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Jedburgh
01-31-2007, 04:56 PM
Infantry, Nov-Dec 06 (AKO Log-in Required): A Case Against Battle Drill Six (https://www.benning.army.mil/magazine/2006/2006_6/13_notes02-03.pdf)

An overemphasis on training for close quarter combat (CQC), or close quarter battle (CQB), in recent years has resulted in its overuse in combat, often in situations where more appropriate options exist.

Platoon by platoon, the Army is learning the hard way how hazardous it is to fight room to room against a well prepared and often suicidal opponent. We can no longer afford to learn the lesson individually. It is time for a candid discussion on this subject, and to address the problem as a responsive, learning, and adaptive Army....

bismark17
01-31-2007, 05:30 PM
I still subscribe to the print edition of Infantry magazine. Is this a regular article in the latest edition or a supplement to it?

jcustis
01-31-2007, 05:34 PM
A few years ago, when I was a lieutenant, the Regimental commander was out and about at MOUT town as we conducted company-level training.

After watching a few dry runs, he made a point of addressing the entire company during a noon chow. He was very adamant that we must not become enamored with SWAT TTPs that are designed to handle a particular threat, and one which we certainly would not encounter in a high-intensity environment.

The biggest sticking point with him was our "secure a foothold" rehearsals that had squads stacked up in neat lines, preparing to make entry from the street or alleyway. "What are you going to do when you have a machine gun aimed in on a principle direction of fire down the street?" was one of his rhetorical questions. It was sage wisdom that put the platoon commanders back in the box of tackling the problem by utilizing stand-off and heavier (SMAW) weapons.

bismark17
01-31-2007, 05:54 PM
I was kind of shocked during MOUT training back in '92 that the instruction was all about using SWAT tactics and not relying on any lessons learned from WW2 or the more modern Beirut ops. The whole stack concept is for barricaded subjects in a controlled area and in which the bad guys are contained. It doesn't appear that we have that luxury very often in Iraq.

slapout9
01-31-2007, 06:52 PM
Bismarck17, Agree 100% This is a real sore point with me for some time. Not only that but the SWAT TTP's they are using are obsolete. most entry teams today go through the door with a full shield (called a body bunker) capable of stopping 7.62 ammo. Why don't they do this in Iraq. Granted they are heavy about 28 pounds or so. You switch off or you will wear the no 1 man out. But they work. You can flash and crash perfectly and still get killed.

Stan
01-31-2007, 08:20 PM
Well put Slapout,
My anti-terrorism courses in West Point, Va were designed around that very basic function, but a one-man team.
28 pounds vs your life, my instructor would ask. No question.

I agree, the (real) situations that our fine soldiers meet each day are different and perhaps 28 pounds ends up a big deal at the end of a hot day.

The entire side of our vehicle is lined with aluminum plates and old, well used police vests that would have merely been thrown away. Only years later did we understand how significant those vests were when a F1 grenade went off less than 10 centimeters from our broad side, where our robot operator sat.

We no longer care about extra things along.

Maximus
02-01-2007, 04:20 AM
Great discussion. Couldn't agree more--we must be very careful training Marines/Soldiers for CQB using SWAT TTPs when the enemy is often hunkered down in what would have been considered pillboxes in WWII. Then 1stLt Elliot Ackerman, USMC, wrote a great Gazette article in the Sept 2006 issue titled "Relearning Stormtroop Tactics: The Battle for Fallujah" that provides insight into his experiences leading a rifle platoon in Fallujah. I tried to attach the PDF file but it's too big. Not sure if you've all had a chance to read it.

In the article Ackerman initially describes how he felt unprepared to attack a highly determined irregular foe in a fortified urban defense commenting that he didn't think we'd "cracked the code" just yet on urban combat. He proceeds to describe all Marine units at first relying too heavily on CQB tactics only to realize very quickly that doing so equates to suicide. He then demonstrates how infantry squads/platoons quickly learned to first identify enemy positions and then moved to isolate/overwatch while calling in tanks, air, D-9s, CAAT, LAR, Bradleys, etc. to reduce before Marines moved into clear. It's in the latter clearing process that CQB skills should be emphasized and employed. In sum: CQB TTPs are fine, but the conditions must be set to employ them before entering the objective.

Another and possibly even more important point brought on in the article is the importance of U.S. units using infiltration tactics when fighting irregular foes in Block III urban combat instead of strictly relying on on-line assaults that are currently recommended in our doctrine and the standard in most of our training exercises. Ackerman argues that using on-line tactics makes the enemy's job easy and falls right into his preferred strategy: attrit U.S. forces at range and then fall back through pre-made tunnels, jumping from roof-to-roof or over gates, etc as U.S. forces close and then to continue this pattern until you run out of room, at which point you execute your pre-determined E&E plan and live to fight another day. His argument in this respect is supported strongly by Poole's analysis in Phantom Soldier and Tactics of the Crescent Moon. Ackerman's experiences demonstrate the validity of urban night infiltration tactics as his platoon successfully infiltrated roughly 300 meters behind enemy lines and proceeded to wreak havoc on the enemy at first light when the enemy attempted to expolit what they perceived to be our predictable on-line attack preference shortly after the sun comes up in the morning.

All this said it's still extremely important for U.S. forces to train for urban ops at the other end of the spectrum of conflict as well. This afternoon I spent an hour conducting an AAR interview w/ an infantry Lt recently back from Ramadi. Many of his comments emphasized the importance of Marines toning down their actions and being much less aggressive when conducting cordon and search operations and even raids. As his company's primary raid force he found after a few months that his unit was much more successful when knocking and talking vs. explosive breaching/kicking down doors--even when conducting raids. He argued that even when we think we have solid intel, we're still wrong or too late in acting very often, therefore, our SWAT hard hit tactics only serve to increase the pool of POIs (pissed off Iraqis). Besides, he said he'd always isolate the objective area first and then move to enter the house with more Marines and firepower than the enemy had. Many interesting points were made throughout the discussion. His company's experience in Ramadi only goes to show that a unit can succeed when doing everything possible to de-escalate as much as possible.

bismark17
02-01-2007, 06:19 AM
Amazing. I will have to read that. Since reading Poole's books I have been highly interested in a more modern or less modern? approach to small unit combat. This bizarre hybrid of mixing police tactics with what our guys are going through over there is just crazy. As slapout mentioned SWAT/HRT/SPU/SRT is going into a uncontrolled environment from a highly controlled environment. They are picking the time and place to strike. They are forcing a dynamic entry without having to worry about their 6. Snipers are overwatching and there is a ton of perimeter security both near side and far side by uniformed officers. They are usually doing the hit after a long period of attempted talking and after a CS deployment plan. The cards are stacked very heavily in our favor. None of this equates to what is going on over there.

