Officers With PhDs Advising War Effort [Archive]

SWJED

02-05-2007, 07:28 AM

5 February Washington Post - Officers With PhDs Advising War Effort (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/04/AR2007020401196.html) by Tom Ricks.

Gen. David H. Petraeus, the new U.S. commander in Iraq, is assembling a small band of warrior-intellectuals -- including a quirky Australian anthropologist, a Princeton economist who is the son of a former U.S. attorney general and a military expert on the Vietnam War sharply critical of its top commanders -- in an eleventh-hour effort to reverse the downward trend in the Iraq war.

Army officers tend to refer to the group as "Petraeus guys." They are smart colonels who have been noticed by Petraeus, and who make up one of the most selective clubs in the world: military officers with doctorates from top-flight universities and combat experience in Iraq.

Essentially, the Army is turning the war over to its dissidents, who have criticized the way the service has operated there the past three years, and is letting them try to wage the war their way...

Petraeus, who along with the group's members declined to be interviewed for this article, has chosen as his chief adviser on counterinsurgency operations an outspoken officer in the Australian Army. Lt. Col. David Kilcullen holds a PhD in anthropology, for which he studied Islamic extremism in Indonesia...

Kilcullen (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/authors/dave-kilcullen/), the counterinsurgency adviser, wrote recently on the Web site Small Wars Journal, "All that the new strategy can do is give us a fighting chance of success, and it certainly does give us that."...

goesh

02-05-2007, 12:56 PM

MSM implies in a subtle way that it is rare for military personnel to be educated/intelligent. All the team is lacking is an old hippy who has had to shoot a few men in his day and as Forrest Gump would say, " and that's all I have to say about that."

jcustis

02-05-2007, 01:28 PM

It's perculiar that Ricks referred to LtCol Kilcullen as a quirky anthropologist first, and then as an officer of the AUS Army.

I can onyl imagine the backlash from the 1/3 who don't get it. I just pray that they are not in positions of significant influence.

bismark17

02-05-2007, 02:18 PM

Interesting article. From what I am reading in Poole's latest book and from a few threads here it sounds like the local Iraqi Police and Army is heavily infiltrated with militias. Getting rid of FOBs and setting up strongpoints with the locals sounds great but I'm not sure I would like to be bunking up with them....

Jimbo

02-05-2007, 02:22 PM

The local cops sure, the national police and Army havge traditionally not been a big problem as far as advisor/Iraqi relationships. I am fan of this idea personally. As one of the paradoxes nlisted is " The more secure you are the less security you have".

George L. Singleton

02-05-2007, 02:36 PM

Let me suggest we get a few things clarified:

1. Winston Groom, of Mobile, Alabama, who I personally like, is a University of Alabama graduate, as am I, and is of course the author of FORREST GUMP. Groom is a many time accolated, world recognized author and was a Captain, USA in Vietnam.

2. Lt. Colonel (Dr.) David Kilcullen, Australian Army is of course a PhD anthropologist, with current expert knowledge both hands on in Iraq and academically dealing with Islam in various settings and forms. There is no reason to be dull and deny his academic focus which operates to compliment his military identity,which military side paid for his PhD.

3. Being a maverick and operating literally and in a think tank sense outside the box is desperated needed in all walks of life, worldwide, but especially in our War on Terrorism today. It is good to know we have the likes of Lt. Colonel David Kilcullen working for General Petraeus now.

Let's kick the old school, hide bound, military academy ring knocker thinking and snide remarks and find solutions to save lives and shorten this war on terrormism and in Iraq/Afghanistan, whose lifespan will last for generations to come, whether the yellow journalism practioners like it or not. "It's a fact" as Forest Gump would say!

The writer of this note served 1963-1965 as a young USAF office with the US Embassy then in Karachi, Pakistan. He is now retired as a reservist from HQ USSOCOM. He is a mean old coot, some would say. GS.

marct

02-05-2007, 02:49 PM

Tom Odom

02-05-2007, 02:50 PM

Kilcullen, the counterinsurgency adviser, wrote recently on the Web site Small Wars Journal, "All that the new strategy can do is give us a fighting chance of success, and it certainly does give us that."

Seems appropriate to quote that last line of the WP article.

And I will say that historically, the services in general and the Army in particular because I was Army have a long-standing love and distrust/disregard (not hate) relationship with those who are viewed as "too intellectual." We go in cycles and we are hopefully now re-entering a cycle where history is not viewed as a "background setting" for events. I actually had a self-declared historian use those very terms in telling me a history page was of less value than a web page on urban operations.

There is another article in this vein worth reading on Ike Skelton and history on the EBird (http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20070205486520.html) and US News and World Report (http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/070204/12skelton.htm)called "Armed With History."

Best

Tom

slapout9

02-05-2007, 03:12 PM

Hi George Singleton, Roll Tide!!! College degrees....uhhhh...lets see, I am a 3rd degree Redneck:)

Steve Blair

02-05-2007, 03:47 PM

What I'm hoping is that this doesn't mark a return to or reaffirmation of the business school mentality that the military saw in the 1960s and beyond. Just substituting the requirement for an Anthropology or International Studies advanced degree instead of business management isn't going to change anything. It may, in fact, just promote intellectual stereotypes and box-checking instead of business ones. Graduate schools can be just as hidebound, if not more so, than service schools and academies.

What we also need to watch for is the "system" setting up those internal dissidents for failure. I'm hoping this is a true conversion for some of the powers-that-be and not a stalling tactic designed to "stay the course" until the next elections and then blame failure on those who happen to have been in charge last (Petraeus and the like).

Tom Odom

02-05-2007, 03:49 PM

marct

02-05-2007, 04:22 PM

Hi Steve,

What I'm hoping is that this doesn't mark a return to or reaffirmation of the business school mentality that the military saw in the 1960s and beyond. Just substituting the requirement for an Anthropology or International Studies advanced degree instead of business management isn't going to change anything. It may, in fact, just promote intellectual stereotypes and box-checking instead of business ones. Graduate schools can be just as hidebound, if not more so, than service schools and academies.

That is a truly scary thought, especially when it comes to Anthropology :rolleyes:. I do feel that the press article does seem to be constructing a Ph.D. as a magic bullet, and that is a BIG mistake. I know too many people with Ph.D.'s who can't think their way out of a wet paper bag, let along think outside of any box :mad:.

There's another problem that hasn't seemed to have come up yet, and that is what, exactly, a Ph.D. stands for. There is, really, very little uniformity in it.

Marc

Merv Benson

02-05-2007, 04:23 PM

I think this is also a reflection of how difficult and competitive it is to reach the highest ranks in the US military. Because mistakes can be critical, it is a system that can be very unforgiving. Sometimes bad luck plops responsibility for the mistakes of others on an officer's blindside ruining a career. But, being perfect is no guarantee of promotion and thus you have people who will seek more education and study to help.

Unlike many PhD's these guys have to test what they have learned in a very unforgiving arena. The real question is whether the Congress will give them the time to make their case.

marct

02-05-2007, 04:27 PM

Hi Merv,

Unlike many PhD's these guys have to test what they have learned in a very unforgiving arena. The real question is whether the Congress will give them the time to make their case.

I think you're right about that. One of the big problems with getting your PhD, at least in the social sciences, is that, often, you aren't allowed to test it :wry:. This means that a lot of PhD's tend to be very "theoretical" with little or no testing in the real world. It's a major frustration, and it also is one of the things that leads to the disconnect between academia and the "real world".

Marc

Stan

02-05-2007, 04:53 PM

Marc,

Tom and I already gave you a shot at the real test. Put the boots on, we get a grand (minus taxes :eek: ) and you graduate with new skills in ??? Ahhh, what does it matter.

I think, that if you had been with Tom and I a decade ago (yes, that would be a sierra hole), we would have had a blast and learned a lot more !

Regards, Stan

marct

02-05-2007, 05:05 PM

Hi Stan,

Marc,

Tom and I already gave you a shot at the real test. Put the boots on, we get a grand (minus taxes :eek: ) and you graduate with new skills in ??? Ahhh, what does it matter.

LOLOL Yeah, that's true. Still and all, you, loose with a G in Estonia... Man, I don't now if I want that on my conscience! ;)

Actually, I did get to apply a lot of my Ph.D. research right after I graduated (one of the few in my cohort who did). As to "putting the boots on", well, if Rob gets those CSTs going I'd be happy to be involved in that. Letting me loose in Iraq or Afghanistan with a weapon in hand might, I suspect, be a bad idea, even if my brothe-in-law would laugh himself silly :wry:.

I think, that if you had been with Tom and I a decade ago (yes, that would be a sierra hole), we would have had a blast and learned a lot more !

Probably :D. And I probably wouldn't be an out of shape academic, either!!

Marc

George L. Singleton

02-05-2007, 05:29 PM

I think it's also interesting to look at the disciplines involved. Just reading the article, I felt that a "Ph.D." was being hailed almost as if it was a technology golden BB. I'm still undecided if it is a good thing hat everyone also has in the field experience. On the one hand, it means that they can operate well in a military environment. On the other hand, it means that their thinking will still be influenced by the military institution even if it is in reaction against the older norms. I guess we'll just have to wit and see.

Marc

One of the best military strategists and tacticians I knew while posted in Karachi was the late Australian Colonel George Humphrey Bates, who after his attache job in Karachi became the Commandant of Australia's equivalent of our West Point. If my memory serves me correctly, as I am now 67 and was 25 when I knew Colonel Bates and his family in Karachi.

George Singleton, Colonel, USAF, Ret.
USA

George L. Singleton

02-05-2007, 05:41 PM

Hi Steve,

That is a truly scary thought, especially when it comes to Anthropology :rolleyes:. I do feel that the press article does seem to be constructing a Ph.D. as a magic bullet, and that is a BIG mistake. I know too many people with Ph.D.'s who can't think their way out of a wet paper bag, let along think outside of any box :mad:.

There's another problem that hasn't seemed to have come up yet, and that is what, exactly, a Ph.D. stands for. There is, really, very little uniformity in it.

Marc

Let us not belittle those who have surpassed our education levels and earned their PhDs. True, the school of hard knocks is a great teacher but that school in the main works poorly on job resumes!

Below letter to ed by me may be of parochial interet to you and some of the other PhD comments site readers just now. I have to get moving, worked all weekend, today is my day to work on federal and state income taxes.

George Singleton

PESHAWAR FRONTIER POST (a daily)

Today is:
February 01 , 2007 Thursday 12 Muharramul Haram, 1428 A.H.

George L. Singleton
USA
GSingle556@aol.com

Mr. Noorullah Khan Khattak of Karak wrote in part in his January 30, 2007, letter to the editor of the Peshawar FRONTIER POST: "As Iran has learnt during its painful journey, the South must carve out its own defense, political and cultural world. Keeping the rude and risqué comments of the boastful western elites, how long our enlightened intelligentsia would kid itself that it can integrate into west-controlled international system? This is the time to reconsider our belonging and regional commonality."

Iran today is the worst example of all theocratic nation states. After 80% of the former Iranian Parliament were disqualified from seeking reelection, being found by the ruling mullahs to be "too moderate", just last week over 150 newly elected members of the new Iranian Parliament demonstrated against the new, irrational and hate mongering President of Iran, Mr. Mahmood Ahmadinejad.

At issue is not a simple difference of religion and culture, as Mr. Khattak supposes. At issue is the never will be resolved struggle between warring factions of Islam which began after the death of Muhammad (pbuh), and the subsequent throughout recorded history convoluted disregard for the connectivity of the Judaic and Christian traditions and faiths without which there would not be any form of Islam today.

No, there is no such thing as a violence "gene." But their is taugt and learned institutional religious intolerance and violent bloodshed both among and between various Muslim sects and then against all non-Muslim religions. I for one am a devout Christian who is willing to agree to disagree for us to coexist. A similar tolerant local and world religious view has to exist in Iran, Pakistan, and elsewhere where you have a Muslim majority, no matter what the variance of sects, and in my view can only exist with better, free, non-religious public education throughout all of Iran, Pakistan and the so-called Muslim world.

Turkey is a sectarian nation with a tolerant governmental structure. Turkey's future membership in the European Union is inevitable and will in my view as a former New York City international banker happen.

I, for one, am otherwise fed up with people looking to take offense at any non-Muslims views and comments, while we non-Muslims are abused daily, officially and unofficially by such letter writing hate mongers.

Headline Junky

02-05-2007, 05:45 PM

My first reaction to reading this article was that these guys are all too sharp and ambitious to take the ball if it's just to run out the clock. Am I the only one expecting initial successes in Baghdad to lead to a full court press, second-phase Surge throughout Iraq?

marct

02-05-2007, 05:52 PM

Hi George,

Let us not belittle those who have surpassed our education levels and earned their PhDs. True, the school of hard knocks is a great teacher but that school in the main works poorly on job resumes!

BA Sociology and Comparative Religion,
MA Canadian Studies (Cultural Studies concentration)
Ph.D. Sociology (Social Anthropology)

Just an FYI :D

Marc

sullygoarmy

02-05-2007, 06:02 PM

Hey All,
New guy to the forum. Former AST member back in 2004 and currently working for JCISFA where we look at security force assistance issues daily. Stationed at Fort Leavenworth and a recent CGSC grad while it was under LTG Petraeus.

The thing I like about Ricks' article is that we're bringing in what many consider the best of the best on COIN and SFA. Most guys know that Kilcullen's work is widely floated around military schoolhouses as a framework for good COIN principles from Leavenworth to Knox. I think using him as an asset, adds a valuable tool to the General's kit bag.

Glad that I found the SWJ website and probably wouldn't have done so had Ricks not mentioned it in his article. Looking forward to the discussion!

Jimbo

02-05-2007, 06:46 PM

Mike,

It is freezing cold hear in D.C., but it beats the automated planning tools class. I am having too much fun on this inter-agency thing. Your CGSC and fellow 6 month hold classmate.

Jim McD

Shek

02-05-2007, 09:39 PM

As a point of reference for what the Army personnel system currently produces, it is nowhere geared towards producing leaders that have an incentive to attend advanced civilian schooling. Despite the press that Petraeus, McMaster, Chiarelli, etc. have garnered for their graduate schooling, they are the exception that chose to do something outside the normal career path and were probably told by many that they were wasting their time.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB731.pdf

As for the comment that the social science degrees cannot be tested in the real world, I think it is fair to say that someone like GEN Petraeus performed better than LTG Odierno did back in 2003 when it came time to test what advantage a degree could provide. While theoretical, having a framework to be able to fit the real world into to try and make sense out of events is better than nothing, plus having the critical thinking skills to be able to approach a problem from multiple angles.

Jimbo

02-05-2007, 09:55 PM

marct

02-05-2007, 10:00 PM

Hi Shek,

As a point of reference for what the Army personnel system currently produces, it is nowhere geared towards producing leaders that have an incentive to attend advanced civilian schooling.

Love the oped piece!

As for the comment that the social science degrees cannot be tested in the real world, I think it is fair to say that someone like GEN Petraeus performed better than LTG Odierno did back in 2003 when it came time to test what advantage a degree could provide. While theoretical, having a framework to be able to fit the real world into to try and make sense out of events is better than nothing, plus having the critical thinking skills to be able to approach a problem from multiple angles.

Let me just clarify that for a second. I didn't say that the degrees couldn't be tested in the real world, I said that often you aren't allowed to test it. This goes back to he academic institutions of ethics review boards that pass on all academic research. What that has come to mean, in a lot of the social sciences, is that you are not allowed to test your theories in the real world from inside the academic environment. Because of his test ban, the academic environment in, say, Sociology or Political Science or Anthropology, tends to reinforce a concentration on what you are allowed to do, which is either "theory" or "approved" testing. In the case of Anthropology, that means you can "test" your ideas in some very limited, real world applications - mainly advocacy work. If you aren't operating within the academic environment, that is an entirely different matter.

I certainly agree with you about the value of having theoretical frameworks and, more importantly, the ability to modify theoretical frameworks to match observed reality. As for "critical thinking skills", the have been a major topic of discussion in pedagogical circles up here for the past decade or so. I've been following that debate, and one of the things that struck me most about it was that there didn't really seem to be a coherent definition of what the term meant :confused:. I had always assumed that it meant looking at a problem, picking it apart into its component pieces, and then trying to find a solution. Once I hit Grad school, I realized that I was being incredibly naive as a number of my peers proceeded to tell me :wry:.

