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slapout9
10-02-2007, 12:11 AM
Colonel Warden will be teaching a 5 day class in Montgomery,Al. (near Slapout:) Oct. 22-26,07. Details are posted at the link below.


http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=27601#post27601

bismark17
10-03-2007, 12:53 AM
So your letting us crash at your place???? I'll buy the Jack and Crown.

slapout9
10-03-2007, 02:13 AM
Hi bizmarck, if you need to. I can put up 3 at my house and can draft some neighbors if that is not enough. Must like dogs:wry:

slapout9
10-15-2007, 11:55 PM
I will be away from a computer for the rest of the week so no SWC till then:(

The week after 10/22/07 the Smart Wars conference starts. I am going to see if I can do daily posts of what we covered in class that day. So while I am away from the computer does anyone have any questions,topics,etc. they would like me to bring up? Just list what you want and I will see what I can do.

The case study method will be applied using Warden's Prometheus Process for past wars,current wars and major disasters. We may just pick one or several or all. Here is the list from the Agenda I just received. Pick one if you like.

American Revolution
US Civil War
American Indian Wars
Napoleonic Wars
Spanish American War
Russo-Japanese War
WW I
WW II
Korea
Vietnam
Gulf War I
Serbian War
Future Asteroid Attack...thats what it says on the paper:eek:
Later Slap

slapout9
11-01-2007, 12:15 AM
Hi guys, just a short note to say what's going on. I have been really busy the last couple of weeks. The class finished last week and it was fantastic. I can say this that one of the attendees just finished a presentation to some general at the Army War college. The presentation was largely about our plan for Turkey. He was rather impressed with the planning methodology so we will see what happens. This weekend I hope to write a description of what went on last week but I just can not get to it right now:(

I had a lot of help from some SWC members in preparing for this SWJED,Rob Thornton,RTK,Cow Gurney,Jedburgh He was late:) John Fishel,Steve Metz if I missed anybody sorry. It has been rather eerie sometimes in the short time since this happened. Some exact phrases we said in class have appeared in the media.:eek:

Again thanks for all the input. Slap

slapout9
11-03-2007, 04:52 PM
I was not sure how to write this and then came to the conclusion that the best place to start is at the beginning:eek:

So here we go. The class was taught in two parts the first was SMART WARS and the second was SMART STRATEGIES.

The smart wars part was the a new part of Warden's writings that I had never seen before. So what is a smart war? It is one that you know you will win, before you start it. To do this a war decision calculus was introduced.

1-Is winning the war Achievable?
2-What is the reward you will receive?
3-What is the cost you must pay,$ and lives ?
4-What is the risk of loosing or damaging other relationships.


Only four questions but very tough questions. These were meant to be answered by the government. It is the level of Grand Strategy. Which was used to guide the level of Military Strategy

Once this was explained to us we looked at a number of historical wars and in retrospect stated why we thought they were or were not smart wars.


I through out two zingers. One was the Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The Cuban Crisis received a fair amount of discussion.

The Missile crisis was a failure at the military level for the USSR but at the Grand Strategic Level it was a success. A pledge by the US not to invade and accept a Communist regime in our western hemisphere.

This emphasized the importance of the Grand Strategy level....it must be right to start with or you end up with a situation you don't like regardless of the military conflict.

From here we were told to act as the Government of Turkey and prepare a military solution for the PKK. This is when we moved to the SMART STRATEGIES part of the course.

I will leave this up for a while for your comments and questions and then post the SMART STRATEGY process.

Rank amateur
11-03-2007, 06:54 PM
I think the way that the questions are asked implies that there's an answer, when in fact there are a range of possible outcomes with probabilities attached to each, which reminds me of
Ike's theory of small wars (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4000&highlight=Ike)

Ken White
11-03-2007, 07:58 PM
I think the way that the questions are asked implies that there's an answer, when in fact there are a range of possible outcomes with probabilities attached to each, which reminds me of
Ike's theory of small wars (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4000&highlight=Ike)

on war, all war -- as I read your link earlier it was not necessarily small ones -- don't cover the problems. Essentially, that 'theory' divined by Fred from talking to someone other than Ike puts emphasis -- according to Fred -- on the commnader's estimate of the situation. Valid -- and important.

Doesn't take much imagination to believe that you and I might look at a problem, absorb all the same data and arrive at estimates that differ. That can a have an obvious and significant impact on what follows.

Not necessarily a flaw but the first problem in the Warden theory that he supposes that entry to war is an elective. It generally, for the US, has not been. Slapout used two great examples, the Dominican Republic and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The former was elective and I submit that Wardens' parameters were not applied -- but did, in the end, apply almost accidentally. We just reacted to a situation not of our making but not to our liking and it worked out okay. ;)

The same can be said of forays into Mogadishu, Bosnia, Haiti and Kosovo -- though all three of the last are still to be 'settled.' :(

Cuba was not elective in the sense that all our actions were responses and that there was no war. There was not one simply to the fact that we gave away far more than we gained. Not only the strategic loss that Slap mentioned but the fact that our trade for removal of the few marginally accurate USSR missiles from Cuba was to remove all the many generally accurate US missiles from Europe and Turkey. Kennedy gave away the farm and covered it well. Not that he was wrong, just that there are a lot myths about that whole thing.

One could say that had Warden's rules -- or Ike's -- been applied to Iraq, we wouldn't be there. One could also say that had both sets been applied, we would be there. It's viewpoint dependent.

Take a look at them:
" 1-Is winning the war Achievable? 2-What is the reward you will receive? 3-What is the cost you must pay,$ and lives ? 4-What is the risk of losing or damaging other relationships. "

Who makes the determination on achievable? Does the opposition agree with your assessment? Is or are stopping genocide, removing a dictator, honoring a treaty obligation, ensuring the viability of another nation adequate rewards? How do you capture the costs in a notoriously unstable and unpredictable milieu? Is honor more important than a relationship; more importantly, given the pragmatic approach of most nations to relationships, is that a temporary loss?

Lots of questions to ask and few answers -- and most of the time, the interpretation of the answers will be in the mind of the decision maker.

I'd also suggest that while attacking Iraq was a decision on our part, it was not entry into a war, it was an election to fight in a certain place at a certain time, the war which caused or enabled (again, viewpoint dependent) that election was NOT our decision.

My point is that the US rarely starts wars, thus to talk of "...a smart war? It is one that you know you will win, before you start it." is to artificially constrain ones vision, develop tunnel vision as it were, focused on a world we don't inhabit.

Better to develop strategic thinking on how to respond to provocations. I suspect we'll see a number of those for the next decade or so.

Rank amateur
11-03-2007, 09:10 PM
Ken makes some good points.

For a war of choice - like Iraq or Grenada- the two relevant questions are:

What's the worst case scenario?
Are you prepared for the worst scenario?

When you're attacked, pride pretty much demands that you respond.

Complicated analysis is only required when you get in a game of chicken: Iran. Diplomatic factors must be considered too. Since the cost of war is high, there is almost always a deal that is better for both sides than war, but obviously some governments are too stupid or too egomanical or too deluded about their military abilities or too idealogical or have other agendas, to take it.

Ken White
11-04-2007, 01:27 AM
...For a war of choice - like Iraq or Grenada- the two relevant questions are:

What's the worst case scenario?
Are you prepared for the worst scenario?

When you're attacked, pride pretty much demands that you respond.

Complicated analysis is only required when you get in a game of chicken: Iran. Diplomatic factors must be considered too. Since the cost of war is high, there is almost always a deal that is better for both sides than war, but obviously some governments are too stupid or too egomanical or too deluded about their military abilities or too idealogical or have other agendas, to take it.

First, three questions:

Is Iraq a war of choice or is the attack on Iraq simply an operational intermediate objective in a broader conflict?

In determining the "worst case scenario" are errors of commission or omission, even egregious ones, possible?

With respect to being prepared for the worst case scenario, if the best professional advice is that one is prepared and that turns out to be incorrect, who is at fault?

Plus a couple of comments:

There are reasons other than pride to respond to attacks. Not least of these is that a series of probing attacks eliciting no or little response can give the attacker a false image of the probability of eventual success and thus encourage the attacker to increase the tempo and strength of his attacks.

Accepting that "the cost of war is high, (and) there is almost always a deal that is better for both sides than war..." is true, it is possible that "...obviously some governments are too stupid or too egomanical or too deluded about their military abilities or too idealogical or have other agendas, to take it" is also true. The question that arises is what action should be taken if one side, NOT a government, will not deal and proves this by making 'demands' that are beyond the power of the nominal opponent, a government, to grant, if that side has no population or infrastructure to protect or steer it through votes or opinion and if it initiates hostilities by attacking that nominal opponent over a period of years, it would seem there should logically be a point at which the nominal opponent ceases to accept such attacks and takes some action of one kind or another.

slapout9
05-27-2009, 01:53 AM
I have beem chomping at the bit to post this because I new this was going to happen but I had to wait until it was public. This is an interview by a Colonel in the India military where Warden was aksed to give a speech earlier this year. Enjoy and let the flames fly.



http://www.idsa.in/specialfeature/InterviewJohnWarden210409.html

jmm99
05-27-2009, 03:28 AM
would not mind comments by Wilf, Ken and anyone else - if they are so inclined - on the following two (short) statements:


John Warden [JW]: Einstein once said that he was uninterested in observations unless there was a theory to explain them. Without theory, there is no rigorous way to develop and test new tactics for the strategic effect they may have.

and:


PKG: How does a combat leader demonstrate combat leadership qualities and lead by example in an age when manned aircraft are becoming increasingly obsolescent?

JW: The word “combat” may be an adjective that is not needed. Leadership is leadership.

Bill Moore
05-27-2009, 04:10 AM
he made a couple of good points, but staying true to form he made a couple of comments that just don't mesh with the reality that I know, such as his comments about rotary wing and fixed wing. Granted it is situation specific, but there are not a whole lot of fixed winged air strips supporting many of the remote fire bases in Afghanistan. I know crisis du jour, but....


Other than carrying people and putting them down in small areas, it would appear that fixed wing aircraft can do almost everything a helicopter can do, but do it faster and more efficiently. In general, there is probably a greater need for more fixed wing capability (which includes UAVs) than for more rotary wing craft.

and the following statement tells me he still has a very narrow view of conflict, we have proven again and again we can't defeat anyone from the air whether in N. Vietnam, London, Kuwait, or Afghanistan.


We should really think about close air support as something that happens because of a big mistake on someone’s part. The idea should be to conduct operations in such a way that it is not needed. Finally, if a situation arises where close air support is needed, the decision to use it should be in the context of the operational level situation at the time.

On the positive side I thought his comparison of the objectives between the first Gulf War and the second Gulf War and Afghanistan were useful.


In the second Gulf War, US objectives for Iraq, other than deposing the Hussein government, seemed to be open-ended, but to include an effective end to historical, regional, religious, and tribal animosity; adoption of a democratic form of government; amicable compromise among groups over contentious issues; and ready acceptance of alliance with the US. Unlike the first Gulf War, with the exception of deposing the Hussein government, all of these objectives depended completely on Iraqi acceptance and cooperation.


The first part of the Afghanistan war was strategic: unseat the Taliban government and replace it with one that would not support and protect Al Qaeda; and destroy Al Qaeda operating facilities in Afghanistan. Following success in the first part, however, objectives expanded to include nation-building, democratization, elimination of the drug trade, and suppression of the Taliban. As in the second Gulf War, success required either dramatic cooperation by most Afghans or intense military operations sustained over prohibitively long time periods.


Open-ended objectives that required the conquered to change core beliefs.

Failure to operate against the right centres of gravity in the right way.

Assuming a short war in both cases while being aware that a very long and expensive war was not a palatable option either from a domestic or an international standpoint.

In my opinion, he is correct, we made every mistake he said we did, but I would argue these mistakes were made because too many officers adopted Warden's theories, and didn't plan to fight a people's war. So I'm agreeing, but adding to his argument that his narrow view of war and the narrow application of force is partly what led us down the wrong path initially.

