Gavins Paratroopers

[sgmgrumpy]

You could spend all day at this site. Huge informational site on past/present US and other country airborne force operations.


GAVIN'S PARATROOPERS
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/7963/paratrooper.htm

[Rifleman]

I confess I have spent all day on that site.

I've got mixed feelings about Mike Sparks though. He does have some pretty good ideas about some things but he's a little far fetched about others. He's also not helping himself, credibility wise, with his well known anti Marine Corps bias.

HE ALSO LIKES TO EMPHASIZE KEY THOUGHTS IN CAPITAL LETTERS AND IT LOOKS LIKE HE'S SHOUTING AT YOU IN PRINT!

I guess it's not so much what Sparks says but the way he says it that rubs some the wrong way.

[slapout9]

Here is audio interview with General Gavin before his death. Most people do not know that he went on to become CEO of the consulting group Arthur D. Little in Cambridge,Massachusetts. Be prepared for an ear burning session as he pulls no punches. The link is listed below #509 Military Security Blankets.



http://www.library.ucsb.edu/speccoll/csdi/a8185.html

[120mm]

I confess I have spent all day on that site.

I've got mixed feelings about Mike Sparks though. He does have some pretty good ideas about some things but he's a little far fetched about others. He's also not helping himself, credibility wise, with his well known anti Marine Corps bias.

HE ALSO LIKES TO EMPHASIZE KEY THOUGHTS IN CAPITAL LETTERS AND IT LOOKS LIKE HE'S SHOUTING AT YOU IN PRINT!

I guess it's not so much what Sparks says but the way he says it that rubs some the wrong way.

Mike Sparks appears to be pretty much a nut-case. Go to this link to read and enjoy:

http://63.99.108.76/forums/index.php?showtopic=19719

[William F. Owen]

Mike Sparks appears to be pretty much a nut-case. Go to this link to read and enjoy:

http://63.99.108.76/forums/index.php?showtopic=19719

It's easy to dismiss Sparks as a nut case but that would be a huge mistake.

I think, and have told him at some length, that I strongly disagree with most of his ideas. I think his military thought is mostly wrong and possibly dangerous.

Now,

1. Mike Sparks is, IMO, actually two or even three people. I think "he" does amazon reviews under the name Sam Damon. I also have e-mails from him that appear to be written by different people. He does exist, I have spoken to him and know men who knew him in the USMC, but there are some others voices out there.

2. His out put is phenomenal. He has literally 100's of web pages across several sites. Some contain excellent historical information. As far as I can tell he works full time on his web sites, and even managed to buy a surplus CH-47 fuselage for some project. - he has resources, and capability.

3. His capacity to influence people is truly extraordinary. Look at the list of authors for "Air-Mech Strike". Some of these guys are smart, well respected men who agreed to work with Sparks. Some of the people on his forum are outstanding individuals and very knowledgeable, or experienced soldiers, and subject matter experts. He has convinced several companies to invest time and money in his projects. The Battle Box being one.

All in all, "we" may dismiss Sparks, but when "he" is sitting across the table from some Senator, or some staffer is writing briefs based on what 'former Marine Officer and Paratrooper, Mike Sparks' is telling them, then you have a cat of a whole different colour.

[SWJED]

Sparks stole whole pages from my old MOUT Homepage web site and published them as his own and sent long ranting e-mails to me that went unread after the first. Haven't heard from him in years and I am the better for it.

[Steve Blair]

Sparks stole whole pages from my old MOUT Homepage web site and published them as his own and sent long ranting e-mails to me that went unread after the first. Haven't heard from him in years and I am the better for it.

And practices like that make it pretty easy for him to "maintain" tons of web pages. Much easier when you 'borrow' your content.

[slapout9]

Hi Wilf, I think you may well be right in that he is more than one person. Also he picks and chooses the pieces of Gavin's writings that support what are I guess are his theories, while he overlooks some critical aspects of Gavin's thinking on the future of warfare.

Hi Dave, As a long time reader of the MOUT page before the creation of the SWJ/SWC I thought some of the material looked very familiar:eek:

[Rifleman]

I've never corresponded with Sparks but here's my take on him. I think he is one man but he does use various names. In addition to Mike Sparks he's been known to post under Sam Damon Jr., dynmicpara, and truthteller (truthseeker?). Those are the ones I know of.

It amazes me how he can go from what I'd consider good, reasonable ideas to utter lunacy.

He had an article about an advanced tactical parachute that I thought made sense. He's also advocated modern rifle grenades and pointed out that current models do not need a blank cartridge to fire them, they're shoot through or bullet trap styles. I don't see anything really weird about either of those proposals.

Then he starts ranting on about making the entire Army Air-Mech and disbanding the Marine Corps. He sees the M113A-whatever model number he's up to now, as the answer to almost any problem. He loves aircraft but hates the Osprey. One wonders if he would love the Osprey if it had been an Army project.

And anyone who doesn't agree with him is a NARCISSIST!, who has "LIGHTITIS!," and DOES NOT UNDERSTAND MODERN WAR!

I wonder if he's just mad, or if time will prove him a mad genius.

[Ski]

Sparks is his worst enemy, and that's why he will never be as influential as he could have been. It's amazing to see what an overblown ego can do to a person.