Marc

George L. Singleton

02-06-2007, 01:12 AM

Hi George,

BA Sociology and Comparative Religion,
MA Canadian Studies (Cultural Studies concentration)
Ph.D. Sociology (Social Anthropology)

Just an FYI :D

Marc

One of our still in graduate school daughters has double undergraduate majors in Spanish and Sociology (statistics side of same). Your degrees and academic focus sound good and logical to me.

Cheers,
George Singleton

Shek

02-06-2007, 01:18 AM

The 101 vs. 4ID comparison is a false one. The situations that 4ID faced were very different from the 101st. There were things done well in both areas of operation and some things that needed to be fixed.

Jimbo,

No doubt that there were different situations and had units with different organic capabilities. However, having worked for a few weeks alongside 4ID and for a few weeks alongside 101, there was a world of difference, and much further beyond what just the different situations would create. Now, maybe I just got a taste of extremes because of who I worked alongside and so my little view is not necessarily representative, but given all that I've read since and haven spoken with friends from both units, I don't see my experience as having been non-representative in general.

Put a different way, would LTG Odierno have had as much success in Mosul, a situation needing lots of people and cultural skills, and would GEN Petraeus not have done as well in Diyala/Salah Ad Din in a situation where people skills were still as important, but more kinetic skills were required. I'm not envisioning a commander emphasizing "putting the screws to 'em" as being as successful in Ninevah, while on the other hand, I'm thinking that GEN Petraeus' experience as an infantry commander up through the ranks would have equipped him for the fight against the greater numbers of FRE.

Cheers.

Shek

Shek

02-06-2007, 01:24 AM

Let's kick the old school, hide bound, military academy ring knocker thinking

Sir,

I read this comment with great irony since GEN Petraeus and all three O6s mentioned by name in the article are West Pointers.

Cheers.

Shek

Shek

02-06-2007, 01:34 AM

Hi Shek,

Love the oped piece!

Let me just clarify that for a second. I didn't say that the degrees couldn't be tested in the real world, I said that often you aren't allowed to test it. This goes back to he academic institutions of ethics review boards that pass on all academic research. What that has come to mean, in a lot of the social sciences, is that you are not allowed to test your theories in the real world from inside the academic environment. Because of his test ban, the academic environment in, say, Sociology or Political Science or Anthropology, tends to reinforce a concentration on what you are allowed to do, which is either "theory" or "approved" testing. In the case of Anthropology, that means you can "test" your ideas in some very limited, real world applications - mainly advocacy work. If you aren't operating within the academic environment, that is an entirely different matter.

I certainly agree with you about the value of having theoretical frameworks and, more importantly, the ability to modify theoretical frameworks to match observed reality. As for "critical thinking skills", the have been a major topic of discussion in pedagogical circles up here for the past decade or so. I've been following that debate, and one of the things that struck me most about it was that there didn't really seem to be a coherent definition of what the term meant :confused:. I had always assumed that it meant looking at a problem, picking it apart into its component pieces, and then trying to find a solution. Once I hit Grad school, I realized that I was being incredibly naive as a number of my peers proceeded to tell me :wry:.

Marc

Marc,

I thought the "fashion tips" metaphor used by Dr. Wong was quite clever, although the message itself is disheartening. Once again, as an Army, in order to close a gap, we implemented a "fix" by starting to award masters degrees for the war college to show that we were "educating" our officers; however, the war colleges don't provide the broadening experience that a civilian graduate school will, and so some of the value of a graduate degree is lost (this isn't saying that they don't receive solid instruction at the graduate level, but a lunchroom conversation over a particular conflictwith other uniformed members isn't the same as one with fellow grad students who may have been with NGOs working a completely different side of the same conflict and can provide a potentially alien perspective).

As far as "critical thinking," I guess that I am also naive as to its true meaning. What I was trying to get at was the ability to look at a problem at from several angles, especially to include those that you disagree with or may not have otherwise ever thought of (e.g. the conservation with a NGO member) so that you can arrive at a solution that has thought through all the possibilities. Thus, as the proverbial saying goes, not all problems look like nails wanting a hammer to fix them :wry:

Cheers.

Shek

jcustis

02-06-2007, 01:40 AM

No doubt that there were different situations and had units with different organic capabilities. However, having worked for a few weeks alongside 4ID and for a few weeks alongside 101, there was a world of difference, and much further beyond what just the different situations would create.

It was probably only a flash in the pan, but I had an opportunity to experience the 4th ID firsthand in mid-April, during the RIP between their elements moving north to Tikrit and TF Tripoli.

We were coiled up north of Samarra, basking in the joy of finally receiving packages and mail, when OH-58s and Apaches appeared over the long line of HETs that were dragging gear north to Tikrit. It was a little bit uncomfortable to watch an Apache circling the battalion TAA, tracking personnel on the ground with the slaved chain gun. Definitely a WTFO moment. It didn't stop there though, and within 15 minutes of the air troop's arrival, we had to call in our patrols because the Apaches began firing rockets, guns, and Hellfires at hell knows what across the highway, only a klick or so away. Needless to say, we were not impressed.

jcustis

02-06-2007, 02:18 AM

What I was trying to get at was the ability to look at a problem at from several angles, especially to include those that you disagree with or may not have otherwise ever thought of (e.g. the conservation with a NGO member) so that you can arrive at a solution that has thought through all the possibilities. Thus, as the proverbial saying goes, not all problems look like nails wanting a hammer to fix them.

Dang marct, you hit one homerun after another! Perusing the Marine Corps career track webpages, I see several fellowships that put folks into the corporate world for a short tour, as well as graduate learning environments, but am not sure what that gets us.

How about a fellowship with the ICRC or other relief affiliated agency? I know, lot's of baggage with a Marine infantry officer sitting in on a relief delivery planning session, but perhaps these are just the walls we need to be breaking down.

SWJED

02-06-2007, 02:48 AM

The Brain Trust (http://www.mudvillegazette.com/milblogs/2007/02/06/#007740) - MilBlogs.

The WaPo headlines (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/04/AR2007020401196.html): "Officers With PhDs Advising War Effort"

The only appropriate response might be "Well, duh!"

But seriously folks... no offense to the fine folks profiled therein, but try finding a senior officer in the military without an advanced degree.

These guys might be exceptional, but they aren't the exception in that department. There's a bit of myth perpetuation here - the reality is the military invests time and money in developing the talents of the right folks for the right jobs - and sometimes they get it right.

And in spite of the article's "but the job is too big for these guys or anyone else" tone, I think the right people have indeed been chosen for this task - a conclusion not just based on the evidence of wisdom exhibited in the highlighted words of this paragraph:

Petraeus, who along with the group's members declined to be interviewed for this article, has chosen as his chief adviser on counterinsurgency operations an outspoken officer in the Australian Army. Lt. Col. David Kilcullen holds a PhD in anthropology, for which he studied Islamic extremism in Indonesia.

Kilcullen has served in Cyprus, Papua New Guinea and East Timor and most recently was chief strategist for the State Department's counterterrorism office, lent by the Australian government. His 2006 essay "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency" was read by Petraeus, who sent it rocketing around the Army via e-mail. Among Kilcullen's dictums: "Rank is nothing: talent is everything" -- a subversive thought in an organization as hierarchical as the U.S. military.

And his Don't confuse the surge with the strategy (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/01/dont-confuse-the-surge-with-th/) entry at the Small Wars Journal blog was recently recommended by one of Mrs Greyhawk's favorite military thinkers.

You might also want to make time for A Framework for thinking about Iraq Strategy (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/01/a-framework-for-thinking-about/) and Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/01/two-schools-of-classical-count/)...

CSC2005

02-06-2007, 03:07 AM

While Tom Ricks did play up on the liberal stereotype of the military being uneducated and needing Ivy League policy makers to make the big decisions, I still give Gen Petraeus credit for bringing in a hand-picked group of creative thinkers. I have been through too many OPTs where the focus was on process and not creative operational design. I would love to read a study on how these guys work out in a year or so from now.

My hunch is that Petraeus picked these officers because of their intellectual/operational ability, not just because they had PhDs. I am sure there are plenty of PhDs in the Army who were not picked. You have to admit that putting a foreign officer on your senior staff is a pretty bold move in wartime and annoyed many of the normal staff officer types.

I am surprised John Nagl did not make the list.

Maximus

02-06-2007, 03:34 AM

Nagl's playing a lead role in ensuring Army MiTTs/MTTs/PiTTs are being trained properly before being sent over. I suspect he has a direct link to Gen Petraeus.

George L. Singleton

02-06-2007, 03:39 AM

Sir,

I read this comment with great irony since GEN Petraeus and all three O6s mentioned by name in the article are West Pointers.

Cheers.

Shek

Well said, and well taken.

However, General Petraeus has chosen as his chief advisor on counterinsurgency operations Australian Lt. Colonel David Kilcullen, who I believe is not a West Pointer, or am I wrong on that one? Like my late Uncle, Rear Admiral Art Gavin, graduate of U. of Wisconsin, who as a Navy 05 was put directly in command of all Navy and Army aviation in the Panama Canal Zone by the Secretary of War in Dec., 1941, immediately after Pearl Harbor. Art surely was hated by many brass hat and fat bottom Army and Navy flag ranks and senior 06s, but he was the best and right guy for that job at that time. I view Lt. Colonel Kilcullen, who is additionally a PhD, as in that mold and wish him well, too!

I am a USAF OTS product, commissioned Feb., 1963. Served as a Det. Commander with the old US Embassy in Karachi, then West Pakistan, housed with a bunch of you green suiters in a MAAG staff house next door to the Army 08 head of the USMAAG to Pakistan. His aide was my housemate and that aide, a lifelong friend since Karachi days, is now himself a retired 08, and was #2 in his class at West Point of 1958.

My job in Karachi from 1963-1965 was as USAF Liaison Officer for the Commander, 6937th USAFSS Group, ie, the base commander, US Air Base (U-2s) at Peshawar. As a Second and First Lieutenant this was a unique assignment but I grew and learned from all concerned, as I surely didn't know a damn thing at the get go!

The service academies are well and good, but many flag rank officers today did not graduate from the academies. Same applies to many fine 06s of all services today.

I turned down as a reserve officer 07 reserve promotion opportunity as the Air Force wanted me to come back on active duty for 8+ months to understudy with the four star then heading up US Space Systems Command. I could not spare the time, etc. away from civilian job and a young family, wife and three small children, and an aged Mom in an Alabama nursing home, who I essentially supported.

Taking USAF Reserve non-unit, largely purple suiter slots my last 12 years in the Air Force Reserve, by dumb luck, coupled with doing all the advanced schools, service and NWC courses, too, helped me as an "old man" make 06.

Colonel was and is good enough for me, when I would have been happy to retire as a Major. *I had been wounded as a non-combatant in the January, 1965 earliest phase of the India-Pakistan War in the Rann of Kutch, so when I left regular active duty in late 1967 did not join the USAF reserve until four years later, in part due to slow recovery from spinal wound from 1965 Rann of Kutch, etc. I limped like hell and hurt like hell for a few years before "rebouding."

Back to the task at hand, the War on Terrorism and in Iraq/Afghanistan. My wife and I were roundtrip on a Space A (Alabama Air Guard refuelding tanker) vacation July, 2006 in Germany and France (and in Belgium and Luxembourg).

At the American Cemetary at Normandy we met a group of 60 Dutch and US Special Forces, headed up by a senior Dutch NCO. They were all in less than two weeks from when we met them (beside Brigadier Roosevelt's grave, the son of President Teddy Roosevelt, killed at Normandy D-Day Landing) headed into Afghanistan. Having been there (Afghanistan and Pakistan) during 1963-1965, I was able to share some cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious experiences that I would hope may have been of some small benefit to these men, and to their mission and personal safety. The Dutch senior NCO made me feel good when he said very low key that he and his men were touring the American Cemetary as boys all under age 30, some in their late teens, to understand better that freedom is not free.

To close on a humerous note. One cousin by marriage is a West Pointer, retired as a Regular Army 05. The other cousin by marriage, (both married to my second cousins who are sisters) is a retired Regular Army 06, University of Alabama ROTC commissoned. If the 05 had used any degree of humility, he, too, could have retired as an 06.

My forte with USSOCOM, and it's predecessor, USREDCOM, and with TDY active duty orders short tours as a reservist with MAC (I ran the airlift in January, 1991 for Desert Storm out of Charleston); with FORSCOM (Peruvian and Bolivian drug wars in late 1980s); and CINCLANT (Admiral Kelso, the famous Navy pilots party CO) my last 10-12 years in the USAF Reserve, as a part time purple suiter, was computerized wargamming using Star Wars big bucks to set up the and help operate the JCS Wargaming Center at Ft. Lewis, which we later moved to it's current location at Hurlburt Field, FL. We developed the pc gamed scenarios and exercises that led to your battlefield pc fighting technology that helps you win and the enemy loose in firefights and such.

I am a mean old free thinker, who worked firing programs for Marine Corp artillery with the best of them, as an unusual example. Coordination of Navy ship bombardments and USAF planes bombardment. Computer gamed as well as tried in the field use of rough field ad hoc flying sites using C-130s and C-10s was a snap after dealing with mundane routing of support flights into and out of Peshawar "around K-2" the second highest peak in the Himalayas, by contrast, in 1963-1965.

I just hope that the Army isn't so short sighted as to "only" give PhDs to West Pointers. Other officers commissioned from other sources are just as bright, and very innovative, too. Not that many West Pointers aren't innovate, but I am biased that many of the West Pointers I knew in years gone by were to focused on their personal career advancement vs. doing the best job possible, whatever it was, for the corporate benefit, as in today's case, of beating back and down a multigenerational fight with radical Islam.

Serving the cause of our nation and the free world, to me, in my own career, part time though much of it was (only the first 6 years out of total 31 years military service were active duty) should in my book always come before personal ambition. Study the situation, apply your actual experiences, say what you think needs to be said and learned from, and don't worry about whether this will or won't profile you as one of "the boys" of the "ring knocker" old club for career enhancement.

Not meaning to insult anyone, but you have my blunt opinions.

Cheers,
George L. Singleton, Colonel, USAF, Ret. (perhaps too much rank for such a blunt outspoken redneck boy from Tennessee and Alabama)
GSingle556@aol.com

PS - Keeping our forces committed to Iraq smaller in number was not a mistake in my view. The mistake to me has been the belated forcing of Iraqis to shoulder as much of the fight as possible sooner, but damn slow elections and constutitional process wasted a bunch of time, in my opinion. Too, I would have and would now find a way to use Turkish troops by the division load! Airlift them over the Kurds. GS.

marct

02-06-2007, 04:13 AM

Hi Shek,

I thought the "fashion tips" metaphor used by Dr. Wong was quite clever, although the message itself is disheartening. Once again, as an Army, in order to close a gap, we implemented a "fix" by starting to award masters degrees for the war college to show that we were "educating" our officers; however, the war colleges don't provide the broadening experience that a civilian graduate school will, and so some of the value of a graduate degree is lost (this isn't saying that they don't receive solid instruction at the graduate level, but a lunchroom conversation over a particular conflictwith other uniformed members isn't the same as one with fellow grad students who may have been with NGOs working a completely different side of the same conflict and can provide a potentially alien perspective).

I also thought the fashion metaphor was good - it reminded me of many academics I have worked with :D.

I think you are right about the war college acting as an internal reinforcer of perceptions. Maybe they would get a better overall "experience" at a civilian graduate school. Honestly, I think it might be better still if they took degrees in civilian graduate schools outside of the US. That way you would get both a civilian "take"on the issue as well as experience in a different culture. It would be interesting to see what the graduate exchange programs are like. By way of example, a couple of my former students have studied in France, while others have studied in England, Australia, the US and New Zealand. The cultural difference alone does seem to make a lot of difference.