I was pretty impressed with the earlier thread in what would be the ideal Infantry squad and wish we would explore that further along with better TTPs. I suppose most of the discussion is better left off the net but it does make me wonder. I grew up as a 3rd generation infantryman/paratrooper and I have heard enough stories that span from WW2-Korea and then with my dad in Vietnam to know the dangers of massing people, even in a temporary situation, for a stack prior to a room entry. I am looking forward to getting my hands on that Marine Officers' AAR.

slapout9
02-01-2007, 11:54 AM
Everybody knows what SWAT stands for don't they? Sit-Wait-And-Talk;)

Stan
02-01-2007, 01:20 PM
Hey Slapout,
My brother-in-law is a DC bomb squad dog handler, going on 17 years.
SWAT teams, in his opinion, perform swift and heartless maneuvers with little compassion. Do we need these folks ? You bet !

slapout9
02-01-2007, 01:47 PM
Stan, Yep some people will always cross the line. That is when put out the STOP sign. I actually saw this put on a ballistic shield. The higher powers made him take it off of course but it looked cool for awhile.

Steve Blair
02-01-2007, 01:58 PM
Sure, we will always need SWAT-style units, and in some cases their tactics may be useful for military ops. But, as seems the case in far too many things, the powers that be want a one-size-fits-all theory for things. "If this works for LAPD SWAT/Delta snatch teams/Chuck Norris, it MUST work for the line grunts as well." You need to retain those capabilities for situations where they are appropriate, but they will not always work.

Stan
02-01-2007, 03:21 PM
Hello Steve,
I not only agree, but think we have somehow forgotten our grunts. We have a good laugh using them as the brunt of a joke (they were afterall in the early 70's those with the lowest GT scores).

Often however, we worry a tad too much. That was the case with Operation Support Hope. The General posted a two-man gate guard with a SAW out front, but no ammo ?

Yes, Africans are slow to learn, but it doesn't take much to figure out the weapon is empty and the grunt holding it like a sack of potatoes didn't help much either.

Somewhere between SWAT man Chuck and an empty weapon with common sense.

Regards, Stan

Steve Blair
02-01-2007, 03:50 PM
Stan, I agree completely. In the whole rush for fancy stuff the ol' Snuffie has been forgotten. And that is a major problem.

Tom Odom
02-01-2007, 04:00 PM
I have written much on this subject, some of which has been discussed here.

Nothing happens until Joe puts his boot on the ground and that gets lost in the swirl of techie thinking whether you are talking close combat or intelligence operators out there looking.

I really liked Billl Meara's book. My review of it makes that clear. One thing that jumped off the pages at me was his practice of getting out and looking. Stan and I made that a practice and it served us and the greater intel community well. It can be a very lonely feeling...then again the first man through the door, stacked or not, is about as alone as one can get.

Best

Tom

Maximus
02-01-2007, 04:53 PM
I have a bunch of notes from the AAR with the Lt. I'll post shortly. I can also send Ackerman's article over e-mail. Just let me know.

slapout9
02-01-2007, 05:04 PM
Tom, in the old days the first man did not go through the door! he would lie on the ground OUTSIDE! the door and look first. If he fired nobody else went through the door until he yelled go, if he didn't fire, he yelled go and the rest of the team would enter and clear their sector. Not perfect but better than going through blind and low tech and cheap to.

Stan
02-01-2007, 05:16 PM
Good evening Folks !
Slapout, God I love the way you pen this Sierra :D
You could've been a grunt ! Errr, naw forget that one :wry:

I love the movies, cops and EOD. One low, the other high and guns a blazen.
Later, is it the white wire, or the blue one ? WHO CARES ?

We alway just blow the flippin thing with a water canon and go home.

Tom,
check out "Kaur's" link RE culture for the Army. Sierrra ! I think someone actually listened to you in the end. Don't let that go to your (bald) head :D

Regards, Stan

slapout9
02-01-2007, 05:26 PM
Stan, what do you mean could have been???? My primary was 11B4P, secondary was 11C4P.:p I got more time in a T-10 than YO mama Got in A T-Shirt:wry:

Stan
02-01-2007, 05:34 PM
Hey Bubba,
I towed you buds out with my M88 (GED, not the BS diesels).

Darn, I knew you were a gun bunny !

I hung out with 4P1 two clicks south of North Korea (DMZ). Then, the only live fire battery in the US Army (well, can't say that any more). Gotta love an M110. Bad news on the other side of the fence (line).

Slapout, yea, I already knew that :D

jcustis
02-01-2007, 06:36 PM
As I shot this out to one of the Marines whos sevres as a scout section leader within the unit (and as a LEO on civvy street), as some food for thought on his training mindset, it became clearer why we have a fixation with such drills.

It's not necessarily b/c the drill is easy, or sexy, but rather because conducting ancillary training would require non-organic assets and expertise that line companies rarely have the pleasure of employing.

The default training situation is to work on skills that get everyone involved, but don't always require the platoon sergeant or platoon commander to be around. The fixation may arise from the fact that the drill has simply been performed so much that it falls into a subtle area of muscle-memory and is the first card to be thrown down.

Against the highest-risk threats, the preferred tactical decision may be to have an attached engineer emplace a satchel charge against the fortified structure. How often do you see engineers training with the infantry, save the integration that occured when we knew for certain we would be crossing into Iraq? For that matter, how many times have battalions conducted a training rotation at MOUT town with non-organic assets/units other than trucks and maybe AAVs?

I think that this article highlights a deficiency within our typical systems-approach-to-training. We simply do not train together enough to build that familiarity on capabilities and limitations of supporting assets. When we do, it is for a finite period of time such as a Combined Arms Exercise, or when a MEU "locks on" six months out from its float date. Even then, the raid is often the critical task trained to, not high-intensity urban combat.

