Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[CrowBat]

David,


Citing Crowbat (in part):

I am aware that Iran has a Kurdish community, although not one noted to my knowledge for being a violent insurgency.
Iran has a large minority of Kurds, and even a province named Kurdistan. One of 'classics' about Iran is that any government in Tehran is in serious trouble only once there is (usually Kurdish-led) demo/protest/unrest/violence in Tabriz - one of areas densely populated by Kurds. That's, just for example, how the affair that ended with downfall of the Shah began. Immediately afterwards, the first major crisis of the then newly-born Islamic Republic of Iran was a major uprising of Kurdish separatists in the same part of Iran. This ended only because of Iraqi invasion of Iran, in September 1980....

And re. 'not one noted...for being a violent insurgency': permit me to remind you of the Kurdish terrorist group named PJAK, which is launching attacks into Iran since years.

Just because Tehran says they're supported by Israel, this shouldn't mean we all ought to 'suddenly forget' about them.


So there are Kurds in the Iranian prison system, whether for criminal or political reasons. IIRC Evin Prison is for political prisoners, Wiki states only a 'wing' is so used:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evin_Prison

So Kurds were covertly recruited in the prison, that I can follow as few prisons have total control - though a political wing can be different (as Israel has shown). I am wary about such a prison allowing 'radical' Islamists to flourish....according to not only one source that enjoyed the hospitality of Evin, the guards are scared to death of the crucial figure behind recruiting activity in question. So much so, nobody even knew his name. That character was eventually left to go - together with all of his newly-won followers.

I always say - indeed: I often insist on - 'connect/ing the dots'. Now, couple such reports with those like this one:http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Feb-07/246688-us-targets-key-iran-based-al-qaeda-facilitator.ashx#axzz2t4guL6bI]U.S. Treasury says Iran helping Al-Qaeda in Syria


......Iran is assisting key Al-Qaeda figures to transfer Sunni fighters into Syria, the Obama administration charged Thursday.

The accusation, detailed in new sanctions imposed by the U.S. Treasury department targeting Iranian terror links, indicates Iranian officials are backing opposing sides in the Syrian civil war.

Olimzhon Adkhamovich Sadikov, described by the Treasury Department as an Iran-based Islamic Jihad Union facilitator who “operates there with the knowledge of Iranian authorities,”......and I think everybody should get the picture.

Namely, while not directly related to each other, these two 'reports' are at least circumstantial evidence of Tehran at least ignoring the activities related to, if not outright co-working in, creation of the Daesh.

...and from that standpoint it's on hand that the super-wise pres - meanwhile renowned for completely ignoring every single advice - is all the time working into the hands of Khamenei, Vahid & clique:
Obama Wrote Secret Letter to Iran’s Khamenei About Fighting Islamic State (http://online.wsj.com/articles/obama-wrote-secret-letter-to-irans-khamenei-about-fighting-islamic-state-1415295291?tesla=y&mg=reno64-wsj&url=http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10733299186635963427804580259091373963342.html)

...Presidential Correspondence With Ayatollah Stresses Shared U.S.-Iranian Interests in Combating Insurgents, Urges Progress on Nuclear Talks
...Sigh...

[Bill Moore]

Articles that follow show how ISIL is adapting to the air campaign, although if the breaking news today that ISIL leadership convoy was targeted turns out to be correct that may change the game, at least for the near term.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/06/world/middleeast/isis-wave-of-might-is-turning-into-ripple.html?ref=world&_r=0

ISIS Wave of Might Is Turning Into Ripple

This title is very misleading, but if its purpose was to draw a reader in, it worked on me. What the author points out is that ISIL is adapting to current conditions, which does not mean they are being defeated. In other parts of the article the author does make a good point, if it is accurate, that ISIL has been unable to expand outside Sunni dominated areas.


Across the territories the Islamic State holds, the group has overhauled its operations. Bases and hospitals have been evacuated and moved to civilian homes that are harder to identify and bomb, Iraqi officials said. Fighters who used to cross the desert in convoys now move in small groups or by motorcycle.


Its fighters now move in small groups, making them less vulnerable to air power. And instead of storming into towns with overwhelming force, the group has begun establishing sleeper cells in areas it wants to seize.

“It used to be that a force would come from the outside and attack a city,” Mr. Alhashimi said. “Now the forces rise up from inside the city and make it fall.”

http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/11/2/isil-brings-morethanjustbrutalitytothebattlefield.html

ISIL brings more than just brutality to the battlefield


But according to a new analysis from the Soufan Group, a New York-based security and intelligence consultancy firm, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL) headline-grabbing brutality has obscured the other factors behind its emergence as a formidable challenger to regional powers. Under the guidance of veteran Saddam-era Iraqi commanders, ISIL has morphed from an underground terror cell into a dynamic and well-oiled military force that defies the conventional definition of an insurgent group.

“In Baghdad, it's still a classic terror group. In Fallujah, it's a light infantry unit. It’s whatever it needs to be,” said Patrick Skinner, the lead author of Soufan’s November report, which collated open-source information and analysis from other experts.

Interesting perspective on how complex the fight is from our perspective. The time it takes to develop consensus with our multinational partners gives the adversary the ODAA loop advantage. I doubt that advantage will be decisive in the long run, but it certainly impedes our ability to apply force effectively.


Kobane is just one battle, and waging it has exposed the steep costs involved in simply stopping ISIL from advancing on a single front. It took a herculean effort of diplomatic engineering led by the U.S., coupled with massive protests by Turkish Kurds, to convince a reluctant Ankara merely to allow those reinforcements through its gates. Even with the backing of coalition strikes, all they've managed is a stalemate.

Here is the link to the Soufan Report, which is quite detailed. The authors all seem to have very good credentials. Just skimmed the report so far (66 pages), but initial impression is positive.

http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf

[ganulv]

In other parts of the article the author does make a good point, if it is accurate, that ISIL has been unable to expand outside Sunni dominated areas.

That’s interesting in light of some of what Joshua Landis was saying in a CNN interview yesterday: http://cnn.it/1Ef74tT

[Bill Moore]

Another we need a political solution speaker that ignores the reality of human passion and hatred. We'll just draw a line on the map, you guys can have this area, and you guys can have that area. This problem will ultimately be solved weapons and force, and unless ISIL is put under significant more pressure than they are now why would they seek a political solution? Unless they the speaker thinks they're happy with the current boundaries of Caliphate? Does he assume Turkey and Iraq will be content with these proposed boundaries? Iran? Seems overly simplistic to me.

[ganulv]

Another we need a political solution speaker that ignores the reality of human passion and hatred. We'll just draw a line on the map, you guys can have this area, and you guys can have that area. This problem will ultimately be solved weapons and force, and unless ISIL is put under significant more pressure than they are now why would they seek a political solution? Unless they the speaker thinks they're happy with the current boundaries of Caliphate? Does he assume Turkey and Iraq will be content with these proposed boundaries? Iran? Seems overly simplistic to me.

I understood him to suggest Turkey as contributing substantially to the “weapons and force” part of the equation.

[Bill Moore]

I understood him to suggest Turkey as contributing substantially to the “weapons and force” part of the equation.

I was doing dishes the first time I listened, and this time I heard "we need to drag the Turks into this to disarm them and establish a good government." Paraphrased, but close to what he said I believe.

Staying in my grumpy and defiant mood, what are the chances Turkey wants to do this? Are they capable of helping them establishing a good government? Why wouldn't Turkey continue to arm the Sunni Syrians to finish off Assad's regime? Granted he is a regional expert, but it all seems out of the reach of reality to me.

[ganulv]

I was doing dishes the first time I listened, and this time I heard "we need to drag the Turks into this to disarm them and establish a good government." Paraphrased, but close to what he said I believe.

From my on the fly transcription:

[3:13] What one would have to do if they wanted to solve this problem, and not just make a narrow counter-terrorism approach to it, would be to try to draw the Turks into Syria with Saudi, American backing, and NATO backing, to try to disarm the militias and set up a government that was a good government, that everybody could get behind and pour money into for development […]
Staying in my grumpy and defiant mood, what are the chances Turkey wants to do this? Are they capable of helping them establishing a good government? Why wouldn't Turkey continue to arm the Sunni Syrians to finish off Assad's regime? Granted he is a regional expert, but it all seems out of the reach of reality to me.

First question: You got me. Almost none at the moment? The chances might go up with a few third party incentives and 5–10 more years of the current status quo.

Second question: A completely fair point. I think you can see what Landis is trying to get at when at 5:08 he discusses the need to realize that a de facto Sunni state has already been created. I think the Western government in a box + aid money approach that has been attempted in Afghanistan is almost certain to fail, too. But maybe a neighbor with longer term interests and a better understanding of the dynamics would stand a better chance. Emphasis on maybe.

Third question: Also fair. The counterweight of Iranian support for Assad?

Landis is putting it out there. For all I know he is playing Devil’s advocate, saying, “If you think what I am saying sounds out of reach of reality…”

[JWing]

Just published new security report for first week of Nov. 2014 in Iraq. Attacks remained relatively low but casualties took a jump due to IS massacres of Albu Nimr tribe in Anbar. Fighting in Anbar has hit a stalemate. IS went after Shiite pilgrims with car bombs in Baghdad. ISF and militias consolidating hold upon Jurf al-Sakhr in Babil while IS has relocated just to the north of it. ISF also on offensive in Salahaddin trying to surround Tikrit and cut off IS units there from their supply lines. Here's a link to the article (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/11/islamic-state-executions-in-anbar-keep.html).

[JWing]

Iran has followed almost the same strategy in Syria and Iraq. Tehran did not trust the Syrian military to put down the protests in 2011 and the ISF was disintegrating after the fall of Mosul in 2014. With the unreliability of the government forces Iran pushed to using militias. In Syria Iran advised and helped create the Shabiha, the Popular Committees and then the National Defense Force. As the fighting intensified it also brought in its militia allies from Syria. It advised the Syrians at the strategic and tactical level and sent in thousands of its own fighters into Syria as well as using Hezbollah for advising and combat operations. Similarly in Iraq Iran sent in advisers to form strategy as well as at the tactical level. Jan 2014 Iraqi militias were starting mobilization for fighting in Iraq and have become the backbone of the defense forces. Many brought back their fighters from Syria for deployment to Iraq. Hezbollah is also operating as advisers in Iraq. Iran wants Damascus and Baghdad to defeat their insurgencies and to increase its influence which it has exponentially done as it is seen as THE key ally supporting the home governments. In Iraq there is an additional goal which is to make sure Iraq does not emerge as a powerful state again, because it doesn't want that rivalry reborn as it was during the Saddam era. Tehran has far greater ability to make sure Iraq doesn't come out of this war a strong country now than ever before. Here's my complete article on the topic (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/11/irans-policy-in-syria-and-iraq.html).

[JWing]

Just wrote an article comparing Anbar in 03-06 with the current situation. Many parallels with anger at U.S.-Baghdad, tribes being divided over insurgency, ISF in a hard place, etc. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/11/understanding-anbar-pt-xiii-gen-nouri.html).

[JWing]

My new article covers Gen. Abdullah Jabouri's observations about how the Iraqi security forces in Anbar struggled to establish themselves until they garnered popular support, and then detailed how the ISF are struggling in the province today. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/11/understanding-anbar-pt-xiv-gen-abdullah.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

English translation of the new speech of Islamic State leader Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi here:
https://ia601403.us.archive.org/21/items/kalimah_201411/english.pdf%20 … …
pic.twitter.com/pHekh6tGsG

[JWing]

Just published my new security report for second week of Nov. 2014 in Iraq. Attacks were at the lowest of any week of the year but casualties were unchanged. In Anbar IS continued executions of Albu Nimr tribe while tribes & ISF were preparing for big operation there. In Diyala ISF freed another irrigation system from IS. Biggest news was ISF entering Baiji district in northern Salahaddin in effort to free refinery there and cut off Tikrit. Overall, ISF was making advances during the week against the insurgency. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/11/attacks-way-down-in-iraq-while-security.html).

[davidbfpo]

Clint Watts (CWOT on SWC) asks if the USA is ready to again build-up Sunni (tribal) militias in Iraq and just maybe nearby - in the knowledge that their loyalty is only rented:http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/2014/11/you-dont-win-hearts-and-minds-you-rent-them-reigniting-sunni-tribes-against-isis#

It is not a policy problem just in Iraq:
The lack of viable ground options for securing terrorist safe havens is not a challenge unique to Iraq. The U.S. faces a similar challenge against jihadist enclaves enmeshed in ungoverned spaces in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya and the Sahel to name only a few places.

He provides a framework summary:
Four factors: Establishing favorable conditions for negotiating with militia partners; Offering incentives for participation; Determining the level of control and responsibility for militia actions and Duration of Support

The use of irregular forces is very common in Western COIN and relatively recently in colonial wars in Southern Africa - sometimes with a persistent legacy, e.g. Mozambique.

The Iraqi Kurds know all too well that external support can be quickly terminated; those Algerians who served France paid a high price.

I am sure the prospective 'rented' militia manpower in Iraq know very well their options and that Daesh (ISIS) will be ruthless.

[jcustis]

If modern COIN concepts seem to hold very little power as a model for action at the moment--or at least rely so heavily on the right mix of balanced strategic objectives and achievable policy goals that it is proving very hard to formulate an effective and sustainable response to ISIS--I'm wondering if Wilf's old prescription for "killing one's way to control" should come to the fore.