As far as "critical thinking," I guess that I am also naive as to its true meaning. What I was trying to get at was the ability to look at a problem at from several angles, especially to include those that you disagree with or may not have otherwise ever thought of (e.g. the conservation with a NGO member) so that you can arrive at a solution that has thought through all the possibilities. Thus, as the proverbial saying goes, not all problems look like nails wanting a hammer to fix them :wry:

Point taken :D! One of the people in my Ph.D. cohort defined "critical thinking" as the ability to rip anyone's argument apart - that way you could get easy publications, still be perceived as "critical", and get a rep as a great theoretician. That particular one never really impressed me, but I did see a lot of it :wry:.

Marc

120mm

02-06-2007, 07:25 AM

Again, my experience with 101st in OIF I was generally positive, while my experience with 4ID was universally negative.

On Petraeus, I like the fit of his jib. He is both warrior and scholar, while not being a weakened amalgamation of both. There are few Generals I would trust to collect a good group without just "picking names." Petraeus is one of them.

Stan

02-06-2007, 07:41 AM

www.usnews.com
By Julian E. Barnes
10/31/05

The general credits the Army's field training for teaching him to be a creative commander. But his adaptive thinking also comes from his work outside the military. At Princeton, where he earned his advanced degree in international relations, he had a chance to interact with exceptional scholars, many of whom had a very different view of the world and of human nature.

lirelou

02-06-2007, 09:22 AM

I appreciated the article despite it's pandering to stereotypes. Just a small comment on Kilcullen. The Australian army is a small, but very professional. It presently counts six active battalions in its structure, and like us relies upon its reserves to meet all its present commitments. Some of my mates felt that in terms of pure manpower, they had only enough men to fully man four of the six infantry battalions. The Aussie Army also has some unique characteristics which make it different from both the British Army, and our own. First of all, Australian infantry officers spend much of their careers within a battalion. This gives them long term exposure to many different levels of battalion operations. In my day (II Corps MIKE Force, 1968), the typical Aussie captain had been a rifle platoon leader, a mortar platoon leader, and often a recce platoon leader, as well as battalion supply officer, transport officer, perhaps intelligence officer, and assistant training officer, before he became a company commander (a Major's position), and many had already commanded companies. They tended to be a few years older than their U.S. counterparts, whose career patterns had taken them in and out of tactical battalions, schools, and non-tactical assignments. Moreover, as the Australian defence forces lacked the enormous logistical power projection capabilities of the U.S. military, both the officers, and especially the warrants, tended to be far more enterprising in seeking solutions outside the traditional chain of command. The men who trained these officers were inevitably the warrants (senior NCOs), and here I would note that the only U.S. service to have an NCO corps which equates to the Aussie Warrants is the U.S.M.C.. These warrants were likewise highly experienced, having spent many years within a battalion, and having held a similar variety of positions ranging from infantryman to BREN gunner, up through section (squad?) and platoon, in rifle, recce, and occasionally mortar platoons. This gave them a grounding in small unit operations that was, in Vietnam, generally lacking within U.S. battalions once the U.S. battalion's original complement had been filled by replacements. In summary, reaching lieutenant colonel in the Australian Army is as much an achievement as making the 0-6 tactical brigade command list in the U.S. Army, and he should have some very solid small unit operational experience that will assist him in his duties. And he not foreign. He's Australian!

Shek

02-06-2007, 12:55 PM

Dang marct, you hit one homerun after another! Perusing the Marine Corps career track webpages, I see several fellowships that put folks into the corporate world for a short tour, as well as graduate learning environments, but am not sure what that gets us.

How about a fellowship with the ICRC or other relief affiliated agency? I know, lot's of baggage with a Marine infantry officer sitting in on a relief delivery planning session, but perhaps these are just the walls we need to be breaking down.

J,

Your NGO fellowships have been proposed within the Army, but I have no idea what traction they've gained. At the cadet level, we run a bunch of summer trips that do NGO work, and are just now expanding the program to ROTC and the other service academies (where there is $$, there's a way!). While several weeks is not the same as a year, I'm sure that this short experience at such a junior part of one's career is a solid formative experience for company grade level ops.

Cheers.

Shek

George L. Singleton

02-06-2007, 01:28 PM

Hi Shek,

I also thought the fashion metaphor was good - it reminded me of many academics I have worked with :D.

I think you are right about the war college acting as an internal reinforcer of perceptions. Maybe they would get a better overall "experience" at a civilian graduate school. Honestly, I think it might be better still if they took degrees in civilian graduate schools outside of the US. That way you would get both a civilian "take"on the issue as well as experience in a different culture. It would be interesting to see what the graduate exchange programs are like. By way of example, a couple of my former students have studied in France, while others have studied in England, Australia, the US and New Zealand. The cultural difference alone does seem to make a lot of difference.

Point taken :D! One of the people in my Ph.D. cohort defined "critical thinking" as the ability to rip anyone's argument apart - that way you could get easy publications, still be perceived as "critical", and get a rep as a great theoretician. That particular one never really impressed me, but I did see a lot of it :wry:.

Marc

Marc:

More small humor from "the old coot" kibitzer.

As I was doing by correspondence the sections of my USAF Command and Staff College, which was being monitored and graded at Maxwell AFB in Montgomery, Alabama by an active duty USAF 05 War College Professor, I did two things, a somewhat "fire for effect" to see what happens scenario. My half Irish impish nature, let's say.

1. I quoted in my C&S paper a long article I in fact had written and published in the WALL STREET JOURNAL a few years earlier on the World Bank loaning to the poorest nations and the linked relationship of the Bank for International Settlements in Berne, Switzerland, where all nations have SDRs (special drawing rights to increase any/a nation's money supply/credit instantly for justifiable purposes of economic need when total national productivity or lack of same stoppers doing whatever requires more funding your country just "ain't" got at the moment). *My eclectic background included several years after active USAF duty, before I joined the USAF Reserve program, as an international banker in NYC. That experience was the basis on which I later wrote and published in the WALL STREET JOURNAL the SDR article, while working as a Congressional Budget Officer for the US Department of Veterans Affairs Central Office in Washington.

2. I also noted an article on the decimation of the rain forest in Brazil and it's effect on the regional, even global economy via climatic impact, which in turn affects weather patterns which in turn affect some economic enterprises, all impacing the (old terminology today) GNP and NNP economic measures, both topics woven into total topic of affordability of "a" nation to deal with "guns and butter."

Topic #1 cited in the bibliography the author as "George Singleton, then an International Banking Officer with Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., NYC" , while #2 cited one of my former New York University Sterne Graduate Business School (night division) B-school economics professors.

My C&S course/paper monitor didn't like my use of the WALL STREET JOURNAL as a source for what he accepted as related topic support material but overlooked/didn't notice who the author was (me!) somehow. On rebuttal, with further explination of my paper's goals and purposes, the 05 relented and agreed after all that "maybe" the occasional WSJ financial/economic reference was OK, still not noticing that I was the article's author.

On the Brazilian rain forest decimation, the 05 paper monitor/grader still did not like the analogy, but finally accepted it, as I simply refused to take it out. And, as I did quarterly guest drills with the *Maxwell Base Commander's office to avoid frequent drill only commutes to HQSOCOM at MacDill in Tampa, I used a drill period to go sit down over coffee with the C&S 05 Professor (at that time I was still a reserve 05 myself) and talked him into "my logic and reasoning" to the point he let it go.

*Base CO was a civil engineer by degree and used me to help redesign the entire base runway and road system. My BA was in history and poltical science, but because I had a night school MBA he felt "I must know what I was doing as I was then at the JCS level involved in both J4 and J5 plans!"

Enough long winded blather. Unique thinking, and different experiences can all help solve problems, including war and civil affairs issues, if one has an open mind and can relate the pieces of the puzzle in an understandable and practical outcome manner.

My view is we really wasted huge amounts of time undermanning and not dealing cohesively up front with the civil affairs needs of Iraq after our first few weeks of hot conflict ended there. I will not digress further into what might have been, as that is now pointless, I am sure you agree.

George Singleton

Shek

02-06-2007, 01:31 PM

GS:

Sir,

I wasn't trying to explicitly or implicitly speak of any superiority of West Pointers, just that whatever favoritism and/or groupthink might have once existed along commissioning lines does not exist anymore, at least at the macro-level. I'm sure that there may be small, limited examples that some can point out, but these would be the exception and not the norm.

Instead, the groupthink that exists does so along institutional fiefdoms/fault lines: SOF vs. conventional, light vs. heavy, etc., regardless of commissioning source. Iraq is serving to break many of these "traditional" lines of resistance between the groups, having been forced to work with each other to get jobs done.

As far as the educational opportunities available, there is no institutional "discrimination" among commissioning sources. However, this doesn't mean that they are necessarily equal. For example, the opportunities available for OCS commissioned officers probably used to be less when they were allowed onto active duty with only two years of undergraduate study - two years of their active duty time would already be dedicated to the degree completion program (DCP), limiting available time for further studies, which would be at the graduate level. However, for the past five years or so, OCS candidates have been required to have their undergraduate degree already, so this constraint doesn't exist with current year groups entering into the window for selection for grad school. Another possible example would be ROTC officers applying for USMA rotating faculty positions. There is no selection discrimination; however, some ROTC commissioned officers may not be aware of the opportunity, and so this could shrink the pool of potential ROTC commissioned officers being selected.

Additionally, the recent introduction of the graduate school for active duty service obligation (GRADSO) program, where cadets can sign up for the option for guaranteed graduate school at their school of choice (stateside) in return for extending their service obligation by three years, distributes slots on a relatively equal basis.

http://www.usma.edu/opa/adso/

So, in the end, I would concur fully with CSC2005's thought that these officers were selected based on their ability to contribute, not because of their commissioning source.

Cheers,

Shek

Tom Odom

02-06-2007, 01:49 PM

Additionally, the recent introduction of the graduate school for active duty service obligation (GRADSO) program, where cadets can sign up for the option for guaranteed graduate school at their school of choice (stateside) in return for extending their service obligation by three years, distributes slots on a relatively equal basis

Just a couple of notes on grad school and masters programs inside and outside the Army:

A. Reference the current GRADSO program, it is a recent shift in programs versus an innovation. I attended grad school as part of the GRADSO program of the 1970s as a DMG top 5% on the graduate record exam.

B. Masters programs have been around in the Army for some time as well. The MMAS program at Leavenworth is quite good whether you do it via SAMS on a 2-year or you take the extra load required to finish it in a year. I did mine in a year and I recommend to all Leavenworth bound officers that they at least consider the MMAS.

Gratefully these progras are coming back--they went into near extinction in the 1990s aside from the handful of officers who are FAOs or West Point instructors.

Best

Tom

George L. Singleton

02-06-2007, 02:01 PM

Jimbo

02-06-2007, 02:03 PM

Having done both ROTC and West Point there are pro's and cons to each, but discussing those pro's and cons, in most cases, is little more than splitting hairs these days. As far as advantages go, the Army is pretty much a level ground as far as commissioning source vs. success. As far as masters programs go, From the mid 1990's until about 2 years ago, there were few opportunities to get a masters or higher degree if you stayed in your basic branch, your two choices were night school/correspondance course on your own, or go to Wetst Point and teach (which equals 5 years out of the field army). Other than that, you pretty much had to become a FAO or another functional area speciality to go to grad school, and face a choice at your Career Field Designation board that you probably were not going to be CFD'd into your . The Army is now offering slots for post command captains to go to grad school and remain in their basic branch. The Army has yet to be directive as to what you will study, but I believe that is coming.

Jim

Shek

02-06-2007, 02:17 PM

While Tom Ricks did play up on the liberal stereotype of the military being uneducated and needing Ivy League policy makers to make the big decisions, I still give Gen Petraeus credit for bringing in a hand-picked group of creative thinkers.

CSC,

I disagree that Ricks is trying to portray the military as being uneducated.

Instead, I see Ricks trying to 1) garner support for effort that Petraeus is trying to undertake and 2) convince the military that there is a tremendous value added in having officers with PhDs.

Looking at my first point, having both read Fiasco and then having had a chance to hear him speak about the book in person, Ricks wants to see the US succeed in Iraq and is very critical of past mistakes that have been made. Clearly, he sees Petraues as a success story, and highlighting some of the differences that he and his assembled team could potentially provide is a reason for someone to give the new strategy a chance (one that Ricks sees as having a chance of succeeding), that it's not just "more of the same."

For the second point, the fact that you have someone overtly reaching out to the "intellectual" community within the military is not the status quo (nor do most senior officers have PhDs - some form of civilian masters degrees, probably, although this number is quickly diminishing and becoming the exception due to our personnel policies implemented in the late 90s; these are the commanders that will make the decisions a decade from now about the worth of advanced civilian education, and it is easier for someone to discount the value of grad school when it didn't play a part in their career advancement). GEN Petraeus did the exact same thing as the 101 ABN DIV CDR. However, he had to pull mostly O-4s and O-5s as a mere division commander :wry:.

Given how just two short years ago the Army was pulling officers out of CGSC early to send them to Iraq and the SecDef was explicitly (http://fairuse.1accesshost.com/news3/upi6.htm) looking at how officer education could be shortened/abbreviated, now is the time to make the case how critical education is to the military mission, and articles like this can potentially move the public and military in the direction where advanced education shouldn't be the exception and pursued at the risk of derailing one's career (http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110006682
). I believe Ricks wants to portray that this should be more than just a fad (also, being based out of DC, the military personnel that Ricks tends to deal in the policy world with are those with advanced education, and so he is clearly cognizant of the fact that many military members are well educated).

Lastly, here's a very apropos article (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/10/2088425) from LTC Nagl (who's commanding a battalion right now) on the topic of education requirements across the spectrum of ranks.

Cheers,

Shek

marct

02-06-2007, 02:26 PM

Hi George,

Marc:

More small humor from "the old coot" kibitzer.

Not at all! It is "the sharing of relevant experience". Besides that, I'm an Anthropologist and one of the things that we know is that stories are the basis of "learning" because they combine both emotion and logic :D.

Unique thinking, and different experiences can all help solve problems, including war and civil affairs issues, if one has an open mind and can relate the pieces of the puzzle in an understandable and practical outcome manner.

I totally agree with that. I remember, during the 2nd year of my Ph.D. fieldwork, I was asked to give a "critique" seminar to the career counsellors I was studying. Within 20 minutes, we got into an intense discussion of how to construct their seminars using a model from the study of ritual (actually, a variant of Victor Turner's work). The discussion moved through all sorts of different religious traditions and, by about 25 minutes int it, we were arguing the relative merits of ecstatic rituals vs contemplative ones in training people how to write resumes. There was something surreal about discussing Divine Pomander and The Gospel of Norea in a business boardroom, but the changes made in their seminars reflected that conversation and, in the end, proved much more effective in getting people to write good resumes.

Marc

George L. Singleton

02-06-2007, 02:42 PM

Hi George,

Not at all! It is "the sharing of relevant experience". Besides that, I'm an Anthropologist and one of the things that we know is that stories are the basis of "learning" because they combine both emotion and logic :D.

I totally agree with that. I remember, during the 2nd year of my Ph.D. fieldwork, I was asked to give a "critique" seminar to the career counsellors I was studying. Within 20 minutes, we got into an intense discussion of how to construct their seminars using a model from the study of ritual (actually, a variant of Victor Turner's work). The discussion moved through all sorts of different religious traditions and, by about 25 minutes int it, we were arguing the relative merits of ecstatic rituals vs contemplative ones in training people how to write resumes. There was something surreal about discussing Divine Pomander and The Gospel of Norea in a business boardroom, but the changes made in their seminars reflected that conversation and, in the end, proved much more effective in getting people to write good resumes.

Marc

As a co-founder and past Alabama State Chairman of the Chuck Colson Prison Ministry, there are some (not vast numbers, but some) one-time, non-violent, higher IQ ex-offenders (ex-cons) who could make good enlisted men and women for any/all branches of our services. IN the process they would find a niche in life and could become military "lifers." These men and women are not of any one ethnic or racial background in my experience, but of all colors and backgrounds, bascially all from in the main poorer homes or lack of homes, and in need of remedial reading courses and such.

From experience of 6 years on the Board of the Alabama Department of Youth Services (our juvenile, under age 18 jail system) we found the same thing, young teenage boys and girls, few but some in number there who could benefit the military if remedial reading and a stable environment were available, such as the military.

