The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[pvebber]

try to be prepared for as many differnat situations as possible.

So there are situations when working back from a single scenario is not the best strategy to use. Since the reason you give is political, this reinforces the idea that its unrealistic to expect that you can always work in military-centric vacuum, disassociated from politics.


That is why he calls it mapping the system. It is a map nothing more or less. Understanding function is a differant step.

Not according to this article. It is all part of step 2WHAT


At the highest level of analysis, we start this process by identifying the systems that need to change so that we can realize our future picture;
at the next level of analysis, we continue by identifying the centers of
gravity (the control or leverage points) against which to apply real resources to force needed system change.

The process by which the model of the system you are trying to abstract through the 5 Rings process is defined is not directly addressed. Since this modeling of functions (the first stage in application of systems theory - you have to understand the system in detail before you can simplify it) it lead to one of the criticisms of Wardens process - that it tries to jump directly to "simple" without a real understanding of the "complex". The real world attempts to do this (SOSA or system of systems analysis) lead to things like the much maligned powerpoint diagram of systems interactions in Afghanistan. The treatment of systems as essentially static by SOSA analysts and the inability to "know what you don't know" about a system lead to much of Gen Mattis' criticism of EBO - which centered in large measure on difficulties implementing SOSA in an way that sufficiently informed decision-makers (I saw this first hand in several JEFX's).


I can tell you from personal experience it works very well.....In LE we call them TASERS they take any will to fight right out of the person. We need Military level TASERS!

So you taser (tase?) somebody, and then they get up and get into the police car right? No the taser ENABLES you take him into custody. It doesn't convince him to get in the car, it just removes his ability to resist for a few minutes. If you don't exploit that opportunity, then he just gets up and runs away. In many ways we have military tasers. Our overwhelming superiority has "taken the fight" out of many potential adversaries, leading them to exploit non-military avenues to engage us. 9/11 taught us the a military is not required to attack us.

The Air Force may be able to provide tasers, but as Warden admits, it only enable ground forces ability to take the perps into custody.



That is exactly why you need to stay in physical area....you can't analyze someones intentions...it is impossible, he may lie to you.....but you can analyze CAPABILITIES and be prepared to disable,disrupt or destroy them.

Like I demonstrate in wargames people bring me into, if you make a country's military irrelevant, it will oblige and use it as a red cape and goad you into military engagement that distracts you from the true political purpose. This is especially true when they have a command of social landscape and maneuver the US to solidify its social networking position by attacking its military on "good ground". In other words if you insist on divorcing the physical from the cognitive and social dimensions, then that will be your undoing. Wars are not "physical" but social phenomena. Physical interaction is simply one way to influence social dynamics. IF you use chess strategy and the adversary know you will, he will make the game Go and will win. You can of course just turn the juice up on the taser and kill the perp, but then you have to deal with the social consequences.


It depends on WHO's house you burn down....the rest of the population may love for doing just that!

Ahhh! not so fast - you just changes the boundary around the system! Another fundamental problem with Warden's use of systems theory. He arbitrarily places convenient boundaries around the "system". I was not trying to influence the broader population. If you don't understand the social as well as the physical network you could also push a large contingent into your adversary's camp by heavy handed "physical" action.

Once again, you can't just draw a boundary around the physical components of an adversary system and ignore the cognitive and social effects of "effecting" the physical parts.


He was a smart guy. But that is really Warden's ultimate point War is the final option never the first,second or even the third. It is only justifiable when you need to eliminate a threat to your survival.

Then he is arguing to fundamentally change the "American Way of War" which is that we employ military forces worldwide as the stick behind or diplomatic and economic carrots. It also begs the question of what constitutes a "threat to our survival"? Was WWII really a threat to OUR survival? WWI certainly wasn't. None of the wars since have been.

What if our survival is not threatened, but our position of economic leadership in the world? If China established a "Pacific NATO" that declared its goal to be not threatening our survival, but systematically degrading our economic might until there was a "level playing field" in their opinion and we no longer constituted a superpower? How do you utilize military force forward in the world, if your stated policy is not to use it unless your national survival is threatened. If an LCS that is inconveniently placed is sunk, what do you do? A Carrier Strike group? THe belligent says "go home and we have no beef with you". That is not a threat to your survival, but emasculates you on the world stage.

If you are only going to war against existential threats why not just maintain a an ICBM force and tell the world, any country that threatens my existence goes away. You then don't need an Air Force.

I really don't think that is what Warden has in mind.


I think he was transferred to another job before he finished.

Which doesn't answer the question of what is broken with the current system? And why it is better to assume the Air Force can do everything and rule things out, rather than look at the joint force as a whole, and decide which service is most effective and efficient at providing desired capabilities?

Nicky is smart, and understands the dangers of dividing the physical from the social and focusing on the wrong one:


But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony.

http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince17.htm

[slapout9]

So you taser (tase?) somebody, and then they get up and get into the police car right? No the taser ENABLES you take him into custody. It doesn't convince him to get in the car Ohhhhh yes it does!:D


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aTd471QNwTc&feature=related

[slapout9]

So there are situations when working back from a single scenario is not the best strategy to use. Since the reason you give is political, this reinforces the idea that its unrealistic to expect that you can always work in military-centric vacuum, disassociated from politics. I think there are situations where we (US) try to solve political and economic situations by dumping it on the military instead of actually solving the real problem.




Not according to this article. It is all part of step 2WHAT There is a bit more to the process than can be explained in a short article.




The process by which the model of the system you are trying to abstract through the 5 Rings process is defined is not directly addressed. Since this modeling of functions (the first stage in application of systems theory - you have to understand the system in detail before you can simplify it) it lead to one of the criticisms of Wardens process - that it tries to jump directly to "simple" without a real understanding of the "complex". The real world attempts to do this (SOSA or system of systems analysis) lead to things like the much maligned powerpoint diagram of systems interactions in Afghanistan. The treatment of systems as essentially static by SOSA analysts and the inability to "know what you don't know" about a system lead to much of Gen Mattis' criticism of EBO - which centered in large measure on difficulties implementing SOSA in an way that sufficiently informed decision-makers (I saw this first hand in several JEFX's). I very much agree on that one. It is something that needs to be worked on. A better feedback loop in particular. To see how the system has adapted after an action has been taken against the system.




So you taser (tase?) somebody, and then they get up and get into the police car right? No the taser ENABLES you take him into custody. It doesn't convince him to get in the car, it just removes his ability to resist for a few minutes. If you don't exploit that opportunity, then he just gets up and runs away. In many ways we have military tasers. Our overwhelming superiority has "taken the fight" out of many potential adversaries, leading them to exploit non-military avenues to engage us. 9/11 taught us the a military is not required to attack us. I don't agree, we have not taken the fight out of them. They are still fighting are they not?


The Air Force may be able to provide tasers, but as Warden admits, it only enable ground forces ability to take the perps into custody. So what is wrong with that?





IF you use chess strategy and the adversary know you will, he will make the game Go and will win. You can of course just turn the juice up on the taser and kill the perp, but then you have to deal with the social consequences. You will have to deal with social consequences no matter what you do. So the question is IMO which action will strengthen your system and weaken your enemy.?




Ahhh! not so fast - you just changes the boundary around the system! Another fundamental problem with Warden's use of systems theory. He arbitrarily places convenient boundaries around the "system". I was not trying to influence the broader population. If you don't understand the social as well as the physical network you could also push a large contingent into your adversary's camp by heavy handed "physical" action.

Once again, you can't just draw a boundary around the physical components of an adversary system and ignore the cognitive and social effects of "effecting" the physical parts. 1-I don't understand, nobody ever said you should ignore them, you just need to realize that you can't predict them. 2-Changing the boundaries is what the whole Strategy is about Warden has always said you want to start at the highest level possible largest system involved) and then work down to the individual target




Then he is arguing to fundamentally change the "American Way of War" which is that we employ military forces worldwide as the stick behind or diplomatic and economic carrots. It also begs the question of what constitutes a "threat to our survival"? Was WWII really a threat to OUR survival? WWI certainly wasn't. None of the wars since have been. Pearl Harbor???


What if our survival is not threatened, but our position of economic leadership in the world? If China established a "Pacific NATO" that declared its goal to be not threatening our survival, but systematically degrading our economic might until there was a "level playing field" in their opinion and we no longer constituted a superpower? How do you utilize military force forward in the world, if your stated policy is not to use it unless your national survival is threatened. If an LCS that is inconveniently placed is sunk, what do you do? A Carrier Strike group? THe belligent says "go home and we have no beef with you". That is not a threat to your survival, but emasculates you on the world stage. Our economic leadership is being threatened, no doubt in my book(China's finance man studies Abe Lincoln,which is why we will loose) but that is not a military problem.


If you are only going to war against existential threats why not just maintain a an ICBM force and tell the world, any country that threatens my existence goes away. You then don't need an Air Force.
I really don't think that is what Warden has in mind. The poorer our country gets the more we may end up looking at this idea and no Warden wouldn't like it nor should anybody else for that matter, because you wouldn't need a Navy or an Army either.