This is partially rhetorical, but I've been thinking about it a lot lately

[Bill Moore]

Is our objective to defend the Iraqi government which would be FID in support of Iraqi COIN (or a hybrid of it, since ISIL has conventional capabilities), or is our objective to disrupt and degrade ISIL to minimize it as a threat to U.S. interests and its allies (Saudi, Jordan, Turkey, Europe, etc.), to include attacking the U.S. homeland? In that case, it may be another form of military operation where we co-opt Iraq and others into our coalition.

I have often wondered if our legacy doctrinal concepts of war, FID, COIN, UW, CT, etc. unintentionally limit the way we approach operations.

I don't think our objective is limited to Iraq's internal defense. I thought about counter-UW operations, but even that concept falls short. It seems we're executing a holistic (whole of government, multinational, and incorporating non-state actors that consist of NGOs and militias) across a wide geographical spectrum that includes but is not limited to Iraq. Campaigning?

Those executing may have some sense of clarity, but sitting on the side lines watching it all seems a little confused to me.

[Bill Moore]

We can't solve their underlying problems, they have to do that. Development has done little to decrease the level of conflict in the majority of conflict zones where development was implemented as a line of effort. Capacity building only works if those we're training have the will to fight (they believe in what they're fighting for). If we believe ISIL is a real threat to our national interests, then killing on a larger scale would seem appropriate. Historically higher levels of violence have worked for non-Western countries in many cases. I don't dismiss an enduring political solution, but I do question our ability to facilitate or impose one, so again if it is in our national interest to degrade ISIL as a threat to our interests, killing them on a larger scale than they can recover from would seem appropriate. We may be able to shape what comes next, we won't be able to control it.

[Bob's World]

It seems to me that in the post WWII era, with a noted escalation in the post Cold War era, we fight far more often for national emotion than for national interest .

Fear, pride, anger, ego, false duty, etc. It rarely ends well when we confuse emotion for interest. To make matters worse we have even morphed our national security strategy in this same era to codify an emotion-based approach to interests.

We need a return to the practical pragmatism we practiced more as a rising nation. We've lways been driven by emotion, be it our decision to fight the Barbary pirates while everyone else paid tribute, or the constant string of "remember the xxxxx" battle cry's that work so well to motivate Americans to war - but it has gotten worse in this era of self-determination, shifting balances of power and our own strategic confusion over all of the above.

Clint Eastwood once said the best acting advice he ever received was "Don't just do something, stand there. Gary Cooper was never afraid to do nothing."

Our foreign policy is not Eastwoodesque or Cooperesque in any way. Certainly not Wayneesque, and in no way George Washingtonesque. We need to just stand there and think about that.

[JWing]

Just wrote a piece on the insurgent networks in Iraq. Many initially thought it was the Baathists and then the Islamists that were the backbone of the insurgency. Neither was quite true. Iraqi Sunnis used multiple identities and experiences from their history to organize the insurgency. An example could be a cleric that came from a traditional religious family, was a former Baathist, had a relative in Iraqi intelligence, and came from an important tribe. All of those connections would be used to organize and recruit for the insurgency. Explains how you have so many former Baathists who were supposed to be seculr within IS's leadership today. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/11/dynamics-of-iraqs-insurgent-networks.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

It seems to me that in the post WWII era, with a noted escalation in the post Cold War era, we fight far more often for national emotion than for national interest .

Fear, pride, anger, ego, false duty, etc. It rarely ends well when we confuse emotion for interest. To make matters worse we have even morphed our national security strategy in this same era to codify an emotion-based approach to interests.

We need a return to the practical pragmatism we practiced more as a rising nation. We've lways been driven by emotion, be it our decision to fight the Barbary pirates while everyone else paid tribute, or the constant string of "remember the xxxxx" battle cry's that work so well to motivate Americans to war - but it has gotten worse in this era of self-determination, shifting balances of power and our own strategic confusion over all of the above.

Clint Eastwood once said the best acting advice he ever received was "Don't just do something, stand there. Gary Cooper was never afraid to do nothing."

Our foreign policy is not Eastwoodesque or Cooperesque in any way. Certainly not Wayneesque, and in no way George Washingtonesque. We need to just stand there and think about that.

Wonder why we are so involved in countering the IS when it does not threaten any waters towers anywhere inside the US.

"More people with American citizenship have been killed by Palestinian terrorists in the lst year than have been killed by ISIS"

[ganulv]

"More people with American citizenship have been killed by Palestinian terrorists in the lst year than have been killed by ISIS"

I know you’re trolling, but I can’t resist. Do you have any statistics on how many Palestinians have been killed by holders of American citizenship in the last year? Because I would be curious as to the ratio.

[davidbfpo]

Ganulv,

I don't want to pre-empt Outlaw 09, but the BBC reported after today's attack in Jerusalem that three victims were Americans:
The victims were Rabbi Moshe Twersky, 59, head of the seminary, Arieh Kupinsky, 43, and Kalman Levine, 55, all of whom also held US passports. The fourth victim, Avraham Goldberg, 68, is also a UK citizen.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-30092720

[ganulv]

Ganulv,

I don't want to pre-empt Outlaw 09, but the BBC reported after today's attack in Jerusalem that three victims were Americans:
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-30092720

I assumed that was the reference he was making. I just wanted to bring up the fact that American citizenship is unlikely to be the why of that crime. It is much more likely that the victims were targeted as members of the Jewish state.

And my question was also meant to bring up the fact that American citizens are not infrequently members of the IDF: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/07/21/how-can-americans-be-fighting-for-israel-in-gaza-some-background/
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/07/21/how-can-americans-be-fighting-for-israel-in-gaza-some-background/)

[OUTLAW 09]

I know you’re trolling, but I can’t resist. Do you have any statistics on how many Palestinians have been killed by holders of American citizenship in the last year? Because I would be curious as to the ratio.

Excluding the Iraq war as IS was then AQI and not in it's current configuration-----I would go back even further and state more American passport holders have been killed by the PLO and it's various affiliates from the Black Sept 1970 event onwards than IS has killed since it has become the IS.

Why question has been since the Ukraine--why are we then if US citizens are not directly being threatened by the IS why are we so over bearing in our military response when in fact Putin has threatened the entire US in ways not even seen during the Cold War?

[OUTLAW 09]

I assumed that was the reference he was making. I just wanted to bring up the fact that American citizenship is unlikely to be the why of that crime. It is much more likely that the victims were targeted as members of the Jewish state.

And my question was also meant to bring up the fact that American citizens are not infrequently members of the IDF: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/07/21/how-can-americans-be-fighting-for-israel-in-gaza-some-background/
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/07/21/how-can-americans-be-fighting-for-israel-in-gaza-some-background/)

It is interesting you mention the IDF---just how many US active duty officers departed US active duty to serve in the 1968 and 1973 wars?

Especially if they held clearances where one cannot in theory hold two citizenships and or actual citizenship where one cannot owe allegiances to two countries when you take your militay oath.

[jcustis]

Haven't the policies regarding those issues changed over the years, directly as a result of problems arising from clearance/citizenship conflicts?

[ganulv]

Haven't the policies regarding those issues changed over the years, directly as a result of problems arising from clearance/citizenship conflicts?

I have no idea how things have changed over the decades, but the IDF seems to have been accepting recruits with U.S. citizenship as recently as this past summer. http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-fg-americans-israel-gaza-military-20140721-story.html

[jcustis]

That has been a long-standing practice among Jews who are not Sabras, but want to serve Israel's armed forces. Common enough that I've seen a number of news articles about it and a Nat Geo expose from the 1970s.

I've seen it go hand in hand with working on a kibbutz for some youth.

[Bob's World]

Ganulv,

I don't want to pre-empt Outlaw 09, but the BBC reported after today's attack in Jerusalem that three victims were Americans:
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-30092720

We may soon see another example of an emotion, rather than interest- based response.

[ganulv]

That has been a long-standing practice among Jews who are not Sabras, but want to serve Israel's armed forces. Common enough that I've seen a number of news articles about it and a Nat Geo expose from the 1970s.

I've seen it go hand in hand with working on a kibbutz for some youth.

OK, that was my general impression, but I haven’t ever known anyone falling into the category, so I wasn’t entirely sure.

[An aside, at the danger of going to too far off into the weeds. I do know someone who worked on the only pig-farming kibbutz (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8708541.stm). I asked him if it is a Christian kibbutz, and he said, “No. Just very secular.” :D]

[Bill Moore]

It seems to me that in the post WWII era, with a noted escalation in the post Cold War era, we fight far more often for national emotion than for national interest .

Fear, pride, anger, ego, false duty, etc. It rarely ends well when we confuse emotion for interest. To make matters worse we have even morphed our national security strategy in this same era to codify an emotion-based approach to interests.

We need a return to the practical pragmatism we practiced more as a rising nation. We've lways been driven by emotion, be it our decision to fight the Barbary pirates while everyone else paid tribute, or the constant string of "remember the xxxxx" battle cry's that work so well to motivate Americans to war - but it has gotten worse in this era of self-determination, shifting balances of power and our own strategic confusion over all of the above.

Clint Eastwood once said the best acting advice he ever received was "Don't just do something, stand there. Gary Cooper was never afraid to do nothing."

Our foreign policy is not Eastwoodesque or Cooperesque in any way. Certainly not Wayneesque, and in no way George Washingtonesque. We need to just stand there and think about that.

What I find interesting during debates is I can make a seemingly rational argument for multiple options. Take ISIL for example, I can make a rational argument on why we should engage and why we should ignore it. I can throw emotion into either argument to motivate the bulk of the people who are motivated by emotion (emotion equates to motivation, which is why those promoting change, action, etc. play to emotion).

The point is, I wonder if that reflects strategic confusion, or simply a reflection of strategic reality where there are no absolute right or wrong answers, only educated and non-educated opinions. We have four enduring national interests, and you can logically argue we should be involved in most conflicts by making links to them. Ultimately we need to accept that democracy is messy, and emotion is part and parcel of the package. Acting on emotion can result in stupid decisions, but failing to act on emotion in other cases (for example, preventing mass atrocities) can be devalue what we claim to stand for as a nation. I think our national identity is in our national interests, but understandably many disagree.

Enduring interests (regardless of political party in power)

1. Protect the U.S. and U.S. persons. (security)

2. Economic interests (prosperity)

3. International order that promotes our interests

4. Values (human rights, democracy, etc.)

[Bill Moore]

Once again the saying that all politics are local proves to fall short. For those that think ISIL is a local movement, they have now expanded to Libya. Foreign fighters returning home to select locations can clearly be a threat to one's national security.

http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/18/world/isis-libya/index.html?hpt=hp_t2

ISIS comes to Libya


Fighters loyal to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria are now in complete control of the city of Derna, population of about 100,000, not far from the Egyptian border and just about 200 miles from the southern shores of the European Union.

The fighters are taking advantage of political chaos to rapidly expand their presence westwards along the coast, Libyan sources tell CNN.

[jcustis]

Bill,

I have long been of the opinion that there are no absolute right or wrong answers. We run the risk of loosing our way trying to find those absolutes, or trying to defend them as such,[

As for ISIS in Libya, the problem is significant not only as it relates to Derna, but the entire span of terrain running from Algeria, through the Nile Delta, across the Suez and Gulf of Aquaba, and over to the intersection of Jordan, Syria and Iraq.

I read portions of three Egyptian online newspapers just about daily, and there is a great concern over the possibility (more like likelihood) of ISIS fusing with militants in the Sinai and in turn squeezing Egypt between malign actors there and in Libya.

Back some 6-7 years ago I used to discount the knuckleheads who claimed allegiance with Al Qaeda, and believe most of them to be localized elements who never even understood what AQ's ideology, method, and endstate was. They merely knew that AQ was a thorn in the side of the US and so they felt it necessary to "be down with AQ", whether it be AQI, AQAP etc.

ISIS is something different. Same level of showmanship, but it has something AQ hasn't been able to produce for at least the past five years--results. I'm am still cautious when I hear the media state that militant forces at "X" location are loyal to ISIS. What defines loyalty? Is it earned? Given freely? IS there a code to follow like the Masons or is it just a matter of assuming the brand name and riding its coat tails? Unless the loyalty brings manpower, weapons, financing and logistical support its just a bumper sticker and not really a big deal. Millions of people around the word subscribe to various ideologies that are inimical to US interests, but we haven't taken to hunting them down to deal with the via kinetics yet. Heck, for many of them we don't bother to think of their dramas at all.

ISIS and the elements of Ansar Bait al-Maqdis have begun this alliance dance in the Sinai, so the issue of ISIS influence is broader than Libya. I don't believe they have the ability to do more at the moment than attack a border outpost or two, and will not be able to grow to any effective size because of the pressure Egypt's security forces are applying, the fact that Egypt is considerably more stable (despite the media sound bytes) than Libya and Sudan combined, and the fact that counterinsurgent effort is about to be applied around the region to a degree not seen before.

That could change with the right spark though.

What we will have, without a doubt, are pretty solid 5-10 years of instability in the region that will require all instruments of national power to deal with. There will be flare-ups fairly regularly, and we are going to have to decide how we want to suppress them. That whole finite resources thing is kinda a big deal.

[Bill Moore]

North Africa is going through another political revolution, and that will take time to sort out. It won't be settled until the extremists are purged.

I disagree that AQ was ineffective, it was AQ that led the West into a global war that expands well beyond Afghanistan. Their brand may have grown stale, but like IBM and Microsoft that will exist for a long time, despite the dynamic upstarts who create their own form of creative destruction. ISIS/ISIL certainly gets a lot of cool points in the extremist and want to be extremist world due to their effectiveness. It seems people are tripping over each other to join the fight there. It provides an identity and an outlet for angry young men, but clearly it is bigger than that.

