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SWJED
01-09-2006, 07:50 AM
9 January Washington Times Op-Ed - Stabilizing Afghanistan (http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20060108-102310-9867r.htm).


...Assessments of troop levels will continue to be what the Defense Department calls "conditions based" and will be flexible and responsive. U.S. presence in Afghanistan has been so effective because we have tailored forces to respond to changing needs. During war, U.S. forces must occasionally be repositioned for contingency missions. Meanwhile, U.S. special-operations forces will ruthlessly continue the hunt for al Qaeda and Taliban holdouts and will be prepared for intelligence and other covert operations throughout the battle area...

Pentagon officials are heartened by NATO's continued willingness to participate in the mission of Operation Enduring Freedom...

The slow transition from combat to stability operations, along with increased multinational presence, is good for Afghanistan and good for America. For decades all over the world -- in Germany, Japan, South Korea and other places -- we have drawn down forces and turned operations over to local authorities when the situation became stable. This transition encourages optimism because it is a strong affirmation of the ability of Afghanistan to stand on its own with a freely elected, democratic government. As the legitimacy of the Karzai government improves, Afghanistan moves from the dark, isolated days of the medieval Taliban into the modern community of nations...

What is occurring in Afghanistan is a template of sorts -- given the caveat that there are major differences in the two situations -- for what Pentagon officials anticipate happening eventually in Iraq. As local Iraqi forces increase in capability -- and with some outside augmentation -- then the U.S. forces will draw down and reposition over time. It must not be a panicked, humiliating retreat, as some defeatists advocate, but a timed, phased, well-considered approach that turns power over to the local people and allows them to take charge of their destiny...

Jedburgh
02-05-2007, 04:57 PM
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on 30 Jan 07:

...Gentlemen I hope you can help us understand the way forward. This will be the first of several hearings we will hold on Afghanistan in coming months and you will help us set the stage. What are the key challenges facing the U.S. and coalition military operations, the Afghan government and security forces, and counter-narcotics and reconstruction efforts? And how should these challenges be addressed?

I am pleased to have with us an exceptionally qualified panel of experts. We have Ambassador James Dobbins, who served as the President’s first envoy to Afghanistan following the 9-11 attacks. We have Ambassador Karl Inderfurth, who handled matters involving Afghanistan as the Assistant Secretary of State from 1997 to 2001. We have the Honorable Ali A. Jalali, Afghanistan’s Interior Minister until 2005. And we have Doctor Anthony Cordesman with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who is another one of the country’s top experts on Afghanistan. ...
Amb. James Dobbins, Dir. International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC%20hearing_013007/Dobbins%20Testimony.pdf)

Amb. Karl F. Inderfurth, Prof. Practice of International Affairs, GWU (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC%20hearing_013007/Inderfurth%20Testimony.pdf)

Ali A. Jalali, Near East South Asia Center for Security Studies, NDU (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC%20hearing_013007/Jalali%20Testimony.pdf)

Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC%20hearing_013007/Cordesman%20Testimony.pdf)

davidbfpo
02-05-2007, 10:54 PM
Found this short article by a lady American aid / development officer, who was in Helmand Province, till October 2006, worth reading:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/02/AR2007020201474.html

The Road to Helmand
I went to Afghanistan to help rebuild people's lives. But I learned the hard way that good intentions aren't enough. By Holly Barnes Higgins

Even has her email for comments: hehiggins@yahoo.com

Davidbfpo

SWJED
02-05-2007, 11:03 PM
Found this short article by a lady American aid / development officer, who was in Helmand Province, till October 2006, worth reading:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/02/AR2007020201474.html

The Road to Helmand
I went to Afghanistan to help rebuild people's lives. But I learned the hard way that good intentions aren't enough. By Holly Barnes Higgins

Even has her email for comments: hehiggins@yahoo.com

Davidbfpo

I think jcustis was going to invite Ms. Higgins to the Council - will check.

Jedburgh
02-05-2007, 11:12 PM
Found this short article by a lady American aid / development officer, who was in Helmand Province, till October 2006, worth reading...
Good article. Thanks.

...But because of mismanagement at multiple levels, personnel turnover, lack of initiative and concerns about personal security, progress simply isn't forthcoming...
The only other critical negative factor from the "friendly" side she left out was careerism.

jcustis
02-05-2007, 11:48 PM
I suspect that the email addy may be missing a critical letter. I'm going to try a "b" instead of an "e".

Or perhaps the Washington Post editor who happens to drift in here will see this and vet the SWC as being a really good group of people. :D

davidbfpo
02-07-2007, 11:07 PM
The link is to Zeeshan Hashmi's recent article in The Times (London) and his brother Jabron Hashmi was killed last July in Afghanistan - the first British Muslim soldier to die there.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article1336519.ece

I've read many American soldiers thoughts on war, here is a quite different one.