Hmmm...time, time, time. Maybe I need to edit my thoughts over on the drill and ceremonies thread. :wry:

slapout9
02-01-2007, 07:07 PM
JC, your are right about the breeching charge. Originally the charge was set to make what they used to call a mouse hole.The reason was we never went through a door or window unless you have to, cause they will shoot you! We used to stack up 5 men. After the hole was blown you enter through the hole. Surprise!! this was late 1970's style SWAT. We had to go back to using doors and windows because the local government is responsible for damage to the structure, even if you are going into a known criminal hide out:( Sometime in the early 80's I think it was that I first saw some shields coming into use, but back then they only stopped handgun rounds, but we don't have to do that know more:wry:

120mm
02-02-2007, 08:27 AM
I feel the same way about the convoy live fire. For some reason, in mobilization stations it has become THE event.

I seriously doubt it does any good. I would like to see some numbers on bad guys killed v. innocent bystanders killed by CS and CSS types shooting out the window of their vehicle while rolling along.

Combine that with the incidence of even seeing who just popped the IED.

slapout9
02-02-2007, 10:58 AM
Here is a link to some good videos on the use of a ballistic shield.;)


http://www.bakerbatshield.com/video.asp#tactical

Stan
02-02-2007, 12:47 PM
Hey Slapout,
Thanks for the videos ! Just sent the link to our Central Criminal Folks. Their shields are big enough for three to crowd in, complete with lights and window.

Stan

Jimbo
02-02-2007, 01:53 PM
Having done this stuff in Iraq, and trained National Guardsmen in it at their mobilization stations, a couple of thoughts. Battle Drill 6 came out of Bragg, not Law Enforcement. When the 39th eSB was training at FT Hood, the cops were the hardest to get to understand how to execute it. They wanted to treat like law enforcement, but it wasn't. As far as shields go, where are you going to transport it, and who is going to lug it around. It isn't very practical in that sense. J Custis summed up the pro's as to why it is trained. Team Leaders can run it. J Custis also summed up the cons, in that the ability to train with vehicles is somewhat lacking. Battle Drill 6 is a single team single room concept. For that, it is highly effective. Implied in that task, is that the rest of the squad/platoon is providing some level of external security/shaping op in order to enable the team to execute the battle drill.

Convoy life fire, CSS units tend to have the highest density of crew served weapons, but are allocated the least amount of ammunition to train with, and the least amount of communications for command and control. The lessons of the 507th and others has driven Convoy Live Fires to be very important. Having rolled on plenty of these with the Iraqis, the "collateral damage" issues happen, but they aren't indescriminate. Convoys usually open up only when engaged by direct fire. Escort vehicles usually do most of the shooting, usually at vehicles, and usually with rifle fire in accordance with ROE when locals fail to stop and clear out.

slapout9
02-02-2007, 03:40 PM
Jimbo, I understand about training LE folks, they are hard headed aren't they?:) I don't have AKO access so I have not read the article, how ever I have seen FM 7-8 and under Battle Drill Six right after figure 4-10 is a note which states that if the room is occupied by civilians or non combatants than the normal ROE may change and normal combat power may not be available. Maybe there should be a battle drill 6 and 6a one for dealing with a known enemy and one for an unknown enemy. According to the manual the two situations are to be handled differently.

Uboat509
02-03-2007, 01:45 AM
I just finished the article and I have to say that I disagree with most of what the author says. As I understand this, and please correct me if I am wrong, the author is calling for us cordon off the building, and then wait while the interpretors try to convince the non-combatants to come out and the bad guy to give up. And then, after some unspecified time, the commander can choose to send in troops to attack. This all assumes, of course, that the bad guy is at the house, that we are surrounding the right house, that the house does not have tunnels or connections to other buildings that will allow the bad guy to escape while we are outside shouting at the building, that the "non-combatants" aren't being armed and/or booby trapped before being sent out, that any actual non-combatants have a choice to come out even if they want to, that bad guy isn't using the extra time now that he has been awakened and alerted to our presence to barricade/booby trap himself inside to await our assault. And that is just what I came up with off the top of my head. A lot of times when we go into a building there are no shots fired, either because the bad guy wasn't really a bad guy (wrong guy, wrong house, wrong Intel etc.), he wasn't prepared to resist, or by the time he woke up and shook the cobwebs out there was a barrel chested freedom fighter standing on his neck pointing his M4 at him. You would waist a hell of a lot of time setting up a cordon and then calling out the non-combatants every time and worse yet you would be giving up the initiative. The article actually reminds of the air force article on COIN which basically put forth the idea that you can safely and surgically kill the enemy from a distance without putting boots on the ground and we have already proved that this is not the case.

SFC W

120mm
02-03-2007, 06:18 PM
I don't object to training convoy live fire, I object to spending up to half your training time on it as a "gate" to get out of mob station. Especially when you're looking at guys who aren't going to EVER go on a convoy.

Frankly, it's something even the most rock-headed O-6 and above can comprehend.

As an aside, if you think the 507th Maintenance Co. problem was a convoy marksmanship issue, we need to talk. It was a leadership issue. It was a mindset issue and it was a map-reading issue.

SGTMILLS
02-06-2007, 02:46 PM
I agree with most of you on this matter. The swat tactics of old are just that...OLD. we didn't use the "stack" method when we went into a house. We had trucks. If we took fire from a specific building, we drove through the front door. Yes, barbaric, but effective. Discussions can be had on every aspect of this war, but overthinking things sometimes slows progress.
PS i am a new member and just want to say hello to everyone.

Tom Odom
02-06-2007, 03:05 PM
Tom, in the old days the first man did not go through the door! he would lie on the ground OUTSIDE! the door and look first. If he fired nobody else went through the door until he yelled go, if he didn't fire, he yelled go and the rest of the team would enter and clear their sector. Not perfect but better than going through blind and low tech and cheap to.

Agreed if it's safe to be out on the street in the first place. But everything is METT-T dependent; we worked this issue hard in 2003-2004. You can see the result as CALL Newsletter 03-4.

The debate over situations is on the mark. And one not subject to a checklist approach. Precision UO is just such a case; precise is a relative term. Aachen WWII and Fallujah 2 are at one end of the spectrum; the other is as discussed here the "call out" to the locals. Each has their place depending on situation.

