Baghdad for around 90% of its money, and its oil industry hasn't seen the growth in exports that it was hoping for. Until those two issues are resolved it will remain part of Iraq despite the announcements every couple months about it leaving and all the press reports about how great its petroleum industry is doing.

[OUTLAW 09]

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/30/exclusive-america-s-allies-almost-bombed-in-syrian-airstrikes.html?via=desktop&source=twitter

seems like we almost bombed our own allies

[OUTLAW 09]

And we get no help from the Iraqi AF.

NBC reports Iraqi air force mistakingly dropped food, water and ammunition to #ISIS militants. Great intelligence

[JWing]

My latest security report for the month of September. Attacks have been going down since August as summer offensive has turned into stalemate in many provinces. Casualties remained extremely high however due to IS massacres in northern Iraq and the fall of Camp Saqlawiya in Anbar where 300 soldiers were killed. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/attacks-down-but-casualties-up-in-iraq.html).

[CrowBat]

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/30/exclusive-america-s-allies-almost-bombed-in-syrian-airstrikes.html?via=desktop&source=twitter

seems like we almost bombed our own allies
We're discussing this 'campaign' (total of 66 USAF/USN and 23 strikes by all of the RJAF, RSAF, UARAF, RBAF and QEAF in one week!) in the 'air power...' thread, and it's nothing but a tragicomedy.

Perhaps I should send my wife to help CENTCOM with targeting?

She definitely knows more about Syria and all the factions involved in fighting there...


And we get no help from the Iraqi AF.

NBC reports Iraqi air force mistakingly dropped food, water and ammunition to #ISIS militants. Great intelligenceThey flew 2.160 combat sorties the last month: if USAF can make as grotesque mistakes as described on the link above, then Iraqis can do some too.

[OUTLAW 09]

Has anyone seen the SAA use the UR-77 Meteorit before---when and who supplied it?

https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=810536442324623

[davidbfpo]

Civil wars are never clear cut, in Europe Bosnia is a good example and Syria today is exceptionally confusing - on both "sides". Linked here is an analysis of the jigsaw of groups fighting each other and then changing tack:http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/profile-tajammu-alwiya-fajr-al-hurriya/

[OUTLAW 09]

Appears the Syria moderate Islamists captured a Russian SIGINT facility that was monitoring all insurgent ops for Assad. Probably one of their most important sites outside of Russia these days.

Embarrassing to say the least for Russian SIGINT types.

Many had not know it was even in Syria.

BIG - #Syria rebels captured Russian SIGINT facility in Tel al-Hara, #Deraa
http://spioenkop.blogspot.com/2014/1...y-reveals.html … (v @oryxspioenkop)
pic.twitter.com/dbYQ3y7g4f

On the 5th of October 2014, the Free Syrian Army captured the Центр С or المركز س 'Center C or Center S' SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) facility (logo on top) jointly operated by the Russian Osnaz GRU radio electronic intelligence agency (logo on the right) and one of the Syrian Intelligence Agencies (logo on the left). Situated near Al Hara, the facility was of vital importance for the Assad regime as it was responsible for recording and decrypting radio communications from every rebel group operating inside Syria, making it likely the Russian-gathered information at this facility was at least partially responsible for the series of killings of rebel leaders by airstrikes.

Translation from 3:08; ''A directive issued by the surveillance office on May 31 to eavesdrop and record all radio communications of the terrorist groups, directive signed by brigadier-general Nazir Fuddah, commander of the first center''

The facility was recently upgraded and expanded by Russia to provide Syria and Iran with situational awareness of the Middle East. After the upgrade, which took from January to mid-February, it reportedly covered the whole of Israel and Jordan and a large part of Saudi Arabia.[1] According to the report, the upgrade was a reaction to Iranian concern of the facility being too much focused on the Syrian Civil War, neglecting espionage on Israel. New equipment and additional personnel was thus added to the base.

It is unknown if the facility is named Center C or Center S ('S' for Syria or special), it is known there's at least one other Russian-Syrian SIGINT facility around, which likely has a similar name.

The Russian operator of this facility was the Osnaz GRU, responsible for radio electronic intelligence within Russia's Armed Forces.

[JWing]

Over the weekend most of Anbar fell to the insurgents including Ramadi. ISF totally collapsed there in just three days. Here's a link to my article (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/iraqs-security-forces-collapse-as.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

http://iswiraq.blogspot.de/2014/10/iraq-situation-report-october-4-5-2014.html

[OUTLAW 09]

Appears the Russian Islamist problem is coming back home to roost.

@MoscowTimes: Kadyrov Calls Suicide Bomber Lone Wolf, Extremist Social Media Paints a Different Picture

http://tmt-go.ru/508513

[OUTLAW 09]

The Iraqi state news correspondent says the air strike missed the IS headquarters in the town by 70 meters.

No joke. Source is the Iraqi state news agency.

23 civilians killed, 42 wounded in "US coalition air strike" on the central market of Hit, hours after IS took over.

http://ninanews.com/English/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=HHEGIH …

[OUTLAW 09]

#BreakingFootage An Iranian #Mohajer_4 drone was seen flying over #Inkhil in #Daraa province.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AuhhNcVgnOQ …

pic.twitter.com/7XdamO7quY

[OUTLAW 09]

My latest security report for the month of September. Attacks have been going down since August as summer offensive has turned into stalemate in many provinces. Casualties remained extremely high however due to IS massacres in northern Iraq and the fall of Camp Saqlawiya in Anbar where 300 soldiers were killed. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/attacks-down-but-casualties-up-in-iraq.html).

IS could even teach the Russians a few things about deception.

ISW Anbar update: "ISIS aims to surround Baghdad from its belts." If succeeds ISF isolated.
http://iswiraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/isis-advances-in-anbar-september-1.html?utm_source=ISIS+Advances+in+Anbar+%28Septem ber+1-October+7%2C+2014%29&utm_campaign=ISW+New+Iraq+update&utm_medium=email …
pic.twitter.com/NQGsaQi7TL


Everyone's looking at Kobane, but look at ISIS advances in Anbar over past 5 weeks. 40k from Baghdad.

http://iswiraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/isis-advances-in-anbar-september-1.html?utm_source=ISIS+Advances+in+Anbar+%28Septem ber+1-October+7%2C+2014%29&utm_campaign=ISW+New+Iraq+update&utm_medium=email …

[JWing]

New U.N. human rights report document IS's attempt to tear apart Iraqi society. Has targeted every group in territory under its control from security forces, to Sunnis to Shiites to Christians to Shabaks To Yazidis to Turkmen to Kurds. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/united-nations-documents-islamic-states.html).

[davidbfpo]

Joel and others.

Thinking out aloud.

What would happen if ISIS and allies got closer to Baghdad? Defeating ISF and non-ISF militias (if you can separate them now).

Ever encircling the city, but not trying to enter.

That would certainly concentrate the minds and actions of the coalition, above all I expect Iran.

[JWing]

My latest (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/increasing-reports-of-sectarian-attacks.html) on reports of increased militia attacks upon Sunni civilians.

[Bill Moore]

Joel and others.

Thinking out aloud.

What would happen if ISIS and allies got closer to Baghdad? Defeating ISF and non-ISF militias (if you can separate them now).

Ever encircling the city, but not trying to enter.

That would certainly concentrate the minds and actions of the coalition, above all I expect Iran.

No clue on how this play out, but I suspect the U.S. will be more careful about drawing another redline it has no intention of enforcing. I also doubt that any country in Europe will do much beyond provide arms unless it is under the auspices of U.S. leadership. As you noted Iran certainly has interests in maintaining their influence, since we basically handed them significant influence in Iraq. Just as importantly I suspect every other nation on Iraq's border has concerns about IS taking control of Baghdad, though I suspect in most cases their interests are conflicted, such as they want to contain Iran and limit the impact the of Sunni extremists that will likely destabilize their regimes. They need leaders willing to make hard decisions, which could result in strange bedfellows temporarily aligned to address immediate threats to common interests.

[JWing]

David

IS appears to be following almost the exact same plan that Zarqawi had of surrounding Baghdad in the belts and then launching direct attacks upon the capital with street fights, etc. They have been very successful in doing this so far especially in the west and south. This is only going to work so far however as Baghdad is overwhelmingly Shiite after the sectarian cleansing that happened after the last civil war. IS is probably already building up its networks in Sunni neighborhoods, but when they start making more direct assaults I expect a repeat of that last civil war which is Shiites cleansing the capital. That's already happening in parts of Babil, Salahaddin and Diyala right now. It's only going to get worse.