Davidbfpo

BRUZ_LEE
02-15-2007, 02:33 PM
I just came across the new SENLIS Council Report on AFGHANISTAN.
At first glance it looks like they got it right. In the appendices they even discuss on COIN theory and give excerpts of the new US COIN manual in order to stress the simple fact, that we don't stick to our own doctrine.
Very sadly that especially the UK troops in AFG recurr to sweep operations and bombing campaigns despite their huge COIN experience.
The Canadians who are right now blaming the Germans of not joining the fight in the South of AFG should rethink.

Highly recommended read. You find the report at:
http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/Full_CI_Report

More discussions on it and more (older) reports at the homepage:
http://www.senliscouncil.net

Jedburgh
02-16-2007, 11:12 PM
...Highly recommended read. You find the report at: Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making Enemies (http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/Full_CI_Report)
Thanks, Bruz - good read.

....and here's more testimony on Afghanistan, this time in front of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 15 Feb 07:

Congressman Mark Kirk - Afghanistan: The Rise of the Narco-Taliban (http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/kir021507.pdf)

LTG (R) David Barno - Afghanistan on the Brink: Where Do We Go From Here? (http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/bar021507.htm)

Peter Bergen - Afghanistan 2007: Problems, Opportunities, and Possible Solutions (http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/ber021507.htm)

Anthony Cordesman - Winning in Afghanistan: The Challenges and the Response (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070215_afghanbrief.pdf)

SWJED
02-19-2007, 10:34 PM
18 February Associated Press - AP Enterprise: Afghan Army Progress Slow (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/19/AR2007021900533.html) by Jason Straziuso.


The Afghan army is struggling with old weaponry, low pay and desertions, yet performs better than the troubled Iraqi army and could defend Afghanistan without U.S. and NATO support in 10 years or less, military officials and analysts say.

The fledgling force's success is viewed as critical to the Western-backed mission of stabilizing Afghanistan, which faced a record number of insurgent attacks last year. Renewed violence expected this spring threatens President Hamid Karzai's government.

Recruitment for the Afghan National Army is being accelerated, and $8.6 billion in new American funding for Afghan security needs will help equip the 32,000-strong force, which U.S. military officials say is proving increasingly resilient in battle.

Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak told The Associated Press that a goal of 70,000 Afghan soldiers has been pushed forward to December 2008 from 2011, and it is hoped to have 46,000 in place by April...

Jedburgh
02-26-2007, 01:31 PM
CSIS, 23 Feb 07: Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070223_breakingpoint.pdf)

Executive Summary

The current study is a follow-up to the 2005 baseline report In the Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/inthebalancepresentation.pdf). The report’s conclusions are based on 1,000 structured conversations that took place in half of Afghanistan’s provinces; 13 surveys, polls, and focus groups; 200 expert interviews; and the daily monitoring of 70 media sources and 182 organizations. Three of the report’s main findings are:

- Afghans are losing trust in their government because of an escalation in violence;

- Public expectations are neither being met nor managed;

- Conditions in Afghanistan have deteriorated in all key areas targeted for
development, except for the economy and women’s rights.

The general assessment of the five key pillars is as follows:

Security Afghans are more insecure today than they were in 2005. This is due largely to the violence surrounding the insurgency and counter-insurgency campaigns, and the inability of security forces to combat warlords and drug traffickers. State security institutions have increased their operational capacity and have trained more personnel, but they - particularly the Afghan National Police - have had problems with retention, staff effectiveness, corruption, and general oversight.

Governance and Participation The central government’s institutional and human capacity has improved, but its legitimacy has deteriorated. Sub-national government structures still lack capacity. In their place, militia commanders and local mafias have filled the void, undermining local governance, democratic rights, and service delivery.

Justice and Accountability Traditional, informal judicial structures continue to fill the gap in justice for many Afghans, while the formal justice sector remains inaccessible and corrupt, and is unable to confront impunity, adjudicate land disputes, unravel criminal networks, or protect the rights of citizens.

Economic Conditions High economic growth and a more open business environment have improved the general health of the Afghan economy, yet these benefits have not translated into sufficient employment and income generating activities for the ordinary citizen.

Social Services and Infrastructure Although reconstruction investments by the international community have enhanced social services and infrastructure, deteriorating security conditions, a scarcity of competent personnel and low quality has limited access and its benefits for many Afghans.
Full 118 page report at the link.

Mondor
02-26-2007, 05:31 PM
Nothing new here I am afraid. If the government is perceived as not holding up its end of the social contract (providing basic security and other services that the population expects) then the populace will find someone who will. Vigilantism in the US Wild West came about because the state and territorial governments were unable, or unwilling, to provide security. Once the government became responsive to the needs of the local population the vigilantes faded away. Though it took a long time and we still have "local" difficulties that date from that era.

Kabul, or any government for that matter, needs to meet the minimum expectations of its population or it will lose legitimacy and any nominal authority it now has. Once that is gone then the people will find it somewhere else. This is of course how the Taliban came to be. They filled a power vacuum, and provided security and stability when no one else was able too.