Best
Tom

jcustis
02-06-2007, 03:36 PM
I agree with most of you on this matter. The swat tactics of old are just that...OLD. we didn't use the "stack" method when we went into a house. We had trucks. If we took fire from a specific building, we drove through the front door. Yes, barbaric, but effective. Discussions can be had on every aspect of this war, but overthinking things sometimes slows progress.
PS i am a new member and just want to say hello to everyone.

SGTMILLS,

Welcome and keep contributing. Hard-won experience is critical to adding depth to all of our discussions.

I can see where some of the impetus comes from. On my own initiative, I attended a TREXPO training seminar run by Bob Taubert, a veteran Marine, gun-writer and FBI HRT plank holder. He stated that over the course of actual operations and training sessions, the British SAS determined that ehy had a very finite amount of time after entry (especially dynamic) before the tangos got their wits about them and could start doing harm to hostages.

sullygoarmy
02-06-2007, 05:21 PM
Have to agree with Tom. Battle drill six is an effective tool for a young infantry fire team to execute but conditions must be set prior to execution. I remember as an infantry LT when battle drill six included tossing in a grenade to "prep the room" prior to entering. CTC bulletin 97-01 recommended changes to battle drill six resulting in what most units are familiar with today.

The author's point in this article, however, has a lot of merit. Leaders must have the mental agility to consider other options, determine the risk versus gain of a forced entry and then make a decision. Do we need to replace or bid farewell to battle drill six? Definately not. Are our small unit leaders more adept at determining when and how to execute a clearing mission than pre-2003? I'd definately say yes.

Good article and discussion to get leaders thinking about other options prior to executing the dogma.

SGTMILLS
02-06-2007, 08:50 PM
Thanks, J
back to the topic...Battle drills, to include A-1 (left/right hook) etc. had merit on a conventional battlefield. We even used them in the desert, but in MOUT (read: unconventional warfare), however, the tactics have to be flexible. I.E. busting down doors with trucks. Now, the problem(s) (yes, plural) that a group would encounter on any given day can be categorized, but what does that tell us? We can develop battle drills until we are blue in the face, it's still not going to make our troops ready for every situation. I guess what I am trying to get across, is...smarter troops, with common sense are 100 times more likely to be successful than any SOP could dictate. Muscle memory training is great for the soldier just out of basic, but the real training begins with instilling a bit of "check your surroundings, then adapt." Using your training and keeping within the confines of ROE and SOP under (adaptive) movement is how we kept our unit at 100% through our tour. Just a bit of thought from a lowly buck-sgt.:)

SWJED
02-06-2007, 08:58 PM
Sgt Mills,

Good point on adapting in an urban environment. The first combined arms battalion that went through the Marine Corps' Basic Urban Skills Training (BUST) program commented that there were too many scenarios thrown at them and they would never see even a fraction of the same. After they went through OIF 1 they said, yes we did not see all those scenarios - but we sure saw a lot of things we DID NOT expect and the BUST training had instilled a mindset of adapting and quickly thinking out complex problem sets...

As many have said - don't teach and train what to think, teach and train how to think...

RTK
02-07-2007, 12:37 AM
Agreed if it's safe to be out on the street in the first place. But everything is METT-T dependent; we worked this issue hard in 2003-2004. You can see the result as CALL Newsletter 03-4.

The debate over situations is on the mark. And one not subject to a checklist approach. Precision UO is just such a case; precise is a relative term. Aachen WWII and Fallujah 2 are at one end of the spectrum; the other is as discussed here the "call out" to the locals. Each has their place depending on situation.

Best
Tom

Tom, glad you brought this up. Tom's too modest, but this product was his brainchild. Far and away it's the best and most operationally relevant resourse I've come across regarding this subject. And it works.

Going through the door works, but if you can take the corner of the building off with a Bradley, tank, or truck, you established a breach in a direction the occupants just aren't oriented in. After that, there must be a logical order of operations. This Newsletter is just that.

Regardless of the method, the old saying "slow is smooth and smooth is fast" always applies. This only solidifies through rehearsals and good training.

slapout9
02-07-2007, 01:10 AM
Here is a nice picture of how most modern SWAT teams go through the day today. If you don't want to shoot them you just run into them with the shield, sounds crazy but it is a very effect hostage or capture technique.
http://www.tacticalcops.com/boston-police-gallery/entry-team.asp

I have seen the truck routine done with an Wells Fargo Armored truck. It is also a great ruse to use, people think here comes the money:)
I have seen grappling hooks and steel cables used for people that have burglar bars on their doors and windows.

Ender
03-31-2007, 11:08 AM
This is a very interesting subject that often comes down to two factors, the current ROE's and your (in)ability to precisely pinpoint an enemy position. There are many times when you "know" the enemy is in a particular place but are unable to provide the evidence to higher that would warrant a JDAM or AC-130 response...OR can not justify the use of higher order munitions because said enemy is (intentionally) lodged inside a mosque, or near a piece of "critical infrastructure," or embedded within the civilian populace. It is in times like these (and these days they seem to outnumber any other kind) that all of the CQB pays off.

In the scope of small wars and unconventional conflict we tend to gravitate towards surgery as opposed to wholesale destruction. This preference lends itself to the close fight. There is a reason why we are NOT fighting standing armies, with uniforms and formal, extended supply lines. There is a reason why conflict has largely evolved from the fields and plains to the rooftops and apartments. The reason is that they really are "safer" (nowhere is safe) not because we can't get to them, but because we WON'T get to them or at the very least, are far more HESITANT to get to them.

I dont think anyone here is saying we should have less focus on CQB but rather remember that there are other options out there, and to get entrenched with one method is going to be fatal, is that right? The message I would want to take away from this is that if circumstance and situation warrant, stop take a breath, assess, and then go ahead and call air or arty or the neighborhood Abrams and don't just rush into the stack because that is what you have been training on for the last X number of years. Training and muscle memory tend to have us dialed in on the last thing we worked with or on and it is critical to stay mentally flexible so that when the tactical situation arises you are not leading or being led by lemmings.

