Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

[JMA]

‎33 years ago today, right now I was sitting in the briefing in the hanger at New Sarum air base prior to the first Chimoio raid (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Dingo) with 96 SAS guys, 103 other RLI guys and a whole bunch of Blue Jobs. H-hour was 07h45 on 23 November 1977... they didn't know what hit them.

...and no it wasn't a refugee camp.

RIP - Frans Nel (SAS) and Phil Haigh (Air Force)

[JMA]

Not enough gunships? A Cessna will do. Take off the door, mount a 30-Browning on the floor (with a primitive sight) operated by your mate, the gunner and next door farmer and sit on a flak jacket to prevent unwanted penetration of the nether regions... and there you have a Cessna gunship... Rhodesian style. They got some.

http://farm5.static.flickr.com/4114/5220409523_4541d45744_b.jpg

Throwing hand grenades out the door was also an attack variation.

As they say, don't just sit there and do nothing... do something, anything.

[IntelTrooper]

Don't know if this has been posted before or is in the right thread -- just happened across this on YouTube. Might be of interest to some folks.

Rhodesia Unafraid (Part 1) (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYL6aTK3k6Y)

[JMA]

You fit a few 30 browning gun pods under the wings and Bob's you uncle...

http://1000aircraftphotos.com/Contributions/1953L.jpg

No. 1953. Beech V35A Bonanza (VP-WHM) (http://1000aircraftphotos.com/Contributions/1953.htm)


The guns were fired by solenoids which were activated by a push-to-talk button on the control column. The sighting mechanism was very simple, yet effective. A fold-out arm with a ring sight on it was snapped into place. A dot on the windshield provided the second reference - line up the dot in the ring, put both on the target and press the trigger.

So if you are ever faced with an existential war your CAS options are limited only by your imagination.

Now if you really want to upgun this kite you do the following:


A further modification was done to the aircraft - unfortunately I don't have any photos of it - which provided my father the ability to drop a series of three or five grenades from the bottom of the aircraft. Basically, there was a hole in the floor (which was normally sealed with a resin plug) between the co-pilot's feet. The grenades were stored in steel tubes in a removable armoured box right behind the pilot and observer, directly over the C of G. All pins were removed from the grenades; the handles were held in place by the walls of the tube. The tube was blocked on both ends by means of two large steel pins, and locked in place by split pins (re-used from the grenades). A spring loaded cap was fitted to the top-end of the tube. At the required time the resin plug was removed from the floor and the tube was attached over the hole in the floor and locked in place. The top pin was removed causing the spring loaded cap to exert pressure on the grenades. A cable was attached to the bottom pin by means of a dog-leash clip. On final approach to the target, the bottom safety pin was removed. Once over the target, the cable was pulled, removing the bottom pin and causing the spring loaded cap to force the grenades from the tube. A further safety device was available and used in the event of a 'hang-up' in the tube. I had to use it on two separate occasions. While not very scientific it worked... Dad would hold the aircraft very steady and I would carefully remove the spring loaded cap, take a small pole (cut from a mopane tree) and push the hung-up grenades out the tube.


I kid you not.

[JMA]

RLI BIRTHDAY – 1 FEBRUARY

On 1 February 1961 the all white Rhodesian Light Infantry was formed as a result of growing concerns within Rhodesia over the shape post colonial Africa was taking (and anticipated would take) where the colonial order had given way to brutal dictatorships and economic collapse often at the hands of the ex-colonial African troops. By September 1961 the RLI were deployed to the Congo border and border control duties to prevent the chaos resulting from the attempted secession of the province of Katanga from spilling over into the then Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

After the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 the insurgency began to increase steadily over time until 1973 by when the RLI had elements permanently deployed on border control and internal operations all the time. The 1974 coup d’etat in Portugal and the ensuing collapse of their colonies exposed Rhodesia to an additional 1,200km of border across which insurgents could infiltrate. To maximise the use of limited forces and to ensure a rapid ability to concentrate those forces the Fire Force concept was developed using Air Force Allouette III helicopters and Lynx (Cessna 337) CAS piston-engined aircraft and primarily the RLI.

The ruthless efficiency of the joint Air Force and RLI Fire Force operations where the RLI was deployed by helicopter and later also by parachute was to account for the deaths of in excess of 12,000 insurgents during the course of the war at a rate of 160 enemy killed for every one of their own lost: a truly remarkable record. By mid 1976 the RLI comprised about half conscripted Rhodesian National Servicemen and of the balance there was a large representation of Brits, Americans, Canadians, Australians and others. Ultimately recruits from some 35 different nationalities passed through the RLI.

Periodically withdrawn from Fire Force operations to take part in cross-border operations into neighbouring Zambia and Mozambique together with the Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS) and supported by the Air Force the RLI was party to inflicting further immense damage to externally based insurgent forces and their logistic support.

On 31 October 1980, after a short but action packed nineteen year existence, the RLI was disbanded after the political settlement which arose from the Lancaster House Conference where nationalist and guerrilla leader, Robert Mugabe, was declared winner of an election marred by massive intimidation and became Prime Minister of the newly independent Zimbabwe.

However, the RLI lives on and on 1 February 2011 will celebrate its 50th birthday. Functions and gatherings both large and small will be held around the world to remember the regiment, honour the fallen and celebrate together the good times when all were young and soldiered with “the incredible” Rhodesian Light Infantry.

[William F. Owen]

Not enough gunships? A Cessna will do. Take off the door, mount a 30-Browning on the floor (with a primitive sight) operated by your mate, the gunner and next door farmer and sit on a flak jacket to prevent unwanted penetration of the nether regions... and there you have a Cessna gunship... Rhodesian style.

The US had been using Cessna O-1's, O-2's and all sorts of light aircraft through out the 1960's and well into the mid-1970's. Talk to any of the "SPAF" - Sneaky Pete's Air Force - and they all have stories of dropping grenades out of the window.

....but today, 40 years on, it's like using Bleriot's 1909 plane in the Battle of Britain. Modern armies and airforces should not be looking to emulate products of improvisation. A modernised derivative of an AU-23 is about as low as anyone should go, and even the case of that is pretty tough to make.

[JMA]

The US had been using Cessna O-1's, O-2's and all sorts of light aircraft through out the 1960's and well into the mid-1970's. Talk to any of the "SPAF" - Sneaky Pete's Air Force - and they all have stories of dropping grenades out of the window.

....but today, 40 years on, it's like using Bleriot's 1909 plane in the Battle of Britain. Modern armies and airforces should not be looking to emulate products of improvisation. A modernised derivative of an AU-23 is about as low as anyone should go, and even the case of that is pretty tough to make.

Posting the Cessna and Beechcraft photos was just for info and for fun.

You can off-set the stuff private individuals got up to to support the war effort against wars and operations that grind to halt when the GPS batteries run down.

Modern blinkered soldiering which frowns upon the use of initiative, improvisation and extemporization by junior commanders (down to junior NCOs) is worse off for this serious error of judgement.

The problems with converting light commercial piston engined aircraft to a weapons delivery role are the limited payload and the ability to find pilots with the balls to fly them (in a combat role). And in the absence of SAMs (SA-7/Grail/or equivalent) are still viable in most of the world, 90% of Africa, a lot of Asia, South America and a bunch of islands.

[William F. Owen]

The problems with converting light commercial piston engined aircraft to a weapons delivery role are the limited payload and the ability to find pilots with the balls to fly them (in a combat role). And in the absence of SAMs (SA-7/Grail/or equivalent) are still viable in most of the world, 90% of Africa, a lot of Asia, South America and a bunch of islands.
I'd strongly agree. Many nations buy combat aircraft they just do not need.

[JMA]

I'd strongly agree. Many nations buy combat aircraft they just do not need.

... nor can maintain nor can operate...

The South African Air Force currently musters 23 operational fighter aircrew. (http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11203:saaf-boasts-23-fighter-aircrew&catid=35:Aerospace&Itemid=107)

...58 of 167 helicopter pilot posts (34%) are currently vacant... 30% of posts for transport pilots are vacant (48 of 156 posts)... the shortage of air traffic controllers, where only 29 of 77 posts (37%) are filled... a shortage of engineers with only 70 of 130 posts (54%) filled... read here (http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3594&Itemid=350)

[JMA]

Over the weekend 4/5 February 2011 the RLI held a 50th Anniversary Reunion and Remembrance Service.

http://farm6.static.flickr.com/5017/5428986721_b0fb0b8dae_z.jpg

View larger image here (http://farm6.static.flickr.com/5017/5428986721_b0fb0b8dae_b.jpg)

[jcustis]

http://www.swelco.co.za/KNYSNA/

A few interesting items (pgs.25-27) once possessed by the LtCol, along with several other interesting pieces of Selous Scouts and RLI history are up for auction in SA.

There's some buzz afoot decrying the auction to Daly's items, but after further research by a member from another board, the items going up are actually a matter of his last wishes and are known (in fact many are posted on the website) to the Scouts Association.

[JMA]

http://www.swelco.co.za/KNYSNA/

A few interesting items (pgs.25-27) once possessed by the LtCol, along with several other interesting pieces of Selous Scouts and RLI history are up for auction in SA.

There's some buzz afoot decrying the auction to Daly's items, but after further research by a member from another board, the items going up are actually a matter of his last wishes and are known (in fact many are posted on the website) to the Scouts Association.

A similar situation developed over the auction of Lt-Gen Peter Walls' memorabilia. See here (http://content.yudu.com/Library/A1pvnr/MedalsAuctionCatalog/resources/195.htm) page 195 onwards.

Walls' action raised R750,000 (approx US$100,000) and were sold to private collectors. Those that were adamant that the items should remain "in the family" and/or in a museum specialising in Rhodesiana failed to come up with the bucks to make that happen.

The same will happen to Uncle Ron's stuff (sadly).

[shawzie]

This is Beaver Shaw’s long awaited work! Beaver was a K-Car gunner in 7 and 8 Squadron’s of the Rhodesian Air Force. He is credited with having shot down a fixed wing aircraft, from his K-Car in 1979.
This book covers the author's and other crewmen's experiences in No 7 Alouette Squadron as helicopter Technicians/Gunners who flew numerous operational sorties in Alouette G and K Car gunships on Fire Force operations during the Rhodesian Bush War. The Alouette III helicopters were extensively used within Rhodesia as well as on external operations into Zambia, Botswana and Mocambique. Beaver served during latter stages of the war - 1976-1980, and has the unique distinction as being the only gunner during the bush war who is credited with a successful Air to Air contact, when he shot down a Botswana Defence Force Islander plane, using the K-Car's 20mm cannon. This occurred during a difficult extraction of Selous Scouts troops who had just attacked a ZIPRA base in Francistown.
We’ll be able to advice price and further details shortly, but to register interest and reserve a copy, email steve@30degreesouth.co.uk now! or in SA canic@mweb.co.za

[jcustis]

Ahhhh..another drain on the funds.

[JMA]

This is Beaver Shaw’s long awaited work! Beaver was a K-Car gunner in 7 and 8 Squadron’s of the Rhodesian Air Force. He is credited with having shot down a fixed wing aircraft, from his K-Car in 1979.
This book covers the author's and other crewmen's experiences in No 7 Alouette Squadron as helicopter Technicians/Gunners who flew numerous operational sorties in Alouette G and K Car gunships on Fire Force operations during the Rhodesian Bush War. The Alouette III helicopters were extensively used within Rhodesia as well as on external operations into Zambia, Botswana and Mocambique. Beaver served during latter stages of the war - 1976-1980, and has the unique distinction as being the only gunner during the bush war who is credited with a successful Air to Air contact, when he shot down a Botswana Defence Force Islander plane, using the K-Car's 20mm cannon. This occurred during a difficult extraction of Selous Scouts troops who had just attacked a ZIPRA base in Francistown.
We’ll be able to advice price and further details shortly, but to register interest and reserve a copy, email steve@30degreesouth.co.uk now! or in SA canic@mweb.co.za

Glad to see this book from an air-force perspective is finally to be published. It will be a valuable addition to the relatively few books written on the Rhodesian bush-war and by someone who was right up there where it was all happening at the tactical level.

[davidbfpo]

'Why did you fight? Narratives of the Rhodesian Insurgency c.1970-1980' is a UK-based academic oral history project, which conducted interviews - in the UK - and had questionnaires returned by others. I've just found it has been published and it is a good background read.

Link:http://www1.uwe.ac.uk/cahe/hpp/research/researchcentresandgroups/rhodesianforcesoralhistory/projectfindings.aspx

There is a link to the eighteen page final report (PDF format).

[JMA]

A new book on the Rhodesian war has been published.

The Search for Puma 164 (http://www.30degreessouth.co.za/index.php?nav=category&category_child=subcategory&category_id=1&subcategory_child=products&subcategory_id=75&view=139)
Operation Uric and the Assault on Mapai
Neill Jackson & Rick van Malsen
ISBN: 978-1-920143-57-2


The battle for Mapai … and the final closure

September 6, 1979. Into the deepening darkness of the African night, a lone Aerospatiale Puma helicopter flies resolutely northward, leaving behind the desolation of the battle for Mapai, in Mozambique’s Gaza Province. Huddled in the cabin, two weary soldiers sit silently immersed in their own thoughts, contemplating their difficult duties ahead. The taller of the two, WOII Graham Enslin, CSM, Support Commando, Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), is struggling to come to terms with the death in action that morning of his younger brother Brian. He wonders how to break the news to his parents. The other, Lt Rick van Malsen BCR, 2IC, 1 Commando, 1RLI, works through the list of names in his hand, names of the 16 men who perished with Trooper Brian Enslin when a South African Air Force Puma was shot out of the sky during the assault on the Frelimo and ZANLA stronghold at Mapai on the much-feared, so-called ‘Russian Front’. It will be his job to send out the official death notices and to advise the next of kin that the bodies of the three South African airmen and 14 Rhodesian soldiers were not recovered. Both men vow that night, each for reasons of his own, to one day return to the scene of the crash to pay proper tribute to the fallen men: the aircrew and troops of Puma 164.

April 11, 2009. And so it was, almost 30 years later, that Rick van Malsen returns to the scene of that horrendous battle, to search for the crash site of the downed Puma, in an effort to achieve closure for the relatives of the dead. This is a story of courage and devotion to duty but, above all, it is a story of comradeship and loyalty undimmed by the passage of time, of a band of brothers bonded together in war, united still in peace.

[student2010]

I would like to write a thesis on the Rhodesian Bush War, specifically the use of Pseudo Operations of the selous scouts and the use of blackface as a tool of deception against African guerillas. I had to abandon my hopes of writing a thesis on the toyota war because I couldn't find any primary sources. Does anyone know of an actual selous scout member that participated in the blackface aspect of the war that I could interview? Or any good books or documents? Thanks.

[trippmccullar]

My thesis partners and I wrote a thesis on "Pseudo Operations & Deception in Irregular Conflict" in 2009 for John Arquilla at the Naval Postgraduate School. I'd be glad to send you a copy to review our bibliography for source info. If you like, send your email address via PM to enable an exchange.

[Jake Smith-Jones]

The Blackface stuff you are considering for your paper might be less interesting than the means by which the Rhodesians converted captured terrorists and made them into 'good guys'...cheers

[bourbon]

My friend, have you stopped beating your wife?

[davidbfpo]

The Blackface stuff you are considering for your paper might be less interesting than the means by which the Rhodesians converted captured terrorists and made them into 'good guys'...cheers

Jake,

This question has been posed before IIRC, cannot recall now in which thread, but did not get a full answer. The Rhodesian thread was just searched, using pseudo and found very little. so will have to look elsewhere. The Rhodesian thread is:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2090

Anecdote suggested in Rhodesia captured guerillas were shocked not to be killed, given a cigarette, offered an alternative to court and potentially death. Plus as the Selous Scouts showed changing sides was very profitable, IIRC there was a per capita reward.

A South African Police brigadier was famous for his skill in persuading prisoners to convert; he had been posted to Rhodesia. Somewhere I have a video of him.

[davidbfpo]

I would like to write a thesis on the Rhodesian Bush War, specifically the use of Pseudo Operations of the selous scouts and the use of blackface as a tool of deception against African guerillas. I had to abandon my hopes of writing a thesis on the toyota war because I couldn't find any primary sources. Does anyone know of an actual selous scout member that participated in the blackface aspect of the war that I could interview? Or any good books or documents? Thanks.

Student2010,

Have a look in the Rhodesian War thread, that refers to several potential sources, mainly books. Given the time lapse and feelings over history I would be surprised if any former-Selous Scout will talk. One post does refer to an Scouts association, so maybe worth contacting.

[MikeF]

Published this morning in the Journal

Securing and Holding Rural Terrain: (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/securing-and-holding-rural-territory)
Use of Pseudo Teams and Airmobile “Very-Light” Infantry Quick Reaction Forces in Rhodesia Counter-Insurgency Operations
by Timothy Bax and Steven Hatfill

[MikeF]

Published this morning in the Journal

Securing and Holding Rural Terrain: (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/securing-and-holding-rural-territory)
Use of Pseudo Teams and Airmobile “Very-Light” Infantry Quick Reaction Forces in Rhodesia Counter-Insurgency Operations
by Timothy Bax and Steven Hatfill

[JMA]

Published this morning in the Journal

Securing and Holding Rural Terrain: (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/securing-and-holding-rural-territory)
Use of Pseudo Teams and Airmobile “Very-Light” Infantry Quick Reaction Forces in Rhodesia Counter-Insurgency Operations
by Timothy Bax and Steven Hatfill

This is a good document and reflects accurately the Fireforce concept of my personal experience.

[JMA]

Published this morning in the Journal

Securing and Holding Rural Terrain: (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/securing-and-holding-rural-territory)
Use of Pseudo Teams and Airmobile “Very-Light” Infantry Quick Reaction Forces in Rhodesia Counter-Insurgency Operations
by Timothy Bax and Steven Hatfill

This is a good document and reflects accurately the Fireforce concept of my personal experience.

[JMA]

I would like to write a thesis on the Rhodesian Bush War, specifically the use of Pseudo Operations of the selous scouts and the use of blackface as a tool of deception against African guerillas. I had to abandon my hopes of writing a thesis on the toyota war because I couldn't find any primary sources. Does anyone know of an actual selous scout member that participated in the blackface aspect of the war that I could interview? Or any good books or documents? Thanks.

davidbfpo has given good advice on this matter.

Three books of essential reading are as follows:

The War of the Running Dogs: Malaya 1948-1960 (http://www.amazon.co.uk/War-Running-Dogs-1948-1960-Paperbacks/dp/0304366714/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1313168770&sr=1-1) - Malaya

Gangs and counter-gangs (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Gangs-counter-gangs-Frank-Kitson/dp/B0000CKJUV/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1313170006&sr=1-1) - Kenya

Pamwe Chete: The Legend of the Selous Scouts (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Pamwe-Chete-Legend-Selous-Scouts/dp/191987433X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1313168860&sr=1-1) - Rhodesia

Which country are you in? That would indicate what your chances are of meeting with primary sources who know what they are talking about.

Success in this regard depends largely on your approach. Remember that these guys have been pestered over the years by people wanting information and are tired of it all. If the approach is made in a professional and academic manner you would be most likely to obtain a positive response.

[cdcockrell]

Lots of interesting stuff out there.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2090

Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies
The Rhodesian Experience
Hoffman, Taw, Arnold
RAND, 1991

Bush War
The Use of Surrogates in Southern Africa (1975-1989)
MAJ Joseph E. Escandon
Fort Leavenworth

The Utility of Military Deception during Counterinsurgency
Major Maxwell S. Thibodeaux
Fort Leavenworth

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub607.pdf

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/pseudo-operations-to-neutralize-extremist-networks-insurgents-and-terrorists

PSEUDO OPERATIONS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:
LESSONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES
Lawrence E. Cline
June 2005
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi

Evans, Michael(2007) 'The Wretched of the Empire: Politics, Ideology and Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia, 1965-80', Small Wars & Insurgencies, 18: 2, 175 — 195

[jcustis]

The gold standard is the Reid-Daly book, Pamwe Chete, or alternately titled Selous Scouts: Top Secret War. Good luck finding a copy that is affordable. I think I scored one of the last ones, from the NOVA webpage store, of all places, many years ago.

I am heartened to see the SWJ article, and to see that veterans of that conflict are taking the time to put their insights down on paper. It's sort of odd to see the JRT Wood illustrations though. I browsed the article and went straight to the core arguments of application, so I wonder if they give credit, as I did not see that cited in the body of their article. There is a link to the JRT Wood page here: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=26550&postcount=68

There are a great number of limitations that would make it difficult to translate the Fire Force of old into an effective counter-insurgent force for Afghanistan. Part of the problem is simple fact of training. We didn't fight that way before the Long War began (though I certainly advocated it some while ago), and trying to adapt to these tactics would require paradigm shifts of enormous proportion.that the Army and Marine Corps just simple cannot make these days.

I think it's a bit off course to reference holding rural territory in the title of article. The Rhodesian Security Forces in the form of the Scouts/RLI/RAR were not holding territory as much as they were interdicting the infiltration of the terr gangs coming from across the border. Once they got far enough, the difficulties of countering and killing them became magnified by a significant factor. For some reason, I remember a reference or statement somewhere that it became 4x harder to make kills once the gang had made it to certain regions of the TTLs.

Insurgent mobility is widely different between gangs of ZIPRA/ZANLA coming across the borders, and how Afghan insurgents move and operate, so that has to be considered as well.

Pseudo operations factor in sanctuary/area denial for sure, if applied the right way, but I don't think enough people recognize the juice being worth the squeeze in the current operating environment.

Anyway, find the Reid-Daly book before you go any further.

ETA-I just went back to the Rhodesian COIN thread and read all 12 pages, including a number of the linked documents and referring links. Man...good sh*t throughout that thread.

Haha...I realized that I'm about as good as a broken record. Most of my points were already posted here: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10742

At least I'm fairly consistent.

[JMA]

There are a great number of limitations that would make it difficult to translate the Fire Force of old into an effective counter-insurgent force for Afghanistan. Part of the problem is simple fact of training. We didn't fight that way before the Long War began (though I certainly advocated it some while ago), and trying to adapt to these tactics would require paradigm shifts of enormous proportion.that the Army and Marine Corps just simple cannot make these days.

I suggest that one takes baby steps on this. Identify one battalion (Ranger/Marine/Airbourne/whatever) and task them to set up a QRF starting in Helmand/Kandahar/whatever. Weld together with this unit the air effort required and do the training at all levels. It is important that the chopper air-crews stay with/train with/rotate with the soldiers - as in one big happy family under a non-negotiable unified command structure. More difficult with fixed wing support but efforts must be made to develop a cooperative relationship with them (best done over a few beers).

Of course such an approach will need unwavering support from the theatre commander... otherwise don't waste your time.

Once there is a record of success other units will cut each others throats to get a chance get assigned to any new QRF (Fire Force) that may be established. The first success will be when they arrive (like the cavalry of old) to pull some callsign out of the sh** and in the process dispatching a bunch of bad guys for good measure.


I think it's a bit off course to reference holding rural territory in the title of article. The Rhodesian Security Forces in the form of the Scouts/RLI/RAR were not holding territory as much as they were interdicting the infiltration of the terr gangs coming from across the border. Once they got far enough, the difficulties of countering and killing them became magnified by a significant factor. For some reason, I remember a reference or statement somewhere that it became 4x harder to make kills once the gang had made it to certain regions of the TTLs.

Yes, the use of the word 'holding' seems a bit strange.

For the pseudo thing to work one needs local population to interact with and 'fool' into believing they are the real deal. It was all about the real time intel. If you had it and you acted upon it immediately you got results no matter where they were located. Once done that 'team' would generally be compromised in that area and would have to be redeployed elsewhere.

Of course the best time to hit them is before they cross the border (in their supposed sanctuary).

The sparsely populated flat areas as found in the south-east (for example) that were used as transit areas were better suited to the Grey Scouts (mounted infantry) to cross grain for spoor and if found have the FF position closer for a quick response to exploit the results of any contact they may have. (The Grey's Scouts came into their own too late in the war to have a real impact but the potential was there.)

One of the problems (as it were) that we experienced was that as the FF got busy (like called out everyday) we were unable to sleep out and conduct aggressive follow-ups of those who escaped. There were not always suitable follow-up troops available to hand over to so the survivors unlike in the earlier days when the remnants of the CT group contacted could sustain more losses in subsequent contacts. So it became the norm to recover all troops at night, feed them steak, eggs and fries (I kid you not) washed down by a few 'frosties' (cold beers) and a good nights sleep and ready for the next days fun. (If we were lucky and were able to deal with the CTs quickly we were often back in time for tea and a game of football or baseball (or even run around the airfield if the day was not too tiring) at the airfield before dinner.)

But essentially you are correct in that the longer the CTs were in the country the easier they found it to get lost among the population.


Insurgent mobility is widely different between gangs of ZIPRA/ZANLA coming across the borders, and how Afghan insurgents move and operate, so that has to be considered as well.

Yes, its an enemy and terrain issue.

Finally, as strange as it may sound the guys who may have the best grasp of what is required for FF type operations are the the Air Force Search & Rescue guys. Think about what they need to do and how they put troops on the ground to extract downed airmen while covering them from the air.

[Fuchs]

Thinking about quick reaction forces in blocking positions and so on (emphasis on quick) ... doesn't this provoke a lot of friendly fire on pursuing forces by the QRF whenever IFF becomes difficult?

The QRF - especially in the Rhodesian example - can't have strong enough teams for asking first and shooting second, after all.

[JMA]

Thinking about quick reaction forces in blocking positions and so on (emphasis on quick) ... doesn't this provoke a lot of friendly fire on pursuing forces by the QRF whenever IFF becomes difficult?

The QRF - especially in the Rhodesian example - can't have strong enough teams for asking first and shooting second, after all.

If I understand you correctly you ask whether there was a blue-on-blue risk as the sweep line closed in on the stop group positions?

If so yes.

Believe you me the stop groups made sure they were in a position where they could duck. But essentially it was the FFC (commander) who would warn the various 'sticks' of the location and approach of others. The RLI commanders had this aspect under control.

Only time I had a problem was at Chimoio (Op Dingo) when the Airborne Commander was from the SAS (who had virtually no FF experience) and as the sweep lines converged on the target there was more than a comfortable number of 'friendly' rounds flying past or into other sweep lines. Two of our wounded were in this manner.

But essentially, yes, there was a real risk that had to be managed. But then in those days there was a lot more emphasis on fire control and fire discipline and the troopies were more experienced through time spent on FF so less likely to blaze away especially when approaching a stop group (or a stop group open fire on an approaching sweep line).

Well done. Good that you spotted this risk ;)

[davidbfpo]

Try 'Hearts and Minds, Psuedo Gangs and Counter Insurgency: Based upon Experiences from Previous Campaigns in Kenya (1952-60), Malaya (1948-60) & Rhodesia (1964-1979)' a conference paper delivered in Australia in late 2010:http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=act&sei-redir=1#search=%22south%20african%20Intelligence%2 0Units%20german%20south%20west%20africa%20campaign %22


Abstract:
Pseudo gangs form the steely side of Hearts and Minds and were used with great effect in counter-insurgency campaigns in Kenya (1952-60) Malaya (1948-60) and Rhodesia (1964-1979). Although the use of pseudo gangs was not new to counter-insurgency tactics, with the British using a similar tactic in the Boer war (1899-1902), the use of such gangs was certainly perfected during these later campaigns producing good results. The Kenya Police Special Branch re-instigated this concept, developing its use during the ‘Emergency’.

The principal concept was to ‘turn’ or co-opt insurgents through a series of inducements to change sides and join the counter insurgency as part of the Government forces but not as regular forces. Rather the co-opted kept their actual identities or their ‘assumed’ identities and return to the conflict areas as part of a ‘gang’, which would be made to appear as if it is still fighting for the insurgents. This ‘pseudo’ gang would then rejoin or flush out the opposition and either capture, gain further intelligence or eliminate them. Based on my ongoing PhD research into these three campaigns, this paper will briefly outline an alternative model that could be developed for current conflicts against insurgents.

[JMA]

Try 'Hearts and Minds, Psuedo Gangs and Counter Insurgency: Based upon Experiences from Previous Campaigns in Kenya (1952-60), Malaya (1948-60) & Rhodesia (1964-1979)' a conference paper delivered in Australia in late 2010:http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=act&sei-redir=1#search=%22south%20african%20Intelligence%2 0Units%20german%20south%20west%20africa%20campaign %22


Abstract:

Great find David. FWIW I will pass that around my network of the O&B (old and bold) and see if any significant comments emerge.

[JMA]

Great find David. FWIW I will pass that around my network of the O&B (old and bold) and see if any significant comments emerge.

...and this paper is also a valuable contribution:


PSEUDO OPERATIONS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:
LESSONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES (www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5619)

[Polarbear1605]

...and this paper is also a valuable contribution:


PSEUDO OPERATIONS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:
LESSONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES (www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5619)

Oh JMA! Please watch the references...might have to bring up the "P" word concerning that author but the duty expert on Pseudo Ops is Dr Paul Melshen at the Armed Forces Staff College. student2010 - Dr Melshen will be glad to talk to you, if you are serious.

[JMA]

Oh JMA! Please watch the references...might have to bring up the "P" word concerning that author but the duty expert on Pseudo Ops is Dr Paul Melshen at the Armed Forces Staff College. student2010 - Dr Melshen will be glad to talk to you, if you are serious.

What are you on about?

Melshen's book on the subject is:

Pseudo operations: the use by British and American Armed Forces of deception in counter-insurgencies 1945-1973 (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Pseudo-operations-deception-counter-insurgencies-1945-1973/dp/B001OPTUCY)

Marked as Currently unavailable.

Just a small point. student2010 was specifically looking at the Selous Scouts and Rhodesia. Melshen's book covers upto 1973 so therefore would not cover the Rhodesian pseudo operations at all.

[student2010]

Oh JMA! Please watch the references...might have to bring up the "P" word concerning that author but the duty expert on Pseudo Ops is Dr Paul Melshen at the Armed Forces Staff College. student2010 - Dr Melshen will be glad to talk to you, if you are serious.

Yes, I am very interested and I am very serious.