Jedburgh
03-30-2007, 05:34 PM
29 Mar 07 update of the CSIS 23 Feb 07 report linked in an earlier post in this thread:

Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070329_breakingpoint.pdf)

Full 137 page report at the link.

tequila
05-03-2007, 04:41 PM
R&S as in Reconstruction and Stabilization Aid. A good article in MR summarizing (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MayJun07/Colucci.pdf) the reconstruction challenges in Afghanistan and the crucial need to strengthen these areas to meet the challenge of a resurgent Taliban.

Jedburgh
05-23-2007, 02:46 AM
CSIS, 18 May 07: The Uncertain Metrics of Afghanistan (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070521_uncertainmetrics_afghan.pdf)

...Afghanistan raises the same broad issues regarding what metrics to use in judging progress in Afghanistan that exists in Iraq. Like Iraq, the answers are complex and involve analysis and judgment down to the local level rather than bean counts at the national level:

• Measuring the nature and intensity of the fighting: Counts of the level and type of attack are still useful, particularly if they cover the full range of attacks by type, are broken out at least down to the province level, and are tied to the level of enemy progress or defeat in controlling the countryside. Overt violence, however, is always an uncertain measure of insurgent activity and success....

• “Mapping” control of the population and area: Last year, the Taliban won in terms of population and area even though it lost virtually every tactical encounter. This year, it is still too early to tell, at least from unclassified reporting...

• The governance and services test: A related metric that is critical in armed nation building is to analyze and map whom actually governs where and what services do they provide. In broad terms, in a conflict like this, every area where the government does not actually govern or provide key services at best is vulnerable and often should be counted as lost. This is particularly true in Afghanistan, where central government has always tended to be distant, ineffective and corrupt...

• Aid coverage, aid activity, and actual useful help: This raises a critical failing in both Afghanistan and Iraq: The almost total lack of honest and meaningful metrics and reporting by USAID, the Corps of Engineer, and similar actions by allied countries. Spending has never been a meaningful metric. Neither has reporting on projects completed without breakouts of the level of services provided by region relative to need...

• Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and Afghan National Auxiliary Police development and presence: There are several different elements involved. As is the case in Iraq, the least important metric is how many people in each service have been trained and equipped. This effort is a vital means to an end, but success consists of having actual forces active in the field. In general, whenever the US government or Coalition authorities issue estimates of the number of people who should be there, this is really a confession of failure...

• The local authority and militia test: That said, the Afghan government is at least 3-5 years away from a mix of governance, military, and police capabilities that can bring authority and security force? Is it really effective? Is it really friendly?...

• Local perceptions: Polls are only one metric, but they are a critical one. If properly conducted, they show local loyalties and concerns. They correct the tendency to assume that enemies like the Taliban do not have strong popular followings in some areas, that NATO military action is not seen as hostile or a threat, and that people support a government that is not active simply because it was elected...

• NATO effort by NATO country by region affected: No set of metrics is more useless in counterinsurgency and nation building than national totals and national averages. This is particularly true in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, where regional and local differences are critical, and Coalition partners take different approaches to fighting and aid...

• Losing by Winning Metrics: There are several additional areas where the US and NATO need to be far more sensitive to the negative impacts of their own operations and carefully measure such impacts through field reporting, public opinion polls, and other tests that are not linked to those actually planning and lementing such operations...

Jedburgh
09-12-2007, 08:19 PM
RAND Review, Summer 07:

Afghanistan on the Edge
A World at Risk of Winning the Urban Battle, Losing the Rural War, Abandoning the Regional Solution (http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2007/afghan1.html)

....In Afghanistan, Jones sees distinct nation-building timelines for the south, east, north, west, center, and areas in between. In the south and east, where most of the fighting has occurred, “we’re closer to years one or two than five or six.” In the north, home to the Northern Alliance that helped rout the Taliban in 2001, “we certainly would be in year five or six. The security situation is relatively benign. Reconstruction is actually possible. International organizations can take money, build infrastructure, and train staff at hospitals in the north.”

In the west, there has been faltering progress. “A year ago, the west was on par with the north. That clock’s begun to slow down a little bit” because of the spreading insurgency in areas such as Shindand in Herat Province. Likewise, the center was holding until recently. “Kabul was on track for progress until 2006. That’s slowed down, too.” He cited a May 2006 U.S. military convoy traffic accident, which killed at least one Afghan civilian and sparked mass rioting, as the turning point in the capital.

Then there are the remote villages scattered about the country. “If you were to travel from Kabul to Herat by foot, you’d see areas that haven’t been touched and have probably seen literally nobody come through. Pockets of the country where there’s been no assistance or international presence or funding at all are in year zero or have even gone back in time.”....

Jedburgh
11-07-2007, 08:12 PM
CSIS, 7 Nov 07: Armed Nation Building: The Real Challenge in Afghanistan (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071107_afghanchall.pdf)

The Real Nature of the War

- Armed nation building, not counterinsurgency.

