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Tom Odom
02-06-2007, 06:00 PM
Just stumbled onto two studies today;

The first is a 2006 study by RAND entitled Learning Large Lessons, The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG405.pdf)


The roles of ground and air power have shifted in U.S. post–Cold War warfighting operations. Furthermore, the two services largely responsible for promulgating the relevant doctrines, creating effective organizations, and procuring equipment for the changing conflict environment in the domains of land and air—the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force—do not appear to be fully incorporating the lessons of post–Cold War operations. Indeed, the Army and the Air Force (and the other services) have tended to view the conflicts of the post–Cold War period through their specific institutional prisms. Additionally, all the U.S. military services have focused the vast majority of their attention on warfighting, to the exclusion of other types of military operations that are increasingly central to achieving national security objectives. These mind-sets must change if the U.S. armed forces are to provide the capabilities most needed to protect and advance national interests in the future.

The study--done for the Air Force in the interest of "jointness"--is very much a wolf in sheep's clothing in some regards, notably I would say in preserving the need for high dollar AF systems. Still it is a remarkable shift from what we in writing Certain Victory encountered from our Air Force counterparts.


And in a similar but more historical vein from the Combat Studies Institute:

Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/horwood.pdf)


The historical development of airpower suggests that interservice rivalry is especially prevalent in this particular area of military activity. From the very beginnings of military aviation, armies and navies have argued as to how the new assets should be used, how they should be developed and which service should control them. This was certainly the case in the United States.

The problem has been compounded, rather than resolved, by the development of independent air forces...

This study concentrates on tactical airpower in South Vietnam and deals with the air war over North Vietnam only insofar as it influenced interservice issues in the South. In order to fully understand the interservice airpower issues that emerged during the Vietnam War, it is fi rst necessary to look back at the pre-Vietnam doctrinal background that preceded them. In regard to the Vietnam War itself, the study’s starting point is the arrival of the first US combat aircraft in South Vietnam in 1961, and concludes with the pivotal year of 1968. The latter date is of necessity somewhat fluid, but it forms a rough stopping point because rivalry over airpower issues between the US armed forces seems to have been in decline after this date, or at least it seems to have been subject to attenuation by compromise agreements which were in force until the end of United States involvement in Southeast Asia. Expressions of these compromises are to be found in post-1968 documents, but these reflect pre-1968 experience.

Best

Tom

Steve Blair
02-06-2007, 06:09 PM
The interesting thing with most writing like this is that the Air Force will put it out, but it is rare that it makes a real impact inside the AF...where it needs to. The Interservice Rivalry paper is interesting, but somewhat flawed in my view when it comes to discussing the AF mindset. I haven't read the RAND one yet, but plan to.

Thanks for posting these, Tom!

Edit: Just skimmed the RAND report and you called it right. It's got heavy traces of "the AF is the only joint service and should get all the money" pieces. I'm not sure how he can claim that the AF has proven to be adaptable to real-world events...if anything they are the most Stalinist of branches: always spinning and rewriting history to suit their own needs. Still, well worth the read.

TWC
02-06-2007, 08:33 PM
Tom/Steve,

A couple of quick points:
-You're right on the money that reports like these need to have an impact in the USAF.
-That being said, I believe there is a new generation of USAF personnel that is not as tainted by the ACTS/Mitchell dogma, and realize that it will always take a joint team. I say that as a 12-year USAF member surrounded by a peer group that truly believes in a JC Wylie-esque "cumulative effects" approach.
-As far as the call for continued acquisition of expensive aircraft....come on, it IS a USAF sponsored report after all....would you expect anything less from any service-sponsored report? (got to fight the Washington DC-AOR battle) :D

TWC

SWJED
02-06-2007, 08:51 PM
Tom/Steve,
-That being said, I believe there is a new generation of USAF personnel that is not as tainted by the ACTS/Mitchell dogma, and realize that it will always take a joint team. I say that as a 12-year USAF member surrounded by a peer group that truly believes in a JC Wylie-esque "cumulative effects" approach.
TWC

Some of the best papers I have read on Small Wars related issues were written by students at the Air University. Over the last several years I often wondered where the hell those guys and gals went after graduation.:confused:

Steve Blair
02-06-2007, 09:04 PM
Some of the best papers I have read on Small Wars related issues were written by students at the Air University. Over the last several years I often wondered where the hell those guys and gals went after graduation.:confused:

I'm not sure where they go either.

There are a number of smart, visionary officers in the AF. It's a shame they get crushed by the Mitchell Mafia in all too many cases. I think many of them settle into specific communities within the AF or get out.

Tom Odom
02-06-2007, 09:29 PM
Some of the best papers I have read on Small Wars related issues were written by students at the Air University. Over the last several years I often wondered where the hell those guys and gals went after graduation.:confused:

Hmmmm

I figure somewhere in the desert near Nellis AFB there is a mysterious circle of smoke stained rocks and bone fragments where dissidents are sacrificed to to preserve the purity of the clan. Those sacrificed probably had to light the fire with their own research papers...:eek:

Just pulling your leg, TWC. One of my best buddies is now an AF 1-Star (maybe 2) and I even let my Momma know it. He did, however, (or at least his squadron did) try to pancake me in Goma with pallets.

best

Tom

TWC
02-06-2007, 09:49 PM
I figure somewhere in the desert near Nellis AFB there is a mysterious circle of smoke stained rocks and bone fragments where dissidents are sacrificed to to preserve the purity of the clan. Those sacrificed probably had to light the fire with their own research papers

Tom,
Don't tell that I told you, but you are right about the Nellis-based sacrifices, but you left out the part that death is caused a F-22 in full afterburner:)

Why are those men in black standing at my door........OH NO!

J Wolfsberger
02-07-2007, 02:36 PM
C'mon, guys. Really, they're almost like a military organization: they dress the same, wear spiffy badges, and a few of them are even trusted with weapons.

120mm
02-07-2007, 02:52 PM
According to my Air Force friends, being "trusted" with weapons is not the same as being "issued" weapons. NONE of the Air Force guys I know are "trusted" with a weapon.

I bet they're trusted more with a reflector belt on, though.

Steve Blair
02-07-2007, 03:19 PM
C'mon, guys. Really, they're almost like a military organization: they dress the same, wear spiffy badges, and a few of them are even trusted with weapons.

You could say the same thing about United Airlines...;)

wm
02-08-2007, 07:22 PM
I provide the following insights from a fellow member of another discussion group to which I subscribe. The author is Edward M. Van Court, MAJ, MI, USAR

Reflections based on more than a decade of continuous first-hand observation of the Air Force by an Army Officer. Hopefully, this will help Army folks who are working with the USAF to understand some of the (to a Soldier) confusing behaviors. Bear with me, these observations do not apply to every Air Force person you'll meet, but describe common patterns of behavior in the Air Force.

Special thanks to a fellow Army Major currently in a joint assignment and collocated with the Air Force for reviewing this piece

1. From the Air Force perspective - Flying is leadership (I have heard this *exact* statement from a newly comissioned Air Force officer, yes he was rated and an Academy graduate); the smaller the crew of the aircraft, the greater the leadership. Hence; any pilot is defined as being a better leader than any non-rated officer, never mind that the civil engineer or communication captain commands a 100+ member unit and the rated Captain might be in charge of one other person. Note also that an F-16 pilot who flies by himself is a better leader than a C-17 pilot who has a crew of a half dozen or so. This is a serious point of contention between rated and non-rated officers.

2. The Air Force does not understand the Officer/NCO relationship. AF doctrine is written/approved by fighter pilots and fighter pilots seldom work closely with NCOs before they are promoted to field grades. The idea of a LT going to an E-7 or a CPT going to an E-8 for advice or as a sounding board for ideas is utterly alien to them. In the Army, we pretty much take it for granted that we, as officers, will have an experienced NCO working closely with us throughout our career. There are exceptional individuals in the AF who break this mold, but they are just that, the exception and very rarely from the fighter or bomber communities.

3. It is easy to arrive at the conclusion that the Air Force is technology riven rather than people oriented, but give them a break. Since the creation of the independent Air Force in 1947, the Air Force, as an organization, has never had ten consecutive years (seldom had 5 consecutive years) without a radical change in basic technologies. Go back further, and you could argue that this extends all the way back to 1914 with the first Army air elements.
When your organization is being routinely radically changed by technology, when you are trying to cope with technology that feels like it changes hourly, it is easy to get in the habit of focusing on technological solutions rather than human ones.

4. What is an Airman? A Soldier is fundementally a rifleman, regardless of other specialization. A Marine is a rifleman of the littorals. A Sailor is a maritime vessel crewman. An Airman... well, there is no one definition that includes every uniformed member of the Air Force, and this is a profound cohesion issue.

Now here is the bitter pill for Soldiers. Before you complain about your Air Force counterpart, read Air Force history (and refrain from wisecracks about how this is easy as there is so little of it). The Air Force of today is a direct result of policy and doctrine decisions by the Army for the Army Air Corps in the 1930s and '40s. These decisions were necessary, and many of them were driven by the needs of WWII, but they had far reaching consequences.

Don't get me wrong; I respect the Air Force and the capabilities it brings to the fight. Learn the lesson of an Army officer who insisted that he didn't need to worry about that space stuff the Air Force does as long as he had his rifle and his GPS. Our capabilities compliment each other. (BTW; the "as long as I have my rifle and GPS" story has taken on mythic proportions in the Air Force).

Steve Blair
02-08-2007, 08:48 PM
I provide the following insights from a fellow member of another discussion group to which I subscribe. The author is Edward M. Van Court, MAJ, MI, USAR

Reflections based on more than a decade of continuous first-hand observation of the Air Force by an Army Officer. Hopefully, this will help Army folks who are working with the USAF to understand some of the (to a Soldier) confusing behaviors. Bear with me, these observations do not apply to every Air Force person you'll meet, but describe common patterns of behavior in the Air Force.

Special thanks to a fellow Army Major currently in a joint assignment and collocated with the Air Force for reviewing this piece

2. The Air Force does not understand the Officer/NCO relationship. AF doctrine is written/approved by fighter pilots and fighter pilots seldom work closely with NCOs before they are promoted to field grades. The idea of a LT going to an E-7 or a CPT going to an E-8 for advice or as a sounding board for ideas is utterly alien to them. In the Army, we pretty much take it for granted that we, as officers, will have an experienced NCO working closely with us throughout our career. There are exceptional individuals in the AF who break this mold, but they are just that, the exception and very rarely from the fighter or bomber communities.

It's possibly more correct to note that the AF treats the majority of its NCOs (outside of certain AFSCs) as technicians without any leadership ability until they are promoted to MSgt. At that point they're expected to transform into leaders. And in many ways AF NCOs are technicians. There's nothing wrong with that. But the disconnect between everything below E-6 and everything above it is rather disconcerting to many of them.


3. It is easy to arrive at the conclusion that the Air Force is technology riven rather than people oriented, but give them a break. Since the creation of the independent Air Force in 1947, the Air Force, as an organization, has never had ten consecutive years (seldom had 5 consecutive years) without a radical change in basic technologies. Go back further, and you could argue that this extends all the way back to 1914 with the first Army air elements.
When your organization is being routinely radically changed by technology, when you are trying to cope with technology that feels like it changes hourly, it is easy to get in the habit of focusing on technological solutions rather than human ones.

Although the AF does worship technology, it's also correct to observe that they are a product of a myriad of systems and checklists (a relic of their SAC and LeMay heritage) which result in a very rigid way of looking at things aside from technological advances. I would also contend that the basic AF culture has remained unchanged by technology. They are still very much addicted at higher levels to the ideal of the fighter pilot and the manned bomber - both fixtures in their organization since the beginning.


4. What is an Airman? A Soldier is fundementally a rifleman, regardless of other specialization. A Marine is a rifleman of the littorals. A Sailor is a maritime vessel crewman. An Airman... well, there is no one definition that includes every uniformed member of the Air Force, and this is a profound cohesion issue.

This goes back to the separation of the enlisted force as technicians and the split between pilots and all other AF officers. There is so little common ground between the flying and non-flying segments of the AF that the term 'Airman' is meaningless aside from rank (E-1 through E-3 or so).

I grew up around the AF, and work with them every day, so I've seen most of this stuff up close and personal. I've also worked with the Army, and seen their ups and downs. The AF can be very flexible when it comes to adapting and implementing technology, but they tend to stumble in many other areas. They will have the most to overcome in the culture area if they are to adapt to the new realities we face in the military sphere.

Van
02-09-2007, 02:27 PM
Steve,
As the author of the comments quoted by WM (and new SWJ member), I wanted to briefly address your reply and the underlying assumption of the thread.

Re: your reply - I agree with you. I don't see any contradictions between what you said and what I said, just different perspectives. Please note that my remarks were originally authored for a different audience as part of a different discussion. The only thing I would add at this point is that the Air Force is not monolithic (hence the "what is an Airman?"). Even within the rated community there is intense factionalization between fighter, bomber, airlift, helicopter etc. communities. When you try to look for common trends across the entire Air Force including civil engineers, security forces, communications, space operations etc. a small brain like mine starts to hurt.

Re: the underlying assumption of the thread - Airpower Versus Groundpower. "Versus"? I am as well aware as any that the discussion is usually couched this way, but isn't this the pinnacle of foolishness? Look at an Armored Cavalry Regiment or a MEF, air and ground forces compliment each other and to try to drive a wedge between them is doing the opponent's work for them. Ahhh yes, the challenge of a military in a democratic society; services have to compete for budget... As a citizen and a taxpayer, it is profoundly disturbing when the service cultures are so caught up in the great budget game that they fail to see that each element is only a part of the whole.

"You should not have a favorite weapon." Miyamoto Musashi in Go Rin No Sho

Steve Blair
02-09-2007, 03:01 PM
Van,

Good reply! I understood that your comments were for a different audience and thus possibly slightly out of context. I tossed my comments out more to amplify your remarks or add things that non-AF types might not understand.

Agree 100% with your remarks about the ACR and MEF/MEUs. Those are outstanding examples of how the system should work. One comment along those lines that I used with some cadets the other day was that all branches and services are actually supporting services in that they all support national goals and policy. I think sometimes they lose track of that in all the dogmatic saber rattling.

What got me going on the subject were some comments made by an AF JAG general some weeks back in Armed Forces Journal about how the AF could still win any situation, including a low-intensity conflict. It's all interesting stuff, and kind of disheartening when you look at the problems we face in the world today.

Oh, and welcome to the Council! We look forward to hearing more of your thoughts!

Bill Moore
02-11-2007, 01:32 AM
The Air Force brings a great capability to the nation versus nation fight, and that threat hasn't disappeared. As for ever better fighters, I would hate to see out matched technologically, because with the emerging economies in some developing nations, it is possible they will put more on the aircraft in the sky than we do. Once you stand down that infrastructure that develops our new planes, you'll lose that talent to other industries, and it will be hard to get that collective pool of talent back again.

Should the Air Force change to adapt to COIN? I'm not sure they need to change much. The C17 crews are working long hours and doing a tremendous job supporting the logistics of this fight. The A10's play a key role in the close fight today with their new capabilities, so they should probably throw more money at that capability.

The part about the Air Force that hard to defend is their civilian culture. Where do the weakest kids go? Of course they join the Air Force because they think it is easier than the other services (I'm talking enlisted). That mentality permeates the Air Force through and through, and the maturity of these kids will let you know when their 8 hour shift is up, and they don't play that dedication to mission like the Army and Marines. I want to apologize to the professionals in the AF that this doesn't apply to, but the professionals in the AF will tell you the same thing.

That is the lower end of the Air Force, unfortunately the highest end of the AF has a record of being corrupt, anti-joint, and have incomplete understanding of strategy. They'll sell their brother services out in a heart beat. They have a lot of pull in Congress because their projects bring a lot of money into specific districts, unlike standing up an Bde or two, or standing up a school that teaches cultural awareness, etc. That is nickel and dime, and won't buy congressmen a lot of support on in their district.

That is just the way it is.

LawVol
02-22-2007, 09:53 PM
I checked out this thread in the hopes of reading some interesting comments on the use of airpower and groundpower in a COIN environment. I had hoped to read how they could compliment each other. However, the discussion quickly turned into a dinigration of the Air Force. One would think this was a transcript from DC as the Army went begging for dollars.

As a current USAF officer (non-rated), I feel compelled to address your comments. Everytime I hear something negative about the USAF it usually includes some comment about how we're always asking for too much money for a next generation fighter or whatever. However, you must remember that our mission is to defend the US in the air and space. To do this, we must not remain short-sighted and defend only against current, known enemies. We must anticipate the unknown and ensure our air capabilities are unmatched. I am quite sure that the Marines and Army are thrilled with our air and space dominance as it ensures close air support, medevac and the like. While our current war is not conventional, we cannot ignore the potential for one. If we did and got bitten in the rear as a result, I'm sure some of the same folks that disparage the USAF now would blame us then too. Sure, we need to adapt to the small wars environment and some of us are looking past the Mitchell view of airpower as solely lethal. Give us some time. We've forgotten some lessons encountered from small wars just like the other branches.

I especially enjoyed the "weakest kids" comment. True enough, we don't have alot of folks that could take a hill (or run up it for that matter), but that isn't our mission. Of course we do have some career fields that require top physical fitness (pararescue, combat controller, etc.) and I'd stack those guys up against any from the other branches. The point is that the USAF trains its folks to the mission; the same as the Army and the Marines.

As for an absence of dedication, you should really rethink your statement. The next time you're at an airbase downrange, take a walk down to the flightline. Get someone to show you how our maintainers live and work. These guys are the grunts of the Air Force. They routinely work very long hours (just like the Army/Marines), in austere conditions (just like the Army/Marines), and sometimes lack food and other necessities (just like, you get it). They just do a different job.

I won't attempt to generalize the entire USAF by generalizing the rationale for joining the USAF rather than another branch of the service, but I would imagine that not everyone joined simply because it was easier. Some join because they want to acquire a technical skill they believe is better acquired through the USAF. It doesn't mean they believe that the other branches are inferior or less patriotic than the USAF. They just made a choice that was best for them. Questioning their dedication and professionalism because of that choice seems unfair.

It amazes me to see people criticize the USAF for having an Air Force first mentality and then listen as they criticize everything about the USAF that isn't like their particular branch. Having served as a USMC grunt and grown up as an Army brat, I've seen a little of them all. They each have a culture that is compatible with their mission. And each could learn a little from the other. There are a great number of former Marines and Soldiers in the USAF and the ones I have spoken to agree with me. Is the Air Force different than the other branches? Sure. Are we less dedicated and less professional? Hell no! Maybe if other branches realize that, jointness could mean something.

We may put on a different uniform and perform a different job, but we're every bit as patriotic, dedicated, and professional as the other branches and recognize that we're all on the same team. And that's just the way it is.

120mm
02-23-2007, 08:49 AM
My Uncle, who is a hero of mine, is an AF BG(ret). He flew before WWII, almost became AVG (taken out with malaria and some other disease before he got the chance) Came back to fly in the China-Burma-India theater for a couple of years (In P-400s, believe it or not), flew F-51s in Korea, F-105s in Viet Nam and became a mathematician for the Air Force prior to retirement.

Myself, I am a former Armor/CAV guy who currently serves in the Reserves as a Terminal Operations Officer, (I work with TALCE and ADACG on the Army side) and I've also done contract work for the Air Force, rebuilding C-130s down in Florida. I know a little about the Air Force, in other words. So I feel qualified to level some criticism at them from time to time.

1. The Air Force has a history of burning through taxpayer's dollars on "luxury items" like officers' clubs, golf courses and whatnot, so that they run out of money prior to completing their "core competencies" like runways. As a taxpayer, as well as the member of a competing service, I feel qualified to be p.o.d about this.

2. The Air Force doesn't have a remote clue as to what "leadership" consists of. See the comments about "flying" being "leadership". Or about the non-use of NCOs as lower level leaders.

3. The Air Forces' personnel system is run by even drunker monkeys than the Army's. They are currently forcibly reclassifying some specialities and ignoring airmen who are volunteering to reclassify.

4. The Air Force is run by a checklist mentality that doesn't necessarily have a "what is right?" check the block. The reflector belt issue and the way that the SFs are treated when it comes to training come to mind right away.

5. And finally, what appears to be the a large part of the Air Force senior leadership really, really thinks that ground forces are a waste of time. Despite historic study after historic study showing the ineffectiveness of air campaigns. In fact, I would suggest that air power is a subractor in COIN. It is an admission that friendly forces aren't strong enough, so they must wreck someone's house in order to accomplish the mission. This, in my opinion, is the most dangerous problem of all.

One last, interesting point. I notice that Air Force personnel are much more apt to take offense at criticism of their branch. Perhaps this is a symptom of criticism being pretty close to the mark for comfort?

LawVol
02-23-2007, 03:23 PM
Criticism is one thing, questioning someone's dedication simply because they make a different choice is quite another. I'll always welcome constructive criticism, but that's not what I'm reading.

120mm: I found your last three sentences quite humorous in their rather sophomoric attempt at framing the rules of a debate. Let me see if I get this straight. I read criticism of my branch of the service and by rising in its defense I validate it? I guess I should saying nothing? But then this simply validates it as well. Silence is acquiescence. Sorry, but it doesn't work that way. Of course, those three sentences could simply make you feel better about your argument. In my experience, statements such as these come from a position backed by emotion and feeling rather than facts. It's akin to the argument in political circles right now that if you criticize anything about the war, you're unpatriotic or somehow providing aid and comfort to the enemy. My comments are based in fact and from having spent a number of years on active duty in two different branches of the service.

To address your "criticisms" specifically:
1) You are absolutely right. I have never seen an officer's club or golf course on an Army base. But what is this? (http://www.theleafchronicle.com/news/stories/20040411/themission/204061.html) Brace yourself, it seems like the Army has established a golf course in Mosul. I wonder where the money came from? I think all branches waste money. Sure, I'd like to stop it and if you have a solution, let's hear it. It would certainly be more constructive than picking and choosing the facts.

2) Ahh, leadership, the sin qua non for any argument disparaging the USAF. I find it remarkable when I hear this argument from people who haven’t actually served in the USAF. Just as my time as an Army-brat doesn't give me any special insight into the leadership qualities within the Army, neither does the fact that you have an uncle retired from the USAF give you any special insight on the USAF as a whole. I've never actually heard the flying is leadership comment (perhaps it has the same mythic qualities as the GPS comment from the same post). However, I would say two things. First, it apparently came from a new lieutenant. Enough said I think. Second, there are leadership roles within a flying squadron and those pilots are responsible for their plane and others. Every mission has a lead. Maybe it’s similar with tanks? I don't know, I wouldn't presume to make such an unequivocal statement since I've never driven a tank (I assume you've never flown an F16?).

3) I'm not a personnel guy but I do know that some of these volunteers are trying to get in to career fields that are already overmanned or in danger of being so. Besides this is driven by funding issues (or maybe we built an extra golf course).

4) There is a deference to the checklist, I'll give you that (see I can admit problematic issues with the USAF; I don't see my branch as perfect like some apparently think theirs is). However, it isn't as prevalent as some think. We're working it. We're being forced to because the current threat isn't what we're normally geared to.

5) There is some truth here. USAF leadership (read pilots) views the world through an airpower-centric lens. It's what they know and what they are comfortable with. Other branches are just as guilty. The older guys see airpower as solely lethal and try to make the fight fit the capability rather than adapting your capabilities (or uses of those capabilities) to the fight. Some of the younger generation are moving away from this (I've actually written on this (January issue of Armed Force Journal)). The over-reliance on lethal power, however, isn't confined to the USAF. I've read a little about the perceived over-reliance on lethal power by the 4th ID in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Baghdad. I wasn't there, but I've read it is several places (I think Fiasco mentions this if memory serves). Most of us that frequent this site realize the hearts and minds aspect of COIN, but that is not shared by a great number of people in all branches of the US military. So I guess some house cleaning is due everywhere.

Jimbo
02-23-2007, 04:09 PM
I will weigh in with my observations based on experience:

March 1998 PAC Site B/Ali Al Slem AB, KU: While constructing and guarding a Patriot Missile Site during DESERT THUNDER I, I take two of my squads over to Ali Al Salem AB to get a hot meal (we haven't had one in about 35 days, other than T-rats). Come up to the first chow hall we find, when we beigin to enter, I am informed that the facility is only for USAF personnel and that we need to go the Army Chow Hall. Find the Army Chow Hall (just set up) and receive MRE's.

June 2002 PAFB/FT Carson, CO: My Company was providing the FORSCOM Fly-Away Heavy Immediate Ready Company (Tanks/Bradleys/men via C-17/C-5). My vehicles and pallets are in a hanger on the flightline. I have my men providing guards. On a Sunday morning at 1030 AM I receive a call from my BDE executive office wanting to know why the USAF security police at PAFB have called him to reprt that civillians are crawling around my equipment. I put on my uniform drive to PAFB and ask my guards what the hell was going on. One of my guards gave a tour of the equipment to two off-duty USAF SP's and their kids. The off-duty SP's were the civilians that SP office called my higher about. So instead going over and asking what was goign on, the USAF P's assumed the worst and called my BDE HQ (they had my home number as well, but why solve problems at the lowest level possible).