What concerns me most is ISIS/ISIL's potential base in Libya are their ambitions to attack the West, and with a foothold in North Africa they have easy access to Italy. Italy can't control the illegal immigration from North Africa (anymore than we control illegals flowing into our country), so the rat lines are well established. I have little doubt they have human networks in Italy and France they can use to help facilitate future attacks.

http://www.christiantoday.com/article/isis.threatens.vatican.urges.muslims.to.kill.every .crusader/41646.htm

ISIS threatens Vatican, urges Muslims to 'kill every crusader'


"At this point of the crusade against the Islamic State, it is very important that attacks take place in every country that has entered into the alliance against the Islamic State, especially the US, [the] UK, France, Australia and Germany," it reads.

Many will dismiss this as rhetoric, but AQ and ISIS generally are quite open when it comes to sharing their strategy. We ignore it to our own peril. Know yourself and know your enemy sort of thing. I suspect attacks will begin in Western Europe soon (within the next 2 years, but likely within the next year). They may be small, but they'll have considerable symbolic value for ISIS/ISIL and the West. A value that will be magnified by the media. Doing COIN in response will not address our security concerns anymore than it has for the past 10 years. Kilcullen is right that is time to rethink this whole thing.

[jcustis]

Kilcullen is right that is time to rethink this whole thing.

Yup.

[JWing]

The U.S. has been pushing Baghdad to reform the Sahwa but the government is split on the issue. New PM Abadi seems open to it and has ordered discussions with sheikhs in Amman and Irbil. He's also talked about forming a National Guard. In Anbar they are trying to recruit 3,000-5,000 tribal fighters and they will be in part be trained by U.S. trainers at Al-Assad. The problem is that his coalition is far from convinced of this policy. Many of these tribes were with the insurgency and then when IS became more dominant flipped to the government such as the Albu Nimr that's been facing executions by IS recently. Others were with Baghdad from the beginning such as Abu Risha and the Hayes brothers in Anbar. The Jabour tribe in Salaahddin was split with some welcoming IS and some fighting. The point being the tribes are all over the place and there are many Shiite parties that are therefore weary of supporting them in the fear that they will just turn on the government again. That's the reason why the legislation to form the National Guard is stuck in parliament. Also the first group of tribal fighters were said to have graduated from Al-Assad but if the announcements of the recruiting and when they finished training are true they only got 1 week of classes at best. Also a tribal sheikh said that Baghdad had only provided weapons for 100 fighters to the Al-Assad base. Overall it's very complicated with a whole number of issues and therefore may not be effective any time soon.

[jcustis]

The U.S. has been pushing Baghdad to reform the Sahwa but the government is split on the issue. New PM Abadi seems open to it and has ordered discussions with sheikhs in Amman and Irbil. He's also talked about forming a National Guard. In Anbar they are trying to recruit 3,000-5,000 tribal fighters and they will be in part be trained by U.S. trainers at Al-Assad. The problem is that his coalition is far from convinced of this policy. Many of these tribes were with the insurgency and then when IS became more dominant flipped to the government such as the Albu Nimr that's been facing executions by IS recently. Others were with Baghdad from the beginning such as Abu Risha and the Hayes brothers in Anbar. The Jabour tribe in Salaahddin was split with some welcoming IS and some fighting. The point being the tribes are all over the place and there are many Shiite parties that are therefore weary of supporting them in the fear that they will just turn on the government again. That's the reason why the legislation to form the National Guard is stuck in parliament. Also the first group of tribal fighters were said to have graduated from Al-Assad but if the announcements of the recruiting and when they finished training are true they only got 1 week of classes at best. Also a tribal sheikh said that Baghdad had only provided weapons for 100 fighters to the Al-Assad base. Overall it's very complicated with a whole number of issues and therefore may not be effective any time soon.

I watched these sort of fledgling efforts wallow around before; in 2004. It was a #### show then, and with a precedent that powerful we can expect to see it happen again in 2015.

[JWing]

My latest article compared the insurgent offensive in the spring of 04 with the current one in 14. Many similarities and lessons learned. In 04 the insurgents made an attempt to seize territory and wanted to foment a general uprising against the government. Led to 2 battles of Fallujah and several other clearing ops in places like Tal Afar and Samarra. End of year U.S. thought that insurgents were defeated. Number of intelligence reports to Bush in December said otherwise. Today IS launched summer offensive and was able to seize huge amount of territory in Ninewa, Salahaddin, Kirkuk and Anbar. ISF now taking back the initiative and retaking territory in Salahaddin and Babil and claiming victory. In 04 major ops just dispersed insurgents to other areas and violence actually increased. Same thing might happen in 2015. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/11/fighting-insurgency-in-iraq-2004-vs-2014.html).

[jcustis]

End of year U.S. thought that insurgents were defeated. Number of intelligence reports to Bush in December said otherwise.

Are you implying that President Bush thought the insurgents (and insurgency) were defeated, and that perhaps he discounted the intelligence reports that "said otherwise"?

I ask because although Cheney may have been running his mouth about the future of the insurgency, everyone on the ground at that time knew we were still in a very hot fight.

[Bob's World]

What I find interesting during debates is I can make a seemingly rational argument for multiple options. Take ISIL for example, I can make a rational argument on why we should engage and why we should ignore it. I can throw emotion into either argument to motivate the bulk of the people who are motivated by emotion (emotion equates to motivation, which is why those promoting change, action, etc. play to emotion).

The point is, I wonder if that reflects strategic confusion, or simply a reflection of strategic reality where there are no absolute right or wrong answers, only educated and non-educated opinions. We have four enduring national interests, and you can logically argue we should be involved in most conflicts by making links to them. Ultimately we need to accept that democracy is messy, and emotion is part and parcel of the package. Acting on emotion can result in stupid decisions, but failing to act on emotion in other cases (for example, preventing mass atrocities) can be devalue what we claim to stand for as a nation. I think our national identity is in our national interests, but understandably many disagree.

Enduring interests (regardless of political party in power)

1. Protect the U.S. and U.S. persons. (security)

2. Economic interests (prosperity)

3. International order that promotes our interests

4. Values (human rights, democracy, etc.)


The list Bill has provided above goes to my point. Not only does the NSS list these as our vital interests, it declares them to be "enduring." Certainly these things are important, the list has become so broad and vague as to strip it of much value, and worse, to validate virtually any situation, any place, any time as being "in our interests" to employ military power to shape in some way. T\

The result of everything being validated as being in our interest, is that we ultimately make decisions to act more often than not based on emotion.

One of the better works on interests was the Harvard study published in 1996.

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/americas_interests.pdf

The timing of that study is critical. We were well into an era of post-Cold War floundering, but were not yet into a period of post-9/11 floundering. The sense was that we had lost our focus as a nation on what was truly important, so this very qualified team took on the task of identifying what a proper focus should be.

Not only did the commission focus on what was important, they then prioritized those interests into four levels of importance. Many on this site have probably seen this document at some point, but given the list Bill provided above, it is worth showing the truly vital interests developed by this this commission:

U.S. vital national interests are to:
1) Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) weapons attacks on the United States.
2) Prevent the emergence of a hostile hegemon in Europe or Asia.
3) Prevent the emergence of a hostile major power on U.S. borders or in
control of the seas.
4) Prevent the catastrophic collapse of major global systems: trade, financial
markets, supplies of energy, and environmental.
5) Ensure the survival of U.S. allies.


This provides a pragmatic focus sorely lacking in the much more ideological and emotional list of today. One can see they are similar, but that they are different in very important ways. Protecting US persons in the US and preserving the right of the US to continue to have the form of government and values for ourselves that we desire is crucial. Protecting every American everywhere and promoting American positions on values and governance for others is not.

Ensuring survival of critical allies is vital, working to shape the governance of those allies through UW or COIN is to put our desires between the those of the populations and governments of those countries and probably none of our business. If we would not intervene in their legal politics, we should not intervene in their illegal politics. Illegal politics usually occur when no effective legal means exist. In other words, they serve a critical purpose, one that is clearly recognized in our own declaration of independence.

Equally important, not everyone we partner with is an ally. We cast far too broad of a net of responsibility when we promise to protect too much. It simply isn't in our interest.

[Bob's World]

North Africa is going through another political revolution, and that will take time to sort out. It won't be settled until the extremists are purged.


I respect the hell out of Bill Moore, and we see many things in very similar ways, but this quote above highlights a fundamental difference in perspective. Our policies of the past several years are more in line with how Bill sees this as stated above, I, on the other hand do not believe that "extremists" cause political revolution, rather that political revolution is caused by certain conditions of governance coupled with the denial of adequate legal means for the aggrieved population to express and address their concerns legally.

There will always be those who take extreme positions far outside the mainstream of the societies they live within, and even when effective legal means exist, these small minorities will at times act out in extreme ways. But that is not what we are dealing with in Africa and the greater Middle East.

We would be far better served by a policy that focuses on helping to solve governance issues rather than to defeat extremism. And by help solve, I mean as much more of a mediator than an arbitrator, and being willing to step back entirely when we have done what we can within the realm of what is perceived as appropriate by those affected and simply let them sort it out. Governments of allies like Saudi Arabia or Turkey might fall to internal illegal politics, as occurred in Egypt. But Insurgency does not destroy a nation, it simply puts it under new management. We should not manipulate legal changes of government to suit what we think is best for us, nor should we manipulate illegal changes of government. We are better served assuming a bit of risk in that change, and being more open to working with new leadership as it emerges.

There are a lot of systems out there that are completely out of balance and in dire need of change. Our very efforts to protect the status quo of those systems is what is empowering extremists to emerge as the leaders of change. We have surrendered the high ground to the lowlifes. That wasn't very smart. How can we be de oppresso liber when we are more often dedicated to the preservation of the oppressor? That bothers me.

[OUTLAW 09]

Haven't the policies regarding those issues changed over the years, directly as a result of problems arising from clearance/citizenship conflicts?

Joel--to hold higher than a Secret then in fact one must be a US citizen and the question of dual citizenship becomes interesting as the US says if one takes an oath of allegiance to another military power then no US service-or if service then none with a clearance is allowed--that has not changed.

[OUTLAW 09]

I respect the hell out of Bill Moore, and we see many things in very similar ways, but this quote above highlights a fundamental difference in perspective. Our policies of the past several years are more in line with how Bill sees this as stated above, I, on the other hand do not believe that "extremists" cause political revolution, rather that political revolution is caused by certain conditions of governance coupled with the denial of adequate legal means for the aggrieved population to express and address their concerns legally.

There will always be those who take extreme positions far outside the mainstream of the societies they live within, and even when effective legal means exist, these small minorities will at times act out in extreme ways. But that is not what we are dealing with in Africa and the greater Middle East.

We would be far better served by a policy that focuses on helping to solve governance issues rather than to defeat extremism. And by help solve, I mean as much more of a mediator than an arbitrator, and being willing to step back entirely when we have done what we can within the realm of what is perceived as appropriate by those affected and simply let them sort it out. Governments of allies like Saudi Arabia or Turkey might fall to internal illegal politics, as occurred in Egypt. But Insurgency does not destroy a nation, it simply puts it under new management. We should not manipulate legal changes of government to suit what we think is best for us, nor should we manipulate illegal changes of government. We are better served assuming a bit of risk in that change, and being more open to working with new leadership as it emerges.

There are a lot of systems out there that are completely out of balance and in dire need of change. Our very efforts to protect the status quo of those systems is what is empowering extremists to emerge as the leaders of change. We have surrendered the high ground to the lowlifes. That wasn't very smart. How can we be de oppresso liber when we are more often dedicated to the preservation of the oppressor? That bothers me.

Robert---you always bring up interesting comments---what bothers me is the simple fact that while we are running around trying to defend and or change population environments we fail to fully understand just why say a young Turkish German dual citizen would suddenly at say the age 19-21 suddenly discover "Islam" and head to Syria and or Iraq?

What is the radicalization process/how and what are the drivers and what about dealing with those that have returned and who no longer wants to fight?

I have often said here the IS runs one of the finest info war campaigns against the West as does Russia on their side of the Ukraine events.

But where is the US---all we think about is tactical field efforts but never the long term hearts and minds via info war.

Maybe in fact Sun Tsu had it right---or is info warfare "something we simply are not up to"---and I do not mean the PR defense contractor we paid for in Iraq and that did nothing but PR releases.

For 25% of all the costs currently in Iraq and Syria that the military is racking up one could establish a world class information war campaign that in fact would dent the IS in far more ways than simply via the tactical method simply addressing the Muslim populations in Muslim terms on why the IS is not Muslim and is in fact a fascist organization using religion as the argument.

Easy to do if one really understands Islam.

[Bob's World]

I personally believe that "radicalization" and "foreign fighters" are two of the most overblown and misunderstood aspects of the current political violence going on across the greater middle east.

People join fighting organizations, legal or non-legal, for all manner of reasons. And people go off to get involved in the fights of others , legal or non-legal, for all manner of reasons as well.

This does not cause these conflicts. We need to worry less about naturally occurring side effects of the tremendous political friction in the world. The US, as an outsider to all this, should focus on how we can help reduce the friction. Instead we fan the flames and attack the smoke.

This also leads us to see what are fundamentally issues of internal governance as some sort of warfare to employ our military power against. The military can help create time and space for civil leaders to get the stuff all in one sack, and the military can help civil security forces mitigate the high end of violence - but there is no enemy that we can defeat and make this all go away. History simply does not support that concept, though historically this is how governments almost always respond.

So, we are in good company, but we will almost certainly achieve the same bad results.