- Struggle for control of ideology, people, and territory --not fight between opposing military forces.

- War of attrition that can last 15 or more years. Enemy can win if can outlast NATO and Afghan government.

- Controlling political and economic space more more important than tactical victory.

- Political and military victory must be ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and “local.”

- Key to success is not NATO, but creating effective Afghan governance, Afghan forces, and Afghan economy.

- Can’t win in one country. Regional, not national struggle.
This isn't a paper, but a 103 slide PPT presentation with lots of charts, graphs and maps converted to a pdf file.

Tom Odom
11-20-2007, 03:59 PM
OxFam has come out with a report critical of PRTs; I respect OxFam and it's work. They usually are quite factual and non-political in such matters.

I should also say that NATO is very much in a learning curve when it comes to COIN and COIN-related initiatives like PRTs.

Tom


Financial Times
November 20, 2007

Afghan Revival Work Failing, Says Oxfam (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a13bc1e4-96f3-11dc-b2da-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1)

By Jon Boone, Kabul

The use of international forces in Afghanistan to spearhead reconstruction work has created development projects that are “unsuitable, unused or targeted by militants”, says a leading aid agency.

Oxfam International says the 25 provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) run by soldiers from 13 countries have concentrated on short-term projects that have done nothing to stem rising violence in the country.

In a wide-ranging critique of international efforts in Afghanistan, prepared for a British parliamentary overseas development committee, the UK-based aid agency says that the Nato-led PRTs have gone far beyond their security mandate and have crowded out local initiatives.

“Given the historic suspicion of foreign intervention, such efforts to win ‘hearts and minds’ are naive,” says the report. “It is unsurprising that the huge expansion of PRT activities has not prevented the deterioration of security.

“The development process needs to be owned and led by Afghan communities, which is essential for sustainability.”

davidbfpo
11-22-2007, 10:01 AM
The Senlis Council have just published a report on Afghanistan (I seem to recall some criticism of them on SWJ before). The (London) Daily Telegraph refers to it:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/11/22/wtaliban122.xml

The actual report (2.0mb) is on the Senlis Council website:

http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/Afghanistan_on_the_brink

I've not yet had time to review it, perhaps later? Is it a coincidence Oxfam have also just published?

davidbfpo

Rex Brynen
11-22-2007, 10:38 PM
The Senlis Council have just published a report on Afghanistan (I seem to recall some criticism of them on SWJ before).

On a quick read through, there's lots of interest in the report.

I'm very doubtful about one central recommendation, regarding the transfer of aid responsibilities to the military, however.

The report is, it must be said, a bit vague on what this would entail. Moreover, in the case of Canada, I do not think--whatever the weaknesses of CIDA--that DND have the capability to do it any better, and due to inexperience could even do it worse. In the case of the UK, DFID is perhaps the single most sophisticated conflict/post-conflict donor around, and again I'm not sure that the MoD could do a better job.

Part of the problem is that I've yet to see a single detailed account of what the problems have been in the aid effort in the south. Complaining (rightly so) that Afghans have yet to see adequate improvement in their living conditions doesn't tell you why that is (poor programme design or project selection, staff shortages, poor skill set, disbursement delays, coordination problems, local bottlenecks, limited counterpart capacities, corruption, political interference, and a host of other potential challenges). Addressing this properly requires that someone look in detail at why things haven't happened to the degree that we might hope.

If what is being proposed is a different sort of aid agency/military model, then that might work well. Again, it requires teasing out what is broken and how it might be fixed.

Jedburgh
12-11-2007, 02:42 PM
10 Dec 07 testimony before the Canadian Senate National Security and Defence Committee:

The State of the Afghan Insurgency (http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT296.pdf)

Afghanistan is not hopeless. To be fair, NATO operations have had mixed success thus far. But the insurgency will ultimately be won or lost in the rural areas of Afghanistan, not in the cities. Success in ending the insurgency will take time and sufficient resources. It would be a tragedy if the naysayers in Canada succeeded in reducing their country’s commitment. The challenge for the Afghan government and its NATO allies is not an easy one. It involves providing security to local villages, especially in strategically important areas of the south and east. It also includes getting a handle on the corruption that is gnawing away at the government and its fragile support base. Most Afghans are not asking for much. They want security and hope, and perhaps something to make their difficult lives a bit better. After 30 years of near-constant war, they certainly deserve it.
Brigadier-General P.J. Atkinson, Director General of Ops at the Strategic Joint Staff, also testified, but I can't find a transcript.

TheCurmudgeon
12-12-2007, 03:56 AM
A lot of good information in http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071107_afghanchall.pdf.