[OUTLAW 09]

@Brown_Moses Russian espionage network in Syria exposed as more facilities are uncovered

http://spioenkop.blogspot.com/2014/10/russia

Mod adds

Above link didn't work for me, this did:http://spioenkop.blogspot.co.uk/2014/10/russian-espionage-network-in-syria.html

[davidbfpo]

From WoTR by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross:http://warontherocks.com/2014/10/the-islamic-states-anbar-offensive-and-abu-umar-al-shishani/


ISIL’s Anbar advance illustrates some of the group’s strengths, but the group remains vulnerable (http://warontherocks.com/2014/09/the-islamic-states-vulnerability/) in many important ways. The group’s recent success in Anbar can be attributed primarily to one exceptional field commander and ISIL official, Abu Umar al-Shishani, who executed a series of brilliant tactical maneuvers. But Shishani’s leadership could not save them from setbacks elsewhere in Iraq. And even the group’s much-publicized advance on the northern Syrian town of Kobane, though it represents a real gain of territory, represents a strategically questionable decision. ISIL is a highly competent fighting force, especially when Shishani is the one giving orders, that continues to make significant strategic errors. This article provides a granular look at ISIL’s Anbar offensive.

[Bill Moore]

David

IS appears to be following almost the exact same plan that Zarqawi had of surrounding Baghdad in the belts and then launching direct attacks upon the capital with street fights, etc. They have been very successful in doing this so far especially in the west and south. This is only going to work so far however as Baghdad is overwhelmingly Shiite after the sectarian cleansing that happened after the last civil war. IS is probably already building up its networks in Sunni neighborhoods, but when they start making more direct assaults I expect a repeat of that last civil war which is Shiites cleansing the capital. That's already happening in parts of Babil, Salahaddin and Diyala right now. It's only going to get worse.

If the Shia purge the remaining Sunnis in Baghdad it seems that would serve as a recruiting tool for the IS (even beyond Iraq)? Also, aren't we ultimately talking about a potential hybrid assault on Baghdad? Zarqawi had to rely on terrorist tactics that promoted civil conflict amongst militias that were principally armed with small arms, but IS now has tanks, artillery, etc., so do you anticipate a different kind of fight, and do you think the Iraqi army has the stomach to hold Baghdad?

[Bill Moore]

I think these reports are interesting since they convey intent, and if the report on the use of Chlorine gas to kill up to 300 Iraqi soldiers is correct (though I remain suspect, since AQI used chlorine gas during OIF and it didn't have much impact, if they cracked the code for making it effective, then we need to relook our protective gear for chemical attacks).

http://warontherocks.com/2014/10/the-islamic-states-anbar-offensive-and-abu-umar-al-shishani/

The Islamic State’s Anbar Offensive and Abu Umar al-Shishani


Using chlorine gas and captured Iraqi military vehicles, Shishani was able to massacre 300 to 500 Iraqi troops and bring 180 back to Fallujah as prisoners. This was the biggest ISIL victory in two months and a major blow against the state of Iraq.

http://www.alsumaria.tv/news/111477/%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-300-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%84

Use Google translate it opens in Arabic, assuming you can't read Arabic :o

Alsumaria News / Baghdad
confirmed the number of MPs from the province of Diwaniyah , on Monday, killing 300 soldiers using chlorine gas for the first time by the militants, " Daash "in Saqlawiyah, north of Fallujah , and, as they carried the responsibility of the deaths of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Haider Abadi and the operations chief of Anbar, because of the slow pace of rescue despite frequent appeals for several days, considered a crime Saqlawiyah as Spyker second. said MP Ali al-Badri, at a press conference at the parliament building in the presence of a number of deputies Diwaniyah province, and attended by "Alsumaria News", "organizing Daash terrorist Chlorine gas was used for the first time in the region of Saqlawiyah after trapping More than 400 soldiers, killing many of them due to suffocation while terrorist gangs detonated car bombs within the brigade headquarters. "

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=7c996cd7-cbb4-4018-baf8-8825eada7aa2&ID=1632&RootFolder=%2Fblog%2FLists%2FPosts

ISIL Determined to Acquire Biological Weapons


The U.S. military has evidence that Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria are seeking biological weapons, an Army official said Oct. 7.

"Intelligence has recently discovered that ISIS intends to pursue biological agents and also is trying to figure out how to weaponize bubonic plague through the use of infected animals," said Brig. Gen. Maria Gervais, head of the Army's Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear School.

None of the above is surprising, analysts have been predicting this for years, and I know we have done a fair amount to prepare for the unthinkable, but on the other hand it makes me wonder why we're doing such a half butted effort to degrade ISIL. We started bombing them, now in their view they have the moral high ground to attack our homelands, and this could be an indicator on how they desire to attack. We waste our time targeting their leaders, but as IDF noted in an interview with one author it is critical we identify and eliminate their innovators.

[OUTLAW 09]

I think these reports are interesting since they convey intent, and if the report on the use of Chlorine gas to kill up to 300 Iraqi soldiers is correct (though I remain suspect, since AQI used chlorine gas during OIF and it didn't have much impact, if they cracked the code for making it effective, then we need to relook our protective gear for chemical attacks).

http://warontherocks.com/2014/10/the-islamic-states-anbar-offensive-and-abu-umar-al-shishani/

The Islamic State’s Anbar Offensive and Abu Umar al-Shishani



http://www.alsumaria.tv/news/111477/%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-300-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%84

Use Google translate it opens in Arabic, assuming you can't read Arabic :o

Alsumaria News / Baghdad
confirmed the number of MPs from the province of Diwaniyah , on Monday, killing 300 soldiers using chlorine gas for the first time by the militants, " Daash "in Saqlawiyah, north of Fallujah , and, as they carried the responsibility of the deaths of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Haider Abadi and the operations chief of Anbar, because of the slow pace of rescue despite frequent appeals for several days, considered a crime Saqlawiyah as Spyker second. said MP Ali al-Badri, at a press conference at the parliament building in the presence of a number of deputies Diwaniyah province, and attended by "Alsumaria News", "organizing Daash terrorist Chlorine gas was used for the first time in the region of Saqlawiyah after trapping More than 400 soldiers, killing many of them due to suffocation while terrorist gangs detonated car bombs within the brigade headquarters. "

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=7c996cd7-cbb4-4018-baf8-8825eada7aa2&ID=1632&RootFolder=%2Fblog%2FLists%2FPosts

ISIL Determined to Acquire Biological Weapons



None of the above is surprising, analysts have been predicting this for years, and I know we have done a fair amount to prepare for the unthinkable, but on the other hand it makes me wonder why we're doing such a half butted effort to degrade ISIL. We started bombing them, now in their view they have the moral high ground to attack our homelands, and this could be an indicator on how they desire to attack. We waste our time targeting their leaders, but as IDF noted in an interview with one author it is critical we identify and eliminate their innovators.


Here is the importance of taking Anbar for IS:

If ISIS wins Anbar, they can "establish a supply line from Syria almost to Baghdad" and launch attacks on the capital

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_e

[OUTLAW 09]

Chechen IS leader and one of their best battlefield types "declares" war on Russia---and based on how Russian has been treating the Crimean Tartars this past six months, and Russian Muslims in general--he might in fact become a serious threat o Russia.

From RIA today:---his threat is even carried by Russian media.

MOSCOW, October 10 (RIA Novosti) - In a telephone conversation with his father, an Islamic State (IS) commander, Tarkhan Batirashvili, also known as Omar al-Shishani or Omar the Chechen, stated that the militant group plans to invade Russia, Bloomberg reported.

"He said "don't worry dad, I'll come home and show the Russians,'" Bloomberg quoted Temur Batirashvili, the father of the IS commander, as saying Thursday.

"I have many thousands following me now and I'll get more. We'll have our revenge against Russia," Omar the Chechen told his father, according to Bloomberg.

In September, the IS issued a video threatening to include Chechnya into its self-proclaimed Islamic caliphate.

In late September, Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov wrote on his Instagram account that Russia had enough power and the means to stop terrorists from crossing its borders. "Taking all responsibility, I declare that those who have voiced a threat against Russia or who have mentioned the name of our President Vladimir Putin will be destroyed right where they made their statement. We will not wait for them to get behind the steering wheel of a plane. They will go where his fellow terrorists are rotting," Kadyrov wrote.

Several hundred individuals from the United States and Canada, as well as about 500 Britons are believed to be fighting for the IS. There are also militants from other countries among IS fighters.

The IS, a sectarian Sunni Muslim militia, is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). It seized large parts of Iraq and Syria and proclaimed an Islamic caliphate on the areas under its control. Its rapid advance in northern Iraq triggered a response from Washington, which launched airstrikes against the insurgents fighting on the Iraqi soil in August. The military campaign was subsequently extended to Syria, with an international coalition set up to defeat the extremists.

According to the US State Department, the coalition currently comprises more than 60 countries, including Arab League members and a number of European countries.

[JWing]

If the Shia purge the remaining Sunnis in Baghdad it seems that would serve as a recruiting tool for the IS (even beyond Iraq)? Also, aren't we ultimately talking about a potential hybrid assault on Baghdad? Zarqawi had to rely on terrorist tactics that promoted civil conflict amongst militias that were principally armed with small arms, but IS now has tanks, artillery, etc., so do you anticipate a different kind of fight, and do you think the Iraqi army has the stomach to hold Baghdad?