He is a die hard air power advocate and appears to sincerely believe that air power can the decisive tool in any conflict, yet history informs us that his argument is bankrupt. Air power plays a "critical" role in the joint fight, but in the end we have to put boots on the ground. When we do that, we sure as heck wouldn't mind having some close air support, so I hope we plan for it.

Ken White
05-27-2009, 04:30 AM
First, with respect to Slap's post. These excerpts from Warden:
Next, it became a powerful targeting tool because it provided a high level understanding of any opponent relevant to the objective for that opponent.True in the ideal, unfortunately, it relies on fallible humans making the right choices, therefor...
We should really think about close air support as something that happens because of a big mistake on someone’s part. The idea should be to conduct operations in such a way that it is not needed.That myth has killed more people than it should have. I will agree that if if you resort to combat, any type, a mistake has been made by someone or several someones. But once combat is required, you are flat not going to end it with air power.
Finally, if a situation arises where close air support is needed, the decision to use it should be in the context of the operational level situation at the time.That's either an ambiguous or a meaningless statement. In the way I think he means it, it's not always possible and Afghanistan is an example -- the Operational level of that war is Afghanistan. The various actions that take place within that operational context are tactical and air support thus becomes of necessity tactically determined.
JW: The political objectives we used to put together the first Gulf War air campaign were as follows:

- Iraq to be out of Kuwait.
- Iraq not to be a strategic threat to its neighbours for at least a decade (as a result of losing so much of its offensive capability including its WMD programmes).
- Iraq functional and able to defend itself against its neighbours.
- The Middle East/Persian Gulf area to be more stable.I guess two out of four is okay. I also guess that the failures in the last two plus the need for Northern and Southern Watches show the best laid plans and all the rings can be upset by dumb humans making decisions... :D
I would agree that in all areas of competition ranging from business to war, strategy is absent or poorly done. We definitely need to get better at it. Given the performance (or lack thereof) of economics, I don’t think, however, that economics would be my model.Well, I can agree with him on that one...

I also agree with most of Bill's comments.

As to the two questions of JMM:

White's corollary; "A theory rigorously tested may prove that an observation was either correct or incorrect and later experience may prove that the testing or the tester was not adequately rigorous."

I agree on leadership. With a caveat. For most people, the transition is not a problem but there are a few people who do well in peacetime yet cannot adequately handle the stress of combat and, conversely, a few excellent combat leaders cannot cope with the boredom and tedium of peacetime.

Thus his statement is essentially correct but the theory and the reality differ due to human vagaries. Make that statements, plural... ;)

Steve Blair
05-27-2009, 01:47 PM
Not much to add to this one. Warden for me is something of a one-track recording. You need airpower in some situations, just like you need any sort of combat power. IMO our own LawVol did a much better job of showing how airpower can contribute to the non-kinetic fight here (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2009/01/the-soft-side-of-airpower.php) than anything I've seen from the colonel.

William F. Owen
05-27-2009, 02:01 PM
PKG: Do the nature and character of war change?

JW: Yes to both but strategic principles seem to be fairly constant over very long periods.
Rubbish. War cannot change and warfare evolves. Strategy is a function of politics, so strategic principles are political principles.

As for the rest, there are a few other statements I catergorically disagree with but Ken White and Bill Moore got there quicker and with more style!

slapout9
05-27-2009, 04:53 PM
Rubbish. War cannot change and warfare evolves. Strategy is a function of politics, so strategic principles are political principles.

As for the rest, there are a few other statements I catergorically disagree with but Ken White and Bill Moore got there quicker and with more style!


Wilf, everybody, it has been pretty mild compared to what I expected. But debate is good! If everybody agreed there would be no reason to post......there would be no reason for the SWC:eek: so let the fire bombing begin.

Tango Sierra
06-06-2009, 08:51 PM
As a Dutch RNLAF major I'm studying Air Power and I'm familiar with the theory of Warden. Now I read the interview with Col (rtd) John Warden and have the following question: Is the theory with 'the five rings' (not the Olympic rings ;)) as useble in COIN as it is in conventional conflicts?

Who can (and will!) help me with this....

slapout9
06-06-2009, 09:08 PM
As a Dutch RNLAF major I'm studying Air Power and I'm familiar with the theory of Warden. Now I read the interview with Col (rtd) John Warden and have the following question: Is the theory with 'the five rings' (not the Olympic rings ;)) as useble in COIN as it is in conventional conflicts?

Who can (and will!) help me with this....

Yes, can you tell me more about yourself?

Tango Sierra
06-07-2009, 11:23 AM
Thanx for the response!

I'm an Air Traffic Controler within the Dutch Airforce, major, age 38. I will start with a joint internal study of the Dutch Defence School in August this year. One part of this study is a deeper knowledge of Air Power. Therefor I'm reading different books related to AP, for example Air Campaign, The War in the Air and The Path of Heaven.

As you know the Dutch are also involved in ISAF, with F16's and Transport and Attack Helicopters (AH64D and CH47). While I read the theories of John Warden I was wondering what AirPower could achieve in ISAF. While surfing on the internet I discovered your forum and thought; let's ask the experts! :)

And so I dropped my question.....

TS

(my initials of ATC)

slapout9
06-07-2009, 03:31 PM
Thanx for the response!

I'm an Air Traffic Controler within the Dutch Airforce, major, age 38. I will start with a joint internal study of the Dutch Defence School in August this year. One part of this study is a deeper knowledge of Air Power. Therefor I'm reading different books related to AP, for example Air Campaign, The War in the Air and The Path of Heaven.

As you know the Dutch are also involved in ISAF, with F16's and Transport and Attack Helicopters (AH64D and CH47). While I read the theories of John Warden I was wondering what AirPower could achieve in ISAF. While surfing on the internet I discovered your forum and thought; let's ask the experts! :)

And so I dropped my question.....

TS

(my initials of ATC)

TS, we like for new members to introduce themselves here at this link.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441&page=50

We do this for all new members so please do so when you can. After you do that I can give you some references to research. But in the meantime he is very well known over there and has lectured at your defense college (not sure what you call it). Anyway looking forward to the discussion. Slap

Tango Sierra
06-08-2009, 08:51 PM
Slap,

I replied your link and introduced myself on SWJ. You mentioned that John Warden lectured in the Netherlands, do you know when?

TS

slapout9
06-08-2009, 10:18 PM
Slap,

I replied your link and introduced myself on SWJ. You mentioned that John Warden lectured in the Netherlands, do you know when?

TS

TS,would you like to talk to Colonel Warden yourself?

Tango Sierra
06-09-2009, 08:27 PM
Of course I would like to speak to John Warden!

Next week we have different lectures about AP and one of these is the theory of John Warden. On Thursday 18th of June I have to start the lecture with a presentation. Therefor I want to know more about Warden in relation to COIN. FYI other speakers that week are Prof Dr Frans Osinga about OODA of John Boyd, Yaron Rosen about the Israeli War and John Olsen about DS and theory of Warden.

From the 22nd of June till the 3th of July we are in the USA at Maxwell AFB to do the simulation game of Air Campaign Planning. Will Col John Warden be interested in sharing his knowledge with us when we're visiting the USA...?

Thanx in advance for even trying to connect me with John Warden!!:cool:

Jan

slapout9
06-09-2009, 08:41 PM
From the 22nd of June till the 3th of July we are in the USA at Maxwell AFB to do the simulation game of Air Campaign Planning. Will Col John Warden be interested in sharing his knowledge with us when we're visiting the USA...?

Thanx in advance for even trying to connect me with John Warden!!:cool:

Jan

Hi Jan,I think he would if he is not busy. Give me a couple of days to find out what he is doing. I will also send you a message with some research you may wish to review, I warn you up front there is a lot of reading in some of the reports. Also I live in Slapout,Al. just outside of Montgomery,Al. near Maxwell AFB so give me a call when you get over here and if you get some free time. Again give me some time for your request about Warden and I will get back with you and let you know what I found out. later Slap

slapout9
06-15-2009, 06:53 PM
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=74581#post74581

Glad to see somebody finally admit just how much Colonel Warden's theories have been used to win the War. Like I said Clear the skies,Hold the skies,Build an Air Bridge to the Objective;)

Ken White
06-15-2009, 08:18 PM
Kayani on an Aircraft Carrier. And the reference to Blimps... :D

slapout9
06-15-2009, 11:42 PM
Kayani on an Aircraft Carrier. And the reference to Blimps... :D

Ken, you see some of those Blimps;)

Ken White
06-16-2009, 12:07 AM
That was enough... :D

slapout9
05-24-2010, 03:58 PM
Washington Times interview with short quotes with Warden's views on Israel-Iran-US Options.


http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/may/24/israel-arms-may-not-be-enough-to-stop-nukes/print/

slapout9
03-05-2011, 02:29 AM
Link to the article below. Read and find out why Airpower Theory has NOTHING to do with the Air Force, it is simply anything guided that moves through Air or Space regardless of which organization owns it or the platform from which it is launched. Also Wilf will have a fit as he takes Clausewitz to task and makes a good argument for "Bloodless Warfare."


http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/2011/2011-1/2011_1_04_warden.pdf

pvebber
03-07-2011, 08:28 PM
Not really a lot new here, mostly a rehash of:

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj95/spr95_files/warden.htm

and

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle/chp4.html

A synthesis of this "strategic paralysis" school of thought , combined with with Boyd's work is done in:

http://ebooks.gutenberg.us/AU_Press_Collection/SAAS_Theses/Fadok/fadok.pdf


The fundamental flaw in the Warden school of thought is that it is based on a fundamentally mechanistic view of systems theory. The only way you can "backplan" from a desired future state to the sequence of "centers of gravity" you have to break, is if there is a rigid cause and effect linkage amenable to such a decomposition.

There is a name for systems that do NOT exhibit that feature. "Complex". If you are trying to break simple systems with rigid cause and effect like power grids or supply chains then the Warden theory works great. Start trying to apply it to political systems and social networks and, well Aaron Barr of HBGary found out the hard way about how "the adversary gets a vote"

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/02/anonymous-to-security-firm-working-with-fbi-youve-angered-the-hive.ars

Airpower allows the simultaneous attack of key points in the adsersary system causing it to collapse. The more precise the ability to attack, the smaller the actualy kinetic effect required and the less the collateral damage.

The reality is that "centers of gravity" are not static and a true systems theory understanding of an adversary of any apprciable complexity is that they are not "mechanism" but "organisms" that do not simply and predictably collapse when "affected" but adapt, repair, re-orient, and exhibit unpredictable emergent responses.

A strategy based on the ability to predict the future - which is what is required in order to foresee a desired end-state, and determine a set of simultaneous actions that will result in an inexorable path to it - is not a realistic one. Despite how energetically we may wish it were so.

Ken White
03-08-2011, 12:18 AM
The reality is that "centers of gravity" are not static and a true systems theory understanding of an adversary of any apprciable complexity is that they are not "mechanism" but "organisms" that do not simply and predictably collapse when "affected" but adapt, repair, re-orient, and exhibit unpredictable emergent responses.

A strategy based on the ability to predict the future - which is what is required in order to foresee a desired end-state, and determine a set of simultaneous actions that will result in an inexorable path to it - is not a realistic one. Despite how energetically we may wish it were so. (emphasis added / kw)Two very important facts. Thanks for posting that. :cool:

Our desire for detailed instructions or a blueprint nowadays never ceases to amaze me. It's almost like people do not want to think... :confused:

Fuchs
03-08-2011, 12:50 AM
Air warfare strategy (real strategy!) becomes pretty interesting once it's being aimed at the enemy leadership's will (or ability to stay in power).

All else in air warfare is of rather secondary quality and ranges from support for army/navy (often very indirect) as lowly as to petty punishments.

Warden's airpower theory sounds to me like a) a misunderstanding and b) a surrender in face of the challenges. It's no wonder that many people are not convinced by him (and equally difficult to grasp why he's still famous!).