[Polarbear1605]

Yes, I am very interested and I am very serious.

Then...Your Welcome! :)

[JMA]

Then...Your Welcome! :)

It would be interesting to hear what Melshen's credentials are in relation to the Selous Scouts and Rhodesian pseudo operations.

[taldozer]

I have this document... it is not a book. However it does cover Rhodesia and the Selous Scouts in detail in an appendix.

Cheers,
Troy



What are you on about?

Melshen's book on the subject is:

Pseudo operations: the use by British and American Armed Forces of deception in counter-insurgencies 1945-1973 (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Pseudo-operations-deception-counter-insurgencies-1945-1973/dp/B001OPTUCY)

Marked as Currently unavailable.

Just a small point. student2010 was specifically looking at the Selous Scouts and Rhodesia. Melshen's book covers upto 1973 so therefore would not cover the Rhodesian pseudo operations at all.

[JMA]

My thesis partners and I wrote a thesis on "Pseudo Operations & Deception in Irregular Conflict" in 2009 for John Arquilla at the Naval Postgraduate School. I'd be glad to send you a copy to review our bibliography for source info. If you like, send your email address via PM to enable an exchange.

I have a copy of the McCullar et al thesis and recommend those interested in this subject to request a copy from him to add to their libraries. It an excellent contribution to the subject.

[davidbfpo]

This link came via the BSAP History group, it appears to be a short introduction to the book 'Only My Friends Call Me Crouks' by Dennis Croukamp

Referring to a question from an American:
'What were your rules of engagement?' I told him I'd never heard of that term in my life until I saw the film of the same name. We only had one rule. Kill The Enemy.”

Link to article, which appears undated:http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/the-greatest-pseudo-terrorists-of-all-time?Contentpage=1

Note this book was originally published in 2005 as 'Only My Friends Call Me Crouks (The Bush War in Rhodesia)' and was reprinted as "THE BUSH WAR IN RHODESIA - The Extraordinary Combat Memoir of a Rhodesian Reconnaissance Specialist" by Paladin Press in the United States.

Link to Amazon UK:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Only-Friends-Call-Crouks-Rhodesia/dp/0620293926

Link to Amazon.com:http://www.amazon.com/Bush-War-Rhodesia-Extraordinary-Reconnaissance/dp/1581606141/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1320788262&sr=

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to a BSAP History Group email directing attention to South African History Online (SAHO), whose purpose is to be:
a non-partisan people's history project. It was established in June 2000 as a non-profit Section 21 organisation, aiming to address the biased way in which the history and cultural heritage of South Africans was represented in our educational and cultural institutions.

SAHO's mission is to break the silence of our past and to create the most comprehensive online encyclopedia of South African history and culture.

Link:http://www.sahistory.org.za/

Prelude over.

There is a small collection of articles around 'The Luthuli Detachment and the Wankie campaign, July-September 1967', the ANC's first military operation; known as Operation Nickel by the Rhodesians, which makes interesting reading as it is before the insurgency really began in earnest.

Link:http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/wankie-campaign


How did the Rhodesians and South Africans experience this operation? What light, if any do these archival documents shed on the Wankie campaign? What did the Rhodesians-South Africans learn from their experiences with the ANC-ZAPU guerrillas? I also examine the controversial issue of South Africa's military assistance to Rhodesia. Do the archival documents shed more light on the South African government's assistance to Rhodesia? What resources did South Africa commit to Rhodesia?

The debrief at the end is IMO the best part; partly as I've met some of those involved and one is an old friend.

Link:http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/archival-documents-pertaining-rhodesian-and-south-african-security-forces

[JMA]

The Military Review published a paper by one Marno de Boer in its November / December 2011 English edition (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/repository/MilitaryReview_201112310001-MD.xml): Rhodesia's Approach to Counterinsurgency: A Preference for Killing'.

One wonders how he was able to defend such drivel first at thesis stage and then manage to slip it past the editorial committee of the Military Review. Quite appalling. This reflects very badly on the Military Review of course.

It would be interesting to hear from anyone who takes the time to read the paper whether they believe he 'proved' anything.

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

I have read the paper and agree with you.

There are numerous critical points, for two examples the author refers to the poor quality of SB intelligence, when it was the SB who were the key personnel in the Selous Scouts intelligence unit. Secondly, the emphasis on the killing of enemy wounded - which I am sure did happen at times - is in contrast to the ability of the Selous Scouts to "turn" captured guerillas.

[JMA]

JMA,

I have read the paper and agree with you.

Yes David, its full of nonsense which we can list... but the biggest nonsense is the last sentence of the paper:


What this article shows is that it is an unrestrained preference for killing on the part of soldiers that can imperil the war effort.

de Boer showed this?

[jmm99]

From the article's lede (emphasis added):


In the 1970s, a bloody insurgency took place in Rhodesia, now present-day Zimbabwe. African insurgents faced a settler-state determined to keep power in white hands. The government adopted a punitive and enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy. Many Rhodesian soldiers embraced the punitive approach to such an extent that they overextended the rules of engagement.

Based on the author's background,


Marno de Boer is currently studying for an L.L.M. in public international law at Utrecht University, the Netherlands, after finishing an M.A. in the history of warfare at the War Studies Department of King’s College, London. This article is based on the thesis he wrote for his B.A. at University College, Utrecht, the Netherlands.

I expected more than what I got.

First, a statement as to factual accuracy (and my use of "DKI"), starting with an assertion by the author:


The penchant to kill resulted in the frequent execution of prisoners, which hampered Rhodesia’s intelligence effort, something existing studies of the war often overlook.[85]

85. Cilliers, 218-35. For a discussion of Rhodesia’s intelligence effort without reference to the issue of prisoners; Godwin and Hancock, The Rhodesian War, 284 refers to Cocks (236) to show how the war brutalized white society; Moorcraft does not mention the execution of prisoners.

(1) J.K. Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia (Beckenham: Croom Helm Ltd, 1985); (2) Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock, Rhodesians Never Die - The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia, c. 1970-1980 (Harare: Baobab Books, 1995, first published 1993 by Oxford University Press); (3) Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, The Rhodesian War: A Military History (South Yorkshire, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2008).

Throughout this review, I've expanded the author's citations (in the qotes) to present the full citation (which he presents the first time he cites the source).

DKI as to Godwin, Cocks and Moorcraft; but the author (de Boer) states that those sources do not refer to the "issue of prisoners" or "the execution of prisoners".

DKI means generally ("Denies Knowledge or Information sufficient to affirm or deny the truth of the claim made; and therefore leaves the claimant to proof of the claim"); here it means that I don't have the book and am left only with addressing the author's assertions. I do NOT assume that those assertions are true; nor do I claim they are false with respect to the sources he claims.

I have and have read Cilliers (typed manuscript). It does not contain any mention of "the execution of prisoners". Thus, de Boer's assertion ("The penchant to kill resulted in the frequent execution of prisoners...") is unsourced. To what extent, his other assertions hold up is beyond my materials and the amount of time I want to spend on this.

---------------------------

One might expect (from an LLM candidate in I Law) somethiung of a legal discussion of Rhodesian ROEs. In that, de Boer disappoints. He does set out something of a "statement of facts" in his section "Violence Toward Civilians" (p. 8 pdf).


Violence against civilians also supports the thesis that soldiers adopted and extended the punitive approach to counterinsurgency. About 19,000 African civilians died in the war. Partly this was a result of insurgent actions. They used force against uncooperative civilians, used them as cover, and targeted the rural health and veterinary services. This later caused a surge of malaria, rabies, and tsetse flies. As the war intensified, the government allowed more violence against black civilians. This punitive approach had started in 1973 with the imposition of fines on communities that aided insurgents. Brutalities against civilians were not yet accepted, but in the late 1970s Rhodesia used the term “killed in crossfire” rather liberally.[72]

72. Moorcraft, 38, 129-35. For a detailed account of ZANLA coercion in peasant communities, see Norma J. Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War Peasant Voices (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

DKI as to the sources; esp. as to de Boer's bottom line: "Brutalities against civilians were not yet accepted, but in the late 1970s Rhodesia used the term “killed in crossfire” rather liberally." Cilliers does give just over 5K in "civilian KIAs" for 1973-1978 (p.242 type; p.143 pdf; snip attached)


There was never a clear and uniform policy targeting civilians though. Actually, the cabinet always pushed for a tougher approach, while General Walls, Rhodesia’s most senior military official, tried to limit the freedom Ian Smith wanted to give him. At one point Smith, supported by several cabinet members, even proposed to abandon the “Queensbury Rules of waging warfare” and impose nationwide martial law. Walls retorted that if the cabinet really wanted that, it should resign and let him rule the country at the head of a military junta.[73]

73. Flower, 211. Ken Flower, Serving Secretly - An Intelligence Chief on Record - Rhodesia into Zimbabwe - 1964 to 1981 (London: John Murray, 1987)

DKI as to the source.

The term “Queensbury Rules of waging warfare” is legally meaningless - as well as militarily meaningless, for that matter. Based on two of the quotes below ("regular police work", "the Rule of Law applied"), we might equate “Queensbury Rules" to the "Rule of Law" (using that somewhat ambiguous term as shorthand for the rules set by domestic law for peacetime law enforcement).

That situation is quite different from "nationwide martial law". Setting up a debate between "nationwide rule of law" and "nationwide martial law" is a strawman. An insurgency can be handled indigenously where the "Rule of Law" applies generally, but where the indigenous "Laws of War" apply locally. An example, of course, is our Civil War (the 1863 Lieber Code), and the consequent periods of Reconstruction and Redemption.

cont. in Part 2.

[Ken White]

Too many instances of "it was said," "it seems," "it appears that..." My impression is that he took a predetermined position and cherry picked to support it.

His 'conclusion' is flawed at best, arguable in the case of every war and certainly not proven for the one he discusses.

I don't agree that the article necessarily reflects badly on Military Review. They publish a lot of articles of real merit and as many with no merit with an almost equal number of mediocrities. I think that sort of goes with the mission of the magazine. Been my observation over 50 plus years that about a third of the magazine on average has some worth and I've found that others agree -- where we sometimes differ is on which articles were worthwhile... :wry:

[jmm99]

In this climate, soldiers had greater freedom to stretch the rules. The reporting of a significant number of “killed in crossfire” was now accepted, while in the early 1970s Special Branch still treated each death as regular police work.[74]

74. Cohen, 488-89. Barry Cohen, “The War in Rhodesia: A Dissenter’s View,” African Affairs 76 (October 1977).

DKI as to the source. De Boer never cites "the rules" that he claims were "stretched". The disconnect in effect between applying "Rule of Law" versus "Laws of War" in irregular warfare was early on picked up by Trinquier, Galula and McCuen. Civil authorities are generally slow to react to an oncoming insurgency - and the peacetime setup often fails.

Ciliers noted that with respect to Rhodesia (pp.220-222 type):


In general, the Rhodesian intelligence community was geared for peace-time operations. Although the insurgent threat was very real, and recognized by Special Branch as such, neither the organisation nor its methods of collecting information was suited to the more specific needs of operational intelligence. ... With the outbreak of armed attacks in late 1972, the Special Branch network of paid informers and police patrols in the North-east came close to total collapse within a matter of weeks. ... The character of the war and Special Branch method of operation within this climate were incompatible. Apart from the fact that the source of paid informants dried up almost immediately owing to a spate of insurgent 'disciplinary killings', the ambushing of normal Police patrols also severely curtailed this source of information. Within a year of the activation of Operation Hurricane it had become evident that the traditional Special Branch intelligence network had run into serious trouble.

The insurgents engaged in classic "selective violence" against civilians (Cilliers' term - "disciplinary killings"), which is really part of the "political struggle" as a facet of its own violence program. So also, ambushing "normal Police patrols" is more of the "political struggle"; though it also marks the transition to a more militarized phase. If the civil authorities do not adapt by shifting to at least a localized "Laws of War" construct, advantage insurgents.


One soldier probably described the new attitude accurately: “If in doubt, shoot. It kept you alive.” He, for example, opened fire on a hut if he saw an insurgent hiding amidst civilians. Soldiers also disclosed that they shot at unidentified figures running at a distance.[75]

75. Cocks, 93, 97; Wylie, 144, 152. (1) Chris Cocks, Fireforce: One Man’s War in the Rhodesian Light Infantry, 4th ed. (Johannesburg: 30° South Publishers, 2006); (2) Dan Wylie, Dead Leaves: Two Years in the Rhodesian War (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2002)

DKI as to the sources. Since the quotes resemble Haditha, they are plausible.

Whether the practices are within or outside of the various MOUT and SASO tactical doctrines - and also within or outside of the conflicting ROEs - could be a topic for debate. That's a debate I won't presently engage in -

"Some cases shouldn't be settled. ... Some cases shouldn't be brought. ... Some cases shouldn't be debated."

As to Haditha, "best practices COIN" and FM 3-24 clearly made their point. "Hearts and Minds", gentlemen - which I believe our young men should not be sent to die for.


Dennison’s war diary gives some idea of the number of civilians killed this way. Between 29 November 1975 and 28 July 1979, his company killed 364 insurgents and captured 39 while killing 170 civilians (the number of wounded civilians is not recorded).[76]

76. Wood, 27, 347. J.R.T. Wood, The War Diaries of André Dennison (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing Limited, 1989)

DKI as to the source. A brief word on "insurgents" and "civilians". The measure of "insurgent" may be a person with AK in hand or nearby; with "civilian" being anyone not fitting that measure. That doesn't mean that those "civilians" were all "innocent".


Interestingly enough, soldiers did not consciously execute government policy when they targeted civilians. The above-mentioned soldier who shot to stay alive thought that higher-ranking officers tried to adhere to the Geneva Conventions while “the troops in the field tended to sneer at the idea.”[77]

77. Cocks, 93.

DKI as to the source.

De Boer here transits from "civilians killed" (in both quotes above this quote) to "civilians targeted". "Killed" and "targeted" are two very different things - which de Boer knows full well as an educated attorney.

As to the GCs (not the APs), the 1949 Geneva Conventions, with the exception of Common Article 3, apply only to armed conflicts of an international character - which the Rhodesian conflict was not. Therefore, in order to discuss the many issues that de Boer asserts, one would have to present the actual rules to which the Rhodesian government and its "higher-ranking officers" adhered - and how the "lower rankers" violated them. De Boer fails completely in that task.


Another soldier explained how troops beat up uncooperative civilians to extract information. Such treatment was actually illegal, and usually ineffective, but often happened.[78]

78. Warren, 39-40. Charlie Warren, At the Going Down of the Sun . . . (Zanj Press, 2006).

DKI as to the source.


An instructor also told Rhodesian Light Infantry recruits that if a civilian saw him on a cross-border operation, he would kill the person so there was less risk of compromising the mission. He would never do this in Rhodesia, because there, “the Rule of Law applied.”[79]

79. Croukamp, 410. Dennis Croukamp, The Bush War in Rhodesia: The Extraordinary Combat Memoir of a Rhodesian Reconnaissance Specialist (Boulder: Paladin Press, 2007).

DKI as to the source. There is a difference in rules vice an internal insurgency (CA 3 based at the time); and a cross-border operation (an aspect of the Law of Neutrality - my post on Ashley Deeks' article). Not to say that either set of rules provide an open hunting license on "civilians".


Given this notion among soldiers that the killing of civilians was illegal, we cannot explain the large number of persons killed in crossfires as government policy. It was probably another manifestation of Rhodesian soldiers embracing a punitive approach toward counterinsurgency and taking it one step further than (they thought) was allowed, by showing little regard for civilian lives.

No source given.

To the extent that this work of art purports to be either a piece of legal scholarship - or a legal brief - in regard to the Rhodesian "rules of engagement", it flunks. I am no more enlightened after reading it, than I was before reading it.

It may or may not hold up as an attorney's "Statement of Facts" (one should expect that to be biased; as also legal scholarship - or a legal brief - will be biased) - that depends on what its sources actually say; and how accurate they are.

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

To the extent that this work of art purports to be either a piece of legal scholarship - or a legal brief - in regard to the Rhodesian "rules of engagement", it flunks. I am no more enlightened after reading it, than I was before reading it.Superb analysis as always. Thank you...

[jmm99]

Your kind words are always welcome. :)

Regards

Mike

Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia (complete pdf and sections) is here (http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/rhodesia/Contents.htm).

[Backwards Observer]

CT's but I have more choice words for them - a good gook is a dead gook - period. We just didnt shoot enough of them.(Not without trying). We should have cleaned out miles of the country side -the whole bang shoot. If you aid, host or support a gook you are dead was my motto even if you were a minor.
The way these guys operated in indoctrinating everyone meant that anyone old enough to carry a gun was a threat. [comment on p.2 of linked thread]

I've sometimes wondered why JMA keeps referring to "gooks" in Rhodesia. The comments in the linked forum thread are instructive on this account.

GOOKS - CHARLIE'S - Whatever you want to call the bastards! (http://www.newrhodesian.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=241) - New Rhodesian Forum

[JMA]

Your kind words are always welcome. :)

Regards

Mike

Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia (complete pdf and sections) is here (http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/rhodesia/Contents.htm).

Cilliers is much quoted as his work is one of the few published on the Rhodesian War. Produced in 1985 it is a bit dated and the final book in the JRT Wood trilogy is awaited with great anticipation. (Due in two years I believe)

For the 'soundbite' generation I would suggest (Doc) JRT Wood's chapter in the book 'Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare' - Marston & Malkasian (http://www.amazon.com/Counterinsurgency-Modern-Warfare-Companion-Marston/dp/B002KE5TNW/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1327640254&sr=1-2)

The 6,500 word chapter - Countering the Chimurenga - is a very succinct explanation of the Rhodesian War in its political context and is a must read for those with any interest in the subject.

http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51Ztj1z57yL._SL500_AA300_.jpg

[JMA]

Too many instances of "it was said," "it seems," "it appears that..." My impression is that he took a predetermined position and cherry picked to support it.

His 'conclusion' is flawed at best, arguable in the case of every war and certainly not proven for the one he discusses.

Yes Ken the content is nonsense but I remain horrified that a university (any university) can accept that drivel as being an acceptable thesis.


I don't agree that the article necessarily reflects badly on Military Review. They publish a lot of articles of real merit and as many with no merit with an almost equal number of mediocrities. I think that sort of goes with the mission of the magazine. Been my observation over 50 plus years that about a third of the magazine on average has some worth and I've found that others agree -- where we sometimes differ is on which articles were worthwhile... :wry:

That's OK for you I suppose but... by publishing that piece of garbage the Military Review legitimised the content of the article which will now become an acceptable source to be quoted from - afterall it has been published in the Military Review - and conferred (by implication) upon this 'person' the status of an expert on Rhodesia. It makes me want to throw up.

The Military Review certainly has a lot to answer for.

[JMA]

To the extent that this work of art purports to be either a piece of legal scholarship - or a legal brief - in regard to the Rhodesian "rules of engagement", it flunks. I am no more enlightened after reading it, than I was before reading it.

Thank you for your comments Mike.

I would be interested on hearing further comment relating to the construction of this 'thesis' from an academic point of view.

I was in two minds whether to quote his first paragraph or his final sentence (and decided on the latter). I note you zeroed right in on the 'problem in the first paragraph. Let's look at that then:


In the 1970s, a bloody insurgency took place in Rhodesia, now present-day Zimbabwe. African insurgents faced a settler-state determined to keep power in white hands. the government adopted a punitive and enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy. Many Rhodesian soldiers embraced the punitive approach to such an extent that they overextended the rules of engagement. Although the Rhodesian Bush War took place in its unique historical context, it should also serve as a warning for commanders of troops currently engaged in enemy-centric “anti-terrorism” operations.

Rules of engagement?

I never heard the term until I saw the movie of that name 20 years after the end of the Rhodesian war.

It should be obvious that you can't over extend what you don't have.

I suggest the problem these youngsters (20 something) have when looking back at a war which happened 30 years plus a go is that they judge actions against current norms. Quite clearly de Boer is not (or rather was not at the time he wrote this) mature enough to address this issue. Surely the arrogance of youth should be tempered by the guidance of his thesis Supervisor?

Then ... damn it ... the Military Review goes and puts his name up in lights.
[/URL]
...then perhaps the other hackneyed cliche of the period is the continued regurgitation of the left-wing liberal line so loved by the 'progressive' university types of the 70's (some around here I seem to recall) that:


African insurgents faced a settler-state determined to keep power in white hands.

Again I suggest a quick read of JRT Wood's - Countering the Chimurenga - from the book [URL="http://www.amazon.com/Counterinsurgency-Modern-Warfare-Companion-Marston/dp/B002KE5TNW/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1327640254&sr=1-2"]Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (http://www.amazon.com/Counterinsurgency-Modern-Warfare-Companion-Marston/dp/B002KE5TNW/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1327640254&sr=1-2) will help these poor misguided souls understand the political dynamics of that time.

...but then again if all whites in Rhodesia were not rabid diehard racists (who were not clinging to power but attempting to ensure a controlled transition to majority rule) then how would these same left-wing academics be able to continue to accept that every white down to infants were legitimate targets for rape and murder by the 'glorious' forces of liberation?

[Backwards Observer]

So among the photos in the first post on Rhodesian "gooks" (GOOKS, CHARLIE'S etc. (http://www.newrhodesian.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=241)) linked above, there is Chinx ("Comrade Chinx Chingaira") leading the ZANLA Ideological Choir. Jesus, you couldn't make this $hit up...or something.

Mr. Chinx is also mentioned in connection with something called the Borrowdale dance (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borrowdale_dance) (wikipedia) among other things.

Incidentally, I went to school with a Rhodesian guy who's family had relocated to Chiang Mai. Funny guy. He ended up going to Duke, initially declaring it "the happiest place on earth" (more or less). He and the other Rhodesian and S. African kids were quite close with the African exchange students (from Ethiopia and Congo, if I recall correctly). It's a small world after all.

[JMA]

I've sometimes wondered why JMA keeps referring to "gooks" in Rhodesia. The comments in the linked forum thread are instructive on this account.

GOOKS - CHARLIE'S - Whatever you want to call the bastards! (http://www.newrhodesian.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=241) - New Rhodesian Forum

'Gook' was a great name which we adopted from the yanks (from Vietnam). It was good in that it replaced the tendency of earlier times to use the 'N' or 'K' words which given that the majority of men under arms on the government side Rhodesia were Black was inappropriate. While 'gook' may have had racial connotations in Vietnam it was a neutral word in Rhodesia.

[Backwards Observer]

While 'gook' may have had racial connotations in Vietnam it was a neutral word in Rhodesia.

"May have", huh? You're quite the diplomat when you choose to be, JMA.:) Well, I won't argue with you...:rolleyes: It's nice that you spared the gentle readers here the actual use of the 'N' or 'K' words (whatever those might be). Unfortunate racial connotations, perhaps. We can all be thankful that we have the "great name", Gook, as a harmless substitute. Awesome. I'm liking this new thoughtful persona of yours. Keep up the good work.:D

Ironically, the Ethiopian guy, who was the son of teachers, suggested (perhaps mischievously) that I might be a fascist because I listened to Motorhead; a band that, according to him, indirectly glorified Nazi ideology. And this was after I'd given him a pair of Malaysian Army camouflage fatigues that he'd borrowed and seemed reluctant to part with! Kids today...or yesterday in this case. Nice guy, 'tho.

Gotta go, it's Gook New Year, rotsa chinks to see...:)

[JMA]

So among the photos in the first post on Rhodesian "gooks" (GOOKS, CHARLIE'S etc. (http://www.newrhodesian.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=241)) linked above, there is Chinx ("Comrade Chinx Chingaira") leading the ZANLA Ideological Choir. Jesus, you couldn't make this $hit up...or something.

Mr. Chinx is also mentioned in connection with something called the Borrowdale dance (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borrowdale_dance) (wikipedia) among other things.

They took this stuff very seriously ... then they could as the UN fed them so they had lots of time to fill. Clever guy this Chinx... he found a comfy little niche surrounded by women and far away from combat.

Oh yes, the UN. When the recruits crossed the border to go for training they were registered as refugees and as such increased the numbers of 'refugees' the UN provided with food, shelter etc etc. So when we hit gook camps the UN were able to confirm that Rhodesian forces had attacked a registered refugee camp. Clever move. The Scandinavian countries provided much of the food to these 'refugees' (they knew who was getting the food).


Incidentally, I went to school with a Rhodesian guy who's family had relocated to Chiang Mai. Funny guy. He ended up going to Duke, initially declaring it "the happiest place on earth" (more or less). He and the other Rhodesian and S. African kids were quite close with the African exchange students (from Ethiopia and Congo, if I recall correctly). It's a small world after all.

This happens all the time.

A Rhodesian who went to Sandhurst (2 years at that time) recalled that in the first part of the first year the Africans from Nigeria/Ghana etc shunned him for being a Rhodesian but certainly by the end of the first year they had befriended him on the basis that "at least you understand Africans". He made some great friends through to the end of the course and they wrote each other for years thereafter.

I had a similar experience working in Mozambique (with expatriate yanks and Brits). The locals used to come to me with their problems because as they said, "You are very 'cheeky' but at least you understand our problems." ;)

[JMA]

"May have", huh? You're quite the diplomat when you choose to be, JMA.:) Well, I won't argue with you...:rolleyes: It's nice that you spared the gentle readers here the actual use of the 'N' or 'K' words (whatever those might be). Unfortunate racial connotations, perhaps. We can all be thankful that we have the "great name", Gook, as a harmless substitute. Awesome. I'm liking this new thoughtful persona of yours. Keep up the good work.

Ironically, the Ethiopian guy, who was the son of teachers, suggested (perhaps mischievously) that I might be a fascist because I listened to Motorhead; a band that, according to him, indirectly glorified Nazi ideology. And this was after I'd given him a pair of Malaysian Army camouflage fatigues that he'd borrowed and seemed reluctant to part with! Kids today...or yesterday in this case. Nice guy, 'tho.

Gotta go, it's Gook New Year, rotsa chinks to see...:)

In 1980 (after the shooting stopped) we had a gook (aka ZANLA Liaison Officer) at the Brigade HQ where I was a staff officer (this was in the days when brigades were commanded by a brigadier and run by a few majors and a handful of captains).

Comrade Crispin was palmed off onto me and the Int Offr (a SAS Captain) for a daily liaison briefing. The Brits on the Monitoring Force told us that Crispin had the status of a full colonel and should be treated as such ...( you have to hand it to the Brits... they have a sense of humour).

Anyway things were quite boring after the war so we started to booby trap his chair using practice detonators (things about the size of a match head which used to go pop instead of bang). Every time we heard the 'pop' we would shout 'GOTSHA'. Crispin never saw the funny side and reported me to the Brits for misusing explosives. No sense of humour at all.

Then one day comrade Crispin confronted me on the use of the word 'gooks' which we continued to use during our briefings. "Why you call us gooks, what exactly is a gook?" So I told him that a 'gook' was the polite name for a !$£%&*!"£$£%*&^$£"!%$^&£**$£"!%$. He was not amused and reported me to the Brits for having a bad attitude.

But despite all this comrade Crispin and I were big mates ;) When ever a shipment of canned fish from those ever so caring Scandinavians arrived he would always present me with a carton. I suspect that he realised that despite all their huffing and puffing the Brits were really nothing more than paper tigers and if he wanted to get anything done it would have to be through me. It was fun while it lasted.

[Backwards Observer]

Then one day comrade Crispin confronted me on the use of the word 'gooks' which we continued to use during our briefings. "Why you call us gooks, what exactly is a gook?" So I told him that a 'gook' was the polite name for a !$£%&*!"£$£%*&^$£"!%$^&£**$£"!%$. He was not amused and reported me to the Brits for having a bad attitude.

Anyone who sez "gook" is a racist. Anyone who doesn't say "gook" is a well-disciplined racist!;)

All joking aside, in Asia it's been my experience that people don't really have a sense of humour about the gook/chink banter. Nine times out of ten you might get just a dirty look, but there's always a chance some overly-sensitive soul will whip out a paint-stripper or some such and slice your throat open. :)

[JMA]

Anyone who sez "gook" is a racist. Anyone who doesn't say "gook" is a well-disciplined racist!;)

All joking aside, in Asia it's been my experience that people don't really have a sense of humour about the gook/chink banter. Nine times out of ten you might get just a dirty look, but there's always a chance some overly-sensitive soul will whip out a paint-stripper or some such and slice your throat open. :)

I'll remember to be careful with my choice of words when I'm next in Asia.

[Backwards Observer]

I'll remember to be careful with my choice of words when I'm next in Asia.

The new sensitive JMA would be in no danger whatsoever, I'm sure. Asians love big friendly, straight-talking lugs from the barbarian lands...they're good to hide behind during riots.:cool:

Kong Hee Fatt Choy!

[JMA]

The new sensitive JMA would be in no danger whatsoever, I'm sure. Asians love big friendly, straight-talking lugs from the barbarian lands...they're good to hide behind during riots.:cool:

Kong Hee Fatt Choy!

Well that begs the question... have I been insensitive or not sensitive enough... or have some people (no names, no pack drill) been... how shall I say it... a little over-sensitive perhaps?

[Backwards Observer]

Well that begs the question... have I been insensitive or not sensitive enough... or have some people (no names, no pack drill) been... how shall I say it... a little over-sensitive perhaps?

I dunno...but if you're feeling 'philosophical', maybe you could say some more about what you thought of the new Marlantes book you mentioned over in the reading thread. That is, if you want to, of course...

[JMA]

I dunno...but if you're feeling 'philosophical', maybe you could say some more about what you thought of the new Marlantes book you mentioned over in the reading thread. That is, if you want to, of course...

I'm at my philosophical best when watching a glorious African sunset with a copius supply of bitterly cold chibulis (beers) readily to hand. What a pleasure!

There were no takers for a discussion on Marlantes. Pity, it is a good point of departure for a good in-depth discussion.

My current preoccupation is the Military Review, however. Had a browse of past editions since the shock of last week.

Remember Matthew Ridgeway encouraging young officers to read, read, read and also do you remember the birth of the current requirement for all officers to have an academic degree by the time they reach captain?

So now the US Army finds itself with millions of men of which thousands (maybe hundreds of thousands) hold degrees and they are still unable to produce a six issue per year magazine of some cerebral quality. Probably a case of not enough submissions or not enough submissions of quality? There has got to be a problem somewhere, yes?