In the middle of a hot war may seem an odd time to address this topic. But, some small subset of these do not need remedial reading, are actually well educated and just made stupid/dumb one time mistakes, and could be of use and easily/readily trained at the grunt use level right now.

Please don't stop the war to deal with these side issues, but someone in military manpower should be gleaning these inputs and talking to the various service recruiting commanding generals to get something done to get and use the virtually ready to go now teenagers and younger adult ex-cons who made a one time, non-violent huge mistake. They are salvagable and I believe in the main would make good enlisted personnel.

George Singleton

marct

02-06-2007, 02:52 PM

Hi George,

Please don't stop the war to deal with these side issues, but someone in military manpower should be gleaning these inputs and talking to the various service recruiting commanding generals to get something done to get and use the virtually read to go now teenagers and younger adult ex-cons who made a one time, non-violent huge mistake. They are salvagable and I believe in the main would make good enlisted personnel.

And, quite possibly, excellent officers :eek:.

Historically, military organizations have been an excellent way of allowing "troubled youth" (I think that's the current PC phrase) to get a good swift kick in the fundament and give them a chance to get both a future and a sense of meaning. And, given the nature of the current conflict, it's not a side issue - it is a fundamental problem.

Marc

slapout9

02-06-2007, 02:55 PM

Steve Blair

02-06-2007, 03:02 PM

Hi George,

And, quite possibly, excellent officers :eek:.

Historically, military organizations have been an excellent way of allowing "troubled youth" (I think that's the current PC phrase) to get a good swift kick in the fundament and give them a chance to get both a future and a sense of meaning. And, given the nature of the current conflict, it's not a side issue - it is a fundamental problem.

Marc

Actually I think it's "challenged youth" or "youth at risk" these days. Or possibly "alternate behavioral lifestyle-oriented persons of pre-adult status"....:D

Shek

02-06-2007, 03:03 PM

Reference the current GRADSO program, it is a recent shift in programs versus an innovation. I attended grad school as part of the GRADSO program of the 1970s as a DMG top 5% on the graduate record exam.

Sir,
Keep in mind, that's a lifetime for me ;). Under the GRADSO program you completed, were you able to go immediately upon commissioning, or was it restricted until after company command as its current reincarnation does?

Cheers,

Shek

Tom Odom

02-06-2007, 03:14 PM

Keep in mind, that's a lifetime for me .

I know I am an old fart :D After 6 orthopedic operations --4 since retirement--the local surgeons call me when their business gets slow to see if I need a new tune up.

But on the GRADSO program as I knew it, we were given the choice. You could go straight to grad school as a new 2LT or delay. You just had to start inside 5 years of commissionng. I did a tour with the 82d (we used C130s, C123s, and C141s--not C119s or C47s), my advanced course, and then started at the Naval Postgraduate School as a MidEast FAO wanna be. That got me into the FAO field earlier than most.

Best

Tom

George L. Singleton

02-06-2007, 03:17 PM

Hi George, I don't know for sure but several years ago Marion Military academy was having tremendous financial problems. How and if that was resolved I don't know but they were trying to get major funding to remain open without drastic increases in tuition. PS- I will be in B'Ham next Thursday and Friday maybe we could meet up for lunch? Hey, you no where Duck town,Tenn, is? My parents are from there. Also you married an Auburn girl? Which side do you sit on when you go to the Iron Bowl:wry:

Thanks for your note. Send me your cell phone number by e-mail with date and time of day you may be reachable here in Bham and we can have lunch, fine with me.

1. MMI went broke and the State of Alabama took over the two year junior college program, from which in the past Second Lieutenant's flowed in goodly numbers.

2. The prep or grades 6-12 private school of MMI remains just that, private, and also remains "broke." That issue, grades 6-12 is still being "discussed."

3. The President of MMI is retired Marine Colonel James H. Benson, who has his PhD about completed from George Washington University in DC.

4. My wife is a Yankee, a graduate of Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. Our oldest of three daughters has two architecture degrees from Auburn. Except for the Iron Bowl we sit with Auburn at Auburn games; with Alabama at Alabama games; and I sit with Alabama at the Iron Bowl, Alice switches, sometimes sits with our Auburn graduate daughter, sometimes with me, the Bama grad.

5. Yes, I know Duck town, great place and area. Tennessee is a great state. Two of our three daughters chose to live and work in TN, one did two degees on scholarships at Vanderbilt, in fact. I sure couldn't afford VU with three children overlapping 3.5 years out of the 5 years (architecture is a 5 year degree) they were all three at Auburn, Vanderbilt and Furman (VU & Furman = our twin daughters).

6. My late Dad did his college during the very early 1920s in the night division of Pace University in NYC, then named Pace & Pace Institute, where he studied accounting and auditing. He later did extra coursework at Auburn University in accounting and auditing when/while he was Chief Examiner of Public Accounts, Alabama's equivalent of other states Auditor's job. *Dad was #7 of 8 children.

REGARDING MARION MILITARY INSTITUTE:

In 2005 I donated to MMI's military museum my late Uncle Alex Singleton's WW I Sgt's wood tunic, with three wound stripes on the sleeve (that would be three Purple Hearts) together with his metalic thread sewn on Sgt's stripes. My late Dad, Bennett Powell Singleton of Union Springs, Bullock Co., Alabama, was Alex Singleton's younger brother. Dad (bps) was America's youngest veteran of WWI, ran away from home and enlisted in the Alabama Army Guard at age 14; two weeks later his Troy, AL ANG Company was called up with President Wilson's Declaration of War against Germany that kicked off US involvement in WW I. Dad was a Corporal, a Squad Leader. He was wounded in a trench in France when a German shell burst in the air over them. All his squad, four men on either side of Dad, were killed outright by the shell burst. Shrapnel blew off the left side/brim of Dad's pie-hat helmet, knocking him out. When Dad came to, all his squad dead, his Lt. was blowing the whiste to go over the top and attack the German lines. Dad did this, alone! He captured 25 Germans who simply "gave up" when this lone, skinny Corporal approached with a rifle mounted with his long bayonet!

Dad mustered out of WWI, then in Germany in the Allied Army of Occupation, at age 16, was returned to an Army post in South Carolina, where he was given a train ticket home to Alabama.

My Grandfather Singleton, who died 5 years before I was born, was a real "hard ass" lay Methodist minister, Probate Judge, and local businessman, general store, etc, etc. He welcomed my father, now with two Purple Hearts (wound stripes) home by blessing him out for running away from home. Dad's "punishment" was to be sent to Marion Military Institute, where he was "jump started" as a junior, having only completed the 8th grade before WW I!

Since Dad's WWI uniform/gear were stolen by the movers when we moved from Alabama to Tennessee in the late 1940s. I used my inherited from my first cousin, his Dad was my Uncle Alex, WW I uniform blouse (NCO) to donate to the MMI military museum. This in 2005 really made my old Karachi Army friend, now a retired 08, furious, as he wanted me to give that wool WW I NCO tunic to some newly being formed Army Museum in Pittsburgh, PA where I never lost anything!

Uncle Alex during WW I was also a brevit Lieutenant for six months or so, his Lt. having been killed in action in the Muse Argon. I also inherited from my first cousin his Dads, my late Uncle's WW I wool officer's tunic. In 2005 I donated that to the Textile Museum at the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa, via my College of A&S.

As Paul Harvey says: "Now you know the whole story that you didn't need to know so much about to begin with!"

Dad died in 1984 at age 81 of heart disease. He chain smoked from age 14, in the trenches in France, WW I, until our family Dr., the late Dr. Thomas Frist, Sr. who was Dad's doc, talked Dad into quitting smoking together with him. Dad was age 53 when he quit smoking. Dr. Frist went on in Nashville, where I grew up, to found and chair Hospital Corporation of America (HCA).

What a digression! Excuse me for taking too much space and time.

George Singleton

slapout9

02-06-2007, 03:42 PM

George,I am retired Law Enforcement and I am now a security manager at a hospital in Montgomery that we bought from HCA?? Small World. I will email you contact information later. I am at my day job and I am about to get busy.

sullygoarmy

02-06-2007, 05:07 PM

Jimbo - good to see you up on the net. I've been pretty busy the past month on TDY trips to Iraq, Germany and recently, Fort Riley. Headed out to work with the marines in Cali next week.

Reference 1st BDE, 1st ID training the transition teams, all the current teams now go through an indepth training program at Fort Riley under 1-1 ID. I was out there last week with my boss pitching a fundamentals of Advisor work to the OC-Ts. On our tour through Iraq, alot of the feedback from the current advisors indicated they would have liked to had more advisor training prior to getting in theater. We gave classes to the 1-1 ID OC-Ts to "plant the seed" in the minds of our future advisors on what their roles, functions and challenges are and will be.

Jimbo

02-06-2007, 06:59 PM

Sully,

Damn, you guys have been busy. Dave and I are freezing our butts off here in D.C. It is weird wearing a suit to work everyday. The interagency issue is like banging my head against the wall on cetain days. Tomorow is a uniform day as I am over at the Pentagon all day. All I got to say is parking is easier at Leavenworth than around here, glad I take the metro in the morning.

Jim

02-06-2007, 09:01 PM

Just thought you might like to know that the current MNSTC-I commander (Petraeus' replacement), LTG Marty Dempsey, has an MA from Duke in English Lit. His proposed replacement, LTG Jim Dubik, currently commanding I Corps, has a Philosophy Masters (from Hopkins I think)--both taught in the English Department at USMA in the 80s. I was a philosophy prof and overlapped with Marty (and with another guy, named Petraeus, who was teaching Social Sciences at the time). The CG down at Knox these days, MG Bob Williams, is another USMA English Department Alum (philosophy MA from Emory) from the same time period, as is the Deputy US MIL Rep at NATO (BG John Adams, English MA, UMASS-Amherst). Another up and coming guy, COL (P) Jeff Smith, was with us too--MA in English from UC-Berkley (I think he has since gotten the Ph.D too).

The head of the English Department, BG (ret) Jack Capps, used to call us "the lunatic fringe." We were the element at USMA that taught critical appraisal and pushed our students to question their world, while all around them the rest of the Academy emphasized the notion of "cooperate and graduate." Cadet slang for the required philosophy class was "Drugs" as in "you have to be on drugs to understand what is going on in that class." We definitely encouraged out of the box thought .

I think the level of advanced degree is less important than the place of study and the subject matter. Graduate studies in the humanities and social sciences tend to open one's mind to new possibilities, especially when one is a conservative military member attending school at a hot bed of liberalism like a Princeton, a Duke, or a UC Berkely in the early 80s. I remember having a great time trying to justify our invasion of Grenada to my fellow grad students and the Philosophy faculty at the University of Kansas.

SWJED

02-06-2007, 09:21 PM

I think the level of advanced degree is less important than the place of study and the subject matter. Graduate studies in the humanities and social sciences tend to open one's mind to new possibilities, especially when one is a conservative military member attending school at a hot bed of liberalism like a Princeton, a Duke, or a UC Berkely in the early 80s. I remember having a great time trying to justify our invasion of Grenada to my fellow grad students and the Philosophy faculty at the University of Kansas.

While not directly on topic your comment brought back to me two items that have intrigued me concerning cultural understanding in an expeditionary environment. A SF officer told me that his group sent members to an Indian reservation to do humanitarian / construction missions - several Australian officers told me of a similar program where they sent Army officers and enlisted to Aborigine reservations to do the same. The thought process here was they would never be able to train for all the possible cultures they might encounter in the future – but they were firm in their belief that it was the “mindset” that was important – once you live in and learn one other culture it is easier to adapt and operate in additional cultures down the road. Basically - one was more open-minded concerning cultural understanding. They also commented that certain personalities amongst the service-members were more conducive to accepting other cultures… Wish I knew more about this but both instances were relayed to me in passing…

Tom Odom

02-06-2007, 09:42 PM

While not directly on topic your comment brought back to me two items that have intrigued me concerning cultural understanding in an expeditionary environment. A SF officer told me that his group sent members to an Indian reservation to do humanitarian / construction missions - several Australian officers told me of a similar program where they sent Army officers and enlisted to Aborigine reservations to do the same. The thought process here was they would never be able to train for all the possible cultures they might encounter in the future – but they were firm in their belief that it was the “mindset” that was important – once you live in and learn one other culture it is easier to adapt and operate in additional cultures down the road. Basically - one was more open-minded concerning cultural understanding. They also commented that certain personalities amongst the service-members were more conducive to accepting other cultures… Wish I knew more about this but both instances were relayed to me in passing…

Dave,

That is the central core of cultural understanding--the mindset. That's why I harp on 2 base rules---you have to have the mindset. Even the best linguist in the world is useless and may in fact be harmful without that mental framework. I have talked this issue with SF and FAOs and others; I believe the selection process has to include some form of adaptabilty measurement.

Where I have faulted the Dept of State in the past is their "adaptability" measures are really focused on how adaptable applicants are to a European/US centric environment centered on class structures and associated definitions of what constitutes "higher culture." In many ways the OSS and then the CIA followed the same path in selection and recruitment with he major exception that the OSS/CIA has always been willing to head hunt among the military, especially for covert operations.

Again Dave, you got it!

Tom

Jimbo

02-06-2007, 10:05 PM

I hated my English classes at West Point. I still cringe when I hear Walzer mentioned.

George L. Singleton

02-06-2007, 10:13 PM

Dave,

That is the central core of cultural understanding--the mindset. That's why I harp on 2 base rules---you have to have the mindset. Even the best linguist in the world is useless and may in fact be harmful without that mental framework. I have talked this issue with SF and FAOs and others; I believe the selection process has to include some form of adaptabilty measurement.

Where I have faulted the Dept of State in the past is their "adaptability" measures are really focused on how adaptable applicants are to a European/US centric environment centered on class structures and associated definitions of what constitutes "higher culture." In many ways the OSS and then the CIA followed the same path in selection and recruitment with he major exception that the OSS/CIA has always been willing to head hunt among the military, especially for covert operations.

Again Dave, you got it!

Tom

With the several overseas Muslims I have had establish e-mail correspondence with me since my numerous overseas letters to ed in the Karachi DAWN; the Peshawar FRONTIER POST; THE TIMES OF INDIA; MOSCOW TIMES, etc., etc., folks such as a key JKLF youthful booster out of Bedford, England of Indian subcontinent parents but himself born in England; the retired Pak Foreign Office senior official who is the grandson of the 2X prior King of Afghansitan, etc., etc. it is the damned "mindset" and "tribal loyalty and mindset/association" coupled with whatever branch or version of Islam they subscribe to, Sunni, Shiia, lesser sect, etc. that overrules and will not, ever, deal with rational thought!!!! This whole area of the world is as bad now as it was in my day, difference being we have no "in common" enemy the way we did during the Cold War with USSR and Communism.

This is the issue and the problem now. Lack of a larger common enemy that "makes them and us" be allies, liking it or not, so to speak.

George Singleton

George L. Singleton

02-06-2007, 10:34 PM

I hated my English classes at West Point. I still cringe when I hear Walzer mentioned.

Let us be careful as I have a young daughter, just complete two degrees at Vanderbilt, BS in English Lit, MEd in English Lit, now teaching 10th grade English Lit in a Williamson Co, TN high school. She did a 6 month overseas semester at U. of Edinburgh, as well, focused on Shakespeare.

Make English Lit your friend and you will discover it is actually both history and historical fiction. I was a history major myself in undergrad school.

Cheers

Mark O'Neill

02-06-2007, 11:51 PM

. A SF officer told me that his group sent members to an Indian reservation to do humanitarian / construction missions - several Australian officers told me of a similar program where they sent Army officers and enlisted to Aborigine reservations to do the same.

I think you might be referring to the 'AACAP' program. Link is here:

http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/19CEworks/Projects/AACAP/AACAP.HTM

The program is largely executed by Engineer units, frequently with a Medical or Dental Team attached.