I wonder whether there's really no much better airpower strategist available (who's willing to publish something)?

Well, save for me, I think of myself as the great airpower strategist, of course. On the other hand, I thought I was a good driver until I wrecked my car without much outside help!

Cliff
03-08-2011, 02:53 AM
Not really a lot new here, mostly a rehash of:

pvebber-

Col Warden's point is only partially to re-hash his theory, but to point out that airpower (as Slap pointed out, this doesn't just mean the Air Force) can be used in "complex" situations as you call it.


The fundamental flaw in the Warden school of thought is that it is based on a fundamentally mechanistic view of systems theory. The only way you can "backplan" from a desired future state to the sequence of "centers of gravity" you have to break, is if there is a rigid cause and effect linkage amenable to such a decomposition.

There is a name for systems that do NOT exhibit that feature. "Complex". If you are trying to break simple systems with rigid cause and effect like power grids or supply chains then the Warden theory works great. Start trying to apply it to political systems and social networks and, well Aaron Barr of HBGary found out the hard way about how "the adversary gets a vote"

So we should just give up on trying to understand the enemy? Warden's rings model is simply a way of depicting a system, complex or not. As Warden says in the article:


Opponents are complicated things with many moving and static parts, but we can simplify our analysis by seeing them as a system, which means that they function in some reasonably connected manner.

In other words, we must somehow simplify the enemy into a system to understand it. How would you recommend understanding the enemy's political system?


Airpower allows the simultaneous attack of key points in the adversary system causing it to collapse. The more precise the ability to attack, the smaller the actually kinetic effect required and the less the collateral damage.

The reality is that "centers of gravity" are not static and a true systems theory understanding of an adversary of any appreciable complexity is that they are not "mechanism" but "organisms" that do not simply and predictably collapse when "affected" but adapt, repair, re-orient, and exhibit unpredictable emergent responses.

An organism is any living system, or the highest level of cell organization (Nation Institute of Health (http://science.education.nih.gov/supplements/nih2/Chemicals/other/glossary/glossary2.htm)). So no, they aren't static- and Warden isn't suggesting that. But we still need to simplify even a political "organism" into a system that we can understand if we are to affect it. Warden is also suggesting that the faster we hit a system (or organism) in a parallel attack, the less it can adapt and re-orient.


A strategy based on the ability to predict the future - which is what is required in order to foresee a desired end-state, and determine a set of simultaneous actions that will result in an inexorable path to it - is not a realistic one. Despite how energetically we may wish it were so.

This is the point of Warden's article - that airpower is not being used as effectively as it could be because the accepted wisdom is that it is "too hard" to use it in complex systems, and that "everyone knows airpower won't work" in situation x (say COIN). He argues that this is because of our terminology and past history. He believes we can find ways to make it work if we try. Warden is arguing that we should try to make sure we keep our desired end state in mind. He also is arguing that if we can't find ways to reach our objectives quickly, we should consider if we should really should go to war.

Warden is arguing not that we need to predict the future, but that we should know what future we want to create.

Do you really think that our strategy should not try and foresee our desired end state?

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff
03-08-2011, 03:13 AM
Air warfare strategy (real strategy!) becomes pretty interesting once it's being aimed at the enemy leadership's will (or ability to stay in power).

What else is war about?


All else in air warfare is of rather secondary quality and ranges from support for army/navy (often very indirect) as lowly as to petty punishments.

Hmm, how do you think the Wehrmacht, or say the Iraqi Military (http://es.rice.edu/projects/Poli378/Gulf/gwtxt_ch6.html#Iraqi Military Units) in 1991 felt about this? Pretty secondary quality huh...


Warden's airpower theory sounds to me like a) a misunderstanding and b) a surrender in face of the challenges. It's no wonder that many people are not convinced by him (and equally difficult to grasp why he's still famous!).

Can you explain why you think this is a misunderstanding, or a surrender?


I wonder whether there's really no much better airpower strategist available (who's willing to publish something)?

Warden's strategy worked out pretty well for us in Desert Storm - it pretty much allowed the US to achieve its objectives. I know that many folks in the ground services scoff his theories... but then again, he is an airpower strategist. He is pretty well respected in the USAF, and his theories are taught at the USAF professional schools.

I think part of the problem with Col Warden's theories is that people want to use them like an Army FM on the Military Decision Making Process, like a cook book rather than a guide.

I think there's plenty of airpower strategy out there - the doctrine is fairly well established.

V/R,

Cliff

slapout9
03-08-2011, 04:06 AM
A strategy based on the ability to predict the future - which is what is required in order to foresee a desired end-state, and determine a set of simultaneous actions that will result in an inexorable path to it - is not a realistic one. Despite how energetically we may wish it were so.

pvebber,
I don't know where you got the idea(you are not alone,many people believe that) that warden believes in predicting things as his chart on the Time Value of Action points out it is about "probabilities."

He has always warned about war being the most dangerous activity there is because of the unpredictability, it goes all the way back to his original publication of "The Air Campaign." Below is a link to a 2004 presentation warning about trying to predict the future.

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/joint2008/papers/Panel%203_June%204_Warden-PPT.pdf

Ken White
03-08-2011, 04:58 AM
pvebber can answer for himself but, for your consideration:
So we should just give up on trying to understand the enemy? Warden's rings model is simply a way of depicting a system, complex or not.True, however there are two problems that must be addresssed -- and Warden and many smart guys who defend him do not bother to address them. First, the Rings model is also a simple way of depicting a system that may be more complex than some not so smart guys who try to use it realize. i.e. it can lead to mistakes. As yousaid above:
I think part of the problem with Col Warden's theories is that people want to use them like an Army FM on the Military Decision Making Process, like a cook book rather than a guide. Secondly, it can depict the system but as has been said, many things out there defy categorization as a system.
In other words, we must somehow simplify the enemy into a system to understand it. How would you recommend understanding the enemy's political system?I suggest that trying to understand the enemy's political system is often unnecessary -- it is also exceedingly difficult to get right, particularly if that system is conducted in another language and / or stems from a quite different culture. What is necessary from both a military and a strategic standpoint is relatively sure if basic knowledge of what that system does. 'What' needs to be known, 'why' and 'how' will most often be nice to have for diplomatic purposes but actually relatively useless for strategic or war purposes.
...So no, they aren't static- and Warden isn't suggesting that. But we still need to simplify even a political "organism" into a system that we can understand if we are to affect it. Warden is also suggesting that the faster we hit a system (or organism) in a parallel attack, the less it can adapt and re-orient.Without quibbling over details, I agree Warden has some good points. As did John Boyd. And Curtis LeMay. Or CvC, Jomini, De Saxe (probably one of the best of the bunch) and Subatai (certainly one of the 'winningest' of all time...). So do you and so do I -- a lot of folks do. None of us or of them has all the answers. I know neither you or Slap suggest that, I'm just reiterating it to point out that the principle sometimes gets lost behind the name. Warden is good but he's not the be all and end all; the Rings have applicability in some situation -- but not in all. Airpower (all source) is great but it also has limitations -- as does ground power or sea power...

My problem with John Warden or anyone who offers THE optimum solution (even though they add caveats, their primary pet rock shows in their pocket) is that I'm old and have yet to see any one trick pony win the dressage.:wry:
He also is arguing that if we can't find ways to reach our objectives quickly, we should consider if we should really should go to war.That's true, he always has -- and he rarely gets credit for that. I suspect his 'air power uber alles approach has a great deal to do with that and his valid points get obscured by that. Parochialism tends to draw parochial responses... :o
Warden is arguing not that we need to predict the future, but that we should know what future we want to create.

Do you really think that our strategy should not try and foresee our desired end state?In reverse order:

Our 'strategies' (multi polar plural ) have not done that at all well in 236 years. Fortunately, we muddle through rather well. :D

We aren't doing the present really well. The future may be a step too far. The Wardens of this world might be able to get there but those really smart guys are only about 20% of the grand total -- that other 80% of us have to be dragged along and herded like a batch of cats. Hard to get there from here. Really hard. Particularly with a governmental system that changes directions every 2 to 8 years (that annoys the daylights out of the Strategists...). We tend to get really serious (that applies to both domestic and foreign political as well as military issues) only when confronted with an existential threat and there are none of those in view at this time... :wry:

Fuchs
03-08-2011, 12:12 PM
What else is war about?

Most warfare is not about directly breaking will, but about doing something that has an indirect effect on the enemy leadership's will, around several corners.


Hmm, how do you think the Wehrmacht, or say the Iraqi Military (http://es.rice.edu/projects/Poli378/Gulf/gwtxt_ch6.html#Iraqi Military Units) in 1991 felt about this? Pretty secondary quality huh...

It's secondary quality because it requires a huge amount of effort and damage in order to reach the real goal very indirectly.

This time "indirect" does not mean "smart", it means "poorly aimed".

The meagre quality becomes more visible if you assume that the same would have been attempted with a copy of the Iraqi air force, negating the extreme disparity in resources. Hint: The Wehrmacht failed in 1940 against the British with pretty much the same as the U.S.A.A.F. attempted in 1942-1944.



Can you explain why you think this is a misunderstanding, or a surrender?

He offers so many targets to attack that I can only conclude he failed to find the real lever.


Warden's strategy worked out pretty well for us in Desert Storm - it pretty much allowed the US to achieve its objectives. I know that many folks in the ground services scoff his theories... but then again, he is an airpower strategist. He is pretty well respected in the USAF, and his theories are taught at the USAF professional schools.

None of this is really an argument in itself, especially not the firs ton, for his actual proposal for Desert Storm had been rejected in favour of a less fancy one - and that one produced some interesting and unanticipated effects.


I think part of the problem with Col Warden's theories is that people want to use them like an Army FM on the Military Decision Making Process, like a cook book rather than a guide.

I think there's plenty of airpower strategy out there - the doctrine is fairly well established.

V/R,

Cliff

There's almost always something "well established". Infantry and cavalry doctrine were "well established" in 1913.

The actual air power in use was
- successful in Iraq 1991 with an extreme resource disparity in near-perfect terrain
- semi-successful at most with various punitive strikes during the 1990's
- successful in Yugoslavia 1999 with an extreme resource disparity, yet still thoroughly embarrassed tactically, technically and strategically.
- successful in Afghanistan 2001 with a total resource disparity that didn't even encounter noteworthy resistance
- successful in Iraq 2003 with 'beyond extreme' resource disparity in very good terrain, but still with major gaffes
- failing in Iraq 2003-2007 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy
- failing in Afghanistan 2005-2011 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy (probably even with a negative net effect!)


Well, if I go to a funfair and easily pling all targets there, and tomorrow I go into the wilderness with a shotgun and miss almost all the rabbits, hitting many trees, squirrels and cats instead - does this mean that my marksman skill is well established and satisfactory?


The only thing that's well established is the orchestration/'synchronisation' of strike packages.
Airpower strategy of the last two decades has been a joke; I saw only a primitive application of brute force.
The whole idea of elegance is totally gone missing because too many resources were at hand for too many conflicts.

---------------------

Just an example; scenario 1999 Kosovo Air War against Yugoslavia, what I would have done:
(1) negotiate an electricity embargo against Yugoslavia by all neighbours, employ observers along the high voltage power lines.
(2) Take out all powerplant turbine rooms in Yugoslavia (save for the one of the nuclear power plant; instead cut its nodes in a safe distance) with a single B-2 sortie (JDAMs were already available).

Offer a deal:
Yugoslavia re-establishes autonomy for Kosovo and accepts foreign (military) police forces of its choice (no more than 50% slavs, though) as reinforcements for a mostly prejudice-free maintenance of security in Kosovo.
NATO repairs the damage ASAP and asks the neighbours to lift the electricity embargo.

How many months would they have accepted a life with electricity restricted to hospitals, the upper class residence area of Belgrade and state buildings? In resistance to what? Basically a gift!
I guesstimate they wouldn't have accepted it for much longer than they endured the resistance-provoking bombardment.

THIS is elegant strategy.