Many of the militias are decked out with heavier weapons these days via Iran. Trucks w/ recoiless rifles & rockets, heavy mortars, etc. And Tehran would step in even more if fighting went bad in Baghdad. Even without that I don't see the city going down.

[JWing]

Good critique of current US led air campaign in Iraq and Syria by Derek Harvey on PBS Newshour (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/pbs-newshour-video-can-airpower-alone.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

One would hope the western ICs will get a chance to copy the documents, codes and take the equipment apart as it is a certainty that this particular Russian SIGINT site was tied into the Russian global GRU/FSB SIGINT network.

Would be a nice exchange for western weapons and bombing raids.


Brown Moses @Brown_Moses

More footage from that captured Russian spy centre in Syria https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w5iHrsNwd5c … cc @oryxspioenkop

[Bill Moore]

I apologize for the bad taste in quoting my previous comment, and may open a new thread on how terrorists/militias/insurgents use and intend to use WMD. I suspect we're at the beginning a trend that will increase exponentially as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are further refined. The new information at the bottom is from the 11 OCT round up on the SWJ homepage.


Alsumaria News / Baghdad
confirmed the number of MPs from the province of Diwaniyah , on Monday, killing 300 soldiers using chlorine gas for the first time by the militants..National Defense Magazine article 'ISIL Determined to Acquire Biological Weapons':http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1632


Syria declares new chemical weapons facilities:http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29534926


The UN Security Council has been told that Syria has revealed for the first time the existence of four more chemical weapons facilities.Of course this sentence shouldn't surprise anyone, hope it was added for comic effect and that the author wasn't actually surprised by this.


Correspondents say the announcement heightens concerns that the Syrian government has not been fully open about its chemical weapons programme. Chlorine gas by itself is minimally effective as a weapon, which is why I remain suspect of the Iraqi news report that ISIS used it to kill 300 Iraqi soldiers. On the other hand what the use of chlorine gas as a weapon indicates is that they will use more dangerous chemical weapons if they acquire them or make them, and as they demonstrated they're a learning organization so it is possible they'll develop their own form of chemical weapons. Highly improbable that states will be able to deter them from using these weapons. The discussion on bio weapons is premature for now, but I suspect it won't be too long until we see an attempt by IS and other extremist groups to use them. I doubt they'll be restricted by the same logic states used about the concern of containing the impact of bioweapons to a specific geographical region.

In sum, the rules have already changed and we should anticipate improvements in their TTPs. The implications are we may to go back to the future, and place a greater emphasis on protective gear for our soldiers, and dust off the homeland response plans for chemical attacks. For the current state of the art (which won't last, it will progress) the effects will be more psychological than physical, but as we have seen from our reaction to the Boston Marathon Bombing psychological effects can have strategic effect in the media age where we have 24hour news coverage.

[davidbfpo]

Bill,

There are only three threads where the subject line includes WMD. There is one thread, which you started, from February 2007 'Possible Chemical Attack in Iraq' which maybe useful today, it covers many points:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2252

I will later today create a new thread, as suggested. Slightly surprised there isn't one, although over two hundred threads have WMD in; although the US definition of WMD is rather wide.;)

[OUTLAW 09]

One must compliment the IS--they seem fully capable at running a "war of movement". Meaning feint left move right then hold, feint right then move left and hold---over and over and it is working well for them.

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-within-8-miles-of-baghdad-airport-and-armed-with-manpads/

[SWJ Blog]

War Against ISIS: US Strategy in Tatters as Militants March On (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/war-against-isis-us-strategy-in-tatters-as-militants-march-on)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/war-against-isis-us-strategy-in-tatters-as-militants-march-on) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[JWing]

My latest security report for Iraq for the first week of Oct. Most of central Anbar fell at beginning of month. ISF & militias continue with latest security op in northern Babil. IS is getting closer to Baghdad. ISF is going through Mansuriya and Muqtadiya areas of Diyala still. Fighting in Kirkuk has shifted to the east to Daquq district. Peshmerga and Shammar tribe have recaptured Rabia border crossing with Syria in Ninewa. Salahaddin remains other main battlefront in Iraq. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/over-1100-casualties-in-iraq-1st-week.html).

[Bill Moore]

My latest security report for Iraq for the first week of Oct. Most of central Anbar fell at beginning of month. ISF & militias continue with latest security op in northern Babil. IS is getting closer to Baghdad. ISF is going through Mansuriya and Muqtadiya areas of Diyala still. Fighting in Kirkuk has shifted to the east to Daquq district. Peshmerga and Shammar tribe have recaptured Rabia border crossing with Syria in Ninewa. Salahaddin remains other main battlefront in Iraq. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/over-1100-casualties-in-iraq-1st-week.html).

How is the Iraqi army adjusting to these high and sustained casualty rattes? Are they expanding their recruiting pipeline and training base? Are they relying on militias? Can they control the militias? I doubt that the stats are available, but I would like to see their officer casualty rate. Are their officers even fighting yet? Are they recognizing and promoting effective combat officers?

How the military and government are adapting is important to understand to assess probable outcomes. Seems to me that Baghdad is at least at risk of being contested.

[OUTLAW 09]

How is the Iraqi army adjusting to these high and sustained casualty rattes? Are they expanding their recruiting pipeline and training base? Are they relying on militias? Can they control the militias? I doubt that the stats are available, but I would like to see their officer casualty rate. Are their officers even fighting yet? Are they recognizing and promoting effective combat officers?

How the military and government are adapting is important to understand to assess probable outcomes. Seems to me that Baghdad is at least at risk of being contested.

Bill---latest number of IS fighters guess estimated by say Moses Brown on the blogging side that have drawn up in array around Baghdad seem to indicate 10K plus fighters--using their war of movement they could in fact drive the ISF and Shia militia a tad crazy as attacks can come from multiple directions.

In some aspects a perfect example of swarming--will be interesting to see how swarming will be used by their field commander who up to now has been rather good at it.

There was a RAND study on swarming and it seems like IS got a copy--in some aspects the IS is in fact validating the old AQI belt strategy as being valid in 2006/2008--they just did not have the same level of manpower they do now have.

Interesting question is just how would have the Army handled the same set of tactics being used by IS now---when AQI/Islamic Army did stand and fight or they used swarming attacks on us---we did not react well to it and we did take some heavy hits---just ask the former COL Jones 1st Cav about their experience with swarming attacks in Diyala.

BUT--they is some serious reports coming out that the ISF together with the Shia militia are killing ever larger number of Sunni civilians--many found with their hands handcuffed behind their backs an shot in the head---if that continues the Sunni tribes will cement themselves even tighter to IS and the Shia will feel a ever deeper ethnic killing surge by IS and the tribes in attempting attacks on Baghdad---the civilians in Baghdad should be prepared for that --in the eyes of IS Shia civilians are just the same as a military target.

[JWing]

How is the Iraqi army adjusting to these high and sustained casualty rattes? Are they expanding their recruiting pipeline and training base? Are they relying on militias? Can they control the militias? I doubt that the stats are available, but I would like to see their officer casualty rate. Are their officers even fighting yet? Are they recognizing and promoting effective combat officers?

How the military and government are adapting is important to understand to assess probable outcomes. Seems to me that Baghdad is at least at risk of being contested.

They had a huge surge of volunteers after Sistani's fatwa in June. Said to have been up to 200,000 joined ISF. Also relying upon militias heavily. They are integrated into supposedly almost 50% of army units now and run their own forces. The ISF has no real control over them. PM Abadi is also trying to clean house with the officer corps. He fired around 300 officers in two waves and got rid of the Office of Commander and Chief that Maliki was using as his own chain of command.

[JWing]

Did an in depth study of car bombs from 2012-2014. IS started 2012 with a surge of VBIEDs in Jan & Feb to let world that it was still around after its nadir in 2011. By 2013 was able to launch car bomb waves. End of 2013 into 2014 launched most VBIEDs in years to soften up targets for summer offensive. Since that started number of car bombs has actually gone down. Trends also show greater use of VBIEDs for tactical attacks such as on ISF and infrastructure like bridges not just on civilians to sow terror. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/car-bomb-trends-in-iraq-2012-2014.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

Syrian rebels started an offensive near #Maarat_al_Numan.
Tanks and apcs involved.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=alACns_RUW0 …
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QpDGPUj

Another tunnel bomb attack on Assad forces---looks like a true mini nuclear blast--that is how much explosives was packed into the tunnel.

Another video of today's #tunnel_bomb vs. an #Assad regime base near #Maarat_al_Numan.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aL-g8zlcAgQ …

[OUTLAW 09]

Joel--it seems that there are two distinct wars ongoing right now in Syria and Iraq---one is IS as they are building their Caliphate --the second one is the moderate Islamist forces fighting directly the Assad military which is slowly but steadily winning both territory and defeating in fight after fight Assad's Army.

When the moderate Islamists defeat the Assad Army what do the two main antagonists then do?--merge together and or fight each other---that is an interesting question.