Which doesn't answer the question of what is broken with the current system? And why it is better to assume the Air Force can do everything and rule things out, rather than look at the joint force as a whole, and decide which service is most effective and efficient at providing desired capabilities? I don't know the answer to that, maybe Cliff or Entropy can shed some insight on that.


Nicky is smart, and understands the dangers of dividing the physical from the social and focusing on the wrong one:

http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince17.htm
Nice link, thanks

[Cliff]

Then he is arguing to fundamentally change the "American Way of War" which is that we employ military forces worldwide as the stick behind or diplomatic and economic carrots. It also begs the question of what constitutes a "threat to our survival"? Was WWII really a threat to OUR survival? WWI certainly wasn't. None of the wars since have been.

World War II was most definitely a threat to our survival. In the short term I agree that Germany and Japan could not threaten the US directly. In the long term, had the UK and Russia been knocked out, do you think we would have lasted long? Also, Hitler was working on his own nukes and a capability to either bomb the US or use intercontinental rockets to hit us. I would say we could not ignore the threat.


If you are only going to war against existential threats why not just maintain a an ICBM force and tell the world, any country that threatens my existence goes away. You then don't need an Air Force.

Except that the USAF runs the land-based ICBMs... we tried this, it was called the New Look - i.e. use nuclear deterrence to allow conventional reductions. I think we are headed to a similar place now - manpower reductions to cut people will result in greater reliance on the deterrent power of nukes, along with the USN and USAF's ability to project power without boots on the ground.


Which doesn't answer the question of what is broken with the current system? And why it is better to assume the Air Force can do everything and rule things out, rather than look at the joint force as a whole, and decide which service is most effective and efficient at providing desired capabilities?

I'm not sure what Col Warden would say, but I think his point would be that Iraq and Afghanistan cost a lot of money and weren't exactly winners. He seeks to reduce costs by using the most efficient and effective force, and posits that as technology improves that will increasingly be airpower (again service neutral). I don't think he'd say the USAF can do everything... but that it can do more than we give it credit for, and we should continue to improve.

I think that as directed energy weapons are fielded, you will see a massive increase in the ability of airpower to affect situations. The fact that you can use a laser as both a sensor and a weapon helps, as does the incredible ability to discriminate (very precise effects).

I think, listening to SECDEF's speeches and the deficit talk, that we will see the Libya model (air but no boots on the ground) increasingly become our preferred model for conflict. Not saying there won't be FID, some COIN, etc. but large scale nation building is off the books as long as we're in a serious fiscal crisis- it just costs too much. Before I get scoffed by the masses, think about the math- yes an aircraft is expensive. But take ONW/OSW as an example- while they cost a lot, we didn't lose any folks or aircraft, and we deterred Saddam from attacking his neighbors and his minorities. That alone saves billions over the long run in health care and replacement procurement costs. We were able to impose our will and generally achieve our objectives at a lower cost than the alternatives.

It's really a back to the future type thing, as we return to the 1990s model of using airpower to project our will.

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

It's really a back to the future type thing, as we return to the 1990s model of using airpower to project our will.How did that work out for us? :wry:

Consider also that if your conjectures of what might have been are removed and what was is considered, WW II was not existential. The only existential war the US has fought was our own Civil War -- which also and not coincidentally had the highest per capita casualty rate. All our other wars have been to disrupt, delay, deter or remove potential threats (think about WW II...). Old JMA on other threads lambastes our obvious lack of consistent policy -- but we do have a few and that one has been around for 220+ years -- we're pretty easy going but we do not tolerate potential threats. Just make noise and no problem, get bothersome and get hurt a bit (and not necessarily militarily...), get too serious and get removed... :cool:

[Marc]

Not saying there won't be FID, some COIN, etc. but large scale nation building is off the books as long as we're in a serious fiscal crisis- it just costs too much.

Not necessarily. Nation building is not expensive if you do it right. Operation Just Cause in Panama is a good example.

[slapout9]

The late 1950's Mike Wallace interview of Alexander de Seversky sponsored by Phillip Morris cigarettes.



http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/multimedia/video/2008/wallace/seversky_alexander_de.html

[Cliff]

How did that work out for us? :wry:

It generally achieved our strategic objectives (Saddam contained/not slaughtering Kurds, helped end genocide in FRY (once we chose to actually use airpower), Serbs withdrew from Kosovo)... without resorting to ground combat. I'm not saying it was effective in resolving the situations completely, but like I said, you do what you can afford to when it isn't an existential threat.


Consider also that if your conjectures of what might have been are removed and what was is considered, WW II was not existential. The only existential war the US has fought was our own Civil War -- which also and not coincidentally had the highest per capita casualty rate. All our other wars have been to disrupt, delay, deter or remove potential threats (think about WW II...). Old JMA on other threads lambastes our obvious lack of consistent policy -- but we do have a few and that one has been around for 220+ years -- we're pretty easy going but we do not tolerate potential threats. Just make noise and no problem, get bothersome and get hurt a bit (and not necessarily militarily...), get too serious and get removed... :cool:

Agree that WWI probably wasn't, Civil War definitely was. I stand by my words on WWII - I don't think we would have co-existed with the Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the Third Reich for long. I agree that in 1941 we were not threatened with immediate destruction... but how long before someone pulls the trigger do they become a deadly threat to you?

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

I'm not saying it was effective in resolving the situations completely, but like I said, you do what you can afford to when it isn't an existential threat.I agree with that last but suggest that both your cases cite minor aims and part way solutions to the problems -- and the Kosovo thing is subject to the qualification of the KLA entry on the ground. Not to mention that in that operation the US -- indeed, the West in general -- got totally snookered by the Albanian Kosovars... :rolleyes:
Agree that WWI probably wasn't, Civil War definitely was. I stand by my words on WWII - I don't think we would have co-existed with the Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the Third Reich for long. I agree that in 1941 we were not threatened with immediate destruction... but how long before someone pulls the trigger do they become a deadly threat to you?I think you just made my point. :wry:

IMO WW II was, for the US as opposed to many others, not existential -- in our case it was a contrived, indeed almost forced, entry (by FDR, devious old Dude...) into an ongoing war where we were not at the time threatened but which we entered in order to insure the removal or at least disruption of potential threats of great significance.

Both points more academic than of real import...:o

[Fuchs]

Old JMA on other threads lambastes our obvious lack of consistent policy -- but we do have a few and that one has been around for 220+ years -- we're pretty easy going but we do not tolerate potential threats.

a) U better not call others "old"! :D

b) "pretty easy going" depends 100% on the definition of "threats"
That's where the real problem is.

Allende, Germany '17, Spain, Grenada and Mossadegh were never actual threats.

[Ken White]

a) U better not call others "old"! :DRelative, all things are relative... :D
b) "pretty easy going" depends 100% on the definition of "threats" That's where the real problem is.

Allende, Germany '17, Spain, Grenada and Mossadegh were never actual threats.Very true. Germany '17 was more a Wilsonian reaction, a liberal 'do gooder' effort to aid those 'friends' perceived as in need of magnanimous US assistance. :rolleyes:

It was if not misplaced certainly not aimed at a real threat -- though the infamous Zimmerman Note lent credence to the potential and British propaganda had an effect. As for the others (and a few more...), more Wilsonian zeal and foolishness to tell others how to think. All were IMO rather stupid and unnecessary, though the Grenadians appear happy with the result in their case...

You're gonna have to change your tag line yet... :D

[Fuchs]

Will do.

This one is related to what you wrote about intolerance to threats, with a bit historical analogy:
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/11/extremist-warfare.html

[Ken White]

Good, perceptive article. Also agree with it and would add that late 1944 and early 1945 in western Europe allowed the US Army to 'learn' some really, really bad lessons (so did Viet Nam and so will Afghanistan and Iraq but that's another thread...).

I enjoyed your last Commenters post on that article with the Liddel Hart quote. Recalled it from my own readings a few days (eons?) ago. Accurate and eminently logical... :wry:

[Fuchs]

I actually changed the signature already. I was just more subtle in changing it than usual.

[Ken White]

And I'm older than usual. :o

Good job... :wry:

[pvebber]

The thread seems to be playing itself out into some related but disparate topics so it may be time to at least review the bidding on the arguments to date as influenced by the wonderful exchange we’ve had thus far.

Going through the Warden Article, I still find the following issues bother me:
First is the debatable definition of airpower as “anything guidable that moves through air or space, manned or remotely piloted”.

What constitutes “guidable”? Does this mean “redirectable in flight” or simply something with a guidance system that corrects for error? The “remotely piloted” would seem to indicate “remotely guidable” but this is not altogether clear. This is important as the former excludes many types of ballistic missiles, GPS guided ordnance (whose guidance minimizes CEP relative to a predetermined location but are not “remotely guidable” in flight) while it includes some types of laser guided artillery shells and other traditional “ground power ordnance” that can be directed by a remote operator to alternative targets. It also defines away seapower as simply a truck for various forms of air power or ground power, since modern ships utilize guided weapons that are launched through the air almost exclusively, or carry Marines. Does Seapower therefore have no role other than as a slow, high capacity component of TRANSCOM?

The other issue with the definition is the reference to manned and remotely piloted, but not autonomous. Does this mean autonomous air vehicles are not considered airpower?