Spent time building roads in the Tarin Khot and Khost areas. I remember working with the provinicial Governor north-east of Khost on the border with Pakistan. The US (or someone) came in and built his a nice building with a generator but he had no fuel to run it. He had no tax base to get money for the fuel. He got support for ANA and ANP from the central government, but he did not have fuel for thier trucks either. Building a complete government there in "our" image is going to take a long time.

I think we need to learn to find a way to build a stabile, functioning government and slowly work towards democracy rather than try to change thousands of years of history.

Beelzebubalicious
12-14-2007, 10:45 AM
online version of recent article in print version. Interesting overview of non-kinetic operations, including a tip to the HTT.


Policing a whirlwind
Dec 13th 2007 | KHOST AND LASHKAR GAR
From The Economist print edition

As foreign troops become more efficient, government is still the problem

http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10286219

JeffC
12-17-2007, 03:51 AM
John McCreary just published a detailed analysis of casualtiy statistics and the state of the war in Afghanistan - the Taliban are making gains and are on the brink of retaking Kandahar, and this against a force ratio of 18-25:1.

From McCreary's report:

The ratios
The loss ratios show the Afghan Army is not doing well and the police remain in a crisis. The overall casualty ratio rebounded in favor of the Allies for the first time this year. The overall ratios of Taliban killed and wounded to Allied
killed and wounded was 3 : 1. In September and October, the ratio fell to 2 : 1. During the summer offensive the ratio was 4 : 1.

The kill ratios once again showed another drop in favor of the Taliban. In November the ratio dropped to 3 : 1, the lowest ratio since the fight began. In early summer the Allies killed Taliban at the rate of 7 : 1. In August the rate dropped to 5 : 1. In September it was 4 :1 in favor of the government. In October the ratio was 3.5 : 1. This is an alarming trend.

I have more on this at my site (http://idolator.typepad.com/intelfusion/2007/12/nightwatch-spec.html), along with a .pdf of the NightWatch report.

Ken White
12-17-2007, 05:10 AM
Concentrating on such figures as he provides in his "report" give you a trees instead of forests perspective.

In any irregular war a force ratio of 18-25:1 is virtually meaningless. Big bureaucratic western Armies -- and , in this case, their Native allies who are trying to fight the same way -- will never be as flexible as the irregulars. Casualties on both sides will fluctuate and a lot of things -- with some real research instead of just looking at figures -- will tell you why they fluctuate.

Such things as operational tempos impacted by political events, unit rotations (putting new instead of experienced troops in play) and a host of other factors intrude.

To balance that excessive negativity induced by almost meaningless numbers, here's an equally excessively positive number; (LINK) (http://apnews.myway.com/article/20071216/D8TIRCIO2.html). Neither set of numbers means much.

Before you rush to point out that good numbers cited by a General are offset by the tone of the rest of the article, true -- but it's from the AP, not an unbiased source. My point is that the numbers don't mean much no matter how much the punditocracy, talking head and Generals like them.

JeffC
12-17-2007, 05:36 AM
Concentrating on such figures as he provides in his "report" give you a trees instead of forests perspective.

McCreary recently retired a senior analyst with J2 after 38 years. You might want to read his entire report before dismissing it as "meaningless numbers". I made a .pdf available at IntelFusion.

Ken White
12-17-2007, 06:01 AM
McCreary recently retired a senior analyst with J2 after 38 years. You might want to read his entire report before dismissing it as "meaningless numbers". I made a .pdf available at IntelFusion.

Not impressed. The NYT came out with an article couple of days ago that said much the same thing. So have several other outlets.

Look deeper. The system likes metrics, they're something to show -- usually, they prove little but they satisfy those with an itch for 'meaningful data on which to base decisions.' Or for analysts who want more than well honed instincts...

That .pdf reminded me of a page in a math text book rather than any intel estimate of value I've ever read. Sorry. The net content was summed up in this; "Taliban can hold terrain for limited periods; Allies cannot prevent Taliban attacks." which doesn't pass the "so what" test. It does not because in a nation that size with terrain like that where shifting loyalties are a national sport it is simply logical that should be so. It would not change if there were ten times as many Allied troops there.

Consider the fact that the Joint Staff and CentCom are -- properly -- concerned about the health of the US Defense establishment and their entire AO respectively; they'd both be quite happy to see Afghanistan and Iraq just go away. Based on prior experience, I have no doubt that some in both places are actively fomenting to make that happen (Note that is not an accusation of treason, merely of being over zealous in pursuing their Bosses stated -- or assumed -- goals). So CentCom leaks to the NYT the fact they're 'reviewing' the mission. Given the paper's tilt that immediately is cast as the sky is falling...

At the same time, Gates is pushing NATO for a bigger commitment -- not just more troops but the things like Choppers and support elements that they promised and haven't delivered. So he doesn't object at all to the Times saying things are going downhill -- perhaps that'll tweak NATO a bit. Could even be that the J staff leaked instead of CentCom.