At the rate the Assad Army is losing bases and territory that might not be so far away.

An even better video on the tunnel bomb attack.

#BreakingFootage Syrian rebel tunnel bomb rocks #Assad regime base near #Maarat_al_Numan.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CYgiH6ZDtU8 …

This looks just like the tunnel bomb trench attacks of WW1 in France.

[OUTLAW 09]

Seems now Russian news media is carrying the killing of Sunni civilians by Shia militia in Baghdad, Samarra, and Kirkuk.

From RIA today:

MOSCOW, October 14 (RIA Novosti) - Amnesty International has slammed Iraqi authorities for supporting and arming Shia militias, who are carrying out attacks in the cities of Baghdad, Samarra and Kirkuk on Sunni civilians, ostensibly in retaliation for Islamic State (IS) actions, a statement published on the organization's website said Tuesday.

"By failing to hold militias accountable for war crimes and other gross human rights abuses the Iraqi authorities have effectively granted them free rein to go on the rampage against Sunnis. The new Iraqi government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi must act now to rein in the militias and establish the rule of law," Amnesty International senior crisis response adviser Donatella Rovera said in the statement.

"Militia members, numbering tens of thousands, wear military uniforms, but they operate outside any legal framework and without any official oversight," the statement added.

The organization stated that Sunnis were attacked under the pretext of fighting terrorism, whereas the real aim of the Shia militias is to "punish Sunnis for the rise of the IS."

According to the organization, details about the fate of many individuals kidnapped by the Shia militias remain unknown. Some abductees, Amnesty notes, were killed even though ransoms were paid.

Amnesty stated that the Shia militias came to power and prominence in June, when the Iraqi Army gave in, leaving almost a third of the country under IS control.

[ganulv]

Joel--it seems that there are two distinct wars ongoing right now in Syria and Iraq---one is IS as they are building their Caliphate --the second one is the moderate Islamist forces fighting directly the Assad military which is slowly but steadily winning both territory and defeating in fight after fight Assad's Army.

When the moderate Islamists defeat the Assad Army what do the two main antagonists then do?--merge together and or fight each other---that is an interesting question.

In the video of the interview with Joshua Landis that I posted on the Syria thread yesterday he touches on some of the previous relations between the FSA and the Daesh, particularly in the taking of the Menagh Air Base: http://youtu.be/_-roW5Y7vbw?t=19m11s He mentions the propo video Flames of War by way of evidence. I won't link to the video, which is easily enough found by any search engine.

[CrowBat]

Joel--it seems that there are two distinct wars ongoing right now in Syria and Iraq---one is IS as they are building their Caliphate --the second one is the moderate Islamist forces fighting directly the Assad military which is slowly but steadily winning both territory and defeating in fight after fight Assad's Army.

When the moderate Islamists defeat the Assad Army what do the two main antagonists then do?--merge together and or fight each other---that is an interesting question.

At the rate the Assad Army is losing bases and territory that might not be so far away.
Sorry but this sounds as if you've missed only some three years of Civil War in Syria?

...and the latest spate of regime's successes too?

You've mentioned three topics here:

1.) The Islamic Front (IF) was established already back in late 2012, with Saudi backing and to counter Qatari supported JAN, i.e. to stop the flow of defections of 'Islamists' (i.e. those Syrian insurgents that were religious) from the FSyA to the JAN. Majority of the IF consists of 'moderately religious' people, but its top leadership is sectarian. Means: Alawis are unlikely to have it good under their rule.

2.) The IF is neither winning nor gaining territory. On the contrary: lately they have lost several major battles.

For example: they've lost much of northern Aleppo Province to the regime's offensive from Sheikh Najjar Industrial City in direction of Nubol and az-Zahra. Organized and run by the IRGC, and with help of a full IRGC-brigade, supported by a battalion each of the Ba'ath Party Militia and Hezbollah ('special forces'), plus NDF tanks and artillery, this operation punched through insurgent defences which were weak following JAN's withdrawal from that area. This withdrawal was caused by US air strikes on local JAN HQ and large-scale defection of (primarily foreign) combatants to the Daesh.

Another 'Islamist' (actually: 'Salafist') insurgent group, Ahrar ash-Sham (and another one recently hit by US strikes), then attempted to distract the regime through a counterattack against the regime's supply corridor for Aleppo, south of that city. This corridor is stretching from Palmyra all the way up to Aleppo, and goes in between areas held by insurgents (western side) and the Daesh (eastern side). Ahrar temporarily captured as-Safira (famous as location of most of Syrian defence industry), but then lost it in a vicious regime (read: IRGC) counterattack.

Overall, the situation on this frontline is now something like 'stalled', but regime 'won' the last round: if nothing else, due to capture of Hindarat, north of Aleppo, it is overlooking the last few roads connecting insurgents inside Aleppo with Turkey. Plus, it is still in control of its corridor.

Another example, this time from south-eastern Damascus: following the latest chemical attack by the regime - which mauled five battalions of the JAN in Adra, in late August - the IRGC launched a major offensive on the IF and the JAN in that town, and overrun them. Then the IRGC launched another offensive on besieged Jobar (meanwhile rather resembling the Moon-scape), and overrun this place too (just yesterday).

This means that now the IF in Eastern Ghouta is completely besieged - and this ahead of the coming winter.

The fighting in Moarek area... even this is no 'win': it's actually an aftermath of a failed IF-JAN offensive in direction of Hama. Earlier this year, this nearly reached the Hama AB (north of that city), but meanwhile the JAN fell back, Ahrar followed in fashion (guess why?), and the IF lacked forces to maintain frontlines. Because of this, the insurgents fell back towards north, i.e. in direction of Moarek (scene of a 4-months long regime's offensive, earlier this year, which was not only stopped cold, but extremely costly in terms of casualties - for Damascus, but for Tehran too).

The difference is: it is in this area that the IF can lean back upon support from Harakat Hazm, i.e. the hard-core of the former FSyA, and one of only 3-4 groups of Syrian insurgents really supported by the US... actually: they are supported by Saudis with US consent. Harakat has its 'A-team' of TOW-shooters in the area, and they've claimed about 30 kills in Moarek area, the last month or so.

Finally, the only area where insurgents managed to seriously advance in this year is southern Syria. Here the Southern Front - which has nothing to do with the IF and is rather similar to the Harakat (though not as happily supported by the US/Saudis) - managed to liberate most of Qunaitra Province. They did so in cooperation with the JAN, which is the reason Washington dislikes the SF so much.

Further south-east, the SF managed to vastly expand the area under its control aside of a very narrow, regime-controlled corridor connecting Damascus with whatever was left of regime's garrison inside Dera'a. Should they manage to completely seal that corridor, the regime there would be in extremely serious trouble, and actually the insurgents could then stop thinking about an advance in direction of Ghouta.

3.) Now to the next topic you mentioned:

When the moderate Islamists defeat the Assad Army what do the two main antagonists then do?The IF is the largest insurgent group in Syria (most conservative estimate: about 50,000 combatants), and the best armed (including not only at least two 'companies' of armour, plenty of artillery, but also two operational SA-8 systems), but they cannot win this war on their own.

Anyway, they are against the Daesh, and there is no way they might ever merge with them, or even with the JAN. Otherwise, they would have done so already long ago.


At the rate the Assad Army is losing bases and territory that might not be so far away.Following its large-scale withdrawal in late June (in reaction to Daesh's advance into Iraq), the IRGC-QF is now back in force in Syria, operating a number of new brigades there. That's the reason why the regime 'suddenly' became capable of capturing Jobar and of advancing north of Aleppo.

Presently, I do not see the way how should insurgents - whether Harakat, Southern Front, Syrian Revolutionary Front and the Tawhid Brigade (four groups de-facto making the FSyA; conservative estimate: about 45,000 combatants), or the IF, and whether either on their own or all united and fighting together - 'defeat' the IRGC-led regime forces in Syria. They are not only too few (primarily because they can't arm and support more fighters), but also not well-enough armed.

This is unlikely to change any time soon - and even less likely to happen if Washington continues its short-sighted policy of blindly ignoring the Syrian regime.

[davidbfpo]

A conservative explanation why the ISF collapsed - before Mosul - which is a good, quick read:http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/why-iraqs-american-trained-army-failed/

It ends with:
One thing is clear: the foreign armies that the U.S. invests so much money, time, and effort in training and equipping don’t act as if America’s enemies are their enemies. Contrary to the behavior predicted by Donald Rumsfeld, when the U.S. removes those “training wheels” from its client militaries, they pedal furiously (when they pedal at all) in directions wholly unexpected by, and often undesirable to, their American paymasters. And if that’s not a clear sign of the failure of U.S. foreign policy, I don’t know what is.


The more I read the more I wondered is the ANSF next.

[Bob's World]

I don't know how many times reality needs to validate the inherent fallacy of "Building Partner Capacity" as adopted in recent years by the US Military.

We are not the British Colonial Office, we are not seeking to secure the British Empire; and it is not 1914 - yet we pursue this line of illogic as if all those things were true.