So they are scraping the barrel for content. Whatever the reason is, it is quite astounding.

So really Ridgeway was only half right. If reading leads to thinking then yes, but only if it results in a proven and demonstrable improvement in the thinking/analytical/interpretive/practical skills of the officer corps.

I have never been a believer in reading lists (especially those provided by individuals - on the basis of "See what I have been reading (aren't I a clever boy)."

I would say, "OK so you read that what did you learn." (Believe me I have been tempted here ... but being the sensitive soul that I am I have refrained from such comment lest my best intentions be interpreted as being provocative).

Back to Marlantes. Here we have a Vietnam veteran with a nice cluster of bravery medals (Navy Cross, Bronze Star etc) who has written about what those who have not been in combat (Grossman, Keegan, Holmes, Bourke etc) have written about speculatively.

Surely with Iraq and Afghanistan behind the US military there must now be literally thousands of officers (and other ranks) who are able to talk about combat/killing/fear/courage/etc/etc from personal experience?

Maybe through the teachings of Grossman they believe that it must be terrible to have to kill an enemy soldier and not having nightmares about having blown away someone who desperately needed and deserved to be killed indicates that they have a real, not psychological, but psychiatric problem they dare not share with anyone. Maybe that they experienced no/little/minimal fear response to close combat as opposed to what Grossman suggests they should have maybe indicates that they have a very big psychiatric problem they dare not share with anyone. I could go on.

Heavens above Vietnam was 40 years ago and Marlantes comes in from the cold only now. I hope we don't have to wait 40 years for the latest crop of combat exposed soldiers to lay it all out. Now there is something meaningful for the Military Review to get involved with (instead of allowing itself to be use as a platform for the publication of a sub-standard pseudo academic excuse for a thesis.)

[jmm99]

JMA: You mentioned in another conversation that you were not acquainted, when in RLI service, with the term "rules of engagement". I don't question that, as such, since our own current FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, does not use the term "rules of engagement" once.

Of course, FM 27-10 is full of ROEs for different situations - as have been US service regulations and doctrinal publications since the 1863 Lieber Code (which is mostly ROEs). In both the US and UK, the ROEs have come under different names from before WWI - e.g., U.S. War Dept. Doc. No. 467, Rules of Land Warfare (1914), and J.W Spaight, War Rights on Land (1911).

So, unless Rhodesia was a rara avis in British colonial terms, it should have had "field service regulations" (including "rules of engagement") for both its police and military services. De Boer's sin was not one of illogic, as such - though, of course, one cannot over-extend or violate rules that do not exist. His sin was in not researching to find the rules that probably did exist for both military and police. If he couldn't find such rules, then he should have said so - and altered his conclusions.

Of course, just because written rules exist does not mean that everyone is aware of them (much less that people are really trained in them). So far as ROEs are concerned, I think Spaight's joke is on point (and perhaps not really much of a joke today):


..... for an ambitious subaltern who wishes to be known vaguely as an author and, at the same time, not to be troubled with undue inquiry into the claim upon which his title rests, there can be no better subject than the International Law of War. For it is a quasi-military subject in which no one in the army or out of it, is very deeply interested, which everyone very contentedly takes on trust, and which may be written about without one person in ten thousand being able to tell whether the writing is adequate or not.

cited here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=100573&postcount=47) (in a prior conversation with you).

As to MR, I think the discussion here justifies the article's publication. I also could name a half-dozen writers who would say the article is just great - based on their own articles re: "war crimes", etc.

As an aside, I went back to Bruce Hoffman's 1991 RAND piece on Rhodesia (http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3998.html). His Appendix C, Cross-Border Raids, summarizes several dozen raids in Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Angola. A study of those raids (if there is more available factually than Hoffman's brief summaries) seems presently material in light of the loosening of restrictions by two US administrations on those direct actions.

---------------------

Another topic - briefly. Going into what soldiers call their enemies is not going to be useful here. I don't need an education on what those terms mean. If you want to know where I stand, I stand with Randall Kennedy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Randall_Kennedy) (my gosh, JMM agrees with a Princeton, Oxford, Yale Law grad, who teaches at Harvard Law). If you want to know where he stands, buy and read his book. I'd suggest termination of "gook" posts.

Regards

Mike

[Surferbeetle]

I'm at my philosophical best when watching a glorious African sunset with a copius supply of bitterly cold chibulis (beers) readily to hand. What a pleasure!

Cheers!


So now the US Army finds itself with millions of men of which thousands (maybe hundreds of thousands) hold degrees and they are still unable to produce a six issue per year magazine of some cerebral quality. Probably a case of not enough submissions or not enough submissions of quality? There has got to be a problem somewhere, yes?

Given that less than 1% of the US population serves in the military, and less than perhaps 10% of that particular demographic will publish in such a magazine:


How deep & wide is the talent pool of concern?



How many who are serving/have served *really* read/tabbed/marked-up/used the fm's?



Of those that bother to read them how many *really* believe that fm's have all/some/any of the answers?



If one's paper shows that one is thinking outside the box by using 'non-approved references' (i.e. not fm's or the reference of the day) or questioning the status quo how long until the 'career light' starts blinking?



I have never been a believer in reading lists (especially those provided by individuals - on the basis of "See what I have been reading (aren't I a clever boy)."

Pity, some of them are quite interesting, useful, and dare i say influential...and keep in mind that some reading lists of late include blogs.

It could be further argued that blog's (to include swj), are a 'new' form of books and periodicals which are not subject to the control of [insert whatever form of detested regulatory framework here - burn in hell SOPA] and can potentially be a better place to learn about/find a balanced/nuanced understanding of what one is looking for than in some 'status-quo-sponsored' periodicals... :wry:

Now, about that clever thing...one could limit one's discussions to fellow readers and continue to avoid (or worse) the social climbers... :D

PS - Like Backwards, and JMM, I am not a fan of the name calling thing either ;)

[jmm99]

Yes, JMA used the "G-Word" in a response to another RLI trooper (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=102021&postcount=161) - in fact, he used it twice (Gee; that's another G-word).

Rex Brynen then said (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=102039&postcount=163):


On a side issue, might I also suggest that we start referring to the black Zimbabweans killed in the war as ZANLA, ZIPRA, "black nationalist guerillas," or something else a little more appropriate than terrs and gooks? SWJ has always frowned on the use of "gooks" for the Viet-Cong, "ragheads" or "hajis" for Iraqis or Afghans, "wogs" in the former British Empire, "kaffirs" for blacks, "stcke" or "figuren" for Jews and gypsies, etc,regardless of whether such derogatory terms were in common use in theatre by the troops of the day.

Thereafter, the G-word disappeared from this thread (whether or not used elsewhere is another issue) - until it was revived by Backwards Observer (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=131545&postcount=246) (directed to JMA as an ad hominem - still an ad hominem whether true or false) and culminated in this wonderful comment by Backwards Observer (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=131559&postcount=255):


Nine times out of ten you might get just a dirty look, but there's always a chance some overly-sensitive soul will whip out a paint-stripper or some such and slice your throat open.

Like the 9/11 folks did - eh ! Nice; really nice.

I think the recent "gook" posts should be deleted.

Mike

[JMA]

Yes, JMA used the "G-Word" in a response to another RLI trooper (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=102021&postcount=161) - in fact, he used it twice (Gee; that's another G-word).

Relax Mike. As explained to Backwards Observer the use of the word 'gook' in the Rhodeisan context had no racial connotations. It was merely a term used for the enemy.

That the use of the word in the context of Vietnam as used by US forces is taken as an insult by people of East-Asian origin is a different issue totally.

Let me illustrate my point:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/63/HinduSwastika.svg/180px-HinduSwastika.svg.png

Plenty of those signs around here in Durban, South Africa. What's the problem? No its not a NAZI Swastika but the 'shakti' used in Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism, and is also a Chinese character. So what are we to do? Ban the use of the symbol because of its NAZI connection regardless that there is no such connection with its use by Buddists, Hindus and Jains? This would be political correctness gone mad.

Rex Brynen then said (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=102039&postcount=163):

Brynen is entitled to his opinion. You take it from whence it comes. The use of CTs (communist terrorists) and terrs (terrorists) are hardly any more inappropriate than the use of the word 'terrorist' is in the post 9/11 world... unless of course you are on the left of the political spectrum.


Thereafter, the G-word disappeared from this thread (whether or not used elsewhere is another issue) - until it was revived by Backwards Observer (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=131545&postcount=246) (directed to JMA as an ad hominem - still an ad hominem whether true or false) and culminated in this wonderful comment by Backwards Observer (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=131559&postcount=255):

This matters how much? Backwards Observer now knows that the use of 'gook' in the Rhodesian context has no racial connotation and no connection with people of Chinese origin.

Now all that remains is for that penny to drop with you.


Like the 9/11 folks did - eh ! Nice; really nice.

I think the recent "gook" posts should be deleted.

Mike

Censorship?

The approach has surely got to be more mature than this. What about discussing the issue of names being applied to one's enemy in an open and frank manner? Why does everyone try to/need to demonize their enemy? Would make for an interesting discussion ... but not for the faint hearted politically correct who would no doubt squirm with discomfort.

[Backwards Observer]

Like the 9/11 folks did - eh ! Nice; really nice.

I'm not following. Are you saying the 9/11 folks were gooks?

Aside from that, if people feel comfortable going to Asian countries and saying stuff like gook, chink, chogi, paki etc. to the locals, that's up to them. I wouldn't advise it, but maybe I'm just uptight.

[JMA]

I'm not following. Are you saying the 9/11 folks were gooks?

They were 'terrs' (terrorists) according to the US ... and maybe Islamic Martyrs according to others.

I would be interested in hearing from Brynen how they should be referred to.


Aside from that, if people feel comfortable going to Asian countries and saying stuff like gook, chink, chogi, paki etc. to the locals, that's up to them. I wouldn't advise it, but maybe I'm just uptight.

Yes people from this neck of the woods would be wise to realise that the word 'gook' to many/most/all Chinese people is seen as a racial slur and should not be used there.

I'm waiting to hear someone tell me that a Hindu living next door to a Jew should not be allowed to display a 'shakti' in his wall for fear of causing upset.

[JMA]

JMA: You mentioned in another conversation that you were not acquainted, when in RLI service, with the term "rules of engagement". I don't question that, as such, since our own current FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, does not use the term "rules of engagement" once.

Correct, I did both the standard RLI recruits course and later a one year officers course. No such thing as rules of engagement.

What did apply of course were the laws of the country. In addition there was a “good faith” provision of the Indemnity and Compensation Act of 1975 to prevent law suit against the security forces and the government relating to actions by individual members of the security forces.


Of course, FM 27-10 is full of ROEs for different situations - as have been US service regulations and doctrinal publications since the 1863 Lieber Code (which is mostly ROEs). In both the US and UK, the ROEs have come under different names from before WWI - e.g., U.S. War Dept. Doc. No. 467, Rules of Land Warfare (1914), and J.W Spaight, War Rights on Land (1911).

So, unless Rhodesia was a rara avis in British colonial terms, it should have had "field service regulations" (including "rules of engagement") for both its police and military services. De Boer's sin was not one of illogic, as such - though, of course, one cannot over-extend or violate rules that do not exist. His sin was in not researching to find the rules that probably did exist for both military and police. If he couldn't find such rules, then he should have said so - and altered his conclusions.

Covered this above. The laws of the country and the Indemnity Act.

De Boer's 'sin' it appears is to have formed an opinion first and then finessed the facts to (kind of) fit the finding he wants. Anyway you look at it, it remains a really crappy piece of work ... which should not have slipped past the scrutiny of the MR editorial board.


Of course, just because written rules exist does not mean that everyone is aware of them (much less that people are really trained in them). So far as ROEs are concerned, I think Spaight's joke is on point (and perhaps not really much of a joke today):

If there were rules of engagement then they would have been enforced.


As to MR, I think the discussion here justifies the article's publication. I also could name a half-dozen writers who would say the article is just great - based on their own articles re: "war crimes", etc.

I disagree. Firstly (as stated before) they have elevated this piece of garbage to the status of a published work and by implication conferred upon the author the status of 'expert' on Rhodesia. Unforgivable.

If they had wished that the publication would generate discussion then surely they would have announced that at the time of publication and invited interested parties to respond through 'letters to the editor' of some other means. They have no excuses.

I suggest that the de Boer article, which was based on an Hons thesis should be weighed against its merits as an academic paper. It is obvious that fails to prove what it set out to. That he got an Hons degree from the Dutch university of Utrecht is by the by as they may have lower standards. I'm sure there are universities in the US whose degrees are not considered to be worth much.

As a kid he has no idea about the subject matter so that can be discounted.

But there is now no stopping the kid. Rhodesia was merely chicken feed ... he has now moved on and is now and 'expert' on the Arab Spring... I kid you not.

The Continued Importance of Broad Popular Support in Political Violence (http://www.heptagonpost.com/De%20Boer/The_Continued_Importance_of_Broad_Popular_Support_ in_Political_Violence)

[davidbfpo]

JMM in Post 261 'A Rose By Any Other Name ...' referred to:
As an aside, I went back to Bruce Hoffman's 1991 RAND piece on Rhodesia. His Appendix C, Cross-Border Raids, summarizes several dozen raids in Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Angola. A study of those raids (if there is more available factually than Hoffman's brief summaries) seems presently material in light of the loosening of restrictions by two US administrations on those direct actions.

JMM,

The Rhodesians, later followed by the South Africans, used cross-border raids as a means of reducing the flow of guerillas into their territory - causing mass fatalities. Leadership attacks were unusual, IIRC attempts were made to kill Nkomo in Zambia, oddly I cannot recall a similar attack(s) on Mugabe & Co in Mozambique; the South Africans were more successful later with attacks on the ANC.

The cross-border tactic was controversial at the time within the Rhodesian military, IIRC Jakkie Cilliers wrote on this in his post-Independence book and others like Michael Evans. Partly as it avoided a serious strategic approach to what was vital inside Rhodesia; it is a long time since I read those sources.

The use made today by the USA, notably in Somalia, Yemen and NWFP, of the tactic cross border raids is very different - with selective targets, with far fewer fatalities. Yes the legal principles maybe the same, the method and effect are very different and so not similar.

[Firn]

This link, The Saints: The Rhodesian Light Infantry (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3qcZzAfvN4) seems more suited in this thread. Needless to say that it shows the history through the eyes of one side only.

[JMA]

This link, The Saints: The Rhodesian Light Infantry (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3qcZzAfvN4) seems more suited in this thread. Needless to say that it shows the history through the eyes of one side only.

I am fascinated by this comment.

A little late in the day to be concerned about hearing both sides to the story don't you think?

Probably 98% of all media coverage in North America and Europe had a distinct bias against the Rhodesian government and forces.

A Canadian who served in the RLI (with distinction I might add) wrote this a while ago:


Many years later back home in Canada I checked the archives of the public library for the newspapers during the time of the Chimoio (Op Dingo) raids. These historic raids had made the front pages of newspapers around the world. Sadly though, the ZANLA bull$hit terrorist propaganda version of ‘an agricultural training centre for refugees’ made bigger headlines and received bigger coverage than the official Rhodesian communiqué printed beside it.

(Of course the Zimbabwe government has long ago given up on that lie and have built a monument to their fallen comrades on the site. It is only the lunatic left who continue with the propaganda lie.)

It would be rather nice (even if belatedly) people were willing to hear both sides of the story and as Mike says as you have heard the 'ZANLA bull$hit terrorist propaganda version' now go find the Rhodesian version.

[JMA]

JMM in Post 261 'A Rose By Any Other Name ...' referred to:

JMM,

The Rhodesians, later followed by the South Africans, used cross-border raids as a means of reducing the flow of guerillas into their territory - causing mass fatalities. Leadership attacks were unusual, IIRC attempts were made to kill Nkomo in Zambia, oddly I cannot recall a similar attack(s) on Mugabe & Co in Mozambique; the South Africans were more successful later with attacks on the ANC.

The cross-border tactic was controversial at the time within the Rhodesian military, IIRC Jakkie Cilliers wrote on this in his post-Independence book and others like Michael Evans. Partly as it avoided a serious strategic approach to what was vital inside Rhodesia; it is a long time since I read those sources.

The use made today by the USA, notably in Somalia, Yemen and NWFP, of the tactic cross border raids is very different - with selective targets, with far fewer fatalities. Yes the legal principles maybe the same, the method and effect are very different and so not similar.

David, the SAS were landed in Maputo by a South African Navy submarine and paid a visit on Mugabe... who surprise, surprise (like Nkomo when they visited him) was not at home at the time.

Here is the detail from the BBC here (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14311834)

[jmm99]

I'll watch.

Mike

[Firn]

I am fascinated by this comment.

A little late in the day to be concerned about hearing both sides to the story don't you think?

Probably 98% of all media coverage in North America and Europe had a distinct bias against the Rhodesian government and forces

I have to confess that I was too young for media coverage at the time and it is far easier now to find the military viewpoint of the Rhodisian army then the one of the other side. Of course it a whole different affair for somebody who shed sweat and possibly blood for a cause lost, I appreciate that.

[Backwards Observer]

I'll watch.

Mike

Take it easy, Mike. No hard feelings.

[JMA]

I have to confess that I was too young for media coverage at the time and it is far easier now to find the military viewpoint of the Rhodisian army then the one of the other side. Of course it a whole different affair for somebody who shed sweat and possibly blood for a cause lost, I appreciate that.

Perhaps what I am suggesting is that it is possible to study military history (strategy/tactics/weapon employment/etc) without getting bogged down in the politics behind the war itself.

Some time back right here on SWC someone suggested that because the French had resorted to torture in Algeria there is little if anything to be learnt from that war. Nonsense of course, but such beliefs persist.

Just the other day I read something up in Liddel Hart's 'History of the First World War' and noted that of the 500 pages just 20 odd were dedicated to 'Origins of the War'. That IMHO is how it should be.

Now your primer on Rhodesia should be the 6,500 word chapter, 'Countering the Chimurenga' written by JRT Wood, in the book 'Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare' - Marston/Malkasian (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Counterinsurgency-Modern-Warfare-PB-Companion/dp/1849081646/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1327254518&sr=1-1) you can get a used copy for around $7 on Amazon.

Read it, digest it and move on and study the war.

[JMA]

JMM in Post 261 'A Rose By Any Other Name ...' referred to:

JMM,

The Rhodesians, later followed by the South Africans, used cross-border raids as a means of reducing the flow of guerillas into their territory - causing mass fatalities. Leadership attacks were unusual, IIRC attempts were made to kill Nkomo in Zambia, oddly I cannot recall a similar attack(s) on Mugabe & Co in Mozambique; the South Africans were more successful later with attacks on the ANC.

The cross-border tactic was controversial at the time within the Rhodesian military, IIRC Jakkie Cilliers wrote on this in his post-Independence book and others like Michael Evans. Partly as it avoided a serious strategic approach to what was vital inside Rhodesia; it is a long time since I read those sources.

The use made today by the USA, notably in Somalia, Yemen and NWFP, of the tactic cross border raids is very different - with selective targets, with far fewer fatalities. Yes the legal principles maybe the same, the method and effect are very different and so not similar.

David, I have a copy of:

Top Secret War: Rhodesian Special Operations
CHARLES D. MELSON
From:
Small Wars and Insurgencies
Vol. 16, No. 1, 57–82, March 2005

PM me if you don't have/want a copy. (220KB pdf)

[JMA]

I must admit to being gobsmacked (sarcasm)

de Boer states:


Another goal was to make soldiers aggressive fighters. This took place explicitly in exercises where recruits had to charge at sandbags with a bayonet while swearing.

Isn't this just too terrible ! (sarcasm)

Note: I have the training programme of the last recruit run in the RLI in late 1979. I note that in week two two periods are allocated for Bayonet Training (FN Rifle 9) followed by a further two periods in week three for Bayonet Fighting (FN Prac 5). Can't think what the Training Officer (Maj Peter Cooper) was thinking. Such barbarity... shame on him. Four whole periods out of 19 weeks on the bayonet. I ask you.

Then the killer:


Moreover, abusive instructors caused anger and resentment among the recruits, which they released on the enemy. Some suggest that these same techniques were used in American training during the Vietnam era.

Damn, ... the yanks too. (sarcasm)

I mean how can it be allowed that a recruit instructor (or gunny) be allowed to say 'hurtful' things to recruits? This all just too much to handle!

[JMA]

This is Beaver Shaw’s long awaited work! Beaver was a K-Car gunner in 7 and 8 Squadron’s of the Rhodesian Air Force. He is credited with having shot down a fixed wing aircraft, from his K-Car in 1979.
This book covers the author's and other crewmen's experiences in No 7 Alouette Squadron as helicopter Technicians/Gunners who flew numerous operational sorties in Alouette G and K Car gunships on Fire Force operations during the Rhodesian Bush War. The Alouette III helicopters were extensively used within Rhodesia as well as on external operations into Zambia, Botswana and Mocambique. Beaver served during latter stages of the war - 1976-1980, and has the unique distinction as being the only gunner during the bush war who is credited with a successful Air to Air contact, when he shot down a Botswana Defence Force Islander plane, using the K-Car's 20mm cannon. This occurred during a difficult extraction of Selous Scouts troops who had just attacked a ZIPRA base in Francistown.
We’ll be able to advice price and further details shortly, but to register interest and reserve a copy, email steve@30degreesouth.co.uk now! or in SA canic@mweb.co.za

This book has been self-published and so is not available through bookshop or Amazon type channels. This is a pity.

Choppertech is based upon the logbook entries of Beaver Shaw then a helicopter tech/gunner on both the Allouette and Augusta Bell choppers used in Rhodesia.

I rate this book as an invaluable contribution to the military record of the Rhodesian War. For serious students of that war it is a must read/must have and certainly a must have for any military library which has a section on Rhodesia.

Those (people and/or institutions) wanting to buy can PM for details.

[JMA]

Sources plowing through 1,000s of pages of 'released' Brit diplomatic correspondence are starting to come up with some gems.

Announcing Op Dingo:

http://farm8.staticflickr.com/7053/6931865227_f7192ef295_z.jpg

Mirage bombers? 'Heavy concentration of troops'?

[JMA]

More on Op Dingo...

http://farm8.staticflickr.com/7195/6931867237_af89bfd8cd_z.jpg

This one's a beauty...

Only left wing loonies swallowed this. It defies belief that Rhodesia would concentrate virtually every aircraft (plus an additional ten helicopters on short term loan from SA) to attack a civilian refugee camp.

Mugabe told diplomatics it was a gook supply camp (which it was, training gooks and then dispatching them into Rhodesia).

So the Brits thought it was 'the headquarters' (which it was - documentation recovered to prove it).

So UNHCR said it was not a 'civilian refugee camp' - now that is progress. Wonder why UNHCR in New York, the Brits, the yanks, the Canadians and assorted European countries went along with the lie?

As to who died. The gooks have now built a monument to their fallen on that day. 1,000 odd - the vast majority men... but that did not stop the idiot Brits at the time agreeing that the Rhodesians had concentrated all their combat aircraft (and more) plus their best troops to put in an attack on a bunch of civvies. (Can't make this $hit up)

Finally on the civil aircraft shot down (amazed that it was not blamed on Rhodesian forces) an addition from another document:


Further to the report on the Textafrica aircraft

The aircraft, shot down by FPLM anti-aircraft gunners on approach to land at Chimoio on 23 November 1977, was a Piper PA-31 Navajo, registration CR-ANS operated by Textafrica. All eight occupants were killed.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to a BSAP History Group email.

There is a website dedicated to Rhodesia's para-military Ministry of Internal Affairs (Intaf), at a quick glance it maybe useful to those immersed in this 'small war':http://www.freewebs.com/dudleywall/

Note the website is under development, so some headers go to blank pages.

[JMA]

Masters Thesis: Rhodesian African Rifles: the growth and adaptation of a multicultural regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980. (http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll2/id/2810/rec/3)

Major Michael P Stewart


The Rhodesian African Rifles overcame profoundly divisive racial and tribal differences among its members because a transcendent "regimental culture" superseded the disparate cultures of its individual soldiers and officers. The RAR's culture grew around the traditions of the British regimental system, after which the RAR was patterned. The soldiers of the RAR, regardless of racial or tribal background, identified themselves first as soldiers and members of the regiment, before their individual race and tribe. Regimental history and traditions, as well as shared hardships on deployments and training were mechanisms that forced officers and soldiers to see past differences. The RAR is remarkable because these bonds stayed true through to the end of the war, through incredible pressure on black Rhodesians to succumb to the black nationalist groups and cast off a government that was portrayed to them as oppressive, racist and hateful. Through the end of the Bush War, 1965-1980, RAR soldiers remained loyal and steadfast to their regiment, and that must be their legacy. In the end, the values of the government were irrelevant. It was the regiment that drew these men in, and their loyalty was more to their comrades and their heritage than to any particular government or cause.

[JMA]

Masters Thesis: Rhodesian African Rifles: the growth and adaptation of a multicultural regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980. (http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll2/id/2810/rec/3)

Major Michael P Stewart

Under 'Acknowledgements' the author states:


I am eternally grateful to the veterans of the Rhodesian Army and Rhodesian African Rifles, many of whom I had the privilege of meeting during the course of this study. These are remarkable men whose hospitality, openness and honesty were tremendous. I only hope this work is adequate representation of a worthy and noble regiment.

In reply and on behalf of my brother officers and men who the author sought out in the UK and in South Africa (where they now reside) in order to conduct the research necessary to do the subject justice a debt of gratitude is owed to this young professional officer in his search for the truth about our little war and through his objective presentation of the facts.

[JMA]

Masters Thesis: Rhodesian African Rifles: the growth and adaptation of a multicultural regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980. (http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll2/id/2810/rec/3)

Major Michael P Stewart

As an additional comment it is hoped that the Editor and editorial staff of the MR (Military Review) have taken note of this thesis and request the author to submit a summary for publication therein.

This may go someway to repair the damage caused to their collective professional reputations (not to mention the indefensible slight against those who served in the Rhodesian forces during the Bush War) especially if accompanied by an official apology for publishing that garbage thesis written by the Dutch kid.

[davidbfpo]

In 1985 I was in Zimbabwe on a holiday, conducting historical research and met a number of Rhodesian Army officers, one of them had been a career RAR officer and retired as a brigadier.

He related the story of the crisis in 1980 when former ZIPRA soldiers mutinied at a barracks near Bulawayo and other ZIPRA soldiers, with armour, in a remote camp tried to join their comrades. The RAR battalion, with white officers in command still, were the only reliable unit available and they violently ended the mutiny. The armour was ambushed by AML90 armoured cars and the British instructors for this new unit played their part too.

One African NCO who had played a key role in 1965, when some RAR soldiers loyalty was uncertain, was still serving as a senior NCO in 1985.

I look forward to reading JMA's discovery.

The crisis is usually referred to as the First Etumbane Uprising and has numerous hits on Google, although I only followed a few.

I did find this paperback published in Australia, by a white Rhodesian soldier 'A Hole in Our Lives', which has passages on the crisis:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Hole-In-Our-Lives-Forever/dp/1465300066/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1331985570&sr=1-1

There is a large tome on the history of the RAR, which IIRC has featured here before; although I've not read it.

[JMA]

In 1985 I was in Zimbabwe on a holiday, conducting historical research and met a number of Rhodesian Army officers, one of them had been a career RAR officer and retired as a brigadier.

He related the story of the crisis in 1980 when former ZIPRA soldiers mutinied at a barracks near Bulawayo and other ZIPRA soldiers, with armour, in a remote camp tried to join their comrades. The RAR battalion, with white officers in command still, were the only reliable unit available and they violently ended the mutiny. The armour was ambushed by AML90 armoured cars and the British instructors for this new unit played their part too.

One African NCO who had played a key role in 1965, when some RAR soldiers loyalty was uncertain, was still serving as a senior NCO in 1985.

I look forward to reading JMA's discovery.

The crisis is usually referred to as the First Etumbane Uprising and has numerous hits on Google, although I only followed a few.

I did find this paperback published in Australia, by a white Rhodesian soldier 'A Hole in Our Lives', which has passages on the crisis:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Hole-In-Our-Lives-Forever/dp/1465300066/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1331985570&sr=1-1

There is a large tome on the history of the RAR, which IIRC has featured here before; although I've not read it.

Entumbane II was the sweetheart of the two where the RAR killed so many from the two factions (ZANLA & ZIPRA) that brigade had to arrange for refrigerated railway trucks to be shunted into the nearby rail siding to accommodate the bodies of the gooks the RAR had piled up. The Bn CO believes that 1RAR (1st Bn) killed more gooks during Entumbane II than during the whole of the earlier war.(He lives around the corner from me and we meet often)

Interesting was how an armoured car troop (4-car) armed with South African Eland-90s did the business with whatever ZIPRA could offer T-34s and assorted BTRs - they were commanded by an Aussie Sgt 'Skippy' Devine (ex-RLI) who was turning the ZIPRA sardines packed into the BTRs into 'crispy critters' faster than the BTRs could come down the highway.

The book is Masodja being the chiShona word for 'soldier' as opposed to insurgent/guerrilla/gook/or what have you. (Amazon.com (http://www.amazon.com/Masodja-Rhodesian-Forerunner-Rhodesia-Regiment/dp/1920143033) or Amazon.co.u (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Masodja-Rhodesian-Forerunner-Rhodesia-Regiment/dp/1920143033)k )

The 'A Hole in Our Lives' book relates to conscript (National Service) intake 147 and their experiences during the war.

[JMA]

Dingo Firestorm
The Greatest Battle of the Rhodesian Bush War
By Ian Pringle


This book tells the story of the biggest conflict of the Rhodesian Bush War, fought in neighboring Mozambique. Code-named Operation Dingo, the battle was a huge gamble. It took place when Rhodesia was running out of money, ammunition and friends. Prime Minister Ian Smith authorized a risky two-pronged attack on ZANLA bases in Mozambique to buy time and weaken Robert Mugabe’s negotiating position. He committed virtually the entire Rhodesian Air Force to support 184 paratroops and helicopter troops in a surprise attack on an enemy force of thousands. The attack was planned to coincide with a meeting of Mugabe and his War Council at their Chimoio HQ.