MAY 2, 2003 Ouja, IZ: 4ID is in the Tikrit area. There is very little in the way of air going on. Things arebusy, but not busy enough to involve the Air Force. The BN S-3 asks the CCT, who are attached to the battalion, if they would like to help out in the TOC, namely many radios and such since they aren't doing much at the time. The AF NCO's think it would be cool because they are bored out of their minds. The AF Captain (A-10 driver, '97 USAFA grad) tells the BNCDR and S-3 in front of the rest of us that he and his men were to highly trained to do that sort of thing, and that they would not help man the TOC. It didn't go well, and the AF NCO's ended up feeling really bad for their ALO putting them in a bad spot.

Since Saddam was on the lose in the area, there was a level of violence out of the locals that did not receive much news until late in 2003. The paintbrush that 4ID gets painted with, tends to be held by journalists who did spend much time in the units AO. Nobody did things perfectly in 2003, but there appears to be a lot of criticism by writers who never spent a lot of time up there.

September 2005, Taji, IZ: USAF provides MiTT personnel to serve as advisors to Iraqi Army Base Defense Units (BDU). The team is led by an AF Captain (USAFA grad again). The BDU has responsibility for the perimeter and the ECP's and a certain distance out from the perimeter (1-2 K's). AF Captain says that his team will not take part in any activities that involve going outside the wire, and he determines that the ECP is outside the wire. The reult is that the other MiTT personnel on the camp are having to spend their not out on ops with theri own IA soldiers babysitting the BDU Iraqis at an ECP because this AF Captain says it is not his lane. In a nu7t sheel, Army/USMC/Navy MiTTs who are responsible for other Iraqi untis on the camp (meaning training/ops) are having to spend their time helping the BDU Iraqis that are on the gate, while the USAF advisor team does little else.

There are plenty of good people in the USAF, the problem tends to be that the USAF is kind of like the kid with nicest toys in the sandbox, he wants to play with everybody else as an equal, but he has some issues with sharing.

For the record both of great uncles were B-17 drivers in the ETO. Scheinfurt-regensburg/Cologne?Berlin, etc. Multiple DFC's.

Jimbo
02-23-2007, 04:27 PM
As for USAF and COIN there is a huge role. The problem has to do with what gets budgeted for procurement. Airlift and ISR are two of the biggest uses of airpower followed closely by CAS. The USAF has procured a good mix of aircraft for this, but not in good quantities. The USAF ha for some reason been keen to kill of the A-10, but it continues to prove its usefulness. The more interesting example I find is the C-17. C-17 procurement was based on the mathematics of cargo capacity not sortie rate. So even though the 2 C-17's can carry what 3 C141's (whatever it is/the math escapes me at this time) did, the isue now come up of hours on airframes with the C-17 having a higher than forecasted usage rate. Personally, my concern is the apparent inability of the USAF to figure out its tanker procuremtn plan.

Steve Blair
02-23-2007, 04:52 PM
What I really think you're missing, LawVol, is the disconnect between some of the people in the AF and how the AF acts when it is on the policy stage. Jimbo brings out some good examples, and I could reel off many others from the historical perspective. What it often comes down to is the AF's institutional inability to deal with any situation other than the one they feel is ideal or desired. They have also had an historical tendency to claim that they have the only true understanding of joint service or operations (take a look at "Air Force Roles and Missions: A History" if you don't believe me...it has an interesting spin on this).

As an organization, the AF tends to swing from one extreme to the other. SAC's dominance of the AF from its first days until the 1970s is one example, the rise of fighter pilots from the early 1970s to today another. There are some fine thinkers and doers within the AF (easy to see if you look at the Air University's paper collection), but this thought does not seem to rise up to the higher levels. As a result you get JAG generals claiming that airpower CAN win a COIN situation by itself, and in an earlier generation you got claims that one E-3 served the same deterrent purpose as a carrier battle group.

What can the AF do to change this perception? For one they should take a long, honest look at the real situation we face today and come up with some real answers. We need tanker capability and airlift. Period. Even the AF has admitted that their main role in an Africa Command would be lift. There should be the same level of focus on this as there is on the "next generation" bomber. They could also focus more attention on their personnel issues and consider cutting programs instead of people next time budget decisions need to be made. They could also stop the "airpower won the war" record. The AF, like all other services, is a supporting arm. It supports national goals. It cannot win everything on its own, any more than the Army can win everything on its own.

As a historian I understand this is a difficult thing for the AF to deal with based on its own history and culture. Tilford makes some interesting comments about this in his book "Setup."

120mm
02-23-2007, 07:02 PM
120mm: I found your last three sentences quite humorous in their rather sophomoric attempt at framing the rules of a debate. Let me see if I get this straight. I read criticism of my branch of the service and by rising in its defense I validate it? I guess I should saying nothing? But then this simply validates it as well. Silence is acquiescence. Sorry, but it doesn't work that way. Of course, those three sentences could simply make you feel better about your argument. In my experience, statements such as these come from a position backed by emotion and feeling rather than facts. It's akin to the argument in political circles right now that if you criticize anything about the war, you're unpatriotic or somehow providing aid and comfort to the enemy. My comments are based in fact and from having spent a number of years on active duty in two different branches of the service.

Actually, LawVol, I don't know a soldier who will get his hackles up if you criticize the Army. In fact, he'd probably throw out a few of his own in good humor. I can criticize the Navy and Marines, and I get back either good-humored repartee or a throw-away line. In my experience, though, if you criticize the Air Force, Airmen will come out of the walls with a response similar to yours. It wasn't meant to be a "sophomoric attempt" at anything, I was stating it as a "fact". And I am serious about suggesting it has to do with the criticism being to close for comfort. Speaking of sophomoric, you only have to be in a locker room for about 30 seconds before you learn that the guy who takes offense the quickest has something to hide.

To address your "criticisms" specifically:
1) You are absolutely right. I have never seen an officer's club or golf course on an Army base. But what is this? (http://www.theleafchronicle.com/news/stories/20040411/themission/204061.html) Brace yourself, it seems like the Army has established a golf course in Mosul. I wonder where the money came from? I think all branches waste money. Sure, I'd like to stop it and if you have a solution, let's hear it. It would certainly be more constructive than picking and choosing the facts.

The problem being, the Air Force has done it from it's inception, and as a modus operandi. Hell, some pretty senior AF officers have gone on record joking about it. I would be willing to bet that the "golf course" was done by soldiers on their own spare time and for little or no funds expended.

2) Ahh, leadership, the sin qua non for any argument disparaging the USAF. I find it remarkable when I hear this argument from people who haven’t actually served in the USAF. Just as my time as an Army-brat doesn't give me any special insight into the leadership qualities within the Army, neither does the fact that you have an uncle retired from the USAF give you any special insight on the USAF as a whole. I've never actually heard the flying is leadership comment (perhaps it has the same mythic qualities as the GPS comment from the same post). However, I would say two things. First, it apparently came from a new lieutenant. Enough said I think. Second, there are leadership roles within a flying squadron and those pilots are responsible for their plane and others. Every mission has a lead. Maybe it’s similar with tanks? I don't know, I wouldn't presume to make such an unequivocal statement since I've never driven a tank (I assume you've never flown an F16?).

I work with the victims of AF "leadership" every day. The AF enlisted men I know are of two flavors. Those that are completely pissed off by some stupid #### that their "leadership" has done to them, and those who aren't very bright.

3) I'm not a personnel guy but I do know that some of these volunteers are trying to get in to career fields that are already overmanned or in danger of being so. Besides this is driven by funding issues (or maybe we built an extra golf course).

These are two sets of personnel trying to get into the same "shortage" career field. One guy WANTS to be a widget gobber, but cannot (though he is perfectly qualified) and the other guy DOESN'T WANT to be a widget gobber, but is being FORCED to become one. And for some insane reason, they just can't swap....

4) There is a deference to the checklist, I'll give you that (see I can admit problematic issues with the USAF; I don't see my branch as perfect like some apparently think theirs is). However, it isn't as prevalent as some think. We're working it. We're being forced to because the current threat isn't what we're normally geared to.

5) There is some truth here. USAF leadership (read pilots) views the world through an airpower-centric lens. It's what they know and what they are comfortable with. Other branches are just as guilty. The older guys see airpower as solely lethal and try to make the fight fit the capability rather than adapting your capabilities (or uses of those capabilities) to the fight. Some of the younger generation are moving away from this (I've actually written on this (January issue of Armed Force Journal)). The over-reliance on lethal power, however, isn't confined to the USAF. I've read a little about the perceived over-reliance on lethal power by the 4th ID in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Baghdad. I wasn't there, but I've read it is several places (I think Fiasco mentions this if memory serves). Most of us that frequent this site realize the hearts and minds aspect of COIN, but that is not shared by a great number of people in all branches of the US military. So I guess some house cleaning is due everywhere.

But especially for the service with the history of expending the most and getting the least in return.

Steve Blair
02-23-2007, 07:38 PM
Before we get too deep here, keep one thing in mind: reliance on firepower is an American military tradition going back many years. It's not any more exclusive to the Army than it is the Air Force. I did read your article, LawVol, and found it very well-informed. The problems I see deal with the overall AF cultural mindset that tends to keep the sorts of changes you discuss locked down tight and subordinated to a "bigger picture" that may or may not be relevant to the real world picture.

If you haven't read them, I'd strongly suggest you pick up Tilford's "Setup" and "The 11 Days of Christmas" by Michel. Both give an interesting insight into the mindset I'm talking about. Both are also written by former AF officers.

Bill Moore
02-23-2007, 07:56 PM
I love a good debate, and although you may have felt some of my statements were shot below the belt, they are based on years of working with the Air Force in varying capacities, so they are not unfounded. I could list tens of examples, but won't unless challenged again. I would argue that the Air Force has a serious perception problem they need to work on; however, when your recruiting incentive is based on we're more a corporation than a military service (my words, not the Air Force's, but in short it is quality of life, what can the Air Force do for me, etc.), then you have a hard time selling the point that the Air Force has a warrior culture. There is always a danger when you speak in generalities, because like everyone else in this council I have worked with a number of professional Air Force officers and NCOs, and even commented in a previous post on the unsung heros flying the wings off the C17s (probably receive minimal recognition in the Air Force) to support the war effort. You have seen numerous posts from soldiers and marines here, and I'm sure you have heard complaints elsewhere, and generally where there is smoke there is fire, maybe not as bad as the smoke would indicate, but none the less there is some fire.

If the Air Force is looking for ways to contribute to small wars I would love to discuss it, but as you may recall (I need to find the article), a high ranking Air Force officer went on record shortly after the initial phase of the Afghanistan conflict ended, stating the Air Force won the war? First off we're a long ways from winning that war, second the Air Force played a critical role in breaking the back of the conventional Taliban forces, so the Northern Alliance to take the ground, and eventually push their conventional forces out of Afghanistan, but it was a "joint/interagency/multinational effort", so to further state that the only thing Special Forces did was provide security for the Air Force's TAC P's is simply silly. If that came from a drunk Air Force junior enlisted guy I could understand it, but coming from a senior officer who represents the culture and values of the Air Force it means something else entirely, and this is exactly what irks so many of us.

I concurred with your comments on projecting out for the defense of U.S. interests in the air and space, and understand it is expensive to maintain the technological edge, and I think the Air Force can provide more than just lift in the support of small wars, but the fire support aspect needs to be more along the lines of A10s, than B1 bombers. We all know in our system that every service needs to make it arguments for their slice of the pie, but they need to logical and honest, not an attempt to rewrite history.

slapout9
02-23-2007, 08:16 PM
Law Vol, answer this. Why does the Air Force pass laws to prevent the Army from owning fixed wing aircraft, while the Navy and USMC can have them?
Why is the air force doing everything possible to cut the Army out of the missile business when it was proven beyond any doubt in the 1950's that there is nothing a plane can do that an Army missile can not do better and cheaper and safer. Do you remember Desert Storm when the Air Force could not find or hit the mobile SCUD missiles using 1950's style mobile lauchers? The only place for the Air Force is back under the Army like it used to be and should be.

Steve Blair
02-23-2007, 08:45 PM
Again, guys, let's keep this reasonably civil.:)

We do need a separate air force for a number of reasons, not the least is preserving the capability to provide hard-hitting deep strike (such as that provided by manned bombers and ICMBs with conventional warheads). I also like the idea of having a service with the full-time job of dealing with air superiority. That said, we also need a force that can provide real CAS and not just lip service to the concept. We also need a robust airlift capability, which is one of the most under-rated jobs in the AF no matter how much they tout the legacy of the Berlin Airlift.

I think many in the Army command structure feel betrayed by the lack of attention to CAS by the higher levels of the AF, although this was called for by the Key West Agreement. There is also some lingering bad feeling about the lack of tactical airlift. By the same token, the AF has yet to shed the "everyone's against us" mindset that helped them form their own service in the first place.

Perhaps we would be better served if the Navy and Marines got to operate A-10s and the Army was allowed to operate a limited airlift fleet, freeing the AF to focus on air superiority and other concepts that are of more corporate value to them. Of course, this would also lead to the defense budget being adjusted, but you can't have everything.

As I've said before, there are good people in the AF. Many of them. But I'm not sure that they as an organization have left the Cold War or even the legacy of WW2's strategic bombing campaigns. The Army has similar pains, though they are struggling to make changes. Perhaps this is what throws the AF into a darker light. In Vietnam both services refused to change with a deep determination. This time around the Army's actually looking at itself and making changes (possibly not the right ones, but that's a different thread). Perhaps that's part of the problem.

Steve Blair
02-23-2007, 08:46 PM
Law Vol, answer this. Why does the Air Force pass laws to prevent the Army from owning fixed wing aircraft, while the Navy and USMC can have them?

This one's pretty simple. The navy refused to give theirs up, and retaining them was part of the deal for them supporting the creation of the AF. Likewise, the Marines managed to keep their aircraft through the same deal, and resisted several attempts before the Korean War to eliminate the Corps altogether.

slapout9
02-23-2007, 09:22 PM
By Steve Blair Again, guys, let's keep this reasonably civil.

Steve, Ok I am for declaring civil war against the Air Force.:)

LawVol
02-23-2007, 10:19 PM
You'll never hear me say the AF is perfect. I will welcome any constructive criticism aimed at improving the AF and assisting it in making a better contribution to our security. However, when the discussion turns to unwarranted criticism of the dedication of Airmen in general, I have to say something because that type of critisism is not warranted. After all, aren't we all on the same team? At least that's what I routinely hear when others call an airpower advocate to task for ignoring ground contributions. Although I almost always enjoy a combative debate, I'll follow Bill Moore's example and resist the temptation unless challenged.

Steve Blair hit the nail on the head. Our leadership (and no I don't mean the lone guy in a jet) is stuck in the Cold War mindset. As a result, they view war through that prism and ignore all else. I agree that this is a fault. However, there is a new breed coming along that sees the need for change in AF thinking to meet the challenges of small wars. Just recently a Viper driver told me that he believes airlift plays a more important role than he in small wars. For those that understand the pecking order in the AF flying community, you know this is a huge statement. I've also had these conversations with rated leadership and essentially been told to shut up and color. It'll take time, but we'll get there. Those dedicated junior officers will make sure we do.

The change in mindset that Bill Moore speaks of is beginning to happen. The steps have been small, but at least its in the right direction. We're adding more combat skills training and placing more emphasis of physical training. It's a start.

Bill Moore, I'll take you up on your offer. I've been toying with an idea and your thoughts (as well as anyone else's) would be welcome. I think we can all agree that security is job one in a post-conflict environment and many argue that a constabulary-type force could be what is needed. If such a force had been in place and functioning just prior to the looting after the fall of Baghdad, we might have a different Iraq.

Since the Army and Marines aren't trained in law enforcement, we could adapt Air Force security forces to handle this job. They already have law enforcement training that could be adapted to account for the differences between military and civilian law. This serves at least tworposes: (1) it provides a much needed reduction in the mission for Army and Marines (yes, I realized they are extremely overtasked) and (2) it puts a ifferent face to the indigenous population. Let me explain. As we know, infantry is trained to fight an dwin battles. This often requires maximum firepower downrange. This also creates a mindset that isn't necessarily conducive to the hearts and minds campaign (please don;t read this as a swipe at infantry as it isn't intended). By using AF in a constabulary role, the public sees a different uniform that clearly demonstrates differing roles. While the constabulary force is employed in fighting crime and maintaining law and order, the infantry would be used as backup as needed to handle insurgent groups and to secure the borders against foreign intrusion. I would also augment the constabulary with teams to assist in setting up the court system and try cases. Thus, the law enforcement would initially be done by US military but transition to civilian control as people are trained and ready.

Thsi is a nut shell description. I actually have some other ideas to fill it out, but you get the idea.

slapout9
02-23-2007, 11:24 PM
Since the Army and Marines aren't trained in law enforcement, we could adapt Air Force security forces to handle this job. They already have law enforcement training that could be adapted to account for the differences between military and civilian law.



What!!!!!:eek: LawVol you never heard of the Military Police or CID? However me and Bubba really like ya for two reasons; you got guts to stand up for your service;) and you come from Tenn. Which means there is hope for you. Maybe you could one day become an Army helicopter pilot. And for your listening pleasure.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZenN39fP98

LawVol
02-24-2007, 12:22 AM
I should have chosen my words more carefully. I meant that Marines and Army aren't trained in a constabulary role. This essentially combines light infantry and law enforcement. While the Army and Marines certainly have infantry skills, they are not trained to conduct criminal investigations. Similarly, to my knowledge, your MPs/CID aren't trained extensively in infantry tactics. A constabulary force would need to have the capacity to deal with small scale insurgent-type activities. I envision something along the lines of the Italian Carabinieri.

LawVol
02-24-2007, 12:28 AM
Thanks for the tune. Without reading the posts below, I immediately noticed the Navy jet. Obviously it wasn't made by an Air Force guy. Oh, and Corps was spelled wrong too! There's a joke here, but I'll pass so I'm not accused of being a hypocrit. :)

Bill Moore
02-24-2007, 01:34 AM
LawVol, I concur our military needs a constabulary force, and your point about the different uniformm reflecting different roles is valid, but I don't think the Air Force should own this mission for the following reasons:

1. There will be serious C2 issues if the Constabulary works for the Air Force, because the Air Force is not (currently) structured to command forces on the ground. Ideally the constabulary would fall under the JFLCC, not the JFACC. I know the Air Force is capable of defending Air Bases and conducting limited operations outside the base in support of base defense, but the intelligence, maneuver, logistics, etc. that go with owning turf outside the base would be tremendous.

2. The Constabulary is a key role, so it couldn't take a back seat funding wise to developing a new Air Craft, and I think we all agree the Air Force currently is not people focused.

3. The growth required to fill the support roles mentioned in 1 above fits more logically in the Army and the Marines, but would argue that Army should own it, since they are established to stay for the long haul (though the Marines obviously have proved their staying power also, but I believe they're supposed to be more focused on relatively short duration (a few months) expeditionary missions in a perfect world).

I think the Air Force could contribute in several areas, but will mention one here that I think would be a good fit, because they're already doing it, and that is their expeditionary medical capability. You already have fly away packages for medical support, but I don't think you have enough. If you have seen the articles recently on the USS Mercy (a hospital ship) providing extraordinary service in SE Asia (especially in support of Indonesia and the Philippines), and the positive ground that has gained for our in the critical hearts and minds campaign, I think you would agree we need more capability along those lines. The Air Force could obviously reach a lot of areas that the Navy can't touch. Food for thought anyway, more coming, I promise.

slapout9
02-24-2007, 01:42 AM
LawVol, MP's are trained pretty well in infantry tactics, CID is not at all. However your point about a Constabulary force is well taken and has been talked about at SWC extensively. Both the Army and USMC have alot of experience in setting one up in days gone by. The small wars manual has a whole section on it. Which just goes to show you that you are an Army and Marine guy at heart. As for the video I think that is an F-5 that gets blown out of the sky by an Army secret missile:) They wouldn't let us shoot down Tom Cruise. As for spelling Bubba says "thats cause they ain't got no schoolin"

LawVol
02-24-2007, 02:13 AM
I see the point of having a constabulary force with green forces, but my purpose is two-fold. First, I already mentioned the need for putting a different face on the constabulary force. Part of doing this requires a different mindset. I can't speak for the Army, but my USMC training taught me to kill the bad guy and that type of thinking permeates all action. Infantry doesn't tend to be very meek and are probably more inclined to use a heavy hand. The Air Force, however, uses a more gentle means of accomplishing things (obviously I'm not talking about the business end of our aircraft). Our culture doesn't necessarily meld well with a total warrior concept (this was mentioned earlier). This could actually be a benefit when dealing with the public. The first reaction may be something other than going to guns, most beneficial in a COIN environment. However, I am still thinking this through.

I agree that C2 would be an issue, but my idea accounts for that. Okay, I'm probably going to get my USAF designation taken from me, but I envision these constabulary teams being OPCON and TACON to the Army or Marines, depending on who owns the AO. After all, if we USAF guys preach centralized control of airpower, we can't really argue the opposite if we start getting into ground operations. BY doing this we'd also gain some serious street credibility when we talk about jointness.

The next purpose is for the USAF to play a greater role. Sure we do the airpower thing, but we can do more and I think the green forces could use the help. While some of our guys are as overtasked as you Army and Marines guys, a great number of us are not. If I'm not mistaken, I believe the Army and Marines have non-grunts performing grunts functions. I'm essentially thinking along the same lines.

120mm
02-24-2007, 08:48 AM
I see the point of having a constabulary force with green forces, but my purpose is two-fold. First, I already mentioned the need for putting a different face on the constabulary force. Part of doing this requires a different mindset. I can't speak for the Army, but my USMC training taught me to kill the bad guy and that type of thinking permeates all action. Infantry doesn't tend to be very meek and are probably more inclined to use a heavy hand. The Air Force, however, uses a more gentle means of accomplishing things (obviously I'm not talking about the business end of our aircraft). Our culture doesn't necessarily meld well with a total warrior concept (this was mentioned earlier). This could actually be a benefit when dealing with the public. The first reaction may be something other than going to guns, most beneficial in a COIN environment. However, I am still thinking this through.

I agree that C2 would be an issue, but my idea accounts for that. Okay, I'm probably going to get my USAF designation taken from me, but I envision these constabulary teams being OPCON and TACON to the Army or Marines, depending on who owns the AO. After all, if we USAF guys preach centralized control of airpower, we can't really argue the opposite if we start getting into ground operations. BY doing this we'd also gain some serious street credibility when we talk about jointness.

The next purpose is for the USAF to play a greater role. Sure we do the airpower thing, but we can do more and I think the green forces could use the help. While some of our guys are as overtasked as you Army and Marines guys, a great number of us are not. If I'm not mistaken, I believe the Army and Marines have non-grunts performing grunts functions. I'm essentially thinking along the same lines.

That's getting pretty close to what's happening now with the AF's security forces. For the cultural reasons mentioned earlier, Big Green takes the SF guys under their wing and makes sure they're functionally TACON for ground ops.

The SF guys I'm familiar with feel overly stretched by the law enforcement mission and want nothing to do with it. Go over the Lightfighter.net and click on the thread called "F*cking Air Force" if you want some feedback on the guys on the ground.

I've always felt that National Guard guys have a similar advantage as AF personnel have when executing a COIN mission. They tend to have better empathy and less of a "mission uber alles" mindset regarding working with "the natives". Better people skills, etc..

Bill Moore
02-25-2007, 05:32 AM
I mentioned this elsewhere today, but in case you're not reading the other threads, I thought it best to mention it here also. I think the Air Force and Navy both have the ability (the Navy already has the capability to some extent) to provide technical experts in various types of engineering, medicine, construction, etc. to the Provinicial Reconstruction Teams, which is the "primary" effort. The Air Force and Navy don't shy away from long technical training programs, and that is what is required to produce the type of experts we need for the major reconstruction and stability efforts we'll be supporting for years. This allows each service to continue to focus on their core compitencies, without trying to assume completely new missions, such as the Air Force in a ground combat role (constabulary). Thoughts?

120mm
02-25-2007, 07:39 AM
I mentioned this elsewhere today, but in case you're not reading the other threads, I thought it best to mention it here also. I think the Air Force and Navy both have the ability (the Navy already has the capability to some extent) to provide technical experts in various types of engineering, medicine, construction, etc. to the Provinicial Reconstruction Teams, which is the "primary" effort. The Air Force and Navy don't shy away from long technical training programs, and that is what is required to produce the type of experts we need for the major reconstruction and stability efforts we'll be supporting for years. This allows each service to continue to focus on their core compitencies, without trying to assume completely new missions, such as the Air Force in a ground combat role (constabulary). Thoughts?

I, for one, liked your ideas in the other thread. "Flyaway hospitals?" Brilliant. I don't mind the other services "getting in the game", especially when it's firmly "in their lane."