Steve Blair
03-08-2011, 02:41 PM
My problem with John Warden or anyone who offers THE optimum solution (even though they add caveats, their primary pet rock shows in their pocket) is that I'm old and have yet to see any one trick pony win the dressage.:wry:That's true, he always has -- and he rarely gets credit for that. I suspect his 'air power uber alles approach has a great deal to do with that and his valid points get obscured by that. Parochialism tends to draw parochial responses... :oIn reverse order:

Warden is also terrible when it comes to using historical examples to "prove" his points. His "The Air Campaign" is riddled with poor examples and things massaged to fit. His guide is flawed in that he really doesn't admit that airpower has any limitations and totally ignores the "soft" aspect of airpower (where I think it can have a greater impact, especially in wars that fall below the "toe to toe nuclear combat with the Ruskies" level). I use his book as a class textbook simply because it's one of the few accessible works out there, but it generates good discussion every time.

Cliff
03-08-2011, 06:21 PM
First, the Rings model is also a simple way of depicting a system that may be more complex than some not so smart guys who try to use it realize. i.e. it can lead to mistakes. Secondly, it can depict the system but as has been said, many things out there defy categorization as a system.

True, but we have to try to understand it somehow. Do the folks who say you can't understand things as a system advocate a trial and error approach to strategy?


I suggest that trying to understand the enemy's political system is often unnecessary -- it is also exceedingly difficult to get right, particularly if that system is conducted in another language and / or stems from a quite different culture. What is necessary from both a military and a strategic standpoint is relatively sure if basic knowledge of what that system does. 'What' needs to be known, 'why' and 'how' will most often be nice to have for diplomatic purposes but actually relatively useless for strategic or war purposes.

I agree that it is hard. Warden is arguing that we should acknowledge when things are difficult, but not let that make us think they are impossible.


Without quibbling over details, I agree Warden has some good points. As did John Boyd. And Curtis LeMay. Or CvC, Jomini, De Saxe (probably one of the best of the bunch) and Subatai (certainly one of the 'winningest' of all time...). So do you and so do I -- a lot of folks do. None of us or of them has all the answers. I know neither you or Slap suggest that, I'm just reiterating it to point out that the principle sometimes gets lost behind the name. Warden is good but he's not the be all and end all; the Rings have applicability in some situation -- but not in all. Airpower (all source) is great but it also has limitations -- as does ground power or sea power...

Agreed... again, Warden isn't saying there aren't limitations, he's just saying that we shouldn't let current limitations make us stop trying to overcome them.


My problem with John Warden or anyone who offers THE optimum solution (even though they add caveats, their primary pet rock shows in their pocket) is that I'm old and have yet to see any one trick pony win the dressage.

Valid point, I would re-iterate my point above on Warden's intent.


That's true, he always has -- and he rarely gets credit for that. I suspect his 'air power uber alles approach has a great deal to do with that and his valid points get obscured by that. Parochialism tends to draw parochial responses... :o

Unless the parochial response is from the Army, then it's ok, right? ;)


Our 'strategies' (multi polar plural ) have not done that at all well in 236 years. Fortunately, we muddle through rather well. :D

We aren't doing the present really well. The future may be a step too far. The Wardens of this world might be able to get there but those really smart guys are only about 20% of the grand total -- that other 80% of us have to be dragged along and herded like a batch of cats. Hard to get there from here. Really hard. Particularly with a governmental system that changes directions every 2 to 8 years (that annoys the daylights out of the Strategists...). We tend to get really serious (that applies to both domestic and foreign political as well as military issues) only when confronted with an existential threat and there are none of those in view at this time... :wry:

Won't argue with you here- again, I think Warden acknowledges this, he just is trying to argue that difficult shouldn't mean impossible.

My next paper is going to be on ways to try and improve our strategic process...

Anyway, good points Ken, I think part of why Warden is misunderstood is because people see him as so parochial. What folks miss is that a lot of his efforts aren't addressed at outsiders, but the folks inside the USAF who are stuck in old ways of thinking. The message for them gets misread when people think it applies to outsiders...

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff
03-08-2011, 06:54 PM
Most warfare is not about directly breaking will, but about doing something that has an indirect effect on the enemy leadership's will, around several corners.

OK, but Warden is arguing that we should try to focus on the ultimate object... getting the enemy to do what we want - IE, "War is politics by other means" as CvC would say.


It's secondary quality because it requires a huge amount of effort and damage in order to reach the real goal very indirectly.

Uhhh, this may have been true before... but not anymore. While World War II did require a lot of effort, Allied Force, OEF and OIF required much less effort. The cost in lives is much less on both the friendly and enemy sides. Do you really think that a NATO ground invasion of Kosovo and Serbia would have been less effort, less cost, and less casualties than Allied Force resulted in?


This time "indirect" does not mean "smart", it means "poorly aimed".

Uhh, Warden is arguing for the direct approach as opposed to attacking fielded forces... how is this poorly aimed?


The meagre quality becomes more visible if you assume that the same would have been attempted with a copy of the Iraqi air force, negating the extreme disparity in resources. Hint: The Wehrmacht failed in 1940 against the British with pretty much the same as the U.S.A.A.F. attempted in 1942-1944.

You are correct, the USAAF didn't have an adequate force until early 1944, and in early 1944 it was used on France and the intended areas of landing, not for strategic attack. Once it was unleashed on Germany mid 1944 it did some real damage. The Iraqi Air Force had 700 (http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/gwaps.htm) aircraft and was (for the time) a fairly credible Soviet-style force. I'm not saying they weren't outnumbered, they were. But the real key was in training, maintenance, technology, etc. You are essentially arguing that airpower was not effective because it worked too well...


He offers so many targets to attack that I can only conclude he failed to find the real lever.

Did you read the paper? Warden is suggesting selecting targets on the inner rings carefully so that you don't have to attack so many targets, the exact opposite of what you are saying above.


None of this is really an argument in itself, especially not the firs ton, for his actual proposal for Desert Storm had been rejected in favour of a less fancy one - and that one produced some interesting and unanticipated effects.

Warden's initial plan was not used, but because LtGen (at the time LtCol) Deptula was kept to be one of the key planners. He ended up writing the final plan.


There's almost always something "well established". Infantry and cavalry doctrine were "well established" in 1913.

This is just silly, Fuchs. What would you recommend airpower doctrine change to? What do you see as the major flaws in the current system?



The actual air power in use was
- successful in Iraq 1991 with an extreme resource disparity in near-perfect terrain
- semi-successful at most with various punitive strikes during the 1990's
- successful in Yugoslavia 1999 with an extreme resource disparity, yet still thoroughly embarrassed tactically, technically and strategically.
- successful in Afghanistan 2001 with a total resource disparity that didn't even encounter noteworthy resistance
- successful in Iraq 2003 with 'beyond extreme' resource disparity in very good terrain, but still with major gaffes
- failing in Iraq 2003-2007 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy
- failing in Afghanistan 2005-2011 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy (probably even with a negative net effect!)

Why is airpower failing in Iraq and Afghanistan? I think it has done more to enable the land forces than anything else. OBTW the drone program has been pretty effective. How would the Army/Marines have done with no airborne ISR, airlift, CAS, AAR, etc?


Well, if I go to a funfair and easily pling all targets there, and tomorrow I go into the wilderness with a shotgun and miss almost all the rabbits, hitting many trees, squirrels and cats instead - does this mean that my marksman skill is well established and satisfactory?

Very few targets have been missed. Warden is arguing that improvements can be made to make airpower more effective in COIN - you won't find me arguing with that. But you seem to think that past failures mean the concept is doomed. By your methodology, we should have declared failure in Iraq and withdrawn in 2007... good plan.


The only thing that's well established is the orchestration/'synchronisation' of strike packages.
Airpower strategy of the last two decades has been a joke; I saw only a primitive application of brute force.
The whole idea of elegance is totally gone missing because too many resources were at hand for too many conflicts.

Are you serious? You seem to have no familiarity with the way air campaigns are planned now... while brute force is a part of it (I suspect Wilf would argue that it must be part of any war!), the process is very tightly controlled.



---------------------
Just an example; scenario 1999 Kosovo Air War against Yugoslavia, what I would have done:
(1) negotiate an electricity embargo against Yugoslavia by all neighbours, employ observers along the high voltage power lines.
(2) Take out all powerplant turbine rooms in Yugoslavia (save for the one of the nuclear power plant; instead cut its nodes in a safe distance) with a single B-2 sortie (JDAMs were already available).

Initially the air targets were limited to fielded forces. Only later was the political leadership of NATO finally convinced to allow the air component to target key infrastructure and the regime. It was the specific push to target Milosevic and his cronies as well as their financial concerns that finally led to the Serbs capitulating. (See RAND report (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1365.html)) This is not an airpower strategy issue- that is a grand/political strategy issue of going to war without the will to do what is neccessary- exactly what Warden is arguing against.


Offer a deal:
Yugoslavia re-establishes autonomy for Kosovo and accepts foreign (military) police forces of its choice (no more than 50% slavs, though) as reinforcements for a mostly prejudice-free maintenance of security in Kosovo.
NATO repairs the damage ASAP and asks the neighbours to lift the electricity embargo.

How many months would they have accepted a life with electricity restricted to hospitals, the upper class residence area of Belgrade and state buildings? In resistance to what? Basically a gift!
I guesstimate they wouldn't have accepted it for much longer than they endured the resistance-provoking bombardment.

THIS is elegant strategy.

Again, something similar to what you propose is basically what ended up happening... Oh by the way, you have just used Warden's 5 rings model to develop your "elegant" strategy. I would also submit that just being without power is unlikely to convince someone like Milosevic, especially when opposition to outsiders is the source of much of his power. But again, that's not an issue with airpower...

The problems that occured were not airpower strategy issues, but problems with NATO's internal political and military leadership. That's not an issue for airpower theory to address directly. Airpower does help mitigate these problems, however, by making the war shorter and less bloody, as Warden points out. So I guess you basically agree with Warden! :D

V/R,

Cliff

Marc
03-08-2011, 06:55 PM
Cliff,

There is one more thing missing in Warden's article: the effect of his strategy on OUR OWN leadership. This lacuna is a bit odd, because this effect was at the heart of his original article (see John A. Warden, “Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century”):


All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment. In World War II the United States and her Allies imposed widespread destruction and civilian casualties on Japan and Germany; prior to the Gulf War, a new political climate meant that a proposal to impose similar damage on Iraq would have met overwhelming opposition from American and coalition political leaders.

The problem with Warden's theory is that public and political intolerance for destruction and civilian casualties has grown faster than the effectiveness of surgical bombings. The steep increase in bombing precision that makes Warden's strategy feasible has been followed by an even steeper decrease in public tolerance for destruction and collateral damage. The 2006 invasion of southern Lebanon by Israel proved that Dan Haloutz's application of Warden's strategy destroyed the center of ISRAEL's five-rings model rather than Hezbollah's.

Cliff
03-08-2011, 07:07 PM
The problem with Warden's theory is that public and political intolerance for destruction and civilian casualties has grown faster than the effectiveness of surgical bombings. The steep increase in bombing precision that makes Warden's strategy feasible has been followed by an even steeper decrease in public tolerance for destruction and collateral damage. The 2006 invasion of southern Lebanon by Israel proved that Dan Haloutz's application of Warden's strategy destroyed the center of ISRAEL's five-rings model rather than Hezbollah's.

I agree that Israel mis-used Wardens model in Lebanon, and certainly discrimination is important. IMHO, one of the big problems with Israel's efforts is that they didn't discriminate adequately between Lebanon and Hezbollah when they did their systems analysis... and so ended up hitting targets that were used by Lebanese civilians. I think that Warden would argue that they failed to adequately find and target the leadership ring, and ended up hitting fielded forces and infrastructure too hard.

As Warden points out, the big issue is time... the quicker a war, the less likely there is to be civilian casualties and the less likely public outrage is. Certainly the "baby milk factory" in Desert Storm and the Chinese Embassy in OAF cost us in the court of public opinion. I think that the actual effects of public outrage are somewhat overrated, however, due to the media and politicians views of them.