[Mike Sparks]

General Gavin's EXACT thoughts in DETAIL are posted below:

Airborne Warfare
www.combatreform.com/airbornewarfare.htm

Cavalry
www.combatreform.com/cavalryandidontmeanhorses.htm

War & Peace in the Space Age
www.combatreform.com/warandpeaceinthespaceage.htm

Crisis Now
www.combatreform.com/crisisnow.htm

FYI "Small Wars" is a bogus BS USMC self-oriented term that is fundamentally ignorant of reality. There are two basic types of wars; Nation-State Wars (NSW) and sub-national conflicts (SNCs).

www.geocities.com/transformationunderfire

Maximizing violence as required for NSWs is the wrong organizational principle with the wrong type of people for SNCs. We need an older, more mature, THINKING, non-egomaniac group of adults dedicated and equipped specifically for SNCs that SMOTHERS violence:

www.combatreform.com/johnpaulvann.htm

The 19th Century-linear culture USMC weak ego lemming is the wrong person for SNCs and modern, non-linear NSWs; though the U.S. Army Airborne Paratrooper who THINKS and takes initiative is a good place to begin if screened not to have narcissistic personality disorder and is older than 25 who practices SNC tasks. We tried using light NSW forces for SNCs and have failed miserably since they have an anti-physical, anti-mechanized and anti-engineering bias due to their narcissism. Narcissism is the #1 problem and threat to the U.S. military and our nation's survival. Humility is not just moral its functional; without it we are lost.

To prevail in SNCs we will need a totally different type of organization, equipment and people not just "full-spectrum" racketeers driven by greed and ego.

AIRBORNE!

Mike

[Norfolk]

Having reviewed a fair bit of your work over the past few months, Mike, I have to say that an Air-Mechanized concept for Airborne Infantry is certainly a concept worth considering and developing.

But why the M-113? While I quite agree that the LAV/Stryker is quite unsuitable for anything but Aid to the Civil Power and Internal Security (it was after all, originally designed as an armoured car for Police use, and is quite suited to ACP and IS), the M-113 has been a known horror from the beginning. Even after the original M-113 had its petrol engine cashed in for the diesel, it was still a death trap if its aluminium-magnesium alloy structure caught fire. You literally had only seconds to get out if something happened before the magnesium ignited and the aluminim melted. One Canadian officer in the 70's risked his life to pull two GI's out of a burning M-113 after an accident on an ex in southern Germany - everyone was amazed that any of them survived. In Vietnam, noone wanted to ride inside it in case it was set alight by enemy RPGs, mines, or roadside bombs.

Apart from the hard ride it gives, the alloy structure of the M-113 is potentially lethal to its occupants. That's why the British switched back to steel construction for warships after the Falklands War, and the US Navy a few years later - the alloy ignites rapidly and melts so quickly that men often don't have time to get away like they would with a steel structure. Wouldn't a light, tracked APC of all-steel construction be rather preferable if such a vehicle could be made available instead of the M-113 (albeit necessarily being heavier than the M-113, as a result)?

[William F. Owen]

@ Having reviewed a fair bit of your work over the past few months, Mike, I have to say that an Air-Mechanized concept for Airborne Infantry is certainly a concept worth considering and developing.

@ But why the M-113? While I quite agree that the LAV/Stryker is quite unsuitable for anything but Aid to the Civil Power and Internal Security (it was after all, originally designed as an armoured car for Police use, and is quite suited to ACP and IS), the M-113 has been a known horror from the beginning.

Can't believe I'm back posting on a Mike Sparks thread, but welcome Mike. Kinda of curious to see how you perform.

@ Have you read the book? Makes things far from clear in my opinion.

@ The M-113 is good design once you do all the stuff that needs to be done. Give it, some work,
http://www.nimda.co.il/projects2.html
and it ends up as pretty useable, but everything is a trade off. The weight of M-113 that can be lifted by CH-47 is a sub-capable death trap. However, most of the standard complaints about the M-113 can be solved.

You do need other types of vehicle to give you the required operational mobility. The modified M-113 is good for some situations. M-113 still dies very quick against IEDs compared to MRAP

[Rifleman]

Mike,

I apologize if my previous two posts on this thread offended you. I have never met you personally or corresponded with you so I'm not qualified to pass judgment on you.

In my defense, although I disparaged you on some things I also complemented you on others. So I've tried to consider the totality of what your writings, please consider the totality of what I've said. In any event, I will refrain from saying anything negative in the future unless the criticism is intended to be constructive.

Oh, and I'm afraid typing in caps does look like shouting in print to me. I admit that no one made me the authority on internet etiquette but I have read many others saying the same thing. It's not an attempt to be PC at anything, just courteous and civil in our exchanges.

[Rex Brynen]

FYI "Small Wars" is a bogus BS USMC self-oriented term that is fundamentally ignorant of reality. There are two basic types of wars; Nation-State Wars (NSW) and sub-national conflicts (SNCs).

This sort of typology survives contact with reality even less well than does the term "small wars."

Very few states around the world are "nation states," a term that technically refers to a high degree of congruence between ethno-national identity and state borders. Indeed, it is precisely because so many states are NOT nation-states, but rather consist of multiple ethnonational groups that spill across political boundaries, that they generate so much ethnic, separatist, or irredentist conflict (Chad/Darfur/Sudan being an excellent example). Interstate wars would be a better term for what you are trying to describe.