120mm
02-25-2007, 07:57 AM
At the risk of stirring the pot, here is a prime example of why the Air Force pisses off so many of us:

http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2007/02/AFpredatorlosses070223/

Basically, the Air Force is using it's own high loss rate as an arguing point as to why they should control all UAVs above 3500 feet.

And I have NO DOUBT IN MY MIND that if the Air Force gets control of them, the Army will get ZERO UAV support and wouldn't be surprised if that is the end of UAVs altogether. I hate these duplicitous bastards.

Bill Moore
02-25-2007, 04:52 PM
120mm if this is an attempt by the USAF to take over the UAV program, then I agree with you, and together we can go down to the nearest Air Force O-Club and start kicking butt because this would be the straw that breaks the camel's back.

However, the article wasn't clear, and it may be an attempt to clarify who owns the space (AO if you will) over 3500 feet. Do our rotary wing assets have to get clearance from the AF to fly over 3500 feet? If they do, then it makes sense that we would also have to clear that space for flying UAVs.

Again if it is an attempt to take our UAVs, then down with the Air Force. If it is an attempt to better manage air traffic, then "maybe" they have a point.

LawVol
02-25-2007, 06:20 PM
There is a knee-jerk reaction in AF cirlces to want to control everything in the air. However, I see the same thing from the Army. After all, a few of you immediately liked the constabulary idea but wanted it with the ground forces. I see that argument and it isn't without merit. It seems that other branches are quite comfortable with the need to take on air missions (rightfully so, I think, since it folds more neatly into the support role they're looking for airpower to have), but bristle when someone mentions the AF taking more of a ground approach. It just seems curious to me.

I keep going back to the same thing because I do not see an AF constabulary, however, as taking over Marine/Army missions. Typical groundpounders aren't trained for the type of work required in establishing the rule of law in a post-conflict environment and they typically receive very little, if any, training to deal with locals (SOF forces may be the exception). I was just rereading part of Fiasco and a passage out of chapter 8 sort of captures it all. It said that immediately after OIF I the grunts were in the mind set of returning home and losing their motivation because they weren't going home. They did realize and weren't prepared for the fact that they had to establish law and order (remember the looting?). Having AF people trained at this available to move in quickly avoids squandering that golden hour. I could understand how hard it would be for the 3d ID to switch gears from fighting to policing, especially with no training or plan. Developing an AF constabulary would allow us to develop the doctrine and would allow the green force to focus on what they do best.

As for the UAV debate, I'm not a flier so it doesn't affect me like it does our pilots. From what I hear, they see the need but I guess there is some fear that pilots will become obsolete. I was at a base in Iraq with the 101st and they had some small UAVs to use for on-call observation. It seemed like a great idea to me. It was immediately available and I'm sure less expensive than having a viper on scene.

Bill Moore
02-25-2007, 09:45 PM
The Army controls the ground, and all actions that influence behavior on the ground in their sector. The Air Force normally controls the deep battle space, unless there is a Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA) established. If the Army lost their UAVs, then they would have to go through another service to "request" support for critical ISR capability, and that support may or may not be provided. We have a hard enough time getting close air support, so when Small Wars are no longer cool and the Air Force is chasing the next big money project, they'll neglect their UAV fleet, and focus on satellite killers or something else. I definitely don't mind the Air Force owning and controlling all assets that support Air and Space Superiority, because that is their mission, but I do mind when they want to interfere with tactical air assets that influence the tactical fight on the ground. I guess the same can be said about the constabulary force, why have the Air Force develop it, when it is going to work for the Army or Marines anyway? To me that just doesn't make sense, the Army already has the infrastructure for training this force. For Small Wars I think the Air Force should focus on enablers, like the ones I mentioned previously, not taking on tactical ground missions outside of base defense. I don't see it as a knee jerk reaction, but a rather well thought out argument. At least from where I sit.

LawVol
02-25-2007, 10:23 PM
Your point is taken, but I'm just trying to figure out a way to get the AF to play a greater role in GWOT, which is essentially COIN. From where I sit, it seems the Marines and Army are shouldering nearly all the burden. I just want to lighten their load a little.

I'm still going to pursue the topic for my paper. Maybe if I can get it published at least it could get people to thinking about making the AF more joint. Hell, if we fielded a ground unit along the lines of a constabulary, it may even get some of our leadership to see a ground perspective that could help when you guys are trying to get air assistance.

Bill Moore
02-25-2007, 11:16 PM
I think the constabulary concept is an idea that DoD, or perhaps DoS, needs to study, so I highly encourage you to write the paper. In the end I don't care if they wear Air Force Blue Cami's or Army Green, it is a required capability. I'll find it interesting to see how you tackle increasing the AF manning when they are in the process of cutting back their numbers. A constabulary force will need to fairly large, because they are long duration missions, perhaps each mission will last upwards of five years, and then how any missions are ongoing simultaneously? I think the two war concept is out, we could be supporting operations in multiple theaters. They key to success is for the constabulary to work themselves out of a job as soon as possible (transition to partner nations or ideally host nation). Look forward to seeing your paper.

LawVol
02-26-2007, 12:33 AM
Proving that not everyone in the AF is technologically proficient, I coudn't find the thread up mentioned on Lightfighter.net. I get the gist from the title however.

The Security Forces guys I've talked to don't want anything to do with law enforcement because it would keep them in the wire (same with our OSI, i.e. your CID). We had an issue pop up at my FOB and it was a chore just to get an investigator (as JAG I can't because it would make me a witness and then I oculdn't prosecute). Perhaps a light infantry/law enforcement mission might appeal to them. Or perhaps not. It's just an idea I've toyed with and I certainly won't be able to account for every issue that might arise with implementing it. If I can just spark a discusion, I'd be happy.

Thanks for the input and keep it coming. I do appreciate it.

jonSlack
02-26-2007, 02:36 AM
Your point is taken, but I'm just trying to figure out a way to get the AF to play a greater role in GWOT,

Getting the USAF more involved for the sake of getting them more involved?

The main effort in COIN are the ground forces, the Army and the Marine Corps. The USAF should be the main effort in the strategic air and the space arenas. I hope there is nobody sitting around racking their brain trying to figure out a way to the Army and the Marine Corps a greater role in those areas merely for the sake of getting them a greater role.

The Army already operates a fixed wing aircraft fleet. I do not understand the institutional resistence to allowing the Army to enlarge this fleet to include aircraft whose role is tactical CAS and where the primary consumer are the ground forces. Actually, I think I understand the resistance, I just do not think it is valid.

I believe in getting assets down to the lowest level possible. But by making the procurement of CAS by the Army a joint effort it makes it much more difficult than it needs to be.

I personally believe, as UAVs become more and more prevalent, there will eventually be a new agreement, similar to the Key West Agreement, that will "allow" or "permit" the Army to continue to fly small unarmed UAVs while all armed UAVs and the larger unarmed UAVs will be controlled by the USAF. I think that is a bad idea, but I think it will happen none the less.

120mm
02-26-2007, 08:18 AM
I think that there is a definite need for an "Air Force Expeditionary Force" that should "own" its own ground combat forces. To include deployable armored vehicles. And if I were in charge of approving budgets, I would support a budget for the Air Forces' version of the Marine Corps.

But - I can only see the UAS (Uninhabited Aerial System) (the name changed last week, from UAV, believe it or not) issue in terms of historical USAF M.O.

1. Claim responsibility for a technology that the Army needs to operate.
2. Get responsibility for that technology.
3. Fail to develop that technology.
4. Retask a poorly suited substitute once the Army NEEDs support from that technology with all sorts of inappropriate restrictions.


http://www.warbirdalley.com/ov10.htm

slapout9
02-26-2007, 12:56 PM
jonSlack,What fixed wing fleet does the Army operate? The only ones I ever heard of was a small fleet used to fly around General Officers, has this changed?

120mm, this idea of an Air Force Marine Corps was proposed by Billy Mitchell and was the initial concept for Airborne forces but changed during ww2. I think it should be looked at again along the lines of German paratroops which were originally part of the German Air Force.

jonSlack
02-26-2007, 01:40 PM
Cargo Chaos: Key West's Revenge (http://www.defensetech.org/archives/002395.html)


Today in Iraq, the military is minimizing its convoy presence by moving the materiel and people through the air instead. In many situations, such as flying mail between FOBs, it is not efficient to use Air Force's C-130. That's why the military is relying heavily on its fleet of intra-theater cargo airplanes, like the Army's C-23 Sherpa and C-12 Huron. [The Air Force left the intra-theater business when it retired the C-27 Spartans after Panama Canal handover.] However, the C-23s and C-12s are rapidly wearing out. So the Army went looking for the replacement Future Cargo Aircraft, to be fielded in 2008.

...

Because of the Key West Agreement, the Army and Air Force shares the air lift function, the Army intra-theater, and the Air Force inter-theater. However, in today's non-linear battlefield, it's difficult to tell where to draw the "theater" line. So when the Army initiated the FCA, the Air Force felt compelled to protect its turf in the air lift business by joining the program, and then delayed the program by dragging its feet on its portion of the joint requirement. I think it was instructive to note that, only after the Army has announced the request for proposal for the FCA, did the Air Force start making noise about its similar requirements, yet did not have its set of requirement ready right away. What was the Air Force rep on the JROC doing? Isn't it his job to tell the Air Force before the Army announces its RFP?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Military_Intelligence_Battalion_(United_States )


1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation) is a unit of the United States Army which specializes in the acquisition of aerial signals information in direct support of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade and V Corps. It is comprised of 3 companies - HHSC, A Company, and B Company.

I do not how many of these battalions there are in the Army, but there are more than the one above.

slapout9
02-26-2007, 02:19 PM
jonSlack, thanks for posting. Do you happen to know what happened to the C-123 which was basically a twin engine C-130 seems it would be ideal for this type situation which why it was invented in the first place. My first 4 jumps were from a 123 in 1972. If I remember it also had rocket assisted take for short run ways if needed, it was meant to be a workhorse in 3rd world type environments.

Steve Blair
02-26-2007, 02:26 PM
Getting the USAF more involved for the sake of getting them more involved?

The main effort in COIN are the ground forces, the Army and the Marine Corps. The USAF should be the main effort in the strategic air and the space arenas. I hope there is nobody sitting around racking their brain trying to figure out a way to the Army and the Marine Corps a greater role in those areas merely for the sake of getting them a greater role.

The Army already operates a fixed wing aircraft fleet. I do not understand the institutional resistence to allowing the Army to enlarge this fleet to include aircraft whose role is tactical CAS and where the primary consumer are the ground forces. Actually, I think I understand the resistance, I just do not think it is valid.

I believe in getting assets down to the lowest level possible. But by making the procurement of CAS by the Army a joint effort it makes it much more difficult than it needs to be.

I personally believe, as UAVs become more and more prevalent, there will eventually be a new agreement, similar to the Key West Agreement, that will "allow" or "permit" the Army to continue to fly small unarmed UAVs while all armed UAVs and the larger unarmed UAVs will be controlled by the USAF. I think that is a bad idea, but I think it will happen none the less.

I agree with this. Expanding the AF into the ground role just for the sake of them being there is not a good idea, IMO. Security Forces did handle roles somewhat like this in Vietnam (though more in the light infantry role), but it was never a mission they enjoyed or really bought into. I'm not sure if they should be forced to just for a stake in the joint game.

jonSlack
02-26-2007, 02:27 PM
Fairchild C-123 Provider (http://www.warbirdalley.com/c123.htm)


The C-123 soldiered on into the 1980s, serving with several Air National Guard units, some being fitted with wheel/ski landing gear for use in Arctic conditions.

Today, surplus C-123s are popular with small freight companies throughout the Americas, and a few are even found on the warbird circuit.

LawVol
02-26-2007, 02:43 PM
I feel like I can't get a break here. I guess we AF guys are damned if we do and damned if we don't.

jonSlack: not [U]just[U] for the sake of getting more involved, but to take up some of the slack. I've read a number of article about the Army being strectched and near the breaking point (not my words), so why not explore ways to help?

Also, I'm not opposed to giving the Army what it needs to get the job done, including fixed-wing assets if necessary. I'm not interested in credit or chest-pounding, I'm just exploring methods of accompliching the mission. If I didn't try to think outside the box, I'd be arguing airpower superiority to groundpower like the airpower zealots do.

slapout9: do you have any more info on this "Air Force Marine Corps" concept? I know the RAF has an infantry regiment, but am unsure of their exact function. Maybe these two things are similar?

--Oh, btw, some of us AF guys are already in a ground role. We call them ILOs (in lieu of). It's guys we send for training to run convoys and not all of them are security forces.

slapout9
02-26-2007, 03:11 PM
LawVol, yes I do but a good place to start is with billy mitchell's airpower. It is online at air university, I don't know the link but it should be easy to find. He even talks of non-lethal gas attacks by bombers followed by large para drops to capture cities in tact. I will post more later.

Steve Blair
02-26-2007, 03:16 PM
LawVol, I understand what you're trying to do, and in theory and principle it's a great idea. But I'm also looking at it through the lens of the AF's culture and past experiences with small wars.

Lift is a natural fit for the AF, as is CAS. Both areas have been neglected in favor of objectives more in keeping with the institutional culture (in spite of protests by a number of visionary officers). Likewise, they have avoided advisory duties aside from "setting up host nation air forces."

Part of the challenge with AF participation in the ground effort is finding something within their own history that they can use that will not in turn be stretched into something that it is not. This is aimed more at a leadership that often proclaims that the AF is the only service that understands Joint operations and therefore should have control of them all.

I would love to see Security Forces aiding MPs and other organizations in teaching law enforcement techniques and practices, and even providing a rapid reaction force. They do not have a constabulary heritage like elements of the Army and Marine Corps, but that does not mean that they could not be used in a way here. But they would have to "buy in" to the concept and be willing to learn from those that have gone before in terms of tactics and techniques. It may also require some shifts in their basic organization and training.

TROUFION
02-26-2007, 03:19 PM
Folks,

This discussion has raged on for a while on this thread, but what is the point. This is not a discussion of air vs ground power it is a discussion of AF vs USA/USMC rice bowls.

Should we not be discussing the need for and interoperatbility of air and ground units? Having been a company commander and FSC calling in JDAM from a B52 I see the validity of precision munitions called by 'precision guided' infantry. Why is this discussion not more about the values and means of intigration of the 4 services, the ability to cross talk and to assist each others missions? There will always be overlap and some conflict in rice bowl type issues yet this arguement should focus more on ways to balance the forces.

The 4 services exist, they have assigned missions. The question is what of those missions need to change to face emerging threats? How much airpower and how much ground? What new concepts can be adapted?

A constabulary force is a good idea, but who wants to pay for it, to recruit it and man it? Is it a realistic goal?

If you follow this thread you'd notice reference to the AF having no real recruiting issues, how would that change (and it would) if they suddenly starting selling an infantry force? This is not AF bashing it is a legit question. How many current blue suits would be willing to lateral move into this new job? I know that when the AF was overmanned by nearly 30k a few years back and the offer of lateral moves to the Army was sent out not many took advantage despite large $ bonuses offered. Again this isn't a slam on the AF it is just that people join the AF for different reasons (excluding Patriotism, Pride and Selfless Service which all services share) than they join the Army, Navy and Marines.

All I am saying is that this parochial argument about who should own what space is not productive, not here anyway. That is a political issue more than anything. We should focus on more tangible arguements, once we can discuss how to fight in new and better ways then we should go back and look at what institutions should be altered, ammended etc. This may sound naive to some but if we are truly trying to find better ways of engaging our common enemy we need to focus on combined arms and balanced attacks.

-T

Steve Blair
02-26-2007, 03:39 PM
T: There has been some discussion of what you mention, and I'm sure there will be more to follow. But the question of interoperability often does come down to politics, especially when systems needed for such interoperability do not exist in the needed quantities (airlift springs to mind first here). It's hard to provide mission assist when the assets needed for same do not exist.

I also suspect you will have some difficulty with the emerging threats idea. The U.S. as a whole has never been very good at identifying these. Depending on who you ask you will hear China, Radicalized Islam, Chavez, narco-terrorism...the list goes on. Often the identification of these threats is influenced by politics (either related to budgets or system development).

LawVol
02-26-2007, 03:46 PM
Blair and Troufion are correct when they say that the AF would need to buy it, both at the leadership and individual levels. It would be a tough sell. However, according to an article I read recently, on any given day we have 5000 airmen deployed performing traditionally Army functions. This has hurt our manning as we are still recruiting and retaining personnel.

As for the blue to green program, I don't know what kind of bonuses they are offering now, but when I looked into it they wanted to give me $10k. The AF will give me $40k for four more years. A $30k loss would not play well with my wife.:) But you are right, typically people have different reasons for joining the AF.

TROUFION
02-26-2007, 05:18 PM
I also suspect you will have some difficulty with the emerging threats idea. The U.S. as a whole has never been very good at identifying these. Depending on who you ask you will hear China, Radicalized Islam, Chavez, narco-terrorism...the list goes on. Often the identification of these threats is influenced by politics (either related to budgets or system development).

Absolutely true, the issue of threat is often seen in the eyes of the beholder.

Nice segue: All of these threats require different approaches, each approach has a different human skill, technology and budgetary constraint. Which are interelated-which ones can have dual/multi-purpose tools? Which ones stand alone, with limited interoperability? What constraints do we impose upon ourselves when it comes to utilizing and integrating air and ground forces?

Guderian and Degaulle argued for their favorite platform as did Billy Mitchell. So too the Pete Ellis types for Amphib Ops and the Para-Marines and Commando-Raider crowds. The competition for dollars has always driven the debates. However, the arguments here should not be on who(service) should do what job but what jobs should be done.

-T

Mondor
02-26-2007, 05:43 PM
What ever threat we focus on there are still a few constants that everyone will need and we should fund/organize those first. My short list of critical items consists of:

• Providing a common operational picture for Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and NGO players
• Common or federated data architecture.
• Robust and efficient data search capability
• Coordination / restructuring of current organizations to achieve the proper blend of military and civilian capabilities to meet contingency and current operational needs

slapout9
02-26-2007, 05:55 PM
I got it! We should just draft everybody in the Air Force, Army and Navy and put them in the Marine corps:) They must be laughing at us because how long have they had the concept of a combined Air, Land and Sea Force adapted to what ever situation they currently face.

120mm
02-26-2007, 06:53 PM
Well, provided that the USAF was initially split off from the Army because of Strategic bombing, and strategic bombing is DOA, it makes you wonder why we don't become purple, completely.

Mondor
02-26-2007, 07:22 PM
I got it! We should just draft everybody in the Air Force,Army and Navy and put them in the Marine corps:)

When everyone is special, no one is. :)

TROUFION
02-26-2007, 08:30 PM
Mondor, I see your point and the capabilities you talk about are valid:


What ever threat we focus on there are still a few constants that everyone will need and we should fund/organize those first. My short list of critical items consists of:

• Providing a common operational picture for Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and NGO players
• Common or federated data architecture.
• Robust and efficient data search capability
• Coordination / restructuring of current organizations to achieve the proper blend of military and civilian capabilities to meet contingency and current operational needs

BUT, these are internally (all services and gov't orgs as well as NATO etc) focused C4ISR issues not threat based future strategic-operational issues. They are VERY IMPORTANT so dont take this the wrong way. I see them as the difference between Wermacht tanks having radios and French tanks not, it is a battlefield C2 issue.

The debate of Airpower vs Groundpower is esoteric, like the old debate of manuever vs attrition. In war a bit of both are always necessary, we exclude options at our peril. Slapout had it right somewhat with the MAGTF (Marine Air Ground Task Force) concept, but Marines pride is taken in being expeditionary, forcible entry, assault or shock troops, from the sea. While sustained land combat is a skill set it is not the prefered method of employment (look to USMC deployments 7 mos vs USA deployments 12-15 mos).

The Army on the other hand is designed principly for sustained land combat (whatever form it takes). If the Army and AF designed an AGTF it would have to be viewed in this light. Even a constabulary brigade or division can be an AGTF, it is just the mission-purpose and intent would be the driving force for the troop, technology and vehicle mix.

Semper Fi, --T

Mondor
02-26-2007, 09:56 PM
My position is that if we do not address these internal issues then we will continue to be in a reactive mode to strategic-operational issues. How can we determine the relevance of our actions to a potential future threat if we do not have a good grasp on what we are doing ourselves? I guess the old maxim “know your enemy as you know your self” is the root of the problem. We do not know, communicate and share data amongst, ourselves, so how can we know the enemy? Difficult to win in COIN when you have no idea what you opponent is up to.

The data and organizational argument ties into the air V. ground argument in a direct way. Until we are able to communicate with ourselves and targeted external groups (NGOs, non-NATO forces…) we will not be able to bring the correct tools to bear on a situation as quickly as we should. It is very much a pro tailored task force argument.

Imagine a PRT that has State, US Mil (air and ground), Coalition, Host Nation, and NGO members/partners. Each is able to view a common operational picture and the organization is tasked based, and may even have a (shock, gasp) civilian lead.

After reading this I realize I am probably off topic. I need to compose my thoughts on this in a thesis level of effort paper and not in the Air V. Ground discussion.

Jimbo
02-26-2007, 10:08 PM
Mondor,

I am working the issue you bring up. You can forget the NGO integration on a team. The key to any of this in any role is identifying your core competnecies as an organization, and developing them in people within the organization that enables them to particiapte in a construcitve manner. This means that more is not always better. As far as the USAF goes, I think a lot of us have weighed in with some things that the USAF could do in COIN.

TROUFION
02-26-2007, 11:12 PM
Mondor,

Good point with the PRT angle. Regardless of the systems that do the intergrating the point of creating a multi-purpose task force, tailored to the mission at hand is excellent.

The idea of a task force that integrates air and ground combat units with logistics, multi-national units, government support units (indigenous-local, UN, DOS, DOJ etc) is right on. Liaisons (with cellphones) for NGO's is about all you can expect from most of these. NGO's do not generally want to associate with the gov't forces as it violates their neutrality rules.

slapout9
02-26-2007, 11:38 PM
Mondor, I hear what you are saying about special but have we gone overboard. We have Airborne units,Special forces,Rangers,SEALs,Recon, USMC in general plus Air Force PJ and even the Coast Guard has rescue swimmers. If you get to special I think you end where you talked about nobody is special. Anyway just a thought.

TROFION, relative to a force/organization for COIN why don't we let a COMBINED ARMS team CLEAR, let the MP's HOLD, and let the ENGINEERS build under a USA Military government and when it is stable enough, turn it over to the civilian host nation government with a letter saying we fixed now don't screw it up?

jonSlack
02-27-2007, 01:12 AM
TROFION, relative to a force/organization for COIN why don't we let a COMBINED ARMS team CLEAR, let the MP's HOLD, and let the ENGINEERS build under a USA Military government and when it is stable enough, turn it over to the civilian host nation government with a letter saying we fixed now don't screw it up?

Clear: IA with US MiTTs and Coalition combined arms.

Hold: Combination of IA with MiTTs, IP with MiTTs, and combined arms battalions all sync'd in their shared AO with US Commanders of the combined arms unit serving as the OIC of the AO.

Build: As much as possible should be rebuilt by local Iraqis with any required technical oversight and guidance provided by Engineers (Do US Army Corps of Engineers sourced MiTTs with the Iraqi equivalent of USACE and local civil building code enforcers exist?). However, large infrastructure projects will probably require coalition military Engineer units (Horizontal, vertical, prime power, well drilling...).

RTK
02-27-2007, 01:26 AM
Clear: IA with US MiTTs and Coalition combined arms.

Hold: Combination of IA with MiTTs, IP with MiTTs, and combined arms battalions all sync'd in their shared AO with US Commanders of the combined arms unit serving as the OIC of the AO.

Build: As much as possible should be rebuilt by local Iraqis with any required technical oversight and guidance provided by Engineers (Do US Army Corps of Engineers sourced MiTTs with the Iraqi equivalent of USACE and local civil building code enforcers exist?). However, large infrastructure projects will probably require coalition military Engineer units (Horizontal, vertical, prime power, well drilling...).

Jon hit the nail on the head. Any hopes to foster any progress are nested in the combined efforts that place the ISF to the forefront of any operation. Without the Iraqis this will all fall apart. By placing them at the tip of the spear in all 3 phases not only do they gain experience but they gain the support of the people. My only issue is placing CAB commanders in charge of the AO. There's going to have to be a balance there, especially since the country is sovereign. More like a joint command between CAB commanders and IA/IP commanders.

slapout9
02-27-2007, 02:17 AM
Agree with all, it has to be a combined everything with Iraq for it to stick and for them to believe in themselves and their country.

Mondor
02-27-2007, 02:32 AM
NGO's do not generally want to associate with the gov't forces as it violates their neutrality rules.

I agree with the NGO statement. In the field they do not want to be associated with any military force. Some of them are rabid anti-military and will not associate with military types even at the cost of the lives of the folks they are trying to help. However, folks like MSF would probably like to get information on demographics, roads, and medical data (outbreak points, reports of communicable diseases...), if not directly from us then through a third party such as the IRC or UNHCR. So probably no "embedded" NGO bodies, but a council of interested parties would be feasible. I know something like this worked in the Balkans and in the early days in Afghanistan.