This raises a deeper question that goes more to Fuch's grand strategic arguements... that is, do we have the will to do what it takes to win? Warden argues we shouldn't go to war if we do not. As Ken pointed out, in our current political system, it's tough to get there... politicians like G.W. Bush (whatever you think of him otherwise) who are willing to throw away their careers to do what they think is the right thing are few and far between.

Again, I'm not arguing that Warden's model is the end-all be-all, but that he is misunderstood because people focus on the 5 rings as a prescriptive solution and ignore the other points he is trying to make.

V/R,

Cliff

Marc
03-08-2011, 07:27 PM
This raises a deeper question that goes more to Fuch's grand strategic arguements... that is, do we have the will to do what it takes to win? Warden argues we shouldn't go to war if we do not. As Ken pointed out, in our current political system, it's tough to get there.

I am afraid you put the cart before the horse. It is not the politician's job to deliver the political will needed for the application of a certain strategy. It is the strategist's job to develop a strategy within the limitations of his leadership's political will.

Cliff
03-08-2011, 07:33 PM
I am afraid you put the cart before the horse. It is not the politician's job to deliver the political will needed for the application of a certain strategy. It is the strategist's job to develop a strategy within the limitations of his leadership's political will.

Marc-

I disagree. In our system of government the politicians ARE the strategists- that is the problem that Ken was pointing out.

Agree that we as the military must strive to recommend strategies that alleviate this - that is why Warden argues for airpower to make wars faster/less bloody.

V/R,

Cliff

pvebber
03-08-2011, 07:51 PM
Cliff,

Great points. I hope to be more responsive to them this evening, but to make sure I don't put words in your mouth or build a strawman, what do you think are the key points Warden is making that are new in this most recent paper?
What do you think is being misunderstood about his other points?

What I argree with him on are:


Strategy provides the framework for finding the best means to attain objectives.

This is true almost by the definition of strategy. The issue becomes what is the best approach to strategy and comes down to Jomini vs Clauswitz which at its root gets back to Plato vs Aristotle...



The objective of a conflict is to achieve a future picture, not to kill and destroy.

One must have a 'desired end-state' that one wants to achieve. The issue comes becomes how tightly coupled cause and effect are in the 'systems' involved.


As we consider conflict, we should explore bloodless-force options exhaustively before reverting to traditional war and battle.

Almost a throw away given a desire for "just war", but important not to take to the extreme. The rub is in how you define "bloodless - force"...


What I disagree on:


The best approach to strategy starts with a future picture, determines the systems and centers of gravity that must change to realize that picture, takes into account the impact of time, and preplans an exit.

We should focus on direct, strategic centers of gravity to the maximum extent possible.

Presupposes the existence and determinability of "direct, strategic centers of gravity" and linear cause and effect relationships between them and the desired outcomes. In Real Life, there are few "strategic centers of gravity" that can be determined (implying determinism...) and the cause and effect chains between them are not identifiable, or linear.


Our conflict vocabulary flows from ancient times and traps us mentally and physically into concepts that no longer make sense, so our vocabulary must change.

How does our vocabulary invalidate any of our current Joint Concepts? Which of those concepts no longer make sense and why? How does changing vocabulary (to what, that of business and return on investment?) enable different concepts. Capabilities enable concepts, not vocabulary.


If we want to change our opponent as a system to conform to our objectives, then the most direct approach entails affecting opponent centers of gravity closely related to the objectives.

Assumes not just a linear Newtonian world-view, but one that presupposes relationships between the enemy system and our desires. Who defines "closely related"? Have not seen enough cultural mismatches in our recent wars to put this sort of thinking to rest?


Fast action and short conflicts are imperative and far less expensive than slow, long ones.

There is a missing consideration of intensity. The reductio adsurdum is that all war should then be nuclear because it is the fastest and shortest conflict.


“Battle” is at best an expensive and risky means to a distant end, and we should almost always avoid it.

THis is perhaps where I disagree with Warden the most. "Battle" is used almost pejoratively, but in its barest sense means "competition". To remove "battle" from the vocabulary of conflict is to remove "competition" because what is a "battle" really, but a constrained competition between two or more adversaries?

By removing "battle" from his vocablary, Warden attributes to Airpower the power to act unilaterally and without the "enemy getting a vote", as though our recent abaility to establish and maintain dominance of the air is a given in any future conflict.

If the other guy has an the capability to compete with you in your desire to apply airpower, how can you assume away "battle"?

And this leads to the ultimate hubris:


It also opens another very exciting possibility: conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood.

and no mention of the "5 rings" ;)

Marc
03-08-2011, 07:57 PM
Marc-

I disagree. In our system of government the politicians ARE the strategists- that is the problem that Ken was pointing out.

Agree that we as the military must strive to recommend strategies that alleviate this - that is why Warden argues for airpower to make wars faster/less bloody.

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff,

Then we know exactly where we disagree. Democratic politicians ARE NOT strategists (maybe they should be, but they are not). I can recommend two books on the subject:

Dick Morris "Power Plays: Win or Loose - How History's Great Political Leaders Play the Game." (especially Chapter Six: Mobilizing the Nation in Times of Crisis)

and

Erik Claessen "Stalemate: An Anatomy of Conflicts between Democracies Islamists and Muslim Autocrats".

Expecting politicians to take up the role of strategist is a short route to disappointment.

Entropy
03-08-2011, 08:42 PM
Interesting discussion so far.

I think the first point I would make is to suggest that a one-size-fits all methodology that biases toward one particular element of national power is, at best, inadequate.

Secondly, a primary problem with airpower-centric solutions is what do you do when you strike all the targets on your prioritized target list and the effects are not achieved? The inevitable temptation is to go further down the PTL into tertiary targets and start hitting everything - hence you get the Israeli's striking an empty Hezbollah office in a populated multi-story building which does nothing to Hezbollah and is ultimately counterproductive. In short, how does one tell when the strategy has failed? In an environment where political concerns limit the use of ground forces, both politicians and the air forces are going to want to "keep going" and hope for some kind of success.

So, ironically, one of air power's great advantages is also a disadvantage.

Marc
03-08-2011, 08:54 PM
In short, how does one tell when the strategy has failed?

Good point, and an important test for every strategy. Hitler's strategy failed in 1942 (Stalingrad and El Alamein), but he needed three more years to understand it. Are we smarter?

Fuchs
03-08-2011, 09:17 PM
Uhhh, this may have been true before... but not anymore. While World War II did require a lot of effort, Allied Force, OEF and OIF required much less effort. The cost in lives is much less on both the friendly and enemy sides. Do you really think that a NATO ground invasion of Kosovo and Serbia would have been less effort, less cost, and less casualties than Allied Force resulted in?

The resources applied were in all the 1991-2011 examples out of proportion with the target. Show me contemporary air war strategy defeating a peer enemy in less than a half year anywhere and I'll buy that it's efficient enough.

Btw, the record for most rapid defeat of a Yugoslav government is an astonishing 11 days. The most powerful alliance ever took 78 days to force very limited demands.


Did you read the paper? Warden is suggesting selecting targets on the inner rings carefully so that you don't have to attack so many targets, the exact opposite of what you are saying above.

The problem is merely that the whole 'rings' stuff is nonsense. The whole approach is just a bad idea. His writing is full of cluelessness with minimal inspiration. You need to get to the core if you want to break will, you need to look at psychology and preferences, not against an organisation complex.

Here's a problem, though.
Let's assume I think I have a better concept that the world-famous five rings crap.
Would you expect me to publish it in an internet forum?

I wouldn't even publish it in my blog.


Warden's initial plan was not used, but because LtGen (at the time LtCol) Deptula was kept to be one of the key planners. He ended up writing the final plan.

... which was what he was told to propose, not what he proposed. There are certain people from that episode who do not hold him in high regard at all.


Why is airpower failing in Iraq and Afghanistan?

It has been a failure because it was no success, especially in regard to strategy. Doing this and doing that does not count much when the real idea was to win, not to keep doing things.


By your methodology, we should have declared failure in Iraq and withdrawn in 2007... good plan.

By my methodology, Iraq would have been left alone since '97, for it had been disarmed as demanded in '96 and was no real-world problem any more.


Are you serious? (...), the process is very tightly controlled.

Yes, and I don't care about tight control.
There's no inspiration behind what's being done, just transpiration and the standard meme of throwing resources at a problem.
The 90's and 00's air wars followed the 8th AF approach of destroying this, then that - trial and error. We need something more close to Biafra air force, Flying Tigers or Luftwaffe May '40.
We need air forces which deliver a good strategic effect on small budget, accomplish their mission against the odds and which can focus on what's decisive.


Initially the air targets were limited to fielded forces. Only later was the political leadership of NATO finally convinced to allow the air component to target key infrastructure and the regime. It was the specific push to target Milosevic and his cronies as well as their financial concerns that finally led to the Serbs capitulating.

I'll translate this for you:

The original strategy didn't work, a new set of targets was opened up and that strategy didn't work either, another set of targets was opened up and that strategy was still failing until finally the hero knight in shining armour arrived and rescued us all from the total strategic embarrassment: The Russian prime minister who convinced Milosevic that Russia would not intervene.


Again, something similar to what you propose is basically what ended up happening... Oh by the way, you have just used Warden's 5 rings model to develop your "elegant" strategy.

Hardly. We bombed a small power for 78 days. Not elegant at all.


The problems that occurred were not airpower strategy issues, but problems with NATO's internal political and military leadership. That's not an issue for airpower theory to address directly. Airpower does help mitigate these problems, however, by making the war shorter and less bloody, as Warden points out.

Most of all, it leads to additional wars because
a) there were already too many hundreds of billions spent on the AF bureaucracy and its toys (and politicians never fail to hit the sunk costs fallacy!).
b) air power offers a fantasy of a war (or bullying) on the cheap, without much negative effects of relevance

The Kosovo air war remains a strategic disaster on too many levels - it's astonishing how well this has been kept out of the public perception.
* technical failure of DEAD attempts
* technical failure of F-117
* tactical failure of way too inept mission planning (such as no variance in French UAV routing and predictable Tomahawk flight routes)
* tactical/technical failure of BDA from the air
* intelligence failure on colossal scope before the war
* political failure: lies about the reasons for war
* intelligence failure: BDA
* top HQ failure to teach politicians about what air power can achieve
* top HQ failure to understand that the short bombing around Sarajevo is NOT a good analogy
* political failure: opposition instead of cooperation with Russia
* logistical failure: Race to Pristina airport
* readiness and deployability failure: TF Hawk
* strategic failure: poor understanding of the purpose of destruction
* PR failure: slowed down train bombing video was a lie
* reconnaissance failure: aerial imagery misinterpretation on colossal scale
* reconnaissance and targeting failure: way too many decoys were engaged
* reconnaissance and targeting failure: deployed ground forces were barely scratched despite being targeted
* strategic failure: way too long campaign in light of the disparity between NATO and Yugoslavia
* political failure: Greece was not convinced to make bases available
* logistical failure: use of North Italian instead of South Italian bases was idiotic
* political failure: many countries provided small packages of combat aircraft instead of the alliance tailoring a force of only the best for the job
* political failure: no gains for us
* political failure: we're stills tuck in there with blue helmets
* political failure: a few thousand criminal insurgents fooled us into fighting their war
* political failure: said thugs are now operating the organised crime hub of Europe under our protection
* political failure: we came to end an ethnic cleansing campaign against Kosovars that did not really exist and then we didn't really keep the Kosovars from cleaning most of Kosovo ethnically from Serbs


The whole thing was a huge embarrassment, and the air war component contributed a lot to the embarrassment. Only so-called "victory" prevented that the whole world laughed about us.


Last but not least: Always keep in mind RAND is writing for its customers; the air force, the navy ...
Any paper that quotes Michael O'Hanlon is by default already at least 50% disqualified in my opinion.