[davidbfpo]

A different theme from recent posts. Spioenkop blog has produced a list of captured and still in use Daesh (ISIS) equipment:
This list only includes captured vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment captured and destroyed by the Islamic State may be higher than recorded here. Some civilian vehicles such as Toyota Hilux pickup trucks are not included in this list. A great deal of effort has been put into avoiding double listings.
Link:http://spioenkop.blogspot.co.uk/2014/11/vehicles-and-equipment-captured.html

[Bill Moore]

Bob,

I don't think there is as much daylight between us as you think.


Our policies of the past several years are more in line with how Bill sees this as stated above, I, on the other hand do not believe that "extremists" cause political revolution, rather that political revolution is caused by certain conditions of governance coupled with the denial of adequate legal means for the aggrieved population to express and address their concerns legally.

Extremist is a loaded term, but until we develop a more nuanced lexicon it will have to do. I agree the people have a right to revolt to remove oppressive governments, and as anyone who has deployed into a combat zone or has studied history knows, these revolts can be quite ugly. Despite our government's desire for adversaries to fight cleanly, that will never happen. Terror is part and parcel of war, and arguing that the use of the atom bomb on Japan, or firebombing both Japan and Germany wasn't a form of terror is living in a state of denial.

On the other hand, those I'm calling extremists (the Islamists) won't stop applying terror after the government falls, they'll act more like the Khmer Rouge and kill everyone who doesn't conform to their views. That is not a representative government that represents the masses (and I'm not necessarily talking democracy), it is just another oppressive government that will likely be worse than the one tossed out. We have to recognize the reality, and not confuse these movements as great patriots attempting to toss an oppressive government out to free the people. As you have stated, they exploit the existing bad governance to pursue their ends.

Next point, we can't wish away that some of these groups have a stated ambition of attacking the West. That obviously means something, and according to the Harvard study you sent, that fell under the red chip priorities. Of course this was written prior to 9/11, so they may recognize that now as a blue chip priority. There are obviously different levels of threats within the broad concept of terrorism, so we have to make some assumptions of what ones are critical and which ones are minor.

Then there is the concept of thinking over time and getting to the left of the problem if it is possible. The study lists the catastrophic collapse of global systems, which is unlikely to collapse due to one event we need to pre-empt, instead it will collapse over time due to slow rot due to transnational crime, terrorism, and other threats to the world order that more significant than we give them credit for. This has only recently been recognized as a significant threat to global and U.S. security, and it requires more action than we're giving it now. It certainly doesn't require large scale stability operations, but it is a bigger problem than law enforcement. How we assess risk and critical interests is probably out dated, and still based on a Cold War model existential threat. That still exists, and the threat is still Russia, but there are certainly other threats that could be an existential threat to our way of life.

I don't believe in a natural order, but some orders are more durable than others. Still at the end of the day, somebody/somebodies make the rules that we live by locally, regionally, and globally. If those rules are important to us, then we need to enforce them. Certainly the existing rules were designed by the West to benefit the West, and will have to be modified.

Not necessarily arguing with your point, just adding there are real threats to our interests that we need to address. Accurately identifying what those threats are with cool headed analysis is required. I do agree we react emotionally now, because emotional arguments are leveraged by politicians in the media to garner political power. We may be coming to a point where we need to toss out our dysfunctional politicians so our nation can move forward into the 21st Century. Frustration levels are high, and while the democratic process works to some extent, it won't work as well as it can unless real problem solvers seek and obtain office, and minimize the power of the old party geezers currently in place. Party interests has come to a point that it trumps national interests, so before we seek to fix the world we need to fix ourselves.

[OUTLAW 09]

I personally believe that "radicalization" and "foreign fighters" are two of the most overblown and misunderstood aspects of the current political violence going on across the greater middle east.

People join fighting organizations, legal or non-legal, for all manner of reasons. And people go off to get involved in the fights of others , legal or non-legal, for all manner of reasons as well.

This does not cause these conflicts. We need to worry less about naturally occurring side effects of the tremendous political friction in the world. The US, as an outsider to all this, should focus on how we can help reduce the friction. Instead we fan the flames and attack the smoke.

This also leads us to see what are fundamentally issues of internal governance as some sort of warfare to employ our military power against. The military can help create time and space for civil leaders to get the stuff all in one sack, and the military can help civil security forces mitigate the high end of violence - but there is no enemy that we can defeat and make this all go away. History simply does not support that concept, though historically this is how governments almost always respond.

So, we are in good company, but we will almost certainly achieve the same bad results.

Robert---would normally agree with you but alone in Europe mainly France/Germany and the UK there have been over 2000 "fighters" depart for the ME and out of the 400 estimated here out of Germany 170 have returned.

If you were in the courtroom in the case of one recent returnee the German court had no earthly idea what to even ask him and or the common terms used by the jihadi "scene". I was stunned by the total lack of understanding on the problem.

Radicalization is a correct term---this individual as did the others left as you indicated for a multiple number of reasons many having to do with the lack of them feeling a part of the German society ie the failure of their integration into the society--which is unusual as they are the first generation completely growing up inside the German society.

The IS info war provides them a world vision where they are in fact "someone" and what is striking in many of their own comments--they have little to no concrete understanding of Islam, the Koran, and or the Hadith's---all they see and or hear via the internet is the IS messaging which appeals to this younger generation---free the opposed but in their own language---come be a fighter and prove yourself, come be someone, come back with pride and respect and it goes on and on.

There are many German Turkish Muslims trying to deflect that flow but get little or no support from the German government or from anyone else for that matter and mainly do it themselves to keep the younger generation from getting themselves killed.

It is extremely important to understand just how this info war messaging triggers their decisions--we are seeing the exact same thing in the Russian info war messaging and that Russian messaging is even driving decisions by "normal European politicians" where one would say they should understand the messaging but it appeals to them along the same lines as the IS messaging does.

What struck me in this particular court case was I had seen the same exact type of individual in my many Iraqi detainee interviews and yet we showed no interest in their internal drivers--once one understood those drivers it was actually easy to get conversations flowing and reach a rapport level that previously was not possible.

And we in the west greatly and totally underestimate this quality of info warfare. With absolutely no push back by western countries--

Right after the recent 25 page al Baghdadi statement release approx. 120 Islamic theorists and legal theorists some even Whabbi's condemned his statements and basically stated he had no idea of what he was talking about---even the al Nursah group in Syria openly questioned IS for their killing of the American who had recently converted to Islam.

But instead of increasing that pressure from within we remained silent.

A recent quote:

Al-Qaeda: 'ISIS Goes Too Far'." Ah the Middle East, where al-Qaeda is the voice of moderation.

[slapout9]

Then somebody explain to me the one constant and common denominator is always the desire to impose Sharia Law or some other from of radical Islam or more accurately "Communism with a God". Seems to me "rational interest" have little if anything to do with the whole mess but the imposition of an Ideology is everything?

Re-read "On the nature of Revolution: The Marxist Theory of Social Change"
by Herbert Aptheker.

[Bob's World]

We could have nipped much of this in the bud early if we would have understood the problem from beginning in terms of fundamental human nature and governance.

AQ had and has a three point platform, paraphrased free of Islamist jargon it is:
Too much Western influence over the Middle East;
Too many existing regimes are too in bed with and corrupted by that Western Influence;
Need to rally together and form a unified system similar to the EU or ASEAN if we are to compete.

What part of that is counter to US interests??? We should have co-opted the heart of this message immediately, leaving bin Laden with nothing left but a bag full of crazy and a handful of followers.

We blew it. It is not too late, but we continue to blow it when we say we want to defeat ISIL and restore Iraq as it was. Be against ISIL, but we must outcompete organizations like ISIL as a source of support for a Sunni Arab population that has very reasonable concerns about remaining under Shia dominated governance.

As to Europe, they need to clean up their own act. Europe is changing, but when minorities perceive themselves to be treated unfairly they will act out. That is how they feel, and that is how they are acting. The problem is not that they went to Iraq in support of the Sunni cause, the problem is that when they return home things are still F'd up.

Governments do not need to give people what they want, they need to work to give people what they need. This includes the US that has slid into a mindset of excessive government programs that simply give things to people. You can't bribe your way out of trouble, which the Saudis will probably learn soon enough. Small changes that go to justice, dignity, popular legitimacy, empowerment, and popular sovereignty are the key.

A couple of small tweaks of policy along those lines and the US would be Canada. If the King would have been a true visionary and moved the capital from London to New York Britain would still rule the world. But that is another thread altogether...don't want to get David too excited.

[OUTLAW 09]

We could have nipped much of this in the bud early if we would have understood the problem from beginning in terms of fundamental human nature and governance.

AQ had and has a three point platform, paraphrased free of Islamist jargon it is:
Too much Western influence over the Middle East;
Too many existing regimes are too in bed with and corrupted by that Western Influence;
Need to rally together and form a unified system similar to the EU or ASEAN if we are to compete.

What part of that is counter to US interests??? We should have co-opted the heart of this message immediately, leaving bin Laden with nothing left but a bag full of crazy and a handful of followers.

We blew it. It is not too late, but we continue to blow it when we say we want to defeat ISIL and restore Iraq as it was. Be against ISIL, but we must outcompete organizations like ISIL as a source of support for a Sunni Arab population that has very reasonable concerns about remaining under Shia dominated governance.

As to Europe, they need to clean up their own act. Europe is changing, but when minorities perceive themselves to be treated unfairly they will act out. That is how they feel, and that is how they are acting. The problem is not that they went to Iraq in support of the Sunni cause, the problem is that when they return home things are still F'd up.

Governments do not need to give people what they want, they need to work to give people what they need. This includes the US that has slid into a mindset of excessive government programs that simply give things to people. You can't bribe your way out of trouble, which the Saudis will probably learn soon enough. Small changes that go to justice, dignity, popular legitimacy, empowerment, and popular sovereignty are the key.

A couple of small tweaks of policy along those lines and the US would be Canada. If the King would have been a true visionary and moved the capital from London to New York Britain would still rule the world. But that is another thread altogether...don't want to get David too excited.

Shifting direction slightly.

Are we in effect via our military strikes against the IS in fact siding with the Shia militia's and Iran against the normal Sunni population. Why--because the bombing has created a perception that we are in fact in bed with the Shia---something I pointed out would indeed occur if we started bombing.

Good Jihadists vs. bad Jihadists? - "#Iraq's Shiite militias are becoming as great a danger as #IS."

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014

By the way the 170 German jihadi's are not showing signs that they want to continue the fight in Germany--in fact they seem to be wanting to distance themselves from the IS---one might call it religious fervor meeting the road of reality as many of the European fighters do not speak Arabic and are being used as simple second line "gophers" , cannon fodder in mass assaults, and or Suiciders.

[Bill Moore]

We made a temporary alliance with Stalin during WWII to address a greater evil (arguably). Alliances are not always built upon mutual respect, but they are always built on common interests.

[omarali50]

Tangentially related http://brownpundits.blogspot.com/2014/11/islamicate-civilization-it-will-get.html?spref=tw

[OUTLAW 09]

We made a temporary alliance with Stalin during WWII to address a greater evil (arguably). Alliances are not always built upon mutual respect, but they are always built on common interests.

Bill--fully agree with the comment but the inherent but---right now a bulk of the ME is in turmoil because of three things;

1. the total failure to settle the Israeli-Palestinian problem in a way that satisfies both parties and right now even Israeli internal politics is being driven by and many may not like the term but they are in fact ultra rightists religious zealots that force a bulk of the more moderate Israeli's farer and farer to the right thus making a compromise virtually impossible

2. the internal dispute between two regional hegemons of two uncompromising religious wings of the same religion ---the Sunni Shia divide

3. the failures of the Arab Springs outside of Tunisia

A possible fourth item might in fact be the Russian and Chinese interests inside that turmoil which they are using for their particular geo political interests.

Address those items and the ME is no longer a center of turmoil.

But by the US taking a "bombing side" and threatening to "eliminate once and for all times IS" we have dug ourselves into a ME version of the Soviet Union and AFG.

Unless we are ready to commit full military power in forcing a settlement the above items will continue to drag in time and energy until we learn to step back and allow those populations to finally settle their issues themselves regardless of outcomes even if we do not like the outcomes.

Many Americans are poor at history ---it took a 30 and 100 years war and virtually the wiping out of the civilian populations in large areas of the now Germany/Rhineland regions in order to get the two large religions of the period to settle their differences---as brutal as it sounds that must again happen in the ME.

[OUTLAW 09]

And there is no US SF/SEAL forces co-working with the British SAS inside Iraq--so there are no US combat forces physically engaged inside Iraq--come on?

#UK 'SAS have killed 100s of #ISIS jihadis in a series of ambushes inside #Iraq

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2845668/SAS-quad-bike-squads-kill-8-jihadis-day-allies-prepare-wipe-map-Daring-raids-UK-Special-Forces-leave-200-enemy-dead-just-four-weeks.html …

[OUTLAW 09]

Here we go again with the ISF unable to beat IS on the ground when it is a "fair fight" with no US air cover.

أبو انس مجاهد @abuanasmujahid

Major General Fadhil Jalil al-Barwari says Ramadi may completely fall to Islamic State as 221 Iraqi Special Forces killed since friday

[davidbfpo]

As this thread moves between the local and regional, if not far wider here are two articles on the regional aspects, both via the Open Democracy blogsite.

One, The geostrategic consequences of the Arab Springstarts with a summary:
The Arab awakening is creating a new socio-political and economic reality in the region, transforming the balance of power, not because states have become stronger, but rather because states have become weak and fragile.