Mondor
02-27-2007, 02:45 AM
Build: As much as possible should be rebuilt by local Iraqis with any required technical oversight and guidance provided by Engineers (Do US Army Corps of Engineers sourced MiTTs with the Iraqi equivalent of USACE and local civil building code enforcers exist?). However, large infrastructure projects will probably require coalition military Engineer units (Horizontal, vertical, prime power, well drilling...).

Wow, sounds an awful lot like the plan of action used in Germany and Japan in from 1945 into the 1950's. The first step of using the recently disarmed military forces to start the reconstruction effort is one that we can not go back in time and initiate. However, there is no reason that a CCC type program, with education, civic lessons, in addition to the work could not work now.

The CCC would not only help clean the place up and put money in the local economy, but could serve as a potential recruiting ground for law enforcement, military, and government agencies.

I would love to see something like this tried on a national level in Afghanistan. I would especially like to target the poppy growing areas. Part of the work could be land reclamation/restoration and less destructive farming techniques.

In either country it would create jobs, establish a positive government presence, and take a large number of unemployed potential bad guy trigger pullers off the street and put them to work. Part of the trouble in Afghanistan seemed to be that the only way these young guys had to impress their friends was to shoot of a magazine of rounds at the coalition forces.

Rifleman
02-27-2007, 04:44 AM
Don't airpower advocates assume that any given situation - counterinsurgency or otherwise - can be solved/resolved by: creating more effective ordinance; finding more effective ways to put said ordinance on target? Isn't that really the gist of the airpower argument?

I don't think you can stop an insurgency or win 4GW that way whether the ordinance is bullets or bombs. Maybe if mass destruction/total annihilation was acceptable, but otherwise no.

120mm
02-27-2007, 07:33 AM
My local AFN radio affiliate informs me that the Air Force has another weapon in the GWOT. "Show of Force". I guess B1s fly over populated areas at night, popping flares at low altitude with 'burners lit. And they publicize this to the press as "aiding the war on terror".

120mm
02-27-2007, 08:39 AM
LAWVOL -

here's a link:

http://lightfighter.net/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/5436084761/m/1791061302/p/1

LawVol
02-27-2007, 03:21 PM
The comments by Rifleman and 120mm are exactly what I'd like to change in the AF. I know I'm preaching to the choir, but I firmly believe that lethal airpower is not the solution to an insurgency. Bombs on target are quite effective at killing bad guys. Unfortunately, no matter how precise, they nearly always kill a civilian or damage some property that is used by the civilian population. Thus, in killing one insurgent, you inevitably create another (or more) so that relying on lethal airpower to defeat an insurgency becomes a sisyphean task.

The "show of force" tactic is completely stupid. You still acheive the negative effect mentioned above, but you don't kill a bad guy. It's equivalent to making Sisyphus' rock heavier each time. We're still caught up the "bomb 'em to the stone age" mentality frm Vietnam. I think some of the younger officer corps realized this, but the leadership either doesn't understand (or doesn't want to understand).

120mm: thanks for the link. I'll check it out.

marct
02-27-2007, 03:32 PM
However, folks like MSF would probably like to get information on demographics, roads, and medical data (outbreak points, reports of communicable diseases...), if not directly from us then through a third party such as the IRC or UNHCR. So probably no "embedded" NGO bodies, but a council of interested parties would be feasible. I know something like this worked in the Balkans and in the early days in Afghanistan.

I was at a talk by the Norwegian Foreign Minister yesterday, and that is the model (a multi-state NGO council) that they are using - a single point source for NGO development aid. He did, however, note that one of the problems that that model has is that they have no security elements embedded in it and no budget for security elements. This is one of he factors that has een making it hard for NGOs to operate in areas like Darfur, and also in many of the UNHCR run refugee camps.

Believe it or not, one of the biggest problems with NGOs is bureaucratic, i.e. they all have their own reporting forms / structures, and so much time and energy is tied up in host countries filling in the forms, they frequently will refuse new aid.

On using UNHCR, I would advise against it. They are overly bureaucratic and, on the whole, dedicated to image presentation and fundraising rather than any actual work on the ground. Their record speaks for them in this sense. For example, consider the refugee camps in Uganda, which are under UNHCR "oversight". Their mandate includes granting a recognition of refugee status that will be accepted internationally for purposes of immigration fast tracking, but they take years to do this processing. In fact, they are so poor at it that the birth rate in the camps exceeds their processing rate.

Marc

Steve Blair
02-27-2007, 04:47 PM
The comments by Rifleman and 120mm are exactly what I'd like to change in the AF. I know I'm preaching to the choir, but I firmly believe that lethal airpower is not the solution to an insurgency. Bombs on target are quite effective at killing bad guys. Unfortunately, no matter how precise, they nearly always kill a civilian or damage some property that is used by the civilian population. Thus, in killing one insurgent, you inevitably create another (or more) so that relying on lethal airpower to defeat an insurgency becomes a sisyphean task.

The "show of force" tactic is completely stupid. You still acheive the negative effect mentioned above, but you don't kill a bad guy. It's equivalent to making Sisyphus' rock heavier each time. We're still caught up the "bomb 'em to the stone age" mentality frm Vietnam. I think some of the younger officer corps realized this, but the leadership either doesn't understand (or doesn't want to understand).

120mm: thanks for the link. I'll check it out.

I think one of the biggest issues with AF leadership (as I've mentioned before) is that the two major contributions (CAS and airlift) that the AF can make NOW to small wars are two things that they do not want to do (for a number of cultural reasons). You're right, LawVol, in the observation that many of the younger officers understand or see this, but they don't have an impact on a leadership that still clings to the old ways.

120mm
02-27-2007, 07:03 PM
If it's any consolation, LawVol, I'm fighting the exact same kind of idiot thinking in the Army. Just on different issues.

tequila
02-27-2007, 07:46 PM
120mm - The B1 thing sounds lifted from the standard Israeli tactic (http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1607450,00.html)in Lebanon and Gaza.

Loggie
03-11-2007, 05:57 AM
I got it! We should just draft everybody in the Air Force, Army and Navy and put them in the Marine corps:) They must be laughing at us because how long have they had the concept of a combined Air, Land and Sea Force adapted to what ever situation they currently face.

When I came to the AF as a newly minted 2d Lt some years back, I was still imbued with 13 years of Marine Corps time behind me. The Air Expeditionary Force concept was just coming online and I made the mistake of observing to my CO (a Major just graduated from the Air Command and Staff College, who in actuality turned out to be a great American) that the AEF looked a whole lot like a MEU, but without the robust organic support structure and rifles. The lecture which followed took me through a textbook litany of the virtues of the AEF and how this (as yet unproven) concept was far superior to the MEU/MEF concept of operations. Fast forward 8 years and the AEF is still teetering on maturity, albeit more effective by a magnitude of 10 than it was then--and 'surprise'; I think they may have picked up some expeditionary operating concepts from the Marine Corps in the intervening years.

What I learned from that short conversation with my new CO was that parochialism was strong in the AF, and that the "not invented here" syndrome was alive and well. It's not an AF unique issue--it's the same in any service, as well as in the joint world (did you know that "joint" is actually spelled "Army"?)

The ILO taskings LawVol referred to have Navy and AF enlisted and officers filling traditional big Army functions (MiTT, convoy, security, etc) AF Lieutenants/Captains were filling Army Company CO positions in Army Trans Bns (until the AF brought them back into the AF fold...); Airmen were manning .50 cals in the back of up-armored security vehicles (and by the way, they were the ones welding the armor to the trucks on days when they didn't have runs scheduled) There are success stories out there that anyone (Doggie, Jarhead, Squid, or Flyboy) would be proud to brag about over a beer (or warm Coke, depending on your locale)

What I see happening at the O-3 to O-5 level (pilots excluded) is that we're starting to gain an understanding of how to operate in a joint environment to achieve common objectives. (Holy Buckets!!!! that sounds like the road to interoperability!) I think,we'll see General officers 20 years from now who'll be significantly less parochial than some serving today.

As far as pilots go, well, I just don't know what to say. The AC-130 and MC-130 pilots I know are great guys (and gals), the airlift pilots can't be paid enough based on what they're actually worth, and the fighter pilots believe they've been anointed by the almighty. Personally I think we should bring back Warrant Officer aviators...but that's another post.

Bill Moore
03-11-2007, 04:13 PM
Yes, I concur that bringing back Warrant Officers will solve all of the Air Force's woes, and ensure we have pilots with large enough gonads to provide real CAS. :-)

John T. Fishel
03-11-2007, 04:41 PM
This post tells a success story.

When I arrived in SOUTHCOM in 1986, staff officers at Army South refused to acknowledge that the Joint HQ had any authority over them and what they were doing - as one told me directly when I attempted (probably in a much too officious manner) to hold him to SOUTHCOM policies.

In 1992, when I began teaching Joint Ops at Leavenworth, my students were, at best, sceptical. Joint, really, was spelled Army in their minds. Five and a half years later, when I moved on to NDU, my Army students at Leavenworth (along with my Navy, Marine, and Air Force students) understood what Jointness was all about. Mostly, this was because they had lived it and had internalized the changes produced by Goldwater-Nichols. I would add that this included the fighter jocks as well as the heavy army fighters. Even the Navy guys were willing to accept that a CINC would have OPCON of a CBG!

We had come a long way in a decade. My sense is that despite some occasional arrogance and stupidity we have come even further since. Now, if we could just really learn the lessons of Small Wars that have been identified for so long.....

Mondor
03-12-2007, 02:21 AM
It seems to me that the folks in the field, or combatant commands, all subscribe to the practice of joint operations and joint commands. After all, it all about accomplishing the mission.

The folks hanging out in MACOMS and Service level organizations are much more likely to have a bit of difficulty grasping the concept. Their world view, i.e. their performance appraisals, a less directly linked to immediate tactical and operational success and more to budget concerns. Not any less committed, just a slightly different perspective that can make them view joint as a dirty, or at least slightly scary word.

120mm
03-12-2007, 08:34 AM
I'm pretty much a "task-oriented" guy, so I don't mind the "concept" of "jointness". However, my experience in OIF I made it seems like "Joint", at least in terms of CJTF-7 meant "people a long ways away who have no connection or stake at what was going on in theater interfering with ops while building their own empires." The only thing that I "saw" CJTF do, was to intercept stuff I'd ordered for V Corps, and confiscating 1/3d of it for themselves, or confiscating anything they thought was "neat." They were kind of like an organized crime gang, in spiffy uniforms and with a dessert bar at their mess hall.

My favorite quote of the war was "The 'L' in CJTF-7 stands for Leadership."

I remain a "joint" skeptic, unless you want to talk about direct coordination issues. I've been "joint" for a while now and seldom had difficulty doing direct coordination.

Van
03-14-2007, 02:49 PM
Two points with which to stir the pot-

1) AF in COIN works for appropriate tasks and targets. Rolling Thunder I failed and Rolling Thunder II suceeded for the same reason; air power works against the right targets. In RT I, there were no rational, feasible infrastructure targets to engage from the air. In RT II, the war had started moving into semi-conventional operations and the infrastructure could be hit from the air in such a way as to cause significant, relevant effects.

2) GEN Jumper (USAF, RET) said that the future of the AF lies in Space Ops, Comm, and ISR. Space Ops is an essential enabler for Comm, and Intel collection, and without our edge in comm and intel, ground forces would be paying a much higher toll than we already are.

The problem: As important as the AF role in COIN is, it doesn't produce the OPR bullets that pilots want, and it doesn't sing the praises of the radiant sungods of the Fighter community. COIN is by it's very nature a ground operation involving a lot of shaking hands, walking around, and using single rifle rounds to shape the outcome (all at ground level, +/- a few meters). The Army couldn't do it today without the AF, but this is not the way the AF wants to hear it worded.

jonSlack
05-30-2007, 08:35 PM
The Hill - Senate language could take away Army’s control of JCA (http://thehill.com/business--lobby/senate-language-could--take-away-armys-control-of-jca-2007-05-30.html)


Questioning whether the Army and Air Force should share the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) program, Senate defense authorizers are directing the Pentagon to assign responsibility to the Air Force for all fixed-wing airlift functions and missions.

The language included in the Senate Armed Services Committee’s version of the 2008 defense authorization bill highlights the debate over the two services’ roles and missions that has been building in Congress and at the Pentagon since Kenneth Krieg, the acquisition czar, directed the two services to enter a joint program for a smaller cargo airplane.

The JCA program, which was intended to replace the beaten-up C-23 Sherpa and C-12 Huron aircraft, has had a rocky start, with a fair amount of behind-the-scenes controversy.

Senate authorizers are directing the secretary of defense, acting through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to make the Air Force responsible for fixed-wing support for the Army’s logistics on the battlefield.

The language accompanies a shift of $157 million from the Army’s budget request for the JCA to the Air Force’s budget line in the Senate’s version of the 2008 defense authorization bill.

johca
06-09-2008, 12:14 AM
I provide the following insights from a fellow member of another discussion group to which I subscribe. The author is Edward M. Van Court, MAJ, MI, USAR


The Air Force does not understand the Officer/NCO relationship. AF doctrine is written/approved by fighter pilots and fighter pilots seldom work closely with NCOs before they are promoted to field grades. The idea of a LT going to an E-7 or a CPT going to an E-8 for advice or as a sounding board for ideas is utterly alien to them. In the Army, we pretty much take it for granted that we, as officers, will have an experienced NCO working closely with us throughout our career. There are exceptional individuals in the AF who break this mold, but they are just that, the exception and very rarely from the fighter or bomber communities.Although written for a different purpose, Air Rescue Its Blurred Identity. Past, present and future (http://www.alaska.net/%7Ejcassidy/pdf_files/Air%20Rescue_blurred%20Identity.pdf) The attached link has some discussion of the officer/NCO disconnect in the Air Force. It also explores very slightly a little bit on the military purpose of using the NCO as a small team tactical leader.

Ken White
06-09-2008, 01:09 AM
in the USAF... :D

Cliff
06-09-2008, 01:43 PM
Although written for a different purpose, Air Rescue Its Blurred Identity. Past, present and future (http://www.alaska.net/%7Ejcassidy/pdf_files/Air%20Rescue_blurred%20Identity.pdf) The attached link has some discussion of the officer/NCO disconnect in the Air Force. It also explores very slightly a little bit on the military purpose of using the NCO as a small team tactical leader.

The stuff on the PJs is interesting! I have a few friends who are CROs, it has been interesting to see the dynamic between them. OBTW, the helo community is interesting in and of itself because especially in the Guard/Reserves, there are a ton of former Army WOs flying as officers. Different dynamic.

The quote from your friend in the Army ignores a fundamental reality. In every service except the AF, the majority of the warfighters are enlisted, and the technical experts are enlisted. In the Combat AF (mobility AF is a slightly different story), this ratio is reversed. It would be inappropriate for a fighter dude to go to his Maintenance NCOIC or Life Support NCO and ask him how to employ vs. a High Off-Boresight Helmet Mounted Sight threat.... so he probably won't, that part is correct.

However, the maintenance, life support, and ops support experts in the CAF are enlisted folks.... and trust me, we go to them every day for advice and help. OBTW, in my experience, the lack of enlisted folks makes the pilot MORE likely to listen to the experienced NCOs, not less... he just won't neccessarily ask them about the things a young Capt/LT in the Army might.

Finally, let me just say that there are a few folks flying fighters who give the community it's reputation... but trust me, everyone knows who they are... they oftentimes tend to always have the jet that breaks, or doesn't quite work right... the folks who take care of their enlisted troops and listen to the NCOs tend to fly their butts off. Karma....

V/R,

Cliff

JHR
06-09-2008, 07:06 PM
Anybody know anythong about the history and demise of the USMC's "Flying Sgts."?

Ken White
06-09-2008, 07:45 PM
(not the AAF). Arnold insisted on college and commissions to attract the 'best and brightest.' So the USAAF went that route and thus so did the USAF when it was formed in 1947. They sort of drug the Navy and Marines along with them and those services phased out the enlisted pilots in the pipeline in 1948. Those that were serving were allowed to continue flying but no replacements were trained. IIRC, the last one flying was a Marine, C-130 rated and he retired in 1973 or 74.

When the Army expanded it's aviation inventory in the late 50s, they wanted to use Enlisted Pilots but the USAF had a fit and the Army compromised with Warrant aviators.

Curiously, the Navy is about to invent that wheel and make some candidates WOs and send 'em to flight school.

Enlisted pilots, pro and con have been argued on this board before; you can Google it.

Cavguy
06-09-2008, 07:50 PM
(not the AAF). Arnold insisted on college and commissions to attract the 'best and brightest.' So the USAAF went that route and thus so did the USAF when it was formed in 1947. They sort of drug the Navy and Marines along with them and those services phased out the enlisted pilots in the pipeline in 1948. Those that were serving were allowed to continue flying but no replacements were trained. IIRC, the last one flying was a Marine, C-130 rated and he retired in 1973 or 74.

When the Army expanded it's aviation inventory in the late 50s, they wanted to use Enlisted Pilots but the USAF had a fit and the Army compromised with Warrant aviators.

Curiously, the Navy is about to invent that wheel and make some candidates WOs and send 'em to flight school.

Enlisted pilots, pro and con have been argued on this board before; you can Google it.

IIRC, Chuck Yeager, AVN hero, was a "Flying Sergeant" before they did away with the program and gave him a commission. Then they tasked him to fly the X-1 because he would do it for a AF salary, vice the high priced test pilots. And he was one of the only ones dumb enough to do it!

:D

Ken White
06-09-2008, 08:06 PM
IIRC, Chuck Yeager, AVN hero, was a "Flying Sergeant" before they did away with the program and gave him a commission.[True, he finished flight training about the time they made 'em Flight Officers, Warrants, on the way to a commission.
Then they tasked him to fly the X-1 because he would do it for a AF salary, vice the high priced test pilots. And he was one of the only ones dumb enough to do it! :DDumb enough? Perhaps. Smart enough to get to BG though. That beats a whole bunch of average bears... ;)

And you should remember from your teenage years that the mantra in his, your and my part of the US is "Watch this s..." Who dares, wins. Dumb, maybe but it's a way of life... :cool:

Cavguy
06-10-2008, 02:22 AM
True, he finished flight training about the time they made 'em Flight Officers, Warrants, on the way to a commission.Dumb enough? Perhaps. Smart enough to get to BG though. That beats a whole bunch of average bears... ;)

And you should remember from your teenage years that the mantra in his, your and my part of the US is "Watch this s..." Who dares, wins. Dumb, maybe but it's a way of life... :cool:

His Autobiography remains one of my favorite reads. I never fail to laugh at all of his "West Virginia Good Ol Boy" vs. the USAF stories, and his self-depreciating sense of humor (except for his flying skills).

I also contend that most valor medals in the Army are for successfully doing dumb (but often necessary) things. Dumb isn't always bad ....

I still characterize my stint at Airborne school as one of the dumbest things I ever did - I can hear the howls from the ABN community already....

Ken White
06-10-2008, 02:33 AM
...I still characterize my stint at Airborne school as one of the dumbest things I ever did - I can hear the howls from the ABN community already....On this, don't bet on it -- you may end up commanding one of those A-bone BCT Cav Sqns... ;)

A guy who was a former 1SG of C Trp in one of them would've appreciated your presence.

BTW, thanks for the AKO feed. Much appreciated

Tom Odom
06-10-2008, 11:52 AM
I still characterize my stint at Airborne school as one of the dumbest things I ever did - I can hear the howls from the ABN community already....

And then you went Cav....

There is a trend there, yes there is...:wry:

Cavguy
06-10-2008, 12:12 PM
And then you went Cav....

There is a trend there, yes there is...:wry:

Hey!

I resemble that remark .....

And I went to IZ ... twice ...

Van
06-10-2008, 12:22 PM
Chuck Yeager ... Smart enough to get to BG though.

Check the rest of the story. COL Yeager was being a fighter jock, drinking with LTs and CPTs and generally setting a bad example for his subordinates. He was a hero so he couldn't be busted out or passed over for it. So the AF promoted him.

Ahhh... The legacy of the WW II AAF, where a screwed up pilot was still a valuable commodity and would probably die on the next mission anyways. Under those circumstances it was cost effective to avoid formal procedings, but the attitudes carried over into peacetime and became part of the culture.

Now Hap Arnold and Billy Mitchell were products of the interwar Infantry mafia dictating that anything with an engine had to be focused on its relation to the dismounts... Sorry, the foot-soldiers, the centerpiece of the military. Arnold and Mitchell were buddies with Patton during the period when he was working on the emerging armor and armor doctrine. That led to him 'checking out' and focusing on his social life and sports while commanding a cav sqdn at Ft. Myers.

Yes, the AF has issues, but never forget that most of them trace back to Army practices during WWII and the interwar period.

slapout9
06-10-2008, 12:22 PM
I still characterize my stint at Airborne school as one of the dumbest things I ever did - I can hear the howls from the ABN community already....

Man that is just low rent:wry:

Tom Odom
06-10-2008, 12:38 PM
Check the rest of the story. COL Yeager was being a fighter jock, drinking with LTs and CPTs and generally setting a bad example for his subordinates. He was a hero so he couldn't be busted out or passed over for it. So the AF promoted him.

In all fairness, it has not been that long since drinking with the guys was not only acceptable. it was required. That did not change until the early 80s.

I can tell you that a Prop Blast at Fort Bragg or a Friday afternoon happy hour on the Yadkin Road O Club annex was a different world.

Tom

wm
06-10-2008, 01:17 PM
In all fairness, it has not been that long since drinking with the guys was not only acceptable. it was required. That did not change until the early 80s.

I can tell you that a Prop Blast at Fort Bragg or a Friday afternoon happy hour on the Yadkin Road O Club annex was a different world.

Tom

OTOH, I can remember being in the O Club in Germany circa 1978-79 and having the Community ADCO (Alcohol and Drug Control Officer) come into the bar at 9:00 PM on a Friday evening and write down the names of everyone still sitting there for a later reporting to the MILCOM commander.

Tom Odom
06-10-2008, 01:46 PM
OTOH, I can remember being in the O Club in Germany circa 1978-79 and having the Community ADCO (Alcohol and Drug Control Officer) come into the bar at 9:00 PM on a Friday evening and write down the names of everyone still sitting there for a later reporting to the MILCOM commander.

that was a leg unit :D

Ken White
06-10-2008, 03:04 PM
Check the rest of the story. COL Yeager was being a fighter jock, drinking with LTs and CPTs and generally setting a bad example for his subordinates. He was a hero so he couldn't be busted out or passed over for it. So the AF promoted him.The fact that he did a good job didn't hurt. As for the drinking with LTs and CPTs -- we can philosophically strongly disagree on that.
Ahhh... The legacy of the WW II AAF, where a screwed up pilot was still a valuable commodity and would probably die on the next mission anyways...

Yes, the AF has issues, but never forget that most of them trace back to Army practices during WWII and the interwar period.And we can disagree on that. Most of the current AF foibles trace to post 1947, indeed, most to post Viet Nam -- they forgot much of what they learned in WW II.;

Ken White
06-10-2008, 03:06 PM
that was a leg unit :D

:D:D:D

Steve Blair
06-10-2008, 03:59 PM
Most of the current AF foibles trace to post 1947, indeed, most to post Viet Nam -- they forgot much of what they learned in WW II.;

Gotta second you on this one, Ken. Plus much of the learning they did during WW II was subjective...based primarily on reinforcing the doctrine of strategic bombardment. Stalin's command historians would be proud...:wry:

wm
06-10-2008, 04:23 PM
that was a leg unit :D
And damn proud of it too. If it weren't for us legs, the parachute-borne would have nothing to compare themselves to :D

wm
06-10-2008, 04:40 PM
Gotta second you on this one, Ken. Plus much of the learning they did during WW II was subjective...based primarily on reinforcing the doctrine of strategic bombardment. Stalin's command historians would be proud...:wry:


Not to disagree, but if the AF issues of today are based on the doctrine of strategic bombing, then why are most of the senior AF leaders fighter jocks?

Seems to me that the real issues started back about 1914. They were significantly enhanced in 1917 by the fact that AEF pilots were trained in combat tactics by the French. BTW, I think I would extend my thesis to the entire US military--we learned a lot of bad habits from our training by the French in WWI and have never really unlearned them. But, that is fodder for a lot of different threads I suspect.

Steve Blair
06-10-2008, 04:50 PM
Not to disagree, but if the AF issues of today are based on the doctrine of strategic bombing, then why are most of the senior AF leaders fighter jocks?

Seems to me that the real issues started back about 1914. They were significantly enhanced in 1917 by the fact that AEF pilots were trained in combat tactics by the French. BTW, I think I would extend my thesis to the entire US military--we learned a lot of bad habits from our training by the French in WWI and have never really unlearned them. But, that is fodder for a lot of different threads I suspect.