Ken White
03-08-2011, 10:42 PM
Unless the parochial response is from the Army, then it's ok, right? ;) I railed about that stupidity by the Army while I was in it for over 27 years and while working for it for another 18. I did not rail about Marine parochialism during my four years as a Marine -- my excuse; I started that at age 16 and didn't know better -- by the time I got to the Army I saw how terribly counterproductive and stifling that excessive loyalty could be. It also crushes initiative and innovation. Parochialism by all the services -- and by the communities within the services is absolutely stupid. It is also absolutely embedded. It needs a firm hand to rid the institutions of a wasteful emotion.

I also frequently rail about it here -- and on an equal opportunity basis. :wry:
Won't argue with you here- again, I think Warden acknowledges this, he just is trying to argue that difficult shouldn't mean impossible.Hmm. You said that four times... :D

I don't think anyone is saying that, at least no one here. The issue to me seems to apply the correct solution to a given situation, not to give up -- and applying on solution to all situations is likely to be problematic...

Then there is this:
Do the folks who say you can't understand things as a system advocate a trial and error approach to strategy?Cannot speak for others but IMO (an opinion shared by quite a few folks I've been around over the years...) is that the interplay of others with your goals and in response to your actions will cause you to have to modify your strategy on a almost constant basis. This will give the appearance in some cases of a trial and error approach, in others, that is exactly what it will be. In still others, both the actuality and the appearance are avoided and it will seem that the Gods smiled.

That latter will generally be due to a fortuitous personage being at the right place at the right time. I will note that the US has in the past produced some of those types and that over the years all three variants have been evident in our 'strategeries.' I will also note that today, the system almost seems to conspire against great competence and that IMO doies not bode well.
...I think part of why Warden is misunderstood is because people see him as so parochial. What folks miss is that a lot of his efforts aren't addressed at outsiders, but the folks inside the USAF who are stuck in old ways of thinking. The message for them gets misread when people think it applies to outsiders...Yes...

Ken White
03-08-2011, 11:16 PM
Democratic politiciansARE NOT strategists (maybe they should be, but they are not).Totally agree, even those with some military knowledge or experience have historically been poor as Politicians trying to influence the strategy of their Generals. Clemenceau who coined the ultimate Civilian control of the Military quip was poor at the task -- but he had enough sense to listen to his good Generals (and to know which were good)...
Expecting politicians to take up the role of strategist is a short route to disappointment.While that is correct, the problem in a Democracy is that Politicians believe they must be seen as doing something. That the something they do is inept, inappropriate and does more harm than good is immaterial. They will meddle, they will screw things royally and only really good Flag Officers will keep them from doing too much damage. Unfortunately, in a system that rewards survival above all else, the number of really good Flag Officers isn't as high as it could or should be.

Regardless, with respect to your initial comment on the topic:
It is not the politician's job to deliver the political will needed for the application of a certain strategy. It is the strategist's job to develop a strategy within the limitations of his leadership's political will.Most US politicians have little will for much other than getting reelected and have definite constraints on the amount of will they will be allowed to exert by the vagaries of Congress and party politics. Add the fact that to most US domestic political concerns far outweigh foreign policy concerns and you have a recipe for military power to be misapplied, misused and wasted by trying to do too little with too few.

While your approach is the way we have done it in this country since 1950 (and before on occasion), that does not mean that it is correct or even sensible. A quick look at recent history will show where that approach has placed us...

Thus this "...It is the strategist's job to develop a strategy within the limitations of his leadership's political will" is saying that the "strategist" should collude and shave points. That's illegal in sports -- and war is more important than any sport. Regardless, Franks did that, so to an extent did Westmoreland and there have been others. The issue should be whether or not that is in the interest of the nation.

Cliff
03-09-2011, 01:45 AM
Cliff,
what do you think are the key points Warden is making that are new in this most recent paper?
What do you think is being misunderstood about his other points?

I outlined most of what I think the key points are elsewhere, but his summary is:



• Strategy provides the framework for finding the best means to attain objectives.
• If we want to change our opponent as a system to conform to our objectives, then the most direct approach entails affecting opponent centers of gravity closely related to the objectives.
• Fast action and short conflicts are imperative and far less expensive than slow, long ones.
• As we consider conflict, we should explore bloodless-force options exhaustively before reverting to traditional war and battle.
• “Battle” is at best an expensive and risky means to a distant end, and we should almost always avoid it.

Finally, he is arguing that:


we should at least begin with the presumption that airpower can carry out any military task... After careful consideration of a problem, we may decide that airpower will not work. That is an acceptable answer—for now.

In other words, airpower can do much more than some would have us believe, and we should keep trying to make it work rather than writing it off.

He closes with a plea to folks in the airpower community to work to sell their case, based not on technological promises but actual perforrmance.


One must have a 'desired end-state' that one wants to achieve. The issue comes becomes how tightly coupled cause and effect are in the 'systems' involved.

True, but you can still try to understand them as a system- ultimately there is a cause and effect, it just may be difficult to understand or predict.


Almost a throw away given a desire for "just war", but important not to take to the extreme. The rub is in how you define "bloodless - force"...

He is simply saying that airpower has the potential to reduce the loss of life.


Presupposes the existence and determinability of "direct, strategic centers of gravity" and linear cause and effect relationships between them and the desired outcomes. In Real Life, there are few "strategic centers of gravity" that can be determined (implying determinism...) and the cause and effect chains between them are not identifiable, or linear.

It may be difficult, but CoGs do exist - you just have to identify the correct ones. This may not always be possible, but again Warden is saying the fact that it is tough shouldn't make us give up. For example, Gadaffi probably has some things he cares about, like his life - and these would be CoGs for the current Libyan govt.


How does our vocabulary invalidate any of our current Joint Concepts? Which of those concepts no longer make sense and why? How does changing vocabulary (to what, that of business and return on investment?) enable different concepts. Capabilities enable concepts, not vocabulary.

His point is the focus on battle and attrition that is very much a part of US doctrine limits our thinking on ways to directly affect enemy CoGs.


Assumes not just a linear Newtonian world-view, but one that presupposes relationships between the enemy system and our desires. Who defines "closely related"? Have not seen enough cultural mismatches in our recent wars to put this sort of thinking to rest?

Again, I think you're taking this too literally. I agree on the cultural mismatches- but I think Warden would argue that we need to understand the enemy as a system prior to picking CoGs.


There is a missing consideration of intensity. The reductio adsurdum is that all war should then be nuclear because it is the fastest and shortest conflict.

Disagree, his stated intent is to reduce loss of life using things like precision...


THis is perhaps where I disagree with Warden the most. "Battle" is used almost pejoratively, but in its barest sense means "competition". To remove "battle" from the vocabulary of conflict is to remove "competition" because what is a "battle" really, but a constrained competition between two or more adversaries?

I think he is decrying the fact that to the US battle means "attrition"...


By removing "battle" from his vocablary, Warden attributes to Airpower the power to act unilaterally and without the "enemy getting a vote", as though our recent abaility to establish and maintain dominance of the air is a given in any future conflict. If the other guy has an the capability to compete with you in your desire to apply airpower, how can you assume away "battle"?

I disagree... the point is to avoid having to fight the enemy's fielded forces through attrition if you can. Yes the enemy gets a vote, but shouldn't we try to deny his ability to act if we can? Again, Warden is saying that our way of thinking pushes us in the direction of thought you are advocating - we're programmed to think about beating the other guy's military.


And this leads to the ultimate hubris:

I guess I don't see what's wrong with trying to reduce the loss of life (on both sides) in combat if we can do so while still achieving objectives...

Again, I emphasive that Warden's point isn't just his 5 rings model... it is that we need to change our way of thinking to avoid being focused on battle. You could say that that focus on battle led us to a bad strategy for COIN in Iraq prior to the surge... because a lot of units were enemy-focused in an effort to defeat them. Just a thought.

Great comments pvebber, looking forward to seeing your response.

V/R,

Cliff

Marc
03-09-2011, 06:06 AM
While that is correct, the problem in a Democracy is that Politicians believe they must be seen as doing something. That the something they do is inept, inappropriate and does more harm than good is immaterial.

Ken,

True. The propensity to do something is an important cause of the difference between policy and strategy. We will probably see more of that in Libya soon.

slapout9
03-09-2011, 04:48 PM
Folks, I have a busy schedule this week but shortly I will post a few responses including some of my personal contacts with Colonel Warden. I will start with how I met him and what he considers to be one of the most important elements of his Airpower Theory and Strategyin general. It is a good story, it shows if you really listen(from a non service dogma related viewpoint) you might just learn something.

Dip
03-09-2011, 08:49 PM
Warden suggests, "airpower advocates must stop trying to use airpower as a substitute for its military predecessors." Accordingly, airpower detractors will engage airpower on that level for precisely the reasons Warden cites. That's what's going on here in spades.

HERE (http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/Pakistan%20Poll%20Report--updated.pdf) is an example of a sublime and enduring airpower victory in an irregular environment (i.e. the Pakistan tribal regions after the earthquake) that isn't "bound to an anachronistic view of war with an anachronistic vocabulary (Warden)."

Of that airpower-centric operation, terrorfreetomorrow.org writes, "Pakistanis now hold a more favorable opinion of the United States than at any time since 9/11, while support for Al Qaeda in its home base has dropped to its lowest level since then. The direct cause for this dramatic shift in Muslim opinion is clear: American humanitarian assistance for Pakistani earthquake victims." A subsuquent study showed that the reversals in opinion were not temporary.

Along those lines, THIS (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/fal07/dipaolo.html) article suggests one way the AF could turn that knowledge into capability. But it won't because the AF is as unlikely to internalize Warden's guidance (cited at the beginning of this post) as the AF's detractors.

To the AF, conventional war = dropping bombs from jets and irregular war = dropping smaller bombs from turboprops. They don't even really recognize strategic effects even when they are creating them. Take the training of the Afg Air Force, for example. The zeitgeist is that the AAF is necessary to allow the gov't to continue to make security gains. What is frequently lost is that in a country like Afg (where vast distances are combined with scant infrastructure is combined with the strategic vulnerability of a central gov't that is too-far-removed from the people), airpower can provide the essential connectivity of the gov't to the population in the hinterlands. I have no idea why the USAF isn't blowing that horn. Maybe it is and I'm just not plugged in enough. More likely, though, that they view it as something they have to do so that the Afghans can start dropping the small bombs...

Regardless, nice to see a well-informed discussion of airpower. Very good exchange.

pvebber
03-09-2011, 11:24 PM
Reread the article and the thread. There are several different lines of argument:

What is new about this article?

Given much of it is a review of Col Warden's previous work, what are the strengths and weaknesses of his theory?

How effectively does Col Warden make his historical case to defend his theory?

The last I will leave to Fuchs, as he has done a bang up job so far ;)

So what is new here? What are the strengths and weaknesses? The thesis appears to be:


Regardless of airpower’s potential, it can never realize its real capability so long as it remains bound to an anachronistic view of war with an anachronistic vocabulary. On the contrary, if airpower is truly to come of age, it must do so in the context of a modern concept of war that associates the use of force as directly as possible with end-game strategic objectives, not with the act of fighting. If this is to happen, the operators of airpower must understand, believe, and teach end-game strategy as the foundation of airpower. Failure to do so will condemn airpower to suboptimization and deprive its owners of using force in such a dramatically different way that will achieve national objectives quickly and at minimum cost. To succeed, airpower advocates must stop trying to use airpower as a substitute for its military predecessors, connect it directly to strategic end-games, adopt a new vocabulary to match airpower’s promise, and become serious promoters not of machines but of ideas.


The premises for this appear to be:

Land operations have dominated warfare and the vocabulary of war is land -centric and therefore prevents unconstrained thought about airpower.

This is indeed something I have never seen argued before. The argument made is that landpower was historically used in series, and the things which occured in series were called 'battles'. Doing away with the concept of serial 'battle' will therefore free us of the notion of serial engagement of the adversary and free airpower to be used simultaneously to affect multiple CoGs in parallel.