Moreover, most civil wars have significant interstate component, whether due to external support for local combatants, or because of direct intervention by neighbours (DR Congo being a case in point). "Subnational conflicts" therefore doesn't work very well for these.

[SWJED]

<snip>

FYI "Small Wars" is a bogus BS USMC self-oriented term that is fundamentally ignorant of reality. There are two basic types of wars; Nation-State Wars (NSW) and sub-national conflicts (SNCs).

<snip>

The 19th Century-linear culture USMC weak ego lemming is the wrong person for SNCs and modern, non-linear NSWs; though the U.S. Army Airborne Paratrooper who THINKS and takes initiative is a good place to begin if SCREENED TO NOT HAVE NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER and is OLDER than 25 who practices SNC tasks. We tried using light NSW forces for SNCs and have failed miserably since they have an anti-physical, anti-mechanized and anti-engineering bias due to their narcissism. Narcissism is the #1 problem and threat to the U.S. military and our nation's survival. Humility is not just moral its FUNCTIONAL; without it we are lost.

To prevail in SNCs we will need a totally different type of organization, equipment and people not just "full-spectrum" racketeers driven by greed and ego.

AIRBORNE!

Mike

P.S. I didn't get the BS PC "memo" that usings CAPS to communicate means shouting or whatever. As a FREE MAN in a FREE COUNTRY I will communicate as I damn well please using the pre-PC BS conventions that if you will look included CAPPING WORDS.

Not a good start and you do not dictate house rules here. This is our house, act accordingly.

[Rex Brynen]

Not a good start and you do not dictate house rules here. This is our house, act accordingly.

You're just saying that because you suffer from NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER, you weak ego lemming you ;)

[Steve Blair]

Oh, and I'm afraid typing in caps does look like shouting in print to me. I admit that no one made me the authority on internet etiquette but I have read many others saying the same thing. It's not an attempt to be PC at anything, just courteous and civil in our exchanges.

Typing in all caps is considered shouting on the Internet. Has been for many, many years in fact (going back to at least 1995). And it's not tolerated here. There is no "memo" regarding this...it's common Internet standard. It falls under the "if you'd get punched in a bar for saying it, don't type it" framework. Or, to fit the privately-funded forum concept better, "if you'd get punched for saying it in your host's living room, don't say it."

And I have yet to see any historical evidence (to go back to an earlier point, not yours, Rifleman) that paratroopers are automatically any better at small wars than any other trooper. Psychobabble does not make this so (unless we have a holodeck handy...which I seem to have missed).

[ibnEpaminondas]

I know that General Gavin's name and the M113 have no connection, but I saw Mike Sparks' name, along with his standard MO, in this thread and thought that he might like read the story link below.

I sincerely hope that Mike uses this news (http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/07/army_vehicles_072108w/) to reinvent himself and do something a little more productive. The potential is there...

[SWJED]

This thread should die - but when it comes to mikey - it is a slow and painful death. If only he had passed his swim test as a Marine 2nd Lt we might have been spared all the pain and agony of his Internet rants and raves.

Hell hath no fury like a Marine scorned...

[SWJED]

“…I know it when I see it.”

What Sparks' doesn't get - from our about page:

“Small Wars” is an imperfect term used to describe a broad spectrum of spirited continuation of politics by other means, falling somewhere in the middle bit of the continuum between feisty diplomatic words and global thermonuclear war. The Small Wars Journal embraces that imperfection.

Just as friendly fire isn’t, there isn’t necessarily anything small about a Small War.

The term “Small War” either encompasses or overlaps with a number of familiar terms such as counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, support and stability operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and many flavors of intervention. Operations such as noncombatant evacuation, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance will often either be a part of a Small War, or have a Small Wars feel to them. Small Wars involve a wide spectrum of specialized tactical, technical, social, and cultural skills and expertise, requiring great ingenuity from their practitioners. The Small Wars Manual (a wonderful resource, unfortunately more often referred to than read) notes that:

Small Wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small Wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.

The “three block war” construct employed by General Krulak is exceptionally useful in describing the tactical and operational challenges of a Small War and of many urban operations. Its only shortcoming is that is so useful that it is often mistaken as a definition or as a type of operation.

We’d like to deploy a primer on Small Wars that provides more depth than this brief section. Your suggestions and contributions of content are welcome.

[slapout9]

“…I know it when I see it.”

What Sparks' doesn't get - from our about page:

“Small Wars” is an imperfect term used to describe a broad spectrum of spirited continuation of politics by other means, falling somewhere in the middle bit of the continuum between feisty diplomatic words and global thermonuclear war. The Small Wars Journal embraces that imperfection.

Just as friendly fire isn’t, there isn’t necessarily anything small about a Small War.

The term “Small War” either encompasses or overlaps with a number of familiar terms such as counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, support and stability operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and many flavors of intervention. Operations such as noncombatant evacuation, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance will often either be a part of a Small War, or have a Small Wars feel to them. Small Wars involve a wide spectrum of specialized tactical, technical, social, and cultural skills and expertise, requiring great ingenuity from their practitioners. The Small Wars Manual (a wonderful resource, unfortunately more often referred to than read) notes that:

Small Wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small Wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.

The “three block war” construct employed by General Krulak is exceptionally useful in describing the tactical and operational challenges of a Small War and of many urban operations. Its only shortcoming is that is so useful that it is often mistaken as a definition or as a type of operation.