We should focus on developing our own understanding, relationships and influence among the populations, governments and places where our truly vital interests manifest most. And then we need to learn to accept a degree of risk in terms of who might rise to power in those places in any particular time, or what form of governance might be employed for some period as well. So long as we are in a position of understanding and influence we are unlikely to be overly put out by any temporary rise of some brand of governance that offends our idea of what right looks like.

But in an era where people and countries everywhere are working to be more like themselves, it is an unwise to invest in security capabilities and capacities that are intended to conform them to US perspectives and interests.

It is time to move on to a better model, one more attuned to the world as it actually exists, rather than one attuned for a world long relegated to the annals of history.

[omarali50]

The ANSF does not have to be next. The US does not make the SAME mistake everywhere...the biggest mistake would be to think that everything is the same.
In Afghanistan, the US supported regime and its army are both viable. They have been badly served by many US mistakes and they have thdir own weaknesses, but none that are necessarily fatal. The mistake here would be to dump them because the mess in the middle east proves the US did nothing right...

[omarali50]

In Iraq and Syria, the US made almost every wrong assumption possible and continues to make new ones. The most rational strategy there would be to support the Kurds with US taxpayer's footing the bill, to help defend the oil kingdoms and Jordan with THEM footing the bill and publicly asking for and defending that assistance, and to let the rest find their own way. Iran can defend Shia Iraq and Alawite Syria, maybe with Russian help. Turkey can stew in its own BS while being kept out of Kurdistan by the US.
Nothing like this will happen of course...I am just saying that would be somewhat rational.

[CrowBat]

Few points here:

1.) Afghanistan: the US went in there and cleaned up the Taliban, back in 2002-2003, which was 'all nice and fine' - but de-facto 'curing effects of disease, not the disease itself'. Nothing was done about Pakistan, and nothing about primary supporters of Wahhabism. And where is Wahhabism an official state religion...?

(Connect the dots for yourself.)

And to make matters worse: the US then de-facto forgot about this war and started the Iraq-quagmire instead.

What a surprise then, the Taliban 'are back'. How could that happen...?

2.) Iraq: yes, the US did really everything wrong there. But what's worse, Obama seems to be so insistent on building-up and expanding Bush Jr's mistakes... I really have a huge problem believing what kind of nonsense is he doing there.

Result: given there is not a word of complaint from Tehran about Shi'a ethnically cleansing Sunnis from areas still under Baghdad control (actually: being more busy with this than fighting the Daesh), I would say Iranians are perfectly happy with having a better part of Iraq delivered under their control. That said, they were already in economic control of much of it before, but now they're going to establish themselves so firmly there, there will be no way to do anything in Iraq without consent from Tehran.

But hey, Obama says Iran is fighting the Daesh and that's making even such terrorists like the IRGC, and such Islamist fanatics like their Shi'a militias from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere...'friends'...?!?

3.) Syria: ....sigh... what I find as amazing as Obama's insistent failures in Iraq, is not only the US, but general Western ignorance of the fact that the Assadist regime there is now completely dependent on Tehran. Nobody cares about the fact that two organizations from FBI's list of 'terrorist organizations' - namely the IRGC and Hezbollah - are in charge of regime's military and intelligence apparatus, nor that this apparatus now consists of IRGC/Basiji-like mix of militias (half of these non-Syrian) and little more but gangs of criminals that are using chemical weapons as they like.

But, 'who cares', eh? Saving Iranian-controlled parts of Iraq is so much more important...?!?

Why? Because 'Iraqi government is US-friendly'....?

4.) Kurds: oh yeah, but sure, lets support Kurds, they're the 'good' ones, they're laicist, and pluralist, and inclusive and thus 'unlike all the Moslems that are all terrorists'.

Hey, has anybody there beyond the great barn realized that:

- a) Kurds are fighting for their own, Kurdish state only, not for the USA, not for a unified Iraq, nor for anybody else?

- b) majority of Kurds are Moslems?

- c) nearly a third of Daesh is consisting of Kurds?

- d) none of major Kurdish 'political' parties is 'pluralist', and they act as 'inclusive' only for show?

- e) half of various important Kurdish groups are considered 'terrorists' not only by the USA, but by Turkey, Iran, even Iraq etc.?

5.) Sunni Arabs: the US politics in the Middle East already proved costly for local Christians and other minorities. Now it's proving exceptionally costly for supposedly major 'Arab' allies of the USA - the Sunnis.

But hey: no problem. Keep on teaching Sunnis that they're incompatible with democracy, pluralism, and non-inclusive, and that they should stick with their police-kingdoms. Because these are maintaining control of their population with help of brutal oppression and extremist religion.

All of this is 'perfectly rational', of course - as long as it's for the sake of oil: who cares if the latter is meanwhile hardly interesting for anybody else but for China, India and Japan...

[OUTLAW 09]

Sorry but this sounds as if you've missed only some three years of Civil War in Syria?

...and the latest spate of regime's successes too?

You've mentioned three topics here:

1.) The Islamic Front (IF) was established already back in late 2012, with Saudi backing and to counter Qatari supported JAN, i.e. to stop the flow of defections of 'Islamists' (i.e. those Syrian insurgents that were religious) from the FSyA to the JAN. Majority of the IF consists of 'moderately religious' people, but its top leadership is sectarian. Means: Alawis are unlikely to have it good under their rule.

2.) The IF is neither winning nor gaining territory. On the contrary: lately they have lost several major battles.

For example: they've lost much of northern Aleppo Province to the regime's offensive from Sheikh Najjar Industrial City in direction of Nubol and az-Zahra. Organized and run by the IRGC, and with help of a full IRGC-brigade, supported by a battalion each of the Ba'ath Party Militia and Hezbollah ('special forces'), plus NDF tanks and artillery, this operation punched through insurgent defences which were weak following JAN's withdrawal from that area. This withdrawal was caused by US air strikes on local JAN HQ and large-scale defection of (primarily foreign) combatants to the Daesh.

Another 'Islamist' (actually: 'Salafist') insurgent group, Ahrar ash-Sham (and another one recently hit by US strikes), then attempted to distract the regime through a counterattack against the regime's supply corridor for Aleppo, south of that city. This corridor is stretching from Palmyra all the way up to Aleppo, and goes in between areas held by insurgents (western side) and the Daesh (eastern side). Ahrar temporarily captured as-Safira (famous as location of most of Syrian defence industry), but then lost it in a vicious regime (read: IRGC) counterattack.

Overall, the situation on this frontline is now something like 'stalled', but regime 'won' the last round: if nothing else, due to capture of Hindarat, north of Aleppo, it is overlooking the last few roads connecting insurgents inside Aleppo with Turkey. Plus, it is still in control of its corridor.

Another example, this time from south-eastern Damascus: following the latest chemical attack by the regime - which mauled five battalions of the JAN in Adra, in late August - the IRGC launched a major offensive on the IF and the JAN in that town, and overrun them. Then the IRGC launched another offensive on besieged Jobar (meanwhile rather resembling the Moon-scape), and overrun this place too (just yesterday).

This means that now the IF in Eastern Ghouta is completely besieged - and this ahead of the coming winter.

The fighting in Moarek area... even this is no 'win': it's actually an aftermath of a failed IF-JAN offensive in direction of Hama. Earlier this year, this nearly reached the Hama AB (north of that city), but meanwhile the JAN fell back, Ahrar followed in fashion (guess why?), and the IF lacked forces to maintain frontlines. Because of this, the insurgents fell back towards north, i.e. in direction of Moarek (scene of a 4-months long regime's offensive, earlier this year, which was not only stopped cold, but extremely costly in terms of casualties - for Damascus, but for Tehran too).

The difference is: it is in this area that the IF can lean back upon support from Harakat Hazm, i.e. the hard-core of the former FSyA, and one of only 3-4 groups of Syrian insurgents really supported by the US... actually: they are supported by Saudis with US consent. Harakat has its 'A-team' of TOW-shooters in the area, and they've claimed about 30 kills in Moarek area, the last month or so.

Finally, the only area where insurgents managed to seriously advance in this year is southern Syria. Here the Southern Front - which has nothing to do with the IF and is rather similar to the Harakat (though not as happily supported by the US/Saudis) - managed to liberate most of Qunaitra Province. They did so in cooperation with the JAN, which is the reason Washington dislikes the SF so much.

Further south-east, the SF managed to vastly expand the area under its control aside of a very narrow, regime-controlled corridor connecting Damascus with whatever was left of regime's garrison inside Dera'a. Should they manage to completely seal that corridor, the regime there would be in extremely serious trouble, and actually the insurgents could then stop thinking about an advance in direction of Ghouta.

3.) Now to the next topic you mentioned:
The IF is the largest insurgent group in Syria (most conservative estimate: about 50,000 combatants), and the best armed (including not only at least two 'companies' of armour, plenty of artillery, but also two operational SA-8 systems), but they cannot win this war on their own.