I noted in the Times article a 'military official' spouting gloom is quoted. His location is not stated (deliberately, I'm sure, so we'll asume he's in the 'stan) but I'll bet big bucks he's here in the States and his 'professional' opinion is swayed by a whole lot of factors of which current on the ground knowledge is not one.

Wheels inside of wheels and nothing in war is simple -- nothing in the bureaucracy that is the US DoD is even merely comples -- its generally a bucket of worms. I assure you there's no intent to denigrate you or McCreary, I'm just highly skeptical of a numbers approach in a COIN effort. I thought we'd learned better than that from Viet Nam -- apparently not. Sad.

JeffC
12-18-2007, 07:37 AM
Wheels inside of wheels and nothing in war is simple -- nothing in the bureaucracy that is the US DoD is even merely comples -- its generally a bucket of worms. I assure you there's no intent to denigrate you or McCreary, I'm just highly skeptical of a numbers approach in a COIN effort. I thought we'd learned better than that from Viet Nam -- apparently not. Sad.

Well, I reject your inference that McCreary built his case solely on statistics. Clearly there's a problem and casualty rates, force ratios, etc., are a part of the picture. Not the whole picture, but no one is claiming that it is, either. It's just a straw man to claim otherwise.

What, in your opinion, are the factors contributing to the fact that the Taliban have encircled Kandahar and may retake it before the Spring? How do you think this has happened?

tequila
12-18-2007, 10:15 AM
Whoa ... retake Kandahar? One has to remember that they don't actually hold any major towns at all and cannot defend even Musa Qala against a thrust by the Afghan Army.

Now what they can obviously do is spread insecurity and fear, and dominate areas at night. They have reestablished their ability to do so in many areas throughout the south and the problem is growing worse. Things are not on an upward path, they are trending downwards, and we had better do something about it. But they are not the VC in 1968, ready to storm Hue City, and probably never will be.

Jedburgh
12-18-2007, 03:20 PM
The Economist, 17 Dec 07: Afghanistan: A Victory, But Little to Cheer (http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10315840&top_story=1)

The recapture of a town that was previously controlled by Western troops is welcome, but it represents a limited triumph for the outsiders as winter freezes much of the country quiet. The year has seen neither the Taliban nor outside troops gain telling advantage. NATO has won all the battles and has managed to preserve the support of most Afghans: if opinion polls can be believed Afghans still support an international military presence in their country (one published by the BBC (http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2007/12_december/03/afghanistan.shtml) this month suggested that 71% of Afghans want American forces to stay). Yet overall levels of Taliban violence continue to rise across southern and eastern Afghanistan. Worse, they have spread significantly into the border areas of Pakistan.....

....The winter is at least a moment to pause and reflect on strategy for next year. At Musa Qala, NATO and Afghan forces easily defeated the Taliban but as diplomats in Kabul, the capital, concede, a far greater challenge is then defending against reinfiltration. Securing territory means getting the support of local people. In Helmand, for example, this requires teams of anthropologists and political officers to deal with a mosaic of tribal interest groups, an approach used by American forces elsewhere in the country. That means a greater emphasis on reconciliation and negotiation with local Taliban leaders, as well as training Afghan forces so they are able to take the lead in military operations.

Politically the challenges are no easier.....

tequila
01-16-2008, 11:54 AM
Hotel Serena bombed and attacked (http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,2240811,00.html?gusrc=rss&feed=media).

Taliban threatens to attack Western restaurants (http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5i8dGftYb0s4XWdUMRdIVs3vh1CKAD8U6OMAG1)in Kabul.

Dr. Barnett Rubin on possible implications (http://icga.blogspot.com/2008/01/more-thoughts-on-serena-bombing-back-to.html). The picture he paints of the current Western "reconstruction" effort in Kabul is quietly devastating - frankly it points out that our civilian efforts are adrift and are just as likely to be alienating and unpopular in Kabul.

The Taliban just won a major IO victory. More such attacks could succeed in crippling an already-sagging international relief and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, just as they did in Iraq --- and I think we all know that without a much better such effort, there really is no hope of a decent outcome in that country.

Dr. Rubin:


... Most of the aid was not delivered by UN agencies. It was delivered by an army of foreign contractors, consultants, and NGOs working for bilateral donors (that's aid-speak for "countries," like the US). And all those foreigners need security that NATO, the Coalition, and the Afghan government cannot provide: hence the proliferation of foreign owned-private security contractors -- and the Afghan private security contractors that they have spawned as their subcontractors, many of which are composed of supposedly demobilized militias.