As an aside and in defense of the stack. In my experiences there were very few times where we would have been able to send one person to look inside a doorway, room etc... because of a courtyard system or the construction of the building or door itself. I like the idea though and will certainly take that tactic and put it into my mental Rolodex! We were decidedly not allowed to drive our vehicles through ANYTHING, (why trash our trucks?) except in the very rare occasions when ROE's were loosened, but even THEN that kind of liberty was time and space dependent. As I said above the majority of the times we "knew" someone was somewhere, but couldn't provide the pictures, birth certificates and fingerprints of the person there to appease the popular press should the attack go wrong. It is the fear of the fourth estate that is the catalyst for highly trained soldiers and Marines to line themselves up and thow themselves into a potential meat grinder. We may not have cracked the code (yet! ;) )and MOUT/CQB may still be one of the more dangerous components of modern combat but in spite of all of this, we are getting better and learning new ways to integrate technology with the commanders need to know what is in the building next door, without having to send in CSI afterwards.

jcustis
03-31-2007, 12:54 PM
I dont think anyone here is saying we should have less focus on CQB but rather remember that there are other options out there, and to get entrenched with one method is going to be fatal, is that right? The message I would want to take away from this is that if circumstance and situation warrant, stop take a breath, assess, and then go ahead and call air or arty or the neighborhood Abrams and don't just rush into the stack because that is what you have been training on for the last X number of years. Training and muscle memory tend to have us dialed in on the last thing we worked with or on and it is critical to stay mentally flexible so that when the tactical situation arises you are not leading or being led by lemmings.

You're dead on the money.

slapout9
03-31-2007, 02:34 PM
Not the best picture but, here is what a lot teams are using. The battering ram is attached to the vehicle and is used to punch a mouse hole in the building and allows the team to enter from an unexpected direction. It will not tear up the vehicle either. This is a picture of an older model MP type vehicle converted to LE colors. Notice the smiley face:)

http://www.swatguide.com/photos/9705STMIE.gif

Ender
03-31-2007, 06:53 PM
Yes that looks as though it would certainly do the job! I love the face, I mean come on, a little special delivery from your local APC is sure to make anyone smile.

VMI_Marine
08-06-2008, 11:46 PM
Here is an older article that addresses the problem as well. This one is from the JRTC perspective. I love the quote at the beginning, which is from the fighting in Aachen in Sept 1944:


"(Streetfighting) is a bad misnomer, because the last place you see any sane man is in a street where every yard is usually covered by a well-sited machine gun. It should be called house-to-house fighting, which it literally is."

--Denis Johnston, BBC Correspondent, On the Front Lines, John Ellis, pg 90

STREETFIGHTING: The Rifle Platoon in MOUT (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_01-9_karagosian.htm)

Schmedlap
08-07-2008, 02:59 AM
I no longer have AKO access, so I could not read the article, but I read the comments and agree with most regarding the train how to think versus what to think and the use of BD 6 as a training tool.

The biggest downside that I have seen when some units conduct MOUT training is that they act as though they are doing something completely different from non-MOUT training. I have had to emphasize to numerous junior leaders that the complement to MOUT is MOT. The former is urban and the latter is not. (That rhymes). You're still maneuvering over terrain. It just happens to be urban terrain. They tended to get too focused on the stack and room clearing and start losing sight of the fact that they were maneuvering across terrain, often forgetting everything that they've ever learned about IMT, tactical movement as a member of a fire team, and the basics of suppressive fire and bounding. They don't forget that stuff when clearing a bunker, but seem to forget it when it comes to clearing a room. For me, that was always the red flag that told me that the leaders were not getting it.

I guess my point is that BD 6 is a useful training tool, but that a significant number of leaders do not realize that it is a tool. They see it as some magical collective task that will make their units lethal. For example, one of the last live fire exercises that my unit did prior to OIF III was a "shoothouse" exercise that consisted of nothing more than 4 guys stacking outside of the room, entering, engaging targets while moving to their points of domination, declaring the room clear, then clearing their weapons and walking out. It never progressed to the squad level or beyond. That was partly due to absurd range restrictions, but largely due to a fundamental misunderstanding of the value and purpose of the drill. Clearing the room, while dangerous and crap-your-pants scary, is the easy part.

Fortunately, I saw dramatic improvement after they got some OJT in OIF. And by "improvement" I mean that clearing rooms largely amounted to verifying that the enemy had been killed by the SBF as the assault element entered the building.:D

Ken White
08-07-2008, 03:07 AM
over and over sets up an easily exploited pattern. I always appreciated it when the evil enema displayed patterns in their futile attempts to shorten my days... :D

reed11b
08-07-2008, 04:27 AM
STREETFIGHTING: The Rifle Platoon in MOUT (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_01-9_karagosian.htm)

The mighty mighty republic of Cortinia!! I fought them often in my days as an airborne paratrooper. Crafty devils they were. Ah the memories:D

William F. Owen
08-07-2008, 06:08 AM
For example, one of the last live fire exercises that my unit did prior to OIF III was a "shoothouse" exercise that consisted of nothing more than 4 guys stacking outside of the room, entering, engaging targets while moving to their points of domination, declaring the room clear, then clearing their weapons and walking out. It never progressed to the squad level or beyond. That was partly due to absurd range restrictions, but largely due to a fundamental misunderstanding of the value and purpose of the drill. Clearing the room, while dangerous and crap-your-pants scary, is the easy part.

Fortunately, I saw dramatic improvement after they got some OJT in OIF. And by "improvement" I mean that clearing rooms largely amounted to verifying that the enemy had been killed by the SBF as the assault element entered the building.:D

I agree on so many levels!

Cavguy
08-07-2008, 06:18 AM
I read the BD 6 article too late - and it cost me. When I was a CO CDR I decided to enter and clear a house, which resulted in one of my SSG's KIA. He later received the Silver Star, posthumously.

For the story, read this article (http://www.ausa.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/ARMY%20Magazine/March%202008/CompanyCommand.pdf) from the March issue of ARMY magazine below, compiled by the CompanyCommand.mil (http://cp.army.mil)Team at West Point.

I'm the B/2-37 AR vignette.




In May 2006, elements of my company and Iraqi police were engaged in a conflict with an unknown number of gunmen located in a house on the outside of town.

.....

I arrived and dismounted on the ground with a squad-sized element of engineers and infantrymen. After receiving heavy small-arms fire, I authorized a section of M1 Abrams and an M2 Bradley to open fire on the house. They fired eight tank rounds and about 100 rounds of 25 mm into the structure, severely damaging it. The small-arms fire ceased, and I decided to lead my two teams to clear the single-story house. My battalion commander offered to let me employ Hellfire air-to-ground missiles from some AH-64s that were now on station to finish the job, but I waived off, trying to contain any collateral damage, and my troops were already inside the SDZ zone] of the weapon. So I continued with the plan to do room-by-room house clearing.