It concludes:
There are three fundamental geostrategic implications shaping the future of the balance of power in the Middle East. The first geostrategic consequence of the Arab Spring is the appearance of people as the main catalyst for these nations' internal dynamics.

The second geostrategic consequence is the proliferation of weak states. First, the monopoly of force has been questioned and weakened in several Arab countries, with increasing violence at sub-state level.

The third consequence is the densification of geopolitical disputes crystallized in latent conflicts. The implications will have a great impact on the relations and power structure in the Middle East.
Link:https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/zaki-samy-elakawi/geostrategic-consequences-of-arab-spring

Second an article by Professor Paul Rogers, which in summary argues:
Behind the flux of conflict on the ground in Syria-Iraq, all sides are digging in for a long war.
Link:https://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/islamic-state-vs-its-far-enemy

[Bill Moore]

Here we go again with the ISF unable to beat IS on the ground when it is a "fair fight" with no US air cover.

أبو انس مجاهد @abuanasmujahid

Major General Fadhil Jalil al-Barwari says Ramadi may completely fall to Islamic State as 221 Iraqi Special Forces killed since friday

Outlaw

Outside of our government talking heads, who said USSOF wasn't fighting?

Second, and I'm sure you will appreciate this, it would make perfect sense for any of our adversaries, especially state adversaries, to quietly (through cut outs) provide limited support to ISIS. The goal isn't for ISIS to win, but to keep the U.S. distracted and provide freedom of movement elsewhere in the world (South China Sea, Ukraine, etc.).

[OUTLAW 09]

Outlaw

Outside of our government talking heads, who said USSOF wasn't fighting?

Second, and I'm sure you will appreciate this, it would make perfect sense for any of our adversaries, especially state adversaries, to quietly (through cut outs) provide limited support to ISIS. The goal isn't for ISIS to win, but to keep the U.S. distracted and provide freedom of movement elsewhere in the world (South China Sea, Ukraine, etc.).

Bill--you bring an interesting comment---by the way where SAS shows up inside Syria and or Iraq so shows up US SOF--an "old saying". The two orgs have trained and deployed together for too many years to not work "quietly" together.

There have been some serious rumint for a number of years that indicated Russia did not do much of anything in allowing/slowing down Russian Islamists from the RF to leave Russia and fight in Syria and Iraq-estimated in the 1300 range potentially though much higher--same goes for some arms shipments from Russia that somehow "disappeared enroute to Syria" that magically reappeared in the hands of the IS. There is also some strong rumint of money laundering via the Russian mob concerning the IS stolen oil sales via Turkish criminal gangs.

Allowing the Russian Islamists to leave might inside the Russian FSB be viewed as a "hope they leave, get killed and or do not return" kind of program.

Russian fear is now the blowback as a large number of those Russian Islamists are headed home and none to happy with Russian control of their individual states inside the RF and the Russian perceived oppression of Muslims in general.

IS has by the way in a number of their recent PR releases attacked Russia directly and are serious about their threats to send home the fighters to cause Russia major problems within their Muslim populations which are extremely tense at the moment due to Russian oppression of their individual rights and there have been a number of Russian nationalist attacks on their mosques as well.

Coupled with the "disappearance" and murders of over 12 Crimea Tartars since the Russian annexation of the Crimea
--it does not bode well for Russia.

[Bill Moore]

There is also some strong rumint of money laundering via the Russian mob concerning the IS stolen oil sales via Turkish criminal gangs.

Ah yes, the great convergence between state, criminal, and VEO actors, which also increasingly merges the black, gray, and while economic systems. Old as mankind, but greatly accelerated and empowered by the globalized systems of trade and finance. Most are aware of this threat, but most don't appreciate the seriousness of the threat to the globalized systems we are so dependent on. Yes a nuclear armed missile or a terrorist with a WMD presents an immediate and potentially catastrophic threat that must be negated to the extent possible. We are good at identifying and planning for these types of tangible threats. What we're not good at is recognizing the risk of collapse due to forces that gradually erode the international systems, like termites gradually destroying the infrastructure of a home. If the house catches on fire we call the fire department, and we have insurance, and assorted other protocols. For termites, which is far from a perfect analogy, because we do recognize the threat and there are methods to mitigate them IF we are aware of the threat and take action. For these slower moving threats in the globalized systems we often lack awareness and fail to take collective action.

[OUTLAW 09]

Appears our bombing strategy inside Syria is in fact driving anti Assad forces towards not away from IS.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/23/us-air-strikes-syra-driving-anti-assad-groups-support-isis?

[Bill Moore]

Appears our bombing strategy inside Syria is in fact driving anti Assad forces towards not away from IS.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/23/us-air-strikes-syra-driving-anti-assad-groups-support-isis?

This comment is telling....


He became disillusioned with the FSA, however, believing it was a tool of foreign intelligence services and poor in combat. After four senior fighters in his brigade were fatally wounded a few months ago, he defected to Isis.

I also found the comment that a lot of groups swore allegiance to ISIS in secret, which implies they can still get support from the West and others, while secretly working with ISIS.

What a f*@# mess.

[OUTLAW 09]

We could have nipped much of this in the bud early if we would have understood the problem from beginning in terms of fundamental human nature and governance.

AQ had and has a three point platform, paraphrased free of Islamist jargon it is:
Too much Western influence over the Middle East;
Too many existing regimes are too in bed with and corrupted by that Western Influence;
Need to rally together and form a unified system similar to the EU or ASEAN if we are to compete.

What part of that is counter to US interests??? We should have co-opted the heart of this message immediately, leaving bin Laden with nothing left but a bag full of crazy and a handful of followers.

We blew it. It is not too late, but we continue to blow it when we say we want to defeat ISIL and restore Iraq as it was. Be against ISIL, but we must outcompete organizations like ISIL as a source of support for a Sunni Arab population that has very reasonable concerns about remaining under Shia dominated governance.

As to Europe, they need to clean up their own act. Europe is changing, but when minorities perceive themselves to be treated unfairly they will act out. That is how they feel, and that is how they are acting. The problem is not that they went to Iraq in support of the Sunni cause, the problem is that when they return home things are still F'd up.

Governments do not need to give people what they want, they need to work to give people what they need. This includes the US that has slid into a mindset of excessive government programs that simply give things to people. You can't bribe your way out of trouble, which the Saudis will probably learn soon enough. Small changes that go to justice, dignity, popular legitimacy, empowerment, and popular sovereignty are the key.

A couple of small tweaks of policy along those lines and the US would be Canada. If the King would have been a true visionary and moved the capital from London to New York Britain would still rule the world. But that is another thread altogether...don't want to get David too excited.

Robert---back to my comments about German jihadi's and the reasons they flow towards IS.

Yesterday the top CI org for Germany updated their estimates of German fighters to 550 of which 60 have been killed and another 170 have returned in less than a full year. The why is critical in understanding their disillusion with IS.

What is interesting is the figures from the UK---estimated 2000 at the low end.

I had worked and lived in the UK for a number of years and found their discrimination inside their society to be far far worse than anything seen in the US---they are about 50 years behind the US in discussing immigration issues and I do think that each European country has internal drivers that are driving their Muslim population towards IS.

Understand those drivers then one understands the propaganda pull that IS uses tailored to each EU country.

Understand the messaging then counter messaging and other efforts can be tailored to slow down the flow---it is all about info warfare which IS has been perfecting since 2004.

And our answer --we hired a DC PR firm and paid millions but it never got into the game outside of billing the US military and using the embassy pool in Baghdad.

For 25% of the current ops budget the US could build a long term info war capacity that would in fact make an impact---but we always think it is propaganda--sometime talking the truth is a powerful weapon we simply do not understand how to use.

Check the current Russian info war efforts---we are nowhere even close --actually we are not even in the same world and it is telling right now.

[davidbfpo]

Only a small part cited:
What is interesting is the figures from the UK---estimated 2000 at the low end.

This estimate comes from a Birmingham Labour MP, a Muslim, who sometimes can be a prolific quote provider. He has given little to support his estimate, other than this:
The authorities say there are 500 British jihadists but the likely figure is at least three to four times that...I think 2,000 is a better estimate. My experience in Birmingham is it is a huge, huge problem.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11248114/Muslim-MP-2000-Britons-fighting-for-Islamic-State.html

The MP has been saying this since June 2014, so the timing of repeating the estimate appears to coincide with a new government campaign, alongside new CT legislation with some curious features. See:http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/khalid-mahmood-2000-british-fighters-7312675

I shall refrain from commenting on Outlaw's other points; I do agree with him on counter-messaging is a huge gap in our response, but then I have said that on the UK thread on this topic.:wry:

[OUTLAW 09]

Only a small part cited:

This estimate comes from a Birmingham Labour MP, a Muslim, who sometimes can be a prolific quote provider. He has given little to support his estimate, other than this:
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11248114/Muslim-MP-2000-Britons-fighting-for-Islamic-State.html

The MP has been saying this since June 2014, so the timing of repeating the estimate appears to coincide with a new government campaign, alongside new CT legislation with some curious features. See:http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/khalid-mahmood-2000-british-fighters-7312675

I shall refrain from commenting on Outlaw's other points; I do agree with him on counter-messaging is a huge gap in our response, but then I have said that on the UK thread on this topic.:wry:


David--sorry for the UK comments but think about it---why the huge IS pull into the UK Muslim population that is not as strong in the other EU countries?

If we take the German Muslim reasons for joining the IS they are virtually the same as ones we hear coming out of the UK but the UK numbers are far higher than German numbers.

We see a similar pattern in France that in fact parallels the UK---and French numbers are also just as high as well. There is a similar but smaller numbers coming out of Belgium where integration of migrants has also stalled over the last years.

So deep inside the UK and French societies something is driving young Muslim men to flow to the IS--we in the West call it radicalization-- but is it really or is it something far deeper--meaning has the migration of Muslims into the UK and especially France from northern Africa created an environment that lends itself to IS info warfare---if yes then what is it in those particular societies that are the drivers?

In France it expressed itself initially in the traditional burning of cars in the zip codes of France with heavy Muslim populations over the last ten or so years ---still occurs in the "traditional times" --but those that once did the burnings now appear to be in Syria and Iraq.

WHAT is not being talked about is ---the highest numbers of Muslim men flowing to the IS are in fact coming from the Russian Federation---which Russia refuses to acknowledge because they claim they have no problems just as they claim no Russian troops in eastern Ukraine and we all know how that is a "lie".

[JWing]

Just posted my weekly security report for Iraq. Attacks and casualties saw a dramatic drop. 3rd wk of Nov saw 2nd fewest attacks of the year and deadand wounded were far down as well. ISF & tribes still fighting it out in Anbar. IS has relocated to northern Babil after being kicked out of its longtime base in Jurf al-Sakhr. ISF & peshmerga trying to clear regions of Diyala & Kirkuk. IS launched a rare attack into Kurdistan with a suicide car bombing in Irbil. Finally ISF & militias broke the siege of the Baiji refinery and are planning a major op to clear Tikrit. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/11/attacks-and-casualties-in-iraq-see.html).

[JWing]

Baghdad said it would create a 3,000 strong brigade made up of tribal fighters in Anbar. Will be trained by Americans at Al-Assad and Habaniya bases there. Idea is being held up by Shiite parties that don't trust loyalty of tribes and perhaps ISF incompetence arming them. Supposedly they have little to no weapons so far. Unit will only get 2 weeks training as well. May be a fiasco or just for show or both. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/11/controversy-over-supporting-iraqs.html).

[JWing]

Premier Abadi is attempting to reform the ISF which suffers from corruption, incompetence, lack of leadership, abuse, and politicization. He's started by firing and transferring literally hundreds of officers. He needs to tackle the institutional problems within the police & military if he wants a competent and professional force that can defend the country. Will be major problem as those attributes are lacking in the Iraqi government overall. Read about this dilemma here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/11/premier-abadis-attempt-to-reform-iraqs.html).

[JWing]

In case you haven't heard there's been major fighting in central Ramadi and other sections of the country since the weekend. IS is making a major push to capture the entire city. Launched multi pronged attack that included a river crossing. They took a building in the downtown government complex as well.

[OUTLAW 09]

Is in fact Assad working together with IS? Has been rumored and proven a couple of times lately.

It's all over soon in #Aleppo.
#Assad can advance with its ally #IS holding fire east of the city.

pic.twitter.com/U1VFqDqo2j

[OUTLAW 09]

Joel--anything floating in space on this--there have been reports of well trained/experienced Chechens in IS fighting currently in Iraq

Useful info also: Book Says Rus KGB Created Islamic Terrorism in Muslim Countries

http://www.chechencenter.info/n/42-world/209

[OUTLAW 09]

Russian law-enforcers shot dead hundreds of Islamists in Dagestan in the last year.

Russia exports as well over 1500 fighters to Iraq and Syria.

At some point it will come back as the IS has already threatened Russia with a war.

[OUTLAW 09]

Taken from a German article which is indicating that in the renewed IS fighting in Kobane the IS attacked physically from the Turkish side thus the Turks knew about it and yet did nothing.

Coupled with a comment two days ago by Erdogan that the "west is killing Muslim children" by the way a charge taken from al Baghdadi's recent 25 page text---would seriously indicate exactly who he is and or is not supporting---US has serious problems with him currently---and this on top of the statement from him indicating he would not accept TTIP unless it anchored Turkish viewpoints--otherwise he would leave NATO is a massive threat as he is not part of the E which TTIP is all about.

Someone needs to reign him in as he is actively supporting IS, does not want to join EU without 300% of what he wants from the EU being approved and he is threatening to leave NATO.