I would offer that defining “Airpower” is more than a consideration of the medium through which it passes, but the purpose to which its passage through the air is intended. “Airpower” as a form of combat power is concerned with the control of the air (or space) and with conducting operations against targets that are not related to the support of missions performed by ground or naval forces.

Airpower indeed has some fundamental capabilities that enable it to perform a distinctive form of combat operations, but to make the capabilities directly supporting ground or naval operations beholden to commanders responsible for conducting other types of operations introduces an unnecessary layer of C2, with potentially high risk effects.

Second:


…perhaps equally few understand that airpower can and should fundamentally change the very nature of war.

Regardless of airpower’s potential, it can never realize its real capability so long as it remains bound to an anachronistic view of war with an anachronistic vocabulary.

This opening salvo is elaborated on building an argument that “battle-centric’ military thinking has been made obsolete by airpower. This is only true if one considers air power to have no effective defense. If there is an effective defense to airpower, then it must be overcome to achieve the broader objective. While it may be possible to do this in a much compressed timeframe compared to ground power, even stealthy airpower is at increasing risk as more sophisticated integrated air defenses are developed. The notion that airpower can strike at will, with little regard to adversary capabilities to defend itself assumes that future adversaries will be as inept at coordinating air defenses as we saw in Iraq, or that the country has no capability to horizontally escalate the conflict in an attempt to deter us from conducting a protracted air campaign, like we did in Desert Storm.

Future adversaries are increasingly likely to have both significant IADS capability AND plans for horizontal escalation. These defenses and escalation options must be defeated in a series of battles that are conducted BEFOR and which must be successful, to enable the sort of paralyzing or coercive strikes described later in the article. They may be entirely air battles, but they still must be successfully conducted, or other operations will be conducted at potentially serious risk.

Airpower MIGHT be able to forgo battle, and directly attack strategic center’s of gravity, but only if the adversary has no capability to conduct an air defense, or unacceptably escalate the conflict to other domains or geographic regions. It may have a significant effort on its hands to defeat those capabilities before it can attack any other targets.

Thirdly, the article proposes a strategic framework for planning operations in general. It consists of 4 steps – defining the desired endstate, identifying the systems and system components we need to effect to achieve this desired endstate, identifying first the ways and only after that the means by which this change is effected, and lastly how to decide we are “done” and the implications of being “done” on the future state of the system we have affected.

That strategic framework borrows heavily from systems theory and assumes some critical analytic tasks can be accomplished. First is that we properly define and bound the system we are trying to effect. Since the global economy affects us all, affecting significant players in the global economy will feedback on us, and open us to the sort of horizontal escalation opportunities that have been assumed away together with a need to think in terms of “battles”. Thus the adversary “system” may not be as simple to define as it was in the case of a global “niche” player like Iraq, or now Libya.

The level of understanding of the way the components of the target system work together needs to be understood at a very sophisticated level to enable one to determine what the effect individual components in the system have on the system as a whole. For physically simple or “mechanical” systems – where each component has an observable role in the workings of the system this may not be hard. Electrical grids are the classic “simple” physical system. Other systems like financial or supply chain systems may not be as readily discernable in either what all the components are, or how the system will adapt to circumstances affecting individual components of the system. Social systems are the hardest of all to discern and understand in terms of the effect of partial or full loss of function of a particular component. The devil is in the details and assuming that devil can always be tamed is a dangerous one.


Opponents are complicated things with many moving and static parts, but we can simplify our analysis by seeing them as a system, which means that they function in some reasonably connected manner.

This is not universally true, at least not to the point where one can determine the knowledge required to identify key components, or the effect of the loss of key components, a priori. Systems at this level are in a constant state of dynamic adaptation to exigent circumstance. Trains break down, traffic jams occur, power substations fail. Even mechanical systems that have important purposes are not always employed in a consistent manner. “Service oriented systems” with a large human component will not always behave, or respond to a shock, in a consistent or predictable way. The “Shock” required to guarantee failure and inability to correct the failure will generally be large and carry considerable consequences into other systems – most notably the system of “observers” that make up the rest of the global community. Too big a “shock” can be considered inhumane and cause “blowback” beyond the system you are trying to affect. That tipping point where force goes from being justifiable to excessive is not one that can be predicted.

That said, the “5 rings” framework has a great deal of value when the circumstances make it the preferred type of methodology to use – when one has a considerable amount of international “top cover”, one is dealing with an adversary that has a fragile air defense capability and limited capability for horizontal escalation (i.e. it can be accounted for and measures taken to mitigate its effects to a large degree), when the underlying analytical assumptions are valid, and the centers of gravity are both discernable, and can be engaged staying well below any potential tipping point for “blowback”. These conditions do not exist in general, so the framework is not universally applicable.

[pvebber]

Where the 5 Rings framework gets on shakier ground is the argument that Return on investment is related to the centrality of the rings, and the time over which they are engaged. This assumes that centers of gravity are distributed in the rings in such a way that the most valuable are always leaders, and the least valuable are fielded forces. The obvious case that turns this on its head is an example country that has a weak central leadership, but strong regionally controlled , but cooperating, IADS systems. In such a country the IAD system must be taken down before any other targets can be engaged, so its value is “the highest” since no action is possible while it operates, and the leadership is too decentralized to be effectively neutralized even if it could all be quickly engaged. A limited transportation infrastructure may in fact be the “most valuable” center of gravity to attack once the IADS system is down, or it might be a leaflet drop on the populace of the major cities. The characteristics of the individual systems and the arrangement of CoGs within the rings and their dependencies and vulnerabilities will determine the relative value particularly of processes, infrastructure, and population. North Viet Nam correctly focused on our Population as the key CoG.

Similarly the notion that “faster is inherently better” has already suffered a considerable loss of support in C2 circles as it has become apparent that “opportune, effective timing” is more important than sheer speed in enacting decisions. The Warden construct is overly reliant on an assumption of a “one turn war” where we make our essentially single, parallel operation, and the result will always be an adversary unable to “take his turn”. This belies much of what we worked out throughout the Cold War to ensure the survivability and effectiveness of our counter-strike nuclear capability. It is doubtful that any country that would engage in a course of action that would result in antagonizing us to the point of war, would do so without a portfolio of “flexible deterrent options” that could be brought into play as a cost imposing strategy on our threats of massive attack.

The massive single blow strategy is also one that is difficult to balance with the “Exciting” possibility of “conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood.” How does one determine the “optimum” single blow that minimizes cost to us, destruction of the adversary, and achieves a desired result with no ill will? Again the information to determine this philosopher’s stone of force application is impossible to know when you start. It seems to imply that we abandon our traditional incremental response to an adversary use of force. We in effect “take it for the team” until we decide in Popeye fashion that’s “alls I kin stans, an I kint stans na more” eat our Spinach and bust Bluto in the chops turning his eyes to little “Xs”. IF we have no strategic methodology that can incrementally respond to rising tensions and brinksmanship, then we severely limit our options to deter war in its early stages.

This also does not consider the possibility of circumstances that result in “wicked” problems whose desired endstate is impossible to agree on, either because the fundamental problem eludes effective characterization, or all results have significant downsides, or coalition interests prevent completely common ground. In these sorts of cases thee may be a requirement to approach the problem in a sequential rather than parallel way in order to learn about the nature of the problem as you apply different ways and means (only some of which will be military) to figure out what sort of end states are achievable, or what endstate characteristics one values over others. This problem is exacerbated by the notion that one can separate and treat as disconnected aspects of a system, the physical and the “morale” and that since the “morale” side is messy, one only needs to reduce the physical to 0 to preclude the “morale” side from mattering. This presumes a fundamentally different underlying structure of warfare than the physical domain and cognitive domains mediated by information domain. The equation “outcome = physical x morale” is only applicable to a small subset of cases where the adversary has an extremely brittle physical system. The alternative in general is “nuclear warfare by conventional means” a dismantling of the adversary’s capability to operate as functional nation. This can’t be done against a nuclear armed opponent (as its effect is an existential one that will trigger a “use or lose” nuclear response) and has a high likelihood to exceed the “tipping point” of global opinion except in the most egregious of circumstances.


Airpower enables us to think about conflict from a future-back, end-game-first perspec¬tive as opposed to one based on the battle obsession of Clausewitz and his followers.

This is a fundamentally false dichotomy. Clausewitz if anything harangues the reader about the need to understand the nature of the war being fought before one embarks on it. The ‘battle obsession’ of Clausewitz is a straw man, to substitute for the real enemy of Wardens construct in Clausewitz – the fog and friction of war that will always frustrate attempts to make war scientific. In beating down the strawman of battle obsession, Warden dismisses Clausewitz entirely and does not deal with the question of how one conquers fog and friction to achieve war with “little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood”. Or how airpower dispenses with the need for battle in cases where the “enemy gets a turn”.