SWJED

02-07-2007, 12:35 AM

slapout9

02-07-2007, 12:43 AM

Dave, my current boss is x-SF and he was sent to an American Indian reservation in the early 1970's Wyoming or Idaho (not sure) they did a lot road construction and minor medical stuff. I will ask him at work tomorrow. Awhile back it was either me or Major Strickland that talked about US military training with Tribal Police forces. It was a cultural thing plus it gets around posse commutates regulations. I will let you know what I find out.

George L. Singleton

02-07-2007, 01:17 AM

Mark,

Thanks much for the link - I guess the cultural education is a second order effect.

That said, the Aussies I worked with during several U.S. sponsored events (Small Wars) were keen on this as an example of the types of low-drag operations that provide an educational benefit for the Diggers.

Dave

Some of you guys are Marines. Did any of you ever hear of the late great Major General Wilbur S. ("Big Foot") Brown, USMC, Ret., Dec? He earned a PhD in History at U. of Alabama after retiring from USMC and was one of my History Profs at U. of Ala, College of A&S, 1959-1962 era.

Brown fought beside many Aussies during his long career, particularly in Asian theater.

There is a Marine Corp artillary classroom bldg. at Ft. Sill, OK named after General Brown. Know lots of his war stories he kindly shared as part of teaching us "history." I liked him very much.

George Singleton

marct

02-07-2007, 02:45 PM

Hi Tom,

That is the central core of cultural understanding--the mindset. That's why I harp on 2 base rules---you have to have the mindset. Even the best linguist in the world is useless and may in fact be harmful without that mental framework. I have talked this issue with SF and FAOs and others; I believe the selection process has to include some form of adaptabilty measurement.

Well, the process that we (Anthropologists) use is fairly well documented - I touch on it in that article of mine in vol. 7 of SWJ. You can train for that mindset since it is pretty rare in most cultures, but the training, at least as we do it, can have some fairly unexpected consequences.

Tom, your point about linguists is well taken. Sapirs' discussion of the relationship between Language, Culture and Personality (http://www.amazon.com/Selected-Writings-Language-Culture-Personality/dp/0520055942/sr=1-1/qid=1170858514/ref=sr_1_1/104-0046598-2588730?ie=UTF8&s=books) is well worth looking at in that regard. Without the flexible mindset, any translations will be transliterations which loose a lot of the actual meaning. BTW, another good book to add to the list in this area is Edward T. Hall's The Silent Language (http://www.amazon.com/SILENT-LANGUAGE-FAWCETT-T402/dp/B000GR0F8O/sr=1-2/qid=1170858782/ref=sr_1_2/104-0046598-2588730?ie=UTF8&s=books). It deals with proxemics - basically body language and how that is used in different cultures to shift meaning.

On the issue of adaptability training, I've often felt that the best "training" I ever got for doing fieldwork wasn't from school, but through training in improvisational acting. One of my friends in the theatre community used to train RCMP people for undercover work, and he would run them through improv training and then plop them down in a city with no money, luggage or ID, except for an emergency coin to make a phone call (if they used it, they failed). They had to report back to a particular location after 72 hours, at which point they would be debriefed and scored. The only person who ever scored 100% walked in wearing a $1000 suit, with another $6000 worth of luggage and a lot of cash.

Where I have faulted the Dept of State in the past is their "adaptability" measures are really focused on how adaptable applicants are to a European/US centric environment centered on class structures and associated definitions of what constitutes "higher culture." In many ways the OSS and then the CIA followed the same path in selection and recruitment with he major exception that the OSS/CIA has always been willing to head hunt among the military, especially for covert operations.

Well, it does make sense for State to focus on that - think about Heinlein's "Pie with a fork" story. What has always amazed (amused) me is that they concentrate on the surface of "high culture" without going deeper. They, and other foreign service groups, are actually trying to train people in a pseudo-aristocratic mindset from the late 19th century. I used to find this absolutely hilarious, since it was so obviously merely a surface understanding of that particular sub-culture.

Marc

Tom Odom

02-07-2007, 03:02 PM

They, and other foreign service groups, are actually trying to train people in a pseudo-aristocratic mindset from the late 19th century.

That is exactly my point. The good ones--the good State folks and I worked with some of the best--slip this mental punch and adapt. Others do not; the Kinshasa crowd Stan and I endured with 2 exceptions fit this model.

And I will also say we face the same type of mental imprinting when we are coming up through the system. In relation to this discussion, the gap between the conventional and unconventional is difficult to bridge.

best

Tom

slapout9

02-07-2007, 03:22 PM

Special Forces and American Indians. I found this link with a short description. It was called SPARTAN- Special Proficiency at Rugged Training and Nation Building!!!! They worked with Indian tribes in Florida,Arizona,Montana. Built roads and gave minor mediacl care. The program went out of action in the early 80's bet they wished they had kept it now. Below is the link.;)

http://www.101st.org/RB6/mainSF8.html

Stan

02-07-2007, 03:33 PM

Good Evening from a Chilly Estonia (minus 27 C. Yes Marc, that's cold here)

Without the flexible mindset, any translations will be transliterations which loose a lot of the actual meaning.

Marc,
God I love hearing that ! How many times I told our CA guys, "yes, you can read it (open source), but did you get it?"

Evening Tom !

Others do not; the Kinshasa crowd Stan and I endured with 2 exceptions fit this model.

Who was the second ? :D

Bill Moore

02-07-2007, 03:42 PM

We seem to equate degrees with intellectuals, and while there is an obvious correlation, I'm not a believer that it is the degree or the IQ score, but rather a person who desires to learn (thus the correlation), is curious about how things really work, always questions the accepted truth, and can truely think outside the box (of course Albert comes to mind) when it comes to solving complex problems whether is designing alternative energy forms, space travel, advanced psychological/sociological concepts, string theory, etc.

Is the military culturally anti-intellectual? Our schools of higher learning (though I think it is changing) teach conformity. We train our officers to embrace doctrine, which means we describe problems based on our doctrinal solutions, instead of really getting at the heart of the matter, which is determining what the actual problem, then designing an appropriate solution (which may not be doctrinal). You look at John Boyd, he came out of left field, and was rejected by many senior officers, while the ever changing Marines embraced him (at least some young Turks in their ranks).

The military isn't only institution to resist change, or in present day lexicon, resist becoming a learning organization. The Academic community at large appears to have blindly embraced an extreme left ideology, like folks in Southern Alabama for the most part blindly embrace Christianity.

Perhaps intellectualism is a combination of intellect, education, and moral courage to break with the ranks? If we're in an organization that encourages conformity, where does the intellectual fit? Do we need intellectuals at the grass roots (the so called strategic corporals)? It is better to have a guy on your left that will follow the SOP, thus be predictable in the unpredictable world of combat? Do we want our general officers to be intellectuals (many are), or guys with a lot of muddy boots experience who learned common sense in the school of hard knocks coming up through the ranks?

I don't know how you design an organization that welcomes both, so you can synergize their unique strengths. Clearly we need intellectual leadership to help design an overall strategy for our war on terrorism, instead of the narrow minded, anti-intellectual, find, capture/kill approach we're using now. We also need experienced warriors to lead the troops in the execution of this strategy. The intellectual can remain aloof, he needs to hear what the guys on the ground are saying, and adapt, and vice versa. Very easy to conceptualize all of this, but it another thing to put it into practice.

Tom Odom

02-07-2007, 04:22 PM

Who was the second ?

Hey mate,

I was thinking of Peter Whaley as the POL section rebel--and yes Peter did have a large bag of personal quirks to match his many bow ties, I fact I confirmed in living with him in Kigali for a year. One of the funniest things I ever saw or participated in was trying to teach Peter to shoot a pellet rifle. he had been back in the States on leave when a flock of several thousands of fruit bats infested our trees. These bats do not sleep all day; they scream and fight and crap constantly. One side of our house was turning white. I called Peter and asked him to buy a pump up pellet rifle, .22 Cal. He went to a sporting goods store and they sold him a .20 sheridan with .22 pellets. Peter came back on a Friday and Saturday we declared war on the bats. You could get a .22 pellet into the .20 rifle if you slammed the bolt home. After about 5 shots that got painful. Anyway Peter had never fired a gun of any knd in his life; he was lousy at first but he improved with beer and experience. That afternoon Ambassador Rawson came by to give us the initial reports on Kibeho; David was surprised to see Peter still wearing pajamas and a silk robe in the back yard with a beer in one hand and a rifle in the other. By the end of the day we had about 500 bats down. The flock departed never to return. That afternoon into evening Kibeho turned very bloody.

The other K-town embassy guy who was ok was the senior econ officer--at least he actually came and discussed things.

Estonia is way too cold for me...

marct

02-07-2007, 04:48 PM

Hi Bill,

Perhaps intellectualism is a combination of intellect, education, and moral courage to break with the ranks?

I've tended to use three different words to describe many of my colleagues,
both academic and non-academic: intellectual, scholar and theologian. My definition of "intellectual" is very similar to yours, but I substitute "a large database" for education. You can get that from education, but you can also get it from private study, life experience, etc.

I tend to use the term "scholar" to refer to someone who is a highly focused intellectual - a personality trait where they want the "best" representation of whatever they are looking at rather than a "satisfactory" representation (which most intellectuals will accept).

I use the term "theologian" to refer to an intellectual who relies on a pre-existing model of reality or interpretive framework. They can be bright, scholarly and will usually fall apart if their axiomatic assumptions about reality prove to be wrong.

If we're in an organization that encourages conformity, where does the intellectual fit? Do we need intellectuals at the grass roots (the so called strategic corporals)? It is better to have a guy on your left that will follow the SOP, thus be predictable in the unpredictable world of combat? Do we want our general officers to be intellectuals (many are), or guys with a lot of muddy boots experience who learned common sense in the school of hard knocks coming up through the ranks?

In a lot of ways, it may be better to turn this question on its head and ask "given the tasks individuals in the organization are required to perform, what mindset would be best?".

I don't know how you design an organization that welcomes both, so you can synergize their unique strengths. Clearly we need intellectual leadership to help design an overall strategy for our war on terrorism, instead of the narrow minded, anti-intellectual, find, capture/kill approach we're using now. We also need experienced warriors to lead the troops in the execution of this strategy. The intellectual can remain aloof, he needs to hear what the guys on the ground are saying, and adapt, and vice versa. Very easy to conceptualize all of this, but it another thing to put it into practice.

This is one of the classic problems in organizational theory. There are ways to do it, the KLM reforms of the late 1970's come to mind, but that requires some very strong leadership from the top. As of about 2004, almost 75% of corporate change management initiatives in North America failed; mostly from a lack of leadership, inadequate internal communications, and a generally poor understanding of culture.

If we look at the US military right now, we can already see signs of a bottom-up change happening but, until there are major adjustments in the career paths of officers (and that's only one of the problems), this probably will not result in an overall change - it's a "surge no a strategy" :wry:.

I think that one of the other, key problems,along with officer career paths, is the axiomatic assumptions behind the organization. Being the greatest conventional army, read organized along Industrial Age patterns, doesn't really do you much good when you are fighting an Information Age war. The long discussions elsewhere on IO/PSYOPs are a good example of this problem.

Marc

sullygoarmy

02-07-2007, 04:54 PM

Dave,

That is the central core of cultural understanding--the mindset. That's why I harp on 2 base rules---you have to have the mindset. Even the best linguist in the world is useless and may in fact be harmful without that mental framework. I have talked this issue with SF and FAOs and others; I believe the selection process has to include some form of adaptabilty measurement.

Where I have faulted the Dept of State in the past is their "adaptability" measures are really focused on how adaptable applicants are to a European/US centric environment centered on class structures and associated definitions of what constitutes "higher culture." In many ways the OSS and then the CIA followed the same path in selection and recruitment with he major exception that the OSS/CIA has always been willing to head hunt among the military, especially for covert operations.

Again Dave, you got it!

Tom

Tom,
This is something we are struggling with at JCISFA and trying to determine how to pick, grow and train advisors. Lots of good info on successful and non so successful advisors out there through history. Having a cultural mindset is vital to the success of our current and future advisor missions. The regular army (ie, not SF) does not have the selection process, psychological screening, personality assessments etc of their advisors today that the SF normally does. Advisors are, for the most part, tasked and receive limited training on what it means to be an advisor and techniques for gaining influence with their counterparts. I like one of the other comments in this thread that a good advisor may have to buck the system a little bit to go against the grain of traditional military culture to be a successful cultural warrior. Good stuff!

Sully

Stan

02-07-2007, 05:20 PM

Tom and Sully,

The other K-town embassy guy who was ok was the senior econ officer--at least he actually came and discussed things.

I had this bad feeling you were going to nominate him ! Yeah, he did come by with some interesting observations, which you always seemed to have answers for :eek:

I like one of the other comments in this thread that a good advisor may have to buck the system a little bit to go against the grain of traditional military culture to be a successful cultural warrior. Good stuff!

That's unfortunate and perhaps not always needed. I had great officers over the years that let me do it "Stan's Style" and I always tried to get home by 11 and with the info we were after. Tom would later offer me a beer :D

Yes, Sully, a tad confusing and simple. But hea, it worked.

Regards, Stan

02-07-2007, 06:14 PM

Marct,

I like the three distinctions you make, but, being a follower of Plato's epistemology, I would add a 4th. Thus, folks fall into the four varieties of "knowing" that Plato's Socrates describes in his allegory of the Cave and his metaphor of the divided line (The Republic, Book VII) See my comments below in that regard.

My definition of "intellectual" is very similar to yours, but I substitute "a large database" for education. You can get that from education, but you can also get it from private study, life experience, etc.

This is what I would call someone with knowledge--episteme in Plato's Greek.

I tend to use the term "scholar" to refer to someone who is a highly focused intellectual - a personality trait where they want the "best" representation of whatever they are looking at rather than a "satisfactory" representation (which most intellectuals will accept).

This is what I would call someone with expert knowledge (Greek nous, when I am being charitable. When being uncharitable, I call this person a purist.

I use the term "theologian" to refer to an intellectual who relies on a pre-existing model of reality or interpretive framework. They can be bright, scholarly and will usually fall apart if their axiomatic assumptions about reality prove to be wrong.

I would subdivide this category (Greek doxa into "believers" and "true believers." The former have some rational basis for their axiomatic structures; the latter's axioms are just "God-given truths" not otherwise subject to much real reflection.

With all that being said, at some fundamental level we are all theologians. What becomes the real differentiator is how aware we are about the beliefs and assumptions that undergird all of the rest of our so-called knowledge. I think Bill Moore had some interesting insights in a post entitled PSYOP in the real world . . ." under the Losing the PSYOP War Thread in the subsection of OIF entitled The Information War.

Much of what Bill says echos what Ludwig Wittgenstein had to say in On Certainty. LW noted that we don't determine truth by hearing the same thing over and over again. If that is all that truth required, then we could just reread multiple copies of the same newspaper story--which is basically what Bill was alluding to in his post about on-line info groups. The truely ironic thing is that those of us who read and post to SWJ may be guilty of the same sin. I just trust that we tend to be a liitle more reflective about our presuppositions than the average person who tunes into Rush Limbaugh
or reads Ann Colter (I don't mean to single out conservatives by these two examples--they just happened to be the first two names to come to mind).

Sorry for the long post and the heavy philosophizing, but this thread is about Ph.D. advisors, isn't it?

marct

02-07-2007, 06:56 PM

Hi WM,

I like the three distinctions you make, but, being a follower of Plato's epistemology, I would add a 4th. Thus, folks fall into the four varieties of "knowing" that Plato's Socrates describes in his allegory of the Cave and his metaphor of the divided line (The Republic, Book VII) See my comments below in that regard.

I must admit that I have never liked Plato's version of Socrates hat much - I always preferred Xenophon's. Still and all, your point is well taken.

I would subdivide this category (Greek doxa into "believers" and "true believers." The former have some rational basis for their axiomatic structures; the latter's axioms are just "God-given truths" not otherwise subject to much real reflection.

The only problem I have with this distinction, and I would grant that it is a valid one in some situations, is that I believe it is a sliding scale distinction, rather than a qualitative distinction. This is based on the observation that "rationality", which relies on logic, is culturally specific rather than universal. I would certainly grant that some cultural logics are closer to an hypothesized transcendent logic, and I'd say that it is usually only in the realm of mathematics or, possibly, music that we get the closest approximations of this transcendent logic (yes, there are definite Pythagorian influences operating in my brain :D).