We’d like to deploy a primer on Small Wars that provides more depth than this brief section. Your suggestions and contributions of content are welcome.


Dave, then start with Gavin without Sparks. Gavin called them Brush fire wars...and he also said that the USMC would be in an excellant position to fight them because of their forward deployment as a Sea based force. I met Gavin 3 times before his death(at his second home in Winter Park,Fl.) and he always spoke highly of the USMC in person and in his writings. I guess my point is don't throw the baby out with the bathwater.

[William F. Owen]

This thread should die - but when it comes to mikey - it is a slow and painful death. If only he had passed his swim test as a Marine 2nd Lt we might have been spared all the pain and agony of his Internet rants and raves.

Hell hath no fury like a Marine scorned...




I sincerely hope that Mike uses this news (http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/07/army_vehicles_072108w/) to reinvent himself and do something a little more productive. The potential is there...

I am certainly no defender of Mike Sparks, (who ever and how ever many people he may be) and he/they is/are his/their own worst enemy/ies, but the issues he/they raises are sometimes deserving of careful study. (and some are moon screamer out there!)

The M113 fiasco is his best known effort. Some of issues Mike raises (usually in error and usually over stated) ask some very serious questions about issues that reside at the very heart of military thought, and its relationships with technology and industry - and even though he comes off as some ranting extremist, a lot of his ideas, stripped of their emotional and abusive content, are more main stream than is comfortable for many.

[William F. Owen]

We’d like to deploy a primer on Small Wars that provides more depth than this brief section. Your suggestions and contributions of content are welcome.

If I may venture an opening line:

"Small Wars are neither small or wars in terms of relative and conventional understanding. Despite the fact that both the words are inaccurate and misleading, but they are useful...."

[Norfolk]

[] a lot of his ideas [] are more main stream than is comfortable for many.

Having to give credit where credit is due, Mike Sparks is at least due that as well as a few other things. As to the Moon Screamers, it goes without saying that if such flubs didn't occurr with depressing and unsettling regularity, then Sparks et al. wouldn't have much credibility. Extremes beget their opposites.

[Rifleman]

Giving credit where credit is due: Sparks' proposal to mechanize the combat support companies in parachute battalions doesn't seem outlandish to me. Some airborne forces have light tracked armor but the US makes do with up-armored Hummers.

I believe Sparks' idea was that the company's vehicles could continue to be used as platforms for crew served weapons (like the Hummers are now), transport one of the rifle companies, or serve as something like a cav troop of sorts for the battalion commander. I may not be understanding that exactly right, but I think that's more or less what he envisioned.

So, assuming that the M113 isn't the best option for that role, what light tracked armor would be suitable that can be airdropped? The German Weisel? Something else?

There are some cav types on this board who should have some good ideas. I never experienced anything heavier than leather personel carriers or the old 1/4 ton jeeps, so I have no idea what can or can't be airdropped and what the logistical problems are.

[MikeF]

I've served in heavy and light (airborne) units in combat.

With tongue partially in cheek, here's my voice- platform is irrelevant.

For an airfield seizure, scouts should jump in (dismounted) prior to main body (old LRSD mission). Scouts survey subsequent drop zones for enemy activity providing brigade commander accurate picture of DZ.

After infantry seizes airfields, planes land and reconnaissance vehicles exit the aircraft...no air drop...just a landing. Then, scouts mount and expand the BCT's terrain.

I know this is short, but it's valid. Too many old NCO's traded stories of failed efforts to drop an LRAS and scout HMMWV. The initial shock of an airborne seizure provides the needed time to land recon vehicles....

Oh BTW, the M113 is not a recon vehicle. I'd prefer a Harley or a gater with a .240 mounted over an M113.

I think we had it right with the XVIIth Airborne concept: 82nd BCT seizes airfield followed by a mechanize IRC from 3ID (tank platoon/bradley platoon with HQ) concept.

It works.

v/r

Mike

[Tom Odom]

Concept in the 70s was to LAPES (low altitude parachute extraction system) an M551 Sheridan battalion in for the "heavy element" rather than heavy drop, which was tried and did work but not as reliably as LAPSE. That is if the C130 crews got LAPES approach --speed, altitude, and attitude of AC correct. This concept goes back into the 50s and 60s. According to global security LAPES (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/systems/lapes.htm) is no longer an active TTP

Of course we were no where near as well equipped for this as the Soviets with the BMD and BMP. They had a larger tolerance for drop associated losses.

Best

Tom

[Ken White]

... Too many old NCO's traded stories of failed efforts to drop an LRAS and scout HMMWV...Can't talk to either of them but my steed in the early 60s was an M151 that survived ten heavy drops -- and I can put a 151 most places you can put a track and a lot of places you won't put either a no ground clearance Gator or a heavy Harley...
Oh BTW, the M113 is not a recon vehicle. I'd prefer a Harley or a gater with a .240 mounted over an M113.That said, the 113, particularly with a Soucy track, is a good scout vehicle, it's small, fast, reliable and fairly quiet. The 114 was even better in it's recommended upgrade -- the problem is that the US Army does not want a Scout vehicle. Every attempt to buy one has foundered.