One of my squad leaders, SSG Legaspi, pulled me aside and asked me to let him lead the entry team and for me to follow in the second team. We also had about 10 Iraqi police with us. We advanced on the house and threw some grenades inside to prepare for entry. After they detonated, SSG Legaspi’s team began entering the house and clearing the first rooms. The IPs cowered and refused to enter, so I led the second team in, flanking around the side of the house. As SSG Legaspi led his men into the rear first floor room, shots rang out, and I watched in horror as SSG Legaspi collapsed on the floor about 10 feet in front of my position. The Soldier behind him was pinned by fire behind a pillar and screaming for help. I was stunned—one of my Soldiers just got hit, another was trapped, and the only way to get to either of them was to traverse the same open area that they just got shot in. Not a good set of options.

.....

A few weeks later, a partner commander was in a similar situation. Instead of charging in, he used police tactics and brought in the TPT [tactical psychological-operations team] truck to demand surrender, which the insurgents eventually did. I immediately began kicking myself. Why hadn’t I done that? Or, why hadn’t I dropped a bomb to begin with since my commander was willing? I kept doing my mental AAR, and each time I found myself wanting. Soon after, I read an article in Infantry Magazine arguing against the current training for house entry—that it was getting too many people killed because the extensive training for it makes it a first—rather than a last—option to many commanders.

Rex Brynen
08-07-2008, 06:38 PM
I'm the B/2-37 AR vignette.

Thoughtful, striking piece, Niel.

MikeF
08-07-2008, 07:11 PM
Neil, thanks for the example. Don't second guess yourself, s*** happens in combat. At least you made a decision.

As Ken said,


over and over sets up an easily exploited pattern. I always appreciated it when the evil enema displayed patterns in their futile attempts to shorten my days

We almost learned the hard way that routine becomes deadly. In early 2007, the threat changed inside the target house. The enemy learned not to fight directly. Instead, they would rig the entire house to blow.

For a time, we mastered the art of battle drill six. We lived by the mantra that "slow is smooth and smooth is fast." My teams could flow through a town seamlessly.

During clearance operations in the DRV, I chose an abandoned home to strong point. To date, we had cleared over 400 homes. Given the location and vantage point, it was key terrain. The location seemed ideal. It was all too inviting. Unfortunately, the enemy identified it as well.

After we secured the house, I had a platoon inside establishing our defense and a platoon outside consolidating. Still something felt odd about the house. In the past 48 hours, we had lost 4 paratroopers to a suicide bomber and discovered an EFP production facility.

An alert NCO continued to search discovering a wire hidden under a rug leading to a hidden basement. Inside the basement, the receiver flashed connected to over 1000lbs of explosives. Thankfully, the det cord was flawed. I would have lost at least 15 soldiers.

Another unit was not so lucky and lost 10 soldiers.

Afterwards, we adopted the crawl approach to clearing.

There is no golden egg with TTPs in sustained COIN. BD6 is not a thing of the past. The key is to be erratic, innovative, and decisive. Sometimes you storm the house; sometimes you call TPTs for surrender; sometimes you blow the house up. As long as you are anything but predictable.

We mastered a similar TTP for driving- always change the tempo. Sometimes we bounded; sometimes we sped; sometimes we crawled.

In any case, the enemy was perplexed and the casualty rate decreased.

v/r

Mike

Tom Odom
08-07-2008, 07:30 PM
Neil,

Virtually the same scenario is what prompted the writing of Nightmare on Wazir Street using Duffer's Drift.

Tom

120mm
08-08-2008, 06:07 AM
Neil, thanks for the example. Don't second guess yourself, s*** happens in combat. At least you made a decision.

As Ken said,



We almost learned the hard way that routine becomes deadly. In early 2007, the threat changed inside the target house. The enemy learned not to fight directly. Instead, they would rig the entire house to blow.

For a time, we mastered the art of battle drill six. We lived by the mantra that "slow is smooth and smooth is fast." My teams could flow through a town seamlessly.

During clearance operations in the DRV, I chose an abandoned home to strong point. To date, we had cleared over 400 homes. Given the location and vantage point, it was key terrain. The location seemed ideal. It was all too inviting. Unfortunately, the enemy identified it as well.

After we secured the house, I had a platoon inside establishing our defense and a platoon outside consolidating. Still something felt odd about the house. In the past 48 hours, we had lost 4 paratroopers to a suicide bomber and discovered an EFP production facility.

An alert NCO continued to search discovering a wire hidden under a rug leading to a hidden basement. Inside the basement, the receiver flashed connected to over 1000lbs of explosives. Thankfully, the det cord was flawed. I would have lost at least 15 soldiers.

Another unit was not so lucky and lost 10 soldiers.

Afterwards, we adopted the crawl approach to clearing.

There is no golden egg with TTPs in sustained COIN. BD6 is not a thing of the past. The key is to be erratic, innovative, and decisive. Sometimes you storm the house; sometimes you call TPTs for surrender; sometimes you blow the house up. As long as you are anything but predictable.

We mastered a similar TTP for driving- always change the tempo. Sometimes we bounded; sometimes we sped; sometimes we crawled.

In any case, the enemy was perplexed and the casualty rate decreased.

v/r

Mike

I think I'm going to frame that and keep it. Smart. Very smart.

Tom Odom
08-08-2008, 12:13 PM
Gents,

I am lookig at updating Handbook 03-04 the Small Unit Leaders Guide to Urban Operations in the next year.

I have asked on of the OC divisions to take it on. But I would love to get direct input from the field. Vignettes are great, especially if tied to TTPs.

If you have something send me a PM and I will send an email address.

Best

Tom

VMI_Marine
08-08-2008, 12:29 PM
Lt Ackerman's article Relearning Stormtroop Tactics talks about isolating strong points and reducing them with supporting assets:


After finding the enemy's position, the infantry would make contact, isolate and suppress the objective, and then either bring up a tank or a D-9 bulldozer to reduce the position.

The key point that I learned last year from the Army is that in a non-kinetic environment, the same idea still applies; only now the supporting assets brought up to "reduce" the strongpoint are an interpreter and/or psyops team.