BUT he should pay attention to Putin--Gazprom just cut gas deliveries to Turkey by 40%.

Hinter vorgehaltener Hand schon vor Wochen, jetzt offiziell: #ISIS greift #Kobane nun auch aus #Trkei an...
http://ln.is/www.nzz.ch/internati/IIX56 #IS.

[OUTLAW 09]

BREAKING: Iraqi PM says there are 50,000 non-existent and falsified 'soldiers' across four Iraqi army divisions via @INTLSpectator

[JWing]

Just published my new security report for 4th week of November. Attacks remained extremely low for another week, while casualties were about the same from 3rd week due to high number of wounded by deaths way down. IS still attempting to take Ramadi in Anbar. Failed in big attack upon Tal Ward in Kirkuk. Still carrying out attacks across Salahaddin despite recent ISF and militia success in Baiji. IS relocated to northern Babil after being kicked out of Jurf al-Sakhr in northeast a long time base. Diyala peshmerga militias and ISF all went on offensive and cleared several villages which are now being disputed between Kurds and militias. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/12/violence-remains-low-in-iraq-4th-week.html).

[JWing]

Joel--anything floating in space on this--there have been reports of well trained/experienced Chechens in IS fighting currently in Iraq

Useful info also: Book Says Rus KGB Created Islamic Terrorism in Muslim Countries

http://www.chechencenter.info/n/42-world/209

I think I heard something about this on Twitter but there was nothing but a brief mention of Chechens fighting in Iraq.

[davidbfpo]

Hardly unexpected, quite interesting C2 dynamics though:http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-iraq-20141203-story.html#page=1

[JWing]

Just published my security report for Iraq for Nov. Lowest number of attacks for 2014 and casualties finally dropped. Attacks have been going down since August but dead & wounded have remained high. Finally dropped in November. Major change in fighting from Oct to Nov cause. Insurgent campaigns mostly stalled and are now losing territory in Babil, Salahaddin, Ninewa & Diyala. Militants appear to be regrouping and have to reconstitute losses. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/12/major-drop-in-violence-in-iraq-november.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

Well worth the read on the profiling of the IS by Brookings.

http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2014/12/profiling-islamic-state-lister?

[OUTLAW 09]

I think I heard something about this on Twitter but there was nothing but a brief mention of Chechens fighting in Iraq.

A tweet from a journalist working out of Jordan:

None of the Chechen militants in #Syria that I am following have suggested any kind of Syrian Chechen involvement in the attacks in #Grozny

[SWJ Blog]

ISIS Resurgence and the Sunni-Shi’a Schism (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/isis-resurgence-and-the-sunni-shi%E2%80%99a-schism)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/isis-resurgence-and-the-sunni-shi%E2%80%99a-schism) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[OUTLAW 09]

Confirmation of Chechen Russian speakers in Syria and the Islamist fighting in Dagestan is getting tough.

This video purportedly proves that Russian speakers took part in the siege of Al Zahra and Nubl in Syria.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2hBqTCsRu30&feature=youtu.be …

FSB Building is burning in Makhachkala /Dagestan (in Russian)
http://russian.rt.com/article/62986
pic.twitter.com/cOfaSOfhwG

[OUTLAW 09]

#BREAKING: In Makhachkala, capital of Dagestan, FSB building (security services) is on fire, only 2 days after Grozny
pic.twitter.com/ugsrVpm6mY

[OUTLAW 09]

#BREAKING: In Makhachkala, capital of Dagestan, FSB building (security services) is on fire, only 2 days after Grozny
pic.twitter.com/ugsrVpm6mY

#BREAKING Vilayat Dagestan,a Jihadist group based in the Russian republic of #Dagestan claims responsibility for FSB fire in Makhachkala.

[OUTLAW 09]

#BREAKING Vilayat Dagestan,a Jihadist group based in the Russian republic of #Dagestan claims responsibility for FSB fire in Makhachkala.

Reportedly conflict w/rebels in #Chechnya is ongoing: Russian authorities use heavy artillery/helicopters in Shali.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2-Sqf3LZB6E&app=desktop …

[OUTLAW 09]

ISW @TheStudyofWar

ISW's ISIS Sanctuary Map (that you see everywhere) just got updated. Find it here and RT.

http://iswiraq.blogspot.com/2014/12/isis-sanctuary-map-december-5-2014.html?

pic.twitter.com/XoQlrzV4YT

[JWing]

Just wrote an article about whether the militias in Iraq will be able to be successfully integrated within the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Iraq faced a similar dilemma in 2005 when Badr took over the Interior Ministry and police commandos that became the National Police and were carried out mass arrests, sectarian attacks, ran secret prisons, etc. Only through several retraining and vetting programs by the U.S. along with a committed Interior Minister and a new commander of the National Police was the force finally cleared out and became loyal to the government rather than Badr. Now the situation is much different with the major outside power Iran pushing militias to the fore and Interior once again run by Badr. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/12/can-iraqs-militias-be-successfully.html).

[CrowBat]

^^Oh, what a surprise....

With Iranian Army - repeat: regular Islamic Republic of Iran Army (i.e. 'not only the IRGC', which has at least four brigades, or an appropriate equivalent of corresponding assets) - now operating its 23rd Takawar (Commando) Brigade inside Iraq, the IRIAF F-4Es and Su-24MKs flying dozens of air strikes, and the 'gentlemen' of... was it the 5th SOG or 10th SOG?... cooperating with them in regards of FAC-ops....

....the West de-facto depends on Iran to 'save us' from the Daesh in Iraq.

Guess, it's logical to expect the Iranians to let Washington vet future Iranian diplomatic representatives in Baghdad too. :rolleyes:

[JWing]

Finished off my Understanding Anbar series with the perspective of several Iraqi generals who were interviewed by the US Marine Corps in 09. All served under Saddam and some got jobs post-03 as well with new ISF. Their description of Anbar after the U.S. invasion parallels today's situation. U.S. made mistake after mistake that alienated the population and helped lead to the insurgency. Then Al Qaeda in Iraq abused Iraqis and Anbar decided to turn against them eventually with the Awakening. Similar to Maliki turning people against Baghdad, and now Islamic State carrying out many of the same tactics like executions and abductions of Iraqis that is turning tribes against them. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/12/understanding-anbar-pt-xv-generals.html).

[JWing]

Just published my security report for Iraq Dec 1-7. Attacks and casualties remained at low level showing that insurgency is regrouping. Only in Anbar is IS on the offensive still. Also has freedom of movement in Salahaddin. Otherwise IS has drastically cut back its operations across the rest of the country. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/12/decline-in-violence-in-iraq-continues_10.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

#Analysis #Map
Final evidence, the #IslamicState is 600 meters away from #Assad-regime held #Deir_Ezzor #airport.

pic.twitter.com/67XBOPWJ9U

[OUTLAW 09]

The US military just released videos of a strike against an ISIS electronic warfare unit in Syria. http://read.bi/1ulFzcB

[davidbfpo]

No surprises here, but a very clear commentary on Iran's expanding influence if not power in Iraq. Here is one passage:
...this (air) campaign is quite obviously meant to help the main ground forces currently fighting the I.S.—namely, the Iraqi government and Shia militias in Iraq—in the hopes that the Islamic State may be defeated through their combined efforts.

(Near the end) Nor does the eventual creation, or attempt to create, an Iranian sphere of influence across the Middle East bode well for American or Western interests.
Link:http://www.thetower.org/article/how-iraq-became-a-wholly-owned-subsidiary-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran/

[davidbfpo]

A long article in The Guardian, based on an interview with an ISIS veteran and entitled 'Isis: the inside story'. Some content is new IIRC.
Link:http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...e-inside-story (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story)

Cross-posted on the wider thread on detention in COIN.

[SWJ Blog]

ISIS: The Inside Story (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/isis-the-inside-story)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/isis-the-inside-story) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[OUTLAW 09]

Now the IS ground strategy is becoming clearer---by spreading the fighting over two countries IS has forced Iran to spread their support forces for Assad as well across two countries--Hezbollah is spread thin---the Iraqi Shia militias pulled back from Syria to defend Iraq etc.

Assad has no more manpower coming from other sources.

Then this today:

This is the second time in 3 days, Syrian rebels use the TOW vs. Northern Daraa.
Notice, #Assad troops have no reserves to fight back

there was some indications that the US had cut back on the supplying of TOWs based on the analyze of TOW videos being released--the number of videos actually did drop which would have indicated a short supply.

But then TOW videos started up again---maybe the resupply was simply a problem and not a foreign policy shift again by this administration.

[SWJ Blog]

Obama’s Strategy for Defeating ISIS is the Only Viable Option. It Can Work. (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/obama%E2%80%99s-strategy-for-defeating-isis-is-the-only-viable-option-it-can-work)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/obama%E2%80%99s-strategy-for-defeating-isis-is-the-only-viable-option-it-can-work) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Fight ISIS? You're Kidding, Why? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/fight-isis-youre-kidding-why)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/fight-isis-youre-kidding-why) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[CrowBat]

Who said Assad has manpower - or might be in need of the same?

The IRGC-QF needed just few months to reorganize, recruit and train new units and send them to Syria.

The SF ('Southern Front' insurgents) in Dera'a can keep on posting flashy videos of their TOW deployments around Sheikh Miskin, but the fact is that their brethren in northern Syria (SRF) was overrun by the JAN, and whatever is left of the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic Front (IF) is in the process of getting overrun or at least encircled and besieged in Aleppo.

And that by IRGC-forces now led by Maj Gen Hamedani (ex CO IRGC's Basiji Corps and creator of the 'National Defence Force' in Syria).

Thus, again: who said Assad needs manpower? The IRGC surely has plenty of it in reserve... If nothing else, there are still enough Palestinians, Afghan Hazaras, or whoever else is next on their 'to recruit' list... (for details, see my last four posts in 'Syria...' thread).

[JWing]

Just wrote a piece on Iranian airpower in Iraq. November an Iranian F-4 jet was filmed flying missions over Diyala. Iranian jets have probably been flying missions in Iraq since July. Iraqi pilot said Iranians were regularly flying jets prop planes and helicopters for the Iraqi air force. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/12/iranian-airpower-in-iraq.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

Who said Assad has manpower - or might be in need of the same?

The IRGC-QF needed just few months to reorganize, recruit and train new units and send them to Syria.

The SF ('Southern Front' insurgents) in Dera'a can keep on posting flashy videos of their TOW deployments around Sheikh Miskin, but the fact is that their brethren in northern Syria (SRF) was overrun by the JAN, and whatever is left of the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic Front (IF) is in the process of getting overrun or at least encircled and besieged in Aleppo.

And that by IRGC-forces now led by Maj Gen Hamedani (ex CO IRGC's Basiji Corps and creator of the 'National Defence Force' in Syria).

Thus, again: who said Assad needs manpower? The IRGC surely has plenty of it in reserve... If nothing else, there are still enough Palestinians, Afghan Hazaras, or whoever else is next on their 'to recruit' list... (for details, see my last four posts in 'Syria...' thread).

And then just why is the Assad army losing slowly more and more ground?

You seem to be in a contradiction.

Groups involved in the Wadi al Dayf Offensive:
Jabhat Al Nusra
Ahrar Al Sham
Jund Al Aqsa
Division 13
Liwa Fursan Al Haqq
Faylaq Al Sham

[OUTLAW 09]

#SAA, captured after attempting to flee in #Idlib..
http://youtu.be/gBbMecvoosE

Supporters of the #Syria|n dictatorship are pushing their #Aleppo hopes very hard. It's propaganda for the "freeze".
pic.twitter.com/h813gjEaat

The entire regime withdrawal got stuck at this point.
All tanks, apcs left behind.
RAN OUT OF FUEL??!!

Syrian rebels narrowly miss an #Assad regime tank north of #Aleppo with the #TOW.
http://youtu.be/Qz48pgBaHdI

A Syrian rebel TOW destroys a fleeing regime T-62 near #Maarat_al_Numan (probably 1 or 2 days ago).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XTodbmn-XbE …

The #Assad regime gave up on #Shaykh_Maskin and rains barrel bombs on the city.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VgCAAy0dCR0 …

#Assad regime forces in #Khan_Shaykhun run for their lives after column destroyed.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KFTP7nEuSXE …

Syrian rebels destroy regime position in #Handarat piece by piece with the hell cannon.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HsXqqZYVQfQ …

Some #Assad troops die in a Syrian rebel TOW attack on their position in #Handarat,north of #Aleppo.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BUvI8njO-Xc …

This #barrel_bomb stroke close to #Bayanoun's white mosque.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fTn3867pbo4 …

[OUTLAW 09]

#SAA, captured after attempting to flee in #Idlib..
http://youtu.be/gBbMecvoosE

Supporters of the #Syria|n dictatorship are pushing their #Aleppo hopes very hard. It's propaganda for the "freeze".
pic.twitter.com/h813gjEaat

The entire regime withdrawal got stuck at this point.
All tanks, apcs left behind.
RAN OUT OF FUEL??!!

Syrian rebels narrowly miss an #Assad regime tank north of #Aleppo with the #TOW.
http://youtu.be/Qz48pgBaHdI

A Syrian rebel TOW destroys a fleeing regime T-62 near #Maarat_al_Numan (probably 1 or 2 days ago).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XTodbmn-XbE …

The #Assad regime gave up on #Shaykh_Maskin and rains barrel bombs on the city.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VgCAAy0dCR0 …

#Assad regime forces in #Khan_Shaykhun run for their lives after column destroyed.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KFTP7nEuSXE …

Syrian rebels destroy regime position in #Handarat piece by piece with the hell cannon.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HsXqqZYVQfQ …

Some #Assad troops die in a Syrian rebel TOW attack on their position in #Handarat,north of #Aleppo.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BUvI8njO-Xc …

This #barrel_bomb stroke close to #Bayanoun's white mosque.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fTn3867pbo4 …


Ppl r reporting #Syria regime s evacuating AbuDhour airbase Idlib to Hama base. Fear of Wadi Aldaif scenario.