The Armor community is too wedded to the northern Europe end of WW II version of reconnaissance -- "We're too impatient to do recon by stealth, we just got out looking for trouble and to do that, you have to have Armor." There's some merit to that idea in some situations but it doesn't have to be that way and it's rarely the best way.
I think we had it right with the XVIIth Airborne concept: 82nd BCT seizes airfield followed by a mechanize IRC from 3ID (tank platoon/bradley platoon with HQ) concept...It works.True -- for some situations; METT-TC again rears its pretty little head... :D

[William F. Owen]

Giving credit where credit is due: Sparks' proposal to mechanize the combat support companies in parachute battalions doesn't seem outlandish to me. Some airborne forces have light tracked armor but the US makes do with up-armored Hummers.

I believe Sparks' idea was that the company's vehicles could continue to be used as platforms for crew served weapons (like the Hummers are now), transport one of the rifle companies, or serve as something like a cav troop of sorts for the battalion commander. I may not be understanding that exactly right, but I think that's more or less what he envisioned.

I was somewhat involved in the original Mike Sparks group discussion on this, and I am certainly not claiming credit for anything, but what it came down to was that it simply made no sense to try and drop an M-113 equipped infantry battalion. What did seem to have merit was adding a small number of M-113s to provide whatever basic capability they brought to the party.


So, assuming that the M113 isn't the best option for that role, what light tracked armor would be suitable that can be airdropped? The German Weisel? Something else?

There are some cav types on this board who should have some good ideas. I never experienced anything heavier than leather personel carriers or the old 1/4 ton jeeps, so I have no idea what can or can't be airdropped and what the logistical problems are.

What is an M113?? There is vast difference between the original A1 and the some of the stuff that has recently been prototyped by RAFAEL and others. Some iterations are incredibly capable, but they tip the scales at >18,000kg

Personally, for modern operations, I think it is generally waste of time to airdrop an AFV. Yes, everyone can come up with a mission where it may have to be done, but I submit they are/will become incredibly rare and the effort does not match the reward.

That being said, there is massive and obvious merit in creating a reasonably armoured vehicle that is as light as possible, with a reduce signature and small logistic foot print. For various reasons the M113 is not an ideal starting point. Personally I favour the UK CVR-T as the basis for future thinking in relation to tracked vehicles.

[120mm]

I would question airborne operations above an LRS/SOF team level at all.

If you boil away all the hype, the best reason I can think of to retain airborne cabilities, is that it preserves the only light infantry the US Army is apparently capable of keeping. If you take away the airborne-specific requirements, our "light" infantry goes to war in 10 foot tall, 140 ton vehicles that cannot travel off-road. WITH reflective belts on, of course.

(I am being partially sarcastic, of course.)

IMO, we can project power properly, or we cannot. The US will never actually put a large unit at risk, doing Airborne ops properly, so they serve no practical purpose, except to preserve the "Airborne Spirit", IMO.

Now that I've ticked off my Airborne friends, it's time to go after my fellow Cavalrymen: Frankly, it's been about the vehicle for too long. Recon needs to become a mission.

I would recommend that CAV be divorced, permanently, from the Armor community, and become it's own deal. I'd tear MI completely down, and restructure collection, analysis and dissemination into a new branch.

I've found more than once, that there is a bit of "Sparky" in me, as well....

[Ken White]

I would question airborne operations above an LRS/SOF team level at all.even if you are wrong... :D
IMO, we can project power properly, or we cannot. The US will never actually put a large unit at risk, doing Airborne ops properly, so they serve no practical purpose, except to preserve the "Airborne Spirit", IMO.I've discovered that use of the word never with respect to the US is not a good idea. We have surprised a number of people over the years by doing things we were not supposed to do. As I just told Reed on another thread, Omar Bradley in 1949 said there'd never be another major amphibious operation -- and a year so later, there I was at Inchon... :cool:

Never's not a good word.

Be that as it may, a lot of folks question parachute units just as you do. I've been listening to 'em for about fifty or more years -- and the units are still here because, as expensive as they are, they offer a capability that cannot at this time be matched in any other way. As to the "Airborne Spirit" there's some truth in that; not least in that the kids know three things; they stand an excellent chance in a combat jump of never getting to the ground alive (and they'll still go); they are probably going to fight outnumbered and surrounded and the other guy better watch out (Hey, long as they believe, who am I to argue...); and like Privates in every Army in the world, they get covered up with manure daily; like Privates in every Army in the world, they dig out and smile -- they just know they do it faster and smile bigger than most. :D
Now that I've ticked off my Airborne friends, it's time to go after my fellow Cavalrymen: Frankly, it's been about the vehicle for too long. Recon needs to become a mission. As an old Cav Guy (whose last TCPC run was in an M41A1C...), I totally and wholeheartedly agree with that.

[William F. Owen]

Never's not a good word.

Be that as it may, a lot of folks question parachute units just as you do. I've been listening to 'em for about fifty or more years -- and the units are still here because, as expensive as they are, they offer a capability that cannot at this time be matched in any other way.

All true, but the current military view of parachute operations does seem to be stuck in a pretty archaic paradigm - and that may have to change, I see military parachuting in dire need of change. Things have come on a lot since 1944 or even 1983.

Having said that, troop carrying gliders went away for reasons that I never really understood, (Bang to bust in < 10 years) so I think some more thinking may be called for on my part!