Anyway, they are against the Daesh, and there is no way they might ever merge with them, or even with the JAN. Otherwise, they would have done so already long ago.

Following its large-scale withdrawal in late June (in reaction to Daesh's advance into Iraq), the IRGC-QF is now back in force in Syria, operating a number of new brigades there. That's the reason why the regime 'suddenly' became capable of capturing Jobar and of advancing north of Aleppo.

Presently, I do not see the way how should insurgents - whether Harakat, Southern Front, Syrian Revolutionary Front and the Tawhid Brigade (four groups de-facto making the FSyA; conservative estimate: about 45,000 combatants), or the IF, and whether either on their own or all united and fighting together - 'defeat' the IRGC-led regime forces in Syria. They are not only too few (primarily because they can't arm and support more fighters), but also not well-enough armed.

This is unlikely to change any time soon - and even less likely to happen if Washington continues its short-sighted policy of blindly ignoring the Syrian regime.

AND pray tell CrowBat--just what is the Assad giving to the Sunni population as a whole--chemical gas strikes---which are still ongoing "although he claims they have no chemicals left, barrel bombs still ongoing and you expect as do the Russians the Sunni majority population will what seek accommodation with Assad? ---come on CrowBat get honestly real in your line of thoughts.

[omarali50]

There is no good solution. Nobody should be supported because they are laicist, secular, whatever, but because they are the best bet to have a working state that will not be insanely anti-US or that can at least be held responsible for hosting terrorist camps in its territory and suchlike...
There is a civilizational crisis in the core Islamicate world. It is not ALL the fault fo the great Satan but the great Satan has been remarkably bad at guessing what will happen next or who the good guys are, so the great Satan will do well to be less ambitious and not base it's policies on perceived/desired outcomes in that struggle. Having a state you can work with is good enough for guvmint work.
Of course, that is assuming there is some sort of "national interest" in butting in 10,000 miles away (Israel? I dont buy the Oil thing..what will they do with oil? drink it? It has to be sold...Oh, I forgot, the oil companies may have a thing to say about that..). Maybe the best thing is to go with Rand Paul and stay the hell away. Let Turkey and Russia and Iran and whatever other "real" country exists there fight it out.

[AmericanPride]

But hey: no problem. Keep on teaching Sunnis that they're incompatible with democracy, pluralism, and non-inclusive, and that they should stick with their police-kingdoms. Because these are maintaining control of their population with help of brutal oppression and extremist religion.

Just FYI, from the Washington Post: Saudi sentences iconic Shiite cleric to death (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/saudi-sentences-iconic-shiite-cleric-to-death/2014/10/15/f522d042-544f-11e4-b86d-184ac281388d_story.html?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2AMideast%20Brief&utm_campaign=2014_The%20Middle%20East%20Daily_10.1 5.14)


“I think the message that Saudis are saying is: ‘We will arrest anybody. We don’t care how high profile they are. ... nobody is above this. We don’t have any tolerance. We don’t have any flexibility,’” Human Rights Watch Middle East researcher Adam Coogle said.

[JWing]

Update on security situation in Anbar. Ramadi did not fall but is 60% under IS control. IS is attacking up and down the province and whole thing threatened. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/update-on-security-in-iraqs-anbar.html).

[AmericanPride]

Nobody should be supported because they are laicist, secular, whatever, but because they are the best bet to have a working state that will not be insanely anti-US

Secular, pluralist regimes are often the 'best bet' to having a working state. With the exception of Turkey (and that's coming into doubt), secularism is dead in the Middle East. And it's not by accident or because of some inherent feature of Islam, but because of deliberate policy decisions made in regional and foreign capitals to undermine secularism and pluralism. When the state represses the population in the name of 'secularism' or provides empty gestures of pluralism (like Saudi Arabia's municipal elections, or Iraq's sectarian 'democracy'), it does far more destruction to that cause than simply outlawing it.

The Islamic State is the culmination of decades of repression, violence, and destruction tightly woven into a fundamentalist Islamist narrative. That we in the West are so shocked by this development after 60 years of warfare in the region speaks volumes about our understanding of the region.

[Bob's World]

I think a key thing to keep in mind is that ISIL success or failure cannot be measured in terms of ground held or lost; or other measures convenient to conventional conflict.

Success or failure will be in the degree of support of the Arab Sunni population to their leadership.

Strategic focus for an anti-ISIL campaign must be on how we outcompete ISIL for the support of this population.

1. Aerial bombing campaigns are more likely to increase support to ISIL by decreasing support to the West.

2. Western commitment to a restoration of Iraq to a single state - even with the promise of government less dominated by Shia factions - is unlikely to weaken support to ISIL from this population.

We need to reframe how we think about the problem, and we need to be willing to step away from aspects of Western policy/strategy we believe are important if they create infeasible conditions for the military operation sent out to secure those same goals.

We set infeasible goals for both Iraq and Afghanistan and then grew frustrated with the massive insurgencies that resulted and the inability of "big COIN" as we defined it to produce or secure the goals we had set. That was the primary strategic error then, and it is the primary strategic error now.

If one defines problems in terms of what one wants them to be, rather than in terms of what they actually are; AND if one sets policy goals that are infeasible in the context of the situation as it actually exists - then no campaign or family of tactics, regardless of how brilliantly and vigorously executed, is likely to produce the desired results in an enduring form.

This conflict is not about ISIL, ISIL simply stepped up to fill a vacuum and promise the Arab Sunni populations of Syria and Iraq liberation from systems of Shia-dominated governance widely perceived as intolerable. The West cannot not be overly wed to reinforcing conditions we think are best for us if we ever want to reduce the insurgent energy driving these conflicts and empowering radical constructs of governance such as offered by ISIL.

This conflict is about helping the Arab Sunni populations of this region get to systems of governance they can reasonably trust. They will need at a minimum what we facilitated for the Kurds, but at this point may settle for nothing less than a fully sovereign Sunni governed state.

[CrowBat]

AND pray tell CrowBat--just what is the Assad giving to the Sunni population as a whole--chemical gas strikes---which are still ongoing "although he claims they have no chemicals left, barrel bombs still ongoing and you expect as do the Russians the Sunni majority population will what seek accommodation with Assad? ---come on CrowBat get honestly real in your line of thoughts.Me do not verstehen what Sie mentir...?


There is no good solution. Nobody should be supported because they are laicist, secular, whatever, but because they are the best bet to have a working state that will not be insanely anti-US or that can at least be held responsible for hosting terrorist camps in its territory and such like...Well, the 'best working states there', and especially those that are 'not insanely anti-US', have Wahhabism as state-religion and public beheadings as highest penalty.


Maybe the best thing is to go with Rand Paul and stay the hell away. Let Turkey and Russia and Iran and whatever other "real" country exists there fight it out.Ho-hum... don't want to spoil the party (and can only hope you're not going to shoot the messenger, like 'Outlaw' likes to do), but: Obama was doing precisely this, and that for five years in Iraq, and for three in Syria.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but somehow it seems things are not the least going the way the West would like them to go. Could that be because other people (but the 'USA') see things differently, and it's a lil' bit... erm... nave to expect, for example, Saudis or Qataris to remove an oppressive regime in Syria, and then establish a pluralist government instead...?


Just FYI, from the Washington Post...Sorry, can't comment this really: I do not know to what of three major cliques within the Saud regime (or their followers) did that character belong, nor for what actual reason was he executed.

Namely, most of such 'high-profile' executions are not meant as some sort of 'message' for the West, or the Daesh, al-Qaida, etc., but they are rather 'mutual' i.e. signals for 'superiority' of this or that clique over its opposition (still within the Saud family).

That's one of typical problems when one has such lovely oppressive regimes as 'friends'.

[JWing]

U.S. just send a divisional command to run a training mission for the Iraqi forces and sent three teams out into the field one in Diyala and two to Anbar. One is being assigned to Al-Assad base in Anbar which was under attack yesterday. First step by Obama administration to rebuild ground forces in Iraq, but only a baby step. Here's a link to my article (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/us-boots-on-ground-in-iraq-advisers.html).

[JWing]

Bob's world

The problem with creating a Sunni state in Iraq is that it would be unsustainable. There are few resources to build an economy around in the Sunni regions of Iraq, plus they are not contiguous.

[OUTLAW 09]

I will posture the following---as long as the US maintains bombing and does not introduce ground troops which is really what the IS wants the Sunni's will keep the Shia bottled up for the coming months as all attempts by the Shia militia and ISF has shown they have no abilities in throwing the IS out of Sunni territory.

That includes bottling up Baghdad.

The question become through with the falling oil prices just how long Baghdad can afford to fight and how long with the Iranians hang on?

The KSA and Kuwait are signaling a level of 60 is fine for them--but can Iraq and Iran go along---not really?

So the Russian are suffering now via the oil prices for their support of Assad---notice the KSA is not fighting hard to support the oil prices that support the Russian budget--makes one wonder of the KSA is also targeting Iraq and Iran?