I didn't say they were based on strategic bombardment...I said that at the end of World War 2 the AF was mainly interested in reinforcing that doctrine. The flip from bomber generals to fighter generals took place in the aftermath of Vietnam...say the mid 1970s or so. That had more to do with the revitalization of TAC during the war than any real conscious change.

Most of our quick training habits actually predate the French and 1914...some have argued that we're still suffering from Root's Industrial-age personnel reforms in the early 1900s. The fact is that the US military has only just recently (as in within the last 50 years or so) started stressing training in a major way. Prior to that the assumption was that training (if there was any) would take place at the assigned unit, not in a centralized location. Odd...but that's how it worked in practice.

wm
06-10-2008, 05:15 PM
Most of our quick training habits actually predate the French and 1914 PM sent so as not to hijack the thread.

johca
06-10-2008, 05:53 PM
Not to disagree, but if the AF issues of today are based on the doctrine of strategic bombing, then why are most of the senior AF leaders fighter jocks?There is top AF leadership change in motion.

Air Force's top leaders are fired (http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-na-airforce6-2008jun06,0,4548639.story?page=1)


Shades of Blue: (http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Pages/default.aspx)

..Gates has recommended Michael Donley and Gen. Norton Schwartz to replace Wynne and Moseley, General Norton Schwartz has a C-130 tactical airlift and special opertions C-130 rated pilot and command and staff of special operations background.

Regarding other post WWII Air Force missions.

There is one in the public domain event in history that is the basis for the novel (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ice_Station_Zebra_(novel)) and movie (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ice_Station_Zebra_(film)) Ice Station Zebra. Now you know one of the reasons why ARRS C-130s were configured with the Fulton Recovery System (http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=1239). ;)

Reference--To catch a falling star- satellite recovery operations: Film recovery (http://www.nasm.si.edu/exhibitions/gal114/spacerace/sec400/sec432.htm)

Spy sat Down (http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1063/1)

CORONA capsule catcher reminisces (http://sci.tech-archive.net/Archive/sci.space.history/2005-08/msg01277.html)

Van
06-10-2008, 06:16 PM
I think we are confusing doctrine and culture. Most of my comments have been about the culture of the Air Force, not the doctrine. The Air Force makes an interesting case study, as I have never personally observed, or even heard of an organization whose culture has been so far divorced from its stated doctrine. To add to the fun, there is a huge generational gap between the Cold Warrior senior leadership and the GWOT up-and-coming folks.

The culture of the Air Force was forged in the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell AFB between WWI and WWII, the lessons of WWII, and tempered by SAC through the 1950s and 60s.

The doctrine of the Air Force has been an unending game of catch-up with technological change, and driven by competition for congressional support. Just as the slickest fighter on the planet comes on line (and yes, the F-22 is a very capable weapons system, especially in the air superiority role), most folks are acknowledging that it and the F-35 will probably be the last manned fighters. The Air Force leaderships' rebuttals to the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency manual reflect the competition piece of their doctrine.

The intersection of culture and doctrine produces statements like Airpower's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen. (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/meil.html). I'm not gonna get drawn into the argument over the assertion. But if I were to look an AF general in the eye and say "Ground power's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by soldiers", I'd get blown through the door. Any discussion of how ground forces command, logistics, operational art, and tactics has been changed by modern communications and weapons systems would be ignored for the apparent arrogance of the assertion.

Re: the Cold Warrior vs COIN Warrior generation gap; I've seen it personally. The young folk 'get' Joint. Mostly, (there are exceptions, but they are not vocal enough) the older guys don't get Joint. You've got a generation of Captains getting promoted who have never served during peacetime. Northern Watch was certainly combat operations, but just too few of the Air Force were directly involved to really effect the culture. What was important, what got you promoted, and what merited confidence and respect prior to 9/11 is not the same as for the post-9/11 crowd. This isn't just the Air Force, but the gap does appear more pronounced in the AF than in the Army.
I'll go out on a limb and say that the AF future looks pretty bright because of their young warfighters. It's just going to be a little painful getting there.

Ski
06-10-2008, 09:09 PM
Unless they continue to slash force structure in order to pay for more expensive operating and procurement costs. Down 40K by 2012 IIRC - to 340K or so overall IIRC.

Norfolk
06-10-2008, 10:45 PM
johca wrote:



There is top AF leadership change in motion.

Air Force's top leaders are fired (http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-na-airforce6-2008jun06,0,4548639.story?page=1)

General Norton Schwartz has a C-130 tactical airlift and special opertions C-130 rated pilot and command and staff of special operations background.


Does this mean that there is a chance that the AF will be able to ditch the Airline uniforms and go back to real Air Force Blues?;)


Ski wrote:



Unless they continue to slash force structure in order to pay for more expensive operating and procurement costs. Down 40K by 2012 IIRC - to 340K or so overall IIRC.


And with a total planned buy of only some 180 or so F-22s (and maybe 1,200 F-35s for both the attack role and air defence role), it makes you wonder how long even the AF can continue to rationalize such a small Top-Tier Air Superiority force, given the self-cannabilization that necessarily goes with it.

Entropy
06-11-2008, 12:07 AM
The doctrine of the Air Force has been an unending game of catch-up with technological change, and driven by competition for congressional support. Just as the slickest fighter on the planet comes on line (and yes, the F-22 is a very capable weapons system, especially in the air superiority role), most folks are acknowledging that it and the F-35 will probably be the last manned fighters. The Air Force leaderships' rebuttals to the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency manual reflect the competition piece of their doctrine.

If the follow-on to the F-22/F-35 begins development in 30 years, maybe. I personally think we'll see unmanned tanks before we see unmanned aircraft personally. There are significant technical challenges in unmanned fighters - a UAV in a permissive environment is one thing, multiple aircraft in a complex, high-speed 3 dimensional air-to-air battle is quite another.


The intersection of culture and doctrine produces statements like Airpower's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen. (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/meil.html). I'm not gonna get drawn into the argument over the assertion. But if I were to look an AF general in the eye and say "Ground power's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by soldiers", I'd get blown through the door.

I doubt very much you'd get blown through the door. Do you really think the Air Force believes land forces should be commanded by anyone but an Army or Marine Commander? I think to most in the AF the statement that "Ground power's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by soldiers" is perfectly reasonable and so obvious that it needs no elucidation.


Any discussion of how ground forces command, logistics, operational art, and tactics has been changed by modern communications and weapons systems would be ignored for the apparent arrogance of the assertion.

On the contrary. The AF is a technology-based service. It understands the advantages of technology perfectly well and has adopted a lot of technology the ground force uses like BFT and COP.


Re: the Cold Warrior vs COIN Warrior generation gap; I've seen it personally. The young folk 'get' Joint. Mostly, (there are exceptions, but they are not vocal enough) the older guys don't get Joint. You've got a generation of Captains getting promoted who have never served during peacetime. Northern Watch was certainly combat operations, but just too few of the Air Force were directly involved to really effect the culture. What was important, what got you promoted, and what merited confidence and respect prior to 9/11 is not the same as for the post-9/11 crowd. This isn't just the Air Force, but the gap does appear more pronounced in the AF than in the Army.

I disagree that the gap is more pronounced in the AF. I'm not sure how many AF personnel served in OSW and ONW doing limited combat ops, but I'm sure it was more than the Army. Those rotations were the impetus for the Air Force move to an expeditionary deployment model similar to the Navy/Marine corps.

I was in the Navy in the 1990's and I remember many in the AF b!tching loudly about "grueling" three month rotations - all the while I was doing 6 month rotations about every 18 months. Us Navy guys got a laugh out of that. Sometime in the late 1990's the AF finally got over that garrison mentality and is now a fully expeditionary force.

Entropy
06-11-2008, 12:36 AM
Although written for a different purpose, Air Rescue Its Blurred Identity. Past, present and future (http://www.alaska.net/%7Ejcassidy/pdf_files/Air%20Rescue_blurred%20Identity.pdf) The attached link has some discussion of the officer/NCO disconnect in the Air Force. It also explores very slightly a little bit on the military purpose of using the NCO as a small team tactical leader.

An interesting paper for me as one just leaving the rescue community after five years. I agree about the limitations of the HH-60G, having deployed with them to Afghanistan. I'd be interested in your take on which airframe you prefer for the next PRV. FWIW, most in my former unit prefer the 101 to both the 47 and 92.

I'm not sure I agree with some of your conclusions though. For instance, I'm not sure what airframes PJ's should employ from beyond the ones they currently do. Also, while there is stress on the HH-60 fleet, we do have enough aircraft to perform CSAR for the CFACC in both theaters as well as ILO Medevac for the land component in both theaters (and it's important to note the CFACC birds do medevac too, but only when the land component, for whatever reason, isn't able to accomplish the mission).

Certainly the aircraft are wearing out much faster than anticipated which only heightens the need for a replacement, which is the AF's #2 acquisition priority behind tankers.

johca
06-11-2008, 09:05 AM
I'd be interested in your take on which airframe you prefer for the next PRVWell, I’m not a fan of the V-22 or the HH-60. I’ve got mission aircrew hours on UH-1, H-3, H-53, C-47 and H-60 helicopters. I was awarded an air medal flying a mission on an Army CH-47 and although I have concerns when it's described as a medium lift helicopter and that perhaps its too large, it is very acceptable and suitable in my opinion to replace the HH-60. On the other hand I don’t believe the other two helicopters got fair consideration, so I’m in the wait and see mode.

The PJs should be able to employ from tactical airlift C-130s. I have mission time to include RSOLL and SOLL I/II missions flying HC-130s, tactical airlift C-130s and C-141s. My opinion is driven in regards to helicopters by the lack of numbers in the inventory and pertinent to the HC-130 in that a flying gas stations primary purpose to air refuel helicopters out weighs risking the limited numbers and high cost of replacing a tanker used to insert a PJ team in a combat threat area. The tactical C-130 or other types of smaller fixed wings make better sense from a risk management and any cost of replacement assessment. Rapid manuever of fuel laden HC-130 tanker puts a lot of stress on wings and other airframe stress points. The numbers in the fleet are such that loss significantly impairs air refueling capability. Putting one at risk to employ a PJ team by parachute into a combat threat location is silly in my opinion.

Prior to 1989 Air Rescue units were called upon to do many special missions. One such mission becoming more openly disclosed in the public internet domain--but not in the paper I wrote and posted--is a event in history that is the basis for the novel (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ice_Station_Zebra_(novel)) and movie (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ice_Station_Zebra_(film)) Ice Station Zebra. Now you know one of the reasons why ARRS C-130s were configured with the Fulton Recovery System (http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=1239). ;) BTW--the gain of HH-53 in-air-fuelable helicopters in the inventory is what took the Fulton system out of being a first choice recovery method. Also the organizational name change from Air Rescue Service to Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service. ;)

Reference--To catch a falling star- satellite recovery operations: Film recovery (http://www.nasm.si.edu/exhibitions/gal114/spacerace/sec400/sec432.htm)

Spy sat Down (http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1063/1)

CORONA capsule catcher reminisces (http://sci.tech-archive.net/Archive/sci.space.history/2005-08/msg01277.html)

Here is part of the USAF Pararescue enlisted speciality classification description from the 2008 AFECD.

PARARESCUE
(Changed 1 Jul 06)

1. Specialty Summary. Performs, plans, leads, supervises, instructs, and evaluates pararescue activities. Performs as the essential surface, air link in Personnel Recovery (PR) and materiel recovery by functioning as the rescue and recovery specialist on flying status as mission crew or as surface elements. Provides rapid response capability and operates in the six geographic disciplines: mountain, desert, arctic, urban, jungle and water, day or night, to include friendly, denied, hostile, or sensitive areas. Provides assistance in and performs survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE). Provides emergency trauma and field medical care, and security. Moves recovered personnel and materiel to safety or friendly control when recovery by aircraft is not possible. Related DoD Occupational Subgroup: 105000.

Van
06-11-2008, 12:48 PM
I think to most in the AF the statement that "Ground power's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by soldiers" is perfectly reasonable and so obvious that it needs no elucidation.

Entropy, I'm not buying it. I do not believe that the AF folks who populate ACC and the AOCs would tolerate the arrogant tone of the statement, and I tried it out on an AF officer last night, and was dismissed out of hand. After ten minutes of discussion, it was allowed that perhaps the ground fight, especially in urban environments is as complex as the aerospace fight. And it was the arrogance of the tone of the assertion rather than the content that was the issue.

And where is the line? More than half of the time, airpower will eventually end up under a non-pilot at some echelon. So all air combat operations should be controlled by ACC at Langley AFB, or can the AF live with the soldier commanding MNC-I controlling a slice of air power?

I understand the need for a central ATO, I understand but loathe the reasons behind the limits on the timeliness and flexibility of the ATO process, but this all goes back to underlying issues of culture versus doctrine (and I am well aware of many of the flaws in Army culture and doctrine - most seem to go back to the inherent [and somewhat justifiable] conservatism of ground troops).

Steve Blair
06-11-2008, 01:01 PM
I was in the Navy in the 1990's and I remember many in the AF b!tching loudly about "grueling" three month rotations - all the while I was doing 6 month rotations about every 18 months. Us Navy guys got a laugh out of that. Sometime in the late 1990's the AF finally got over that garrison mentality and is now a fully expeditionary force.

Actually, from what I've seen, the 'expeditionary' element of the AF is still pretty much the same high demand, low density units that have always been hit hard by these things (A-10s, AWACS, certain support segments, and transport aircraft). Sure there's been a great deal of talk about the AEF concept, but it still doesn't work right. And they still bitch about 6 month deployments like it's something they never expected to do. Having worked around the Army, it's a thing about the AF that I still haven't re-adjusted to. I guess, to borrow one of Jill's lines from another thread, I haven't drunk the Kool-Aid yet.

The biggest issue I've seen with the AF culture is that to make it past a certain point you really need to swill down the Kool-Aid and say things like "airpower can win a counterinsurgency on its own." Even though I'm tired of having to say it, I'll say it again: there is some amazing thinking and questioning going on at the lower and middle ranks of the AF. But it seems that if you want to make it to (and past) O-6 you have to drink that air supremacy Kool-Aid. I'm hopeful that will change as the combat and joint experience of the AF becomes broader, but even one of their own (who most likely has been banished to Thule by now) came out and said in a letter to editor in Air Force Magazine that the AF wasn't doing near enough to prepare its general officers for higher command positions because they weren't doing enough joint assignments (it's in the June 08 issue...by a colonel at Maxwell in response to an article here (http://www.afa.org/magazine/march2008/0308command.asp) that claimed there was a shadowy conspiracy to keep AF generals out of senior positions...don't have an online link at this time). In the same issue, of course, there's an editorial slamming SecDef Gates....:wry:

Tom Odom
06-11-2008, 01:10 PM
It will be interesting to see how things pan out with the change at the top. My friend the SOF MC-130 jock told me at Leavenworth when we were students how the AF was divided. He is now a 2 star; who knows how high he will go now...

Tom

johca
06-11-2008, 03:50 PM
. But it seems that if you want to make it to (and past) O-6 you have to drink that air supremacy Kool-Aid. I'm hopeful that will change as the combat and joint experience of the AF becomes broader, but even one of their own (who most likely has been banished to Thule by now) came out and said in a letter to editor in Air Force Magazine that the AF wasn't doing near enough to prepare its general officers for higher command positions because they weren't doing enough joint assignments (it's in the June 08 issue...by a colonel at Maxwell in response to an article here (http://www.afa.org/magazine/march2008/0308command.asp) that claimed there was a shadowy conspiracy to keep AF generals out of senior positions...don't have an online link at this time). In the same issue, of course, there's an editorial slamming SecDef Gates....:wry:All the military departments have the problem of commissioned officers jockeying for promotion to the above O-6 grades by gaining political advantage and popularity rather than through extraordinary leading and competent supervising and management. Promotion to these grades has become too much a game of self aggrandizing and conforming to what got the current generals and admirals promoted. The problem is such has in the Air Force at least become the disease of enlisted promotions where EPRs, awards and decorations have become dependant on external off or out of doing primary military duties of getting higher education and participating in community volunteerism. It has become believed wanting to pursue and enlisted career and obtaining NCO authority and status is for those who can’t become a commissioned officer.

However, back to inability of or lack of top combatant command positions being filled by Air Force Generals. In this regard I do I have to give Retired General McPeak some credit although he was not well thought of while he was in charge. McPeak at least recognized being a rated officer and specifically a single seat fighter pilot divorced the commissioned leaders from actually having to provide immediate management, supervision and leading to any group of followers or workers. His initiative to get pilots more involved in other duties other than being in the cockpit never truly got any understanding or support within the AF commission ranks and grades.

Beginning in 1986 the wave of future promotion opportunity was realized to be doing joint operations type duties, but doing Joint Duties became get into a position to fill the square and back out for improving self-promotion potential rather than developing experience and understanding of all ground, air, and water strategies and tactics. The problem with the Air Force is the fighter pilot warrior is a lone knight or the lone gunman who gets very little being in command of leading tactical elements. Their specialty is flying and in most cases that’s all they had interest in until they got promoted out of the cockpit. No matter how you cut, slice, and deice, the Air Force does a poor job of providing its commissioned officer of being more than on-paper leaders, especially now that the transformation to the Expeditionary wing pushed Wing command up above the O-6 pay grade.

The Air Force commissioned duty position is a paradox as it has become focused on control of technology that is limited to doing flight and being the supposed moral oversight preventing misuse of weapon systems rather than leading troops into battle. The resulting dilemma is the Air Force officer lacks the leading tools and strategies to conduct asymmetric battle which requires boots on the ground to seek out, find, and engage low technology ground fighters that maintain very little hard target infrastructure to bomb and interdict.

In my opinion the Amateur Combat Command has become to focused on subordinating, manipulating, and influencing what combatant command do with its air component and has lost focus on its obligation to be ready and prepared to fight.

ACC has become focused on gaining and sustaining influence of Forces command and manipulating organizational transformation within the Air Force so that it controls all air component command positions in the combatant commands by functionally aligning every thing into deployable expeditionary wings sitting on ACC bases as an ACC administratively controlled AEF until its deployed to fight. Its called organizational incest and it strengthens promotion opportunity for those who blindly conform and seldom offer a dissenting opinion. The Air Force needs to wake up to fulfilling it military obligations as a independent military department, or it needs to assimilated back into the Department of the Army. :eek:

johca
06-11-2008, 07:44 PM
A part of the Airpower Versus Groundpower debate also includes conducting special operations. Although not written for arguing air power pertinent to what special operations missions air power can contribute to, Distinctive Beret Uniform History of the U.S Armed Forces (http://www.alaska.net/%7Ejcassidy/pdf_files/U.S.%20Armed%20Forces%20Beret%20History.pdf) gives indication Air Force had developed some unique capability, but then sort of didn’t know what it had once it put such capability in-place to be used.

Here’s some information about function fitness, Functional Fitness as it Pertains to Obtaining and Sustaining Pararescue Qualification (http://www.alaska.net/%7Ejcassidy/pdf_files/Functional%20Fitness.pdf).

slapout9
06-12-2008, 12:15 AM
The co-author of this article Major Gregg Brown was at the SMART Wars SMART Strategies workshop I went to last year. He told me he was going to write this and it has finally been published. He is an aid to General David Deptula of EBO fame. He had some interesting ideas about what the Air Force should become and how they could better serve the Joint Community. Also had some good ideas about the Army he likes tanks. So flame away about his article.



http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/sum08/deptula.html

johca
06-12-2008, 06:11 AM
Tanks have terrain limitations and UAVs have telemetry limitations caused by weather, terrain, solar activity, bandwidth, and potential jamming issues. The more UAVs operating in a confined area the more difficulty there is pertinent to sustaining separation and preventing midair in the heat of maneuvering to avoid a threat. There still remains the logistics of refueling, rearming and repairing/maintaining. Certainly great for asymmetric warfare against a low tech enemy or battle against a low density in number threat. My confidence diminishes when considering employing UAV capability toe-to-toe in a conventional fight against a nation having significant emerging technology capability such as China. Also Rusia may be less of a imminent threat, but who can predict the future with any certainty?

I never am comfortable with eggs all in one basket. The article reminds me a lot of persuasion and convincing I was reading during the late 1980s and early 1990s when it was being considered to do away with the A-10 because F-16s and other advanced new technology fighters were considered equal if not superior to the A-10 in participating in and contributing to providing effective close air support. Perhaps my lack of confidence results in not knowing what current technology is capable of, but technology has to be paid for and kept up with new developments to counter new attack threat to or defense from the UAV capability. Telemetry depends on EMF and disrupting EMF and analog sensors (no such thing as a digital sensor) is cheap and easy to do. (Digital imaging depends on anlog devices doing the measurement and the digital communication still requires wave form and frequency to carry it).

Cliff
06-17-2008, 10:14 AM
The intersection of culture and doctrine produces statements like Airpower's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen. (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/meil.html). I'm not gonna get drawn into the argument over the assertion. But if I were to look an AF general in the eye and say "Ground power's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by soldiers", I'd get blown through the door. Any discussion of how ground forces command, logistics, operational art, and tactics has been changed by modern communications and weapons systems would be ignored for the apparent arrogance of the assertion.


Hmm. Isn't it Joint Doctrine to have a COCOM, who is in charge of a CFLCC, CFACC, and CFMCC? I don't think that you'd get much arguement about the ground forces being centrally controlled... it kind of makes sense - that whole Unity of Command thing...



Re: the Cold Warrior vs COIN Warrior generation gap; I've seen it personally. The young folk 'get' Joint. Mostly, (there are exceptions, but they are not vocal enough) the older guys don't get Joint. You've got a generation of Captains getting promoted who have never served during peacetime. Northern Watch was certainly combat operations, but just too few of the Air Force were directly involved to really effect the culture. What was important, what got you promoted, and what merited confidence and respect prior to 9/11 is not the same as for the post-9/11 crowd. This isn't just the Air Force, but the gap does appear more pronounced in the AF than in the Army.


I completely disagree with the ONW/OSW having few of the AF... the whole reason the Air Expeditionary Force structure was invented was to share the load... the entire Combat Air Forces went to combat with our USMC and USN brothers and sisters every 12-18 months. We got shot at, shot back, and our young folks learned what combat is like. Was it super-high intensity? No. But there's a certain something to having flown over someone else's country, having them shooting at you, and having to protect your own folks. The problem with the AF now is that we are almost LESS involved... or at least, different folks are involved. Intel, ALOs, TACPs, Spec Ops are more involved now or involved at similar levels. The CAF forces are less involved....

On jointness, the USAF has been working with the USN and USMC's forces for a long time now - ONW/OSW was a major driver behind that, since we fought daily with our fellow aviators. The result has been the services specializing... the Navy has left air superiority, tanking, and most of the SEAD mission to the USAF, with EA left to the Navy and everyone doing strike/CAS. We are now to a point where the services can't go to war without each other, and we all know it. Trust me, at the warfighter level, we work joint ops every day even in training.



I'll go out on a limb and say that the AF future looks pretty bright because of their young warfighters. It's just going to be a little painful getting there.

I agree. Most of the comments on the AF folks make on this forum are so far from the reality of what our young folks are doing, it is crazy... If you honestly think that the culture of the AF is determined solely by the top few folks, then maybe you can say there's a cultural problem. If you think the culture is the traditions/moral fiber/ways of doing things held by the majority, then I think the USAF is better off than folks say.

Steve Blair
06-17-2008, 01:06 PM
I agree. Most of the comments on the AF folks make on this forum are so far from the reality of what our young folks are doing, it is crazy... If you honestly think that the culture of the AF is determined solely by the top few folks, then maybe you can say there's a cultural problem. If you think the culture is the traditions/moral fiber/ways of doing things held by the majority, then I think the USAF is better off than folks say.

I think you need to understand that it's that senior leadership that is doing the talking for the AF. That's what people see and read. They don't hear from your young warfighters...they hear folks like Dunlap saying that airpower can win a COIN scenario on its own. Cultural perception is often controlled by those at the top.

The other thing that makes me cynical about this is that we've seen it happen before. A whole generation of AF officers came out of Vietnam intent on changing things...and for the most part they were either co-opted with the existing power structure or eased out. I honestly do hope that it's different this time around.

But I also feel that this is one of those issues that we'll have to agree to disagree on....:)

Cliff
06-17-2008, 02:07 PM
However, back to inability of or lack of top combatant command positions being filled by Air Force Generals. In this regard I do I have to give Retired General McPeak some credit although he was not well thought of while he was in charge. McPeak at least recognized being a rated officer and specifically a single seat fighter pilot divorced the commissioned leaders from actually having to provide immediate management, supervision and leading to any group of followers or workers. His initiative to get pilots more involved in other duties other than being in the cockpit never truly got any understanding or support within the AF commission ranks and grades.


This is part of why Gen Mosely was re-aligning maintenance under operations - give folks a chance to lead more than just other pilots.