I'm not attacking all those aid workers. I'm one of them. The point is not about our individual merits -- there are saints and sinners among us. God knows, I am probably a more legitimate target for the Taliban than that Filippina woman they killed in the gym. But collectively we have generated an infrastructure serving only our needs that dwarfs the infrastructure provided for Afghans. This infrastructure -- of which the Serena Hotel is the flagship -- is the most visible part of the aid system to Afghans. Projects may mature in a few (or many) years, but right now Afghans see the guest houses, bars, restaurants, armored cars, checkpoints, hotels, hostile unaccountable gunmen, brothels, videos, CDs, cable television, Internet cafes with access to pornography, ethnic Russian waitresses from Kyrgyzstan in Italian restaurants owned by members of the former royal family and patronized by U.S. private security guards with their Chinese girlfriends and Afghan TV moguls, and skyrocketing prices for real estate, food, and fuel, traffic jams caused by the proliferation of vehicles and exacerbated by "security measures" every time a foreign or Afghan official leaves the office -- I could go on, but the Serena is a symbol of all that ...

Ken White
01-16-2008, 04:11 PM
...
The picture he paints of the current Western "reconstruction" effort in Kabul is quietly devastating - frankly it points out that our civilian efforts are adrift and are just as likely to be alienating and unpopular in Kabul.Western thought applied in south Asia has typically done that...
The Taliban just won a major IO victory...They did? I missed that, where was it? What did they do that comprised this major victory?
...More such attacks could succeed in crippling an already-sagging international relief and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, just as they did in Iraq --- and I think we all know that without a much better such effort, there really is no hope of a decent outcome in that country.

"We" do? That was never likely to work in any event; the key is to get the Afghans to take responsibility for their own nation. That will not be easy; it entails turning around over a century of unhelpful western, Pakistani and Russian meddling and developing a sense of nationhood and getting the pride to transcend the individual and tribal level; that and 3,000 years of history. I figure about two generations and all the virtually fruitless NGO and western government 'help' in town won't speed that up by very much.

tequila
01-16-2008, 04:14 PM
I am optimistic about Afghanistan. We've been there longer than in Iraq, yet the large majority of Afghans still welcome Western troops. Despite the ugly picture presented, Afghan life expectancy has increased since 2002 (in marked contrast to Iraq), Afghan refugees have returned to the country as opposed to being generated, and more Afghans have access to medical care and education than before 2002, again all in marked contrast to Iraq.

We can still turn this around. Afghanistan now is like Iraq in 2003, before we locked ourselves into the Green Zone. But first we must recognize that a turnaround is necessary.

tequila
01-16-2008, 04:28 PM
They did? I missed that, where was it? What did they do that comprised this major victory?

They successfully infiltrated and attacked Westerners in one of their most secure environs. Canadian PM Harper has stayed in that hotel. The Tailban infiltrated several attackers who shot and blew up Western expats.

The IO victory is not so much in the broader Western public, which no longer appears to care much about the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan, but rather in the Western NGO and aid community as detailed in the Rubin post. If they can pull off follow-on attacks on Western establishments and run the NGO community into Green Zone-style compounds or out of the country, they will have gone a long way towards successfully alienating the Afghan people from the Western mission there.


"We" do? That was never likely to work in any event; the key is to get the Afghans to take responsibility for their own nation. That will not be easy; it entails turning around over a century of unhelpful western, Pakistani and Russian meddling and developing a sense of nationhood and getting the pride to transcend the individual and tribal level; that and 3,000 years of history. I figure about two generations and all the virtually fruitless NGO and western government 'help' in town won't speed that up by very much.

NGO and Western gov help has not been utterly fruitless - it has already vastly expanded the Afghan central government's ability to provide services to the Afghan people. The only way to build a sense of nationhood and loyalty towards a central government is to establish a national infrastructure and a government which can actually provide security, law, and services instead of another layer of predatory authority. Without Western capital and technical assistance, there is no way that the Afghan central government can do this on its own especially in a neighborhood with fierce competitors like Iran, Pakistan, and India.

Of course the Afghans will have to do most of the work and the whole point of Rubin's post which I endorsed is that Western governments must be willing to surrender much of the responsibility and power to the Afghans in terms of the reconstruction effort. But without the capital and security umbrella provided by the West, a truly independent Afghanistan will be strangled in its cradle.

Ron Humphrey
01-16-2008, 04:58 PM
in large part about the Afghans themselves being the necessary actors in creating success. There is still a very important part however in being the Big cousin who's standing there to help just in case you start really getting the $#@ kicked out of you.

In order to stand they have to not only feel like it's plausible to do so but must be able to feel that any given failure isn't necessarily the end all be all.

That where we come in and thats where NATO really needs to get its priorities straight.

Right now it's way to easy for the bad guys to sell locals on NATO not really caring in the larger sense.

Ken White
01-16-2008, 05:47 PM
They successfully infiltrated and attacked Westerners in one of their most secure environs. Canadian PM Harper has stayed in that hotel. The Tailban infiltrated several attackers who shot and blew up Western expats.Not at all difficult to do; quite easy, in fact. The Hotel was and is an icon target; resonates far more with the media and the intelligentsia than it has actual effect on the ground. To say it's an IO oriented strike is correct, to say it's a 'victory' is, IMO, an massive overstatement.
The IO victory is not so much in the broader Western public, which no longer appears to care much about the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan, but rather in the Western NGO and aid community as detailed in the Rubin post. If they can pull off follow-on attacks on Western establishments and run the NGO community into Green Zone-style compounds or out of the country, they will have gone a long way towards successfully alienating the Afghan people from the Western mission there.The broader western public never cared much about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Still don't and are unlikely to ever do so -- they, mostly, just want them to go away.