[Bob's World]

Bob's world

The problem with creating a Sunni state in Iraq is that it would be unsustainable. There are few resources to build an economy around in the Sunni regions of Iraq, plus they are not contiguous.

True, but those are solvable problems and it paves the way for getting to sufficient trust for natural stability to re-emerge.

The best one can achieve by simply attacking ISIL and committing to the re-establishment of the status quo is to re-set the conditions of failure and change who the next leader to emerge to address these conditions will be.

The worst is that we completely alienate Sunni Muslims globally in a manner that lends even more strength to AQ; and also stoke this small fire into a conflagration that erupts within other disenfranchised Sunni populations across the Arabian Peninsula.

Better to attempt a difficult strategy that has the potential to succeed, than to take an easier course that is doomed to fail.

[OUTLAW 09]

I will posture the following---as long as the US maintains bombing and does not introduce ground troops which is really what the IS wants the Sunni's will keep the Shia bottled up for the coming months as all attempts by the Shia militia and ISF has shown they have no abilities in throwing the IS out of Sunni territory.

That includes bottling up Baghdad.

The question become through with the falling oil prices just how long Baghdad can afford to fight and how long with the Iranians hang on?

The KSA and Kuwait are signaling a level of 60 is fine for them--but can Iraq and Iran go along---not really?

So the Russian are suffering now via the oil prices for their support of Assad---notice the KSA is not fighting hard to support the oil prices that support the Russian budget--makes one wonder of the KSA is also targeting Iraq and Iran?

Here is the impact on Iran.

Los Angeles Times ✔ @latimes

Drop in global oil prices threatens to hit Russia and Iran harder than Western economic sanctions have done:
http://lat.ms/1tYDt2g

[CrowBat]

Bob's world

The problem with creating a Sunni state in Iraq is that it would be unsustainable. There are few resources to build an economy around in the Sunni regions of Iraq, plus they are not contiguous.About 90 years ago, Britain created just such a state that was named 'Transjordan'.

For the first 40 years of its existence, this was completely dependable on British financial support.


Here is the impact on Iran....which is a reason more to wonder why is Obama showing such restraint and even 'understanding for higher Iranian national interests' - in upholding the Assadist regime in Syria.

There is no explanation for this... well, except Iran has what a pal of mine tends to call 'assets not publicly known'. Though, existence of such would then really 'explain everything'.

*********

BTW, Outlaw: I am still waiting for a 'translation' of your question above. No problem to answer it - all provided I would understand it.

[Bob's World]

The legend is that Transjordan was "Churchill's thumb" - that he placed his fist and thumb on the map, traced a line around it and proclaimed it to be the new Transjordan.

Inherently illegitimate, and as accurately pointed out here, void of the fundamental resources to be a true state.

We cannot draw the new borders, but we can create the conditions for fighting to stop, new lines to form and negotiations to ensure that each entity that emerges has the fundamental basics to support a functioning state.

Drawing lines for others, creating governments for others, and overly attempting to preserve an increasingly irrelevant status quo by suppressing conflict are all activities that are increasingly inappropriate or even infeasible in the emergent environment.

[omarali50]

Bob's world: "True, but those are solvable problems and it paves the way for getting to sufficient trust for natural stability to re-emerge."

What is "natural stability"? there is no such thing. There are existing patterns of culture and ethnicity and religion that make some solutions easier than others, but the elastic limit is not easy to know in advance. There was an Iraqi state, it was "unnatural" (with a Sunni Arab minority lording it over Shias and Kurds), but it held together for 80 years and could well have held out longer. Could even recover from its current disunion, though that does not look very likely. Sunni Arabs armed with Islamist ideology may not accept whatever limited territory you are going to grant them. Or they may. Its not that one of these arrangements is NECESSARILY going to work or is impossible.
I am not really disagreeing with your call to reassess the "mission". I just think that the ideological glue that will hold any Sunni Iraqi statelet will (today and in the near future, not some eternal essence) be Islamist in nature and will demand expansion into "naturally" shia and Kurdish areas, making "natural stability" very difficult. Isolation of ISIS led Iraq until military defeat is the only option there, though one can make the case that it is a job for Saudi Arabia and Iran and other neighbors..and whatever mercenaries they can bring to bear, not necessarily for the US. Some of them may opt to join ISIS-led Iraq rather than fight them. That too may not be an American problem, though it is a problem for people in the region...
In short, I dont think America can easily come up with a BETTER solution than the current muddled policy, but CAN get itself to the sidelines (or be clearer about what it will and will not do and what it CAN and CANNOT do).
A bad situation for years is pretty much guaranteed. You dont have to take my word for it, but I am not the only one saying that...
American mistakes helped bring this about. But American good sense will not necessarily make it all good in any reasonably short time frame. The caliphate Jinn is out of the bottle.
See this video from the TTP in Pakistan. The guy in the video is an ex-army doctor. When he talks about what Islam demands of us, I can hear my teachers in military school 40 years ago. Sure, it was possible that future generations of students would take the ideology of Pakistan as non-seriously as most of us did, but after 20 billion dollars pumped in for the Afghan Jihad etc, that option is now officially closed. #### happens.
http://www.mediafire.com/watch/?75piv2l2qtc6s6w

btw, notice that the good doctor was able to get to TTP-land after being arrested in Croatia and deported to Pakistan for being a jihadist. The ideology is attractive to people, even to people deputed to fight it...

[Bob's World]

Artificial stability is when the primary purpose of security force is to protect the government from the people. This is the essence of military stability operations. Such a system requires tremendous security "energy" to sustain. Often we create this and think we have solved the problem, leading us to remove the very energy that is keeping revolution in check. The results are predictable. Thus the rise of ISIS, and coming soon, the re-emergence of the Taliban with the government of Afghanistan compressed once again to the ring road and control of a handful of cities.

Natural Stability is when the primary purpose of security forces is to protect the people from each other so as to allow society to go about the pursuit of life, liberty and happiness in the context of their respective culture. This still requires security energy, but much less and with a very different focus.

You have to impose one to get to the other. But one has to address fundamental drivers of revolution if one hopes to make that transition. Our dedication to restoring the status quo of Iraq as we left it creates conditions that make ever getting to natural stability largely infeasible.

[CrowBat]

^^...which is actually a very simple concept: indeed so much so, I do not understand why are there so many people who know nothing about it?

[SWJ Blog]

ISIS Threat Is 'Extremely Worrying' Says Counter-Insurgency Expert (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/isis-threat-is-extremely-worrying-says-counter-insurgency-expert)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/isis-threat-is-extremely-worrying-says-counter-insurgency-expert) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[JWing]

I just interviewed Georgetown's Daveed Gartenstein-Ross about the Islamic State's commander responsible for the on going offensive in Anbar and IS's general tactics and strategy. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/a-discussion-of-islamic-states-strategy.html).

[Bob's World]

Hmmm. I am not sure why everyone talks about the progress of IS in terms of ground taken, and progress against IS in terms of equipment destroyed or ground lost.

It reads like news reports of the German advance into Russia during WWII, complete with a seemingly Stalingrad-like fixation on a seemingly moot city by IS.

While I do believe that the "cell" has divided - that what was once internal revolutionary insurgency is now better thought of as warfare between the new Islamic State and the existing states of Syria and Iraq; I am also pretty certain that any "defeat" of IS can do little more than knock them back into being a revolutionary insurgency once again.

Given that likely reality, then progress in terms of ground covered, cities captured or lost, equipment damaged or destroyed is interesting, but in the big scheme of things not the primary measure of success or failure.

IS leadership are the ones who stepped in to champion the cause of the Sunni Arab populations of Syria and Iraq. From all that I have seen, this is a tenuous link at best, as most of this population does not condone the approaches of IS or buy into their ideology. They do, however, believe strongly, that they have little future under the Shia dominated governments of Syria and Iraq.

The question for the US is: "How do others with interests in this region out-compete IS for influence with the Sunni Arab population"?

The measure of strategic progress or losses is not in material or dirt, but in the shift of who is winning this competition for influence.

So, some questions:

How does dropping bombs on Sunni Arabs fight under the IS flag build influence with the families of those fighters or undermine the leadership of IS?

How does being officially dedicated to the re-establishment of the Iraqi state in the image the US wants for them build influence with Sunni Arabs or undermine their belief that only IS offers them hope for political change?

Once again, I think we have framed the problem in the wrong terms, and we measure the wrong things. We need to get the strategic context straight first, then we need to get our narrative straight second. Only then can we design a campaign of tactics that is reasonably likely to produce the success we seek.

[JWing]

Just published new security report for 2nd wk of Oct in Iraq. Attacks remain low since high of summer offensive. Series of deadly car bombs throughout central Iraq increased casualties for the week however. IS on offensive in Anbar and Salahaddin still. Other provinces trying to hold ground against security ops. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/car-bombs-in-iraq-increase-casualties.html).