Pringle describes the political and military backdrop leading up to the raid, and he tells the story of the battle through the eyes of key personalities who planned, led and participated in it. Using his own experience as a jet and helicopter pilot, he recreates the battle in detail, explaining the performance of men and machines in the unfolding drama of events.

The author obtained exclusive interviews with three top Rhodesian commanders weeks before their (coincidental) deaths in 2010, including valuable insights by Lieutenant General Peter Walls, the supreme Rhodesian commander. Dingo Firestorm is a fresh, gripping recreation of a key battle in southern African military history.

http://www.internationalpubmarket.com/images/covers/1770224289_cf150.jpg

Pre-order here (http://www.internationalpubmarket.com/Books/BookDetail.aspx?productID=305860)

[Fuchs]

I recently had an e-mail exchange with someone and the topic extended to some Rhodesian and South African stuff.

Let me state one possible view:

Both Rhodesians and South Africans proved highly technically proficient with their indigenous production of AT mine-proofed vehicles (famous V-hull, stretched Land Rovers etc).

Both countries, but more so South Africa, demonstrated how to rip marginal quality troops a new one in bush mobile warfare.

Rhodesian exiles are especially proud about their heliborne QRF including light infantry.


Now what Rhodesian exiles do NOT mention often at all is their countries' border AP mine belt that did very likely contribute a lot to the explosives that made up the anti-colonialist freedom fighter's road mining campaign. Instead, there's almost exclusively talk about regular Soviet-origin AT mines.

Yes, I wrote anti-colonialist freedom fighters, for the regime defended by Rhodesians and South Africans was one of extreme exploitation of the human rights-deprived black huge majority. I don't care what kind of outside assistance they got. It's a shame on us Westerners that the Soviets had to step in to help the oppressed. We should have fixed that mess. Rhodesia and South Africa effectively were huge slave camps with Whites running the them as self-enriching wardens. Both countries had fully deserved a declaration of war and invasion by the Western world, but the threat would probably have sufficed.
I know the freedom fighters were also called terrorists, but that's a largely pointless term during times of guerilla war. During war, the party with inferior practical repertoire makes use of what it got, even if this means to simply lay mines and burn down some houses of civilians. Heck, even the Allies did it on a scale never seen before or after - despite material and numerical superiority.

No matter what RLI or other units did militarily; for today it's entirely useless because

(1) they fought against marginal quality opposition.
It's like Italians mopping up Abbessinians, then getting bagged by numerically inferior Commonwealth forces on first contact who then in turn got torn a new one once a few Germans had arrived on the scene. Who thinks we should learn from the Italians '37???
Seriously, who thinks the RLI/fire force would have been of ANY use in face of a motorised East German rifle battalion guarded by two Shilkas??

(2) there's absolutely no use for the skills of how to oppress a majority of the indigenous population or how to keep all neighbouring countries in a state of permanent chaos and extreme economic peril. In fact, anyone who strives for such knowledge should be highly suspect to us*.



It's a shame that I felt it was appropriate in this place to change this line from "is highly suspect".

[JMA]

I recently had an e-mail exchange with someone and the topic extended to some Rhodesian and South African stuff.

Let me state one possible view:

Both Rhodesians and South Africans proved highly technically proficient with their indigenous production of AT mine-proofed vehicles (famous V-hull, stretched Land Rovers etc).

Now what Rhodesian exiles do NOT mention often at all is their countries' border AP mine belt that did very likely contribute a lot to the explosives that made up the anti-colonialist freedom fighter's road mining campaign. Instead, there's almost exclusively talk about regular Soviet-origin AT mines.

Not worth mentioning because the amount of explosives lifted from the ‘cordon sanitaire’ (border minefield) was miniscule.

Where do you get this nonsense from? Is it mere supposition?

It is not just me and my personal recollections but I phoned two Engineer officers who worked on the ‘cordon sanitaire’ to confirm my memories... so you can take it to the bank.

But please tell me how the anti-personnel mines would have been disarmed so they could be carried/transported to the roads that they wanted to mine?

[JMA]

Yes, I wrote anti-colonialist freedom fighters, for the regime defended by Rhodesians and South Africans was one of extreme exploitation of the human rights-deprived black huge majority. I don't care what kind of outside assistance they got. It's a shame on us Westerners that the Soviets had to step in to help the oppressed. We should have fixed that mess. Rhodesia and South Africa effectively were huge slave camps with Whites running the them as self-enriching wardens. Both countries had fully deserved a declaration of war and invasion by the Western world, but the threat would probably have sufficed.

I know the freedom fighters were also called terrorists, but that's a largely pointless term during times of guerilla war. During war, the party with inferior practical repertoire makes use of what it got, even if this means to simply lay mines and burn down some houses of civilians. Heck, even the Allies did it on a scale never seen before or after - despite material and numerical superiority.


I'm sorry that the Rhodesian war experience is so painful for one with a German origin. I appreciate that the military skills of the German forces in WW2 are under valued and under acknowledged because of the Nazi connotations. I believe and have been on record here that despite the scale of human rights abuses perpetrated as both national policy and as carried out in the field being both shocking and horrific there is a lot to learn from the German methods of warfighting etc.

I wonder why you single out little Rhodesia and slightly bigger South Africa for this belated attention and the belief that an armed invasion by the West was justified when dealing with real or imagined human rights abuses even in today's 'enlightened' world never happens even if there is some wringing of hands. Some time ago I posted a recent scale of freedom levels worldwide and failed to detect any demand from you for the West to invade any country in order to set "the people free". So the deduction is simple you have a reason to focus only on the two countries you mentioned while ignoring every other where real or alleged abuse has or is taking place.

Maybe the problem lies within you given your background?

There is a definition of terrorism... go look it up. That the cause may in your opinion justify the means does not make the method anything other than terrorism.

[Fuchs]

Where do you get this nonsense from? Is it mere supposition?

No hard sources on this one.


I'm sorry that the Rhodesian war experience is so painful for one with a German origin. I appreciate that the military skills of the German forces in WW2 are under valued and under acknowledged because of the Nazi connotations.

The nature of warfare of WW2 was mostly of inter-state nature, encompassed almost all forms of warfare and all great powers of the period were far from having a white vest.

I don't think that German or generally WW2 experiences in terror bombing or in occupation warfare are of real value to us today. The only theoretical interest that I have in German WW2 occupation warfare or generally German warfare against opposition of clearly inferior nature co0ncerns the origin of Jagdkampf, which lays at least concerning the word itself in anti-guerilla patrols.


I wonder why you single out little Rhodesia and slightly bigger South Africa for this belated attention and the belief that an armed invasion by the West was justified when dealing with real or imagined human rights abuses ...

Because this is practically a South Africa and Rhodesia bush war appreciation and idol thread by now.
We could discuss North Korea in a North Korea thread.



Some time ago I posted a recent scale of freedom levels worldwide and failed to detect any demand from you for the West to invade any country in order to set "the people free".

Save for North Korea and some poorly definable issues at the Sahel zone there's no oppression that comes close to the one of a Spartan model with a tiny caste of oppressors, a class of semi-free and a vast majority caste of unfree labourers anywhere in the world.
Apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia did fit such a description, though. They were practically what the Nazis wanted East Europe to turn into: Nazi states that persisted until long after WW2.


There is a definition of terrorism... go look it up. That the cause may in your opinion justify the means does not make the method anything other than terrorism.

There are thousands of definitions of terrorism, it is one of the most ill-defined words in the world and commonly mis-used to portray armed opposition other than on the battlefield as despicable.


It's pointless to point fingers at terrorist tactics after leaving little else to the enemy as practically available repertoire and then label the entire violent opposition as terrorists. The South Africans and Rhodesians regularly designated their opponents as terrorists and communists in an attempt to mobilize domestic and foreign support, but the most telling nature of those enemies was that they were fighting against most of the people being enslaved by their own government.

One side's freedom fighters are the other side's terrorists, and in my opinion the side that has the moral high ground deserves to win the narrative. Those who fought against de facto slavery had overall the moral high ground, while the government forces of Rhodesia and South Africa ranged morally on Waffen-SS level, driven by an ideology and racism that was a perfect equal.

________________

Your reply exposes that you're under the wrong impression that I would somehow associate specially with WW2-era Germany or have somehow a psychological problem with German history.
I suppose that's not the case. Whatever focus on German military history I have is a result of my easy access to German language sources and the major German involvement in both World Wars. Indeed, I don't think there's any good reason for a special attachment to one's own country's military history. My studies include hundreds to thousands of years of warfare from five continents. There are lessons to be drawn from everywhere and all time periods.
The lessons from Rhodesia on the other hand appear to be supremely useless for any reasonable military endeavour.

[davidbfpo]

Fuchs,

This is a long running thread and IIRC the political aspects have appeared before. I have not gone back to see what posts said though.

Yes Rhodesia was a white minority regime for nearly all it's history, first as a self-governing colony, in 1965 it declared itself independent (UDI), then declaring itself a republic, agreed to an 'Internal Settlement' with power-sharing, before The Lancaster House Agreement - from which Zimbabwe emerged.

Rhodesia's mistake was to refuse to consider any realistic settlement before the 'men of violence', the external nationalists, started their war. Ian Smith argued with some of his advisers "Why talk, when we are so strong?"; an approach that was to be seen in South Africa, before political change.

I am not sure if an internal, realistic settlement was possible.

By time the 'Internal Settlement' was agreed the war - fought overwhelmingly in the rural areas, with a huge African population and very few whites - had entrenched both sides. Between both sides were the rural Africans terrorised by the 'men of violence'. I recall vividly white Rhodesians who I meet in 1985 saying any African loyalty depended on a rural African calculus over who had the power over their future, it was that calculus that changed.

Nor should the steady increase in emigration of the Rhodesian white population be overlooked as the war intensified.

The cross-border operations some contend failed to address the internal political situation and the 'Fire Force' approach gained time by killing some of the incoming flood of guerillas. Plus unlucky civilians.

Finally after 1980 two academics wrote on the failure of the Rhodesia's war-fighting strategy, Jackie Cilliers and Michael Evans - they are both worth reading. I am not aware of any updates in the last thirty years, as Fuchs has noted much of the commentary on SWC reviews the military tactics used.

[Fuchs]

David, Rhodesia doesn't really bother me.
You probably noticed already that I step in from time to time when things here get too politically uncritical, too tolerant of what should not be tolerated in civilised countries.

The conversion of a thread into a RLI appreciation thread with photos of badges, lots of sentimentality about good old times etc was as bothering to me as would have been a SS fanboi theme or a scalp-hunting theme in a SWC thread.

Accordingly, I'm not too happy about seeing my reply moved from the intended location. It could just as well be deleted in this one.

[JMA]

No hard sources on this one.

Yet you state it as if it was a major oversight that the Rhodesians would prefer remains untold? That does not reflect well upon you.


The nature of warfare of WW2 was mostly of inter-state nature, encompassed almost all forms of warfare and all great powers of the period were far from having a white vest.

Not quite. (I am wondering whether is a deliberate attempt to hide the horrible truth) The record shows that the Nazis deliberately targeted religions (Jews) and ethnicities (Slavs).


I don't think that German or generally WW2 experiences in terror bombing or in occupation warfare are of real value to us today. The only theoretical interest that I have in German WW2 occupation warfare or generally German warfare against opposition of clearly inferior nature co0ncerns the origin of Jagdkampf, which lays at least concerning the word itself in anti-guerilla patrols.

Ok, what you believe is of historical value or not is certainly not the definitive opinion but merely your personal opinion. There are lessons to be learned - both positive and negative - from just about all wars and all armies/forces which would have some value today.


Because this is practically a South Africa and Rhodesia bush war appreciation and idol thread by now.

Not sure why that would worry or concern you if it were true. As with other wars/insurgencies there are both positives and negatives that come out of the Rhodesian bush war.

Who is forcing you to read that thread? Or are you deciding what people should be allowed to read or not?

(There is nothing in this thread about the South African border war or Angola other than a photo of a American who served in both Rhodesia and SWA/Angola... so do try to be more accurate.)


We could discuss North Korea in a North Korea thread.

There is a thread on North Korea... nothing stopping you from posting there.


Save for North Korea and some poorly definable issues at the Sahel zone there's no oppression that comes close to the one of a Spartan model with a tiny caste of oppressors, a class of semi-free and a vast majority caste of unfree labourers anywhere in the world.

Nonsense. Go do your research. You are viewing the world with one eye closed.


Apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia did fit such a description, though. They were practically what the Nazis wanted East Europe to turn into: Nazi states that persisted until long after WW2.

That is merely a statement without substantiation. An intelligent commentator would never group Rhodesia together with South Africa on that basis.

Go on try to exercise your intellect a little... try to draft a list of countries where a minority exercised hegemony over a subjugated majority (say since WW2). When you get to five you can stop... and I don't expect you to be man enough to print an apology in the public domain.


There are thousands of definitions of terrorism, it is one of the most ill-defined words in the world and commonly mis-used to portray armed opposition other than on the battlefield as despicable.

Caught out again so you duck and dive about definitions.

Keep it simple... use this one: "The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organized group against people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or governments, often for ideological or political reasons"

Whatever the cause may be - noble or otherwise - if such methods are used then it is terrorism... simple as that.

Now here's a thing... I didn't meet one democrat or human rights activist among the ZANU/ZAPU military or political wings during the war... nor have any been evident in the post 1980 Zimbabwe. Now how come you supposed smart guys missed that?


It's pointless to point fingers at terrorist tactics after leaving little else to the enemy as practically available repertoire and then label the entire violent opposition as terrorists.

Terrorism is terrorism... and your political or ideological support of those using terrorism changes nothing. As I said... show me the democrats and human rights activists who were fighting to liberate the subjugated masses... surely after 30 years of liberation you would be able to identify at least one Zimbabwean? The leftists in Europe and North America were little more than useful idiots to be exploited at the time. That - 30 years on - there are still people who believe that Rhodesia fought a war of liberation defies belief.


The South Africans and Rhodesians regularly designated their opponents as terrorists and communists in an attempt to mobilize domestic and foreign support, but the most telling nature of those enemies was that they were fighting against most of the people being enslaved by their own government.

Again it is not intelligent to group South Africa with Rhodesia together nor to believe that the struggles in those countries were to liberate the masses. Events in post 1980 Zimbabwe prove that it was merely a transfer of power to another minority... and as you will have noticed in South Africa it is much the same (time will no doubt prove it true as well). So you and the liberals in the West don't come out of this very well intellectually do you?


One side's freedom fighters are the other side's terrorists, and in my opinion the side that has the moral high ground deserves to win the narrative. Those who fought against de facto slavery had overall the moral high ground, while the government forces of Rhodesia and South Africa ranged morally on Waffen-SS level, driven by an ideology and racism that was a perfect equal.

Use of the word slavery is a lunatic assertion and brings your grasp of the circumstances (and your intelligence it must be said) into question.

Your recall of history is selective.

Your Waffen-SS analogy is childishly provocative. The vast majority of Rhodesians and subsequent post war immigrants fought against Nazi Germany in WW2. Nothing you say will change that nor redefine the reality of the Rhodesian history.

By all means start your own thread to discuss South Africa... this thread is about Rhodesia.


Your reply exposes that you're under the wrong impression that I would somehow associate specially with WW2-era Germany or have somehow a psychological problem with German history.
I suppose that's not the case. Whatever focus on German military history I have is a result of my easy access to German language sources and the major German involvement in both World Wars. Indeed, I don't think there's any good reason for a special attachment to one's own country's military history. My studies include hundreds to thousands of years of warfare from five continents. There are lessons to be drawn from everywhere and all time periods.
The lessons from Rhodesia on the other hand appear to be supremely useless for any reasonable military endeavour.

It is standard among Germans that there remains a raw nerve about their past politically, racially and militarily. Hence the almost guaranteed response - such as yours - where it is felt a politically correct - bending over backwards response is needed on any or all of these three factors.

This raw emotion is evident in your response... and for that I pity you.

[JMA]

No matter what RLI or other units did militarily; for today it's entirely useless because

(1) they fought against marginal quality opposition.
It's like Italians mopping up Abbessinians, then getting bagged by numerically inferior Commonwealth forces on first contact who then in turn got torn a new one once a few Germans had arrived on the scene. Who thinks we should learn from the Italians '37???
Seriously, who thinks the RLI/fire force would have been of ANY use in face of a motorised East German rifle battalion guarded by two Shilkas??

The old style German arrogance is coming out again.

In war first you need to know your enemy. Not sure that after 70 years you can still lay claim with any certainty of how the German military of today would perform. But by all means dream on.

Whether you like it or not the Rhodesians knew their enemy and demonstrated it through a number of audacious surprise attacks against targets which resulted in almost unbelievable results at very low KIA/WIA cost.

Yes the enemy was low quality but the Rhodesians knew how and with what force levels to take the war to the enemy.

As to the Fire Force it remains a classic example of find, fix and finish.

Doing this with the basic building block of 4-man sticks placed interesting demands on command, leadership and structural issues not faced by most other militaries.

And to your ridiculous comment about the much vaunted but untested East Germans with Shilkas. If they had been the enemy a different method and means would have had to be developed. Simple.

However, I do understand your confusion with war in general and minor tactics specifically and that rises from your lack of combat experience. If you had such experience you would understand that the spiritual and mental attributes such as tenacity, morale, team work, dedication and the will to fight and training standard are far more important than numbers or equipment.

As Napoleon said: "Morale makes up three-quarters of the game; the relative balance of manpower accounts for only the remaining quarter."

How would you understand this if you have not been there? This is why I suggest that you need to be careful of making uneducated comments about circumstances you have no basis for understanding.

[Fuchs]

Come on, your view on Rhodesia is excessively uncritical. I did not expect any other view and that's why I jumped in in the first place.

My remarks about the analogies stand and I do not feel that your attempts at refuting them have any weight. Rhodesia fought against Nazis? So what? So did the Stalin. This doesn't exclude the possibility of having a horrible regime.

Hitler's plan for East Europe was one with Germans settling there as the exploiting, warlike masters with the exploited Slavs working in the agricultural sector and mines.
The Spartan model was similar, with an intermediate caste.

Rhodesia may not have had such a strong intermediate caste ("coloured people", Asians) as did South Africa, but the Blacks could easily be understood as Slaves to the state, to be employed at far below fair wage by the Whites and they clearly didn't get the same quality or quantity of services from the state.



Maybe you should do some research yourself, since your idea of what Rhodesia was like is obviously tainted by being a White and by having developed a lot of sentimentality.

http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0001/000161/016163eo.pdf

Now guess what level of discrimination was Hitler planning for the separation of Slavs and Germans.

He would basically have copied this link.
Well, maybe he would have preferred less involvement of Germans in agriculture, for he really, really disliked rural environments and agriculture personally.

So yes, since "Nazis" is nowadays a rather wide description that does not necessitate them being Germans, I can easily and correctly describe the Rhodesia as a historical Nazi state. You were effectively fighting for a Nazi regime.
The excuse that said regime did fight against original Nazis a generation earlier does help ####, for the same did not keep Stalin from being among mankind's top three mass murderers and leading one of mankind's worst-ever regimes either.



Last but not least; the idea that Rhodesians could have coped well with quality opposition is almost entirely without base. They sucked in WW2.
The ability to mop up marginal quality opposition does not mean anything about one's ability to cope with quality opposition, and little to nothing is to be learned from the former for the latter. That's what my Abbessinians-Italians-British-Germans story was meant to show.

P.S.: The East German military was in many regards better (more serious and disciplined) than the West German one.

[JMA]

Come on, your view on Rhodesia is excessively uncritical. I did not expect any other view and that's why I jumped in in the first place.

My remarks about the analogies stand and I do not feel that your attempts at refuting them have any weight. Rhodesia fought against Nazis? So what? So did the Stalin. This doesn't exclude the possibility of having a horrible regime.

Hitler's plan for East Europe was one with Germans settling there as the exploiting, warlike masters with the exploited Slavs working in the agricultural sector and mines.
The Spartan model was similar, with an intermediate caste.

Rhodesia may not have had such a strong intermediate caste ("coloured people", Asians) as did South Africa, but the Blacks could easily be understood as Slaves to the state, to be employed at far below fair wage by the Whites and they clearly didn't get the same quality or quantity of services from the state.

Maybe you should do some research yourself, since your idea of what Rhodesia was like is obviously tainted by being a White and by having developed a lot of sentimentality.

http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0001/000161/016163eo.pdf

Now guess what level of discrimination was Hitler planning for the separation of Slavs and Germans.

He would basically have copied this link.
Well, maybe he would have preferred less involvement of Germans in agriculture, for he really, really disliked rural environments and agriculture personally.

So yes, since "Nazis" is nowadays a rather wide description that does not necessitate them being Germans, I can easily and correctly describe the Rhodesia as a historical Nazi state. You were effectively fighting for a Nazi regime.
The excuse that said regime did fight against original Nazis a generation earlier does help ####, for the same did not keep Stalin from being among mankind's top three mass murderers and leading one of mankind's worst-ever regimes either.

Last but not least; the idea that Rhodesians could have coped well with quality opposition is almost entirely without base. They sucked in WW2.
The ability to mop up marginal quality opposition does not mean anything about one's ability to cope with quality opposition, and little to nothing is to be learned from the former for the latter. That's what my Abbessinians-Italians-British-Germans story was meant to show.

P.S.: The East German military was in many regards better (more serious and disciplined) than the West German one.

I understand your German preoccupation with race... there seems to be little Germans can do about it.

None better evidenced than the continued innuendo of superior qualities of German soldiers. This is clearly not supported by the facts of history. What is supported by history is that the German military has been better organised and structured and in many cases better led than most other nations but the man for man comparison of the fighting men with the racially superior outcome for Germans is not only nonsense but the dangerous perpetuation of the myth of German racial superiority.

There is no shortcoming in the individual fighting ability or the levels of courage and bravery of the British or American soldiers just (as at last count 70 years ago) the individual German soldier acquitted himself well. You cling to some fantasy of the East German military as you know that both the Brits and Americans know from the Cold War experience that the (West) German army was a pathetic shadow of its former stature. Hence the need to place the East Germans on a pedestal. Doesn't work.

I would offer another more balanced source for a history of the Rhodesian war from the following book:

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare - Daniel Marston & Carter Malkasian (http://www.amazon.com/Counterinsurgency-Modern-Warfare-PB-Companion/dp/1849081646/ref=sr_1_7?ie=UTF8&qid=1345378688&sr=8-7&keywords=counterinsurgency)

... with the applicable chapter being:

COUNTERING THE CHIMURENGA: The Rhodesian Counterinsurgency Campaign 1962–80

It remains laughable that where the settlers and colonizers were of European origin their conquer and domination is somehow worse than the inter tribal wars/massacres/genocides that preceded the arrival of settlers in any given country.

In the case of the area called Rhodesia the Matebele (Ndebele) arrived a mere 60years before the Europeans and were in the process dealing with the Shona people through a continuing series of raids against them. European and North-American - so-called human rights activists, academics and assorted other useful idiots - completely ignore the obvious hypocrisy of their racially biased position.

Such politics are complicated and one appreciates that some will seek a simple explanation to a complex situation - like Rhodesians Bad, 'Nationalists' Good.

Simple people seek simple answers.

I still wait for someone to draw a comparison between the fate of the Africans (blacks) under European domination in Rhodesia and the fate of Tibetans under Chinese domination in Tibet.

Then the question you will not and can not answer... which is to provide proof that the people you placed on a pedestal - on the supposed moral high ground - the so-called 'Nationalists' were indeed the human rights activists and democrats they presented themselves as and not the thugs/mass murderers/thieves they to a man turned out to be once they were given the country.

Yes I know the admission of having been used as a 'useful idiot' by thugs and killers masquerading as human rights activists and democrats would be too painful. More black Zimbabweans have been killed after the bush war by the regime than were killed during the war. To Rhodesians this outcome was obvious... to the useful idiots this was met with (embarrassed) silence (and lamely blamed on the legacy of colonialism).

I am amazed that 32 years after the current regime was handed the country on a plate there are still those - you included - that believe the bush war was fought to suppress African people as opposed to an attempt to secure an orderly and controlled transition to majority rule.

[Fuchs]

I understand your German preoccupation with race... there seems to be little Germans can do about it.

None better evidenced than the continued innuendo of superior qualities of German soldiers.

Serious question: What do you smoke?
(Yes moderator, I am honestly interested in what he smokes. Gotta be something exotic.)


I am amazed that 32 years after the current regime was handed the country on a plate there are still those - you included - that believe the bush war was fought to suppress African people as opposed to an attempt to secure an orderly and controlled transition to majority rule.

I am always amazed anew at the naivet and gullibility of people in face of blatant propaganda.

[JMA]

The Bleed (http://www.amazon.com/The-Bleed-ebook/dp/B008IJ5JF6/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1345404677&sr=8-1&keywords=THe+Bleed)

John R Cronin has published a book on Kindle about his service in the USMC and Rhodesia. I served with John in the RLI and enjoyed his coverage of his service in the RLI and the Selous Scouts immensely. At $5.15 it is certainly a must read for those with an interest in the Rhodesian bush war.

http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/41nhcs0qg-L._BO2,204,203,200_PIsitb-sticker-arrow-click,TopRight,35,-76_AA278_PIkin4,BottomRight,-48,22_AA300_SH20_OU01_.jpg

"These memoirs are a 35-year window into the life of someone who walked silently on patrol with Marine Recon in the jungles of Vietnam, jumped into action with the Rhodesian Light Infantry's Fire Force, infiltrated guerrilla groups on counterinsurgency operations with the Selous Scouts, navigated the teeming streets of Cairo, was kidnapped by Hizbollah in Beirut, and then left this life behind for a completely different, though no less highly competitive atmosphere of a doctoral program at the University of London.

It's not just a war story - though there are stories of two wars embedded in this narrative - but rather it's an account of what it was like as an American, as a total stranger, living across several continents and what people had to endure just to make it from one day to the next. It's a story of survival."

.

[JMA]

The Bleed (http://www.amazon.com/The-Bleed-ebook/dp/B008IJ5JF6/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1345404677&sr=8-1&keywords=THe+Bleed)

John R Cronin has published a book on Kindle about his service in the USMC and Rhodesia. I served with John in the RLI and enjoyed his coverage of his service in the RLI and the Selous Scouts immensely. At $5.15 it is certainly a must read for those with an interest in the Rhodesian bush war.

http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/41nhcs0qg-L._BO2,204,203,200_PIsitb-sticker-arrow-click,TopRight,35,-76_AA278_PIkin4,BottomRight,-48,22_AA300_SH20_OU01_.jpg

"These memoirs are a 35-year window into the life of someone who walked silently on patrol with Marine Recon in the jungles of Vietnam, jumped into action with the Rhodesian Light Infantry's Fire Force, infiltrated guerrilla groups on counterinsurgency operations with the Selous Scouts, navigated the teeming streets of Cairo, was kidnapped by Hizbollah in Beirut, and then left this life behind for a completely different, though no less highly competitive atmosphere of a doctoral program at the University of London.

It's not just a war story - though there are stories of two wars embedded in this narrative - but rather it's an account of what it was like as an American, as a total stranger, living across several continents and what people had to endure just to make it from one day to the next. It's a story of survival."

.

Extract from the ebook:


... Enter moi in the middle of August of 1976. I reported in to the RLI the same day 3 Commando, my assigned unit, had returned from its 10 day R&R in preparation to be deployed the following day. I walked over from the BOQ across the parade deck to meet the rest of the officers and senior NCOs as they arrived to pre-pack up some equipment and I could see them studying me as I made my way to the offices.

It was the same look I had received the day I walking into Third Force Recon that day and I could feel the eyes on my back as I went down the corridor. Everyone had heard that a new officer was due in, and a Yank officer at that, and they were keen to see what kind of impression the new face would leave with them. They all had a ton of combat experience behind them, and as I grew to know them and the men of the other commands, I would be struck by how closely they resembled in temperament and bearing the Marines I had just left. Funny. profane. tough, violent, tactically and strategically savvy, innovative and not afraid to take some of the most awful risks you can imagine, they were solid in the bush and could be relied on to take care of one another out there without one doubt of hesitation, which is what made them so aggressive and ideally suited for Fire Force.

...

[JMA]

Who Dares Loses?
Assessing Rhodesia’s Counter-Insurgency Experience
Greg Mills & Grahame Wilson (http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/files/Who-Dares-Loses.pdf)


Pound for pound, the Rhodesian security forces may have been the most effective fighting force of the last century. Numbering at their peak 15,000 troops, pitted against an opposition likely at least three times as strong within and without the country by the war’s end, and employing increasingly aggressive tactics taking them into the neighbouring countries, they were able to keep in check their numerically superior guerrilla opponents, despite having to operate across a country larger than Germany, and over terrain practically impassable in many locations. But still, the war was lost with the advent to power of Robert Mugabe’s regime in 1980 – or was it? This article revisits the Rhodesian strategy, assesses what mistakes were made and the conduct of the war, and identifies lessons for contemporary counter-insurgency campaigns.

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

Good catch the RUSI Journal 2007 article, via your link and the final paragraph says it all:
Rarely do insurgents, in Rhodesia as elsewhere, lose the political aspect of their struggle in spite of their performance in the field, the latter often a function of superior equipment, training, technology, mobility and operational coherence of those countering the insurgency. Thus the
Rhodesian experience should teach us, above all else, that what is required to counter insurgency are superior political tactics and strategy, from the local to the global level

[JMA]

Officially known as the Transitional Shoot was an essential part of the ongoing shooting training for trained soldiers.


RHODESIAN TRANSITIONAL SHOOT
(aka Drake Shoot)

INTRODUCTION

1. During most contacts a low rate of kills is being achieved to the number of rounds fired. For example after one engagement it was reported that a platoon fired approximately eleven hundred rounds and achieved no kills or hits despite the fact that the contact took place at a range of less than thirty yards. Examination of the contact area later revealed that the majority of shots fired by the security forces were high, this was borne out by the amount of damage to trees in the vicinity. Most rounds had struck foliage three to four feet above ground level.