So why should we be concerned that there are so many potential issues with Wardens airpower manifesto. Well, 2012 will see perhaps the most extensive review of roles and missions of the services, at least since Gold Water Nichols, if not WWII. Everything is on the table, including the “even division of defense dollars into thirds. If the argument that is taken into this debate by airpower advocates is:


Airpower can operate against virtually all of the centers of gravity directly related to strategic objectives, regardless of their loca¬tion. Because it can bring many under attack in compressed periods of time, it is well suited for parallel operations. Finally, air¬power can produce appropriate effects with little destruction and bloodshed, if desired.

Then these claims need to be subjected to appropriate scrutiny and if found wanting, sent back to the drawing board. The stakes are high regardless of the claims that “none should fear airpower advocates”:


To see such a valuable resource properly used, however, we Airmen must stop thinking we can do so via the two methodologies most prominent in the last few years: trumpeting our spectacular technology and asking merely to be treated as equal members of a team composed of the three forms of power.

For all its disclaimers, this is about the Air Force wanting a bigger piece of the defense budget – a zero sum game that would occur at the expense of the Army and Navy. The strategy advocated in the article is to argue that the framework you choose for strategy should be chosen to “lock in” airpower as the winner:


If our approach to strategy finds acceptance, airpower becomes the ob¬vious solution; if it fails, we are just another hawker of new gizmos.

This is a pretty bare-faced attempt to hijack the current Joint construct and substitute out current military planning methodology which assumes strategy is done outside the military “system” (though not without military involvement) and replace it with a strategy framework that is “loaded” in favor of airpower and imposes a requirement to cede at least some of the strategy process to airpower practitioners. This is not just unabashedly parochial, but begs the question of what happens when the situation is not amenable to solution by coercive application of airpower. The notion that “if airpower can’t solve a problem, its not a military problem” reduces the realm of military applicability to variations on the “halt scenario” (ie a country does something, like invade a neighbor, that you want to “halt” so you apply airpower to eliminate the adversary’s capability to (in some combination) command his fielded forces, supply his forces, support his forces from the rear, sustain popular support for the adventure, and finally, just destroy the forces themselves (back to the five rings).

There are many other military problems besides variations on the “halt” scenario and defining away as “non-military” so nothing but airpower is applicable is not an argument for airpower, it’s an intellectual sleight of hand that serve neither the nation, nor airpower advocates.

[pvebber]

Why should we start out with “airpower has limits” in our mind instead of “airpower has no limits”?

Because it does.

And to be responsible stewards of the taxpayers money, ALL ‘xxx-power” advocates need to start with WHAT WE ARE CAPABLE OF TODAY and argue for the evolution (or occasional revolution) of those capabilities based on an actionable course of conceptual and technology development that improves capabilities and adds new one over time. Should there be a think tank out there thinking with an open aperture how to press the limits of “the doable” Certainly! And they exist. They are doing that and new technologies and capabilities are on the horizon that will enable major changes in how we fight. But for once we have to be prepared to think in holoisitc terms about the future joint force, and in this upcoming debate of roles and missions we have to consider how “xxx-power” can enable solutions to threats that are out there brewing in an integrated way. This is the opposite of the parochial “it should be the goal of airpower to get a bigger share of the pie” strategy advocated in this article.

In the fiscal environment we are going to be in a “if we don’t hang together we will all hang separately” mode in the coming years – perhaps as long as the coming decade. We need to advocate for our xxx-powers strengths, not try to “game the system” to our advantage by trying to argue for artificially constraining strategic frameworks. Let your xxx-power constituency argue how it holistically empowers the entire joint force, not why it should hold primacy over them. If each of the services (lets not pretend that airpower is not substantially = to Air Force) go into next years debates with the strategy espoused in this article, the resulting melee – like a election primaries, will only give ammunition for more drastic cuts in defense when the broader “general election” pits defense against the rest of government.

[slapout9]

pvebber, my local electric company has scheduled a power outage (on purpose:eek:) tomorrow for about 8 hours, but like MacArthur I shall return.

[pvebber]

I'll let my missive above stand as my position on this thread and give you the final word - whenever your power company gets its Rings inorder ;)

[slapout9]

Until then look at this...ipad and unmanned drone at the office:eek:


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jc-DX3S_QMw&feature=feedrec_grec_index

[davidbfpo]

Apologies cannot recall if posted here before.

Slap,

Try this for an IT application:http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/04/predator-smart-camera-locks-on-tracks-anything-mercilessly/

I think this application is already in operation, or certainly at the development stage within the military-industrial complex.

[slapout9]

pvebber, it has been a great discussion. You raised many good points and I was tempted to just respond to the question of can Air power do it all, but perhaps it is better to start with a little history or how did we (USA) get into this mess. Part 2 to follow.

[slapout9]

During WW2 we produced many specialized vehicles that could maneuver to the right position in order to put lots of dumb steel missiles on target. The vehicles were more important than the steel missiles because until they maneuvered into the proper firing position you could never be sure of hitting anything. The economic strategy was to produce lots of vehicles and lots of dumb steel missiles and give them to the military to fire at the enemy until he was dead or surrendered.

Toward the end we developed the Atom bomb. Now all the sudden War changed dramatically or so it was thought . No longer could large Armies or Navies conduct Mass operations without the risk of their total destruction. All we needed was a few specialized delivery vehicles and a few very special droppable missiles.

But something else was also happening. The relative importance of the vehicle to the weapon was changing. A shift was taking place. Although a very specialized vehicle was still needed, the weapon itself was becoming more important than the vehicle. Would the Army and Navy allow this?

Stay tuned for Part 3.

[Marc]

But something else was also happening. The relative importance of the vehicle to the weapon was changing. A shift was taking place. Although a very specialized vehicle was still needed, the weapon itself was becoming more important than the vehicle. Would the Army and Navy allow this?

Of course the Army and Navy would allow this. And they did. Guided anti-tank missiles often cost as much (or more) than the non-specialized vehicle that carries them (APC, light truck, all terrain vehicle). The combination of non-specialized vehicles with high-tech, high-cost weapon systems had proven to be very effective, allowing light infantry units to engage armored forces (see for instance the battle of Debecka Pass Iraq, or the Toyota War in Chad, or the operations of Egyptian infantry against Israeli armor in the Sinai during the early phases of the Yom Kippur War). The same goes for fire-and-forget light anti-air missils. For the Navy, the demise of the big-guns battle ship in favor of the frigate carrying sophisticated missile weapon systems represents a similar evolution.

[slapout9]

In 1947 LTG James M. Gavin would(former Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division) publish a book called "Airborne Warfare." It was about how the future of our country depended upon Air Power. An exert from the book is published below. By the end of the year "The Great Divorce" would happen. The Army Air Corps would become a independent service. The United States Air Force was created.


It was 2,200 yeas later when sea power reached its full potential. Then, in the battle of Normandy, the Allied powers, using hundreds of seacraft of all types, invaded the Continent of Europe. The sea was used to its fullest. It is significant, however, that part of the invading forces were transported by AIR. It was significant because that battle saw sea power at its peak. AIR power was just beginning. And this is the critical point that we have arrived at, and this is the competition we are in. This media that envelops us we must use. We must imagine, design, and develop the means and methods of using it. We must--if our people and our institutions are to survive. For the people with their institutions who best learn how to use this media will survive in this highly competitive world.
AIR power is now the decisive element in modern war. And by AIR power is meant every contribution to waging war that man has created and that can be flown. Men, weapons, ammunition, food, bombs, missiles, and all that it will take to fight a future war must FLY. Clearly, therefore, in the development of our AIR power and Airborne potential changes must be made in our ground force equipment as well as in our Air Force equipment.

The new independent Air Force was going to change everything. A mental Atomic bomb had been dropped on the Army. The Navy was figuring out that in order to survive it needed to go Atomic and to go under the water, that too was going to change everything or was it? It was starting to appear that an Air Force (really an Airplane Force ) and the Atomic Submarine Navy, and maybe a few good Marines were all we needed. There wasn't going to be anything left for the Army to do.....or was the Army about to deliver the Change of all Changes. A change in the very concept of what a weapon is and most important a conceptual change of what an organization is.

Stay tuned for part 4.

[slapout9]

Haven't forgotten about this thread but tornado's hit Alabama hard last night so it may be a couple of days before I finish. Airpower could have made a big difference and we need more advanced Airpower and Airborne concepts for war and civil emergencies. More Emergency VTOL aircraft (not just helicopters) Air Force used to say "Speed is Life" certainly true last night and today. Emergency crews are stuck to the ground...just pathetic and unnecessary!

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Zenpundit for this, the graphic is of note and available on:http://committeeofpublicsafety.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/bowtie13.png

Zen has some comments:http://zenpundit.com/?p=4274#comments

[SWJ Blog]

Old Wine in New Bottles: Douhet, Warden, and Counterinsurgency (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/old-wine-in-new-bottles-douhet-warden-and-counterinsurgency)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/old-wine-in-new-bottles-douhet-warden-and-counterinsurgency) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[slapout9]

Link to article and interview of Retired USAF Colonel John Warden, author of "The Enemy Is A System" and Winning Strategist from Gulf War One on how to handle Iraq crisis by using Strategy and Airpower.




http://americanthinker.com/2014/06/iraq_crisis_solved_by_col_john_warden.html

[Steve Blair]

Sorry, slap...that's just Warden trying to make his preferred solution relevant even when it isn't. ISIS is still a relatively irregular foe, and according to Colin Gray's informative (if overly-wordy) study "Airpower for Strategic Effect" (commissioned by the Air University and Air Force Research Institute) one of the things airpower does poorly is "Apply heavy and potentially decisive pressure for conclusive strategic effect in (largely) irregular conflicts." (Gray, p. 281).