With all that being said, at some fundamental level we are all theologians. What becomes the real differentiator is how aware we are about the beliefs and assumptions that undergird all of the rest of our so-called knowledge.

γνῶθι σεαυτόν - couldn't agree more (for those of you whose Greek is rusty, this reads "gnothi seauton" or "know thyself"). I would, however, point out that the routes to knowing yourself are, in and of themselves, culturally bound and symbolically limited. Not too many people have tried to analyze the similarities and differences in a scientific manner, Charlie Laughlin (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Laughlin) has done some work on it, but there really aren't too many others.

The truely ironic thing is that those of us who read and post to SWJ may be guilty of the same sin. I just trust that we tend to be a liitle more reflective about our presuppositions than the average person who tunes into Rush Limbaugh or reads Ann Colter (I don't mean to single out conservatives by these two examples--they just happened to be the first two names to come to mind).

Personally, I rarely listen to neo-cons - they are way too neaveau for my tastes :D. More seriously, I think that Bill's posts are spot on in some ways, and that there will be an inevitable spill over into who we, as individuals, hang out with. In my opinion, I think that it really does go back to how well you know yourself and how comfortable you are with going outside of your "comfort zone".

Sorry for the long post and the heavy philosophizing, but this thread is about Ph.D. advisors, isn't it?

Yupper :D. I think the philosophizing is very useful, whether or not any particular individual agrees with the specifics of any particular philosophical position. The important thing, to my mind, is to create an environment which encourages an airing of basic axiomatic assumptional differences. As an example of another related, I would point to the discussion concerning ROEs (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2077) and Battle Drill-6 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2089).

Marc

Stan

02-07-2007, 07:47 PM

Yupper . I think the philosophizing is very useful, whether or not any particular individual agrees with the specifics of any particular philosophical position. The important thing, to my mind, is to create an environment which encourages an airing of basic axiomatic assumptional differences.

WM, You are indeed correct. I haven't been here that long, but at times, the thread simply takes off, and Marc, as always is correct. The thread(s) create an environment, and folks get involved.

Regards, Stan

selil

02-07-2007, 09:32 PM

The idea of advanced degrees has changed over time. The rudimentary idea of the degree system in the United States has the bachelors degree associated with practitioner status, the masters degree describes itself as mastery and synthesis, and the doctoral degree is defined as dedicated advancement of the science.

We take a mildly well rounded citizen of the world out of high school and push them through a series of courses defining and deepening knowledge across the spectrum and specializing them into a profession or area of expertise. Once the knowledge, skills, and abilities of the individual have been tested and associated with the objectives of the degree plan we graduate that person from the bachelors program. They base their knowledge on the “wrote” and usually don’t go much beyond that.

The graduate degree is conferred upon those who master a level of knowledge. We further devolve from general theory and worldly concepts professing a deeper understanding of one portion of the pool of knowledge rather than the principles of the pool itself. Unlike the Renaissance man current academia culture has stove piped removing the interdisciplinary links of liberal arts and restricting the sciences to wading rather than diving into the pool of knowledge.

When you look at a doctoral thesis defined within the scope of a problem within a discipline, and often defined as narrowly as a piece of a miniscule element of a whole that incremental knowledge added to science becomes infinitesimally small. And, missing from the discussion is the often liberally considered thought of ethics, right & wrong, the reflection on results, and so much more that science ignores. The doctoral thesis is not about being a well-rounded thinking intellectual, but about being a narrowly focused juggernaut of specialization.

The PhD does not confer wisdom. It does give the tools to research, adapt, consider, reflect, and corresponding make decisions based on rational thought. The near transference of expertise from one dissertation topic to a new topic is inherent in the advanced strategies that a doctoral student should be equipped with. Those who have never experienced the horrendous crashing of your own ego as an trained proponent of the scientific method has shredded your well vetted ideas do not understand the relationship of a PhD to thinking.

A well-formed PhD program will create an evaluative thinker. It unquestioningly can create arrogant imbeciles filled with the inertia of clueless thought wrapped in the heritage of intolerance and suicidal intellectualism. Somewhere in the travesties of ivory towers there are intellectuals who gather knowledge against the storm of “focused” research and realize knowledge is not restricted by a degree or departmental agenda. But, they won’t get tenure.

The military hierarchy isn’t much different than the academic. The malfeasance of restrictive thought, career centered choices, refutation of challenges, and leadership by blame management infects all of the services officer corps. A few rotten apples can ruin the barrel but they can also make some kick butt hard cider. When looking across the ranks of those who lead there is a panorama of a normalized curve showing a swelling of those who do their jobs, those who don’t do their jobs, and those who do their jobs superlatively. Much like academia within the bastions of military head quarters there are likely those who don’t worship at the altars of restraint and look more towards solving problems. It would be nice to think in the structured thoughts of doctoral military leaders the flexibility and reflectivity of thinking and research might reach a crescendo to allow for problem solving where blame is put away and solutions are created.

It’s a nice thought anyways.

Shek

02-07-2007, 09:38 PM

On the issue of adaptability training, I've often felt that the best "training" I ever got for doing fieldwork wasn't from school, but through training in improvisational acting. One of my friends in the theatre community used to train RCMP people for undercover work, and he would run them through improv training and then plop them down in a city with no money, luggage or ID, except for an emergency coin to make a phone call (if they used it, they failed). They had to report back to a particular location after 72 hours, at which point they would be debriefed and scored. The only person who ever scored 100% walked in wearing a $1000 suit, with another $6000 worth of luggage and a lot of cash.

It's "The Amazing Race" and a cultural SERE school all in one! This would actually be a great experience, providing motivation for learning some language and how to interact with people in a positive way so that you can get from point A to point B without any money.

02-07-2007, 09:59 PM

Marct,

Some more grist for your mill.

The only problem I have with this distinction, and I would grant that it is a valid one in some situations, is that I believe it is a sliding scale distinction, rather than a qualitative distinction. This is based on the observation that "rationality", which relies on logic, is culturally specific rather than universal. I would certainly grant that some cultural logics are closer to an hypothesized transcendent logic, and I'd say that it is usually only in the realm of mathematics or, possibly, music that we get the closest approximations of this transcendent logic (yes, there are definite Pythagorian influences operating in my brain :D).

Your presuppositions are showing here. Where I come from, 'rational' simply means giving reasons for one's position. It does not specify how many or what kind of reasons count as enough. We could define a sliding scale of rationality as follows: to be more or less rational is to justify more or fewer of your beliefs with reasons. That, however is not what I had in mind.
Logic is also not merely mathematical reasoning a la Whitehead, Russell, Quine, Tarski, etc. Nor is it just a Pythagorean harmony of the spheres. Logic is a set of rules for a method of enquiry. In addition to truth functional logic (which need not just be two-valued, as in true or false), we have, among others, epistemic logics, deontic logics, modal logics, and, my personal favorite, interrogative logics. This last is the kind of thing we find in Platonic dialectic/the Socratic Method, Aristotle's Organon, and Hegel's Transcendental Dialectic, to mention some of the big names. I think the most lucid description of it, however is Collingwood's logic of question and answer.
We can, of course qualify, our assessment of arguments in each of these logics with normative statements as to what kinds of reasons are good or better than others. This might put us into a different type of sliding scale than the one you seem to allude to in your response. But we don't have too.

"[G]nothi seauton" or "know thyself"). I would, however, point out that the routes to knowing yourself are, in and of themselves, culturally bound and symbolically limited.

I think this last smacks of the worst sort of relativism, derived from what I take to be the misinterpretation of the work of William Graham Sumner. I also don't drink from the Foucault and Derida post-structuralist Kool-Aid. And I don't necessarily agree with the "language as semiotics" interpretations of folks following in the wake of C.S. Peirce. Some things about who and what we are just are not up for grabs--we are all, after all, members of the same species. As a result we all have some of the same basic needs (although they may not follow Maslow's hierarchy). We probably best know ourselves by knowing others around us.
This last is a long way around getting to the point that others mentioned. We can best train ourselves for operations in another cultural milieu by training ourselves in another cultural milieu.

Jedburgh

02-07-2007, 10:14 PM

...On the issue of adaptability training, I've often felt that the best "training" I ever got for doing fieldwork wasn't from school, but through training in improvisational acting. One of my friends in the theatre community used to train RCMP people for undercover work, and he would run them through improv training and then plop them down in a city with no money, luggage or ID, except for an emergency coin to make a phone call (if they used it, they failed). They had to report back to a particular location after 72 hours, at which point they would be debriefed and scored. The only person who ever scored 100% walked in wearing a $1000 suit, with another $6000 worth of luggage and a lot of cash...
Similar in some respects, but it certainly wasn't a scored competition, was the final day of a Turkish "Headstart" course I attended when first assigned to a remote nuke detachment as a young artilleryman many years ago. (All cherries remained at the Group HQ near Istanbul until completion of inprocessing and the headstart course, then we were sent out to our various detachments) On the final day of headstart, our instructor brought us all out to Istanbul's Grand Bazaar - and then abandoned us. After just two weeks in-country, and four days of basic language instruction, we had to fend for ourselves and find our own way back. It was a real learning experience.

120mm

02-08-2007, 07:01 AM

Selil, the elegance and accuracy of your summary has me mentally gasping. That was absolutely perfect on the spot.

SWJED

02-08-2007, 08:24 AM

George L. Singleton

02-08-2007, 12:05 PM

Herschel Smith discusses the issues raised in this thread at his Captain's Journal web log - The Petraeus Thinkers: Five Challenges (http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/02/07/the-petraeus-thinkers-five-challenges/).

For those of you who have yet to take a minute to read this Captain's Journal blog, you guys and gals now literally fighting this war for all of us, I urge you now to do so.

My views dating from 1963-1965 stationed in Karachi @ our then US Embassy and ever since concur with much or most of what this blog says, but I am simplier and more blunt spoken:

1. Both uneducated and even educated Muslims, be they Iraqis, Afghans, Pakistanis, of the UAE, name any Muslim world nation, are flat out, everyday, all the time liars. They make up b.s. to suit the moment and are totally unable in most cases to deal in reality.

2. I conclued 40 years ago in Pakistan they did this for two simple reasons:
a) To "get along with" what they thought a Westerner wanted to hear and be told, despite the grim facts of real life in their part of the world.
b) To appeal to any/a Westerner's "tourist sense" in hopes of getting you to buy something that was not as it seemed in their lying presentation.

3. Culturally, tribalism and ethic, sub-sets of culture that date back long before Islam existed, run very deep. If they could, for example, the Pakhtuns would form their own economically illogical nation out of parts of mainly Pakistan and Afghanistan. Ditto the boys in Balochistan, where Pakistan has it's own hot small war running largely out of control today. The bulk of these fellows are uneducated or undereducated, many youth today cannot/could not afford the uniform required of a/as child to attend for instance a Pakistani public school, but the Madrass schools will take them in, totally free, without such requirements, and educate and brain wash them ASAP, turning out ready made suicide bombers and terrorists. All funded of course, in the main, with Saudi Wahabbi money, the most extreme Sunnis Islam.

I have never been in Iraq, but have been several times in Iran. On Iraq, which is mainly Arab in composition as I understand, but then split between Sunni and Shiia, in the main, Islam, you have wild tribal characteristics that run back to the Old Testament argument of who was Abraham's "favored" son, Ishamael, born of Haggar, or Isaac, born of Sarah.

Understand that most Arabs can't even read so only a semi-literate to a literate Arab Muslim would even know or care about or understand that this early simple dicotomy of Ishmael vs. Isaac was used by Muhammed as the foundation stone to claim the "origin" of Islam from our common worship of the same God "ancestry."

Pakistan is mostly non-Arab, as is Iran, as you all know. No words wasted here, but the Islamic characteristic of huge lies and wild made up stories for whatever purpose, of late, to defame the West in general and the US/UK specifically, is the order of the day, clearly.

The Islamic characteristic of lying as a form of daily life dates back in my lifetime to my days in Pakistan, 40 years ago, and goes on today unabated, part of the "lore and culture" for lack of a sharper definition.

Again, the Captain's Journal blog is worth the read. While he invites comments, and I saw none, I think this larger forum would be the better place to comment back to the Captain's Journal blog, which is why this statement is my comment on that journal blog.

George Singleton, Colonel, USAF, Ret. (6 years active duty up front, the rest mainly individual reserve with regular forces at the JCS level, total service 32 years)
Former Commander, Det. 2, 6937th Comm Gp, old USAFSS, attached to the US Air Attache Office, American Embassy, Karachi, then West Pakistan, 1963-1965; former International Banking Officer, Asia (incl. SW Asia) Division, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., NYC, now part of JP Morgan Chase Bank; Assisant Deputy Commander for "the" Desert Storm Airlift out of Charleston AFB, SC, 1991; retired (reserve wise) from duty with HQ USSOCOM, formerly USREDCOM; detached reserve duty on TDY orders (repeatedly) with HQFORSCOM when/while then Lt. Gen. Colin Powell, USA was very "briefly", mainly on paper, the CG; TDY orders periodically for two years on war plans staff, joint/interservice/NATO, under Admiral Kelso, of Tailhook fame, while he was then CINCLANT out of Norfolk, VA. US Department of Veterans Affairs, Area National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) Acting Manager, based out of Bham VAMC, 1993/1994. A coaltion of VA; DOD; the US Public Health Service (PHS): and FEMA which deals with actual operable plans for both domestic and international terrorist, natural, or war disasters. NDMS responded from across the nation with teams to the World Trade Towers both in 1993 and in 2001, as a small example. NDMS also sent teams a year ago to Kashmir to help with earthquake relief. Only meant as info basic background not meant as an old coot's bragging. You guys know more in a year of today's small wars than we did in a lifetime!

120mm

02-08-2007, 12:23 PM

I captured one "factoid" right away that I agreed with: I do believe that if we rolled into Iraq acting like "Billy Bad Ass", the end result would've been less US AND Iraqi deaths. Instead, we went in with a relatively soft image (though in reality we were killing a LOT of people) and our public face was "liberation from Saddam" not at war with Iraq.

I think this was perceived as weak, and encouraged problems.

In the movie "Unforgiven", William Munny leaves town shouting about how he was going to kill everyone he sees, their wives, kids and dogs. Of course, he kills no-one.

It reminds me of the parable of the "two kings". The king who always rewarded was killed when it was his turn to punish. The king who always punished was lauded, when he started rewarding.

George L. Singleton

02-08-2007, 01:15 PM

To amplify your good remarks. The war was against the Baathis Party, made up of specific tribes, all Sunnis, of which party Saddam was the dictator and head. Baathist Party dates back well before WW II and is 100% built on the Nazi model. Hitler and his Nazi regime were/are popular in Iraq among the Baathists for a few simple reasons:

1. Antisemitism appeals to radical Sunni Baathists, before, during, and ever since WW II. They flatly hate Jews, long before the founding of Israel the Baathist hated Jews.

2. An early Baathis Mufti in fact became a General in the Nazi SS and went from today's Iraq to Nazi Germany to command his Muslim storm troopers as part of Hitlers army against the USSR/Russians.

3. De-Baathification is better understood as de-Nazification. That is what it is.

However, the US and our allies, even at the end of WW II, did not totally dismantle either the German nor the Japanes police at home nor all their troops in the field immediately. We in fact used the in place Japanese Army initially to help maintain law and order in what is today Malaysia and South China, as we had insufficient forces in these areas to do the security job then needed. Just one example.

Cheers,
George Singleton

Stan

02-08-2007, 01:53 PM

Greetings George !

2. I conclued 40 years ago in Pakistan they did this for two simple reasons:
a) To "get along with" what they thought a Westerner wanted to hear and be told, despite the grim facts of real life in their part of the world.
b) To appeal to any/a Westerner's "tourist sense" in hopes of getting you to buy something that was not as it seemed in their lying presentation.

A great summation that applies to nearly all of Sub-Sahara (and darn few Arabs there).

I would watch our State counterparts (who dare not go outside the embassy walls during social and political upheaval) send their drivers and gardners to gather info :D

Once info in hand, they would begin the arduous task of writing the day's report (your first reason above). The Zairian merely gave his "patron" exactly what he thought his patron wanted to hear. Tha fact that is was nowhere near true, meant little.