Mike and Neil, thanks for sharing your experiences.

Rank amateur
08-08-2008, 01:41 PM
Lt Ackerman's article Relearning Stormtroop Tactics talks about isolating strong points and reducing them with supporting assets:



The key point that I learned last year from the Army is that in a non-kinetic environment, the same idea still applies; only now the supporting assets brought up to "reduce" the strongpoint are an interpreter and/or psyops team.



In a non kinetic environment, once you isolate - i.e. build a fence around a neighborhood - there is no urgent need to reduce. For example, you can spend a couple months - or even years - negotiating with people until they lay down their weapons.

Tom Odom
08-08-2008, 01:51 PM
In a non kinetic environment, once you isolate - i.e. build a fence around a neighborhood - there is no urgent need to reduce. For example, you can spend a couple months - or even years - negotiating with people until they lay down their weapons.

Unless you are the police in Prince Georges County MD :wry:

Seriously, the key phrase in this discussion remains METT-T. Everything else is but a guideline to consider.

I can tell you we have seen "stacks" running down streets as units wrongly applied CQB ttps to movement. Very little in my business begins with the phrase "Thou shalt not..."

Tom

MikeF
08-09-2008, 07:35 PM
I'm reflecting this weekend...

On the Job with Operation Minotaur (http://www.npr.org/templates/player/mediaPlayer.html?action=1&t=1&islist=false&id=9204322&m=9204323)

This segment was done 72 hours prior to us discovering the rigged house. As for the reporting, we considered her a "one-night stand" reporter. She shows up, indulges you, and leaves never considering a long-term relationship.

This NPR segment cost me a Senate Armed Forces investigation so I'll put it into the appropriate context...

1. We did not torture anyone...Jamie states the detainees were interviewed out of view. While accurate, it is misportrayed. We handed over the detainees to the MPs.

2. "Let's get Rocky and beat these guys up." Rocky is a 110lbs kurdish iraqi. On patrols, he would scream, "STOP!!!" We'd immediately halt our convoy assuming that he identified an IED or ambush. Instead, he would be concerned with a dog being run over...During an interrogation, Rocky's emotional intelligence disarmed detainees in a way that often provided accurate intelligence.

3. As per my earlier post, we found the rigged house days later.

For additional context, we were penetrating into the denied areas of the Islamic State of Iraq. Moreover, for security reasons, we conducted a major deception operation with the media, Iraqi government, and Iraqi populace. Unfortunately, NPR choose not to leave before understanding the entire operation.

What she failed to document was that we bypassed over 100 deep-buried IEDs and secured an area devestated with sectarian violence, genocide, and terrorist training camps pushing fighters to baqubah, baghdad, and possibly Saudi Arabia.

I suppose those are minor sound bites within the grand scheme of things.

After she left, I felt bad for the curfew that I enforced on the populace. I lifted it to allow them to grab food, water, and electricity....Hours later, four of my soldiers were killed by a suicide bomber.

I never made that mistake again. I still had to write the letters to the families of my fallen.

v/r

Mike

carl
08-09-2008, 08:59 PM
If I had listened to that broadcast when it was originally aired, I would have thought it was a measured report of the situation as it was. The foreign accent and sober delivery would have had me fooled. She did not do your soldiers justice.

You mentioned in the broadcast, perceptions of impunity. That is also a problem for law enforcement here in the States as Slap can probably attest.
Hard, bad men (or often boys, juvys get away with a lot) get back into the town with vastly increased confidence and their neighbors wonder if the cops can really do anything. I read this problem was particularly bad in New Orleans.

If it is of any interest, in the state I was in, going into houses wasn't done much. The suspects were gassed out or talked out. This even extended to cell extractions at the state pen. We practiced cell extractions in training, mostly because it was fun. We even did one once at a county jail. But in the big prisons, they just pumped in the gas until the prisoner agreed to come out. Not very dramatic but safer for all.

jcustis
09-27-2009, 08:01 PM
I need this article again, but my AKO is acting squirrely and I doubt I'll get to rectifying the problem easily. Could someone pinch a copy for me? I need to get this and some good commentary from another site out to the coy cmdrs.

sladethesniper
09-27-2009, 09:03 PM
There is a time and a place for surgical, precision and hi-intensity MOUT. I have freely transitioned between the three, sometimes on the same day doing all three, depending on METT-TC.

While some units are enamored of "the one way" and hone their skills to be perfect at one skill set, I will settle for "good enough" at a wide range of skills which will allow the tactical flexibility to prosecute targets in a variety of ways.

The ROE is usually THE definitive variable on what is allowed, which has the unintended effect of causing escalation with regards to a situation. If others find themselves in that situation, then the transition from precision (or surgical) MOUT to hi-intensity must be trained on or else they will quickly find themselves out of their depth when that situation arises.

With regard to the enemy, here is a little personal vignette:
We were doing some training with a LE SWAT team (a double booked range...what are the odds!) and we watched them, and they watched us. Eventually, we started to compete, as we are wont to do...
Long story short, they attacked we defended (10 on 10) and we defended like we were taught. Concertina in the stairs, crew served covering the avenues of approach, etc. We won. Crew served weapons vs. SWAT = dead SWAT.
They defended, we attacked. We attacked hi-intensity (using a borrowed M-113 as cover) and using "bait" to troll for shots... Again, we won.
There was some good natured discussion afterwards (after a full day of fun, including one night iteration) which basically boiled down to "don't attack a well defended position with SWAT tactics"

SWAT stuff is nifty and a very acceptable TTP IF certain other criteria are met. Simply doing it because that is the only thing you know is the wrong answer.

-STS

jmm99
09-28-2009, 12:02 AM
what you are driving at with this:


from STS
The ROE is usually THE definitive variable on what is allowed, which has the unintended effect of causing escalation with regards to a situation. If others find themselves in that situation, then the transition from precision (or surgical) MOUT to hi-intensity must be trained on or else they will quickly find themselves out of their depth when that situation arises.

Could you illustrate what you mean re: ROEs in the three intensity levels, transitions, etc. Draw me a word picture - like the SWAT vs INF vignette. :)

Or attach a Powerpoint :D

Best

Mike

PS: welcome to the shop.