[Ken White]

All true, but the current military view of parachute operations does seem to be stuck in a pretty archaic paradigm - and that may have to change, I see military parachuting in dire need of change. Things have come on a lot since 1944 or even 1983.need to take a look at current doctrine. Having left reasonably good and functional airplanes (with occasionally marginal crews... ;) ) for a good many of the years between the two you cite, I'm pleasantly surprised at todays approach; different as day and night, as they say. No one is looking at Division drops, and only rarely at Brigade sized ops. Nor does anyone want to do a drop on a potentially hot DZ -- or indeed do a drop at all if it can be avoided. Still, particularly in HIC there is a worthwhile capability.
Having said that, troop carrying gliders went away for reasons that I never really understood, (Bang to bust in < 10 years) so I think some more thinking may be called for on my part!Well less than ten, really -- only about four or five with any real use. Four problems with the concept led to that; lack of controllability as they slowed and neared the ground resulting in excess dispersion (among other things); difficulty in arriving at a successful merging of strength and lightness in gliders (and a concomitant light load -- except for the Gigant) -- and the high casualty count on assaults (all in WW II except Eban Emael; good op, bad precedent) resulting from those two problems; the training and use of the Glider Pilots (the Germans, UK, US and USSR used three different solutions, none was entirely satisfactory); lastly, the use of towing aircraft wasn't a terribly efficient use of airframes. IIRC, there was a post WW II study and the towing aircraft suffered far more kills per capita in ops with Gliders than did pure drop aircraft.

The only big Glider with useful capacity was the Me 321 Gigant. It didn't do at all well as a Glider and later had engines added and was the first good large military transport. The US tried two big ones, the CG 13 and CG 16 but neither was successful. We also tried an un-engined C47 Dakota as an XCG 17 Glider -- it didn't work either.

Todays manufacturing can probably fix the strength / weight issue and the towing aircraft problem may be addressable with todays power capability but the other two difficulties will remain. Could be solved, I suppose but I'm not at all sure there's any value added. The only real use for parachute unit capability is entry into denied space at medium to long distances and those distances mitigate against towing Gliders.

[Rifleman]

.....troop carrying gliders went away for reasons that I never really understood, (Bang to bust in < 10 years) so I think some more thinking may be called for on my part!

Going to come up with some kind of 21st Century stealth glider, are you? :cool:

[Tom Odom]

The only big Glider with useful capacity was the Me 321 Gigant. It didn't do at all well as a Glider and later had engines added and was the first good large military transport. The US tried two big ones, the CG 13 and CG 16 but neither was successful. We also tried an un-engined C47 Dakota as an XCG 17 Glider -- it didn't work either.

Ken

Don't forget that the C-123 airframe was originally concieved as a glider.


The C-123 Provider (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C-123_Provider)was designed originally as an assault glider aircraft for the United States Air Force (USAF) by Chase Aircraft as the XCG-20 (Chase designation MS-8 Avitruc)[1]. Two powered variants of the XCG-20 were developed during the early 1950s, as the XC-123 and XC-123A. The only difference between the two was the engine. The XC-123 used two Pratt & Whitney R-2800-CB-15 air-cooled radial piston engines, while the XC-123A used two General Electric J47-GE-11 turbojets, the same as those on the Boeing B-47 Stratojet. It was initially well regarded for tactical troop transport for its ruggedness and reliability and ability to operate from short and unimproved airstrips, which meant the low slung turbojets, prone to ingesting foreign objects, were dropped in favor of the more conventional option. The XC-123A had its engines replaced with R-2800s and was redesignated YC-123D.

Agree strenuously that never is a word doomed to failure when it comes to military operations. The 101st air assault was a modern application of earlier theories and attempted ops. I wondered in 1992 what would have happened with XVIII Anb Corps had CINCENT Stormin Norman not outlawed all mention of airborned operations. The bridges would have been classic targets.

And there is no substitute for having the capacity to put troops on the ground in weird places when time is critical. Just having the card in one's military deck is of tremendous benefit.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Going to come up with some kind of 21st Century stealth glider, are you? :cool:

Nah! I'm happy risking my effort on far less exotic endeavours, and researching the doctrinal and intellectual blocks to designing decent armoured vehicles is likely to be far more achievable and useful!

[William F. Owen]

And there is no substitute for having the capacity to put troops on the ground in weird places when time is critical. Just having the card in one's military deck is of tremendous benefit.

Tom

Concur without question. I would never agree to the total loss of the ability to deploy infantry units via parachute.

However the fact that no one in NATO, that I am aware of, has yet done a unit sized high altitude stand off drop, or is even attempting to develop the capability, suggests to me that the thought in this area may be lacking.

If modern airborne Ops are still focused on dumping sticks of troops along linear DZs at between 250-1,000 ft AGL, then things are not really progressing.

[Rifleman]

Let me see if I can steer this thread in a slightly different direction: why do we need separate parachute and air assault units?

Give parachute units the organic lift they need (or "marry" each parachute brigade with an aviation brigade in garrison per Col. MacGregor), train the troopers in air assault ops, and call it good to go. A lot of this already occurs anyway. I never went to air assault school, yet airmoble operations were routine in my battalion and I had periodic classes in basic rappelling and pathfinder ops.

[Steve Blair]

Let me see if I can steer this thread in a slightly different direction: why do we need separate parachute and air assault units?