Regards, Stan

Tom Odom

02-08-2007, 02:00 PM

George and 120,

I disagree with both of you. Both of you are trapped in the dillemma of what was the objective of the war. 120, general officers I respect still debate the "hard versus soft approach"; the very debate is tied to the lack of a clear objective for the war.

George,

Simple slogans like all Muslims are liars are essentially worse than useless because they obviate the need for any thinking. As for Baath=Nazism, that is equally simplistic and that very vein of simplistic thinking led Bremer to make simply stupid decisions: disband the Army, purge all Baath.

I would question the statement All Baathists Hate All Jews, especially the statement before Israel became an independent country.

As for service in the Waffen SS or Wehrmacht; that itself is a long list. The Free Officer Movements in the Middle East--Iraq, Syria, Egypt--were more anti-British or anti-French than pro-Nazi. As for contamination by association, consider that Raziel one of the 2 founders of the Stern Gang actually went so far as to initiate contact with the Nazis in the fight to kick the Brits out of Palestine.

Best

Tom

George L. Singleton

02-09-2007, 02:43 AM

Tom, I guess someone wishes not to have my factual, detailed reply that I entered here earlier today and which initially was posted?

Cheers,
George Singleton

Shek

02-09-2007, 02:48 AM

Tom, I guess someone wishes not to have my factual, detailed reply that I entered here earlier today and which initially was posted?

Cheers,
George Singleton

Sir,

I think the mods felt that the posts were going off topic (i.e. were only tangentially related to officers with PhDs), and so they spun some of the posts off into a new thread here.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=9743#post9743

Cheers,
Shek

Jedburgh

02-09-2007, 03:25 AM

Tom, I guess someone wishes not to have my factual, detailed reply that I entered here earlier today and which initially was posted?

Cheers,
George Singleton
Your detailed reply - along with much of the discussion that has branched way off topic - was moved to another thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2148) in the Adversary/Threat forum. The subject matter had strayed well away from Iraq and into discussion of broader GWOT threat perceptions. Although no longer focused on Iraq, that discussion certainly has value in itself, and deserved its own thread.

There was no intent of eliminating your response or shunting away your reply to be ignored. It was simply to move the emerging discussion into a more appropriate forum, and allow further discussion of the Petraeus' brain trust without this distraction.

George L. Singleton

02-09-2007, 03:36 AM

Much of what I have read here so far tells me many of your posting folk have a pretty good grasp of things themselves.

I will say again, on the record, regarding the brain trust, that you cannot expect to successfully reason with disassociated tribes and variations of Islam folks who at the grass roots level view us Westerners as infidels.

No, I do not for a minute say or think all Muslims are extremists or nuts. However, the number who are such appears to be growing, which is unhealthy for civilization in general and our boys and girls in harms way.

Brain trusters are working a difficult problem that I would, as an ancient warrior, view as one of internal security and a policing nature.

Brain trusters missed the boat but could recover if they will reconsider airlifting in multiple divisions of Turkish troops to use in Baghdad, as a starter.

Cheers,
George Singleton

Bill Moore

02-09-2007, 03:07 PM

I caught part of a story on NPR this morning about DoS's challenge in finding personnel for OIF, and the failure of the administration to get beyond words on the Civilian Augmentation Corp (something close to this phrase, where the President wants experts in various fields from civil engineering to electrical engineers to volunteer for service). I think it is a great idea, but I can understand why that will take time to implement.

I think our problems in Iraq are largely associated with our legacy industrial age management systems, where every worker, and every organization, has a defined box to work in, you do this and nothing else. You can elevate that to the national level, where we describe the elements of national power as DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic), or possibly emerging doctrine MIDLIFE (Military, Information, Diplomatic, Law Enforcement, Intelligence, Finance, and Economic). What I saw in Iraq at the end of Phase III was that the military leadership largely thought their mission was done, so we went through the painful pregant pause that led to the mess we're in now. Instead of waiting for DoS to step up to the plate, which still hasn't happened, I think we need to get away from the stay in your box management system, and realize that we as the military own responsibility for all the elements of national power (in a situation like Iraq and Afghanistan, where we're starting from scratch after a regime change), until we can outsource it to the appropriate the agency. Bottom line until we can outsource it, we own it. That implies we can't sit on our hands waiting for the other elements of national power to catch up, we need to keep moving forward.

Now when we talk about PhD advisors, we need centers of excellence (groups of experts on DIME and MIDLIFE (far beyond the capabilities of the POLMIL officer) at the appropriate levels in military organizations to facilitate planning and execution of what we're calling phase IV tasks in OIF) for DIME/MIDLIFE.

Now pardon me if I'm pee in your neo-conservative corn flakes, but we need to be prepared to establish other forms of political structures beyond democracies for countries that never experienced democracy. We need to implement a structure that actually fits that society's culture, economic structure, and history. For those that can't let it go, DoS can "encourage" the development of democracy over the next 50 years, "after" that country is "secure" and functioning economically. That means we need political PhD advisors who can bring more to the table than our constitution, they need to understand how to stand up a variety of political systems, so they can advise the military on what we need to do to get the process started under martial law, so when we eventually transition it to another agency, we're already moving the right direction setting the right conditions.

02-09-2007, 07:32 PM

Long ago and far away in the Land of Ahs (the marketing campaign used by the Kansas department of tourism when I lived there in the mid 80s), the Army taught me during CGSC about a thing called the "country team." I guess that hummer is passé now.
One would think that DoD and DoS should be joined at the hip throughout the planning and execution process whenever the US gets ready to involve itself in some OCONUS adventure. Likewise, one would think that a similar relationship would exist between DoD and DHS for a CONUS-focused operation.
It is not clear to me that we need a bunch of Ph.D's in uniform to solve the problem in Iraq. Someone else on this thread masterfully described a Ph.D. as a person who has gone from a macroscopic grasp of knowledge to becoming an expert in a piece of minutiae (I admit I have wordsmithed that other post greatly). What we really need are people who can see that many folks are stakeholders and have a part to play in the solution; we need people without blinders on or otherwise afflicted with tunnel vision. We need some folks who are wise, not just smart. Solomon, where are you???

Tom Odom

02-09-2007, 08:11 PM

Long ago and far away in the Land of Ahs (the marketing campaign used by the Kansas department of tourism when I lived there in the mid 80s), the Army taught me during CGSC about a thing called the "country team." I guess that hummer is passé now

CTs were my life and sometimes life was rather like the Hatfields and the McCoys as Stan and I encountered in our tour together in Zaire. Stan Reber was instrumental in identifying cousins and those who only claimed kinship.
Rwanda was a much closer CT. The team leader, Ambassador David Rawson, set the tone and that was cooperate, coordinate, and watch each other's back.

But I will also say the same kind of play occurred inside the Beltway; during Desert Storm it was much like Rwanda. Later when I visited from Rwanda, the inter-agency feud was in play like Zaire.

In another post on here by Menning (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2168), he put up George Packer's New Yorker article on Dave Kilcullen and Montgomery McFate. The article is an extract of Assassins Gate. Anyway Packer relates how Kilcullen came to the attention of Paul Wolfowitz because of Kilcullen's writings on irregular war.

I am glad that happened; I wish that in 2002 when Wolfowitz in speaking to Congress dimissed ethnic schisms in Iraq as trivial concerns when compared to the Balkans, he had stumbled across someone besides Ahmed Chalabi.

McFate is anthropologist whom Packer descibes as a missionary for the importance of cultural knowledge. An anthropologist, she had become a consultant for the Navy.

The Army and the Marines have long had a FAO program. The Navy and the Air Force started theirs in the 1990s when the JCS saw how important FAOs were to understanding the "New World Order" based on operations in the Middle East and Africa. I offer a quote on that very subject from 1994 I used to close my memoirs :

...I had two very important encounters with FAO’s during my recent trip to Africa and Europe:
...First, in Africa, I saw how important LTC Marley and LTC Odom are to their respective Ambassadors and to the CINC. They are both out in harm’s way using their unique skills to be invaluable eyes and ears in this crisis...
...As I go around the Army today, I find that the Marley’s and the Odom’s are as important as ever—maybe even more important when consider the role they could play in many of the crises we are facing almost daily.
Gordon R. Sullivan General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

The Army has long had Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and PSYOPs. Kilcullen's experiences have resurfaced what many of those forces along with FAOs have understood for decades.

In a round about way I am making three points:

a. Our decisions are often made without counsel when there are many Solomons at hand.

b. Sometimes it takes an outsider--because they are an outsider--to be heard.

c. And any reaction depends on who is doing the listening.

Tom

emjayinc

02-09-2007, 10:03 PM

Bill Moore

02-10-2007, 12:09 AM

Wm,

You are one of the few that implies that our interagency process is functional. They still teach us about the country team, and I have it seen it work well for missions in Liberia, Senegal, Philippines, etc.; however, there was no country team in Iraq or Afghanistan. There is a "huge" difference in scale from advising a government, to standing one up; advising a gov on economic models, to standing up a working model, etc.

The State Department (and this is only one agency) still can't mobilize enough resources to perform their functions in Iraq. The military is the only organization in the U.S. government that is robust enough to execute the DIME/MIDLIFE tasks in a situation like this. It would be worthwhile for me to see what the military's role was in post war Japan and Germany for reference.

If we are going to take those missions on, then I would argue we need a cadre of PhD (forget the PhD, we guys and gals educated on how to do this) advisors to enable us to perform these functions at an acceptable level.

Obviously State needs more funding, but just throwing money at the problem won't solve the problem, it will also require a significant culture change. Second, do we want to throw that much money at State for this type of venture? If we make that investment, it would imply we're signing up for a few more regime changes down the road. I don't think that is cost effective. The military will always provide the bulk of the doers in hostile situations.

By no means am I taking taking anything away from the country team, I seen it function well when the "right" personalties were in place.

We have all seen the result of what happens when the military waits for an alleged capability. I'm not faulting State, I understand some of the beltway politics that led to this. None the less, I think we need this capability in the military.

selil

02-10-2007, 05:23 AM

Piled higher and deeper? Actually, a good point in modern times,when degree granting institutions can be accredited by any Tom, Dick or Harry who wants to do so. However, in the case of these Ph.D officers, I'm sure they all got theirs from top rank universities.

I'd like to know where you get that just anybody can accredit a degree granting institution. The national and regional accrediting authorities like North Central are far from just anybody. There are groups who give bogus degrees but those are ferreted out rather quickly.

marct

02-10-2007, 01:19 PM

Hi Bill,

The military is the only organization in the U.S. government that is robust enough to execute the DIME/MIDLIFE tasks in a situation like this. It would be worthwhile for me to see what the military's role was in post war Japan and Germany for reference.

I think that one of the underlying problems goes back to a perception that derive from the nation state model and the functional differentiation between "politics", "military", "economics", etc.

First off, most nation states have developed bureaucracies around these functional areas which tend to produce institutional mindsets that are rather narrowly focused. Increasingly, nation support / building activities and humanitarian protection actions (e.g. Darfur, etc.) in partial states require a totally integrated approach that is at odds with any of the functionally defined institutions.

Second, there appears to be a very poor definition, including debate, on what the actual missions are. Part of this stems from the functional splitting, but some of it also stems from the requirement to achieve some form of international consensus on the action. Another part appears to stem from a reluctance to state in unequivocal form a desired end state for the action in a flexible enough form that the mission can adapt to changing conditions. For example, the public "spinb" on the end state of OIF was that there would be a popular uprising into a democratic state - n debate, and not much flexibility either.

If we are going to take those missions on, then I would argue we need a cadre of PhD (forget the PhD, we guys and gals educated on how to do this) advisors to enable us to perform these functions at an acceptable level.

...None the less, I think we need this capability in the military.

While I don't think we should conflate PhD with experience (I think both would be useful), I do agree that it is important a) to have the capability in the military and b) to us that capability in the initial mission definition stages as well as in the operational planning stages.

Marc

Bill Moore

02-10-2007, 07:53 PM

Marc,

Exactly, and I'll borrow a concept I saw on a discussion thread on the Global Guerrilla site, where the commentor made reference to the "Red Queen" hypothesis, which is in short is, "for an evolutionary system, continuing development is needed just in order to maintain its fitness relative to the systems it is co-evolving with". Since the author was obviously better educated than I was, I couldn't follow it all, but he appeared to be making parallels to organizations as biosystems. The thoughts that I developed off that was that networked organizations (if they are organizations) adapt on an open feedback system. To me that means they adapt to changes "outside" of their organization. Bureaucratic organizations adapt based on input from within their organization, thus they actually be living in a parallel reality that isn't reality at all. I think you touch upon this point when you address the State Department, it is organized to deal with other nations, not non-state actors, and I have seen little change (as an outsider, beyond words and concepts) that are they adapting to this new player in the global arena. I think the State Department is much more bureaucratic than the military. They have several highly educated employees who are company men, but very few intellectuals capable of accepting and adapting input from outside their closed feedback loop. Their leadership, for the most part, wants to protect the status quo. Read the "Ugly American" and you'll see things haven't changed that much. Unlike the State Department, the CIA, Commerce, and assorted other agencies, the military must achieve results, and is far and away the nation's leader (outside of niche industries) for change. We have wars and conflicts to win, we can't wait on the rest of the government to catch up. We need educated, experienced, and men and women with the courage to be objective enough to understand the true cause and effect nature of the conflict, and not blindly rely on doctrine. PhD is a misnomer, but we should encourage our officers and select NCOs to pursue this type of liberal education (not liberal politics, don't confuse the two). More courses should be made available for free on-line, etc. When I was trying to stand up a local government in a region in Iraq I sure as heck which I had that knowledge at my finger tips.

I'll drag part of this conversation/thread into the interagency section eventually, because I want to pursue organization structure and roles in more depth. However, I don't think we strayed too far off course from the underlying issue of this thread, which is PhD's in the military. I think I am building a case on why we need them.

02-10-2007, 08:29 PM

120mm

02-10-2007, 08:30 PM

George and 120,

I disagree with both of you. Both of you are trapped in the dillemma of what was the objective of the war. 120, general officers I respect still debate the "hard versus soft approach"; the very debate is tied to the lack of a clear objective for the war.

Best

Tom

Tom, as usual, it is a joy to debate with you. Very few people on the internet come off as pleasant to disagree with than you. Thank you.

I don't agree with either the "hard" or the "soft" approach. I think there is "some" utility in discarding the "image" of the white hat when invading someone else's country. At the very least, claiming to oppose Saddam, and not Iraq, leads Iraqis to believe you are lying when your ordnance kills the wife and kids.

I would suggest there might be some merit to the "appear to be hard, when you are actually soft" method of operation.

Either way, what we did, didn't work.

John T. Fishel

02-10-2007, 08:32 PM

The whole interagency process, both in Washington and in the field at the Country team level, is dependent on the quality of leadership being exercised. It also depends on the resources made available. Planning for post-war Germany and Japan actually began in 1942 concurrent with the fielding of Civil Affairs units. Although it was George Marshall's intention to transfer them lock, stock, and barrel to DOS, that never happened and the capability to stand up governments remained in the military, where it still resides. Unfortunately, the AC Civil Affairs is tiny while the RC is far smaller than we need. That said, planning for Phase IV, as stated by none other than Tommy Franks in his memoir, AMERICAN SOLDIER, was something that was left to USD Policy which thought that "hope [really was] a method."

Summary statement: although the military has more of the necessary assets than any other agency, it is both short handed and fails to use what it has as well as it should.

Bill Moore

02-11-2007, 01:57 AM

John,

Concur with your summary statement, especially where we failed to use what we had. The Civil Affairs folks in my sector during the phase III/IV transition period were paralyzed initially. They were reservists with a variety of skills, but I remember their commander told me they weren't prepared for this, they were trained to assist struggling governments, not stand governments up. None the less, once they got past the shock they started making head way into the unknown with no guidance from higher, to include DoS. Interesting TTP, the combat arms commander assigned a combat arms officer to each CA function to provide the Type A personality leadership needed at that point to overcome the inertia. The combat officer would have the CA officer/NCO explain the problem, what needed to get done, find out what resources he needed, then help him develop a plan to execute. The CA effort was the primary effort, so my hat is off to the Commander for organizing the force this way, it worked out great.