[JMA]

A well presented set of options.

This I liked:


Western political leaders are paralyzed by three “conventional wisdom” worries:

1. Nothing can be done short of a full-scale repeat occupation of Iraq.
2. Nothing we do can fundamentally change the situation, but simply postpone the inevitable collapse, and
3. Nothing we can do will create a stable, new situation sustainable over time.

Col. Warden insists that none of these assumptions are true.


Link to article and interview of Retired USAF Colonel John Warden, author of "The Enemy Is A System" and Winning Strategist from Gulf War One on how to handle Iraq crisis by using Strategy and Airpower.

http://americanthinker.com/2014/06/iraq_crisis_solved_by_col_john_warden.html

[TheCurmudgeon]

First, ISSIS is an extraordinarily vulnerable position from the perspective of a system. Warden analyzes that ISIS is especially susceptible to techniques similar to those used in the 100-hour Desert Storm miracle.

Second, the ISIS army has expanded rapidly across a huge territory. That looks impressive on a map. But it means ISIS is not well-established, dug-in, or supplied. As your author interprets it, ISIS is a mile wide but an inch deep. That makes them especially vulnerable with poor supply lines, communications, connections, and preparation.

Third, ISIS have put themselves into a position which is quite vulnerable, in that they stretch across rocky, barren country and desert. This leaves their forces and military equipment far more exposed than over normal terrain.


This demonstrates a complete misunderstnding of ISIS and their relationship with the large Sunni insurgency and the Sunni population.

He has no actual experience in these matters. In Desert Storm there was no attempt to hold territory or to deal long term with the population or Iraq.

I did not see anything helpful in the article.

[Steve Blair]

There are some valuable parts to Warden's stuff, but his biggest shortcoming is that he sees airpower as capable of doing EVERYTHING on its own and being applicable in every situation...even when it's not. Airpower is his hammer, and every situation is a nail...

[jcustis]

Hilarious.

Might work if everything collapses and we can get ISIS into a stadium to celebrate victory...then JDAM the snot out of it.:wry:

[JMA]

There are some valuable parts to Warden's stuff, but his biggest shortcoming is that he sees airpower as capable of doing EVERYTHING on its own and being applicable in every situation...even when it's not. Airpower is his hammer, and every situation is a nail...

In the context of the self imposed limitation of 'no boots on the ground' airpower is all that is available.

In the context of that airpower is indeed everything - being the only option available.

That said, feel free to offer a few ideas for other options you see as being available.

[slapout9]

There are some valuable parts to Warden's stuff, but his biggest shortcoming is that he sees airpower as capable of doing EVERYTHING on its own and being applicable in every situation...even when it's not. Airpower is his hammer, and every situation is a nail...

Steve,
I have know idea where this idea about Airpower being everything came from but it is NOT TRUE! He has never said that or written that to my knowledge. What he has said and does believe is that many times because of Political Policy in the USA and the advanced technology we have that Airpower will be the "KEY" force in the exact same sense that the Marine Corps believe in designating a "MAIN EFFORT". Take a look at the PPT he delivered in February this year 2014 down under in a place called Canberra.

Please take a look, is this not an excellent approach to WINNING instead of being a mind slave to some older/foreign/loosing doctrine.


http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/UploadedFiles/General/1615-1700_John_Warden_Presentation.pdf

[slapout9]

This demonstrates a complete misunderstnding of ISIS and their relationship with the large Sunni insurgency and the Sunni population.

He has no actual experience in these matters. In Desert Storm there was no attempt to hold territory or to deal long term with the population or Iraq.

I did not see anything helpful in the article.

Curmudgy,
Your kidding right!!

No he doesn't know much about insurgencies and he is not interested in holding somebody else's terrain for which they will fight to the death for.......What he does know alot about is WINNING which is what this country needs to start doing instead of holding territory.

[Bill Moore]

Warden apparently thinks,


Warden championed and perfected the concept of approaching “the enemy as a system.” Rather than throwing armies against armies and air forces against air forces, Warden’s strategies involve analyzing an enemy’s military forces as parts of a much larger whole. In the Persian Gulf Air Campaign, Warden dismantled the enemy’s ability to function. You can incapacitate the functioning of your opponent from a system standpoint.

We have tried this for decades and not once was it successful. It sure as hell didn't defeat Iraq during DESERT STORM, but relentless targeting of their fielded forces, along with a decisive ground assault did. Targeting the C2 and other systems were supporting efforts, and the overall impact of that that targeting is not possible to assess. The results of the highway of death, the ground campaign, all combined with a PSYOP effort resulted in mass capitulation.

That was a conventional fight, and even then a systems approach had questionable effect. The insurgency is not a systems of systems that conforms to linear thinking, it is composed of a think and adapting adversary who has dealt with our air power previously. This approach is simply an attempt to script write, much like the flawed EBO concept, where if we do X, then Y will happen.

On the other hand, can airpower disrupt, maybe even halt ISIS in their tracks? It certainty can if we have the intelligence to effectively direct it. Ultimately if the Iraqi government wants to win they certainly need to take and hold their sovereign territory, that isn't conventional, it is simply common sense. They are a legitimate state if they can't control their territory, and if ISIS is controlling it then they're winning. I think ISIS could handle getting pushed back a little by a combination of air and ground forces. Unless they're stupid they'll adapt a Fabian strategy and avoid a decisive battles and wage a war of attrition, I think we been down this road before. If we expect too much from air power, like winning, we'll once again be very disappointed. On the other hand, we should use our air power to the extent possible to disrupt and degrade ISIS. A win by ISIS is not in our interest.

[OUTLAW 09]

There is a different solution appearing after the ISIS drove back the massive Iraqi attack on Tikrit to a point 25 kms from Tikrit----even the Samarra relief column is not moving much from the sheer weight of IED strikes on the convoys.


In Der Spiegel from today there is an interview with the senior Chief of Staff for the Iraqi ISIS Response Staff who basically states all three ethnic groups must have their own regions and openly critiques the marginalization of the Sunni's by Malalki and he is a Shia.

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/tikrit-isis-kaempfer-draengen-irakische-armee-zurueck-a-978172.html

[slapout9]

Here is a much better Youtube link to the radio interview of Colonel Warden that goes along with the above listed article. if you listen closely and are familiar with real systems thinking you will find that what people say Warden says as opposed to what he actually says and means is a alot different.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DjyFlNtzh0&feature=youtu.be

[Steve Blair]

Steve,
I have know idea where this idea about Airpower being everything came from but it is NOT TRUE! He has never said that or written that to my knowledge. What he has said and does believe is that many times because of Political Policy in the USA and the advanced technology we have that Airpower will be the "KEY" force in the exact same sense that the Marine Corps believe in designating a "MAIN EFFORT". Take a look at the PPT he delivered in February this year 2014 down under in a place called Canberra.

Please take a look, is this not an excellent approach to WINNING instead of being a mind slave to some older/foreign/loosing doctrine.


http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/UploadedFiles/General/1615-1700_John_Warden_Presentation.pdf

Slap...most of Warden's doctrinal ideas can be traced directly to the Luftwaffe's doctrine of 1936. He also ignores the fact that airpower cannot control terrain, secure a population, or do any number of other things that may be required for actual winning. Can it buy you space? Sure. Can it be extremely effective if you have proper intelligence (which we often do not)? Again, sure. But Warden seems to feel that kinetic airpower is the solution in any and all places. You really might want to read Colin Gray's "Airpower for Strategic Effect" for a wider context on this.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Curmudgy,
Your kidding right!!

No he doesn't know much about insurgencies and he is not interested in holding somebody else's terrain for which they will fight to the death for.......What he does know alot about is WINNING which is what this country needs to start doing instead of holding territory.

No Slap, not kidding. There is a vast difference between interstate combined arms war and instrastate insurgencies. "Winning" in one forum has little or nothing to do with winning in the other.. Only someone who had not been involved in the fight in Iraq or Afgahanistan over the last decade could think otherwise.

You forget that we made short work of the Iraqi Army in 2003-4, yet could not win in the long run. It is the long fight that matters, not the opening palys of the first quarter, as the Colonel likes to think

[Ray]

An interesting thought from Col Warden.

What he should have added is do a 'Sri Lanka' and all will be Quiet on the Iraq Front.

Devastate the whole place so that they are left picking up the pieces for the rest of their lives and never in a position to trouble anyone.

Of course, the UN is in the pocket and Human Rights Pollyannas are under control, right?!

Hakuna Mata!

[TheCurmudgeon]

Ray, Sri Lanka has one advantage that makes it unique ... it is an island. There is no border sanctuary. Not so with Iraq.

Although, turning the area into a wasteland does have its advantages ...