The Air Force commissioned duty position is a paradox as it has become focused on control of technology that is limited to doing flight and being the supposed moral oversight preventing misuse of weapon systems rather than leading troops into battle. The resulting dilemma is the Air Force officer lacks the leading tools and strategies to conduct asymmetric battle which requires boots on the ground to seek out, find, and engage low technology ground fighters that maintain very little hard target infrastructure to bomb and interdict.


I don't think we really should expect AF officers to lead boots on the ground against an insurgency... maybe train the host nation AF, or support the Army or USMC, but leading troops on the ground? They do need to lead from the air, since you can't ask anyone to do something you can't do yourself...



In my opinion the Amateur Combat Command has become to focused on subordinating, manipulating, and influencing what combatant command do with its air component and has lost focus on its obligation to be ready and prepared to fight.

ACC has become focused on gaining and sustaining influence of Forces command and manipulating organizational transformation within the Air Force so that it controls all air component command positions in the combatant commands by functionally aligning every thing into deployable expeditionary wings sitting on ACC bases as an ACC administratively controlled AEF until its deployed to fight. Its called organizational incest and it strengthens promotion opportunity for those who blindly conform and seldom offer a dissenting opinion. The Air Force needs to wake up to fulfilling it military obligations as a independent military department, or it needs to assimilated back into the Department of the Army. :eek:

Johca, not sure where you're getting this. The re-alignment under ACC is due to the fact that the DoD and Congress have mandated pulling back to the US (ACC is the MAJCOM for CONUS bases) from Europe and the Pacific... hence ACC had no choice in this or input.

Also, when forces are deployed to an AOR, even if they are part of an AEF, they no longer fall under ACC but instead OPCON is chopped to the appropriate COCOM and ADCON is chopped to the appropriate AF Component Commander... so ACC is out of the loop - just as it was in ONW/OSW, OAF, OEF, and OIF.... just like TAC was largely ignored in Desert Storm.

The consolidation under ACC is a fact of life... there's not much we can do about it given manpower and budget limitations along with the forced pullback to CONUS that BRAC and its ilk resulted in...

SWJED
06-28-2008, 11:50 AM
USAF Counterinsurgency Issues and Trends (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/06/usaf-counterinsurgency-issues/)


With a hat tip to Daniel Troy of the Consortium for Complex Operations - United Press International recently ran a three part series titled Emerging Threats: USAF Counterinsurgency authored by Shaun Watterman....

Access to all three parts plus an analysis piece are at the SWJ link.

slapout9
07-05-2008, 02:26 PM
An alternative Air Force view on Dunlap's critique of the new Army/USMC COIN manual. Go to the link below and scroll down to the section called-IN My Humble Opinion-then look for Short Changing The Joint Fight-An Alternative View by LTC. Buck Eaton USAF.


http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aunews/

Ken White
07-05-2008, 03:07 PM
Dunlap revisited, more like. While he offers a slightly different approach, the message is essentially the same.

Not that I totally disagree with what either he or Dunlap have to say; just that I think in both cases they unfortunately come across as a little whiney and "Hey, you left us out..."

Tom Odom
07-05-2008, 03:35 PM
Dunlap revisited, more like. While he offers a slightly different approach, the message is essentially the same.

Not that I totally disagree with what either he or Dunlap have to say; just that I think in both cases they unfortunately come across as a little whiney and "Hey, you left us out..."

Agreed. I am not convinced Buck like Dunlap ever read 3-24. He read passages and filled in with what he wanted it to say. More Hap Arnold airmindedness mess.

Tom

Entropy
07-05-2008, 04:58 PM
Anyone know when JP 3-24 is due? It will be interesting to see how the joint vision of COIN ends up.

Cavguy
07-05-2008, 08:44 PM
Anyone know when JP 3-24 is due? It will be interesting to see how the joint vision of COIN ends up.

Early next year if the timeline holds up. The lead author is at Leavenworth and works near us.

No drafts for passing around yet. I do know the USAF is participating fully.

Darksaga
07-10-2008, 09:51 PM
You know, it is nice to have the capabilities that the Air Force offers however when you get down to brass tacks you have to have boots on the ground to accomplish the mission effectively.

selil
07-10-2008, 10:13 PM
In one of the LIC books commissioned by the USAF in the late 80s early 90s I read recently it said something to the effect "It is as imperative to mission success that the Air Force have infantry as the Army have Air Power" I about fell out of my chair.

C4ISR Journal this month has some pretty good articles on detecting stealthy air craft using ultra-violet and other out of visible spectrum light techniques. Cheap, inexpensive, useable for targeting (as anybody who knows anything about missiles will tell you), light is a big handicap for stealth. High power lasers of course are the answer for AAA and SAMs. But, then who needs stealth. Somebody smarter than me likely has figured that out.

Rex Brynen
07-18-2008, 01:59 PM
Terrorism Funds May Let Brass Fly in Style (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/17/AR2008071703161.html?hpid=topnews)
Luxury Pods for Air Force Debated

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, July 18, 2008; Page A01


The Air Force's top leadership sought for three years to spend counterterrorism funds on "comfort capsules" to be installed on military planes that ferry senior officers and civilian leaders around the world, with at least four top generals involved in design details such as the color of the capsules' carpet and leather chairs, according to internal e-mails and budget documents.

Tom Odom
07-18-2008, 02:29 PM
A military officer familiar with the program, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak about it, likewise said that its extravagance has provoked widespread contempt among lower-ranking Air Force personnel. "This whole program is an embarrassment," the officer said, particularly because transport seating for troops en route to the battlefield is in his view generally shoddy.

Now there is an airman/leader disconnect.

selil
07-18-2008, 02:37 PM
And, here I was all impressed that at the cyber space symposia I saw generals riding on the bus to get to lunch or the hotel.

slapout9
07-18-2008, 02:50 PM
Link below has a picture of the thing,capsule,lounge chair,whatever you want to call it. Notice the drink holder to:eek:

http://blog.wired.com/defense/

Rex Brynen
07-18-2008, 03:01 PM
Link below has a picture of the thing,capsule,lounge chair,whatever you want to call it. Notice the drink holder to:eek:

http://blog.wired.com/defense/

No, that's a United Airlines first class passenger seat.. the actual capsule is shown on the WaPo article.

In any event, I'm sure the Air Force wouldn't have cup-holders. It would have Personal Liquid Replenishment Mounts (Anti-Spill), and they would cost about as much as Steve's new motorcycle.

Entropy
07-18-2008, 03:05 PM
Link below has a picture of the thing,capsule,lounge chair,whatever you want to call it. Notice the drink holder to:eek:

http://blog.wired.com/defense/

That's an image of a United Airlines first-class seat for international travel, not the SLICC.

Still, yet another dumb AF move.

slapout9
07-18-2008, 03:12 PM
I couldn't get the article to come at first for some reason but I see what you mean now.

Entropy
07-18-2008, 03:22 PM
And actually, the picture in the article is not the SLICC, but the SLIP, which I gather is not enclosed and is smaller (only one pallet position).

Rex Brynen
07-18-2008, 03:25 PM
And actually, the picture in the article is not the SLICC, but the SLIP, which I gather is not enclosed and is smaller (only one pallet position).

There are two pictures in the WaPo piece (it is a slide show)--one of each, I presume.

Its a good thing we're not all in IMINT... :D

wm
07-18-2008, 03:34 PM
They really are getting more cost conscious in the Air Force. ;)

At least they are buying multi-pallet-sized loads to slide into more than one existing aircraft rather than buying several aircraft customized as flying VIP hotels--
But, that's like my wife saying she saved us money buying the 4 pairs of shoes she didn't need at 40% off at DSW. :confused:

Entropy
07-18-2008, 08:19 PM
Danger room has updated it's post on the subject (http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/07/air-force-leade.html):


UPDATE: An Air Force spokesman sent DANGER ROOM a lengthy story today refuting details in the Washington Post's story. Here's the gist of the Air Force argument.


Reference “SLICC” specifically…good pun that it is, these travel systems actually reflect less than the industry standard for executive travel accommodations, but are of such a quality that a theater commander, a cabinet secretary, or a US Congressman can work, rest, and hold meetings (to include secure communications capability) in an environment that also appropriately represents the responsibilities, authority and requirements of senior U.S. government representatives. The SLICC is not a “comfort” capsule—it is a conference capsule, named such because it provides an environment in which senior leaders can hold private conversations, accomplish work of both timely and sensitive nature, conduct meetings with staff, and rest while the aircraft is en-route.

Actually, it's not the Air Force's response that makes me think this story is overblown (and in at least one case inaccurate), but the documents the story is based on. I've gone through the documents, posted on POGO website, and I must admit, it's weak soup. I strongly encourage everyone to check out the documents for themselves. Most of the e-mails revolve around routine fixes to things that don't work, like seatbelts that are too short, etc. As for one issue -- that the brown be swapped for blue -- the reason, according to the e-mail, was to match the interior of the rest of the plane, not to match the Air Force's color (gray was another option provided).

Norfolk
07-18-2008, 10:20 PM
You know, being a Grunt was probably a mistake after all. Instead of living like an animal, hurting and exhausted, half-starved, seriously sleep-deprived, and way out in the boons, I could have joined the Air Force and eaten like a king, slept between clean sheets, and been able to head off the the pub anytime I liked during off-hours.

Guess I wasn't smart enough to be Air Force.:wry:

Rex Brynen
07-18-2008, 11:59 PM
You know, being a Grunt was probably a mistake after all. Instead of living like an animal, hurting and exhausted, half-starved, seriously sleep-deprived, and way out in the boons, I could have joined the Air Force and eaten like a king, slept between clean sheets, and been able to head off the the pub anytime I liked during off-hours.

I remember being on exercise one typically damp BC evening, sitting in my nice warm radio truck (amply supplied with hot chocolate and "relocated" vanilla pudding cups), hearing all the net traffic from the grunts trying to sleep in the rain--and thinking much the same thing, Norfolk ;)

Norfolk
07-19-2008, 11:52 AM
I remember being on exercise one typically damp BC evening, sitting in my nice warm radio truck (amply supplied with hot chocolate and "relocated" vanilla pudding cups), hearing all the net traffic from the grunts trying to sleep in the rain--and thinking much the same thing, Norfolk ;)

I loathe you Sigs types.:mad:;)

Umar Al-Mokhtār
07-19-2008, 01:37 PM
it's all warm and comfy inside, especially when the HEAT round comes in! :D

Tom Odom
08-12-2008, 06:07 PM
And quoted from the Georgia South Ossetia Thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=54291#post54291)

For Entropy



Quote:
Unchallenged air power was Russia's trump card (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/47618.html)

By Tom Lasseter | McClatchy Newspapers

TIRDZNISI, Georgia — The Russian fighter jet screamed low to the earth and peeled off so quickly that the bomb wasn't visible until it hit the ground. The explosion shook everything and sent a shower of debris flying over the head of a young Georgian soldier.

The soldier, lying against an embankment on the side of the road, shouted in a panicked voice for everyone to stay still. His palms were flat on the dirt in front of him. "It's Russian MiGs," the soldier said, his eyes wide.

For three days, Russian jets and bombers have unleashed a massive aerial campaign against Georgian forces that, more than anything, dramatically changed the war's direction.

Until Russian jets showed up, Georgian tanks and infantry looked to be on their way to defeating rebel forces in Tskhinvali, the capital of the breakaway province of South Ossetia.

Van
08-12-2008, 08:33 PM
(N)o one should be surprised if we see this cited in the future as an example of the "Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power", especially "Whoever controls the air. generally controls the surface" and "Air power is primarily offiensive".

(From "Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3124)")

Upon reflection, this conflict may become a seminal case study for students of air power. Usually, I'm in the peanut gallery, but by the vagaries of fate have been thrust into this discussion, and am still trying to figure out how this happened.

For example, Geogia found out that airframes on the ground are as useful as altitude above you...

I'd really like to dig into the Georgian air defense system that has apparently had a small measure of success.

Stan
08-13-2008, 09:06 AM
From RIA Novosti's Opinion and Analysis covering the Russian press

Russian army needs overhauling (http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080812/115990123.html)



"Only the Su-24 is capable of flying at night, the rest of our aircraft are totally blind in the dark," said Alexander Khramchikhin, an analyst at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis. "Unmanned aerial vehicles remain our unfulfilled dream."

Experts say the crash of a Russian Tu-22 bomber in the conflict area was due to a Russian technical deficiency. The bomber is designed to deliver nuclear strikes from great heights, and its bombs are allowed to stray by as much as 1.5 kilometers :wry: . To make conventional bombs effective in these conditions, the plane must either be equipped with high-precision weapons, which Russia lacks, or descend and risk exposure to anti-aircraft fire.

Tom Odom
08-13-2008, 12:22 PM
From RIA Novosti's Opinion and Analysis covering the Russian press

Russian army needs overhauling


Experts say the crash of a Russian Tu-22 bomber in the conflict area was due to a Russian technical deficiency. The bomber is designed to deliver nuclear strikes from great heights, and its bombs are allowed to stray by as much as 1.5 kilometers . To make conventional bombs effective in these conditions, the plane must either be equipped with high-precision weapons, which Russia lacks, or descend and risk exposure to anti-aircraft fire.
(http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080812/115990123.html)

Interesting. The Libyan TU22 that bombed Omdurman while I was there in 84 wallowed in at 500 feet using the Nile as a beacon to drop 4x 1000 pounders. As this occurred on a Friday, the staff college was out and so were the Sudanese Air Defenders--whose electrical powered 100mm guns were out of action due to fuel and generator problems. So 24 years later this platform is still flying under a similar performance envelope.

Best

Tom

William F. Owen
08-13-2008, 01:44 PM
Interesting. The Libyan TU22 that bombed Omdurman while I was there in 84 wallowed in at 500 feet using the Nile as a beacon to drop 4x 1000 pounders. As this occurred on a Friday, the staff college was out and so were the Sudanese Air Defenders--whose electrical powered 100mm guns were out of action due to fuel and generator problems. So 24 years later this platform is still flying under a similar performance envelope.

Best

Tom

Different Tu-22, I think. The Tu-22 used by the Libyans, (also used to bomb Kampala) were "Blinders". I think the one lost in Georgia was a Tu-22M or "Backfire"

Tom Odom
08-13-2008, 02:33 PM
Different Tu-22, I think. The Tu-22 used by the Libyans, (also used to bomb Kampala) were "Blinders". I think the one lost in Georgia was a Tu-22M or "Backfire"

Correct but based off same airframe, one with swept wings (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tu-22)(Tu22) and one with swing wings (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tupolev_Tu-22M)(Tu22M). That was the reason the Tu22 in Omdurman wallowed so at 500 feet flying slow. Interesting that even with swept wings a Blinder seems to have a high altitude high speed or a low altitude slow speed profile (at least in interpreting the news report).
Tom

Entropy
08-13-2008, 11:27 PM
Thanks Tom,

I just popped in as I'm in the middle of a cross-country move and finally am at a campground with WIFI access. I've missed the Olympics and this whole Georgia-SO-Russia thing completely. I may be able to make a more informed comment about the air aspect once I get settled in my new place in a week or so.

William F. Owen
08-14-2008, 06:40 AM
Has anyone got any good or reliable breakdown on the Georgian Forces?

Stan
08-14-2008, 05:55 PM
Retired brass condemn Russia's early ending of hostilities against Georgia

RIA Novosti, Opinion and Analysis (http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080814/116046487.html)


General of the Army Anatoly Kornukov, ...lists miscalculations and troops' inadequate training for hostilities. In his view, "the crew of the Tu-22 that was shot down over Georgia were sent to their death," because no timely steps were taken to identify Georgia's aid defenses.

General of the Army Makhmut Gareyev ...believes that "the short-lived act of Georgian aggression has brought to light all the painful defects in the training and battle management of our troops, as well as in decision-making in a military period."

The former deputy chief of the General Staff believes that in the opening hours of the conflict the Russian political leadership was over-hesitant and the generals should have taken the initiative in their hands:

"When guns, in this case Georgian multiple rockets, scream and roar, it is truly bad form to wait for instructions from higher-ups: it is necessary to strike immediately at enemy bases and firing positions.

It is the ABC of warfare."

AmericanPride
08-22-2008, 08:10 AM
I'm not certain there is a legitimate, on-going debate regarding military power. What I mean by legitimate is a debate regarding the principles of war and politics. There's certainly deep divisions on culture and tactics, but those are relevant only to specific cases. So we get arguments about which expression of power is more effective in which particular circumstances. Since all conflict is inherently political, we can find or create situations in which any combination of military power would be most effective. Selective case studies can write any branch, capability, or component into irrelevance.

What I'm more interested in is how (or if) airpower alters the relationship between the political object and military power. Is On War on AF reading lists?

Here's my reading of Clausewitz: War is political. The political object defines the nature of the conflict. Victory becomes the immediate goal and replaces the political objective. Victory is achieved by subduing the enemy's will or destroying his capabilities. Most wars are limited because the political object is limited. I think it's absurd to suggest, therefore, that any form of power is "decisive" if it is not ultimately capable of subduing the will of the enemy or destroying his capabilities. And the way to do that is to deny the enemy space. Land. People don't live in the sky or in the ocean -- they're just ways to get to other people's land. Blow up a man's house from the air and he'll build another house. But take away his land upon which his house is built, and he'll be homeless.

William F. Owen
08-22-2008, 08:28 AM
I'm not certain there is a legitimate, on-going debate regarding military power. What I mean by legitimate is a debate regarding the principles of war and politics. There's certainly deep divisions on culture and tactics, but those are relevant only to specific cases. So we get arguments about which expression of power is more effective in which particular circumstances. Since all conflict is inherently political, we can find or create situations in which any combination of military power would be most effective. Selective case studies can write any branch, capability, or component into irrelevance.

What I'm more interested in is how (or if) airpower alters the relationship between the political object and military power. Is On War on AF reading lists?


Whoah! - This is like the Rosetta stone of the entire point! Excellent point to bring up and excellent question.

IMO, there is clear blue water between politics and the military. Yes, all war is political, but military means can only be applied to military problems or security problems. The concept of "military influence" is verging on the absurd, if taken too far. Military force can only legitimately be used against military or armed forces.

If the problem is not a military one, then military force is a logically less than effective instrument.

Military force is about breaking will. It is the imposition conditions that the enemy resists. It is not useful to frame that idea in the concepts of "sending messages" or "influencing people."

The real problem with the air power weenies is there enduring quest to show that air power is an effective political or coercion/influence tool. We all know it is an historically indecisive military tool, and getting more and more limited in it's applicability.

AmericanPride
08-23-2008, 05:50 AM
Military force is about breaking will. It is the imposition conditions that the enemy resists. It is not useful to frame that idea in the concepts of "sending messages" or "influencing people."

"Never do a light injury to your enemy." - Machiavelli

I suspect Machiavelli would be in agreement with your statements, and he wrote those words some 500 years ago. I think to test the claim of decisive airpower, it'd have to be done counter-factually in order to isolate it as a variable. What if the US did not commit soldiers and marines to the Global War on Terrorism?

Entropy
08-28-2008, 02:58 PM
American Pride,

Count me with you as one who is skeptical whenever someone makes a claim that a particular piece of the warfighting pie is or was "decisive." This goes equally to the air power and ground power mafias. It's my belief that the "whole is greater than the sum of the parts" when it comes warfighting and even the most "decisive" single capability has dependencies without which it wouldn't be "decisive." In reality, the way one organizes and employs various capabilities what is truly decisive. For example, it wasn't the tank or airplane that made the German military in WWII so effective, it was how those capabilities were organized and employed. So I agree with most of your excellent comment, especially this part:


I think it's absurd to suggest, therefore, that any form of power is "decisive" if it is not ultimately capable of subduing the will of the enemy or destroying his capabilities.

The second part, however, requires significant caveats IMO:


And the way to do that is to deny the enemy space. Land. People don't live in the sky or in the ocean -- they're just ways to get to other people's land. Blow up a man's house from the air and he'll build another house. But take away his land upon which his house is built, and he'll be homeless.

I might agree that taking an enemy's land is probably the ultimate coercive tool besides killing but it is not always necessary nor desirable nor possible to do that. And it's not possible to do that in the vast majority of cases without air power (and naval power too). It seems to me that the most strenuous ground power advocates go too far in suggesting that taking land is not just the ultimate way, but the ONLY way.

As for "On War," yes, it is required reading in Air Force circles.

WILF,


The real problem with the air power weenies is there enduring quest to show that air power is an effective political or coercion/influence tool.

I might suggest that military power in general is not a particularly good coercion/influence tool regardless of what limited sphere of "power" it comes from - at least before military operations commence.


We all know it is an historically indecisive military tool, and getting more and more limited in it's applicability.

Historically indecisive except when it isn't - the Battle of Britain and Midway being the most obvious examples.

More limited in its applicability? Please explain that - in what areas is air power no longer applicable where it previously was? When did air power "peak" in terms of applicability? I think, if anything, air power is more applicable today than ever before, especially in the realm of conventional conflict.


American Pride,


I think to test the claim of decisive airpower, it'd have to be done counter-factually in order to isolate it as a variable. What if the US did not commit soldiers and marines to the Global War on Terrorism?

One can ask a related, but opposing question: What if the US did not commit air power at all? For instance, how would we be doing with no aircraft of any type in Afghanistan?

So again, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. The ground power and air power weenies (to use WILF's term) would have you believe the other is merely incidental which is not the case at all IMO.

Entropy
08-28-2008, 03:11 PM
BTW, the Rand monograph linked in Tom's opening post to this thread was revised and updated. Here's the new link to Learning Large Lessons, The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG405-1.pdf)

Ken White
08-28-2008, 03:34 PM
Count me with you as one who is skeptical whenever someone makes a claim that a particular piece of the warfighting pie is or was "decisive." This goes equally to the air power and ground power mafias. It's my belief that the "whole is greater than the sum of the parts" when it comes warfighting and even the most "decisive" single capability has dependencies without which it wouldn't be "decisive." In reality, the way one organizes and employs various capabilities what is truly decisive. For example, it wasn't the tank or airplane that made the German military in WWII so effective, it was how those capabilities were organized and employed.We can agree on that. ;)
I might suggest that military power in general is not a particularly good coercion/influence tool regardless of what limited sphere of "power" it comes from - at least before military operations commence.However, I disagree on this. It can be an excellent coercive tool, even without actual application if the strength and, far more importantly, the previously demonstrated will to use it if necessary is present.

It's on the latter aspect that military power too often fails as a coercive instrument. I could make a strong case for the fact that virtually every US war occurred because an opponent thought the US was too lazy, introspective or hedonistic to respond to a provocation. Contemporarily, I'd go even further in pointing out that our current military operations are the result of four Presidents from both parties over a period of over 30 years -- and since 1979 in particular -- failing to show some will and responding not at all or very halfheartedly.
Historically indecisive except when it isn't - the Battle of Britain and Midway being the most obvious examples.Probably not the best examples to bolster your case. Both are battles 'won,' not the greater war in which they occurred. Both were responsible for short circuiting attempts that probably would not have truly been able to impose a strategic victory by the opponent, thus they aided in speeding the Allied victory but neither was in and of itself a truly decisive event -- which takes nothing away from the bravery and effort of the participants. Nor does it deny that both were pivotal battles.
One can ask a related, but opposing question: What if the US did not commit air power at all? For instance, how would we be doing with no aircraft of any type in Afghanistan?Interesting question. How are the opponents doing with no aircraft of any type in Afghanistan?
So again, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. The ground power and air power weenies (to use WILF's term) would have you believe the other is merely incidental which is not the case at all IMO.On that we can agree. Both are necessary, both contribute however, particularly in conventional conflict, it still boils down to the three exhausted and grubby Grunts left out of that nine man squad occupying ground. ;)

reed11b
08-28-2008, 04:42 PM
in conventional conflict, it still boils down to the three exhausted and grubby Grunts left out of that nine man squad occupying ground.
Ken is dead on again. Regardless of how much of a "force multiplier" air power is, it requires well trained and equiped soldiers, especially marine and army infantry, in decent numbers to make long term changes. Sometimes I wonder if a single "defense force" concept would not be better then the sepperate branches, though I know that is not the best answer either.
Reed

AmericanPride
08-28-2008, 06:10 PM
It's my belief that the "whole is greater than the sum of the parts" when it comes warfighting and even the most "decisive" single capability has dependencies without which it wouldn't be "decisive." In reality, the way one organizes and employs various capabilities what is truly decisive.

Agreed.


I might agree that taking an enemy's land is probably the ultimate coercive tool besides killing but it is not always necessary nor desirable nor possible to do that. And it's not possible to do that in the vast majority of cases without air power (and naval power too). It seems to me that the most strenuous ground power advocates go too far in suggesting that taking land is not just the ultimate way, but the ONLY way.