Give parachute units the organic lift they need (or "marry" each parachute brigade with an aviation brigade in garrison per Col. MacGregor), train the troopers in air assault ops, and call it good to go. A lot of this already occurs anyway. I never went to air assault school, yet airmoble operations were routine in my battalion and I had periodic classes in basic rappelling and pathfinder ops.

Actually something like this was attempted with the 11th AAD(Test)...otherwise known as the First Cavalry Division. The original concept called for an entire brigade to be airborne qualified (meaning that MacGregor's idea isn't all that new), and the Howze Board plan had a great deal more fixed-wing aviation than ended up in the final model. The airborne brigade was scrapped due to a shortage of paratroopers (by about mid-1966 if not sooner). The 173rd also had a hand in developing some airmobile techniques that later became associated with the First Cav (and other units).

[jkm_101_fso]

Let me see if I can steer this thread in a slightly different direction: why do we need separate parachute and air assault units?

Give parachute units the organic lift they need (or "marry" each parachute brigade with an aviation brigade in garrison per Col. MacGregor), train the troopers in air assault ops, and call it good to go. A lot of this already occurs anyway. I never went to air assault school, yet airmoble operations were routine in my battalion and I had periodic classes in basic rappelling and pathfinder ops.

We don't need to separate them. I'm pretty confident the 82nd does just as many, if not more AA Ops than 101 in Combat and CONUS.

There is absolutely no necessity to be AA qualified to get on a helicopter and get off one...you are correct. AA school or PF school will prep those that need to slingload equipment...even then, some OJT can train anyone to do that job. I know that in 101, the NCO or Officer that signs the 7382-R has to be AA or PF qualified; or at least that was the standard in my BDE.

IMO, in the 70s when the 101st became "airmobile", then eventually "air assault", it was more out of nostalgia of keeping the Division "special"...since they weren't airborne anymore. Air Assault school is more of a right of passage for Soldiers; and a requirement for green tabbers at Campbell.

I've done AA ops with the IRAQI ARMY...so trust me, there is no special qualifications. Although I will admit, their exit from a chinook after landing was just as fast and proficient as any 101 unit I was with!!!

[Ken White]

...However the fact that no one in NATO, that I am aware of, has yet done a unit sized high altitude stand off drop, or is even attempting to develop the capability, suggests to me that the thought in this area may be lacking.

If modern airborne Ops are still focused on dumping sticks of troops along linear DZs at between 250-1,000 ft AGL, then things are not really progressing.Actually, the troops and units are willing and able (and the technology in the form of MC1-1 and other, newer parachutes is available but the senior leadership, ever overly cautious and worried lest they upset the Mothers of America with a too-high training casualty rate have forbidden the use of the MC1-1 in mass jumps due to fear of in air collisions. That's easily rectified with training but training is (was?) not a US Army priority. not to relieve angst, anyway...:wry:

The 82d experimented with the MC1-1 off and on after its introduction in the late 60s. Bottom line, it worked, casualties were slightly higher (IIRC, the extrapolated jump injury rate went from 7.1 per 100K to 7.8 per 100K) In any event, that's the current problem. My belief is that in a major war, that would not be a problem...

You're sort of stuck with a static line for two reasons; training time and cost for free fall and the ability to put a mass of people on the ground quickly.

To address your linear DZ problem -- and it is one -- multiple DZs at random distance and angles and short sticks are a workable and tested tactical solution but they are not used routinely because they are very difficult to plan and the rehearsal and training time required of the Air Crews upsets the USAF.

Again, given a war, most of that peacetime big deal stuff would be essentially not of concern.

[Rifleman]

To address your linear DZ problem -- and it is one -- multiple DZs at random distance and angles and short sticks are a workable and tested tactical solution but they are not used routinely because they are very difficult to plan and the rehearsal and training time required of the Air Crews upsets the USAF.


So, would it be better for the Army to have their own transport for this- maybe a small plane along the lines of the old Caribou?

[reed11b]

So, would it be better for the Army to have their own transport for this- maybe a small plane along the lines of the old Caribou? I would say yes, especially since strategic drops have little historical success. However in saying yes, you have opened the old key-west accords argument and you have completely destroyed the strategic justification of airborne troops. The C-26 the Army is getting theoretically would fit the bill perfectly, think they could get enough funding to buy them?
Reed

[Ken White]

So, would it be better for the Army to have their own transport for this- maybe a small plane along the lines of the old Caribou?I don't think they could ever have enough and the size of the bird isn't the issue with oil spot drops. Plus bigger birds get more people more places more quickly and for a strategic role -- or just for a strategic deterrent -- number of troops per aircraft is important and you have the range problem, smaller aircraft = less range. As Reed mentions, unlikely the Army could get enough anyway due to the roles and missions split anyway. That split works okay; just a hiccup every now and then.

Reed:

What strategic drops "...have little historical success?"
The C-26 the Army is getting theoretically would fit the bill perfectly, think they could get enough funding to buy them?It's a C-27 and the Army's funded for 75. I suspect they'll end up with double that number when all's said and done. That's not really a lot; figure 150 at 85% in operational units = ~125 given worldwide commitments, you might have half of 'em when and where you need 'em and even if, say 65, are used all for troop drop, with door bundles, that's only about 2,500 troops. Tactically and Operationally okay but no strategic threat or deterrent.