Wm, our planning for OIF was the worst I have ever seen. You're absolutely correct that we shouldn't cross the LD if we don't have a feasible plan to make a better peace.

I'm not sure I follow your comments on the country team. Country Team's exist where there are embassies, and some do great work. My point was when you do a regime change, there is no country team in the lead. I may be the only naysayer in this council, but I don't consider OIF a counterinsurgency like El Salvador, Philippines, etc. It is a post war reconstruction project that got off to a slow start, and now has evolved into a state of anarchy. COIN strategy probably won't work.

02-11-2007, 02:33 AM

Wm, our planning for OIF was the worst I have ever seen. You're absolutely correct that we shouldn't cross the LD if we don't have a feasible plan to make a better peace.

I'm not sure I follow your comments on the country team. Country Team's exist where there are embassies, and some do great work. My point was when you do a regime change, there is no country team in the lead. I may be the only naysayer in this council, but I don't consider OIF a counterinsurgency like El Salvador, Philippines, etc. It is a post war reconstruction project that got off to a slow start, and now has evolved into a state of anarchy. COIN strategy probably won't work.

Bill,
I suggested earlier that we revitalize the country team concept. I was not real clear as to what I meant. Revitalize implies more than just taking an old concept off the shelf and using it again. I am not proposing a return to the status quo country team that I learned about in the early 80's at CGSC.
We are no longer in the kind of world that such a construct supports. A new team structure might not restrict itself to a single country. In fact in light of the globalizing of today, a regional approach is probably even more apropos. At a minimum, it ought to include State, Commerce, Energy, and Defense reps in its management structure. Depending on where and what is being contemplated, other Federal agencies also get pulled into the planning and execution process.
You may very well be correct that the uniformed services own the hands-on work for a large part of the time. That, however, mandates some serious reconsideration of what our AC/RC force mix looks like. It probably also requires that a whole lot more of the Federal civilian workforce be subject to deploying to an AOR.

To bring this back on thread, we need smart people (some of whom may be Ph.D.s) from a wide range of "nation-building" disciplines to be more than just advisors. We need them to be active particiapnts in the planning and execution of any expedition that the US chooses to consider or launch.

Stan

02-11-2007, 11:07 AM

Greetings WM !

Long ago and far away in the Land of Ahs (the marketing campaign used by the Kansas department of tourism when I lived there in the mid 80s), the Army taught me during CGSC about a thing called the "country team." I guess that hummer is passé now.
One would think that DoD and DoS should be joined at the hip throughout the planning and execution process whenever the US gets ready to involve itself in some OCONUS adventure. Likewise, one would think that a similar relationship would exist between DoD and DHS for a CONUS-focused operation.
It is not clear to me that we need a bunch of Ph.D's in uniform to solve the problem in Iraq.

Having served in 9 embassies in various capacities I can tell you that the CT is a good example why DoD and DoS will never be joined at the hip. There were indeed folks with PhDs and some who even thought they were PhD material.

That meant precious little during civil wars and upheavals. It would be that very same PhD (know to some as JJJ) who sent my boss on a hopeless mission only to later disregard factual reporting. JJJ would later show to have his passport stamped crossing the Rwandan border, and ask "Tom, what's that smell?" "That would be death Jon" Tom replied. JJJ never returned on our watch :D

DoD and DHS had difficulties, but far less than with State. Most surrounded personnel. The majority of the NCOs are "on loan" and now outside of their environment and PMOS. So if DHS was trying to retain and at times reward her personnel, I didn't see it.

Regards, Stan

John T. Fishel

02-11-2007, 11:56 AM

Bill--

You are so right that there is no CT concept at work when war goes down. In fact, when there is a major military operation (and sometimes not so major but greater than an El Sal or exercise) even if there is an ambassador in country he is not in charge of the military. In the first Gulf War, as I wrote in an eariler book (Civil Military Operations in the New World), there was no ambassador in Kuwait or Iraq and the ambassadors in Turkey and Saudi supported GENs Schwartzkopf and Galvin (who was in support of the former). A real problem comes when there is dual authority between State and DoD as in Iraq. Hopefully, the Petraeus/Crocker co-consulship will work well, but if it does, it will be because the two men are working very hard to make it work. The real question, in my mind, is why no president in living memory has ever done the finger pointing exercise that Max Thurman did with Carl Stiner and Wayne Downing putting Stiner in charge of all operations in Panama. The President can do that as he does in his appointment letter to ambassadors and he could do it without the restriction regarding military operations. Unfortunately, he hasn't told either Petraeus or Crocker that he is in charge (nor, I might add, is the Chain of Command/Commo clean). Thus all resolution of disputes will have to be done by the President if they are to be resolved.

A final word on CTs. If you have a strong ambassador (like Ed Corr in El Salvador) then the CT will work well - the ambassador is its commander. If you have a weak ambassador (like Arthur Davis in Panama), then the CT is just a BOGSAT (bunch of guys sitting around a table - with apologies to Jeff Fuller who coined the term and who I haven't seen since we worked on the USSOCOM Joint Mission Analysis nearly 20 years ago).

Cheers

John

Stan

02-11-2007, 01:35 PM

John,
How very correct. I didn't want to come off sounding as if the CT does not have its place. I also don't mean that a PhD is insignificant. We had a few very good "career" Mission Chiefs, some without PhDs. When the situation became more than upheaval, the military came in and the CT took a back seat. In our case, they even refuted our reports in spite of the fact they were nearly a thousand miles west of the problem. That was more agenda.

Regards, Stan

Jimbo

02-11-2007, 02:30 PM

There are many problems with inter-agency cooperation from the CT level to D.C. The ability of state to provide personnel is huge issue. There are also internal problems as well. I know these issues very, very intimately. The Rick's article has everybody focused on the PhD qualification. If you look at what Mansoor, McMaster, and Kilcullen have done professionally, meaning experience, then you realize that PhD's are merely a nice to have. McMaster and Mansoor got their PhD's when they were on the history faculty at West Point. The history department makes you complete your PhD while you are on the faculty. Traditionally, the officers who get picked up to teach at West Point go to very good programs that specialize in their discipline. There is a long standing relationship between Princeton and West Point for International Relations. The History department has been heavy with Duke, Ohio State, Kansas, and Texas A&M for military history. As far as the quirky Australian, well Dave is kind of quirky, and pretty damn funny.

max161

02-11-2007, 03:04 PM

Greetings WM !

Having served in 9 embassies in various capacities I can tell you that the CT is a good example why DoD and DoS will never be joined at the hip. There were indeed folks with PhDs and some who even thought they were PhD material.

That meant precious little during civil wars and upheavals. It would be that very same PhD (know to some as JJJ) who sent my boss on a hopeless mission only to later disregard factual reporting. JJJ would later show to have his passport stamped crossing the Rwandan border, and ask "Tom, what's that smell?" "That would be death Jon" Tom replied. JJJ never returned on our watch :D

DoD and DHS had difficulties, but far less than with State. Most surrounded personnel. The majority of the NCOs are "on loan" and now outside of their environment and PMOS. So if DHS was trying to retain and at times reward her personnel, I didn't see it.

Regards, Stan

Having only served in and around two country teams my experience is limited but I can tell that here in the Philippines the Country Team does work. There is an extremely effective CT organization which is probably a function of the right combination of personalities focused on the right mission priorities but it is certainly an example that can cited as working. The DoD-DoS relationship as well as the DoD-and other agencies relationships are very, very good.

Stan

02-11-2007, 05:08 PM

Hello Max161 !
I gave my previous post some more thought and posted again to John. A CT should work as well as your last two CTs have. I would have welcomed that relationship.

Marct on this SWC forum writes frequently and has made more sense out of things than almost any State person has done in my 23 years (18 overseas). Marc, as far as I know has not been to Africa or Iraq, but has a wealth of knowledge and shares it with all of us.

I recently told Marc, we could have used a person of your expertise (and PhD) years ago.

There's definitely room in my professional work for folks like Marc. So long as we don't lose sight of the mission and personal agendas don't get in the way, a CT should function well. It contains more than just State and all those ideas, opinions and resources should not be neglected.

Regards, Stan

marct

02-11-2007, 05:28 PM

Hi Stan,

Marct on this SWC forum writes frequently and has made more sense out of things than almost any State person has done in my 23 years (18 overseas). Marc, as far as I know has not been to Africa or Iraq, but has a wealth of knowledge and shares it with all of us.

Geeze! I think I'll get you to write a letter of reference for me the next time I apply for a job :D.

So long as we don't lose sight of the mission and personal agendas don't get in the way, a CT should function well. It contains more than just State and all those ideas, opinions and resources should not be neglected.

I'd certainly agree with that, although I think WMs idea of regional or, possibly, global equivalents might be a better option. I suspect that the most effective form of organization would be a "matrix organization (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matrix_management)" with a sliding scale local - regional - global for any given "project".

Marc

jcustis

02-11-2007, 05:38 PM

Mr. Maxwell,

Let me also extend a greeting. We need members like yourself to add to the depth of writing here at the Council. Please feel more than free to share opinion, correct misperception, and most importantly, offer dissent so that our discussions are more than one-layer deep.

Stan

02-11-2007, 05:57 PM

Thans JC, Well Put !

Max, Sorry. Welcome aboard !

so that our discussions are more than one-layer deep

Evening Marc !

I'd certainly agree with that, although I think WMs idea of regional or, possibly, global equivalents might be a better option. I suspect that the most effective form of organization would be a "matrix organization" with a sliding scale local - regional - global for any given "project".

I like Wikipedia BTW !

The Country Team originally provided us with a weekly view of "what's happening" as well as any relavant USG (State) objectives. You already had your organzation's objectives, but that doesn't mean they were the same. Often they were not. You also received a review of the other-than-State happenings (those would vary from "no comment" to "extremely interesting"). Armed with the info for the day or week, you set off to cover those objectives. Now it gets interesting. Agendas take priority.

We were reporting on the "general strikes" in and around the city. They were set in motion by the new political party apposed to the current Mobutu regime. The first strike worked as planned. Future strikes were called, but people simply could no longer participate with salaries in the balance for a no show at work. The agendas at the CT were simple. People wanted their dependents back at post, but State would approve only if the political process was working and the situation was safe. Neither were the case.

The DAO report was based on fact (both of us out and on the ground) and the State view was gathered from drivers and gardners (the State folks would not go outside and look). DAO's report lost.

In sum, the CT is a matrix organization and if tuned correctly without personal agendas, will work smoothly.

Marc, don't quit your day job just yet :D

Regards, Stan

Tom Odom

02-12-2007, 02:15 PM

max161

02-12-2007, 02:23 PM

John

Absolutely correct: a strong Ambassador who is focused on the team is the key

A weak Ambassador means the childrendon't play well together.

But a strong Ambassador focused on himself is just as bad. Then the bad "kids" play to egos and that usually means trouble.

Best

Tom

I could not agree more. That is the situation we have in the Philippines. Not only is the Ambassador focused on the team, more importantly she is focused on the entire spectrum of missions, including the military mission. Her support to the JSOTF-P mission is a key component to our being able to successfully execute operations.

sullygoarmy

02-12-2007, 02:57 PM

John T. Fishel

02-12-2007, 07:25 PM

Tom and Max--

My, but we are in violent agreement! I especially want to echo Tom's second point. But I would also note that a strong but self centered leader will generally screw up any endeavor.

Stan

02-12-2007, 07:37 PM

Good Evening John and welcome !

But I would also note that a strong but self centered leader will generally screw up any endeavor.

Tom and I were somewhat lucky. We would taste failure and victory in less than a one year period dealing with CTs and egos.

Perhaps why this thread is smoking along !

PS
An embassy and its CT are at times intense. We all begin being measured as individuals, but we are supposedly part of the team. An intelligent leader will use those individual traits where most appropriate. However, some of our leaders choose to ignore those specialties and/or unique qualities because their views differed (read agendas). If we let that happen with say DHS, the info becomes vague and from there, nothing you report will be taken seriously.

Regards, Stan

selil

02-12-2007, 09:54 PM

Tom and Max--

My, but we are in violent agreement! I especially want to echo Tom's second point. But I would also note that a strong but self centered leader will generally screw up any endeavor.

A good friend (even if he was in the Army) while looking around the sad state of leadership in the corporate world said to me, "A bad platoon commander can screw up a unit faster than the clap".

You can't breed for leadership and you rarely reward it.

Tom Odom

02-16-2007, 05:58 PM

For you Joe Dirt fans, for the last 4 days I have been like the dog on the porch, hence a lack of posts--it hurt too bad to reach for the computer in Toto-land where it was 0 to 5 degrees every morning.

But anyway.

The team leader comments are all spot on but I would add one--you cannot train experienced leadership. You can teach leadership as a subject and we have to; history is always my favorite lab for that.

To me the sign of an experienced leader is one who can recognize his own shortcomings even as he sees the strengths of others. CTs and platoons are alike in that they are small and you have to maximize the benefits of your collective strengths as you minimize the effects of individual or collective weaknesses. Egos are by defintion potentially crippling weaknesses.

The smallest possible team is 2 (unless you speak to yourself and answer in a different voice); one of the most arrogantly stupid moves I ever witnessed was my successor in Zaire's (Congo) decision to put Stan Reber back behind a desk. One of the smartest I ever saw was Ambassador David Rawson's decision to turn over security arrangements for the National Security Advisor's visit to Kigali to my Navy chief--I was in DC and returned the day before the visit.

Best

Tom

C Wardynski

03-29-2008, 07:38 PM

Tom - the GRADSO, PADSO and BRADSO career service incentives are substantial innovations. With these programs the Army has made "willingness to serve" a figure of merit along with military and academic order of merit. As such, these programs figure significantly in the distribution of fully funded graduate school, commissioning branch and initial duty station to ROTC and USMA cadets. In particular, the GRADSO program is exceptionally innovative in that it functions much like a stock option. Cadets selecting the GRADSO option secure the option to secure a fully funded masters degree between their sixth and eleventh year of service. Under GRADSO they can attend any graduate program of their choosing in the United States for up to 22 months. Thus, if an officer desires to pursue a Masters of Engineering at MIT and he/she has the scores to gain admittance, he/she can attend MIT. As an added innovation, officers can "pay ahead" up to two years of "3-for-1" service obligation entailed in attending graduate education. This feature of the program is much different from traditional graduate school programs in that officers can "pay-down" their graduate school service obligation prior to actually beginning graduate school. This adds flexibility to the program so that officers can better manage their careers and still allow officers to complete their graduate school service obligation by sixteen years of service. Heretofore, with the exception of winners of Hertz, Rhodes and other scholarship programs, typical USMA and ROTC cadets had no ability to secure access to graduate school prior to commissioning. Moreover, the Army had linked attendance at graduate school to a subsequent service in a "utilization" tour. With GRADSO, continued service in the Army constitutes "utilization." This allows operational field officers to return to troop assignments immediately after graduate school. As an innovation, the GRADSO, BRADSO and PADSO options are designed to increase junior officer control over key aspects of their career and development so as to increase their career satisfaction. Additionally, the GRADSO option is designed to achieve two other objects. First, with GRADSO, new officers can be certain that they will be afforded the opportunity to attend graduate school at mid-career. Graduate education at this point will provide these officers with the means to update their general human capital as they begin to move from service in general leadership fields to specialized fields entailed in service as a field grade officer. As such, this investment in human capital will add to these officers’ productivity as Army leaders. Officer participating in the GRADSO program can also expected to garner a permanent and substantial increase in their expected lifetime earnings after military service. As such, GRADSO benefits the Army and participating officers. Since the Army launched the GRADSO, BRADSO, and PADSO incentives in 2006 about 33% of USMA graduates and 45% of eligible ROTC graduates have participated one or combinations of these programs. As a result, by 2014 the number of officers attending graduate schools within each year group will rise from about 400 today to 1000. This investment by the Army marks a strategic choice to substantially expanded resources (time and dollars) to develop adaptive leaders for the challenges that lie ahead.