I would say that certainly depends upon how the political object defines the conflict, which then returns us to the original problem of the debate in which any scenario can be imagined by which we can justify or condemn any aspect of military power. But the relationship between land and military power is such that any belligerent, regardless of his own intent, cannot wage war without effectively occupying some kind of space of his own from which to operate. Even while airpower and sea power are necessary in particular circumstances, this is only in consideration in how that power relates to the occupation of land or in other circumstances, how that relates to the desired political end-state. I will not claim that the occupation of land is the only way because as I stated earlier, wars depend upon the political object sought, and therefore, as you stated, it is not always necessary or desirable to occupy the enemy's land to defeat him. Nevertheless, I think we should be careful not to confuse ends and means, because the occupation of land is simply the means to disarming the enemy (which is the means to annexing his land :D); and I think as war moves to its extremes it is revealed that the occupation of land is what places the enemy in a position of the most disadvantage therefore more likely to accept the terms of our demands. I assert that airpower is a secondary capability (which is relative term as I do not mean to imply ineffectiveness) on the basis that it cannot deny space to the enemy and therefore force him to disarmament.

William F. Owen
08-28-2008, 06:33 PM
I might suggest that military power in general is not a particularly good coercion/influence tool regardless of what limited sphere of "power" it comes from - at least before military operations commence.

Yes, all military power is limited unless it's actually used.


Historically indecisive except when it isn't - the Battle of Britain and Midway being the most obvious examples.

There has never been any solid evidence that a destruction of the RAF was a required condition for the invasion of Birtain. They did however need to destroy the British Fleet, and this was something the Luftwaffe felt unable to do guarantee.

Midway was platform wacking. Something air power is good at.


More limited in its applicability? Please explain that - in what areas is air power no longer applicable where it previously was? When did air power "peak" in terms of applicability? I think, if anything, air power is more applicable today than ever before, especially in the realm of conventional conflict.

In simple terms fighters exist to shoot other fighters, aircraft and bombers down. If the enemy lacks that which you can legitimately use airpower against, then I submit it is of limited applicability. The ability to successfully employ the air environment is and always will be useful, but that is not always dependant of "air power" or air forces.


The ground power and air power weenies (to use WILF's term) would have you believe the other is merely incidental which is not the case at all IMO.

While the use of the word "weenies" may seem unnecessarily disparaging, I see Land and Sea power theorists as being fairly confident as to their worth, and knowledgeable of thier limits. I have yet to see this from the air power theorists, who seem to constantly over state their case and effectiveness.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
08-29-2008, 01:49 AM
from today's USA Today:

http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2008/08/losing-hearts-a.html

While I don't consider USA Today to be a paragon of military analysis there are some key observations made:

"Killing innocents with bombs is, of course, a disastrously ineffective way to compete with the Taliban for the hearts and minds of beleaguered Afghan civilians, which makes it infuriating that U.S. forces continue to make such mistakes." (first part true, second part a bit over emotional)

"The Taliban, like other brutal guerrilla forces, deliberately puts civilians at risk to provoke just such disasters, which it tries to capitalize on no matter how they occur or how many civilians die." (while this may seem like stating the obvious I think some in the US military don't get the point)

"An unnamed U.S. official quoted in The Washington Post said Taliban forces have figured out how to plant false intelligence and lure Americans into making airstrikes that kill civilians." (that's a pretty smart tactic, if true)

"It's all one more reminder that if the war in Afghanistan is to be won — no lock in any circumstances — that it won't be won from the air but with troops on the ground."

Sometimes I feel that airpower enthusiasts ignore the truth in the second and third quote. While I agree that airpower is a terrific force multiplier if I were the TB or AQ I would always make sure my leadership get togethers were under the guise of some other large gathering. That way should a nice PGM arrive at the meeting there would be plenty of dead women and kids lying around for propaganda purposes. Hey, but that's just me... :D

ODB
08-29-2008, 02:18 AM
I was one of the lucky ones who got to clean up the pieces after a pilot claimed self defense and dropped a 500 pounder on the Canadians conducting training at Tarnak Farms. He called it in numerous times and was told not to drop it. His self defense claim was because of the tracers from their M240 machine guns. See if I remember right, tracer burnout is 900 meters. Kind of short range in comparison to 10,000 feet. This was the incident that brought about the Amphetamine use claim. I fully understand making bad decisions but this is an example of how different things look from 10,000 feet and the way they look from the ground.

Entropy
08-29-2008, 07:07 AM
However, I disagree on this. It can be an excellent coercive tool, even without actual application if the strength and, far more importantly, the previously demonstrated will to use it if necessary is present.

My sense of history is that the benefits reaped from successful coercion gained primarily through the threat of military force are transitory and at some point down the road will result in war on less favorable terms. There are many historical examples where one side will accommodate the other in response to a threat only to buy time - in fact I think that's the most common response to military coercion which is why I don't consider it a very good coercive tool.

However, I think it can be useful when combined with other forms of coercion and influence - IOW as part of an overall strategy that uses all appropriate forms of influence while recognizing that adversaries have "red lines" that even credible threats of military force will not budge.

You're right to point out the problem of will, but I think that is a "feature" of democracy we will have to live with.


Probably not the best examples to bolster your case. Both are battles 'won,' not the greater war in which they occurred.

Well, that all depends on what level of warfare you're talking about. If your scope is "WWII" then you may be right, but in that case it could be argued that every battle was simply a "battle won" that, by itself, could not "impose a strategic victory" or be decisive by themselves.

I'm not arguing that air power is decisive at the grand-strategy level of warfare. In my view, to say that air power can/can’t win wars is a foolish argument to begin with. It's like claiming that the naval component can win a war by itself. And even the land component. My view is that, for the US at least, the Civil War is over and we aren't going to face a situation where one service/component is going to do it all on its own. We succeed because we can integrate our forces that goes beyond "combined arms."

At the tactical and operational and even sometimes at the strategic level, the various elements can be decisive factors and that includes air forces IMO. In that context, I believe air power was the most decisive factor in the two cases I put forth.


Interesting question. How are the opponents doing with no aircraft of any type in Afghanistan?

:D You got me there, though we both know those opponents have advantages we do not and never will posses.


On that we can agree. Both are necessary, both contribute however, particularly in conventional conflict, it still boils down to the three exhausted and grubby Grunts left out of that nine man squad occupying ground.

I don't disagree. People in LPC's in dangerous and unpleasant places will be an enduring feature of warfare. I do think, however, that air power can be the difference between three exhausted and grubby grunts left out of a squad and three left out of a company.

American Pride,


I would say that certainly depends upon how the political object defines the conflict, which then returns us to the original problem of the debate in which any scenario can be imagined by which we can justify or condemn any aspect of military power.

Agreed and the rest of your comment is excellent. In the example of Kosovo, one of the problems in assessing the efficacy of air power is the incongruity of the political objectives. Here's a pretty good essay on the subject. (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/hinen.html)

Wilf,


There has never been any solid evidence that a destruction of the RAF was a required condition for the invasion of Birtain. They did however need to destroy the British Fleet, and this was something the Luftwaffe felt unable to do guarantee.


Yes, they needed to destroy the British fleet. The only way that was going to happen, given the smaller German naval force, was through the establishment of air superiority to allow combined naval and air attacks on the British fleet. The claim there's "no solid evidence" seems amazing to me in light of the historic record and German war-planning. One could argue the odds of successfully conquering Britain WITH German air supremacy may have been small (a point of some debate), but the odds were were nil without it.


Midway was platform wacking. Something air power is good at.


"Platform wacking?" Yes, that is largely the point of naval warfare. That air power is good at it would seem to buttress my point and not detract from it.


In simple terms fighters exist to shoot other fighters, aircraft and bombers down. If the enemy lacks that which you can legitimately use airpower against, then I submit it is of limited applicability.

Again, I'm missing your argument. Air power is not limited to fighters. Even if it was, all US fighters (USAF, Navy, Marine) are multirole aircraft except the F-15C.


The ability to successfully employ the air environment is and always will be useful, but that is not always dependant of "air power" or air forces.

I don't think I ever claimed it was always dependent, but most of the time it is highly desirable at a minimum. For the US it's almost always. Even in the unlikely event the Army ever goes off by itself, it's still going to have it's UAV's and fixed and rotary wing aircraft which are elements of air power as much as an F-22 is.

Umar,


Sometimes I feel that airpower enthusiasts ignore the truth in the second and third quote.

Agree with your comment, but keep in mind that the air component does not conduct independent operations in either Afghanistan or Iraq. IOW, these operations are driven by or in support of ground or SoF force requirements and operations or are JFC-directed. The people at the CFACC are actually quite cautious and have, at times, denied requested ground force strikes for fear of civilian casualties.

And claims in the article about the 90 civilians killed look to be propaganda.

reed11b
08-29-2008, 04:23 PM
Air power is not limited to fighters. Even if it was, all US fighters (USAF, Navy, Marine) are multirole aircraft except the F-15C.
I think that would be the point. Why are they multi-role? Not becouse they are the best platforms for the job, but to keep the AF "relevent". If all fighters are multi-role, then why the big push for manned bombers? Do they want manned bombers becouse of the continued belief that they can win wars on there own? Are any other services asking for more big manned bombers?
Reed

Ken White
08-29-2008, 07:06 PM
...
However, I think it can be useful when combined with other forms of coercion and influence - IOW as part of an overall strategy that uses all appropriate forms of influence while recognizing that adversaries have "red lines" that even credible threats of military force will not budge.

You're right to point out the problem of will, but I think that is a "feature" of democracy we will have to live with.True on both counts.
Well, that all depends on what level of warfare you're talking about. If your scope is "WWII" then you may be right, but in that case it could be argued that every battle was simply a "battle won" that, by itself, could not "impose a strategic victory" or be decisive by themselves.With only a few caveats, that's essentially true. Lot of evidence of many 'won' battles leading to a lost war.
...We succeed because we can integrate our forces that goes beyond "combined arms."True again.
At the tactical and operational and even sometimes at the strategic level, the various elements can be decisive factors and that includes air forces IMO. In that context, I believe air power was the most decisive factor in the two cases I put forth.Since both were effectively air battles, well, yeah. :D
:D You got me there, though we both know those opponents have advantages we do not and never will posses.Many of which could be removed but that 'will' thing gets in the way again. :(
I don't disagree. People in LPC's in dangerous and unpleasant places will be an enduring feature of warfare. I do think, however, that air power can be the difference between three exhausted and grubby grunts left out of a squad and three left out of a company.Sometimes yes, sometimes no. Lot of variables. Still, mostly that's a good statement.

We can agree it takes everyone and there is no one-service takes all situation (Except maybe in mid-ocean... ;) ).

Entropy
08-29-2008, 08:27 PM
I think that would be the point. Why are they multi-role? Not becouse they are the best platforms for the job, but to keep the AF "relevent". If all fighters are multi-role, then why the big push for manned bombers? Do they want manned bombers becouse of the continued belief that they can win wars on there own? Are any other services asking for more big manned bombers?
Reed

Both the US and Navy have transitioned from "one trick pony" aircraft in the last 20-30 years. As aircraft procurement and operating costs grew, and with shrinking budgets in the 1990's, the USAF and Navy could no longer afford to field and especially maintain and operate a large force of single-role aircraft. In addition to cost savings, many of the legacy systems were designed to counter specific Soviet threats that no longer existed (The F-14 and Phoenix missile combination, for example). So with end of the cold war it made sense from a capabilities standpoint to go multirole as well. The trend is not even limited to aircraft - the Navy retired many classes of ships in favor of standardized multirole vessels. There may be examples in the Army as well, though I can't think of any offhand.

The culmination of this trend in aircraft design is the F-35, which is both a joint and international program and is intended to replace a handful of existing multirole aircraft from the USAF/Navy/Marines and allies, and service that diverse set of missions with one basic airframe. I'm somewhat skeptical that putting all those eggs in one basket will work in the end without serious compromises, but we'll see.

Of course, there are some roles that require more specialized platforms - Aircraft carriers, aerial refuelers and, to a certain extent, bombers to name a couple. Multirole fighters simply don't have the range, payload and endurance to fill the bomber role in many cases. Recently there has been talk of a new bomber for the AF with a target IOC as early as 2018 - a date which is wishful thinking at best (the Navy UCAS (http://www.is.northropgrumman.com/systems/system_pdfs/X-47B_Brochure.pdf) multirole unmanned bomber program is already in development and won't be fielded until 2020 at the earliest).

Entropy
08-29-2008, 08:36 PM
Ken, when we come to agreement it really does make me feel smarter than I should. I know you get a lot out of it too, but this forum is very lucky to have you here. :)


Since both were effectively air battles, well, yeah.

:D Why do you think I picked them?


We can agree it takes everyone and there is no one-service takes all situation (Except maybe in mid-ocean... ).

I guess you haven't heard about the new effects-based Air force submarine program! :D

Bill Moore
08-29-2008, 08:40 PM
I find it odd we never talk about sea power, but I guess that is because the Navy never made the false claim they could win the war alone like some in the Air Force.

First, the question posed about how our opponents are doing without any form of air power was an excellent question to make one pause and perhaps lead to a paradigm shift, well done.

Now just to be contrary I'll defend other than ground power, because I think the discussion is to limited and unnecessarily black and white. I have the view that we're always in conflict and we're always vying for some sort of advantage (strategic shaping) to prevent that conflict from escalating into war, and if it does, then being in a position to dominate if it does.

If one nation wants to occupy another nation (Iraq occupies Kuwait, Japan occupies the Philippines, etc.) it may take an Army after the fact to oust them out, but in "theory" naval and air power could have prevented them from projecting their force in the first place. The same applies for projecting our shores, our air and sea power is critical. Is that decisive? Depends on how you define it, if it prevents an attack in the first place is it decisive? (I'm talking conventional not asymmetric).

Several nations have long range weapons, we can launch nukes from submarines and silos and obliterate our nation state enemies. That serves as a real deterent if our enemy believes we have the political will to use those weapons. If a certain country presented serious threats to our nation, would the credible threat of destruction by strategic weapons be enough to alter their behavior without occupying their ground with troops? Of course credible implies we would use the weapons if they didn't comply; Japan as an example.

Our naval, air and strategic weapon superiority has forced our enemies to adapt to what we generally call asymmetric approaches/tactics to achieve thier objectives. We haven't found a way to effectively use the powers that has caused this shift to counter asymmetric threats. Some members of the Air Power community seem to think this is possible through EBO where technology will allow us to be all knowing and all seeing so we can reach out from the sky and eliminate all the bad nodes. Maybe I'm a dinasour, but I think that is rubish. On the other hand, I think our air and naval power is absolutely critical to our national defense, and for more reasons than I addressed here.

Ken White
08-29-2008, 09:19 PM
Entropy; you're too kind but the check is in the mail (and I think I learn a whole lot more here than I impart). ;)

Nope. I missed the news flash on the EBS (don't go there... :D) but I do know about B52 mine capability and a couple of other AF tricks in the ocean in motion...

Bill Moore: Well said -- as you aptly point out it's a whole lot more complex than tactical application. Your comments on strategic deterrence and this:
On the other hand, I think our air and naval power is absolutely critical to our national defense, and for more reasons than I addressed here.totally accurate summation are spot on.

ADDED, inadvertently truncated:

I said this earlier about military force as a policy instrument:

""However, I disagree on this. It can be an excellent coercive tool, even without actual application if the strength and, far more importantly, the previously demonstrated will to use it if necessary is present.

It's on the latter aspect that military power too often fails as a coercive instrument. I could make a strong case for the fact that virtually every US war occurred because an opponent thought the US was too lazy, introspective or hedonistic to respond to a provocation. Contemporarily, I'd go even further in pointing out that our current military operations are the result of four Presidents from both parties over a period of over 30 years -- and since 1979 in particular -- failing to show some will and responding not at all or very halfheartedly."

I'd add an interesting thought. In most of those earlier wars, our military unpreparedness was almost always a major factor in the opponents miscalculation; that was a possibly a larger concern than our will.

Since 1955 or so, our military preparedness has certainly been commensurate with the various threats -- now our will is suspect. Thus, this comment by Bill Moore is important:
in "theory" naval and air power could have prevented them from projecting their force in the first place. The same applies for projecting our shores, our air and sea power is critical.No question Entropy is correct on the problems with 'will' in a democratic society but the problem just illustrated seems to me to say we should have a better and more firmly entrenched policy on the use of force.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
09-27-2008, 01:39 PM
Charlie Dunlap was op-eding down south:

www.ajc.com/opinion/content/opinion/stories/2008/09/17/dunlaped_0917.html

Rex Brynen
09-27-2008, 01:54 PM
Charlie Dunlap was op-eding down south:

www.ajc.com/opinion/content/opinion/stories/2008/09/17/dunlaped_0917.html

...and I rather liked the pithy reply by John Robinson:

Airstrikes not answer to war in Afghanistan (http://www.ajc.com/opinion/content/opinion/bookman/stories/2008/09/25/robinsoned_0925.html)
By JOHN A. ROBINSON
Thursday, September 25, 2008


The U.S. military does not target innocent civilians. Period. I realize this assertion should restate the obvious for most Americans, but when the number-two ranking lawyer in the U.S. Air Force implies otherwise, I can not allow the potential ambiguity to go unanswered.

Last week, Major Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., the Air Force deputy staff judge advocate, penned a personal piece in the AJC that urged unfettered airpower in the war in Afghanistan. His message about civilian deaths: you can’t make an omelet without breaking a few eggs. Civilian eggs, that is.

After seven years of mostly unconventional warfare, you’d think “airpower first” advocates such as Dunlap would have learned the strategic lesson that General David Petraeus recently summarized: “You don’t kill or capture your way out of an industrial-strength insurgency.”

...

John Robinson is a military targeteer and an Army chief warrant officer based in Atlanta. He has served as chief of ground targeting in Afghanistan and the Army’s targeting liaison to the Air Force headquarters supporting both Afghanistan and Iraq. These are his personal views.

Someone needs to get Robinson on SWJ/C!

slapout9
09-27-2008, 02:42 PM
Someone needs to get Robinson on SWJ/C!

Absolutely!

Rank amateur
09-27-2008, 03:19 PM
The real problem with the air power weenies is there enduring quest to show that air power is an effective political or coercion/influence tool.

Dropping a bomb on Khadafy's kid seemed to change Khadafy's attitude and his political policies.

William F. Owen
09-27-2008, 03:37 PM
Dropping a bomb on Khadafy's kid seemed to change Khadafy's attitude and his political policies.

Anomalies do not make a trend, and I submit that the Colonels change of stance can be traced to few more things than the loss of one child.

Bill Moore
09-27-2008, 06:01 PM
If you carefully read both articles, it is hard to find a particular item to take issue with. While normally critical of MG Dunlap's articles, this one seemed reasonable (with a couple of exceptions noted below). To me he seemed to be making a defense to pre-empt the Taliban from effectively using their propaganda to ground one of our most effective asymmetrical advantages in this fight.

While none of us like it, there will be times when innocent civilians are killed, just as innocents are frequently killed accidently in ground battles. I think the number of civilian deaths caused by air power combined with bad intelligence is definitely unacceptable and the procedures need to be scrutinized, but to the point of grounding the air assets (which contrary to MG Dunlap's proposal, I doubt that is even seriously being considered).

If you accept the argument that we need to get out and protect the population in the rural areas, that implies numerous small unit outposts (and a logistical nightmare), that on occassion may need fire support to help hold their position. The best fire support for ground troops is generally artillery, but due to range restrictions that won't always be available, so our air assets remain critical.

MG Dunlap's tone, and his inappropriate use of one signal intercept where the Taliban talk about air is typical of his style of chest thumping for air power, and giving it more than its due is provocative, I still found little to debate.

The Chief's response was well written, but we obviously interpreted MG Dunlap's article differently (then again, he obviously has insights on the air force we don't based on where he sat, I can only refer to the article), and in the end he supported the use of air power when "appropriate". Perhaps the issue is defining "appropriate" use of air power in Afghanistan.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
09-27-2008, 09:17 PM
about the kid, the bank, and the cops was spot on. I also took him to task from a different perspective: the analogy to Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh...

Airpower is not the panacea to fighting insurgencies
(Part I)

Charlie Dunlap seems to be the 21stCentury doppelganger of Billy Mitchell and Curtis LeMay combined. His op-eds intone an unvarying paean to the supreme glories of airpower as being the solution to all of America's military issues.

Well, almost.

In his September 17, 2008 op-ed in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution he takes the Taliban to task for their efforts (understandable) to emasculate our vast air power capability by giving it a bad rap in the press. Many of our foes fear our arsenal, and rightly so, thus they will naturally do anything to mitigate its effect. The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) called it “grasping the belt;” when engaged with US forces they tried to establish themselves as close as possible to our troops, knowing that any artillery or close air support called in would be “danger close.”

According to Dunlap the Taliban has begun “frenzied efforts of their propaganda machine” to excoriate the US Air Force and its supposedly indiscriminate use of bombs to kill innocent women and children. He quips that “the Taliban's depraved moral code helps. They shamelessly intermingle with civilians in order to use them as human shields. Their lack of morality also gives them license to falsely allege civilian casualties when they can't orchestrate them.” Dunlap seems to miss the point that they must do that to mitigate our superiority in weaponry. “Unfortunately, the media seems quick to report whatever claim is made.”

Unfortunately the media also reports real civilian casualties, which are often incurred during air strikes. Whether it is 1 or 100, civilian deaths in a COIN campaign only strengthen the insurgents.

While I agree with the point of his overall assessment, Dunlap then backs his argument by making a false analogy in which he equates the Taliban’s strategy to the sieges of Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sahn. An interesting metaphorical usage, considering these were two very conventional battles that albeit were in part lost or won due to airpower, they were also set piece battles in wars which both had strong counterinsurgency aspects and in which the counterinsurgents ultimately lost.

As Paul Harvey would say, here’s the rest of the story:

The genesis of DBP was a year earlier, November 1952, when the French had executed a similar operation at Na San, 150 air miles west-northwest of Hanoi. They established it as a ‘base aéro-terrestre’ to support Operation Lorraine. Giap attacked the camp during two nights but the French were able to successfully defend the post, inflicting heavy casualties upon the Viet Minh battalions. Later the French withdrew the garrison, mostly by airlifting them out.

Giap learned that he needed heavier artillery (he employed mortars and 75mm recoilless rifles at Na San) and that unless he could seize high ground around the post (Na San was on a plateau) he should avoid attacking entrenched camps. The French believed they had found ‘la formule’ for enticing Giap to attack these type posts, whereupon French firepower would annihilate the Viet Minh units.

Operation Castor was Na San writ large. It was launched in November 1953 in the mountainous northwestern region of Tonkin to interdict the Viet Minh LOCs for their offensive in northeastern Laos. The French also were hopeful that they could bring about a battle on their terms, one in which they could bring the full power of their air and artillery against Giap’s main force.

On 20 November the French executed an airborne drop into the valley of Dien Bien Phu, the aim of which was the capture of an old Japanese airstrip. The French set up the DBP ‘base aéro-terrestre’ to serve as an anchor for mobile strike operations against the Viet Minh sanctuary as well as a supply point for GCMA units operating in the mountains (GCMAs were French Special Forces units).

The French expected that Giap’s reaction to this incursion would be to attack the base, where upon, as at Na San, the French would crush him. They believed that the aerial lifeline between Hanoi and DBP would be sufficient to sustain the forces in place.

However, several factors doomed the French strategy at DBP. In the first place the distance between Hanoi and Na San was 150 air miles while the distance between Hanoi and DBP was 180 miles, which meant longer transit times for aircraft. Na San’s airfield was on a plateau with few high points nearby whereas DBP was in a valley, with several dominating high points. In 1952 Giap’s artillery consisted mostly of mortars, recoilless rifles and old Japanese 75mm howitzers. By 1954 the Viet Minh had received from China 105mm howitzers (also the primary artillery piece used by the French) and Soviet 12.7mm and 37mm anti-aircraft guns.

The French were aware of these massive increases in Viet Minh fire power but were confident that their counter battery efforts and air support would quickly neutralize any Viet Minh artillery, which they believed would be easily spotted in their reverse slope positions. This was not to be. At DBP Giap had defied convention by placing his artillery in positions on the forward slopes of the overlooking hills. Plus, he had them placed in positions dug into the slopes from the rear, so only the barrel protruded from the aperture. By not disturbing the foliage the Viet Minh artillery was perfectly hidden from French observation.

The actual “siege” commenced on 13 March 1954 with a massive bombardment of the French positions (the French artillery chief, Col. Piroth, who had assured his leadership that his guns would silence the enemy’s, committed suicide shortly thereafter). In the ensuing weeks the Viet Minh tightened the noose by systematically capturing French hilltop positions. 26 March proved the last day French aircraft could use the airfield, from then on re-supply would be by parachute drops. Viet Minh anti-aircraft fire forced the French transports to drop from higher altitudes (around 600 to 900 feet was most accurate, the new altitude was set at 8,000), thus decreasing the accuracy of the drops. As the perimeter shrank more and more supplies dropped into Viet Minh hands. French attempts at aerial interdiction of the Viet Minh supply lines were no more effective than similar US efforts to interdict the Ho Chi Minh trail a decade later. On 7 May, after 54 days of grueling combat, the garrison was over run.

The defeat broke the French government's will to continue the Indo-China War and peace accords were signed dividing Vietnam into a communist dominated north and a democratic south. The two countries were separated by a "Demilitarized Zone."