My experience with the NGO community is, over all, far from positive and my experience with western government aid in the ME and Asia isn't a whole lot better. YMMV.

While there is some merit to your suggestion that a lack of such involvement from the west will have an adverse effect on the Afghans, I believe "a long way" is an overstatement of some magnitude. NATO armed forces will pick up the effort as they really pretty much already have.
NGO and Western gov help has not been utterly fruitless - it has already vastly expanded the Afghan central government's ability to provide services to the Afghan people...True -- and most of that support has been from various armed forces.
...The only way to build a sense of nationhood and loyalty towards a central government is to establish a national infrastructure and a government which can actually provide security, law, and services instead of another layer of predatory authority. Without Western capital and technical assistance, there is no way that the Afghan central government can do this on its own especially in a neighborhood with fierce competitors like Iran, Pakistan, and India.It will still take at least a couple of generations; the capital is far, far more important than is the governmental 'assistance' but the west is wedded to building dependency in return for that assistance (the socialist mantra of 'we know what is best for you' is alive and well...) -- I don't think the Afghans will play that game, they're a lot more independent than are Arabs...
Of course the Afghans will have to do most of the work and the whole point of Rubin's post which I endorsed is that Western governments must be willing to surrender much of the responsibility and power to the Afghans in terms of the reconstruction effort. But without the capital and security umbrella provided by the West, a truly independent Afghanistan will be strangled in its cradle.We can agree on all that while disagreeing, apparently on the provision of capital (by whom and with what strings) or that the NGO will have much effect one way or another -- and we can agree they need the security assistance for a while longer.

Stan
02-07-2008, 08:41 PM
Roots of Peace (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/pix/b/100089.htm) Builds School on Former Afghan Battlefield.


The U.S. Department of State salutes Roots of Peace, a non-governmental organization that turns minefields into productive farmland, for building a new school on a former battlefield near the Bagram air base in Afghanistan. The project was funded by 1 million pennies ($10,000) raised by American students through the "Roots of Peace Penny Campaign"

The school originally consisted of a few tents serving just 50 pupils after fighting between the Taliban and Northern Alliance destroyed the original building. Today, a new, sturdy 10-room school, certified by Afghanistan's Ministry of Education, accommodates over 260 boys and girls. Prior to construction, landmines and explosive remnants of war were cleared by The HALO Trust

More at the links...

davidbfpo
04-02-2008, 08:36 AM
THis article appeared in The Spectator (UK) last week, by Adam Holloway and is to the say the least challenging, notably for the UK: http://www.spectator.co.uk/the-magazine/features/575371/to-bring-peace-to-the-afghans-talk-to-the-taleban.thtml

Oddly the article does not say who Adam Holloway is, but a quick Google strongly suggests he is a Conservative MP, who has recently visited Helmand Province and there is a shorter piece on his website: http://www.adamholloway.co.uk/Afgan.htm

davidbfpo

Jedburgh
06-16-2008, 01:33 PM
RAND, 9 Jun 08: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.pdf)

This book examines counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan following the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001. It is based on repeated trips to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. It focuses on the early stages of the insurgency—from 2002 until 2008—and examines why and how the insurgency began. It also draws lessons from the broader literature on counterinsurgency warfare and provides recommendations to help the United States develop capabilities and improve performance in future counterinsurgency operations. The focus of this research is on the U.S. military. However, since the actions of other U.S. government agencies, countries, international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are obviously important, they are discussed where appropriate. The results should be of interest to a broad audience of policymakers and academics concerned with counterinsurgency and the related issues of state-building, nation-building, and stability operations.....
NPR interview (audio) with the author of the study (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91415076)

davidbfpo
06-26-2008, 08:15 AM
Found via another thread a Canadian think tank's publication, which has sveral articles on Afghanistan, on a quick read worth a look, especially the book review by a lady living in Kandahar: http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1153.pdf

davidbfpo

Jedburgh
06-28-2008, 09:40 PM
27 Jun 08: Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan (http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/Report_on_Progress_toward_Security_and_Stability_i n_Afghanistan_1230.pdf)

This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). It includes a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. This report is the first in a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2010 and has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of Agriculture. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to the Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Afghanistan. The information contained in this report is current as of April 10, 2008.

davidbfpo
06-29-2008, 12:51 PM
The British journalist Sean Langan, who has made several fimls in Afghanistan, was kidnapped, held for weeks - with a news embargo - till his release this week. An interesting story: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/frontline/2212395/British-journalist-Sean-Langan-tells-of-Taliban-kidnap-ordeal.html

davidbfpo