William F. Owen
09-28-2009, 07:04 AM
There was some good natured discussion afterwards (after a full day of fun, including one night iteration) which basically boiled down to "don't attack a well defended position with SWAT tactics"

SWAT stuff is nifty and a very acceptable TTP IF certain other criteria are met. Simply doing it because that is the only thing you know is the wrong answer.


My understanding is that SWAT = Special Weapons and Tactics, was implicitly developed for the minimum use of force, so it is ROE dependant, and that was explicit in the original concept.

The UK developed a "Red- Amber- Green," scale to define the use of force in the Urban environment. Red was basically LE-SWAT, and Green was "ceiling hits the floor," stuff.

For sure, all the "Shoot house," stuff is basically garbage, against someone who knows you are coming.

davidbfpo
09-28-2009, 11:56 AM
Citing Wilf:
The UK developed a "Red- Amber- Green," scale to define the use of force in the Urban environment. Red was basically LE-SWAT, and Green was "ceiling hits the floor," stuff. For sure, all the "Shoot house," stuff is basically garbage, against someone who knows you are coming.

Some years ago I asked our local SWAT equivalent what happens if the "bad guys" do not stay still i.e. in a premises and go mobile. There was a pained reaction and invocations of "Trust us, we know they will". Bearing in mind the 24/7 capability was six firearms officers, so I asked will front and rear entrances be covered? "Trust us, we practice a lot". I assume "bad guys" have learnt, "stay still, you lose".

Then of course along came the Mumbai attack and all the comments worldwide on whether capability matched that risk.

davidbfpo

William F. Owen
09-28-2009, 01:01 PM
Then of course along came the Mumbai attack and all the comments worldwide on whether capability matched that risk.


...and remember Hungerford (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungerford_massacre)?
Mumbia was nothing new, but it does show how utterly un-prepared most folks are for existing and well-understood threats.

Infanteer
09-28-2009, 07:19 PM
If anyone could post a copy or send it to an official email address that I can supply, that would be great.

We've been wrestling with this stuff as well. Our Infantry School - the COE for Urban Ops - focuses on "Badgers, Panthers, and Doves" and four man stacks. End result is a confusing array of lingo and overstacking which leads to big clusters of guys. Don't get me wrong - dominating urban spaces and knowing angles is awesome small unit stuff, but when you get guys off of an Urban Operations Instructor course with "Subject Matter Expert" status it can be hard to challenge their conceptions of what is tactically sound.

We've managed to kill the petting zoo and really have to enforce rules on having more than 2 dudes in a small space.

jcustis
09-29-2009, 05:36 AM
I can't help with a copy Infanteer, as I am on the hunt as well, but I did want to share this quote from a poster on another board. I believe he was on Takur Ghar Mt. during Operation ANACONDA, fighting to recover SEAL Neil Roberts' body.


Your Experience is right there and spot on, its just the verbage that was getting us all tripped up.

I didn't want your comments to get wasted because a grunt in here read them and said "What is he talking about? TL's are absolutely supposed to lead from the front"...

...The GWOT might have brought up everyone's game, but we are stil talking about skill level one (active duty) soldiers. After an entire rotation deployed and a 9-12 months at home station prior to their next deployment, if they were worth a sh*t, shouldn't they be getting close to becoming a TL at that point?...

...Since we are all disucussing MOUT TTPs. I think that you were all taught that the key to a good assault is a successful breach. If the breach and the decisions made upon entering that breach are f**ked up, the whole assault is at risk of failure...

...And not to get too much into the specifics of our TTPs, but Battle drill 6A is a good way to lose a lot of guys for nothing.

Going back to Sinisters comments about having tools and not know why they were created is an absolute truth.

I see the hours and DAYs that GPF BCTs train on this trying to get this right and it hurts me.

Those TTPs are designed to limit loss of life of non-combatants while RAPIDLY securing a target. The lives of the assaulting element come a distant second to the above mentioned factors.

Now take your deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Is there ANYTHING in ANY house that you ever stepped foot into that is worth dying over?

Short of the answer "an American Hostage", your answer should be negative.

So why in the hell are you leading with flesh? stun grenades/flash bangs...blah blah blah.

If you are in a BCT you and I both know you don't have the assets to lead into every room with a stun grenade.

I have literally observed THOUSANDS of entries by various units in the GWOT and the reality is that lack of munitions and a false sense of security lead to more humans going through doors than dogs, bangers, or anything else.

So what is so important in these houses that you are unwilling to set containment and sort that sh*t out from the outside??????????????

Callout is the future in OIF/OEF. Partner forces are the future in these places too. A house must always be cleared with boots on the ground, that does not mean that it needs to be YOU or YOUR soldiers. Its their country, make them earn their freedom, one doorway at a time.

... STOP trying to do CQB in a mud house on the side of a mountain! There is NOTHING inside worth losing your life over.

Find other TTPs and enablers that are safer and more effective.

Ken White
09-29-2009, 07:55 PM
I have a comment on only three items in it, cleaning up the language a bit:
I see soldiers doing things today that absolutely amaze me, but I also see them f***k up a guard roster, drive under NODs like s***, and not take care of their equipment too!Since the person that stated this is apparently an NCO, my questions are why did he allow those things to happen and what did he do about it?
How many of you here have ever made breach into a hallway with a sand bagged machinegun at the end?If we're still here, obviously none of us was stupid enough to try that.
You REALLY want to trust an E-2 with making the decision on how best to seek cover and supress this threat ?I've had several E2s, even more E3s and a slew of SPCs that were more capable of doing that than their team leaders of the time were...

We have an Army that rewards time in service and time in grade -- the cream doesn't rise because the system is skewed against it.

Lot of nonsensical bluster and noise in that post. He may be a gem and a super soldier but in my observation most of the kill 'em all and let god sort 'em out / hooray for me types are more noise than competence and substance. The really good guys don't need to do that stuff. Most won't tolerate those that do it.

P.S.

Got so busy sneering at the 'Gee Look at me' business I forgot to say that I broadly agree with his point which was, I think, after removing all the not beneficial to him or the Army and unnecessary chatter:

Room clearing and SWAT techniques are dangerous and misapplied, don't establish a pattern, use host nation forces where possible and take sensible care of your troops.

jcustis
09-29-2009, 09:43 PM
Great point Ken. I made some edits to get to the heart of that poster's points. And yes, he is a blowhard, but he has a good point.