Has COL Warden read Joint doctrine lately?

When required to employ force, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and adversary vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. JP 3-0

Simultaneity is a key characteristic of the American way of war. It refers to the simultaneous application of power against key adversary capabilities and sources of strength. The goal of simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an adversary’s collapse by placing more demands on
adversary forces and functions than can be handled. This does not mean that all elements of the joint force are employed with equal priority or that even all elements of the joint force will be employed. It refers specifically to the concept of attacking appropriate adversary forces and functions in such
a manner as to cause confusion and demoralization.

The COL's desires seem to be esconced in current doctrine, with the exception of attributing exculsivity of action to airpower.

Unconstrained, airpower provides the vehicle to directly achieve strategic ends without the need for other forces.

What if the strategic ends require interpersonal contact between human beings? Say to gain the support of a potential ally? Why can't land or naval forces be positioned so as to take simultaneous action that directly achives stragic ends? This key premise is actually an assumption, as no evidence is provided that it is true, and it is fairly easy to conjecture situations where it is not true. (for example if your desired end state is to enforce a strategy based on interdiction of maritime contraband how does one do board and search of potential interlopers with airpower?)

Strategy is about conceiving a desired endstate, identifying means to achieve it, implementing a course of action, and deciding when you are done.

Again, right out of Joint doctrine.

b. The design and implementation of leverage and the ability to know how and
when to terminate operations are involved in operational art and are discussed in Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations.” Because the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations or groups, it is
fundamentally important to understand that termination of operations is an essential link between national security strategy, NMS, and end state conditions — the desired outcome. This principle holds true for both war and MOOTW. JP 3-0

Opponents are complicated entities that can be simplified by a systems analysis. (e.g. Five rings model).

Here is where things start to get contentious. The issue is "complicated" vs "Complex". When some of the "five rings" anaysis of Gulf War 1 are looked at, the sample centers of gravity (see http://www.venturist.com/Prometheus%20Concepts%20Summary.htm) are given as:

Saddam Hussien (dead),
the electrical system non-functional,
roads and bridges unable to support mobility,
military officers demoralized or defecting,
air defense unable to interfere with US operations.

With the exception of affecting military officers, those are all complicated, but not complex systems that can be modeled, simplified and decomposed into a subset of vital nodes. Physical systems that those that can be effectively approached from a systems analysis perspective. Truely complex systems - most notably social systems - are largely opaque to the sort of systems analysis that is required to predict what an effect will do. Complex systems also have a characteristic of irreducibility - they can be decomposed only so far before any resulting model is no longer useful, and you will not no until after the fact that you have exceeded the irreducibility threshold.


Centers of Gravity can be identified in the system which, if affected quickly and and simultaneously, allow the state of the system to be changed to a new, more desirable state.

Another charateristic of complex systems is that the output can not be predicted from a given set of inputs. You can "set the dials and pul lthe levers" of a complex system the same way, and even if you have modeled it with 100% accuracy, you will get different outputs. When dealing with complex systems there is no way to no way to establish a requisite list of CoGs and no way to be certain that doing something to one COg will have a positive feedback one time and a negative feedback the next. This is the fundamental problem with "effects-basd warfare" in general. In every case Ive seen thee is no "theory of action" that connects the action taken, to the desired result - it is simply a matter of "guilt by association" or "correlation equals causality" (until it doesn't).

Were it possible to create a "strategic effects machine" we would have figured it out by now in Afghanistan. Alas there is no "CoG analysis" that tells what levers to pull and dials to turn to create teh desired end state. You can lament "trail and error" but you can desire a magic strategic endstate computer all you want, but what we know about complex system theory says its impossible. Energent behavior is "emergent" becasue by definition it is not predictable.


continued in next post

pvebber
03-09-2011, 11:25 PM
Affecting CoGs in series vice parallel is dramatically more expensive.

Only if you are inept at operational art. How do you know that the cost of firing 1000 cruise missiles all at once to achieve your objective is going to be more successful than firing 100 on 9 consecutive days. or 8 or 7? Boyd discusses this problem in realtion to OODA loops.

Maybe urban legend, but supposedly he tells the story of a dogfight with a new pilot where he makes a complicated series of manuevers, the response to which would lead to Boyd being on the youngsters 6. After completting the manuevers Boyd is horrified to find the younster behind HIM. He asks the youngster how he figured out how to turn the tables. The youngster said "I had no clue what to do, I was gonna go left, then thought maybe right and all of a sudden there you were in front of me!"

You can make the OODA loop so much faster than your opponent that you end up outsmarting yourself, or paralyze him so much that he can't even surrender. With tipping point phenomena, you can't predict how much effect you need to effect the tip, or how much excess you applied after the fact. Sometimes incrementalism is also a political requirement.

Again Warden's argument requires a very determinsitic world view to be correct. There are parts of an adversary "system" that operate that way, but on the whole they do not, and the parts that do may not always be politically acceptable because of collateral effects.

Now these criticisms should NOT be extended to "well, then you must mean we shouldn't even try". Criticism is not condemnation - it is the seemingly obvious caution that we should not try to apply a theory that indeed works against some parts of the some problems, to ALL parts of ALL problems.

Some systems we have to try to understand in their holistic, complete, complex entirety, because simplification introduces errors that render overly simplistic models useless. JUst becasue we want there to be an easy answer that we can apply airpower to simply, quickly and relatively bloodlessly doesn't mean that is possible. Everything we have learned from the last 10 years of war has demonstrated that the heady days of Joint Vision 2010, eliminating the Fog of war and mechnically applying combat power to centers of gravity win wars is folly. Either that or our best and brightest fighting these wars are criminally incompetent for not having achieved our desired endstate quickly and cheaply.

When all is said and done, lets assume Warden is 100% correct. Then what? What changes?

How do we change Joint doctrine to use a language that "enables unconstrained use of airpower"? What things would a Warden designed Air Force do that todays Air Force doesn't do? How does our concept of war change if we assume airpower is a "strategic end-sate generating machine"? How does it harmonize our future growth with China so the rising tide floats all boats? How does it convince Iran to abandon its desire for nuclear power? How does it reduce the strategic risk of our excessive debt? In a multi-polar world what are the end-states we can achieve by compelling, coercing, or denying? Can airpower be a carrot instead of a stick? (other than by giving away!)

pvebber
03-09-2011, 11:30 PM
Dip writes:

I have no idea why the USAF isn't blowing that horn. Maybe it is and I'm just not plugged in enough.

You have not seen the latest Air Force ad campaign: HADR is not only sexy its "SCI-FI"

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bg9K1mCh65U

Fuchs
03-10-2011, 12:11 AM
Saddam Hussien (dead),
the electrical system non-functional,
roads and bridges unable to support mobility,
military officers demoralized or defecting,
air defense unable to interfere with US operations

Let's use this as an example (and I read '91 here):

Two approaches to air war:
'True' strategic air war with the intent to break the enemy government('s will to resist) directly with air power
and
operational air war in support of other arms; usually land support of a land campaign, rarely (Pacific War) primarily support of naval warfare. This may include bombing industries if those industries supply the OPFOR.


Saddam Hussein was caught in a miscalculation.
His withdrawal (the mission to be accomplished under UN mandate) would almost certainly follow if he understood his mistake. Offering him a way out that saves his face would likely reduce his resistance once he grasps the situation (and hurry the process up).


So what needed to be done? He needed to be convinced that the situation is serious. Air power eventually achieved this when he ordered a withdrawal (ground offensive was accelerated to interfere with the withdrawal iirc).

It did actually not take much to convince him that the coalition was serious. Diplomats could have paved him a nice way out of the mess and air power could have demonstrated political resolution with actual attacks. Those actual attacks could have been directed against his counter-strike capabilities in order to minimise the mess; attack aircraft airbases, SCUDs (the latter did eventually fail, of course), suppress long-range artillery (longer range than the ubiquitous D-30's).
This would have required some self-support of air power in form of the strike package support; SEAD, AEW, ECM...
The bombing of barracks, bridges, palaces, electrical nodes, tanks and bunkers was not strategically necessary (the CAS at Khafij was tactically useful, though).


Now another version; air power in support of decisive land operations.
The scenario is roughly the same, but the decision is expected to lay in the hands of the ground forces (assumption: Hussein is too stubborn to yield to air power alone.
Air power softens up and deceives in order to prepare for a decisive land campaign advance: A near-encirclement of the occupation forces in Kuwait would almost certainly force Hussein to accept the need to withdraw. Alternatively, the encirclement could be completed in a more Clausewitzian approach of disarmament.


It should be obvious in both cases that I'm not intent on destroying a card house with some smart moves; I'm intent on defeating the will.
I look at personal preferences and assume somewhat purposeful decision-making within the limits of typical psychological malfunctions (such as cognitive dissonance or problematic group dynamics).
An enemy head of state only needs to be attacked if it itself is the problem or if by assumption a successor would be more inclined to bow to our demands. Aggressor politicians deserve a high explosive event, but killing them makes it damn hard to negotiate an armistice with them in the following days and weeks.

-----------------------------------
The 2nd kind of air warfare (in support of a decisive surface campaign) isn't truly strategic in my opinion, but rather a support campaign that works through the economy/infrastructure (WW2 examples). It's working only very directly towards victory:
Air power succeeds to pave the way for its exploits (SEAD, air superiority fight), air power affects the enemy at home (supply flow to OPFOR reduced), blue surface forces defeat red forces in battle more easily, red government accepts that it was overpowered militarily, its will is broken.
That's often way too indirect because more direct, more elegant, approaches are available.

Cliff
03-10-2011, 03:51 AM
The resources applied were in all the 1991-2011 examples out of proportion with the target. Show me contemporary air war strategy defeating a peer enemy in less than a half year anywhere and I'll buy that it's efficient enough.

Hmm, there isn't one. That doesn't mean the strategy is invalid though. How about 1973 or 1967? Are those contemporary to you?


Btw, the record for most rapid defeat of a Yugoslav government is an astonishing 11 days. The most powerful alliance ever took 78 days to force very limited demands.

Mostly a political issue with NATO, which as I have pointed out Col Warden specifically warns against.


The problem is merely that the whole 'rings' stuff is nonsense. The whole approach is just a bad idea. His writing is full of cluelessness with minimal inspiration. You need to get to the core if you want to break will, you need to look at psychology and preferences, not against an organisation complex.

Name calling isn't useful, Fuchs. Psychology is exactly what Col Warden is talking about when he talks of attacking leadership.


Here's a problem, though.
Let's assume I think I have a better concept that the world-famous five rings crap.
Would you expect me to publish it in an internet forum?

I wouldn't even publish it in my blog.

Good of you to not share with us, then. :)


... which was what he was told to propose, not what he proposed. There are certain people from that episode who do not hold him in high regard at all.

That's true... because Col Warden bucked the establishment (TAC's leadership especially)... and the Army certainly didn't like that Stormin' Norman overruled their desires in favor of the USAF plan. Again, why does this matter in evaluating his ideas?


By my methodology, Iraq would have been left alone since '97, for it had been disarmed as demanded in '96 and was no real-world problem any more.

But you won't tell us how as you said.


Yes, and I don't care about tight control.
There's no inspiration behind what's being done, just transpiration and the standard meme of throwing resources at a problem.
The 90's and 00's air wars followed the 8th AF approach of destroying this, then that - trial and error. We need something more close to Biafra air force, Flying Tigers or Luftwaffe May '40.
We need air forces which deliver a good strategic effect on small budget, accomplish their mission against the odds and which can focus on what's decisive.

There was actually extensive analysis and resources were not thrown willy-nilly at the problem, and it wasn't just destroying things. The effects were carefully calculated. The big problem was that the target set was limited to fielded forces, which as you point out was not a great target. Then again, that's pretty much the opposite of what Warden is arguing we should do...