2. From those observations it would appear that whilst it is possible to train a soldier to a high standard of shooting on the range it does not necessarily follow that he is automatically able to apply the lessons learnt when he comes under fire in battle.

This lack of application can be put down to two basic reasons:

a. A failure to relate his weapon training lessons to fieldcraft.

b. A natural nervousness due to stresses created by battle conditions.

AIM

3. The aim of this range practice is to teach soldiers to relate field craft and ground appreciation to good shooting under realistic conditions.

METHOD

4. The basic faults to overcome are:

a. A tendency to fire high. This is a result of firing range practice at comparatively large figure targets mounted approximately six feet above ground level. The terrorist will usually be at ground level and will present a target no higher than twelve inches.

b. Failure to fire at potential enemy cover. Soldiers nust appreciate the ground, and fire at likely enemy positions, WHETHER THEY CAN SEE MEN THERE OR NOT. Logs, bushes, tree trunks and folds in the ground all provide likely cover, the high velocity 7,62mm round will penetrate most natural cover at close range!

c. Tendency to concentrate fire on the most likely position. If a terrorist is visible or isolated cover suggests more likely position, there is a tendency for all to fire in one direction. This results in the arc to the front not being fully covered and although one terrorist may be well and truly dealt with, several others in less obvious fire positions will remain unscathed and potentially dangerous.

5. To summarise, a soldier must be taught and practised to:

a. Fire low, no higher than 9 - 12 inches above the estimated ground level.

b. Select and fire at likely enemy fire positions remembering to relate his field craft to his shooting.

c. Fire at the enemy within his own particular arc to his front and not to be drawn to fire at obvious targets already covered by others within his fire unit.

RESULT

6. This dootrine has been tried and proven. A platoon trained on the lines described above engaged terrorists in three separate contacts in one day, resulting in:

a. Four terrorists killed.

b. Two seriously wounded (one suffered 10 hits).

c. Five captured.

d. A total ammunition expenditure during the whole day of 250 rounds and one grenade.

PRACTICES

7. The following practices are best fired on field firing ranges or in jungle lane areas but can be adapted to classification or transitional ranges by the provision of artificial cover.

8. This shoot should be fired by all soldiers at the completion of recruit training and Practice 3, with variations, by trained soldiers at every available opportunity.

http://farm8.staticflickr.com/7139/7839334066_1982f8a618_b.jpg

http://farm9.staticflickr.com/8447/7839334742_7d6de788e2_b.jpg

[Fuchs]

7,62mm round will penetrate most natural cover at close range!

Not sure about British English, but that's not possible in American English (or only DOD speak).
The supposed "cover" would in American English only qualify as "concealment".

It's noteworthy that Germans don't properly differentiate between the two either. "Deckung" and "Sichtschutz" are different things tactically, and this should be better appraised. We talk too often about "Deckung" instead.


http://www.scribd.com/doc/2472256/Army-fm20-3-Camouflage-Concealment-and-Decoys
(I would have sworn that the "D" in "CCD" was about "deception" (http://www.all-acronyms.com/cat/2/CCD/Camouflage,_Concealment_and_Deception/117022), maybe in an earlier FM version?)

[JMA]

Not sure about British English, but that's not possible in American English (or only DOD speak).
The supposed "cover" would in American English only qualify as "concealment".

It's noteworthy that Germans don't properly differentiate between the two either. "Deckung" and "Sichtschutz" are different things tactically, and this should be better appraised. We talk too often about "Deckung" instead.


http://www.scribd.com/doc/2472256/Army-fm20-3-Camouflage-Concealment-and-Decoys
(I would have sworn that the "D" in "CCD" was about "deception" (http://www.all-acronyms.com/cat/2/CCD/Camouflage,_Concealment_and_Deception/117022), maybe in an earlier FM version?)

Yes obviously then the British use of the word covers a wider definition.

"Cover" in general terms is in relation to observation and enemy fire.

In the instance of a contact it would follow that if you seek cover from enemy fire you will not be able to take part in the fire fight or play only a limited part in it.

(As an aside here the fieldcraft lesson "Selecting lines of advance" would, if the lesson was adhered to, make sure that a stick/fire team/squad/section were not totally caught out in the open or in a disadvantageous tactical position. Accepting that operations in jungle and thick bush limit your options for tactical movement somewhat.)

The training in response to receiving the order "Take Cover" is to "Dash, down, crawl, observe, sights, fire." Remembering to change your firing position often.

So unless your intention is to "hide", cover would generally relate to cover from enemy observation. Folds in the ground may afford partial cover from enemy fire but your head, arms and weapon would need to exposed... preferably behind something providing cover from direct enemy observation.

The aim of the Transitional (Drake) Shoot is to improve the effectiveness of selecting and firing into likely cover (behind which the enemy may be lurking) during a contact while winning the fire fight. Or as the document on the shoot stated:


The aim of this range practice is to teach soldiers to relate field craft and ground appreciation to good shooting under realistic conditions.

Don't let semantics distract you.

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to BSAP Assoc. (History) email a review of 'Shadows of a Forgotten Past: To the Edge with the Rhodesian SAS and Selous Scouts' by Andrew Hudson and concludes:
The book deserves an equal place alongside similar contributions and I recommend it to those who wish to add to their existing collection of publications on the exploits of these famed units during the bush wars in Southern Africa.

Link:http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28904:book-review-shadows-of-a-forgotten-past-to-the-edge-with-the-rhodesian-sas-and-selous-scouts&catid=57:Book%20Reviews&Itemid=141

Well reviewed on Amazon:http://www.amazon.com/SHADOWS-OF-FORGOTTEN-PAST-Rhodesian/dp/1908916605

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to a "lurker" to this book, published July 2012, which I have not read or seen in the UK.

'Viscount Down:The Complete Story of the Rhodesian Viscount Disasters' by Keith Nell (ex-Rh. SAS) is reviewed once on:http://www.amazon.com/Viscount-Down-ebook/dp/B00AQVO6KS/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1360272206&sr=1-1&keywords=viscount+down and has copious reviews on its own website:http://www.viscountdown.com/

There is a cheap Kindle edition US$10; via the website US$77 and UK Pounds 44.

Without demeaning what happened for SWC a follow-on episode maybe noteworthy, taken from a review of the book:
This is followed by the hunt for the terrorist gang responsible, and starts with my sudden and totally unexpected assignment to quell a mutiny by 100 heavily armed terrorists who had availed themselves of an amnesty offer of a safe return and were being held in a secret bush camp. The story includes a personal account of living with these undisciplined and gung-ho thugs who had to be turned around and trained in undercover operations before our search for Nkomo’s missile gang could commence. It is a text book case of how opposing forces can work together in highly subverted and extremely hostile territory; of intelligence gathering and winning hearts and minds of the local population. A key component of our success was the ability to suddenly appear and conquer without affording the enemy opportunity to return fire and then to vanish without trace.

[BushrangerCZ]

I was taught this is called "Cover shoot"

[davidbfpo]

A newly discovered CSI article: 'The Rhodesian African Rifles: The Growth and Adaptation of a Multicultural Regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980', which now joins my reading pile:http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/ArtOfWar_RhodesianAfricanRifles.pdf

Added: JMA added a post below that the paper was already in this thread. Sigh, memory loss.

The Amazon precis:
The Rhodesian African Rifles overcame profoundly divisive racist and tribal differences among its members because a transcendent "regimental culture" superseded the disparate cultures of its individual soldiers and officers. The RAR's culture grew around the traditions of the British regimental system, after which the RAR was patterned. The soldiers of the RAR, regardless of racial or tribal background, identified themselves first as soldiers and members of the regiment, before their individual race and tribe. Regimental history and traditions, as well as shared hardships on deployments and training were mechanisms that forced officers and soldiers to see past differences. The RAR is remarkable because these bonds stayed true through to the end of the war, through incredible pressure on black Rhodesians to succumb to the black nationalist groups and cast off a government that was portrayed to them as oppressive, racist and hateful. Through the end of the Bush War, 1965-1980, RAR soldiers remained loyal and steadfast to their regiment, and that must be their legacy. In the end, the values of the government were irrelevant. It was the regiment that drew these men in, and their loyalty was more to their comrades and their heritage than to any particular government or cause.

A marked contrast - to date - with more contemporary conflicts, such as Afghanistan. Yes, there is a long running, large thread on Rhodesian COIN to which this will join one day:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2090

[Morgan]

David,

I've done a quick read-through and it looks quite interesting. In posting this, are you suggesting that we (US/ coalition/ etc...) attempt something similar in Afghanistan....local troops led by "western officers" or perhaps encourage/ promote a regimental system within the ANA?

[davidbfpo]

David,

I've done a quick read-through and it looks quite interesting. In posting this, are you suggesting that we (US/ coalition/ etc...) attempt something similar in Afghanistan....local troops led by "western officers" or perhaps encourage/ promote a regimental system within the ANA?

Morgan,

I would not go that far in Afghanistan, rather if similar interventions are considered which require a rebuilding of security forces consideration should be given to using features of such a unit as the RAR.

My recollection is that at least one attempt was made in Helmand to form a locally recruited or hired unit with a strong ISAF component, akin to the practices of the Imperial Indian Army on the North-West Frontier (which has appeared on an earlier thread).

Back to Rhodesia now. From reading long ago the RAR recruited mainly from one small tribe, who had a long tradition of service.

More when I have read the CSI paper.

[Morgan]

Morgan,


My recollection is that at least one attempt was made in Helmand to form a locally recruited or hired unit with a strong ISAF component, akin to the practices of the Imperial Indian Army on the North-West Frontier (which has appeared on an earlier thread).


David, Can you direct me to that thread? I was not aware of any such effort and am curious as to the results.

[davidbfpo]

Morgan,

The first thread is historical 'The Role of the British Political Officer on the North West Frontier':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7518&highlight=scouts

It took some searching, but in 2010 'Red Rat' referred, very briefly to a British unit in Helmand Province:
The 'Helmandi Scouts' which has been in the field for at least 2 years.

See Post 67 on the thread 'Counterinsurgency and Its Discontents'.

It is not clear IMHO whether this is a UK unit or a locally recruited unit. It does look suspiciously like the former.

A Google search found two other references, from a CSIS book / PDF that it was an Afghan unit, without a page reference alas:http://csis.org/files/publication/090727_ansf_draft.pdf

[Red Rat]

PM sent to Morgan.

I think they were a locally recruited unit, mentored by the British, but at a time when mentoring was not the norm.

[JMA]

David, this thesis was covered in the Rhodesia thread from this point onwards:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=133657&postcount=340





A newly discovered CSI article: 'The Rhodesian African Rifles: The Growth and Adaptation of a Multicultural Regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980', which now joins my reading pile:http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/ArtOfWar_RhodesianAfricanRifles.pdf

The Amazon precis:

A marked contrast - to date - with more contemporary conflicts, such as Afghanistan. Yes, there is a long running, large thread on Rhodesian COIN to which this will join one day:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2090

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to a BSAP History email alert, a partial quote:
Bird manages to describe life on an SB station in an operational area very well. He tells of the, hereto generally unknown and unsung, commitment, huge risks and sacrifices made during the ‘hondo’ by many dedicated members of SB. Exposed are the frustrations of intelligence gathering with counter-insurgency work, where useful information often fell on deaf ears, or where the clue-less, who should have known better, could never use the ‘int’ efficaciously. But there were exceptions, brave men who took to unconventional, if not dirty, tactics and with whom lifelong friendships endured.

Link:http://justandrewbooks.wordpress.com/2013/11/06/book-review-special-branch-war-by-ed-bird/

Link to South African publisher:http://www.30degreessouth.co.za/ and the UK option:http://www.30degreessouth.co.uk/

Amazon UK shows the book will be published in January 2014:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Special-Branch-War-Slaughter-Matabeleland/dp/1909982342/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1384021987&sr=1-1&keywords=Special+Branch+War

[JMA]

Ex RLI soldier and renowned painter, Craig Bone, is offering the complete edition of his book free on Kindle for 11 November 2013 only.

Go to amazon.com

If you snooze, you lose.

[jmm99]

This article (appearing in the SWJ Blog, as I write), Drawing Lessons from Zimbabwe's War of Liberation (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/drawing-lessons-from-zimbabwes-war-of-liberation) (by Jephias Andrew Dzimbanhete; Journal Article, December 10, 2013), does exactly that - all stops are pulled.

The author's conclusion is relatively restrained given the body's overall content (snip):


The foregoing discussion has shown that current attempts to equate and link the selective nature of violence that was deployed by the revolutionary guerrilla forces to contemporary outbreaks of violence are unfounded and devoid of academic analysis. The nonselective violence that is perpetrated by troops of an incumbent government is normally intended to stifle legitimate demand for economic and political spaces by the citizens. On the other hand the application of violence on civilians by the liberation fighters was in the interest of creating economic and political space. It would be fitting to refer to guerrilla violence as ‘freedom violence'.

Of course, under the 1977 APs to the GCs, "freedom fighters" were exempted from a number of the Laws of War. Consistent with the proponents of the 1977 APs, the author now introduces "freedom violence" as a protected category.

The article is certainly timely - Nelson Mandela's funeral and all. And, it takes one back to the 60s and 70s.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

It is noted with sadness the the Journal has deemed it fit to publish the following piece of garbage:

Drawing Lessons from Zimbabwe's War of Liberation: Efficacious Use of Propaganda and Violence

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/drawing-lessons-from-zimbabwes-war-of-liberation

It is a well known component of insurgencies that at a point the insurgents take control of the population and exert 'discipline' as a means of "defending the revolution". In many counter insurgencies more civilians are killed by the insurgents.

In Rhodesia we (the military) were both unwilling and unable to cross the line that the insurgents did as a matter of course.

As the publication of this garbage follows on from the publication of that scandalous piece by the Dutch boy in the MR a year (or so ago) it may indicate that US editors are less fastidious than they should be?

[JMA]

Mike, this is a pathetic attempt to white wash the atrocities carried out by the (ZIPRA and ZANLA) insurgents against the civilian population during the Rhodesian War. It may be worth some discussion from a legalistic PoV but nothing else.

There was an almost universal paranoia amongst the insurgents about spies and informers in the population and as a result many were killed in front of gathered groups of villages in the most brutal manner - to send a message to the people of what will happen to sell-outs. To state that all claims by security forces of insurgent atrocities were propaganda not merely wrong but dishonest.

My question (like when that Dutch boy's garbage was published in MR) is how did this trash pass editorial review?



This article (appearing in the SWJ Blog, as I write), Drawing Lessons from Zimbabwe's War of Liberation (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/drawing-lessons-from-zimbabwes-war-of-liberation) (by Jephias Andrew Dzimbanhete; Journal Article, December 10, 2013), does exactly that - all stops are pulled.

The author's conclusion is relatively restrained given the body's overall content (snip):



Of course, under the 1977 APs to the GCs, "freedom fighters" were exempted from a number of the Laws of War. Consistent with the proponents of the 1977 APs, the author now introduces "freedom violence" as a protected category.

The article is certainly timely - Nelson Mandela's funeral and all. And, it takes one back to the 60s and 70s.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

the Dzimbanhete article isn't worth a review.

What I was trying to put across is that the article (exemplified by its coinage of the term "freedom violence") comes from the same well (manure pile, whatever) as the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, in their carving out exceptions for the "freedom fighter", the "transitory guerrilla", the "occasional IED layer", etc., etc.

It reminded me of the agitprop of the 60s and 70s, which I also said in the post. As I use the term "agitprop" here (agitation of a mass audience by propagation of the written word), the material can be true, false or mixed (white, black or varying grays) and can be acceptable, unacceptable or "so what" (depending on the reader's viewpoint). The author Dzimbanhete uses a more limited definition:


In this article I subscribe to Sturges's definition of propaganda. He writes that propaganda is the practice of distributing material that is untrue or if it is true, it is actually not relevant and applicable. The aim of propaganda is to confuse and deceive those that receive it.[1]

[1] P. Sturges, ‘Information in the National Liberation Struggle: Developing a Model', Journal of Documentation, 60, 4 (2004), p. 439.

That kind of agitprop is definitely black (or a deep shade of gray) in content. One might well ask whether Dzimbanhete's article itself is "propaganda" as Sturges defines it. Sturges, BTW, is in Pretoria (faculty bio (http://web.up.ac.za/default.asp?ipkCategoryID=7063)). Here are abstracts of his 2004 (http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?articleid=864253) and 2005 (http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?articleid=1529392) articles.

The "literary genre" of Dzimbanhete's article is similar to that of our USAian Nick Turse (born in 1975; Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nick_Turse)), who has made himself a career from the time of his 2005 Columbia University Ph.D dissertation, "Kill Anything That Moves: United States War Crimes and Atrocities in Vietnam, 1965-1973", to the present - his 2013 Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam (http://www.amazon.com/Kill-Anything-That-Moves-American/dp/0805086919). Whether Turse's agitprop about Vietnam is black, white or gray is not going to be an issue for me here. Turse does resemble Dzimbanhete (re: that author's talk of "freedom violence") in Turse's 2000 article, New Morning, Changing Weather: Radical Youth of the Millennial Age (http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue4/forumturse.htm):


On April 20, 1999, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold engaged in a shooting and bombing spree in Columbine High School that left fifteen students, including the alleged gunmen, dead. ...
...
When a youngster decides to make war on his school and classmates, the media leaps to vilify him, his alleged influences, his weaponry, and his parents. Politicians are keen to do the same, and capitalize on the shootings by pushing for new firearm regulations and stiff penalties. And why not? Don’t we punish psychotics bent on threatening life and property, set upon destroying the "American" way of life? Shouldn’t we condemn those who take the lives of others through "senseless" violence? Or should we try to make sense of it? Preferring the latter option, I propose that kids killing kids may be the radical protest of our age, and that Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold may be the Mark Rudd and Abbie Hoffman figures of today.
...
While these young boys may have no Port Huron statement, no manifesto, and no coordinated actions (that we know of), they are a legitimate radical faction that may have one-upped the violent Weather Underground and the revolutionary Abbie Hoffman. These boys have truly embraced "revolution for the hell of it," maybe better than Abbie ever did. The randomness of their "non-campaign" may be the ultimate expression of "rage against the machine," ripping into the system, as it were, at its most vulnerable and fundamental level, perhaps more so than Weatherman’s bombing of the U.S. Capitol.
...
The violence unleashed by these juveniles also acts as a call to action for like-minded individuals. Their ability to gain recognition and exert power grows with each like incident, forcing us to look for connections and search for scapegoats. Maybe they have no pithy slogans, no unifying symbol, maybe Marilyn Manson is no Bob Dylan, and maybe their Woodstock ’99 is a poor rip-off of the original (which "ripped off" Monterey), but no one can deny the radicalism of their murderous behavior. Who would not concede that terrorizing the American machine, at the very site where it exerts its most powerful influence, is a truly revolutionary task? To be inarticulate about your goals, even to not understand them, does not negate their existence. Approve or disapprove of their methods, vilify them as miscreants, but don’t dare disregard these modern radicals as anything less than the latest incarnation of disaffected insurgents waging the ongoing American revolution.

In this early Turse piece, we have another example of the "freedom violence genre". Is it "propaganda" in the Sturges sense: material "to confuse and deceive those that receive it ?"

Finally, to your question (asked before about the Dutch article): how do these things get past editorial boards. The secret is to footnote the hell out of everything - in Dzimbanhete's article, 31 footnotes preceded by a bibliography of over a dozen books, articles and oral interviews. To completely vet these (to determine how black, white or gray), one would have to check the substance of each cite; and also determine its credibility.

For example, Dzimbanhete writes:


Writing in 2006, Parker, a former Rhodesian serviceman, revealed that the Selous Scouts were responsible for the murder of Father Killian Huesser, a Roman Catholic priest based at Berejena Mission in February 1980.[3]

[3] J. Parker, Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (Alberton: Galago, 2006), p. 285.
...
The balance of probability points to the Rhodesian Selous Scouts as being responsible for the murder. It was very likely that the Rhodesian Selous Scouts were responsible for the murder of white missionaries at rural outposts and rural African businessmen.[5]

[5] The Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Tourism and Immigration published a pamphlet in July 1978 in which the description of the murders is given.

As to the first cite, did Parker say that; and, if so, is Parker a credible witness ? I don't know; but would find out if this were a litigated case. It isn't, however. The second cite (the Ministry of Information, Tourism and Immigration) doesn't, on its face, prove the "probability" asserted.

For good or bad, editorial boards do not do that kind of vetting - that process is left to the reader or independent reviewer. As an example, we see the influence of footnotes and reviewers in a review (http://www.amazon.com/review/R17O35DKFXJZJ5/ref=cm_cr_dp_title?ie=UTF8&ASIN=0805086919&nodeID=283155&store=books) of Turse's new book:


I read the book on my Kindle. When I finished a chapter about 3/4 of the way through, I noticed the last "chapter" seemed enormous, but I was ready to grind through it. It turns out that last "chapter" was probably 75-80 pages of footnotes and source material. That was impressive and amazing. The proof is in the pudding. And the accolades from people like Daniel Ellsberg and Andrew Bacevich are to be taken seriously. Turse's other books, as well as his amazing contributions to TomDispatch.com (http://www.tomdispatch.com/) well worth investigating for readers who found thus book interesting, educational, and enlightening.

And so it goes - and will continue to go.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

There has been some discussion on this (excuse for a) paper on the Journal. I have responded there. Mike also responded on the Rhodesian thread to which I will respond.

[JMA]

the Dzimbanhete article isn't worth a review.

What I was trying to put across is that the article (exemplified by its coinage of the term "freedom violence") comes from the same well (manure pile, whatever) as the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, in their carving out exceptions for the "freedom fighter", the "transitory guerrilla", the "occasional IED layer", etc., etc.

It reminded me of the agitprop of the 60s and 70s, which I also said in the post. As I use the term "agitprop" here (agitation of a mass audience by propagation of the written word), the material can be true, false or mixed (white, black or varying grays) and can be acceptable, unacceptable or "so what" (depending on the reader's viewpoint). The author Dzimbanhete uses a more limited definition:

One man's freedom fighter is another man's ...

Apart from attempting a great deception Dzimbanhete seems to have missed the history of the last 30 years that questions the definition of 'freedom' that was delivered to the 'toiling masses' of Zimbabwe upon liberation. Some might say they were delivered from the frying pan into the fire.

I guess I am surprised that there has been such a limited reaction to this deliberate attempt to deceive and sanitize depraved killers. This is the great tragedy.


That kind of agitprop is definitely black (or a deep shade of gray) in content. One might well ask whether Dzimbanhete's article itself is "propaganda" as Sturges defines it. Sturges, BTW, is in Pretoria (faculty bio (http://web.up.ac.za/default.asp?ipkCategoryID=7063)). Here are abstracts of his 2004 (http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?articleid=864253) and 2005 (http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?articleid=1529392) articles.

The "literary genre" of Dzimbanhete's article is similar to that of our USAian Nick Turse (born in 1975; Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nick_Turse)), who has made himself a career from the time of his 2005 Columbia University Ph.D dissertation, "Kill Anything That Moves: United States War Crimes and Atrocities in Vietnam, 1965-1973", to the present - his 2013 Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam (http://www.amazon.com/Kill-Anything-That-Moves-American/dp/0805086919). Whether Turse's agitprop about Vietnam is black, white or gray is not going to be an issue for me here. Turse does resemble Dzimbanhete (re: that author's talk of "freedom violence") in Turse's 2000 article, New Morning, Changing Weather: Radical Youth of the Millennial Age (http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue4/forumturse.htm):

I don't know this character but let us agree that there were atrocities committed in Vietnam... by both sides. Just as this Turse person tried to make a name for himself (and get a Ph.D at the same time) so is this Dzimbanhete person. Shameful behaviour that should have been recognised by the Journal Editorial Board.


In this early Turse piece, we have another example of the "freedom violence genre". Is it "propaganda" in the Sturges sense: material "to confuse and deceive those that receive it ?"

Well he certainly confused the editorial board of the Journal into publishing it.

I can't see how they can do anything but resign in disgrace.


Finally, to your question (asked before about the Dutch article): how do these things get past editorial boards. The secret is to footnote the hell out of everything - in Dzimbanhete's article, 31 footnotes preceded by a bibliography of over a dozen books, articles and oral interviews. To completely vet these (to determine how black, white or gray), one would have to check the substance of each cite; and also determine its credibility.

Yes, shocking indeed. In this case Dzimbanhete interviewed three people. Like the Dutch boy he seems to have had a preconceived idea/position/belief and went about trying support it by searching out random cites to support that position. One wonders if the institution matters. Are first rate institutions as slovenly as the second rate institutions of this one and that of the Dutch boy?


As to the first cite, did Parker say that; and, if so, is Parker a credible witness ? I don't know; but would find out if this were a litigated case. It isn't, however. The second cite (the Ministry of Information, Tourism and Immigration) doesn't, on its face, prove the "probability" asserted.

Mike what Parker reports is probably true. Unlike Dzimbanhete there is no point in attempting to deny which I can't state with absolute certainty did not happen.

What I am attempting to understand is why at this late stage Dzimbanhete is seeking to decriminalize the atrocities carried out by the insurgents.

I would offer two guesses, one, that as the Mugabe regime nears collapse the killers who are now old men would be concerned that with the fall of the regime their protection would fall away and they would be vulnerable to both or either legal or vigilante action from family of their victims. Two, that in the spiritual context of Zimbabwe these aging killers are attempting to appease any angry spirits -ngozi or evil spirits - by convincing themselves that their acts were not murder but rather acts of justice therefore would not upset the spirits.


For good or bad, editorial boards do not do that kind of vetting - that process is left to the reader or independent reviewer.

This is clearly for bad (or worse as you like). So why have an editorial board then?

[carl]

JMA:

I can't fault SWJ for publishing that piece. It was an editorial decision and sometimes ya' win and sometimes ya' lose. It did stimulate a lot of discussion which is always a good thing.

As history the piece is hopeless. Maybe the editors knew that, maybe not (I suspect they did) but that didn't really matter because people who comment on it can easily rip it apart; and they have done so.

When viewed as other than a historical account, it has a lot of value. You can pick it apart to see what makes those guys tick and use it for future reference.

JMM99:

That Turse fellow is foul, Ellsworth Touhy, Savonarola foul judging by that piece you excerpted. It is a little scary in a moral and physical sense that he can achieve the prominence he has in our country.

[JMA]

JMA:

I can't fault SWJ for publishing that piece.

Carl you are too kind.


It was an editorial decision and sometimes ya' win and sometimes ya' lose.

Well in this case it is the truth that is the loser.


It did stimulate a lot of discussion which is always a good thing.

Not sure the discussion has been in the right direction. We are talking about a blatant attempt to lie and deceive and what are we discussing? The merits and demerits of the Rhodesian War and the Rhodesians.


As history the piece is hopeless.

Yes, but what merit does it have. The only one I can see is that it can be used as an example of a deliberate attempt to alter history through the misuse of (admittedly second rate) universities and the exploitation the gullible (or useful idiots) who help spread the lie.

This can be used in military colleges as a warning to how the past can be twisted and altered in the most dishonest ways by ideologically motivated individuals who are both unwilling and unable to live with the truth of the past and seek to sanitize their role.


Maybe the editors knew that, maybe not (I suspect they did) but that didn't really matter because people who comment on it can easily rip it apart; and they have done so.

I don't think the Journal editors had the faintest idea about the bush war and that this was an attempt to sanitize the actions of depraved killers. I don't think it has been ripped apart. The key proposition has in the main been missed ... that being that Dzimbanhete wants readers to believe that the atrocities carried out by ZIPRA/ZANLA were justifiable acts of justice of people who deserved to die.


When viewed as other than a historical account, it has a lot of value. You can pick it apart to see what makes those guys tick and use it for future reference.

It should have been presented in that way then... but it wasn't.

[jmm99]

is here (http://smallwarsjournal.com/content/editorial-policy). I've talked about the editorial policy as it relates to technical things (the bottom half of the page). Now, we should look at the substantive part (the top half); and the policy lede ("Citizen Kane's Statement of Principles"):


We believe that responsive publishing and open dialog around well formed ideas grounded in experience and/or deep study (hopefully both) serves our community better than the protracted processes found in other venues to incrementally advance the rigor of a piece before its eventual exposure to light. We want to publish viewpoints on today's issues today, rather than in months or years.

We screen submissions so that we are reasonably convinced that the articles we publish are worthwhile additions to the dialog in the community. To us, that means they are:

•An offering concise and tightly argued enough to be worthy of the time of our busy readers;

•Serious, thoughtful work from a stakeholder worth understanding, if not necessarily agreeing with;

•Relevant and of interest to practitioners of small wars;

•Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive; and

•Written well enough that the message comes through clearly.

Saying that these articles are "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive..." implies to me (once an assistant editor for a couple of years on a law review) some sort of substantive review process.

In truth, "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ..." might as well have been left out, because the following paragraphs establish that no one really looks at whether the article is "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ...." So, the policy continues:


Our experimentation with various approaches to peer review has led us believe that the vast expertise of our readership and the immediacy of their response via open comments is far better vetting than a review panel we could assemble and labor slowly through.

We do not screen articles for their compliance with a house position or agenda. The flip side of that is that we do not necessarily agree with what we are publishing. We do not pretend to own the dialog or preach any gospel. SWJ does not promote any particular position, other than one of rigorous reflection and cross-examination given the complexities of small wars. The point is not for us, the authors, or for any site user to be right, but for all of us to be more informed and better.

We would like to provide our authors more editorial review than they get, which is next to none. We only make minor formatting and mechanical edits; we'd do more if we were better staffed. In the meantime, let's not let your red pen or our lack of enough of them get in the way of good ideas reaching the right eyes and ears promptly.

While we screen submissions, we do not and cannot fully vet authors and facts. Problems will come up from time to time. Authors who choose to submit their work to us do so courageously, realizing that they are subject to a public wire brushing by our discriminating and vocal readers for any errors.

We trust our audience to appreciate the distinction between inaccuracies that do not foul the rest of the work, and major issues: either deal-breaker errors or deception that we were too dumb and busy to interdict before publishing. If the latter two come up, we will deal with them as they arise. If livable errors come up, note and move on.