[slapout9]

Slap...most of Warden's doctrinal ideas can be traced directly to the Luftwaffe's doctrine of 1936. He also ignores the fact that airpower cannot control terrain, secure a population, or do any number of other things that may be required for actual winning. Can it buy you space? Sure. Can it be extremely effective if you have proper intelligence (which we often do not)? Again, sure. But Warden seems to feel that kinetic airpower is the solution in any and all places. You really might want to read Colin Gray's "Airpower for Strategic Effect" for a wider context on this.

Steve,
I have read it and if you remember I was the person that found Gray's report and posted the link to the PDF download when it first came out.

1-So from memory Gray also points out that America HAS TO BE A HIGH TECHNOLOGY POWER as it relates to our primary warfare method....does he not point that out in the publication?

2-He also points out that one of the things that Airpower has to do in the future is generate the desired Political effect on the ground by using Airpower.....does he not say that somewhere in the document? That is nothing but restating what Warden has said for years.

3-If you look at the PDF I posted from his (Warden's) presentation in Canberra he states as he has done so for years. First you start with the Peace plan you want, then you develop the War plan you need to accomplish those Political objectives and then and only then do you decide if Airpower can accomplish those desired objectives. He does not say nor has he ever said that Airpower is the only solution.

[slapout9]

No Slap, not kidding. There is a vast difference between interstate combined arms war and instrastate insurgencies. "Winning" in one forum has little or nothing to do with winning in the other.. Only someone who had not been involved in the fight in Iraq or Afgahanistan over the last decade could think otherwise.

You forget that we made short work of the Iraqi Army in 2003-4, yet could not win in the long run. It is the long fight that matters, not the opening palys of the first quarter, as the Colonel likes to think

Curmudgy,
I don't think you had joined this discussion group at the time so you are probably not familiar with some of Warden's earlier comments that I posted from years ago when this Fiasco first started.

1- when we first went into Iraq he warned that we should be careful about being jubilant to soon because "All we have is a beachhead in the middle of 1 billion undefeated Muslims" turned out to be pretty accurate.

2-I posted a copy of a letter to the editor that wrote warning of the dire consequence that would happen when we decided to disband the Iraqi Army which would leave the entire country in an unstable situation. Again turned our to be pretty accurate.

3-But I agree he probably doesn't think much about the way we are thinking of insurgencies because it is not working! Whether we like it or not the " Enemy Is Still A System" and he is smart enough to know that we are not going to turn the Sunni into Democrats nor the Shia into Republicans and have a nice democracy in the Middle East. What is possible is to use American Airpower to support local Arab Armies to achieve our true interest in the region.

[AmericanPride]

1. I don't think the statistical evidence supports the theory that "airpower alone" is a practical strategy; now if we're looking at producing specific political outcomes then I suppose that, in theory, under some conditions airpower alone could be successful. I'm not aware of any examples of this, however.

2. Is ISIS a 'system' or a 'network'? Does the distinction matter? In a system, you destroy a component or sub-component in order to produce failure in the system as a whole. In a network, if you destroy a component or sub-component, the rest of the network still operates. And there is an argument to be made that any organic organization is not a system, but a network.

3. The problem with ISIS is that it represents a fundemental contradiction in American foreign policy in the Middle East and the difficulty is in deciding which component of our policy should be discarded.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Curmudgy,
I don't think you had joined this discussion group at the time so you are probably not familiar with some of Warden's earlier comments that I posted from years ago when this Fiasco first started.

1- when we first went into Iraq he warned that we should be careful about being jubilant to soon because "All we have is a beachhead in the middle of 1 billion undefeated Muslims" turned out to be pretty accurate.

2-I posted a copy of a letter to the editor that wrote warning of the dire consequence that would happen when we decided to disband the Iraqi Army which would leave the entire country in an unstable situation. Again turned our to be pretty accurate.

3-But I agree he probably doesn't think much about the way we are thinking of insurgencies because it is not working! Whether we like it or not the " Enemy Is Still A System" and he is smart enough to know that we are not going to turn the Sunni into Democrats nor the Shia into Republicans and have a nice democracy in the Middle East. What is possible is to use American Airpower to support local Arab Armies to achieve our true interest in the region.

You are correct that I am not familiar with his earlier works. They may sway my opinion, but I doubt it.

The reason we are not "Winning" is because we are incapable of achieving the political objective. See http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/democracy-in-iraq-the-american-militarys-kobayashi-maru/. You cannot kill or bomb your way out of an insurgency. It is a political beast from start to finish. Military types don't like to think that all problems cannot be solved with high explosives, so they deride this fact, but they cannot change it.

The prescription he offers is not going to "Win" anything but a longer war. That is the reality. Too many people want simple explanations to complex problems. That has been our problem since 2001. I am sorry, but reality is knocking on the door. It is not a pretty reality. It is not one that can be solved by air power. It is just a dark, ugly reality that humans are the way they are.

The good Colonel seems to forget Clausewitz' maxim that war is merely political policy conducted by other means. Bombing is not going to achieve the political policy objective of a democratic Iraq secure within its traditional borders. We screwed the pooch on that in 2003-4.

There are two ways this plays out. Either 1) we replace the dictator we overthrew with a dictator who is capable of viciously suppressing sectarian differences, or 2) the state of Iraq ceases to be. That is the political reality that we have been fighting against for over ten years. Better targeting or thinking of the enemy as a system are merely better tactics. Tactics alone cannot achieve strategic objectives. They certainly cannot achieve the desired political objectives

[AmericanPride]

Either 1) we replace the dictator we overthrew with a dictator who is capable of viciously suppressing sectarian differences

I respectfully disagree on this point. Saddam Hussein ruthlessly suppressed everyone and his government included a large number of high ranking Shias. The absence of sectarian conflict is what enabled the Hussein government to function. This false narrative is part of the current problem in formulating an effective response and it's part of the cause of Iraq's instability in the first place since the US administration actively institutionalized sectarian differences in the post-Hussein political system. Sustainable democratic governance is not created through active division of the population.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I respectfully disagree on this point. Saddam Hussein ruthlessly suppressed everyone and his government included a large number of high ranking Shias. The absence of sectarian conflict is what enabled the Hussein government to function. This false narrative is part of the current problem in formulating an effective response and it's part of the cause of Iraq's instability in the first place since the US administration actively institutionalized sectarian differences in the post-Hussein political system. Sustainable democratic governance is not created through active division of the population.

AP, you could be right. However, I think that history has demonstrated in Iraq, Syria, and even places like Kosovo that, in places where there are traditional sectarian differences that have been suppressed via extreme cohesion, once that suppressive force is released those old hatreds surface with a vengeance. Until they are properly addressed, there will be no peace.

However, I will argue against your ideas that sustainable democratic governance is not created through active division of the population. I believe that democracy is easier to achieve where there are bonds that hold the target population together. The idea of power sharing is easier to accept where there is not already a strong distrust. There is trust among homogenous groups. I believe that democracy is actually easier to achieve in a homogenous population than in a sectarian one. I believe the research on the matter will back me up. Again, see http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/democracy-in-iraq-the-american-militarys-kobayashi-maru/.

[AmericanPride]

AP, you could be right. However, I think that history has demonstrated in Iraq, Syria, and even places like Kosovo that, in places where there are traditional sectarian differences that have been suppressed via extreme cohesion, once that suppressive force is released those old hatreds surface with a vengeance. Until they are properly addressed, there will be no peace.

That's true to an extent. But "traditional sectarian differences" implies that they not inherent and that they are mutable. The escalation and descalation of conflict goes through phases over time and across generations; some time periods better or worse than others. Each of those countries you cited have long periods of both, and in the eras of peaceful co-existence normalcy consisted of mixed neighborhoods and marriages, and significant cross-cultural polination. Ethnicity is a specific frame not always correctly selected and accurately applied, and sometimes, like the recent conflict in Iraq, it takes on a life of its own after some instigatation. This is actually true in nearly all instances of intensifying inter-ethnic conflict, including cases of genocide. Once one group decides to seize power for itself (or is placed into power by an external force), the situation compels all other groups to act accordingly. Identifying division is an act of alienation in itself, and institutionalizing it in the political system invariably leads to conflict since someone is always the out-group. This is what the United States did in Iraq by attempting legitimize in law the religious differences of the population. It's a structural problem, not a cultural one.

"Those old hatreds" did not "surface with a vengeance" in Syria, Iraq, and Kosovo until instigated by intervention. In the case of Iraq, it was the failure of the Bush administration to replace the Hussein regime with an effective government - instead, the CPA dismantled government entirely starting with the security forces and administration. And we held on to the narrative of Baathists = Sunnis = repressive minority to justify their legal alienation in the new political system. And in Syria, it was the instigation of armed groups through US allies while the US itself worked diligently to destablize the Assad regime, obstructing Syria's ability to actually keep its civil society together.

There's a reason why the West has generally abolished laws distinguishing rights and priveleges on the basis of race or religion.

[AmericanPride]

However, I will argue against your ideas that sustainable democratic governance is not created through active division of the population. I believe that democracy is easier to achieve where there are bonds that hold the target population together. The idea of power sharing is easier to accept where there is not already a strong distrust. There is trust among homogenous groups. I believe that democracy is actually easier to achieve in a homogenous population than in a sectarian one. I believe the research on the matter will back me up. Again, see http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/dem...obayashi-maru/.