Thirteen years later, in the fall/winter of 1967, the PAVN, under Giap's command, began a series of assaults against US Marine positions near the DMZ. By mid-January 1968 the PAVN had several division sized units in the vicinity of the Marine’s airfield at Khe Sanh, located in northwestern South Vietnam, near the DMZ. This was viewed by Gen Westmoreland and others as an attempt to repeat DBP. However, there were those, in particular Marine Corps Gen Krulak, who viewed the operation as an elaborate feint to draw US military attention and resources away from the Tet Offensive, which commenced 1 February.

Unlike DBP, at Khe Sanh the PAVN were successfully repulsed in their attempts to capture the high ground located north and northwest of the main base. Westmorland committed a huge amount of air power to relieve pressure on the Marines, and kept forces ready in I Corps for relief of the post. Giap broke off his attacks after 77 days of combat. Again, while it was an American tactical victory, the strategic result has come under considerable debate.

Yet at Khe Sanh several factors were significantly different from the siege of DBP. Khe Sanh was much closer to supply bases (45 miles versus 180 miles at Dien Bien Phu). At Khe Sanh the Marines held onto the high ground, and their artillery and air support forced the PAVN to position their own artillery at a much greater distance, decreasing their accuracy. At Dien Bien Phu the French artillery (six 105mm howitzer batteries and one battery of four 155mm howitzers plus mortars) were only sporadically effective while the Viet Minh had the advantage of providing nearly direct fire into the French encampment.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
09-27-2008, 09:19 PM
What was airpower’s ultimate contribution to these battles?

At Dien Bien Phu primarily it was logistical. The Viet Minh were careful not to attack the French in broad daylight, choosing instead to attack at dusk and fighting through the night, thus mitigating the effects of French close air support. By employing their anti-aircraft assets closer and closer to the airfield, the Viet Minh shut it down, forcing the French garrison to rely on airdrops. With a shrinking perimeter and drops from higher altitudes fewer supplies reached the French troops, although Giap’s forces certainly benefited from many miss-drops.

At Khe Sahn tactical air was certainly a force multiplier, as was the strategic employment of air strikes against the PAVN supply routes (which the French employed too little effort to at DBP), but the “air bridge” of supplies was also key, and the PAVN were never able to completely shut down the airfield.
Regardless, in both cases, the combat was predominantly infantry fighting hand-to-hand on hilltops around the posts.

So what do the air power lessons of Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh have to do with our present COIN operations in Afghanistan (and Iraq): In my opinion pretty much nothing. Both were battles fought in sparsely populated areas where non-combatant casualties where of no real concern.

Dunlap does correctly discern that the Taliban’s tactics are so designed that “they will achieve a tremendous victory on the battlefield of public opinion.”

Exactly, this is why COIN operations are as much political as they are military. John Paul Vann in Vietnam observed: “This is a political war and it calls for discrimination in killing. The best weapon for killing would be a knife, but I’m afraid we can’t do it that way. The worst is an airplane. The next worse is artillery. Barring a knife, the best is a rifle — you know who you’re killing.”

The Air Force’s contribution to COIN is predominantly in the ISR realm (and logistical) and is certainly invaluable. Tactical air has its use as well, but must be employed very judiciously in order to avoid any non-combatant injuries.

Ultimately, by using examples of set piece battles in arguing his case for airpower’s use in COIN, Dunlap is metaphorically comparing apples to oranges.

William F. Owen
09-28-2008, 06:31 AM
Charlie Dunlap seems to be the 21stCentury doppelganger of Billy Mitchell and Curtis LeMay combined. His op-eds intone an unvarying paean to the supreme glories of airpower as being the solution to all of America's military issues.


You're not kidding! - Excellent posts by the way

Air is essential to successful COIN operations. You can't work without it, but that does not mean dropping bombs, or firing any weapon from the air.

Additionally the the USAF is seriously worried by things like GMLRS, GPS guided 155mm, and Army UAVs, dropping 55kg PGMs. All spells bad news for the "into the blue" boys as they become increasingly irrelevant, to the kinetic end of the business.

His idea that "some civilian casualties are acceptable" is just ludicrous, and to my mind means he has fundamentally missed the point. That they may occur, might be unavoidable. That is not the same thing.


John Paul Vann in Vietnam observed: “This is a political war and it calls for discrimination in killing. The best weapon for killing would be a knife, but I’m afraid we can’t do it that way. The worst is an airplane. The next worse is artillery. Barring a knife, the best is a rifle — you know who you’re killing.”

Which is why GP Infantry are the decisive arm across the spectrum of terrain and conflict. The are best enable by a sound approach to combined arms, some of which require the air environment.

Bill Moore
09-28-2008, 04:47 PM
William and Umar I agree with what you written up to a point, but given the terrain, rural population, and size of Afghanistan, our requirement is to get riflemen (whatever nationality, preferably Afghani) everywhere that matters (throughout the rural population). It is unrealistic to assume we provide fire support with the King of battle (artillery) throughout the country. Assuming you agree with this, and assuming the Taliban (and other hostile groups) are capable of massing sufficiently to challenge smaller outposts, do you agree we still need airforce bombers/fighters/gunships for firesuppot? At least until we have sufficient ground mounted fire support systems?

Using the air force offensively in a COIN is normally counter productive, it has proven to be counter productive in Afghanistan, but I still think they provide a defensive fire and psychological asset that is valuable (if properly used).

LawVol
09-28-2008, 05:34 PM
In reading Robinson's response to Dunlap's op-ed and some of the posts here, I can't help but notice the mischaracterization of Dunlap's words to support a somewhat opposite point of view. Robinson begins his article by suggesting that Dunlap implies that the US should or does target innocent civilians. Others here have posted comments indicating that Dunlap think civilian casualties are acceptable. I fail to see this as a reasonable interpretation of Dunlap's comments and am reminded of the tenor of a presidential campaign rather than a serious debate on the efficacy of airpower in a COIN environment.

"We can never forget that every civilian death is heartbreaking." "No force in the history of warfare has ever worked harder or spent more time and resources to limit civilian casualties than has the U.S. military and its coalition allies." These comments from Dunlap would seem to counsel against targeting of civilians and emphasize the US military's commitment to mitigate such casualties. These comments, however, are ignored. What is apparently pounced upon (here I can only make a guess as to the support Robinson relies upon) is his statement that "so long as they are not excessive under the circumstances, international law tolerates the tragedy of civilian deaths." While some may not like this, it is an accurate statement of international law. However his reference to this being a "tragedy" would indicate that he is not, as some claim, arguing that we should target civilians. He then even provides the justification for this rule of international law by outlining the consequences of prohibiting all attacks where civilians might be killed.

I also didn't read this piece as advocating airpower as the solution to all of America's military issues. He may (or may not) have made such arguments in the past, but this piece doesn't do that. Rather it seems to argue that we should not take airpower completely off the shelf.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
09-28-2008, 09:34 PM
Assuming you agree with this, and assuming the Taliban (and other hostile groups) are capable of massing sufficiently to challenge smaller outposts, do you agree we still need airforce bombers/fighters/gunships for firesuppot? At least until we have sufficient ground mounted fire support systems?

Using the air force offensively in a COIN is normally counter productive, it has proven to be counter productive in Afghanistan, but I still think they provide a defensive fire and psychological asset that is valuable (if properly used).

While the USAF's major contribution to COIN lies, IMHO, in the realm of ISR and transportation, there are still valid uses for the offensive use of bombers/fighters/gunships (particularly gunships). The key is the judicious use of these very powerful assets.

It is not so much as to whether the TB, or others, is capable of ‘massing sufficiently to challenge smaller outposts,’ it is. The difficulty is that most insurgents use the Maoist formula of ‘swimming amongst the people’ for protection. That is one of the toughest parts of COIN, separating the wheat from the chaff. When TB or AQ forces are in the "open" (by open meaning we are 100% sure there are only combatants present) then air power needs to be in the ground commander's tool kit, since arty may not be available. This is particularly relevant for SF units since they are often operating far from a firebase.

LawVol: I agree that Dunlap does not advocate the specific targeting of civilians and in this specific op-ed does not offer airpower up as "as the solution to all of America's military issues." However, Dunlap’s op-eds tend to lean well on that side of most of his arguments.

There is no one I know of on this forum that would ever want to take airpower completely off the table. However, whether we mis-drop a bomb, mis-target arty or mortars, or drive through a crowd either shooting indiscriminately or acting menacingly (to the latter I refer primarily to a certain brand of contractor) we are losing credibility in the eyes of the very people we are supposedly protecting.

While ‘winning hearts and minds’ may seem a bit trite and over-used these days, we do greater harm to ourselves through these acts. Dunlap, and his ilk, seem to miss that point. This is a war of ideas…one of the the ideas being our side is the better one and that the locals should be on it. Air power is impersonal at best.

In his latest op-ed Dunlap takes the TB to task for using the equivalent of ‘human shields’ to protect themselves from our airpower (and artillery as well). That comes under ‘no s**t.’ If I was in the same situation, confronted with a nation who’s ability to rain fire and death down upon me almost at will, I would probably do the exact same thing. All the more reason to be as exceptionally careful as possible when having a very large piece of ordnance dropped on people.

Entropy
09-29-2008, 12:01 AM
I think I'm with Bill and Lawvol for the most part on this one. I don't agree with a lot of what Gen. Dunlap has said in the past, and especially don't agree with the way he said it, but in this case I don't find a whole lot objectionable.

I like to go to the Vanity Fair article on the Korengal Valley (http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/01/afghanistan200801?printable=true&currentPage=all) from earlier this year because it gives an accurate picture, IMO, of the kinetic airpower issue in Afghanistan. Some relevant quotes:


Around the same time as the checkpoint shooting, coalition air strikes killed seven Afghan children at a mosque compound in the southeastern part of the country. Reaction was predictably outraged, but almost lost in the outcry was the testimony of survivors. They allegedly told coalition forces that before the air strike al-Qaeda fighters in the area—who undoubtedly knew they were going to be bombed—had beaten the children to prevent them from leaving.

“We had surveillance on the compound all day,” a nato spokesman explained. “We saw no indication there were children inside.”

ISTM this is the kind of thing Gen. Dunlap is really addressing in his latest article. And speaking of that checkpoint shooting, there is this:


American forces are far more sensitive to humanitarian concerns than the Russians were—and far more welcomed—but they still make awful mistakes. In June, jumpy American soldiers in Korengal shot into a truck full of young men who had refused to stop at a local checkpoint, killing several. The soldiers said they thought they were about to be attacked; the survivors said they had been confused about what to do. Both sides were probably telling the truth....According to Colonel Ostlund, there was a possibility that the Taliban had paid the driver of the truck to not stop at the checkpoint when ordered to. By the colonel’s reasoning, the Taliban would win a strategic victory no matter what: either they would find out how close they could get a truck bomb to an American checkpoint, or there would be civilian casualties that they could exploit.

Air strikes that kill civilians seem to get all the press back here in the states, but the problem of civilian causalities is certainly not confined to that realm. Robinson's point about discernment and discrimination do not apply solely to air forces.

An equally good and relevant article (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/magazine/24afghanistan-t.html?_r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all) is about the same unit from about the same time and the whole basis of the article was an attempt to explain an increase in air strikes in Afghanistan. I'm not going to quote it because the entire thing deserves a read or a re-read. It's simply the best article I've yet seen on how kinetic air power is used in Afghanistan and how simplistic statements that "air power is good" or "air power is bad" paint over the complexities of the conflict. The VAST majority of kinetic air power is CAS or other fires in direct support of the ground forces who are in contact with enemy forces. Strikes that are completely independent of the ground element are exceedingly rare. Even in the latest incident in Azziband in western Afghanistan (which killed between 7 and 90 civilians depending on who you believe) the air strike was in coordination and support of a SOF ground force who supposedly had adequately surveilled the target.

I might therefore suggest that the problem of air strikes killing civilians is not a problem itself but a symptom of a different problem. Calls for reducing or eliminating kinetic air power as a tool may assuage the symptom but will not eliminate the root problem. The problem is, depending on who you ask, variously, lack of adequate ground forces, risk-aversion, poor intelligence, etc. Are those the real problems and, if so, what's the alternative?

Here's a simplistic assessment of how I see things: As an airman who's been to Afghanistan, from my perspective it's the the ground forces in theater that want air strikes since it's the ground force that has laid out the requirements for air assets to be on station in X amount of time with a Y capable ordnance package. It's that same ground force that authorizes the actual strikes (and then there is the huge amount of Apache gunship support that too often goes unrecognized - those guys and gals do some amazing work). Then I come here and read from the ground experts how bad air strikes are and get to read John Paul Vann quoted for the umpteenth time. To me, there appears to be a disconnect within the ground forces about what you want the air forces to do. So again, what's the alternative? We're simply not going to the kind of ground force increases that we'd all probably like - forces that would have allowed us to quickly MOUT or cordon Azzizabad in a timely manner, for example. Intelligence is always going to be a problem.

Umar says we need to be "exceptionally careful." Well, great, but that assumes that we are not being exceptionally careful now and regardless, how does "exceptionally careful" translate into TTP's or alternatives? I mean the air forces in theater are so sensitive on this topic that they've actually, on occasion, overridden orders to drop from the local ground force commander because of collateral damage concerns. But that is rare - the air component should not be in the business of constantly second-guessing requests for support from the men who are fighting and dying on the ground. But as an airmen the issue is both confused and sensitive because when an air strike goes wrong it's the air forces that get the blame when all we're doing, in the end, is providing a requested service and trying to help our brothers and sisters on the ground.

Wilf,


Additionally the the USAF is seriously worried by things like GMLRS, GPS guided 155mm, and Army UAVs, dropping 55kg PGMs. All spells bad news for the "into the blue" boys as they become increasingly irrelevant, to the kinetic end of the business.

I'm going to raise the BS flag on this one and ask you to provide one shred of evidence to support that assertion. Most people I know in the Air Force wonder what has taken the Army so long to get with the precision program. Most people I know in the Air Force wonder why it took the Army almost 11 years to get the GPS 155 into the field. Most people I know in the Air Force understand that artillery and kinetic air power are complimentary. Most people I know in the Air Force are not worried in the least about Army precision munitions (increased arty precision does not negate its mobility range and logistical limitations), but maybe you can explain why they are and provide some evidence.

William F. Owen
09-29-2008, 06:27 AM
I'm going to raise the BS flag on this one and ask you to provide one shred of evidence to support that assertion. Most people I know in the Air Force wonder what has taken the Army so long to get with the precision program. Most people I know in the Air Force wonder why it took the Army almost 11 years to get the GPS 155 into the field. Most people I know in the Air Force understand that artillery and kinetic air power are complimentary. Most people I know in the Air Force are not worried in the least about Army precision munitions (increased arty precision does not negate its mobility range and logistical limitations), but maybe you can explain why they are and provide some evidence.

Raise away. What you say may well apply to most people you know. This was not intended as a categoric statement, and is not just my view but the view of several US Army officers, I know and meet in the course of my job. I submit, that the logic stands in the absence of evidence. I am talking about COIN and not Combat operations.

GMLRS and GPS-155 can do things that previously required air power. I understand that CAS and Indirect fire should be complementary. Yes, CAS has the range the logistic autonomy. I suggest that rational and sensible application of mature technologies is shifting the emphasis.

I think the USAF is aware of that and maybe hoping to re-emphasise their role in the kinetic side of life of CLOSE Support, where their real and required utility is in in things non-kinetic - transport, ISTAR, and Comms.

I do not think it far fetched to suggest that the USAFs proselytising of air power, can force them to threats where no such threat should exist. - and if the USAF tell me that they are in no way concerned, about the rise of surface to surface tactical PGMs, forgive me for remaining sceptical.

Entropy
09-29-2008, 06:10 PM
I submit, that the logic stands in the absence of evidence.Really? Then try this slightly amended logical argument on for size:

"Additionally the the Army is seriously worried by things like SDB, GBU-49, and USAF UAVs, dropping all kinds of PGMs. All spells bad news for the "Army Strong" artillery boys as they become increasingly irrelevant, to the kinetic end of the business." ;)

Logic without evidence rarely results in a valid assertion. The argument above is as equally flawed as the original.

reed11b
09-29-2008, 06:21 PM
Really? Then try this slightly amended logical argument on for size:

"Additionally the the Army is seriously worried by things like SDB, GBU-49, and USAF UAVs, dropping all kinds of PGMs. All spells bad news for the "Army Strong" artillery boys as they become increasingly irrelevant, to the kinetic end of the business." ;)

Logic without evidence rarely results in a valid assertion. The argument above is as equally flawed as the original.

What your (in bad taste) revision of Wilf's quote fails to acvknowledge is that COIN fighting can be done without aircraft, but not the other way around. Defensive snarling does not a good counter-argument make either.
Reed

Entropy
09-29-2008, 06:58 PM
What your (in bad taste) revision of Wilf's quote fails to acvknowledge is that COIN fighting can be done without aircraft, but not the other way around. Defensive snarling does not a good counter-argument make either.
Reed

Didn't mean at all to come across as snarling (I did put a wink in there!), though I admit that in my lengthy post last night I was defensive and in a sour mood. In general, I do not like arguments that boil down to service parochialism unless they have some measure of substance behind them. Being based largely on perception, they are too easy to make and my alteration of Wilf's original comment was meant to demonstrate that. How can Wilf or some Army officers possibly know that the Air Force is "worried" about Army PGM's? Without any evidence, they can't. In the same way, how can I possibly know or reasonably claim the Army is "worried" about USAF PGM's? I can't. Both arguments, lacking any substance, have an equal measure of validity, which is to say hardly any.

Furthermore, what need is there for me to acknowledge that COIN fighting can be done without aircraft when the original comment was about aircraft and artillery in the current conflict? I agree completely that COIN fighting doesn't require aircraft and would add that it doesn't require artillery or a lot of other things either. Or rather, those things are unnecessary in theory, but not in actual practice in Iraq and Afghanistan.

William F. Owen
09-30-2008, 08:34 AM
Being based largely on perception, they are too easy to make and my alteration of Wilf's original comment was meant to demonstrate that. How can Wilf or some Army officers possibly know that the Air Force is "worried" about Army PGM's? Without any evidence, they can't. In the same way, how can I possibly know or reasonably claim the Army is "worried" about USAF PGM's? I can't. Both arguments, lacking any substance, have an equal measure of validity, which is to say hardly any.


My original post may have lacked the necessary level of semantic precision to usefully present my hypothesis, thus it was legitimately challenged.

I don't "know" that the USAF is "worried" about the Army's increasing level of autonomy when it comes to close supporting precision fires. I don't "know" that they are worried about a lack of competent peer competitor air threats, but I suspect that want to the wider world to realise they exist, and thus the F-22 is required.

The majority of the USAF's advocacy of "air power" has been based on demonstrating it's relevance and importance. Anytime that this relevance is challenged, it seems to cause to concern, and thus generate literature reinforcing their position.

reed11b
09-30-2008, 05:50 PM
I would argue that one can imply the AF's concern over legitamcy based on there increase in non-recruiting based PR advertisment. Anyone rember the Chinese Sat killer commercial? Also completly mis-leading. AF PR is starting to approach the MC's in size and scope. Unlike the the AF, however, the MC is a very small organization that has always needed to fight for it's existance.
Reed

Entropy
09-30-2008, 08:21 PM
The majority of the USAF's advocacy of "air power" has been based on demonstrating it's relevance and importance.

So your position, if I'm interpreting correctly, is that USAF air power advocacy is mainly for the purpose justifying service "relevance and importance" and not, say, an honest difference of opinion about the effective use of military force in defense of the US and its interests? That would imply, ISTM, that the USAF is acting in an intentionally dishonest manner - I therefore hope that my reading is incorrect.


Anytime that this relevance is challenged, it seems to cause to concern, and thus generate literature reinforcing their position.

What would one expect when relevance is challenged? You recently wrote an excellent article on MW which seemed to generate "literature" by MW advocates. It only seems natural that criticisms generate responses. And frankly there's a big difference between legitimate challenging and what often appear to me as thinly disguised arguments that the USAF, as a service, is uniquely expendable (And sometimes, these arguments aren't disguised at all (http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=abolish_the_air_force), even thinly).

However, I've said before the USAF has done a poor job of explaining itself and has been too reactionary in responding to criticism. It has done a poor job of responding to legitimate criticism in part because there is so much that isn't legitimate. That's where, IMO, a lot of service defensiveness comes in. Even I, who learned about "air power" in the Navy and who used to laugh at the AF people bitching about deployments, I am surprised at the number of people who seem revel in their disdain for the USAF. I'm surprised at the number of people I encounter or read that really believe the AF should just be "given back" to the Army. So if the AF acts defensive and feels it must legitimize itself more than the other services (possibly even the Marines!), then at least consider there is some basis for it given that there are many who think the service should not exist at all.


I don't "know" that they are worried about a lack of competent peer competitor air threats, but I suspect that want to the wider world to realise they exist, and thus the F-22 is required.

Or maybe their perspective is simply different from yours? Why the need to impugn intent and assume the reason for the F-22 is a desire to want the "wider world to realize they exist." I don't even understand what that means - the AF wants to the world to know they exist?

Getting back to the question of arty vs kinetic air power, here's my take on recent history:

The USAF simply learned the value of precision fires before the Army did. I attribute this mostly to the almost daily air operations over Iraq in the 1990's where precision became important for a variety of reasons - an experience the Navy shared but the Army did not. So when OIF came around, the AF and Navy were ahead of the curve of the artillery people in this department. As a result, air power did supplant artillery in many cases when precision became a critical aspect of fire support. Now the Army has taken on those lessons and the pendulum is swinging back into balance. Artillery can never supplant kinetic air power and neither can kinetic air power supplant artillery, though in specific instances, one will be preferable to another. Neither the Army nor the AF need fear they are losing relevance. Obviously, employment is situation dependent and I think in the case of Afghanistan kinetic air power will continue to play a more prominent role than artillery simply because of the geographic and logistical realities.

Reed11b said:

I would argue that one can imply the AF's concern over legitamcy based on there increase in non-recruiting based PR advertisment. Anyone rember the Chinese Sat killer commercial? Also completly mis-leading. AF PR is starting to approach the MC's in size and scope. Unlike the the AF, however, the MC is a very small organization that has always needed to fight for it's existance.

I'm not sure what your point is here. Advertising is what it is and I'm not sure what metrics one can use to differentiate between recruiting and PR advertisement. My sense is that most ads have some of both.

I'm curious what evidence you are basing your assertion about the scope of AF PR as compared to the MC, or the Army or Navy for that matter?

Ken White
09-30-2008, 09:21 PM
So your position, if I'm interpreting correctly, is that USAF air power advocacy is mainly for the purpose justifying service "relevance and importance" and not, say, an honest difference of opinion about the effective use of military force in defense of the US and its interests? That would imply, ISTM, that the USAF is acting in an intentionally dishonest manner - I therefore hope that my reading is incorrect.Or is it simply an accusation of excessive belief and parochialism as opposed to intentional dishonesty?
The USAF simply learned the value of precision fires before the Army did. I attribute this mostly to the almost daily air operations over Iraq in the 1990's where precision became important for a variety of reasons - an experience the Navy shared but the Army did not. So when OIF came around, the AF and Navy were ahead of the curve of the artillery people in this department.Need to dig in the history a bit, the Army has been into trying to get precision fire since early in WW II. They got it in the 50s and 60s with a number of missiles; getting that precision with tube Artillery and the acceleration therefrom is infinitely more difficult. There were abortive experiments in the 1950s and the M712 Copperhead started development in the early 60s, took until the 80s to get fielded and it worked great -- but it cost too much (~$500K/rd) -- so the Army developed Excalibur as a cheaper solution.
As a result, air power did supplant artillery in many cases when precision became a critical aspect of fire support. Now the Army has taken on those lessons and the pendulum is swinging back into balance.Not totally correct, I think -- availability was a BIG factor...
Artillery can never supplant kinetic air power and neither can kinetic air power supplant artillery, though in specific instances, one will be preferable to another. Neither the Army nor the AF need fear they are losing relevance...True.
I'm not sure what your point is here. Advertising is what it is and I'm not sure what metrics one can use to differentiate between recruiting and PR advertisement. My sense is that most ads have some of both.

I'm curious what evidence you are basing your assertion about the scope of AF PR as compared to the MC, or the Army or Navy for that matter?True again, all the services are less than brutally honest in their advertising -- including the Army and the Guard and Reserve.

Entropy
09-30-2008, 11:32 PM
Interesting thread. Haven't we done this before???

Yes, this is the "neverending" thread after all. :)

As Rob Thorton said in another thread, "Man - seems like we retake this hill every so often."

Bullmoose Bailey
12-11-2008, 04:00 PM
Some USAF units are leading the way in COIN Opns.

Worked closely in zone with an ESFS that was assigned to my Infantry Battalion in OIF. That ESFS conducted itself very well essentially carrying out a textbook COIN Operation in the area.

Both airpower & ground tactical air elements have a place in our national future.