Now, to be frank, I've no problem with what these caveating paragraphs say. In fact, SWJ is neither the Harvard Law Review nor the Michigan Law Review, having a large student editorial staff and a faculty editorial board. Vetting even a couple of footnotes takes a lot of time, as my posts will soon prove. I don't expect that to happen before an SWJ article is published. As a corollary, I also don't expect SWJ articles to be necessarily "reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ...." Caveat emptor.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

This post deals with this text from Dzimbanhete's article:


The balance of probability points to the Rhodesian Selous Scouts as being responsible for the murder. It was very likely that the Rhodesian Selous Scouts were responsible for the murder of white missionaries at rural outposts and rural African businessmen.[5]

[5] The Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Tourism and Immigration published a pamphlet in July 1978 in which the description of the murders is given.

Missionary murders rang a bell; and lo and behold, a bit more than three years ago, I'd downloaded the report he cited. It's still there:


The Murder of Missionaries in Rhodesia (http://www.rhodesia.nl/mission.htm)
Ministry of Information
Rhodesia
July, 1978

The report recites a dozen incidents (most with multiple victims). All eyewitnesses identified the attackers as "guerrillas" or "terrorists". In addition, forensic evidence existed such as this:


Chief Inspector David Perkins, a ballistics expert with the British South Africa Police at the time of Musami Mission massacre of February 7, 1977, testified at the inquest that an AK rifle bearing the number 3036, of North Korean manufacture, had been proved under microscopic examination to be one of the weapons used in the slaying.

A notebook found on the body of a terrorist, Mombi Macheni, contained the following passage:

On Sunday the day of 6/2/77 we went to Musami at St Paul's Mission. We reached there at 9.15 and we had a storming raid. We shot four Europeans who were priests. Sisters were five, and altogether there were nine, eight dead.

We took a watch only. No comrades were injured in the action.

On the same day we went to Mazvidva and killed informers, kraalhead and the other one. This was 12.15, then we went.

Nobody was injured. We were very happy.

The entry in the notebook was signed by "No Talks" Mabhena. Beside his name was the number 3036.

The report (no surprise, since it is a government report) presents no evidence (much less "the balance of probability" or "very likely") that the Selous Scouts were responsible for the murders. Thus, so far as this particular text and footnote by Dzimbanhete is concerned, a fact checker could say "pants on fire."

What we do find in the report and elsewhere are claims by the Patriotic Front leadership that Rhodesian security forces committed the ca. 1976-1978 murders of white missionaries and black kraal leaders. One media outlet, quite independent of the government, is the Catholic Herald Co. UK archive (http://archive.catholicherald.co.uk/) (cited in this and the next post on Berejena Mission). In any Catholic Herald archive, you can hit "zoom page" for a blowup of the original column allowing correction of some bad OCRing by the archivist.


We didn't kill priests says Front (http://archive.catholicherald.co.uk/article/17th-march-1978/1/we-didnt-kill-priests-says-front)
17th March 1978

THE Patriotic Front Leaders, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo have vigorously denied that their forces fighting in Rhodesia have attacked missionaries or are against the church in any way.

In an interview with the Catholic Herald on Wednesday Mr Mugabe said his ZANLA forces were specifically instructed not to harm missionaries but to regard them as their friends. "The missionaries are first and foremost working for the people and to work against them is obviously to work against the people they serve."

Mr Mugabe explained that ZANLA did not use violence against local Africans to gain support he said his forces used education and persuasion even if assistance was refused to the guerillas.

He strongly denied that his forces had been involved in the killing of missionaries at Lupane in 1976 and Musami in 1977.
...
Mr Nkomo said that the freedom fighters had been told not to harm the missionaries. "I have broadcast that message myself," he said.

He described as nonsense and absolute rubbish allegations that the Patriotic Front was anti-Christian or anti-missionary. "The stand which the Catholic bishops have taken against the Smith regime has alienated them from the regime and it has retaliated by deliberately punishing them. It has then tried to blame it on the guerrillas."

Mr Nkomo did admit that there might be one or two "unruly people" amongst the guerrillas but he promised that they would be punished by demotion or fatigues or some other method.

One might well question Mugabe's credibility in 1978, given his track record after 1978 to date. In fact, that is exactly what some South Africans are doing.

Becoming Zimbabwe (http://www.ijr.org.za/publications/pdfs/IJR%20OP%20Becoming%20Zim%20proof%203.pdf) (2009; Institute for Justice and Reconciliation). Here's some snippage:


This report provides a complimentary aspect to "Becoming Zimbabwe" by posing a general critique of history teaching and curriculum in Zimbabwe. It attempts to enhance the book’s use, and serves as an educational tool at secondary and higher levels for comparison and analysis of history teaching and curriculum in Zimbabwe. The report also provides an outline of the kinds of historical texts and narratives on Zimbabwe, and how they are taught within Zimbabwean technical colleges and universities. The supplement therefore provides an overview of history teaching in Zimbabwe in relation to the content and focus of "Becoming Zimbabwe".

The book is B. Raftopoulos and A. S. Mlambo (eds), Becoming Zimbabwe. A History, c. 850–2009 (http://www.amazon.com/Becoming-Zimbabwe-History-Pre-colonial-Period/dp/1779220839), Harare, Weaver Press, 2009.

Back to the report and the literary genre inspired by Mugabe. Chapter I deals with the uses of liberation history in Zimbabwean politics, as exemplified by Mugabe's and ZANU PF's "Patriotic History" (snips):


Patriotic History proclaims ZANU PF as the alpha and omega of Zimbabwe’s past, present and future. Zimbabweans are encouraged to be ‘patriotic’, which means supporting ZANU PF.

Anything short of this is considered ‘unpatriotic’.

Patriotic History has four main themes:

1. land;
2. no external interference based on ‘Western ideals’ such as human rights;
3. race; and
4. a ‘patriots’ versus ‘sell-outs’ distinction.
...
‘Patriots’ versus ‘sell-outs’

Lastly, Patriotic History separates Zimbabweans into ‘patriots’ and ‘sell-outs’, such that opponents to ZANU PF are necessarily classified as ‘pro-colonial’, ‘sell-outs’, ‘un-African’, and ‘puppets’, while followers of ZANU PF are categorised as ‘patriots’. The patriots and sell-outs distinction is extended to the rest of the globe. External critics of ZANU PF are typecast as ‘foes’ of black Africa.

The distinction has its genesis in late 1950s urban politics and has been a constant premise in nationalist politics since. The denotation of ‘sell-out’ changes over time depending on the character of a challenger. To be a ‘sell-out’ during the liberation war was to be an informant of the colonial Rhodesian state and to support a rival nationalist party. To be a ‘sell-out’ after 2000 is to abandon ZANU PF’s ‘central’ role in nationalist history, to resist the land seizures, and to value civil and political rights over economic rights.

Patriotic History is a sophisticated narrative that plays on real historical grievances such as land. Indeed it is more than a narrative. It is part of a political culture that legitimises violence, and inhibits political tolerance, civil and political rights, and democracy.

To me, Dzimbanhete's article fits into the "Patriotic History" genre, which itself is a part of the nationalistic "freedom fighter" and "freedom violence" narrative. I have no idea whether the man is a Mugabe supporter or not.

Here is the abstract for his 2012 article (http://www.saseeduc.net/conferences-2/sase-2012) about the armed liberation struggle:


Title: ‘I died for this country’: National Heritage and Zimbabwe’s War of Liberation

Abstract

What legacies make the Zimbabwean war of independence a national heritage?

The significance of posing this question cannot be overemphasised. There is an explosion of current and dominant narratives of the war whose sentiment is that the people who died during and because of the liberation struggle made sacrifices that bequeathed national heritage status to Zimbabwe’s war of liberation. The same perspective stresses that sacrifices were a monopoly of the people who ‘jumped the borders’ out of colonial Rhodesia during the war years. The same body of narratives attaches prominence to the inaccurate but deliberate definition of the terms, ‘deserters and sell outs’ in the process of appropriating the Zimbabwean armed independence struggle for particular groups of people.

This paper seeks to show that the co-operation and unity between the armed liberation fighters and the povho (the black civilian population in the war zones) during the period of the war constitutes an impressive legacy of Zimbabwe’s war of liberation. The cordial relationship, a product of a shared political goal, manifested in the collaboration between the freedom fighters and their hosts, confers national heritage status to the war. This study revisits this aspect of Zimbabwe’s liberation war and examines the contribution of various categories of the African population.

The paper thus challenges perspectives that privilege a single category of the participants of the war and also overemphasise death as the only notable sacrifice made during the decolonisation process of Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the article demonstrates that sacrifices during the armed struggle were not a monopoly of any one group.

My next post will deal with a less clear-cut set of facts, Berejena Mission.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

This post deals with this text from Dzimbanhete's SWJ article:


Writing in 2006, Parker, a former Rhodesian serviceman, revealed that the Selous Scouts were responsible for the murder of Father Killian Huesser, a Roman Catholic priest based at Berejena Mission in February 1980.[3]

[3] J. Parker, Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (Alberton: Galago, 2006), p. 285.

The Aluka Database (http://www.aluka.org/page/about/historyMission.jsp) has two relevant entries (both interviews in 1998; abstracts only; text behind paywall). The first interview covered the period from 1976-1980 at Berejena Mission:


Interview with Constantine Vengesai (http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.XSTPCMAZA0008)

Description: A teacher in various Chivi schools up to 1976 when he moved to the controversial Catholic Mission of Berejena, he was part of the group of teachers who initiated a fund for the guerrillas and his testimony is rich in the day to day happenings at the mission involving guerrillas and soldiers. He also details the inter-party rivalry between ZAPU and ZANU supporters and how this literally led to the flight of ZAPU activists from the district during the war.

The second interview, dealing with Fr Huesser's death, comes later.

The second source for 1976 events at Berejena are the Catholic Herald archives, from which we learn quite a bit, as in this article:


Mission Priest held by Smith (http://archive.catholicherald.co.uk/article/3rd-december-1976/2/by-smith)
3rd December 1976

FR PAUL ECiLl[EGLI], 47-year-old Swiss Catholic missionary, was arrested last week by Ian Smith's Rhodesian authorities at the Berejena Mission, southeast of Fort Victoria.
...
A spokesman for the Bethlehem Fathers in Britain commented: "It is generally assumed that Fr Egli has been arrested for refusing to disclose the whereabouts of freedom fighters and for attending guerrilla meetings."

Sr Aquina Weinrich, OP, writing in the current issue of Blackfriars, highlighted the moral dilemma posed by the illegal Rhodesian regime's oppression of the majority black population — "a committed Christian must ask himself whether the cause of justice and peace is better served by force of arms or by the continuation of present oppression . . . in this situation neutrality does not exist."

Liberation Theology is at its clearest in the sister's comments above. Here is her article, GUERILLA WARFARE IN RHODESIA (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1741-2005.1976.tb02304.x/abstract;jsessionid=40C0EA7EAEEAD00C80D19441E8D8D4 19.f03t01), New Blackfriars Volume 57, Issue 678, pages 499–505, November 1976 (first page only; the rest is behind a paywall).

So, from at least 1976 on into 1980, Berejena Mission provided material support to the guerrillas (a possible motive for the government to act harshly); but the Berejena area was subject to intense inter-party conflict between ZAPU and ZANU supporters (a possible motive for either guerrilla faction to act harshly toward the other faction's supporters). As Sr Weinrich said ... "neutrality does not exist."

Immediately after Fr Huesser's death, who did it was a mystery to the Catholic Herald:


Precarious path to freedom and unity (http://archive.catholicherald.co.uk/article/29th-february-1980/3/precarious-path-to-freedom-and-unity)
29th February 1980

Also of significance are the deaths in the past month of two Catholic priests, Father Raymond Machikicho and Father Kilian Huesser.

It is ironic and tragic that Father Machikicho should have been killed by supporters of' the guerrillas. The death of Father Iluesser[Huesser] is still a mystery.

The death of Fr Machikicho was less of a mystery:


Church concern for Rhodesian refugees and fear of violence (http://archive.catholicherald.co.uk/article/8th-february-1980/1/church-concern-for-rhodesian-refugees-and-fear-of-)
8th February 1980

The concern mirrors wider fears about the possible breakdown of the ceasefire: this week Fr Raymond Machikicho, a black priest working with the Bethleham Fathers near Gwelo, and his driver, became the latest victims of the continuing violence when they were beaten to death, allegedly by young guerillas.

However, by early March, fingers were pointed by Berejena Mission clergy at Rhodesian security forces:


Mugabe men not killers (http://archive.catholicherald.co.uk/article/7th-march-1980/1/mugabe-men-not-killers)
7th March 1980

1 HI. 1 ORCLS[THE FORCES] of Mr Robert Murata:[Mugabe], who won a resounding victor:, ifi [victory in]this week's Rhodesia elections, were not responsible for the recent harassment of mission stations. This is the claim made by priests and nuns in Rhodesia.

Fr Killian I luesser[Huesser], of the Bethlehem Fathers, was murdered at Berejena Mission two weeks ago by a group of men dressed like Mugabe's Zimbabwe Africa National I.iberation Army (ZANLA). But priests at the mission claim the inert[men] were really members of the Rhodesian Security Forces.

Their evidence was backed-up by Dominican Sisters in a BBC Panorama programme on Monday.

"Beaten-up people tell us they always fear auxiliaries or Security Forces" said a nursing sister. Relationships between the Church and the guerrillas has been fairly good.

Mr Mugabe was brought up as a Catholic, and although he no longer professes his faith, he keeps close contact with Church leaders.

It appears that this claim was based on hearsay (unless the priests claimed to eyewitnesses, who were spared ??); and on total irrelevancy (the Dominican Sisters of the BBC program).

Thanks to the Aluka Database, we might have a credible eyewitness to the murder (the second interview mentioned above):


Interview with Ratidzo Hasha (http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.XSTPCMAZA0024)

Description: A Form One student at Berejena Mission in southern Chivi who witnessed the murder of a Roman Catholic Priest Father Killian Heusser by members of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts towards the general elections of 1980.

Eyewitnesses do not necessarily hold up to cross-examination, but do provide probable cause (at least in the US) for the case to move forward.

Parker seems to be something of a red herring. I gather he does not claim to have been present at Huesser's murder; but is relying on hearsay of one kind or another. The picture as to Parker is more than a bit muddied by the following, source 1 (http://www.galago.co.za/CAT1_019_b.htm) and source 2 (http://z13.invisionfree.com/julyseventh/ar/t2142.htm) (taken from source 1) are the same:


Parker not our man:

REGARDING ‘ South Africa ’s plot to kill Prince Charles’ (May 7) and the status of Jim Parker, author of Assignment Selous Scouts.

As the officer commanding Special Operations CIO Headquarters, I categorically state that Parker was never an attested member of the BSAP Rhodesian Special Branch, or the Selous Scout Regiment.

At no time during his service as a police reservist was he authorised by a competent authority to direct, brief, or command personnel in the field.

The alleged attack on Berejena Catholic Mission in the Chibi Tribal Trust Land on the night of February 19, resulting in the death of Father Huesser, was never contemplated by those officers in authority, and was totally unlawful.

- MJ McGuinness, via e-mail — letter to the editor Sunday Times, (28 May 06)

and in response,


About turn:

REGARDING “ South Africa ’s plot to kill Prince Charles” (May 7), and MJ McGuinness’s disavowal, “Parker not our man” (Letters, May 28) of the Special Branch status of Jim Parker, author of Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer:

I have the utmost respect for McGuinness, who is a former colleague from my Rhodesian BSA Police days. I have listened to several hours of taped interviews that Parker conducted with McGuinness while researching his book. Much of what he wrote emanated from McGuinness, including the plot to assassinate Prince Charles and much more. Surely he wouldn’t have been so revealing if he hadn’t accepted Parker’s bona fides as a former subordinate — albeit a “lowly” reservist and not a regular policeman? Particularly as he also acknowledged Parker as “his man” in the tapes.

Regarding the Berejena Mission incident that was “never contemplated by those officers in authority”, such a thing couldn't have been anything else but unlawful.

The same would apply to similar incidents that McGuinness discussed with Parker which occurred in what were then Salisbury, Gwelo and Rusape. It is also evident from the McGuinness tapes that certain officers in authority did more than just “contemplate” in those cases.

Does this explain his puzzling about-turn?

- Peter Stiff, publisher of Assignment Selous Scouts by Jim Parker, Alberton — letter to the editor, Sunday Times (4 June 2006)

The student at Berejena, Ratidzo Hasha, seems the best evidence to support this particular Dzimbanhete claim, but Dzimbanhete doesn't appear to mention him.

This research took far too long for its worth to me.

PS: Dzimbanhete also has two 2013 articles on JIARM (http://www.jiarm.com): LANGUAGE AS AN ASPECT OF THE WAR: SPECIAL SHONA REGISTERS OF ZIMBABWE'S LIBERATION WAR (http://www.jiarm.com/Dec/paper6522.pdf); and NEGOTIATING FOR SURVIVAL: THE NATURE OF THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ZANLA)'S GUERRILLA WARFARE DURING ZIMBABWE'S WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (http://www.jiarm.com/Dec/paper7212.pdf).

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

I believe we are drifting off the essential focus of Dzimbanhete's paper which was:
The foregoing discussion has shown that current attempts to equate and link the selective nature of violence that was deployed by the revolutionary guerrilla forces to contemporary outbreaks of violence are unfounded and devoid of academic analysis. The nonselective violence that is perpetrated by troops of an incumbent government is normally intended to stifle legitimate demand for economic and political spaces by the citizens. On the other hand the application of violence on civilians by the liberation fighters was in the interest of creating economic and political space. It would be fitting to refer to guerrilla violence as ‘freedom violence'.

So quite frankly if, repeat if, some priest was taken out for collaborating with the insurgents that could hardly be termed 'non-selective violence'.

So it all comes down, according to Dzimbanhete, 'creating economic and political space'.

Just as with that garbage from the Dutch boy, which the MR saw fit to publish, the thesis is not proven (by any stretch of the imagination).

In point of fact what he attempts to sell is that the atrocities of the insurgents were justifiable and acceptable. As he attempts to convince:
Executions were dictated by the need to survive since civilian collaboration with the colonial army forces put the lives of the freedom fighters and the peasants at risk. It was clear that guerrilla violence that visited the rural folk was discriminate. It was used against only those elements of the rural population, who against the express advice of the liberation forces collaborated with the Rhodesian security forces.

This as opposed to:
The violence that the Rhodesian colonial forces perpetrated against the rural peasants was apparently systematic and organised. It is on this score that it should be appropriately labelled ‘terrorism' and it was the Rhodesian security forces that deserved to be called ‘terrorists'.

In the Rhodesian thread on SWC many aspects of the Rhodesian bush war have been discussed and more discussion would serve to inform people better on what worked and what did not work during the bush war.

However, I see little point in using a piece of garbage such as this paper to launch into such discussions. The MR published and thereby gave some credibility to the Dutch boy just as the Journal has done with Dizumbanhete's garbage. Both the MR and the Journl should be ashamed.

[JMA]

Its shocking... better they just say: "We have to find x number of words for each edition and will use anything to fill up the edition. Some will be meaningful, some will be garbage, sift through it all yourself."



is here (http://smallwarsjournal.com/content/editorial-policy). I've talked about the editorial policy as it relates to technical things (the bottom half of the page). Now, we should look at the substantive part (the top half); and the policy lede ("Citizen Kane's Statement of Principles"):

Saying that these articles are "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive..." implies to me (once an assistant editor for a couple of years on a law review) some sort of substantive review process.

In truth, "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ..." might as well have been left out, because the following paragraphs establish that no one really looks at whether the article is "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ...." So, the policy continues:

Now, to be frank, I've no problem with what these caveating paragraphs say. In fact, SWJ is neither the Harvard Law Review nor the Michigan Law Review, having a large student editorial staff and a faculty editorial board. Vetting even a couple of footnotes takes a lot of time, as my posts will soon prove. I don't expect that to happen before an SWJ article is published. As a corollary, I also don't expect SWJ articles to be necessarily "reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ...." Caveat emptor.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Mike,, well done on sifting through all that.

Interesting indication of Dzimbanhete's selective cherry picking is Parker as a source.

I did not bother to read Parker's book as my information was that Parker himself was not what he claimed to be.

Nevertheless, Dzimbanhete gleefully grasps Parker supplied evidence that Rhodesian Forces killed a priest ... while at the same time discarding Parker's reports of grotesque atrocities by the insurgents.

The man can't have it both ways.

But the great sadness is that first the Journal and then some individuals take this clown seriously.



This post deals with this text from Dzimbanhete's SWJ article:

The Aluka Database (http://www.aluka.org/page/about/historyMission.jsp) has two relevant entries (both interviews in 1998; abstracts only; text behind paywall). The first interview covered the period from 1976-1980 at Berejena Mission:

The second interview, dealing with Fr Huesser's death, comes later.

The second source for 1976 events at Berejena are the Catholic Herald archives, from which we learn quite a bit, as in this article:

Liberation Theology is at its clearest in the sister's comments above. Here is her article, GUERILLA WARFARE IN RHODESIA (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1741-2005.1976.tb02304.x/abstract;jsessionid=40C0EA7EAEEAD00C80D19441E8D8D4 19.f03t01), New Blackfriars Volume 57, Issue 678, pages 499–505, November 1976 (first page only; the rest is behind a paywall).

So, from at least 1976 on into 1980, Berejena Mission provided material support to the guerrillas (a possible motive for the government to act harshly); but the Berejena area was subject to intense inter-party conflict between ZAPU and ZANU supporters (a possible motive for either guerrilla faction to act harshly toward the other faction's supporters). As Sr Weinrich said ... "neutrality does not exist."

Immediately after Fr Huesser's death, who did it was a mystery to the Catholic Herald:

The death of Fr Machikicho was less of a mystery:

However, by early March, fingers were pointed by Berejena Mission clergy at Rhodesian security forces:

It appears that this claim was based on hearsay (unless the priests claimed to eyewitnesses, who were spared ??); and on total irrelevancy (the Dominican Sisters of the BBC program).

Thanks to the Aluka Database, we might have a credible eyewitness to the murder (the second interview mentioned above):

Eyewitnesses do not necessarily hold up to cross-examination, but do provide probable cause (at least in the US) for the case to move forward.

Parker seems to be something of a red herring. I gather he does not claim to have been present at Huesser's murder; but is relying on hearsay of one kind or another. The picture as to Parker is more than a bit muddied by the following, source 1 (http://www.galago.co.za/CAT1_019_b.htm) and source 2 (http://z13.invisionfree.com/julyseventh/ar/t2142.htm) (taken from source 1) are the same:

and in response,

The student at Berejena, Ratidzo Hasha, seems the best evidence to support this particular Dzimbanhete claim, but Dzimbanhete doesn't appear to mention him.

This research took far too long for its worth to me.

PS: Dzimbanhete also has two 2013 articles on JIARM (http://www.jiarm.com): LANGUAGE AS AN ASPECT OF THE WAR: SPECIAL SHONA REGISTERS OF ZIMBABWE'S LIBERATION WAR (http://www.jiarm.com/Dec/paper6522.pdf); and NEGOTIATING FOR SURVIVAL: THE NATURE OF THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ZANLA)'S GUERRILLA WARFARE DURING ZIMBABWE'S WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (http://www.jiarm.com/Dec/paper7212.pdf).

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

I want to get back to the topic of "selective violence" ("targeted killing" in my jargon, as in this thread, The Rules - Engaging HVTs & OBL (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=13239)) in a later post tonite - hopefully not focusing on the Zimbabwe Prof and the Dutch Boy. :)

A couple of brief points about your comments on SWJ. First:


We have to find x number of words for each edition and will use anything to fill up the edition.

I don't think that is accurate simply because there are no editions. A few months ago, I went through the archives month by month from Jan 2012. The articles are simply posted day by day (roughly 1 a day, but that varies), apparently as they come in.

Second:


... better they just say: ... Some will be meaningful, some will be garbage, sift through it all yourself.

Yup. Caveat emptor. End SWJ digression - at least for me.

-----------------------------------------
Parker, Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (http://www.amazon.com/Assignment-Selous-Scouts-Rhodesian-Special/dp/1919854142) (Amazon quoting: 16 Used from $91.35, 6 New from $201.06; it may be "fiction", but it sure is expensive fiction).

There are only two reviews; I'll snip from both.


Rhodesian Bush War & BLACK Operations (http://www.amazon.com/review/R37SD1PBHYZTLH/ref=cm_cr_dp_title?ie=UTF8&ASIN=1919854142&channel=detail-glance&nodeID=283155&store=books), April 28, 2008
By Troy A. Lettieri "Professional Warrior" [JMM Lookup, About 1 (http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/showthread.php?t=11732), see post #1, SFC, 3rd SFG, Bronze Star w/ V; About 2 (http://tacticaltracking.tripod.com/SOTTIver3.7.pdf), business; SWC Member as taldozer (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/member.php?u=215), Last Activity: 04-29-2013, Join Date: 02-21-2006]

This review is from: Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (Paperback)

NOTE - I rate this book a solid 3.5

This book is an important read in understanding the history of the Selous Scouts and the unit's full spectrum of operations. The book covers the direct involvement of the British South African Police (BSAP) Special Branch (SB) which played a major role in all Pseudo-Operations undertaken by the Selous Scouts. The Selous Scouts was basically established as a joint BSAP and Army unit. The SB was responsible for "turning", training and re-introducing the newly "turned" terrorist to the Selous Scouts for operations against their comrades. The SB function is often over looked or given a cursory look it other works/books on the Selous Scouts (as in Reid-Daly's "Pamwe Chete" and other titles on the Selous Scouts).

Now, you must know there is some major controversy associated with this book. The Selous Scouts Association (SSA) has distanced itself from this book. The SSA said that there are some extraordinary claims as to what the Selous Scouts did during the war and the SSA has described the major claims in the book as "total fiction". The SSA also claim that Parker was not an attested member of the Rhodesian Special Branch and he was not a member of the Selous Scouts Special Branch. Rather that he was in fact a Police Reservist. But Peter Stiff, the publisher of the book, has stated that the above claims are not true and that the Parker, was a Reserve Detective Section Officer with SB Selous Scouts at Operation Repulse virtually fulltime as an A Reservist during the last years of the war. All I can say as a avid researcher/historian on Rhodesian matters, I have learned most former Rhodesian Spec Ops types are very closed mouth about their "operational" past and today still remain security conscious. So I feel the "real" truth of the matter will never be known for a long time if ever.

Over all this book is well documented and has extensive endnotes and bibliography, as well as many never before published photographs.

With the controversy aside the book still is a required read for the military/intelligence professional.

and the second:


Informative, but not what you might be expecting (http://www.amazon.com/review/R1Y8B0ZJWKE7AP/ref=cm_cr_dp_title?ie=UTF8&ASIN=1919854142&channel=detail-glance&nodeID=283155&store=books)., June 10, 2011
By Historicool [JMM Lookup, About 1 (http://www.amazon.com/gp/pdp/profile/A23UQMKRZNYHDX/ref=cm_cr_dp_pdp), nothing beyond this]

This review is from: Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (Paperback)

This book, aside from detailing several supposed top secret operations that have proven to be controversial claims, the book has the unfortunate honor of being one of the few books about the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. It is important to note, from the start, that this book primarily covers the Special Branch side of the Selous Scouts, which was largely responsible for intelligence processing and more police-focused operations.

The book begins with coverage of the war in general up until the author joined the Special Branch Selous Scouts including some basic coverage on the war, Selous Scouts operations, and some interesting information on the Operation Repulse and Operation Thrasher areas and events occurring there. This is one of my gripes with this book - namely the coverage of the general war. While the coverage of Selous Scouts operations is entertaining it is overwhelmed by basic information on the bush war that could be found elsewhere. As the reader goes along the information on the Operation areas becomes more plentiful, but again the information is not always related to Scouts operations. Eventually information on Scouts Chem/Bio warfare, and the day to day operations of the Scouts in the later years of the war comes to light, but again, this is information on the Special Branch of things, which is vastly different than information on the Army Scouts. There is also some brief discussions of attacks on religious missions, and opponents of the regime - which has likely caused so much of a stir due to the author's lack of documentation to prove that these were sanctioned ops rather than rogue ones. It's difficult to prove some of these claims due to the country changing hands and the likely destruction of documentation, but the author should qualify these statements a bit more then. Its difficult too when one of his major sources for the book Mac McGuiness later denied saying some of the information attributed to him the book

The book's latter quarter covers the Scouts and their South African allies attempts to prevent the ZANU-PF from gaining power, then assassination attempts against Mugabe before he can take power. Again, the claims are interesting, but not well proven. Naturally, claims of things like attacks against UANC, etc supporters by Scouts dressed as ZANLA in an effort to get the Brits to disallow the ZANU from the elections, poisonings, etc. do not paint the Scouts in a good light and is bound to elicit vehement denials, but the author should have known to back up his claims strongly or soften them a bit more than he does by saying "I am not sure, but I have good belief based on evidence X and Y to say that the higher ups knew about Operation A or B."

Overall, it's a decent read, though needs to be taken with a grain of salt. The author adds to the limited information on the Scouts from the perspective of Special Branch, but should have done more (and perhaps his editor as well) to explain some of his more fantastic claims and spent fewer pages on a general accounts of the war. At the same time,his (albeit brief) discussion of SADF Paras a Fireforce units towards the end of the war, the use of Recce's as "D" Squadron RSAS, the use of SADF "Rose" mines (and the attendant dangers to the user as well as the target), and the integration of SAS and Selous Scouts into the South African Recce Commandos is of definite use to those interested in SADF and Rhodesian special units.

So, from these reviews I glean about the Parker book, " Some will be meaningful, some will be garbage, sift through it all yourself"; and definitely Caveat Emptor.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

One of the sources in Mark O'Neill's Second-party Counterinsurgency (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=19610) is Stathis Kalyvas, his theory and empirical research into selective and indiscriminate violence in irregular civil wars. I've arranged Kalyvas' online materials in chronological order from 1999 through 2009. I've not read all of them (only a quick skim in part only); but I believe what amounts to an online book is worth the slog. On cursory view, the basic idea seems to accord with Jack McCuen (RIP 2010; Birmingham Mich obit (http://www.tributes.com/show/John-J.-McCuen-US-Army-88991055), West Point Tribute (http://apps.westpointaog.org/Memorials/Article/16583/); I may have posted these before).