[reed11b]

Ken I have decided you were probably once a great smart @$$ SPC, I have decided that you are alright. Even if you are wrong:p

[Ken White]

Ken I have decided you were probably once a great smart @$$ SPC, I have decided that you are alright. Even if you are wrong:pI was never an SPC, That rank came in long after I did, in fact, it came in after I retired. I was a double dipping DAC by the time it arrived. Not to say I wasn't a smart ass corporal though. Couple of times... :D

And I'm not wrong on the discussion -- that's proven by the fact that the Eighty Twice and two Airplane BCTS exist. Seems to me you've just fallen for the Army 'Heavy Divisions rule' * party line and a have belief that the will to commit the Country to an all out war no longer exists and thus the airborne option isn't necessary in large numbers. Neither of those things I think are true. No biggie... :cool:

You didn't tell me what those failed strategic drops were???

* They do -- a lot of places and a lot of the time but not all places and at all times. METT-TC...:p

[William F. Owen]

Actually, the troops and units are willing and able (and the technology in the form of MC1-1 and other, newer parachutes is available but the senior leadership, ever overly cautious and worried lest they upset the Mothers of America with a too-high training casualty rate have forbidden the use of the MC1-1 in mass jumps due to fear of in air collisions. That's easily rectified with training but training is (was?) not a US Army priority. not to relieve angst, anyway...:wry:


Using some of the high performance canopies around today, you hop and pop at altitude ( either static line or drogue stabilised FF) and then fly to a 100m x 100m DZ either using GPS and/or NVG and some kind of low light marker kit.

Each aircraft can dump it's entire load, and deconfliction is really down to how you space the aircraft over the release point. I would figure 90 seconds separation enough. If the bad folks can't hear you coming and you can get 400 infantry on the ground in about 10 mins, then you may have something that gets results.

[Fuchs]

Going to come up with some kind of 21st Century stealth glider, are you? :cool:

It's an obsolete concept for personnel insertion since HAHO techniques and helpful tools for their use at night (NVG, GPS) are available.
Pretty much the same concept (just with autopilot instead of parachutist) is possible for load-carrying gliding chutes (up to several tons iirc), covering possible requirements for heavy weapons and motorized vehicles.

Gliders might have had a justification till the 90''s, though - my guess is that training was simply too difficult/expensive and accident rate too high.
Gliders are furthermore very sensitive to ground conditions and slopes.

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About air-mech ideas; there are different facets.

One is that infantry with CAS and little indirect fires is a rather weak combination and might fail to take its objective. A couple of light tanks might help a lot - that was the idea behind Tetrarch, Locust, Sheridan and Buford. Buford (and its upgraded 120mm version Thunderbolt) also gave some serious addition to the paratroopers' capability to defeat armor (which was quite poor till the introduction of Javelin). The Arnhem '44 and Crete '44 scenarios highlight these challenges.

The other air-mech concept in the U.S.Army was published in several papers (and refuted), including ARMOR Magazine iirc.
It was about bypassing obstacles and reds through the air and maneuver not horizontally, but horizontally plus vertically into a position in the enemy's rear. But the tempo challenge (assault quicker than your opponent can use his reserves) and the breakthrough challenge could be avoided to some degree with this concept.
I dislike it for its hardware cost, risk, susceptibility to appropriate defenses and because modern conventional wars like that would likely not have the force densities to really require a breakthrough battle anyway (exceptions like Turkey vs. Greece scenarios prove the rule). Modern vehicle speeds are so high that it's probably a better idea to think about how to close in to vehicle speeds with unit speeds than to call for heavylift helicopters.
This concept was actually not far away from the Arnhem '44 scenario; the real addition was some mechanized maneuvers behind enemy lines (Liddel-Hart alike) in addition to taking (an) objective(s).

And then there's the simply Shinseki-like air-deployability idea, which is afaik pretty much dead in most Western armies.

The German air mechanization concept (Luftmechanisierung) is afaik (I regret to not be very well informed - it seems to still be an informal concept anyway) two concepts:
1) A fire brigade style force to be inserted at crisis points (the classic defensive German paratrooper concept of the Cold War); a concept of diminishing relevance.
2) A Helicopter-centric super-mobile strike force, to form and quickly move a Schwerpunkt. Transport helicopters would form a base, and infantry would only act as Blues team and security force. The forward helicopter base in the 1991 Iraq war might have been an important inspiration.
This idea centered on the Tiger helicopter and certainly took a serious blow when an Apache regiment was shredded over Iraq in 2003 by low tech defenses.
I'm not aware of the present state of German Luftmechanisierung; the helicopters are under procurement, but the extraordinary concepts seem to have been on already eroded feet of clay.
In reality, German paratroopers are today jsut like other infantry being rotated through overseas peacekeeping missions and preparations for overseas missions.

I'd like to learn about the Russian's operational ideas for their BMD-equipped airborne troops.
Afaik they were intended to overrun NATO airbases and important bridges (as well as potential interventions in the Third World) during the Cold War and serve today (together with BTR-equipped motorized and internal affairs ministry troops) as internal quick-reaction force.
I don't know about any really modern conventional war concepts for their employment.

[Rifleman]

It's an obsolete concept for personnel insertion since HAHO techniques and helpful tools for their use at night (NVG, GPS) are available.

Yes, I understand. It was a "tongue in cheek" comment. ;)