[JWing]

New security report for 3rd week of Oct out. IS still making charge across Anbar. ISF are offensive in Babil and Salahaddin. Comprehensive run down of attacks and casualties across Iraq. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/is-still-making-charge-in-anbar-while.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

About 90 years ago, Britain created just such a state that was named 'Transjordan'.

For the first 40 years of its existence, this was completely dependable on British financial support.

...which is a reason more to wonder why is Obama showing such restraint and even 'understanding for higher Iranian national interests' - in upholding the Assadist regime in Syria.

There is no explanation for this... well, except Iran has what a pal of mine tends to call 'assets not publicly known'. Though, existence of such would then really 'explain everything'.

*********
BTW, Outlaw: I am still waiting for a 'translation' of your question above. No problem to answer it - all provided I would understand it.

with oil heading to 60 per barrel---there is no impact on Iran--come on...AND Opec increasing pumping and not worrying about 60 per barrel--can Iran get up not really.....

[JWing]

I'm at home sick from work but I was still able to write a short piece on how Premier Abadi has announced that the fake bomb detectors will finally be replaced in Iraq. These have been one of the biggest corruption scandals in Iraq that have cost the lives of thousands. It's a small but important move by the new premier. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/10/iraq-to-finally-get-rid-of-fake-bomb.html).

[JWing]

Please read my latest interview. I talked with Abu Abed, ex-Sahwa leader from Amiriya, Baghdad. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/11/the-rise-and-fall-of-sons-of-iraq.html).

[davidbfpo]

A rather sharp critique of US policy in the Middle East, by a ret'd US diplomat (who last served twenty years ago):http://chasfreeman.net/the-collapse-of-order-in-the-middle-east/

Here is a taster:
We are trying to cope with the cumulative consequences of multiple failures. Just about every American project in the Middle East has now come a cropper.

(Later) We have a military campaign plan but lack a political program. We are bombing Da`ish to contain it. There is little reason to believe this will prove effective. Based on past experience, there is no reason to believe it will evolve into a strategy....Da`ish displays unity of command, strong discipline, and elevated morale. The coalition we have assemble to oppose it has no agreed objectives. It is divided, disjointed, and demoralized.

[omarali50]

It will get worse. I have some background on the Islamic angle.

http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2014/11/islam-colonization-imperialism-and-so-on.html

[OUTLAW 09]

Iraq's Sunnis won't fight ISIS for the U.S. says NIQASH, a non-profit media organization operating out of Berlin. Without Sunni support, America's war in Iraq cannot succeed. Here's why.

Negotiations Fail

According to NIQASH, a source at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad said there have been secret negotiations between various Sunni Muslim armed factions, via Arab and Iraqi Kurdish intermediaries, for the past three months. At the request of U.S. diplomats and military personnel, Shia officials from the Iraqi government have also been meeting with the leaders of these groups in Erbil, Kurdistan and Amman, Jordan.

At the same time General John Allen, the Obama's appointed coordinator of U.S. efforts in Iraq, has been trying to contact the Sunni tribal leaders he worked with in Anbar during the previous war's "Awakening." "But it was surprising," a NIQASH source reported, "Most of General Allen's former allies refused to cooperate with us. And some of them are actually now living outside of Iraq because of the Iraqi government's policies."

Oops. With some irony, America's failure to secure the 2006 Awakening caused those Sunnis sympathetic to America's aims to flee Shia persecution. Those "good guys" are thus not available in 2014 to help out America in the current war.

[JWing]

Just published my weekly security report covering Oct. Attacks and casualties were slightly up in Oct compared to Sep. IS faced its first major setback losing Jurf al-Sakhr in Babil. ISF also on offensive in Salahaddin and peshmerga in Ninewa. IS on the other hand still trying to take rest of Anbar and Mount Sinjar. Was significant month because Iraqis able to take important ground from IS for first time. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/11/violence-in-iraq-october-2014-is.html).

[CrowBat]

A rather sharp critique of US policy in the Middle East, by a ret'd US diplomat (who last served twenty years ago):http://chasfreeman.net/the-collapse-of-order-in-the-middle-east/

Here is a taster:
Hard to believe anybody is as bold as to say it THAT clearly.

But then, of course: the author is already in retirement (so nothing bad can happen in return, and nobody listens).

[SWJ Blog]

Decentralization: The Future of ISIS (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/decentralization-the-future-of-isis)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/decentralization-the-future-of-isis) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[JWing]

The Albu Nimr tribe in Anbar which has been fighting the insurgency since 04 is facing mass arrests and executions by the Islamic State. Read what happened in my latest article here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/11/iraqs-albu-nimr-tribe-facing-mass.html).

[davidbfpo]

Crowbat referred to Kurds fighting with and for ISIS now two weeks ago, which rather puzzled me - even allowing for the impact of radicalisation. A Kurdish contact responded:
There are kurds within and supporting ISIS. Although the this is not typical of kurdish political views. The vast majority are secular and vehemently opposed to such organisations.... I understand, the majority of those involved in ISIS are from a particular region, Halabja, in the kurdistan region of Iraq. This is, no doubt, connected to tribal, or religious networks in this are, which probably extend into Iran.

Just spotted a lengthy article on Stripes:http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/kurds-helping-islamic-state-militants-fight-against-their-own-officials-say-1.312226#.VFpVUVTCtf4.twitter

It comments include why Halabja, a town gassed by Saddam Hussein, in 1988:
Halabja was known as a secular village and the home of Abdullah Goran, one of the best-known Kurdish poets in the 20th century and a member of the Iraqi Communist Party. But in the past three decades, Muslim preachers have become active and have turned it into one of Iraqi Kurdistan's most religiously conservative areas....(How many?) Some 70 Iraqi Kurds...

[CrowBat]

David, sigh... I can't talk about the source, but consider this 'first hand': more than 300 Kurds were recruited for the Daesh alone in Evin Prison, in Tehran, in 2013.

So, somebody talking about '70'.... that's as silly as declaring majority of Kurds for 'secular'. Vast majority of Kurds are Sunni Moslems (even Wikipedia 'knows' this (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish_people#Islam)).

That is: except your source meant, '70 from specific village/minor town', of course.

*************

EDIT: the Austrian Ministry of Interior has published its data on Austrians that joined the Daesh so far.

154 went there, 64 came back, some 20+ are known to have been killed so far.

Anybody there seriously attempting to sell the story there are less Kurds fighting for the Daesh than Austrians...?

[Bill Moore]

There have always been Kurds in al-Qaeda in Iraq, so this shouldn't be a surprise. Of course we prefer the simple answers, Arabs bad, Kurds good. There are Sunni, Shia, and Christian Kurds, and who knows there are probably a few Buddhist converts:D. In all seriousness though we need to avoid over generalizations.

[SWJ Blog]

Obama to Seek Congressional Backing for Military Campaign Against ISIS (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/obama-to-seek-congressional-backing-for-military-campaign-against-isis)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/obama-to-seek-congressional-backing-for-military-campaign-against-isis) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

Citing Crowbat (in part):
more than 300 Kurds were recruited for the Daesh alone in Evin Prison, in Tehran, in 2013.

I am aware that Iran has a Kurdish community, although not one noted to my knowledge for being a violent insurgency. So there are Kurds in the Iranian prison system, whether for criminal or political reasons. IIRC Evin Prison is for political prisoners, Wiki states only a 'wing' is so used:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evin_Prison

So Kurds were covertly recruited in the prison, that I can follow as few prisons have total control - though a political wing can be different (as Israel has shown). I am wary about such a prison allowing 'radical' Islamists to flourish. Those recruited presumably hate the Iranian regime and have cause to wage war upon release - making their way to Iraq / Syria to join Daesh.

[davidbfpo]

A pessimistic analysis from Jane's, on both Sunni and Shia opponents of Daesh:http://www.janes.com/article/45284/state-of-war-the-iraqi-sunni-actors-taking-on-the-islamic-state

Here is one passage:
...neither the Peshmerga nor Shia militias have either the means or legitimacy to assert authority over the substantial swaths of predominantly Sunni territory that the Islamic State currently controls in conjunction with local Sunni insurgents.

In short, the current array of Sunni groups and forces opposed to the Islamic State across Iraq is too weak and too localised, and is lacking in the wider credibility required to constitute an effective fighting force.

[JWing]

The main group affiliated with Al Qaeda pre-2003 in Iraq was Ansar al-Islam which was a Kurdish Islamist group. Zarqawi later set up camp with them and they were folded into his organization. It should be no surprise then that there are still Kurdish Islamists involved in the Islamic State.

[JWing]

In eastern Salahaddin is Tuz Kharmato district. It was abandoned by the ISF in June and parts of it were taken over by the peshmerga but just the KUrdish regions. IS surrounded a Shiite Turkmen town called Amerli there, which was later relieved by a joint ISF, militia & peshmerga force. Afterward the militias set about cleansing the entire district of Sunnis by killing civilians, looting and blowing up and burning their homes. Now militias and Kurds are fighting for control of area which has led to more and more confrontations with minor skirmishes and casualties. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/11/continued-clashes-between-militias.html).