First as to Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War - Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Logic_of_Violence_in_Civil_War)


The Logic of Violence in Civil War (http://www.amazon.com/Violence-Cambridge-Studies-Comparative-Politics/dp/0521854091) is a book which challenges the conventional view of violence in civil wars as irrational. The main argument is that violence only emerges in those disputed territories, and it is generally driven not by the conflict itself, but by previous rancors and enmities among the population.

The author, Stathis N. Kalyvas (born 1964), is a political scientist known for his analysis of the dynamics of polarization and civil war, ethnic and non-ethnic violence, and the formation of cleavages and identities. He has also researched party politics and political institutions in Europe. He is a professor at Yale University.

Here are the online publications I found:


Stathis Kalyvas, Wanton and Senseless ? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria (http://www.seminario2005.unal.edu.co/Trabajos/Kalyvas/Wanton%20and%20senseless.pdf) (1999)

Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/ocvprogram/licep/1/kalyvas/kalyvaspaper.pdf) (2000)

Stathis Kalyvas, Leftist Violence During the Occupation (http://stathis.research.yale.edu//files/redterror.pdf) (2000), in Mark Mazower, After the War was Over: Reconstructing Family, State, and Nation in Greece, 1944-1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 142-183.

Stathis Kalyvas, "New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction? (http://stathis.research.yale.edu//files/New.pdf) (2001), in World Politics 54:1, 99-118.

Stathis Kalyvas, The Ontology of "Political Violence:" Action and Identity in Civil Wars (http://stathis.research.yale.edu/files/The%20Ontology%20of%20Political%20Violence.pdf) (2003), in Perspectives on Politics 1:3, 475-494.

Stathis Kalyvas, The Urban Bias in Research on Civil Wars (http://stathis.research.yale.edu//files/SecSt_kalyvas.pdf) (2004), in Security Studies 13:3, 1-31.

Stathis Kalyvas, The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil Wars (http://stathis.research.yale.edu//files/Paradox.pdf) (2004), in Journal of Ethics 8:1, 97-138.

Stathis Kalyvas, Warfare in Civil Wars (http://stathis.research.yale.edu//files/WCW_kalyvas.pdf) (2005), in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (eds.), Rethinking the Nature of War. Abingdton: Frank Cass, 88-108.

Stathis Kalyvas, Promises and pitfalls of an emerging research program: the microdynamics of civil war (http://stathis.research.yale.edu/documents/Kalyvas_OCV.pdf) (2009), in Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud (editors), Order, Conflict, and Violence (2009)

From the 2009 article, we get a brief summary of the theory from Kalyvas:


I operationalize control on a five-zone continuum, from zone 1 (total incumbent control) to zone 5 (total insurgent control). The main prediction is that the distribution of selective violence is likely to be bimodal, concentrating in zones 2 and 4. Incumbents will be most likely to resort to selective violence in areas where they exercise hegemonic, though not total control (which I call zone 2) and insurgents most likely to resort to the same type of violence in similar areas on their side (which I call zone 4). Areas of total control (zone 1 for incumbents and zone 5 for insurgents) will be largely free of violence (though not of repression). Areas of complete contestation and parity where both sides are simultaneously present in equal force (zone 3) will be free of violence. Figure 16.1 provides a graphic depiction of these predictions.

1758

"Figure 16.1" - Ken White (see ref.) field expedient method of explaining a bimodal chart (beats Powerpoint, but you have to water and feed the camel :D).

PSV = Peak Selective Violence (by hegemonic party); PIV = Peak Indiscriminate Violence (by non-hegemonic party). The logic is that, if you have hegemonic control, you should have good local intelligence and you can select targets. The non-hegemonic party suffers the converse; either it foregoes violence or has to go with indiscriminate violence.

Kalyvas does not promise a silver bullet, but rather a hard slog, valley by valley, village by village - with everything being very local.

Ref. for "Bactrian curve", KW post from 2008, I have whoa'd. Hoist by my own pet... (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=59512&postcount=56)


I would further submit that your Bactrian curve applies not only to the counselors at Law but to all the categories I cited, including Private and Generals and to most of the world in most things. Scary, huh?

Good reading.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Mike, I return from West Africa in a week and will attempt to get you a used copy at a fraction of those prices. Will then mail it to you as a belated Christmas pressie. (Might even read it first)

This because it may help to satisfy your enquiring mind on this matter.

I will check back in by in-box around the 20th.

regards
Mark





-----------------------------------------
Parker, Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (http://www.amazon.com/Assignment-Selous-Scouts-Rhodesian-Special/dp/1919854142) (Amazon quoting: 16 Used from $91.35, 6 New from $201.06; it may be "fiction", but it sure is expensive fiction).

There are only two reviews; I'll snip from both.



and the second:



So, from these reviews I glean about the Parker book, " Some will be meaningful, some will be garbage, sift through it all yourself"; and definitely Caveat Emptor.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Mike,

Kalyvas' ideas seem to resonate with me at first glance.

Clearly in almost all insurgencies there is some commonality in beliefs that leads to the insurgent cause receiving initial (tentative) support from the population.

However, it reaches a point when the insurgents need to "protect the revolution" by exerting a tight control over the civilian population... including executions.

I have mentioned the paranoia among insurgents over spies/sell outs/informers (real or imagined) among the rural population. This led to violence/executions being carried out as a warning to the population and to make an example of certain individuals. This I maintain was driven by the insurgents need to survive. Their life expectancy was not good and they knew it. The peasants bore the brunt of their fear and paranoia.

I will need to read further to fully understand how Kalyvas differentiates between 'indiscriminate violence' and 'selective violence' and (importantly) why there is a need to differentiate between the two.



One of the sources in Mark O'Neill's Second-party Counterinsurgency (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=19610) is Stathis Kalyvas, his theory and empirical research into selective and indiscriminate violence in irregular civil wars. I've arranged Kalyvas' online materials in chronological order from 1999 through 2009. I've not read all of them (only a quick skim in part only); but I believe what amounts to an online book is worth the slog. On cursory view, the basic idea seems to accord with Jack McCuen (RIP 2010; Birmingham Mich obit (http://www.tributes.com/show/John-J.-McCuen-US-Army-88991055), West Point Tribute (http://apps.westpointaog.org/Memorials/Article/16583/); I may have posted these before).

First as to Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War - Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Logic_of_Violence_in_Civil_War)



Here are the online publications I found:



From the 2009 article, we get a brief summary of the theory from Kalyvas:



1758

"Figure 16.1" - Ken White (see ref.) field expedient method of explaining a bimodal chart (beats Powerpoint, but you have to water and feed the camel :D).

PSV = Peak Selective Violence (by hegemonic party); PIV = Peak Indiscriminate Violence (by non-hegemonic party). The logic is that, if you have hegemonic control, you should have good local intelligence and you can select targets. The non-hegemonic party suffers the converse; either it foregoes violence or has to go with indiscriminate violence.

Kalyvas does not promise a silver bullet, but rather a hard slog, valley by valley, village by village - with everything being very local.

Ref. for "Bactrian curve", KW post from 2008, I have whoa'd. Hoist by my own pet... (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=59512&postcount=56)



Good reading.

Regards

Mike

[TheCurmudgeon]

JMA,

I am jumping into this thread late. I wish I had a better understanding of Rhodesia but I don't. I actually think that it would be very interesting to do a paper where Rhodesia and South Africa are compared in their transition from colonial state to "modern" state. But that is for another day.

I have written several pieces for the SWJ. I like this forum because, unlike more academic journals it lets nearly everyone offer their opinions. You do not have to agree. You can violently appose the author's take on the world, but it still gets put out there. I don't think you understand how important this level of unopposed give and take of knowledge is; how rare this is in the world of academics. In addition I get feedback from the audience who has knowledge and experience in the field. This is invaluable to me.

So please, do not take this out on the editors of the SWJ. They are few and they are well meaning. I personally appreciate this forum. Do not attack Dave and others unless you are willing to become an editor for this forum.

I feel that you too, have become personally involved in matters here. It is hard to hear that people who you came to respect and love died for an unjust cause. I don't know how to address that or to deal with the fallacious nature of it. I do know that this site is unique in what it offers. Don't throw the baby out with the bath water. This site cannot always be great, but it is good. Sometimes, that is the best we can expect.

[JMA]

JMA,

I am jumping into this thread late. I wish I had a better understanding of Rhodesia but I don't. I actually think that it would be very interesting to do a paper where Rhodesia and South Africa are compared in their transition from colonial state to "modern" state. But that is for another day.

If you want a better understanding you would have to read widely. If you do not have the interest to do so better not to involve yourself in making comments and judgements on the Rhodesians and the Rhodesian war.

South Arica and Rhodesia were two totally different situations. South Arica was not a colony - the Union of South Africa came into being in 1910. No comparison of note.


I have written several pieces for the SWJ. I like this forum because, unlike more academic journals it lets nearly everyone offer their opinions. You do not have to agree. You can violently appose the author's take on the world, but it still gets put out there. I don't think you understand how important this level of unopposed give and take of knowledge is; how rare this is in the world of academics. In addition I get feedback from the audience who has knowledge and experience in the field. This is invaluable to me.

I understand the dynamics of this place well - I have been posting here for a few years now - and am happiest posting in the cut-and-thrust environment of the Council. I find much of the content and posts on the Journal to be too pretentious for my taste - this probably because of the low barrier to entry which allows just about any wannabe to try to 'make a name for himself'.


So please, do not take this out on the editors of the SWJ. They are few and they are well meaning. I personally appreciate this forum. Do not attack Dave and others unless you are willing to become an editor for this forum.

They have been sloppy and need to tighten up and apply some discipline. It is quite possible to pass stuff like this garbage from Dzimbanhete around to establish that it has no academic merit and is merely a continuation of propaganda from a bygone era. But yes, the Journal has to be cut some slack on their sloppy editorial implementation while the piece from the Dutch boy that appeared in MR is scandalous.


I feel that you too, have become personally involved in matters here. It is hard to hear that people who you came to respect and love died for an unjust cause. I don't know how to address that or to deal with the fallacious nature of it. I do know that this site is unique in what it offers. Don't throw the baby out with the bath water. This site cannot always be great, but it is good. Sometimes, that is the best we can expect.

You are missing the point ... My criticism has been aimed at the Dzimbanhete paper that was published by the Journal. Others have turned this into a general thread on Rhodesia with Outlaw 09 freaking out.

Those I served with understand we are caught on the wrong side of history. While here and elsewhere I discuss military aspects and seldom if ever allow myself to get drawn into a political debate. Yes I lost dear friends in the war but I am able to sift through the crap and apply the filter of 'from whence it comes'.

JMA are my real initials and Mark Adams is my real name, I make no secret of my identity and as such don't protect myself with anonymity. I appreciate that serving men may need to be careful if they are commenting on a controversial subject.

Why you feel the need to defend the right of an individual to write garbage and those who publish it is beyond me. Maybe you should discuss this with someone (seriously).

[TheCurmudgeon]

Mark,

In the spirit of honesty my name is Stan Wiechnik. My bio is somewhere on this site. I don't want to go all Voltaire (http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/v/voltaire109645.html) on you, but I do like the free give and take this site offers within the realistic limits of what they can do. I would like to make three points:

1)The editorial staff of this site is limited and they have a lot to do. I know that on one of my articles (Political Legitimacy and Values) it took Dave four days to edit it for presentation on the site. That was simply converting it and correcting some simple errors. I don't know if Dave has any help, but it is a daunting job to edit everything let alone fact checking the information. Dave gets it ready.

2) on other more academic sites there is a bunch of old "know-it-alls" that have their own agenda. What gets by them is limited. Here, the members of the SWJ community are the editors. We read the papers and make comments. If we think something is BS, we can say it for all to see. Two articles after the one on the Rhodesian conflict was a article entitled "The Rule of Law: A Definition in Socio-Political Terms". While good intended, the author could not find the Rule of Law with both hands. Perhaps it should have never been published. But even in that lacking piece of scholarship were nuggets of interest. He is right that the concept of Rule of Law needs to be expanded and addressed in relation to the specific nature of the society that you are trying to apply it in. It is culturally biased to attempt to foist our ideas on the Rule of Law on others. I made my feeling known in the comments after the article. In essence, you and I are the editors of this journal and we do it by the comments we make after the article.

3) related to two, because it offers a cornucopia of articles, some good and some bad, ideas get offered here that could not be offered elsewhere. I have two articles I hope get published because they offer a different way of looking at the problem of COIN. They would never get published elsewhere ... no "academic journal" would take the risk. Here it is and open forum. It is for the members of this small community to do the work of looking at ideas for their practical value.

No, I am not defending a biased article. I can say that, since that article was published here I have learned more about the Rhodesian conflict than I knew before BECAUSE people like you called BS!

I hope you understand my position. I certainly mean no offense or disrespect.

[jmm99]

not a demand or even "suggestion" (since both of you would tell me to go to hell in that case), please take the continued discussion of SWJ Editorial Policy and Freedom of Speech to PMs.

Stan, take a look at Kalyvas' large volume of work. It's very much "We-They" and his level 3 equilibrium is much akin to the situation between equally matched chimp groups and equally matched "primitive" human groups. They confront each other, make a lot of noise and don't kill a lot (relative to unbalanced groups).

Gotta leave for a while.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

I would appreciate to hear what aspects of the Rhodesian Bush War are of interest to (principally the) US reading public (as represented here).

Responses will be much appreciated.

Moderator's Note

Created as a new thread, which hopefully will get attention and responses - one has been moved (ends).

[davidbfpo]

After a long delay (from September 2013) I have finally read the CSI article: 'The Rhodesian African Rifles: The Growth and Adaptation of a Multicultural Regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980'. Well worth reading, although it naturally lacks any contribution by African members, even if there are few references and wartime quotes.

I knew the RAR expanded to three battalions by the end and that many of its recruits came from one particular tribe, where there was a strong family tradition of service. The author notes that whenever the RAR stated it was recruiting large numbers offered to service, even if paid 10% of the white Rhodesian pay scale.

Rightly he asks whether a much larger RAR would have served all Rhodesians better. Majority rule with a largely African military would have been a "game changer".

Link:http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/ArtOfWar_RhodesianAfricanRifles.pdf

[JMA]

David,

I know that a paper was put forward in 1968 after Op Caudron to increase the RAR to two or three battalions. It was turned down. Two reasons for it being turned down were that there was no money in the sanctions limited budget to meet the increased cost and secondly a perceived need - at the time - by politicians not to arm to many blacks. This last supposed reason was ridiculous as by the end of the war up to 80% of the security forces were black.

It should be noted that the RAR was unique among colonial African battalions formed by the British in that the (white) officer corps were Rhodesians and not Brit expats doing a few years on service out in the colonies.

This officer corps stayed until the end and were in command when 1RAR put down a ZIPRA insurrection in Bulawayo area called the Battle of Entumbane (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Entumbane_Uprising) in 1981. The RAR were loyal to their battalion (and their officers) to the end.

On the other hand elsewhere in Africa as soon as the Brit expat officers left the units became involved in all sorts of skullduggery working on the basis that 'power comes from the barrel of a gun'.

Effectively then the RAR example can not be replicated and training of such forces will inevitably lead to providing better trained troops for future political misuse.




After a long delay (from September 2013) I have finally read the CSI article: 'The Rhodesian African Rifles: The Growth and Adaptation of a Multicultural Regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980'. Well worth reading, although it naturally lacks any contribution by African members, even if there are few references and wartime quotes.

I knew the RAR expanded to three battalions by the end and that many of its recruits came from one particular tribe, where there was a strong family tradition of service. The author notes that whenever the RAR stated it was recruiting large numbers offered to service, even if paid 10% of the white Rhodesian pay scale.

Rightly he asks whether a much larger RAR would have served all Rhodesians better. Majority rule with a largely African military would have been a "game changer".

Link:http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/ArtOfWar_RhodesianAfricanRifles.pdf

[davidbfpo]

SOFREP.com has published an article 'How to Create American Selous Scouts', which aims to be:
a study of speculative counterinsurgency kinetic tactics, not strategy.....These kinetic tactics make up the miniscule amount of counterinsurgency warfare that is dedicated to decimating the enemy.Link:http://sofrep.com/38775/bush-war-tactics-and-isis-forging-the-american-scouts/#ixzz3LndknDNw

I misses a number of points made here - to say the least. Alas you have to subscribe to comment, so I have added to my post.

Dangerously it assumes in the American context such a unit could be created using Americans, so ignoring the fact that the Selous Scouts were mainly a black African unit and a good number (never quantified) were "turned" nationalist fighters. Survival aside, the Scouts offered very high cash rewards for those it KIA.

The Scouts had an integral police intelligence unit, from the BSAP Special Branch; some consider their value diminished as the war went on, as the SB's informer network was eliminated.

Psuedo-Ops was one speciality, infiltration along guerilla supply routes and in areas suspected to be loyal to the guerillas.

Spotting guerilla movements, from fixed, covert OPs and calling in (later) 'Fireforce' to do the killing - was their main role. JMA posted a rare statistic: 66% of all internal kills were due to spotting by the Scouts and 'Fireforce' follow-up' in comparison the SAS - in ambushes I expect - claimed 13% of kills in the 'Malayan Emergency'.

If SOFREP wants a model to learn from, for combat overseas, there is more to learn I would contend from the RAR.

[flagg]

SOFREP.com has published an article 'How to Create American Selous Scouts', which aims to be:
Link:http://sofrep.com/38775/bush-war-tactics-and-isis-forging-the-american-scouts/#ixzz3LndknDNw

I misses a number of points made here - to say the least.

Dangerously it assumes in the American context such a unit could be created using Americans, so ignoring the fact that the Selous Scouts were mainly a black African unit and a good number (never quantified) were "turned" nationalist fighters.

I posted similar concerns in the comments on that article.

I would think that IF the US were to develop pseudo capabilities, they would need a number of isolated "silos" for each unique AO.

An ethnic Ethiopian, with the right training, might be able to work effectively in Somalia.

An ethnic Omani, with the right training, might be able to work effectively in Yemen.

But neither of them would be effective, regardless of training, in Lagos.

I reckon there's current and future needs for both Rhodesian Selous Scouts-like and Israel's Duvdevan-like capabilities.

And while there would be a lot of common foundation, I would think each AO would have very high specificity.

Even the Israelis had two distinct units for it's undercover operations in Gaza(Shimson) and West Bank(Duvdevan) as an indicator of the "ultra-local" nature of the task I suppose.

Duvedevan can't work in Tehran and 14Int would not have been able to work in Iraq.

For the likes of Iraq/IS, I would think a "translation layer" would be needed...such as Jordanian SF/GID to partner with relevant US forces.

As I understand it, when operating in a pseudo infiltration role, the white Selous Scouts fellas overwatched from kopjes with the black badged fellas conducting the meet and greets.

So where will the 100 ethnic Ethiopian/Somali US citizens come from to join the services, then volunteer, in order to get 1-2 qualified personnel for the unique Somali AO?

Then rinse and repeat for every other AO.

And isn't there also a Title 10/Title 50 problem that means unless solved, such an effort would fall under CIA?

Trusted local/regional proxy partners(acting the role of badged black Selous Scouts) would almost certainly be required wouldn't they?

[davidbfpo]

I have consolidated four RFI threads into this:All matters Rhodesian / Rhodesia (merged thread) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3407)

A lot of information sits in the main thread: Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2090&highlight=rhodesia) and the recently published book: Africa's Commandos - new book on the RLI (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15803&highlight=rhodesia) (Now in Historians arena).

As the war in Rhodesia was within a region wracked by conflict it is worth checking another thread: South Africa's COIN war in SWA/Namibia/Angola (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10859&highlight=rhodesia) and COIN in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961–1974 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=19529&highlight=portuguese) (Now in Historians arena).

A debate over the Rhodesian tactic 'Fireforce' is found in the Afghan context: Moving the Rhod. Fire Force concept to Afghanistan? (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10742&highlight=rhodesia)

A general search finds Rhodesia / Rhodesian appears in over a hundred threads, often in book lists for example.

I have copied this to the main thread.

[davidbfpo]

History Today is a popular UK magazine and I caught this article today via Twitter. The title 'A Secret History of African Decolonisation' is misleading, the article is just about the French role in Rhodesia and is minus any footnotes:http://www.historytoday.com/joanna-warson/secret-history-african-decolonisation

The author is at Portsmouth University, her bio:http://www.port.ac.uk/centre-for-european-and-international-studies-research/members/dr-joanna-warson.html


From the outset, French arms were vital to counterinsurgency efforts led by the Rhodesian Security Forces, with at least 50 French-manufactured Alouettes in the service of the Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF) between 1965 and 1980. The Rhodesians also had access to Mirage FI planes and Maxtra rocket launchers, leading one Zambian press report from 1977 to conclude that 22 per cent of all military material used by the RhAF was of French origin.

I found this odd. The Mirages were South African planes, I'd expect the Maxtra rocket launchers were too. IIRC the Alouettes came via commercial contacts, although Rhodesia did have some in 1965; I don't recall them being South African owned. In all my contacts with ex-Rhodesian military officers not one has mentioned the French.

[davidbfpo]

Bloggers use each other's material, so hat tip to this other site for assembling a set of video links to Rhodesian footage, in particular an American who served as an officer with the RAR (3yrs 1976-1979):http://www.smallwars.com/forum/analysis-of-regions-nations/177-the-rhodesian-bush-war

There's also, a so far unread MA dissertation by a Kings War Studies student, 'An Embarrassment of Riches? - Britain's Lost Lessons from the Thodesian Counterinsurgency War', 71 pgs:http://www.smallwars.com/articles/91-britain%E2%80%99s-lost-lessons-from-the-rhodesian-counterinsurgency-war-by-adam-robinson


The Abstract:
The counterinsurgency war fought in Rhodesia has a particular resonance for Britain. The Rhodesian Forces fought a protracted war using largely British equipment and British tactics, learnt from a shared experience of counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya, Kenya and Aden. When Rhodesia declared independence in 1965, the two countries went their separate ways and subsequent lessons from Rhodesia have generally gone unheeded by Britain. This paper will address the lessons that were presented by this war that could have been learnt and adopted by Britain during its subsequent counterinsurgencies of Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan. The paper will go on to analyse why some of those lessons were not addressed or, if they were, whether it was from the experiences in Rhodesia or from the UK’s own experiences. The fundamental questions of how Britain learns its counterinsurgency lessons and whether there was a conscious decision, because of Rhodesian secession, to ignore any experiences from Rhodesia will be answered. By using academic sources, direct contact with those involved in the Rhodesian counterinsurgency and by reference to contemporary and current doctrine, this paper will conclude that there are several lessons from Rhodesia that the UK could have learnt, and even some that are still to be heeded. It will conclude that the UK has had, until recently, a poor history of studying and codifying counterinsurgencies, that it has always been introspective when examining counterinsurgency lessons, and that it was because of this, and no other reason, that Rhodesia is not taught as a counterinsurgency case-study.

[rhodtpr]

History Today is a popular UK magazine and I caught this article today via Twitter. The title 'A Secret History of African Decolonisation' is misleading, the article is just about the French role in Rhodesia and is minus any footnotes:http://www.historytoday.com/joanna-warson/secret-history-african-decolonisation

The author is at Portsmouth University, her bio:http://www.port.ac.uk/centre-for-european-and-international-studies-research/members/dr-joanna-warson.html



I found this odd. The Mirages were South African planes, I'd expect the Maxtra rocket launchers were too. IIRC the Alouettes came via commercial contacts, although Rhodesia did have some in 1965; I don't recall them being South African owned. In all my contacts with ex-Rhodesian military officers not one has mentioned the French.



According to Petter-Bowyers "Winds of Destruction" (30 degrees South - 2005) the Rhodesian AF owned 8 Alouette III helicopters by late 1960-early 1970;

"We had only eight helicopters and could ill afford a slow turn around and the physical stresses that repeated refueling induced during intense operations." (P.102).

On page 107 of the same book Petter-Bower states that the Sud Aviation of France provided 3 more Alouette hellicopters after UDI in 1965 (to compliment the 5 in service at the time of UDI) in exchange for the RhAF newly designed and developed "pressure-refueling pump".

The SAAF provided men and equipment (Op Polo) from the mid-1970's in order to provide their aircrews with operational experience. A SAAF liason officer posting was permanently attached to RhAF HQ (P.239).

Through this relationship Rhodesia was able to employ South African aircrew and aircraft in the Bush War effectively sidestepping international sanctions that were in place against the country since UDI in 1965.

In 1976 a shipment of 18 Cessna 337's were flown directly from Reims in France to Rhodesia in two ferry moves...the planes were disguised as Malagasy fisheries aircraft and registered to a false company in Spain. The Rhodesian pilots were accompanied by a French pilot who handled all the communications and logistics involved in the move. (P.253-259)

Operation Sand involved the training of RhAF pilots and aircrew via attachment to the SAAF on all SAAF aircraft which included RhAF pilots manning a squadron of Mirage III aircraft (p.266).

:)

[davidbfpo]

Prompted by a recent discussion I have added two lengthy quotes. The first is from an interview of a Selous Scouts intelligence officer conducted thirty years ago and a more recent commentary on that interview.

The Scouts activities have been controversial, but is the tactical mix they developed that intrigues me. In particular the ability to "turn" captured Nationalist guerillas and have them fighting their comrades within days. Above all they were a reconnaissance unit or recce in the mainly African countryside, who identified targets for others to follow-up.

[davidbfpo]

Below are my interview notes and I have added in italics some comments. The officer was genuine and had been recommended to me by a Rhodesian Army officer who knew his role.





Around 1977 moral doubts started, as did the corruption
We were not prepared to win, our terms of reference dictated that in the last eight or nine years. Referred to Taber’s ‘War of the Flea’.
Politically, including Ian Smith, majority rule was not ruled out – they were searching for a suitable black role. But they did not understand the African mind, the majority will always support the violent man and unless you are tough you will lose.
They (the guerrillas) never needed to win a contact, the economic aspect of the war, which accounted for 50%, was lost they just keep on coming in and spread us about, thereby increasing the costs.
The Africans knew that somebody was always watching them.
We, the Rhodesians, just did not realise the signs were there. The choice was quite literally to win make the country a desert.
Reid-Daly’s concept was a stroke of genius, a fusion of brains and brawn. He was an ideal W.O.1, but he believed he was an “all rounder”. The brains were provided by Chief Superintendent Mac McGuiness, with about seven others, of the (Police) Special Branch who formed S.B.S.S. (A Google search found the SB officers were called Liaison Officers). It was devised as a tracking unit and became one to terrorise the other side.
The unit was 60% captures in the field, about 800 Africans, who were turned within a week and put on operations. There was total trust between us; I personally can recall one “fire fight” where I was the only one with ammunition left, they stayed and did not run. The entire staff at Inkomo Barracks (Google shows this as 40km from Harare near Darwindale) were similar in composition, but they were not combat fit. (This is the only reference I can easily find to the extent of recruitment from captured guerrillas, an interesting topic in itself).
(Their motivation?) Sometimes they perceived as the strong guys, but most were dupes really only concerned with their living conditions.
Such was the terror we instilled our main camp was never attacked (Google refers to Inkomo Camp as a major ammunition dump was sabotaged in 1981 by the South Africans and ex-Rhodesians).
What happened was that our credibility failed, I remember articled clerks at Price & Waterhouse (multi-national and global accountancy practice) saying in 1977-78 ‘All you’ve got to do is win the war”.
Our primary role was an intelligence gathering unit – 80% of our time was devoted to reconnaissance. I was a de-briefing officer for all returning “sticks” from each contact.
We adapted the ‘Supersonic’ radio so scouts could speak into the speakers (I think this implies the users were covert and within the population. This radio was in widespread use in the TTL or communal areas and would not stand out).
We did our job so well, in a professional manner – when we went into the “bush” de-bussing, back tracking and remaining stationary once in place. So much so that the Air Force had near total confidence in targeting a “Fire Force” without our actual seeing opponents. It was applied behavioural science, why did an old lady go for a “pee” at 0900hrs and counting kraal usage (This is lost on me now and I suspect refers to unusual behaviour being spotted).
There was a $50 per head reward; many of the regiment became quite wealthy.
For our opponents it was the “life of Riley”, drinking beer, getting girls from the kraals, the occasional shooting – let alone a “contact”.
Personally I weighed up the balance for Rhodesia, debits and credits – it was overwhelmingly in favour.
I personally was driven mad by the rejection that we should paralyse neighbouring economies; remember Mao’s dictum “Maximise the enemies losses, minimise yours”. We needed a “handle” on their sources of supply and finance. For example we distributed ultra-violet marked bank notes and with the banks help established relationships.
The cross-border operations i.e. attacking camps was not in the national interest.
We infiltrated their supply chain. I’m not saying who did this though. Their clothing was poisoned or defective equipment introduced, for examples half-second grenade fuses or plastic explosive AK47 rounds. All this had a potent effect the guys who were poisoned would attack those who had last fed them!

(Google search on poisoned clothing + Rhodesia finds many references to this activity; accounts appeared later in Rhodesian memoirs and became very controversial, for example view http://everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=1347508 (http://everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=1347508) and http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/sep3_2006.html (http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/sep3_2006.html) )


A shocking blind spot in our effort was counter-intelligence; given the fact any African could be a spy. For example in the attack on Chimoio we found sheaf’s of papers and plans of the Armoured Car Regiment Barracks – what they could not believe was that the ammunition was stored in a squash court, they thought it was behind the rifle butts.
I began to doubt whether personal sacrifice was warranted and started to ensure my personal safety.
The attitude evolved that politicians were not to be trusted and especially since we knew any war-winning strategy was unacceptable.

[davidbfpo]

The comments were made many years after my interview:
One of the keys to understanding why many terrorists were turned so easily is found in their cultural make up.


The answer may also be found within your notes, where in effect your source suggested that the African will follow those who show themselves to be strong (for this read "more ruthless, more violent, more powerful" etc), and will as a general rule vote for them. Setting the tribal niceties aside, mentally the captured terrorists often fell from their perceived positions of power i.e. God with an AK47 who commanded all he wanted - beer and women etc, to a frightened, defeated nobody on his way to see a Judge and a rope. In the African mindset, having been captured, bettered and effectively defeated by "his own people" would, I have little doubt, have been a particularly sobering psychological experience. (I am not sure if this means Rhodesians, of whatever colour, or black Rhodesians).