The "bonds" do not necessarily have to be cultural or ethnic. This is a narrative imposed on the majority on the minority to justify the exclusion of the minority from the political process. Those in power do not want to share and deliberately create filters through which to distribute power - this often comes down to ethnicity, religion, race, and so on. The power of a democratic society is not created by its homogenieity but through its plurality in which all groups (or alliance of groups) have similar levels of power and access to power. This is why successful power sharing agreements distribute power rather than separate those seeking it.

Maliki's refusal to share power is invitation by other groups to contest it. The problem is complicated because the most empowered opponents have been so radicalized by the trauma of the War in Iraq, the Arab Spring, and the War in Syria, that the two sides are light years apart in their political positions. Our policy in Iraq and Syria has more or less propelled Al Qaeda from a marginal terrorist threat to one of the most robust movements in the Middle East in decades. It was not sectarian differences that created this problem, but the many years of violence and instability by our failure to create a stable government in Iraq in 2003.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Our policy in Iraq and Syria has more or less propelled Al Qaeda from a marginal terrorist threat to one of the most robust movements in the Middle East in decades. It was not sectarian differences that created this problem, but the many years of violence and instability by our failure to create a stable government in Iraq in 2003.

I disagree in general, but this comment I find odd. The key players now, ISIS, are not AQ. They have deliberately separated themselves from that organization, which probably had it height of power in 2006 and has been on the decline ever since. I am not sure our policy (other than our occupation of traditional Islamic lands) has done much to alter that groups opinion of us.

We might have been able to create a stable government in Iraq, but it would not have been democratic. The odds against that were 1725 to 1, and estimates were that it would've taken 50 years of active support. I think it was a pipe dream that we could recreate the middle east in our own likeness. Worse, it was not even a well thought out pipe dream. It was stupidity on the highest level. A massive waste of blood and treasure. The best thing we did was leave that country. It is folly now to think that we are going to save it.

We destroyed Iraq. Humpty-Dumpty cannot be put back together again. Perhaps we only accelerated what would have happened eventually. I cannot say. But I think that better tactics in targeting or a more effective aerial bombing campaign is not going to fix the political realities on the ground.

[slapout9]

1. I don't think the statistical evidence supports the theory that "airpower alone" is a practical strategy; now if we're looking at producing specific political outcomes then I suppose that, in theory, under some conditions airpower alone could be successful. I'm not aware of any examples of this, however.

2. Is ISIS a 'system' or a 'network'? Does the distinction matter? In a system, you destroy a component or sub-component in order to produce failure in the system as a whole. In a network, if you destroy a component or sub-component, the rest of the network still operates. And there is an argument to be made that any organic organization is not a system, but a network.

3. The problem with ISIS is that it represents a fundamental contradiction in American foreign policy in the Middle East and the difficulty is in deciding which component of our policy should be discarded.

Responses in order of the questions:

1-Your right on this point. Which is why Warden points out in the PPT that the Peace plan comes first then the War Plan then decide if you need an Air plan or an Army,Navy,Marine plan, etc. However the overthrow of Guatamala in 1954 was accomplished by Airpower and Airpower alone after the Army plan failed, but of course that never happened since it was a CIA Air Force that was used.;)

2-It is a system and it does matter. Simply attacking a personnel Network(Ring #4 IMO) is not going to get you the results you want, especially in War. This is a point that is often overlooked about Warden's rings, he has always maintained that you need to do something to ALL of the rings as close to Parallel as possible depending on your available resources. Attacking in Parallel hellps with the fact that war is the most unpredictable and dangerous activity that man engages in so it is best not to take chances.

3-I pretty much agree with this one, so has Warden, you can hear part of that in the radio interview when he talks about Left over Wilsonian thinking.Which is reference to President Wilson's "we will make the world safe for democracy speech"

[slapout9]

You are correct that I am not familiar with his earlier works. They may sway my opinion, but I doubt it.

The reason we are not "Winning" is because we are incapable of achieving the political objective. See http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/democracy-in-iraq-the-american-militarys-kobayashi-maru/. You cannot kill or bomb your way out of an insurgency. It is a political beast from start to finish. Military types don't like to think that all problems cannot be solved with high explosives, so they deride this fact, but they cannot change it.

The prescription he offers is not going to "Win" anything but a longer war. That is the reality. Too many people want simple explanations to complex problems. That has been our problem since 2001. I am sorry, but reality is knocking on the door. It is not a pretty reality. It is not one that can be solved by air power. It is just a dark, ugly reality that humans are the way they are.

The good Colonel seems to forget Clausewitz' maxim that war is merely political policy conducted by other means. Bombing is not going to achieve the political policy objective of a democratic Iraq secure within its traditional borders. We screwed the pooch on that in 2003-4.

There are two ways this plays out. Either 1) we replace the dictator we overthrew with a dictator who is capable of viciously suppressing sectarian differences, or 2) the state of Iraq ceases to be. That is the political reality that we have been fighting against for over ten years. Better targeting or thinking of the enemy as a system are merely better tactics. Tactics alone cannot achieve strategic objectives. They certainly cannot achieve the desired political objectives

Pretty much the same thing for some time. If you listen to the radio interview he brings these same points up during that interview. Also if you look at panel #2 of the PPT I posted he explains that Military force does not work against Religious,Cultural or Politcal belief systems. So the Military should not be tasked to do something for which Military cannot accomplish. I know you are busy but look at the PPT and listen to the actual inteview if you get the chance.

P.S.
I would add that we the USA cannot kill our way out of an insurgency but the COIN case involvoing the Tamil Tigers shows that it can be accomplished by the Home team.

[Ray]

You cannot kill or bomb your way out of an insurgency. It is a political beast from start to finish. Military types don't like to think that all problems cannot be solved with high explosives, so they deride this fact, but they cannot change it.


My experience in my country has been quite contrary to your statement that - Military types don't like to think that all problems cannot be solved with high explosives,

Actually, it is the politicians who think that military actions alone can solve insurgencies while they dither over trying to find a political solution and then dither away endlessly.

Even in the Second Iraq War, the Plan envisioned the tactical aspect but only to the point of how to win the military aspect and not how to disengage once the military action was over and occupy to implement the political plan.

Events thereafter indicate a series of 'spit and paste' jobs which lacked any political vision, resulting in the chaos that ensued and still ensuing.

The issue is that it is incumbent to 'think through' the Plan and coalesce the political objectives with the military plan, and also how the political objectives will take over from the military once the military action is over, in a seamless manner.

In most cases, I think the military does it part of the Plan well, but then the politicians seem to lose their way since they cannot think beyond the immediate.

That leaves the military holding the can, with the hapless politicians hoping that 'something' is conjured so as to exit the mess with as much of 'saving face', as is possible.

Here, in this dilemma of the politicians, 'whiz kids' amongst the military keep alive this false hope with gung ho ideas and schemes.

It is totally an incorrect surmise that gung ho military actions can replace political solutions. It fact, military action without political actions, is the sure shot elixir to lose whatever is gained.

I could go on and indicate how Indian UN contingent do better than most in war ravaged countries, including Somalia which was a horror to many. But then that would not be on topic.

[Ray]

P.S.
I would add that we the USA cannot kill our way out of an insurgency but the COIN case involvoing the Tamil Tigers shows that it can be accomplished by the Home team.

The LTTE case is unique and one has to understand why it cannot be done in Iraq.

The animosity of the Buddhist majority towards the Tamil is historical and they don't honestly recognise that Tamils belong to Sri Lanka. Therefore, there is no love lost if the Tamils exist or they are wiped out.

The animosity is more intense because the Tamils flourished under the British since they learnt English and were in positions of influence that were open to the 'natives'.

On the other hand, the majority Buddhist Sri Lankans looked upon the British as interlopers who came to subjugate them. They boycotted the British and did not learn English and so were left out in the blue whereas the Tamils (who in the first place the Buddhists did not feel belonged to Sri Lanka or Ceylon then) were ruling the roost, after the British.

One of the thing the Sri Lanka Govt did was abolish English and adopted Singhalese Only (the majority Buddhist's language) so that the Tamils did not have the advantage. Then more restrictions were placed. This cause the Tamil heartburn and the LTTE was born.

Therefore, given the equation, wiping out the Tamils ruthlessly and without a care for Human Rights, was not taken to be a crime, and instead applauded.

This cannot be replicated in Iraq.

The Muslim world is not that small a demographic size as the Tamils in the island of Ceylon.

The Muslims are a huge number around the world and increasing.

Any Sri Lankan replicating will have serious repercussions and no country is ready for that, because even now, the chaos that the Muslim fundamentalists are capable of doing and are doing, is more than what can be chewed!

[TheCurmudgeon]

Pretty much the same thing for some time. If you listen to the radio interview he brings these same points up during that interview. Also if you look at panel #2 of the PPT I posted he explains that Military force does not work against Religious,Cultural or Politcal belief systems. So the Military should not be tasked to do something for which Military cannot accomplish. I know you are busy but look at the PPT and listen to the actual inteview if you get the chance.