[OUTLAW 09]

And Syria is not having a manpower problem?

Rebels have captured a shia child soldier 14 years on the front of Sayfat in #Aleppo #Syria
pic.twitter.com/lysYkC1sm2

[OUTLAW 09]

Aymenn J Al-Tamimi @ajaltamimi

Bear in mind re. #pt Kata'ib Hezbollah & other #Iran proxies in particular considering 'Great Satan' cause of #Iraq's recent troubles.

Notice the Iraqi's seem to blame others for their current security issues with IS.

[JWing]

Very proud to present this collaborative piece I was able to orchestrate featuring 24 Iraq observers on whether the unity of Iraq will survive the current crisis. Those participating include:

Ahmed Ali is senior research analyst and Iraq Team lead at the Institute for the Study of War
Dr. Liam Anderson is a political science professor at Wright State University
Dr. Amatzia Baram is professor emeritus at the Department of the History of the Middle East and Director of the Center for Iraq Studies at the University of Haifa, Israel
Kamal Chomani is the co-founder of the Kurdish Policy Foundation and a journalist
Dr Eric Davis is professor of political science at Rutgers University
Steve Donnelly is a former member of the Salahaddin Provincial Reconstruction Team and served in the State Department
Dr Johan Franzen is a senior lecturer in Middle Eastern History at the University of East Anglia
Fanar Haddad is a research fellow at the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore
Sarhang Hamasaeed is senior program officer for the Middle East and Africa at the United States Institute of Peace
Haider Hamoudi is an associate professor of law and associate dean of research and faculty development at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law
Faleh Jabar is the director of the Iraq Studies Institute, Beirut, Lebanon
Sajad Jiyad is a research fellow and associate member of the Iraqi Institute for Economic Reform
Dr. Abbas Kadhim is a senior policy fellow at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University
Ibrahim al-Marashi is an assistant professor of Middle East History at California State University San Marcos
Ramzy Mardini is a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council
Dr. Harith Hasan al-Qarawee is a fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Studies, Harvard University
Dr Babak Rahimi is associate professor of communication, culture and religion at the University of California San Diego
Colonel Joel Rayburn is an active duty army officer, a senior military fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, and contributor to the Hoover Institute’s Working Group on Islamism and the International Order
Dr. Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute
Dr. Thabit Abdullah is associate professor of History at York University
Christine van den Toorn is the director of the Institute of Regional and International Studies at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani
Reidar Visser is an independent Iraq researcher who writes the blog Iraq and Gulf Analysis
Judith Yaphe is visiting professor of International Affairs, Institute for Middle East Studies, Elliott Schoo, George Washington University
Akiko Yoshioka is a senior researcher at the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan

Here's the article (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/12/24-voices-on-unity-of-iraq.html)

[OUTLAW 09]

Interestingly in the last few days a lot of new TOW ATGM videos have been posted online, including from the Hazzms

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qz48pgBaHdI …

[OUTLAW 09]

Summary of Ma'arat al-Numan Wadi Deif battle :

http://www.agathocledesyracuse.com/archives/193 pic.twitter.com/BOabEFWueC


The War Next Door pt 1. Find out how Israeli soldiers treat Syrian rebels in our exclusive footage on @vicenews
https://news.vice.com/video/the-war-next-door-part-1 …

[CrowBat]

And then just why is the Assad army losing slowly more and more ground?

You seem to be in a contradiction.
Not the least: it's your picture that's incomplete.

Since IRGC is in control of regime's forces again (October this year), the renewed practice of squandering re-trained units (which we could monitor through the summer), ceased, and 'economy of force' was re-introduced. Means, the regime is holding out in most of places, while only one major offensive operation and one major besieging operation are undertaken at time.

Per province, the situation is something like this:
- Idlib: JAN + Ahrar ash-Sham kicked out SRF and Hazzm, but nothing changed about regime's position (indeed, a major JAN offensive on regime in Idlib City collapsed with heavy loss)

- Lattakia: regime's position stabile (it remains in control over more than 95% of this province)

- Aleppo: regime on advance, about to cut off remaining IF and FSyA insurgents in eastern part of the city; JAN is squandering own units, time and resources for pointless attacks on Nubol and az-Zahra

- Raqqa: under Daesh control since months, with minor pockets held by insurgents in between

- Hassakah: partitioned between Daesh and Kurds, with few minor regime garrisons holding out

- Dayr az-Zawr: regime smashed a major Daesh offensive with help of chemical weapons (see 'chlorine') and stabilized the situation; means, everything is back to positions from October

- Tartus: undisputedly under regime control

- Hama: JAN and Ahrar forced remnants of the former 11th Armoured Division to withdraw from Wadi ad-Dayf to Moarek; this is praised as a 'big victory', but is actually changing very little (it's a very bleak 'revenge' for the loss of Moarek); besides, about 1,000 regime troops managed to escape together with a significant quantity of intact armour (the latter is particularly important because the regime is meanwhile short on operational armour)

- Homs: under firm regime control bar the pocket between ar-Rastan and Talbiseh now controlled by the JAN, and a Daesh-held pocket near T.4, which is now jeopardised because of regime's victory in Dayr az-Zawr.

- Damascus and Rif Dimashq: Jobar nearly overrun by regime, about 800 insurgents boxed into an area less than 1km in diameter; rest of Eastern Ghouta should be much easier to overrun; this is continuation of defeats of insurgents in this part of Syria

- Quneitra: no major insurgent advances since months

- Dera'a: this is the only province where regime is losing lately, and the only majority of which is still held by insurgents not Jihadists or the Daesh. But, capital of Dera'a is still under regime's control, and the regime is able to supply it down the highway from Damascus. Recent insurgent capture of Sheikh Miskin was an important victory, but foremost a morale bolster: it was stopped by a strong regime counterattack. Overall, even should the insurgents breach-through in direction of Damascus, they would run into a chain of major military bases surrounding the city, and I do not see them having the strength to take even one of these. Furthermore, the SF and JAN are increasingly at odds, especially because of creation of first Daesh cells, and this is no good sign: usually, such disputes end with collapse of moderates.

- as-Suwayda: thin area along its western border to Dera'a held by insurgents, rest under firm control of pro-regime Druze.

Overall:

No matter what happened at Wadi ad-Dayf, I do not see regime really 'losing' anything important. With the decline of oil prices, even possession of the Sha'er gas field is not as important. On the contrary, the IRGC will see to complete the siege of Aleppo and its methodical advance in Eastern Ghouta (Rif Dimashq province), and I do not see a trace of hope of either situation changing any time soon.

With these two exceptions, nothing really changed for most of this year. Foremost: since the Daesh squandered its offensive capability by fruitless attacks on Ayn al-Arab and Dayr az-Zawr, the regime (i.e. IRGC and Hezbollah) is now the only force with proven capability to advance and then hold the territory it occupied.

[OUTLAW 09]

Not the least: it's your picture that's incomplete.

Since IRGC is in control of regime's forces again (October this year), the renewed practice of squandering re-trained units (which we could monitor through the summer), ceased, and 'economy of force' was re-introduced. Means, the regime is holding out in most of places, while only one major offensive operation and one major besieging operation are undertaken at time.

Per province, the situation is something like this:
- Idlib: JAN + Ahrar ash-Sham kicked out SRF and Hazzm, but nothing changed about regime's position (indeed, a major JAN offensive on regime in Idlib City collapsed with heavy loss)

- Lattakia: regime's position stabile (it remains in control over more than 95% of this province)

- Aleppo: regime on advance, about to cut off remaining IF and FSyA insurgents in eastern part of the city; JAN is squandering own units, time and resources for pointless attacks on Nubol and az-Zahra

- Raqqa: under Daesh control since months, with minor pockets held by insurgents in between

- Hassakah: partitioned between Daesh and Kurds, with few minor regime garrisons holding out

- Dayr az-Zawr: regime smashed a major Daesh offensive with help of chemical weapons (see 'chlorine') and stabilized the situation; means, everything is back to positions from October

- Tartus: undisputedly under regime control

- Hama: JAN and Ahrar forced remnants of the former 11th Armoured Division to withdraw from Wadi ad-Dayf to Moarek; this is praised as a 'big victory', but is actually changing very little (it's a very bleak 'revenge' for the loss of Moarek); besides, about 1,000 regime troops managed to escape together with a significant quantity of intact armour (the latter is particularly important because the regime is meanwhile short on operational armour)

- Homs: under firm regime control bar the pocket between ar-Rastan and Talbiseh now controlled by the JAN, and a Daesh-held pocket near T.4, which is now jeopardised because of regime's victory in Dayr az-Zawr.

- Damascus and Rif Dimashq: Jobar nearly overrun by regime, about 800 insurgents boxed into an area less than 1km in diameter; rest of Eastern Ghouta should be much easier to overrun; this is continuation of defeats of insurgents in this part of Syria

- Quneitra: no major insurgent advances since months

- Dera'a: this is the only province where regime is losing lately, and the only majority of which is still held by insurgents not Jihadists or the Daesh. But, capital of Dera'a is still under regime's control, and the regime is able to supply it down the highway from Damascus. Recent insurgent capture of Sheikh Miskin was an important victory, but foremost a morale bolster: it was stopped by a strong regime counterattack. Overall, even should the insurgents breach-through in direction of Damascus, they would run into a chain of major military bases surrounding the city, and I do not see them having the strength to take even one of these. Furthermore, the SF and JAN are increasingly at odds, especially because of creation of first Daesh cells, and this is no good sign: usually, such disputes end with collapse of moderates.

- as-Suwayda: thin area along its western border to Dera'a held by insurgents, rest under firm control of pro-regime Druze.

Overall:

No matter what happened at Wadi ad-Dayf, I do not see regime really 'losing' anything important. With the decline of oil prices, even possession of the Sha'er gas field is not as important. On the contrary, the IRGC will see to complete the siege of Aleppo and its methodical advance in Eastern Ghouta (Rif Dimashq province), and I do not see a trace of hope of either situation changing any time soon.

With these two exceptions, nothing really changed for most of this year. Foremost: since the Daesh squandered its offensive capability by fruitless attacks on Ayn al-Arab and Dayr az-Zawr, the regime (i.e. IRGC and Hezbollah) is now the only force with proven capability to advance and then hold the territory it occupied.

AND again you failed to answer the direct question---if the manpower is not an issue then why Shia child soldiers? Which by the way is being denied.

#Iran-ian "Yasir" drone are now used in #Iraq by #Harkat_Al_Nujaba, part of "popular committees".
pic.twitter.com/jL8F1iqmsQ

[CrowBat]

AND again you failed to answer the direct question---if the manpower is not an issue then why Shia child soldiers? Which by the way is being denied.I answered your question about supposed lack of manpower by the regime already two posts ago.

It's solved through renewed influx of IRGC-recruited units.

Propaganda by side, but the three IRGC- and two Hezbollah brigades spear-heading the offensive into Aleppo, the two NDF units in Dayr az-Zawr, and four IRGC units running the show in Eastern Ghouta are not staffed by 'Shi'a child soldiers'. Call them 'criminal gangs recruited in Iranian prisons', or whatever else if you like/prefer/must call them that way: that would be closer to truth.

Especially Eastern Ghouta is a complex battlefield in densely built-up urban areas, separated by orchards, walls etc. It's another 'bocage' there and one can monitor deployment of corresponding - and increasingly sophisticated - tactics developed by the IRGC for this purpose since 2013, supported by complex and specialized pieces of machinery; anything but supposed 'child soldiers'.

And BTW: I would say that 25-30 years after the Iran-Iraq War, it's about the time to realize that all the (Iraqi launched) stories about 'human-wave attacks', 'plastic keys to heaven' and similar were of the similar quality like this about 'child soldiers' now.

[OUTLAW 09]

I answered your question about supposed lack of manpower by the regime already two posts ago.

It's solved through renewed influx of IRGC-recruited units.

Propaganda by side, but the three IRGC- and two Hezbollah brigades spear-heading the offensive into Aleppo, the two NDF units in Dayr az-Zawr, and four IRGC units running the show in Eastern Ghouta are not staffed by 'Shi'a child soldiers'. Call them 'criminal gangs recruited in Iranian prisons', or whatever else if you like/prefer/must call them that way: that would be closer to truth.

Especially Eastern Ghouta is a complex battlefield in densely built-up urban areas, separated by orchards, walls etc. It's another 'bocage' there and one can monitor deployment of corresponding - and increasingly sophisticated - tactics developed by the IRGC for this purpose since 2013, supported by complex and specialized pieces of machinery; anything but supposed 'child soldiers'.

And BTW: I would say that 25-30 years after the Iran-Iraq War, it's about the time to realize that all the (Iraqi launched) stories about 'human-wave attacks', 'plastic keys to heaven' and similar were of the similar quality like this about 'child soldiers' now.

Is Turkey helping Peshmerga with providing them with HJ-8 ATGM for their fight against the #IS? pic.twitter.com/LF0ZaOd8Hx

[CrowBat]

Not that I know.

And it would greatly surprise me to hear Turkey is now arming Peshmergas in any fashion - or even letting any other armament but that strictly controlled by Turkish military pass Turkish territory underway to Kurds in northern Iraq.