The Selous Scout upper command were also very careful not to promote any suggestion that they were fighting for "Rhodesia" or "Smith" or any other institute that the terrorists would have a disliking for, or been taught to hate. The Scouts slogan "Pamwe Chete" effectively means "Together Only" and conveys the idea of brothers fighting for each other, not for a system.


For a captured terrorist to be offered the chance to join a unit with an extremely fearsome (i.e. strong) reputation, carefully cultivated via propaganda, enabled the African to avoid the Judge, and regain his position of power once again. (For sometime the Rhodesian COIN included criminal prosecutions, with the death penalty and I suspect this time-consuming practice lessened as the war expanded).


I know of instances where terrorists captured in the morning were handed their AK47`s back to them in the afternoon (after a carefully orchestrated chat and assessment), and off they went happily hunting down their old friends as a member of the "strong." It probably seems bizarre to a westernised mindset, and I’m afraid it does not portray the African in a particularly favourable light, but the turning methods frequently worked. I know of only one incident where an "ex" terrorist turned on his new associates, and this was his intention all along.

It should be added that the intelligence community frequently used the terrorist propaganda against them. The terrorist High Command would spend as much time, if not more, pushing propaganda into the heads of their men as they did on military training. (Hence the frequent comments that ZANLA were poorly trained compared to ZAPU).


Consequently your average terrorist was expecting all sorts of nasty things to occur if they were captured. The Scouts, as part of the turning technique, made certain that the captive was treated respectfully, and provided with any medical assistance he required (delivered by pretty African nurses).

Basically he was treated the absolute opposite as to how he had been told he would be, without the fact that he was still deep in trouble going away. The effect of this was to add to their confusion, and in the end self preservation will swing the person for you.

The Scouts were effectively the armed wing of a larger intelligence organisation. As the interviewee suggests the entire exercise was intelligence driven, and as an Intelligence Officer his liaison with SB (Rhodesian Police Special Branch) would have been frequent. It perhaps could be argued that he was more SB than Scout. It is certain that in some quarters the line between SB and Scouts would have blurred.


Usually SB men were involved in the investigation of incidents, i.e. weapons collection (for forensic examination where the weapon would be traced to various previous activities etc); and all the other intelligence gathering methods.

On the issue of dirty tricks, discovered ammunition dumps were frequently sabotaged so that the AK47 rounds would explode in the barrels. Grenades were certainly tampered with in terms of fuse timing, and RPG7 rockets were rigged to detonate on triggering, as this weapon was usually the first fired in ambush situations. The detonation obviously killed the launcher and his nearby associates, and gave away the ambush position.


I also know of Scouts who attacked Rhodesian targets in order to "prove" their credentials to the real terrorists.


The radios, manufactured by the Rhodesian Company Supersonic (one of our answers to sanctions) could be rigged in a number of ways. The first was to have it blow up after a number of activations (15?), and these would be passed on through various contacts within the tribal areas to the guerrillas who would be interested in listening to propaganda broadcasts from Mozambique etc. Another use was to have the radio emit a beacon that a “Fire Force” helicopter could home in on. There was suggestion that this beacon transmitted when the radio was actually turned off, as once the Lynx or Trojan spotter (the first stage of a “Fire Force” operation) was airborne the terrorists would switch the radio off to listen to the air activity, thus effectively giving their position away.


There is a lot of stuff on the web about the heroics of the Selous Scouts. They are (were) a particularly tough bunch, but it remains true that while it was their job to find the terrorists, it was the RLI who killed them.

The poisoning allegations; it appears however that someone, or rather some group within SB may have in fact gone down this road as a progression from sending out dodgy radios etc. For obvious reasons it is not really likely that anyone will confess to involvement in operations of this kind particularly in today’s world.


I am certain however that there was South African (intelligence) involvement in the process, and this has been aired during the Truth and Reconciliation hearings after the change down there.


To be blunt, the general consensus from those I have discussed the matter with over the years was, "a dead terrorist is a dead terrorist." They do not regard the supply of poisoned camouflage uniforms to terrorists, as anything remotely approaching the deliberate and indiscriminate use of chemical/or other weapons on a civilian population. It should also be added that we frequently used Frantan (Napalm) and white phosphorus grenades/bombs on terrorist targets, and when a four man “stick” are challenging anything up to thirty opponents, a phosphorous grenade was frequently a life saver.

Could the turning techniques used in Rhodesia be used in our war today with Moslem extremists? Perhaps there are similarities in the extremists poor self esteem, driven by anger to fight against a powerful opponent that always "wins" (beginning with the Crusades.) I believe the sense of power it gives these deluded individuals, to be part of a system fighting "unbelievers" with guarantees of heaven etc as a reward, makes them an interesting opponent. Does their penchant for feeling "strong" come from plotting against and killing the innocent?

[davidbfpo]

Flagg,

Good catch there! Which was posted on a new thread on Rhodesian Chemical & Biological Warfare.

Peter Baxter's hitherto unknown - to me - website has plenty to read. I have emailed him to ask for details of the 2017 Rhodesian Military History & Tactics speaking tour with Chris Cocks and him - which I know will be of interest here. See:http://peterbaxterafrica.com/

His Amazon bio:
Peter Baxter is an author, amateur historian and African field, mountain and heritage travel guide. Born in Kenya and educated in Zimbabwe, he has lived and travelled over much of southern and central Africa. He has guided in all the major mountain ranges south of the equator, helping develop the concept of sustainable travel, and the touring of battlefield and heritage sites in East Africa. Peter lives in Oregon, USA, working on the marketing of African heritage travel as well as a variety of book projects. His interests include British Imperial history in Africa and the East Africa campaign of the First World War in particular. His first book was Rhodesia: Last Outpost of the British Empire; he has written several books in the Africa@War series, including France in Centrafrique, Selous Scouts, Mau Mau, SAAF's Border War and Somalia: US Intervention, 1992-1994.In the recent Selous Scouts thread I added two references to the use of poisoned clothing: Google search on poisoned clothing + Rhodesia finds many references to this activity; accounts appeared later in Rhodesian memoirs and became very controversial, for examples view http://everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=1347508 (http://everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=1347508) and http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/sep3_2006.html (http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/sep3_2006.html)

[davidbfpo]

Watching an email exchange between former BSAP members I came across some comments on the war, as the police rarely publicly remember I've added them anonymously.

1)
I do agree we suffered an insurgency and our efforts were that of a counter-insurgency… if one has to label it a war… then perhaps best described as a small war, but an insurgency is more appropriate.
The introduction of Ground Coverage to the BSA Police circa the time of the Mau Mau insurgency placed ground roots intelligence in the forefront of information gathering concerning the impending insurgency and concentrated its efforts on the labour movement and the nationalists. The battle for the hearts and minds of the labour force/people was well established in the early 1960’s, if not slightly earlier, and this is well chronicled. Many will remember the activities of Benjamin Borombo and how the nationalist subverted his struggle for the labour movement into the nationalist/political struggle of blacks.

Imperial powers might well have been stuck up with organisation and structure at the expenses of knowing its subjects, a good many of whom were beginning to demonstrate their disloyalty in the late 1950s – police intelligence was aware of the threats and changes taking place in Africa and had a good insight into grass roots activism of the time.

The early days of the insurgency were marred, for the insurgents that is, since their ranks had been so very well infiltrated by Rhodesian spies and agents… Most incursion intentions were know well in advance of them occurring and most if not all of them were pretty well wrapped up within days, at worst weeks, of them occurring.2)
The imperialist ego was so deluded by 1965 that intelligence such as it was did not even know that the battle for hearts and minds was taking place under our noses including on the football terraces of Bulawayo. Imperial power which had boiled down to meticulous organisation of a wasting resource namely "loyal" manpower, never had a chance against the grass roots impulse of freedom.

If the intelligence was available it was not used by Field Commanders effectively and anyway they were always in and then going deeper into a situation where the availability of manpower could never meet the demand remember vast swathes of the TTL/Communal land was lost to rebel control by the ceasefire.

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to a pointer on the BSAP Regimental Association (History Group) for a book published in 2015: 'The Rhodesian Command Dakota' by Laurence Hill (privately published) and a few lines of description:
A little-known fact of the Rhodesian War was the use of a Rhodesian Air Force DC3 as a flying command and communications post. This book offers a rare insight to the personnel and workings of this remarkable aircraft.A few reviews here:https://www.amazon.co.uk/d/cka/Rhodesian-Command-Dakota-Laurence-Hill/136724529X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1483985550&sr=1-1&keywords=The+Rhodesian+Command+Dakota

In the USA only available as a Kindle, with a few reviews:https://www.amazon.com/Rhodesian-Command-Dakota-Memoirs-Rhodesias-ebook/dp/B01M0KF5BE/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1483986114&sr=1-1&keywords=The+Rhodesian+Command+Dakota

I would query 'a little known fact', perhaps it is the detail within that is new?

[davidbfpo]

In 2014 on another thread there was a very slight mention by JMA (a former member):
Group Captain Petter-Bowyer has published an extremely interesting autobiography - "Winds of Destruction". See Post 64 which refers to forward air control or ground air control:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3407&page=4

Only possible in a very small airforce 'PB' was involved in most of the developments in the Rhodesian Air force and the war - importantly the home grown weapons development.Today I was reminded in a BSAP History Group email and there is a glimpse of the book on the link, with the contents and introduction. PLus a lot of the book! Link:https://books.google.co.za/books?id=akwPLOZMZYIC&pg=PA377&lpg=PA377&dq=lancaster+house+cease+fire+contraventions&source=bl&ots=Gh0k3jN5K2&sig=G#v=onepage&q=lancaster%20house%20cease%20fire%20contravention s&f=false

There are five* reviews, but it is expensive US$251 (paperback) - maybe as it was published in 2005:https://www.amazon.com/Winds-Destruction-Autobiography-Rhodesian-Combat/dp/0958489033/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1489857439&sr=1-1&keywords=9780958489034

There are similar five* reviews for a cheaper purchase in the UK:https://www.amazon.co.uk/Winds-Destruction-Group-Captain-Petter-Bowyer/dp/141201204X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1489862965&sr=1-1&keywords=petter-bowyer

[davidbfpo]

This story how a BSAP (police) officer encountered murders and the changing loyalties of the African population - after terrorism was used.

As it is five pages long I have added it as an attachment.

It appears as a vignette in Nick Russell and Hugh Phillips’ “Blue & Old Gold: The History of the British South Africa Police 1889-1980”, published in 2009.
See:https://www.amazon.co.uk/Blue-Old-Gold-1889-1980-Security/dp/1920143351/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1489864247&sr=1-1&keywords=Blue+%26+Old+Gold

See:https://www.amazon.com/Blue-Old-Gold-History-1889-1980/dp/1920143351/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1489864285&sr=1-1&keywords=Blue+%26+Old+Gold

[davidbfpo]

Long ago I read this book, so was surprised today to see it was republished in 2015 and has been reviewed in the latest 'Perspectives on Terrorism' (a free, online journal):
Jakkie Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia [Routledge Library Editions: Terrorism and Insurgency,
Volume 4] (New York, NY: 1985/2015), 284 pp., US $ 112.00 [Hardcover], US $ 36.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-138-88789-3.

This is a highly systematic account of the Rhodesian government’s counter-insurgency campaign during the war’s crucial period of 1972 to 1979. It begins with a history of the period from 1890 to 1979, with
successive chapters examining the Rhodesian security forces command and control management of the campaign; how their forces approached the concept of protecting and consolidating control over the country’s villages; conducting border minefield clearing operations; engaging in psychological operations to gain population support; conducting external military operations against insurgent base areas, including against insurgent sanctuaries in neighboring countries; and the role of intelligence in penetrating insurgency forces and gaining situational information advantage against them. The author concludes that when the war for Zimbabwe officially ended on December 21, 1979, despite the execution by the Rhodesian Security Forces of their counter-insurgency strategy, “very few of these had in fact proved successful.” (p. 243). One of the problems, the author explains, is that a “racial preconception …permeated all levels of white/black interaction, specifically in rural areas. Counter-insurgent operations were conducted to the exclusion rather than the support of environmental improvement. Population and resources control, a means to the end of regaining and re-establishing government control, became an end in itself: the object simply being to facilitate counter-insurgent operations” (p. 246). Above all, “At no stage was attention at high level seriously directed towards redressing grievances exploited by the insurgents to justify their criticism of the existing white administration” (246). This important book was originally published in 1985, but its approach and findings continue to be pertinent to the current period, with unresolved insurgencies in countries such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and elsewhere.
The author is Chairman of the Board and Head of African Futures & Innovation at Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa.Link:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/612/1210

The books appears on Amazon minus any review on .com & .uk websites.

[davidbfpo]

A well produced paperback (358 pgs) from UK-based Helion & Company:http://www.helion.co.uk/bandit-mentality-hunting-insurgents-in-the-rhodesian-bush-war-a-memoir.html

This is a refreshingly honest account by a New Zealander who volunteered to serve in Rhodesia’s British South African Police Support Unit, as the insurgency gained momentum 1976-1980. The Support Unit was the still largely civilian police’s para-military unit (1200 strong), with black African other ranks & NCOs and officered by regular, white police officers and those whites doing National Service.

What motivated him to serve? Simply ‘a selfish love of combat and life with a complete lack of routine…I was hooked on the adrenalin rush…adventure for the sake of adventure’ (Pg.267). Plus the opportunity between six week tours in the bush to drink, party and relax. By 1978 even with his experience no-one bothered to persuade him to stay, so the author left and ended up as an adviser to newly recruited UANC fighters, known as security force auxiliaries.

Little has been written about the ordinary black African role in Rhodesia’s insurgency; I exclude the Selous Scouts who were mainly turned ex-guerrillas. Loyalties were not fixed, the author recounts in the autumn of 1976 a captured guerrilla recruit claimed to be a serving policeman’s wife (Pg.79). Their motives were mixed, paid employment, revenge for some; they were loyal to the Support Unit and the BSAP – who ‘watched over them’ and like the French Foreign Legion ‘gave solid service in return’ (Pg.172).

The stance of the majority, rural African population in the Tribal Trust Lands facing violence from the guerrillas and the Rhodesian security forces was to steadily change. The Africans would claim ignorance of the guerrilla’s presence to actively supporting them. A good illustration at a Rhodesian firepower demonstration from an old African man asking ‘He said that if we are so powerful, why are there so many CTs in the bush? A good question’ (Pg.80).

Counterinsurgency warfare success is based on the security forces protecting the civilians from the insurgents; Rhodesia simply had extremely limited spending power, let alone forces able to live with the rural Africans and protect them (Pg.132). Personally I doubt the white Rhodesian government had the motivation to ever protect "their Africans", an attiude that hardened as the war developed.

This is a book which rightly concentrates on hunting insurgents, although criticisms of the Rhodesian approach abound, for example the lack of any briefing and debriefing (Pg.289). It helps to explain why Rhodesia failed to survive as the numbers of disaffected Africans grew, with so many leaving to join the nationalist guerrillas the security forces could not “hold the line”.

Worth reading, in part for the author's recollections and what can be learnt today. "Holding the line" is an appropriate phrase, yes a negotiated settlement was reached in 1979, but the "line" was simply full of holes and lacked after the Portuguese exit in 1974 strong foundations.

*Copied to Rhodesian COIN thread*.

[davidbfpo]

There is a separate thread on a book on Rhodesia's use of CBW, with 10k plus views and perhaps one day it will be merged here. See:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=24515

[davidbfpo]

One of the grimmer stories about the war was the discovery post-1980 of disused mine shafts, IIRC in the north east in 2011, with hundreds of bodies and the indication they had been killed, then dumped there.

A "lurker" talked about this story, quantifying the numbers were as high as five thousand and that they had been prisoners in custody awaiting trial. The pressures were immense and eventually a senior police officer, now deceased, came up with a "solution". The prisoners were shot by the police and dumped in the mine shafts.

Sadly there are rumours that Zimbabwe in the Super-Zapu insurgency in Matabeleland also resorted to such harsh measures.

[davidbfpo]

A "lurker" has pointed out that next month Mike Borlace's paperback book is published; it is called 'Spider Zero Seven'.

From Amazon:
Mike Borlace is considered to be one of the most experienced combat helicopter pilots of recent times. Now he collates his experiences in this compelling wartime memoir set against the backdrop of the civil war fought in Rhodesia during the 1970s.....Out of the 1096 days he served as a pilot in 7 Squadron, Borlace spent 739 days on combat operations. During his 149 contacts with the enemy he was shot down five times and wounded twice.Link:https://www.amazon.co.uk/Spider-Zero-Seven-Mike-Borlace/dp/1788038959/ref=sr_1_sc_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1516722544&sr=1-1-spell&keywords=mike+burlace

[davidbfpo]

Found via a BSAP History Group email as his medals are due for auction next month, a fascinating and rare account of a black African member of the Selous Scouts. The account opens with:
An extremely rare and important Silver Cross of Rhodesia group of four awarded to Sergeant, later Major, Martin Chikondo, a ‘Selous Scouts legend in the art of close-in reconnaissance,’ who was one of the early pioneers of the Selous Scouts and pseudo-warfare. He helped Reid-Daly implement his initial training programme and selection course for the Selous Scouts, prior to being one of the original members of the Recce Troop, Selous Scouts, with his mentor Chris Schulenburg.

Chikondo ‘had carried out countless missions deep in enemy territory with the master of close recce Captain Chris Schulenburg’, and accounted for innumerable terrorists during those missions and earlier operations for the Selous Scouts. Well versed in ‘long-range external reconnaissance operations in the form of two-man call signs, covering approximately 200 kilometres into enemy territory; introducing and executing last-light as well as night free-fall operations, using a separate provisions box under its own parachute; using World War II techniques for train derailments by command detonation, with slab as well as plastic explosives; external enemy telephone-line tapping; enemy target marking by the use of flares for off-set night bombing; and waterborne operations’, Chikondo went on to gain a commission and make the crossover into the army of Zimbabwe after the change of government in 1980.

Once again a pioneer, Chikondo was one of the first officers of the newly formed Zimbabwe Parachute Battalion. Subsequently serving with those he had fought against, despite most of the Selous Scouts moving en masse to South Africa with the change of regime, he went on to serve with distinction until his retirement from the Army in 1991.
Link: https://www.dnw.co.uk/auction-archive/past-catalogues/lot.php?auction_id=476&lot_id=311388 (https://www.dnw.co.uk/auctions/catalogue/lot.php?auction_id=476&lot_id=15094)

The account refers to the original Scouts formation:
The course commenced with about 120 African volunteers and eight Europeans....Psuedo operations and close-in recce...

Plus him visiting the UK in 1980, to explain what had happened to the Parachute Brigade; "kith & kin" at work.

[davidbfpo]

Years ago there were a famous pair, infamous to some, of British TV reporters in the later years of Rhodesia: Nick Downie (cameraman) and Robert Cecil (reporter). This week You Tube's algorithm produced their most famous report 'Rhodesian Bush War 1978', a very short film (7.5mins) of a Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) action in the bush; I had forgotten how vivid it was and noted his closing remarks became all too telling for Zimbabwe. There is a fuller documentary 'Frontline Rhodesia' (30 mins), alas that appears to remain in a TV company vault.
Link to the You Tube film clip:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPLFp9-zupc

As Nick Downie remarks in the film Richard Cecil was die in another action (explained later).

From a blogger an explanation for Nick Downie's success in filming:
Nick Downie, former SAS trooper turned war cameraman. Some of the nastiest fighting was documented by this chap throughout the 70's, 80's and 90's. His training allowed him to get closer than most would dare:
Link and note the focus is Dhofar & the SAS:http://mysecretwardhofar.blogspot.com/2011/12/looking-for-nick.html

It appears that Nick Downie wrote a critique of the Rhodesian campaign at the time. It opens with and my emphasis in bold:
The Guerrilla war in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is at the same time both a classic counter insurgency situation, yet unique in the methods employed against the insurgents. The author, a freelance cameraman and former soldier (having served in five campaigns, three times in the counter in surgency role, and twice as a guerrilla commander) spent six months in Rhodesia in 1978 filming the conduct of this campaign. His partner, journalist Lord Richard Cecil, was killed during contact between government troops and ZANU guerrillas. In his opinion, any professionally trained guerrilla force operating in the Rhodesian bush could have brought the country to its knees literally years ago.

This article outlines the methods employed in COIN duties within Rhodesia, specifically describing an operation by one of the elite Fire Force units of the Rhodesian Army......Indeed, the liberation armies of ZANU and ZAPU are arguably the worst guerrillas to have taken to the field this century.
Link:http://rhodesianforces.org/RhodesiaStudyinmilitaryincompetence.htm

(http://mysecretwardhofar.blogspot.com/2011/12/looking-for-nick.html)There is a fuller account of how Richard Cecil died on a blogsite ARSSE, once well known here in the UK. Earlier I used 'infamous' as both men wore Rhodesian uniform and carried a firearm - not something many journalists would do. This account gives IMHO a considered explanation.
Link:https://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threads/african-infantryman-of-the-year.126106/page-315#post-8125623
(https://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threads/african-infantryman-of-the-year.126106/page-315#post-8125623)
There is a main thread on Rhodesian COIN, with 303k views to date and one day this thread will be merged into it.
Link:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?2090-Rhodesian-COIN-(consolidated-thread-inc-original-RLI)

[davidbfpo]

Discovered this book via the BSAP History Group email. It was published in 2014 and is still available via the second link (in various formats).

The book summary:https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Rhodesian_Air_Force_Operations.html?id=yu3uBwAAQBA J&redir_esc=y

The publisher:https://www.lulu.com/shop/search.ep?keyWords=rhodesian&type=

[davidbfpo]

Once more a discovery thanks to the BSAP History Group email; again published in 2014 on a website I'd not seen before 'Our Rhodesian Heritage'.

It is a long report by a Special Branch officer on 'Operation Enterprise - The Battle for Salisbury' as the war ended, so to just after the elections. A few snippets: the US SF Master Sgt who joined the Army who was a spy; the use of motorcycles in the open ground and the value of intelligence. Most of the operation was conducted in the African rural areas around Salisbury (now Harare) and some in the city itself.

Link:http://rhodesianheritage.blogspot.com/2014/03/operation-enterprise-battle-for.html

[davidbfpo]

A set of medals is due to be auctioned and the bio sketch illustrates what the Selous Scouts did:
A scarce Rhodesian Military Division Order of the Legion of Merit pair awarded to Sergeant-Major A. J. Balaam, Selous Scouts, late Rhodesian Light Infantry, a master ‘pseudo-operator’ during the Bush War, who thought nothing of operating behind enemy lines for stints of a month at a time, often on his own in horrendous conditions, whilst co-ordinating multiple pseudo groups.

A Mortar expert, Balaam also suffered shrapnel wounds whilst serving on a covert operation against a Frelimo target in Mozambique. Over the course of five years’ service with the Selous Scouts he took part in the attack on Mapai in June 1976, and the notorious raid on Nyazonya, 9 August 1976, which resulted in the deaths of over 1,000 ZANLA insurgents (four Scouts wounded).

After the formation of Zimbabwe in 1980, Balaam was employed in 5 Reconnaissance, South African Defence Force, Special Forces. He subsequently became a civilian advisor responsible for training the Transkei Defence Force, and from there became involved with the training of both the Lesotho Liberation Army and the Ciskei Liberation Army. The latter led to a failed coup, 19 February 1987, which ultimately led to Balaam’s arrest.
Link:https://www.dnw.co.uk/auctions/catalogue/lot.php?auction_id=493&lot_id=50692

[davidbfpo]

Checked out their website just, quite a few articles to read and so enjoy.
Link:http://www.therli.com/

[davidbfpo]

I found this previously unknown website and a 'long read' on Rhodesia, which I have quickly skimmed through. Note the author appears to be sympathetic to the Rhodesian cause, but does include a first-hand witness to the situation faced by the mainly rural African population.
Link:https://www.psywar.org/content/rhodesia

The website's 'About Us' states:
PsyWar.Org is an archive of wartime aerial propaganda leaflets and research site for the history and techniques of psychological warfare, PSYOPS and information operations. The website which would become www.psywar.org (http://www.psywar.org) was first launched in mid-1997 by Lee Richards. Since then the site has established a reputation for primary research in this field and has built a large following from professionals working in the information, influence and social science spheres, educators, war studies students and those with a general interest in military history and propaganda.

[davidbfpo]

Copied from the Rhodesian COIN thread.

Discovered this likely "gem" looking for something else and I recognised the author's name. It is a short article (13 pgs) and opens with:
Any book about the Scouts would be incomplete without some reference to its earliest origins and how the Rhodesian Army became the first army we knew of to train army trackers as opposed to employing native or indigenous trackers, as the British did in Malaya and Borneo, with the Senoi Praaq and the Sarawak Rangers. To understand how the Rhodesian Army became the first to train and use army trackers, rather than recruiting local native trackers, I need to go back to explaining why my thinking was so different from that of my fellow officers. I grew up during the Second World War, fiercely proud of the role of Rhodesians in various theatres and could think of little but joining the army at the first opportunity. I could foresee at least twenty years of peace ahead of us and I did not want to be a peacetime soldier. Vaguely I could foresee a different kind of warfare emerging after that – guerilla warfare.
Link:http://pitchstonewaters.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Selous-Scout-story-Savory.pdf

There are a number of remarks on the wider context of being a tracker, after all the author became an open opponent of the Rhodesian government. His later career was as an ecologist. See:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allan_Savory

[davidbfpo]

Looking for something else I found this complimentary book review; the author Professor Timothy Stapleton is a Canadian and has written other books on warfare in Africa. Amazon states:
During the decolonization wars in East and Southern Africa, tracking became increasingly valuable as a military tactic. Drawing on archival research and interviews, Stapleton presents a comparative study of the role of tracking in insurgency and counter-insurgency across Kenya, Zimbabwe and Namibia.

One reviewer used to frequent here and in this post cited in part:
This book does an excellent job at weaving all the historical facts and figures around the players. It details the complete evolution of tracking as an effective counter-insurgency tool. .....As well, the sections on Rhodesia were also very enlightening with tons of information I was unaware of, as it relates to the development of tracking in the Rhodesian Security Forces from pre-Tracker Combat Unit to the Selous Scouts.
Link:https://www.amazon.com/Warfare-Tracking-1952-1990-Society-Culture-ebook/dp/B012W8BWKO/ref=sr_1_4?crid=2ZTMIN26WKCQ9&keywords=timothy+stapleton&qid=1559125764&s=books&sprefix=timothy+sta%2Caps%2C229&sr=1-4

The reviewer suggests readers track down the author's earlier article, which has a section on Rhodesia; free via this link:https://mantracking.files.wordpress.com/2017/07/bush-tracking-and-warfare-in-south-africa.pdf

[BayonetBrant]

Updating the link to my review of the RLI book that Mark Adams helped put together

https://www.armchairdragoons.com/articles/reviews/classic-reviews-africas-commandos-book/

(I'm working over at a new site, and have re-pub'ed some of my older content there)v

[davidbfpo]

I don't think this report has appeared here; caveat this is a large thread.

Discovered via the BSAP History Group and it is a scanned copy (174 pgs), the main author being Bruce Hoffman and available for free via:https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/groupsioattachments/61171/74548006/746/1?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJECNKOVMCCU3ATNQ&Expires=1591276652&Signature=RWrxLxwZXOm3zpwyyqPlmmZlRz4%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3D%22rhodesian+less ons.pdf%22

(https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/groupsioattachments/61171/74548006/746/1?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJECNKOVMCCU3ATNQ&Expires=1591276652&Signature=RWrxLxwZXOm3zpwyyqPlmmZlRz4%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3D%22rhodesian+less ons.pdf%22)

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to Jon Custis for spotting that Charles Melson has written 'Fighting for Time: Rhodesia's Military and Zimbabwe’s Independence', which has been published in the UK and USA by Casemate Publishers. It has to date on rating and one very short review.

Links to Amazon sites (there are other publishers): https://www.amazon.com/Fighting-Time-Rhodesias-Zimbabwes-Independence/dp/1952715067/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1624999730&sr=1-1 and https://www.amazon.co.uk/Fighting-Time-Rhodesias-Zimbabwes-Independence/dp/1952715067/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=fighting+for+time&qid=1624999836&s=books&sr=1-1

The author's bio:
Charles D. “Chuck” Melson served as the Chief Historian for the U.S. Marine Corps, at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps in Washington, DC, and the Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia. His military service included 25 years as a U.S. Marine. For some 23 years he wrote, co-authored, or edited official publications and series. Chuck was also a joint historian with the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command. He received the General Edwin Simmons-Henry Shaw Award for public historians, the General Leonard Chapman Medal for professional military educators, and the commemorative Rhodesian Independence Medal.

Parts of the book can be found on Google Books: https://books.google.bs/books?id=iv0hEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA5&lpg=PA5&dq=jon+custis+marine&source=bl&ots=PP0a-1ZoQ-&sig=ACfU3U1vc5eKIUy4KI2yhJnsovf-sY5iQg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwizqvzRsrnxAhUNTjABHR0XAJcQ6AEwCHoECAsQA g

[davidbfpo]

I know a review of Melson's book is due in the journal Small Wars & Insurgencies.

Awaiting my attention and time is a book published in Zimbabwe, in 2020 and available via Bush War Books in South Africa: 'A Brutal State of Affairs: The rise and fall of Rhodesia' by Henrik Ellert and Dennis Anderson, both were police officers, in the Special Branch at the time. Two reviews and five ratings on: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Brutal-State-Affairs-Rise-Rhodesia-ebook/product-reviews/B088RLZX1S/ref=cm_cr_dp_d_show_all_btm?ie=UTF8&reviewerType=all_reviews

[davidbfpo]

I still add updates here - partly as this thread continues to get many visits (754k till today).

Today I received an article by Dr. Robert Lyman, ex-UK Army and now a military historian on the Rhodesian War; it was published a year ago today. It is a critical commentary and some of the links / names have appeared here before. See: https://robertlyman.substack.com/p/black-and-white-or-how-to-lose-a