P.S.
I would add that we the USA cannot kill our way out of an insurgency but the COIN case involvoing the Tamil Tigers shows that it can be accomplished by the Home team.

I looked at the slide set. It was not terribly helpful. Full of platitudes like "short is good, long is bad"; "If you can't do it quickly, maybe you should not do it at all"; "get out at the right time and place" (my stock broker tells me the same thing); "you must have clear, concise, measurable national objectives". I don't think any of our plans to date were designed to violate these rules. In fact, I would say that the early days of Iraq were all about "short is good, long is bad", which is why there was no plan for Phase IV because there was not supposed to be a Phase IV. We had "clear, concise, and measurable national objectives" back in 2004, but no one bothered to check if they were achievable.

[slapout9]

Curmudgy,

I think they are more guiding precepts or prime directives based upon his experiences. But from the Link to the article you posted at War On The Rocks you must be a Star Trek fan. so here is an episode on the Prime Directive.......could be about our involvement in Iraq and the long term fight between the Sunni and Shia or anybody else for that matter. As they say Art imitates life.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FLHH-mE94Pk

[TheCurmudgeon]

Slap,

I fully appreciate the Prime Directive, I just think it is not possible as described in the Star Trek series. We cannot pretend we do not already have contact with other parts of the world. I doubt there is anywhere on the planet where you could go and show the people a picture of the White House or the Pentagon and not have then understand what those building represent. That is why those ideas will not work in our world.

On the other hand, I believe we need to let others find their own way. That is a painful concept for many. the thought of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians dying to allow political reform to take its natural course bothers many. Take for example UNICEF. It is a great idea to help innocent children survive childhood deceases and starvation but what do you do when you suddenly have more adults than the system can bear. War of course. But UNICEF will never admit that they are the cause of conflict in Africa. It is a funny thing playing God with entire societies. That does not stop people from feeling that it is their duty to do it.

I am a serious skeptic when it comes to human nature. I would like to believe that some day we could reach the apex that is represented in Star Trek. I just don't know how many people will die to allow that to become a reality.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Slap,

I fully appreciate the Prime Directive, I just think it is not possible as described in the Star Trek series. We cannot pretend we do not already have contact with other parts of the world. I doubt there is anywhere on the planet where you could go and show the people a picture of the White House or the Pentagon and not have then understand what those building represent. That is why those ideas will not work in our world.

On the other hand, I believe we need to let others find their own way. That is a painful concept for many. the thought of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians dying to allow political reform to take its natural course bothers many. Take for example UNICEF. It is a great idea to help innocent children survive childhood deceases and starvation but what do you do when you suddenly have more adults than the system can bear. War of course. But UNICEF will never admit that they are the cause of conflict in Africa. It is a funny thing playing God with entire societies. That does not stop people from feeling that it is their duty to do it.

I am a serious skeptic when it comes to human nature. I would like to believe that some day we could reach the apex that is represented in Star Trek. I just don't know how many people will die to allow that to become a reality.

Elijah Craig and Porter go so well together, but I really gotta quit posting after my fourth Boilermaker ...

[Bill Moore]

Curmudgy,

I think they are more guiding precepts or prime directives based upon his experiences. But from the Link to the article you posted at War On The Rocks you must be a Star Trek fan. so here is an episode on the Prime Directive.......could be about our involvement in Iraq and the long term fight between the Sunni and Shia or anybody else for that matter. As they say Art imitates life.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FLHH-mE94Pk

I loved this, not I have a new toy to play with "the prime directive," you'll regret ever sharing this with me. :D

[Bill Moore]

Slap,

I listened to the interview, read the article, and looked over the brief you provided on Col Warden's proposed strategy for dealing with ISIS. At the end of all that, I'll admit he is a more measured than I thought, but he still offers little that is helpful or new.

He starts out in the radio with a lot of ifs, if we can do this, and if we can do, then we would be put ISIS in the hurt locker. He said ISIS was surrounded and if we could get Iran, Turkey, and Syria to cooperate with us and attack them they would be very vulnerable. That argument is based on the premise we could persuade Iran, Turkey, and Syria to fight with us, and that the President would be willing to pursue this when we're in a proxy war with Iran, and we're certainly no friend of Assad, and I doubt we have any more influence over Turkey now than we did in 2002/3 when we requested their assistance in dealing with Iraq.

He then states that is an easy situation to deal with using air power, which made me wonder if he had a temporary moment of insanity. The insurgents are exposed now because they're not being targeted from the air, so they can afford to be exposed. If we start targeting them, it will be a "see me now, now you don't" as they blend into the civilian population.

In his brief the chart states air power can achieve strategic objectives directly, IF they're strategically conceived. I didn't hear anything that resembled a strategically conceived objective until the end of the interview when the interview pulled it out of him. His view is we want a stable Iraq (think about that objective and his proposal to conduct an air campaign and get Iran, Turkey, and Syria to target ISIS) without a strong Sunni extremist center.

Nothing he proposed would lead to that end state, it would further destabilize the region, and provide a lot of propaganda value to ISIS for recruiting if we side with the Shia against the Sunni (at least doing so openly).

He didn't explain how ISIS was a system and what that meant and how to target it. ISIS isn't a system, it is a network that thrives in an ecosystem.

I gave it an honest read and still don't buy what he is trying to sell.

[novelist]

There are some valuable parts to Warden's stuff, but his biggest shortcoming is that he sees airpower as capable of doing EVERYTHING on its own and being applicable in every situation...even when it's not. Airpower is his hammer, and every situation is a nail...

I concur. Air Power is important within the purview of applying a "Parallel Warfare" strategy to a functioning Nation State with a hostile military establishment. It also plays a vital role in CAS. But ISIS is an amorphous entity prosecuting an "unconventional war" that requires counter unconventional warfare methods along the lines of Internal Defense, COIN, etc. I don't think conventional force, even if it does follow COIN doctrine, should be applied to an unconventional warfare situation. Vietnam proves this out, as do the efforts of the Armed Forces in Iraq, which have been wasted along with many lives of brave men and women. The VC today would be called "Terrorists," not "Freedom Fighters." The terms "terrorist, guerrilla, and irregular" are somewhat interchangeable. I make this point only to say that Unconventional Warfare is more suited to Special Forces, and possibly "Light Fighters" conducting "snatch & grab" ops of Tier One personalities for interrogation supported by good, reliable intelligence collection and information constituting "ACTIONABLE INTEL"; PSYOPS, to include "special effects" and perhaps some VOA involvement; and some unspeakable Black Ops. The GWOT should be prosecuted by covert means with very minimal press coverage. Air Power cannot accomplish these things. This is the only way to root ISIS out and destroy it. The prerequisite however, is a friendly pro-American government in Iraq and a well trained Iraqi Army of mixed ethnic and religious backgrounds willing to defend their country in a common cause.

[slapout9]

Link to Warden interviewon Strategic Compressio or Winning Fast. Ends with some advice to the President!


http://www.westernjournalism.com/retired-colonels-advice-obama-deal-isis-now-cant-wait/

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to WoTR for this article, so from near the start as a taster and the author is a USAF veteran:
World War II decisively disproved many elements of Douhet’s theories, at least in Europe, where strategic airpower was critical to victory, but not independently decisive. Since then, the most zealous airpower advocates have latched onto each new promise of airpower-centric victory, from nuclear weapons to the combination of stealth and precision. In the process, we lost sight of some of the most effective air efforts undertaken to neutralize enemy forces on the battlefield and render an adversary’s goals impossible to achieve militarily. Somehow, we relegated interdiction (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/i/4890.html) to the back benches. The most pernicious of the prevailing airpower theories is Col. John Warden’s “five rings,” which returned to the vision of a decisive strike against enemy leadership through airpower, with the expectation that the target country would quickly fold. This theory, tied closely to an unambiguously decisive air campaign in Desert Storm, remains deeply ingrained in the Air Force — a beguiling mirage that seems to have been proven in Iraq in 2003, discounting the twin facts that the air campaign did not succeed in either decapitating the government or causing its collapse. Twenty-four years later, we remain mesmerized by the prospect of quick victory against any opponent without actual regard to the limits of military force, much less the limits of airpower. This theoretical framework has handicapped the next generation of airpower strategy development and blinded the Air Force to airpower applications that are effective, but not quick, easy, or subject to the beguiling lure of advanced technology. Extended interdiction campaigns are proven, war-winning efforts that have been given short shrift in the face of a misty vision of landing a decisive blow. The effectiveness of airpower in battle is a result of interlocking, coordinated efforts that deliver mutually supportive effects as part of an integrated campaign.....


Link: http://warontherocks.com/2015/09/the-five-ring-circus-how-airpower-enthusiasts-forgot-about-interdiction/?

[slapout9]

Hat tip to WoTR for this article, so from near the start as a taster and the author is a USAF veteran:


Link: http://warontherocks.com/2015/09/the-five-ring-circus-how-airpower-enthusiasts-forgot-about-interdiction/?

This article may not qualify as plagerism but it is pretty darn close!
Read "The Air Campaign" planning for combat. Chapter 6: Air Interdiction!