[OUTLAW 09]

NEW MAP: Situation in #Qalamoun Region | #RifDimashq Province, for December 19, 2014.
#Syria

pic.twitter.com/DQ4Wag612t

[OUTLAW 09]

I have often pointed out Putin's past history as a KGB officer in the GDR as a key element of his "world vision" and it is now FSB and former KGB members who compose his inner circle after the "liberals" were forced out.

I also took hits here for bringing up the term "Russian fascism" a number of times and we are now seeing more articles "starting" to notice that in fact the term "fascism" can be currently applied to Putin's inner circle and his form of governance that is being created every day in Russia especially picking up stream since the Maidan which he views as the more serious threat to him and Russia.

Russia's turning point, when Putin implemented his innate KGB values. http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/12/window-on-eurasia-2014-turning-point.html …
Bottom line...
pic.twitter.com/ggJVn2YGE2

[OUTLAW 09]

I have often pointed out Putin's past history as a KGB officer in the GDR as a key element of his "world vision" and it is now FSB and former KGB members who compose his inner circle after the "liberals" were forced out.

I also took hits here for bringing up the term "Russian fascism" a number of times and we are now seeing more articles "starting" to notice that in fact the term "fascism" can be currently applied to Putin's inner circle and his form of governance that is being created every day in Russia especially picking up stream since the Maidan which he views as the more serious threat to him and Russia.

Russia's turning point, when Putin implemented his innate KGB values. http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/12/window-on-eurasia-2014-turning-point.html …
Bottom line...
pic.twitter.com/ggJVn2YGE2

Once one understands his mindset then one can understand the Russian support for Assad and Iran.

[OUTLAW 09]

Looks like the KSA oil campaign is starting to affect Iran as it has Russia.

Exclusive: #Iran's support for #Syria tested by oil price drop http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0JX21420141219 …

#SaudiArabia is playing chicken with its oil -- to punish #Russia and #Iran. My piece for @ReutersOpinion: http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/12/15/saudi-arabia-is-playing-chicken-with-its-oil/ …

[OUTLAW 09]

Interesting development---so is Iraq going to ask the US for funding to now support the Shia militias.

http://news.yahoo.com/iraqs-shiite-fighters-desert-over-shortages-061752938.html

[OUTLAW 09]

For those that have really understood the QJBR/AQI/IS battlefield tactics we are seeing it work again--they have a unique way of spreading the battlefield, staying on the move and using swarming tactics--and yet their opponents never seem to "see".

Out of the IS trolls came recently a comment that in fact Kobane was a diversionary move for a number of reasons then we hear the Shia are winning over all BUT then this ----

#BREAKING; #Iraq; #ISIS launched an assault on Baiji at dawn. Heavy clashes currently ongoing as ISIS attacked from several different axis.

[OUTLAW 09]

First time I have heard this--wonder where they did come form--there has been talk on the street about illegal German weapons shipments but no evidence. Maybe over Turkey as a member of NATO?

German machine gun MG3 used by #IS were available even before Germany delivered them to Peshmerga. Origin unclear.
pic.twitter.com/wGcG7WFSJF

[OUTLAW 09]

Dagestani insurgency leaders swear loyalty to ISIS:
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/254364/ …

[OUTLAW 09]

#IS advances are reported south of #Baiji and in western #Anbar province.
#Iraq

[OUTLAW 09]

"Wathig el Battat,killed in azim #Iraq by #IS special forces along with his bodyguards" via @Ahmad_alarabi11
pic.twitter.com/ZN7AgxXowJ

[JWing]

Just wrote a short history of Kataib Hezbollah, the Hezbollah Brigades. Was created by the Quds Force in 2007 as a small elite unit to attack the Americans. 2013 went to fight in Syria to support Assad after Iranian request. Is now one of many militias fighting against the insurgency. It's leader Abu Muhandis also acts as Iran's unofficial rep to Iraq. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/12/instrument-of-irans-power-in-iraq-and.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

#Syria | A map of caliphate circulated among #IS supporters, a growing red south #Damascus.

Considering their resistance and territorial growth, it really may become a Sunni nation in 5 years.

It appears that after a massive swarm attack from multiple directions Baiji fell again to the IS--ISF pulled completed out.

#BreakingNews:Following a massive attack this morning in Baiji,all #ISF forces pull out of d city.#IslamicState is in full control of #Baiji

[OUTLAW 09]

So who is emplacing the GPS trackers?

#Iraq: posters allegedly found in #Nineveh province mosques warn locals of what to look for in a GPS tracking device.

pic.twitter.com/NhQDvCn8t6

[OUTLAW 09]

Well worth the read as he is the only western journalist that has been together with IS in Syria and Iraq.

http://juergentodenhoefer.de/seven-impressions-of-a-difficult-journey/?l... …

(Added) The BBC News report, with a short film by this German reporter:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-30585783

[JWing]

Just released my weekly security report in Iraq. Attacks have gone from 30.1 per day in June & July to 19.6 per day over last few weeks. Deaths in Dec avg. 44.4 per day down from 139.0 in June. Anbar & Salahaddin remain major battlefronts but in rest of Iraq insurgents are retreating and re-grouping resulting in drops in violence. Read the whole report here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/12/violence-and-casualties-remain-at-low.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

#Iraq #IS sources claim #IS downed a helicopter in #Baiji today. Pic shows wreckage of a IA Bell-407 downed Oct. 8.
pic.twitter.com/EzeYq8xU5U

#IS: "Jaish al-Muhajereen wal ansar and Katiba al-Khadra declare Ba'ya (loyalty) to #IslamicState in #Aleppo #Syria."
pic.twitter.com/U5nkTcl7AC

[JWing]

IS shot down a Jordanian F16 over Aleppo and captured the pilot as well.

[JWing]

Just did a short history of the Abu Fadhl Al-Abbas Brigade. Was one of many militias created by Iran consisting of mostly Iraqi fighters but also some Lebanese Hezbollah elements to support Assad's government. 2014 started sending its fighters to Iraq and is combat throughout the country now. Both are part of Tehran's policy to prop up Damascus and Baghdad and they have become dependent upon it for security support now. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/12/abu-fadhl-al-abbas-brigade-from.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

Syrian rebels use 9M113 Konkurs ATGM vs. #Assad regime-occupied @UN OGG Position 56

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ct2uca9ibdQ … pic.twitter.com/Kc4OhZIads

[OUTLAW 09]

Updated: List of groups fielding TOW Missiles

https://hasanmustafas.wordpress.com/2014/11/22/the-moderate-rebels-a-complete-and-growing-list-of-vetted-groups-fielding-tow-missiles/ …

Includes 4 new factions, updated social media, added new info etc.

[OUTLAW 09]

Quite significant that the Islamic Front has abandoned Islamic" and it's now "fully merged" under the Levant Front.

[OUTLAW 09]

BREAKING: #IslamicState shot down a Drone in #Ishaqi North of #Baghdad
pic.twitter.com/439HN9SPZD

[OUTLAW 09]

White Jihadi missed uni application and joined ISIS instead'

http://dailym.ai/1x7Ivzp
pic.twitter.com/pNOnyqS0eG emo jihad?

[OUTLAW 09]

Here a string of news from 2012 possibly related to the work of an Israeli mole within the highest ranks of Hezbollah

pic.twitter.com/cG6xOToCtr or https://twitter.com/search?q=pic.twitter.com%2FcG6xOToCtr%20&src=typd

[OUTLAW 09]

"Resurgence of the SSNP in #Syria:"
http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/resurgence-of-the-ssnp-in-syria-an-ideological-opponent-of-the-regime-gets-a-boost-from-the-conflict/ …
pic.twitter.com/EC1b8BFMqk

#Aleppo Update : For 1 month Regime Tanks are Immobile due to Fuel Shortages, Alternate : Artillery & Human Wave
pic.twitter.com/06He8tQCAI

#Aleppo Update : Captured "Afghans"; we re Recruited 2 Fight 4
#Damascus Shrine(ideological)/#Latakia Mountains(Skill), Not
Plain/Urban Area

[OUTLAW 09]

Syrian rebels claim to have cut off roads,water and electricity for the city of #Idlib in response to the arrest of students.

Here they are, blocking one road.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=leB_jdMvCmQ …
pic.twitter.com/44JwXHA8Qg

#Map
#ASSAD's crimes yesterday.
More than 100 civilians were killed on the 26th of December by the regime's raids.
pic.twitter.com/CsY4BP1hp1

[OUTLAW 09]

This was just posted but nothing on the verification side as of yet as it was posted by an IS poster who posts a lot for IS.
https://twitter.com/ARaqqah?original_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fukraineatwar .blogspot.com%2F&tw_i=548815882513051649&tw_p=embeddedtimeline&tw_w=467271264835346432

BREAKING : The Islamic state has a modern anti-aircraft weapons

pic.twitter.com/32QjSx4yxo

[OUTLAW 09]

Iraq calls on US to arm 100,000 Sunni tribes against IS
http://bit.ly/1HOOtGV

Reporter # Serena Shim killed in #Turkey for reporting on #Erdogans I.S.I.S friends.
pic.twitter.com/MNmUjf0Bfp

[OUTLAW 09]

There's 'chatter' of a broad #Lattakia offensive by #JN and other factions. Are there any details available?

pic.twitter.com/4xdjbGb0zo

[OUTLAW 09]

#Inkhil, the "city of angels", gets further destroyed with dozens killed in the last 24 hours

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rSEYw-_XWY …
pic.twitter.com/JpHgurQAJC

[OUTLAW 09]

I answered your question about supposed lack of manpower by the regime already two posts ago.

It's solved through renewed influx of IRGC-recruited units.

Propaganda by side, but the three IRGC- and two Hezbollah brigades spear-heading the offensive into Aleppo, the two NDF units in Dayr az-Zawr, and four IRGC units running the show in Eastern Ghouta are not staffed by 'Shi'a child soldiers'. Call them 'criminal gangs recruited in Iranian prisons', or whatever else if you like/prefer/must call them that way: that would be closer to truth.

Especially Eastern Ghouta is a complex battlefield in densely built-up urban areas, separated by orchards, walls etc. It's another 'bocage' there and one can monitor deployment of corresponding - and increasingly sophisticated - tactics developed by the IRGC for this purpose since 2013, supported by complex and specialized pieces of machinery; anything but supposed 'child soldiers'.

And BTW: I would say that 25-30 years after the Iran-Iraq War, it's about the time to realize that all the (Iraqi launched) stories about 'human-wave attacks', 'plastic keys to heaven' and similar were of the similar quality like this about 'child soldiers' now.

so there is no manpower shortage?--come on get real and there are no "child soldiers" and there are no human wave attacks due to the lack of fuel for the Assad armor-? and yet you criticize others----

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/desperate-for-soldiers-assads-government-imposes-harsh-recruitment-measures/2014/12/28/62f99194-6d1d-4bd6-a862-b3ab46c6b33b_story.html

[JWing]

Baathist Naqshibandi which is the 2nd largest insurgent group in Iraq has lost out to the Islamic State in most cities it had large and powerful presence in before the summer offensive. http://www.aymennjawad.org/2014/12/the-naqshbandi-army-current-situation-in-iraq

[JWing]

Just wrote article on the 5th reported loss for Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force member in Iraq. Was shot by an IS sniper in Balad, Salahaddin although Iran is claiming it was in Samarra defending the Askari shrine there because that's part of Tehran's propaganda line. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/12/fifth-iranian-revolutionary-guard-corps.html).

[OUTLAW 09]

Just wrote article on the 5th reported loss for Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force member in Iraq. Was shot by an IS sniper in Balad, Salahaddin although Iran is claiming it was in Samarra defending the Askari shrine there because that's part of Tehran's propaganda line. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/12/fifth-iranian-revolutionary-guard-corps.html).

New #ISIS release shows them using #TOW ATGMs in #Syria, source yet unknown http://justpaste.it/al-qariatin
pic.twitter.com/WnymlGLYCQ

ISIS claim killing of IRGC Brig. Gen. Hamid Taghavi in Iraq
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Dec-29/282521-isis-claims-killing-of-iranian-military-adviser-in-iraq.ashx …

Killed in Samarra, site of Askari shrine.

[JWing]

Just wrote a new piece on the history of Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, League of the Righteous. Began as a breakaway Sadr faction and has now considered a nationalist group that is defending Iraq from the insurgents today. Read about the transformation here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/12/asaib-ahl-al-haq-from-breakaway-sadr.html).

[JWing]

Just published my new security report for the 4th week of December in Iraq. Attacks and casualties were up due to intense fighting in Anbar and a mass grave being discovered in Diyala. ISF, militias and tribes also freed Dhuluiya and other sections of Balad district in Salahaddin province. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/12/slight-uptick-in-violence-in-iraq.html).

[JWing]

I've been trying to cover some of the militias that are now operating in Iraq. Today came out with an article about the Khorasani Brigade. It's one of the newer militias that went from fighting in Syria to Iraq. Is now carrying out sectarian cleansing of Sunnis in Salahaddin and Diyala while arguing with Kurds over the disputed territories. Shows how militias might help to defeat the militias but could lead to longer term problems for Iraq. Read more here (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2015/01/khorasani-brigade-another-iraq-militia.html).

[davidbfpo]

This thread has run since June 2014, when Mosul fell to ISIS & others. It has 56k views and 1,132 posts. It is appropriate as 2015 has arrived that it be closed and a new thread started.

The new thread, is called 'Iraq 2015: nowt is simple in this conflict' and due to the overlap with the Syrian civil war should be read alongside the 2015 Syrian thread.