While the Flying Tigers and Luftwaffe in May '40 accomplished great things, I don't think they were shining examples of airpower strategy - especially the Luftwaffe. But this is distracting us from the real point - your argument for better use of resources is exactly what Warden is arguing for - so you agree with his ends but not his means?


I'll translate this for you:

The original strategy didn't work, a new set of targets was opened up and that strategy didn't work either, another set of targets was opened up and that strategy was still failing until finally the hero knight in shining armour arrived and rescued us all from the total strategic embarrassment: The Russian prime minister who convinced Milosevic that Russia would not intervene.

The strategy used was not the one recommended by the airpower experts involved. You are conflating NATO's national and international grand-strategy issues with airpower strategy. Also, Warden argues that we shouldn't go to war if we're not willing to do what it takes to win - which seems to be what you're arguing (don't go with a less-than optimum strategy). While Russia's position was important, I don't think it was decisive - but even if it was important, how does that diminish the air strategy? It worked in the context of the political situation.


Hardly. We bombed a small power for 78 days. Not elegant at all.

You're using the same point (conflating grand strategy with military strategy) again.


Most of all, it leads to additional wars because
a) there were already too many hundreds of billions spent on the AF bureaucracy and its toys (and politicians never fail to hit the sunk costs fallacy!).
b) air power offers a fantasy of a war (or bullying) on the cheap, without much negative effects of relevance

Fuchs, if the west ever goes to war with China, I hope I am still around afterwards to talk to you about the fallacy of airpower. Your second point is also one that is made by Warden- we shouldn't focus on technological miracles, but find strategies that work.


The Kosovo air war remains a strategic disaster on too many levels - it's astonishing how well this has been kept out of the public perception.
* technical failure of DEAD attempts
* technical failure of F-117

I disagree with the DEAD, although there were issues. Many of these problems have been resolved. As for your second point, why do you think the USAF was trying to buy F-22s?


* tactical failure of way too inept mission planning (such as no variance in French UAV routing and predictable Tomahawk flight routes)
* tactical/technical failure of BDA from the air

BDA is always problematic, but massive improvements have been made there. It will always be an issue.


* intelligence failure on colossal scope before the war
* political failure: lies about the reasons for war
* intelligence failure: BDA
* top HQ failure to teach politicians about what air power can achieve
* top HQ failure to understand that the short bombing around Sarajevo is NOT a good analogy
* political failure: opposition instead of cooperation with Russia

BDA is a repeat, the rest are issues with the NATO alliance and not airpower.


* logistical failure: Race to Pristina airport
* readiness and deployability failure: TF Hawk
* strategic failure: poor understanding of the purpose of destruction
* PR failure: slowed down train bombing video was a lie

Same point as above


* reconnaissance failure: aerial imagery misinterpretation on colossal scale
* reconnaissance and targeting failure: way too many decoys were engaged
* reconnaissance and targeting failure: deployed ground forces were barely scratched despite being targeted

Got it, why do you think there's been massive investments in ISR tech and systems?


* strategic failure: way too long campaign in light of the disparity between NATO and Yugoslavia
* political failure: Greece was not convinced to make bases available
* logistical failure: use of North Italian instead of South Italian bases was idiotic
* political failure: many countries provided small packages of combat aircraft instead of the alliance tailoring a force of only the best for the job
* political failure: no gains for us
* political failure: we're stills tuck in there with blue helmets
* political failure: a few thousand criminal insurgents fooled us into fighting their war
* political failure: said thugs are now operating the organised crime hub of Europe under our protection
* political failure: we came to end an ethnic cleansing campaign against Kosovars that did not really exist and then we didn't really keep the Kosovars from cleaning most of Kosovo ethnically from Serbs

Again, grand strategic issues.


The whole thing was a huge embarrassment, and the air war component contributed a lot to the embarrassment. Only so-called "victory" prevented that the whole world laughed about us.

Same. Fuchs, you argue many of the same points that Warden makes, but then criticize him. You take the fact that the NAC and the political leadership of NATO didn't take the advice of the military experts until it was obvious it was the only way to achieve victory, and use that to discredit the original strategy. Additionally, you give Warden no credit for the fact that he agrees that we should not go to war if we're not willing to use the proper strategy for political reasons. You criticize Warden for his argument's intellectual rigor, then use misleading and repetitive examples of your own to support your counter.

I know I am not going to convince you, and that's OK. I would appreciate it if you avoided name calling in future discussions, though. Even if you disagree with someone you can still respect them.

V/R,

Cliff

Ken White
03-10-2011, 04:33 AM
but I posit this, properly redacted to preclude assignment of intent, evil or otherwise, for consideration.
"... no credit for the fact that he agrees that we should not go to war if we're not willing to use the proper strategy for political reasons."Well, I freely give such credit -- however, being an ancient, curmudgeonly cynic, I also have to point out that most warfare theorists, good, bad and indifferent have said things to that effect. It is almost a mantra among them, ancient to classical to contemporary.

My suspicion is that part of the problem is few politicians read the treatises and will insist on sending folks off to fight while barring the use of good strategeries or even sensible TTP...:eek:

The follow on to that is that many arguments about theory and strategy -- indeed many great ideas pertaining to strategy -- founder on that shoal. If is a very problematic word...:(

Cliff
03-10-2011, 05:08 AM
There are several different lines of argument... ...How effectively does Col Warden make his historical case to defend his theory?
The last I will leave to Fuchs, as he has done a bang up job so far ;)

Agree with all but your last line. Warden's historical examples aren't perfect, but Fuchs' aren't much better.


Has COL Warden read Joint doctrine lately?

When required to employ force, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and adversary vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. JP 3-0

Simultaneity is a key characteristic of the American way of war. It refers to the simultaneous application of power against key adversary capabilities and sources of strength. The goal of simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an adversary’s collapse by placing more demands on
adversary forces and functions than can be handled. This does not mean that all elements of the joint force are employed with equal priority or that even all elements of the joint force will be employed. It refers specifically to the concept of attacking appropriate adversary forces and functions in such
a manner as to cause confusion and demoralization.
The COL's desires seem to be esconced in current doctrine, with the exception of attributing exculsivity of action to airpower.

Note the focus on forces in the above paragraphs- that is what Warden is arguing against. Additionally, I would say that joint doctrine is not always (or even often) neccessarily followed. Additionally, the JFC is normally an Army commander, and the Army doctrine is very force centric.


Unconstrained, airpower provides the vehicle to directly achieve strategic ends without the need for other forces.

What if the strategic ends require interpersonal contact between human beings? Say to gain the support of a potential ally? Why can't land or naval forces be positioned so as to take simultaneous action that directly achives stragic ends? This key premise is actually an assumption, as no evidence is provided that it is true, and it is fairly easy to conjecture situations where it is not true. (for example if your desired end state is to enforce a strategy based on interdiction of maritime contraband how does one do board and search of potential interlopers with airpower?)

Again, Warden isn't saying that land or naval power won't work, or can't help- he is saying that airpower can be more effective in many situations. The fact that airpower can work doesn't mean that land or seapower can't.


Strategy is about conceiving a desired endstate, identifying means to achieve it, implementing a course of action, and deciding when you are done.

Again, right out of Joint doctrine.

b. The design and implementation of leverage and the ability to know how and
when to terminate operations are involved in operational art and are discussed in Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations.” Because the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations or groups, it is
fundamentally important to understand that termination of operations is an essential link between national security strategy, NMS, and end state conditions — the desired outcome. This principle holds true for both war and MOOTW. JP 3-0

I agree, I don't think Warden would argue. He is saying that the language we use tends to drive us to a certain strategy. Your example cited puts the termination or desired outcome at the end... Warden is say

Okay, quibble time- MOOTW is out, your JP 3-0 must be out of date.

From JP 3-0, 17 Sept 2006, (Inc change 1 13 Feb 08), page I-3:


Theater strategy is determined by CCDRs based on analysis of changing events in the operational environment and the development of options to set conditions for success.

Warden argues that strategy should start at ends, then work backwards. The Joint Ops Planning Process starts at the ends and theoretically works backwards. But a few paragraphs after the one you cite we have this:


Commanders strive to end combat operations on terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners. The basic element of this goal is gaining control over the enemy and/or gaining influence over a relevant population.

Warden would say that control drives us to strive for decisive battle to seize control of terrain, when we might be able to achieve our objectives by influencing the enemy's will. Subtle differences, but Warden is saying that attrition and battle are a part of our basic mentality in the US military.

The Army's Military Decision Making Process is similar, although even more force/terrain centric- as it probably should be. The first steps of Course of Action Development are "assess relative combat power", then Generate Options which consists of making COAs...


A good COA can defeat all feasible enemy COAs while accounting for essential stability tasks. FM 5-0, March 2010, B-14 to B-15

In other words, the COA is developed based on the enemy forces expected actions. Again, the Army tends to drive most joint planning because they are most of the people involved.


Opponents are complicated entities that can be simplified by a systems analysis. (e.g. Five rings model).

Here is where things start to get contentious. The issue is "complicated" vs "Complex".

Agree on that!


When some of the "five rings" anaysis of Gulf War 1 are looked at, the sample centers of gravity (see http://www.venturist.com/Prometheus%20Concepts%20Summary.htm) are given as:

Saddam Hussien (dead),
the electrical system non-functional,
roads and bridges unable to support mobility,
military officers demoralized or defecting,
air defense unable to interfere with US operations.
With the exception of affecting military officers, those are all complicated, but not complex systems that can be modeled, simplified and decomposed into a subset of vital nodes. Physical systems that those that can be effectively approached from a systems analysis perspective.

No argument there, Desert Storm was a relatively un-complex setup, especially since our objectives were fairly simple (eject Iraq from Kuwait, make sure they could defend themselves but not attack neighbors post-conflict).


Truely complex systems - most notably social systems - are largely opaque to the sort of systems analysis that is required to predict what an effect will do. Complex systems also have a characteristic of irreducibility - they can be decomposed only so far before any resulting model is no longer useful, and you will not no until after the fact that you have exceeded the irreducibility threshold.

True. Humans are complex. But you can still determine ways to affect them.


Centers of Gravity can be identified in the system which, if affected quickly and and simultaneously, allow the state of the system to be changed to a new, more desirable state.

Another charateristic of complex systems is that the output can not be predicted from a given set of inputs. You can "set the dials and pul lthe levers" of a complex system the same way, and even if you have modeled it with 100% accuracy, you will get different outputs. When dealing with complex systems there is no way to no way to establish a requisite list of CoGs and no way to be certain that doing something to one COg will have a positive feedback one time and a negative feedback the next. This is the fundamental problem with "effects-basd warfare" in general. In every case Ive seen thee is no "theory of action" that connects the action taken, to the desired result - it is simply a matter of "guilt by association" or "correlation equals causality" (until it doesn't).

I guess my point is, what alternative do we have? Also, I think Warden's argument on the time element is critical... because humans are involved, and provide most of the complexity and a lot of the uncertainty on effects you refer to above, psychology matters. If you can successfully hit someone so quickly and in so many places that they can't react, the likelihood of them reacting in the way you want is increased, because they don't have time to change their actions or adjust.


Were it possible to create a "strategic effects machine" we would have figured it out by now in Afghanistan. Alas there is no "CoG analysis" that tells what levers to pull and dials to turn to create teh desired end state. You can lament "trail and error" but you can desire a magic strategic endstate computer all you want, but what we know about complex system theory says its impossible. Energent behavior is "emergent" becasue by definition it is not predictable.

What was our desired endstate in Afghanistan? I think Col Warden would argue that putting in extensive troops in on the ground in the first place was part of where things went wrong... He also says that airpower may not be the answer (yet), but that we should try and figure ways to use it to achieve our ends.

The COIN scenario is obviously the most difficult to apply Warden's system to... but then again, have Design, JOPP, MDMP, or FM 3-24 been completely successful in AFG?

On to the next one... good points!

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff
03-10-2011, 05:32 AM
Affecting CoGs in series vice parallel is dramatically more expensive.

Only if you are inept at operational art. How do you know that the cost of firing 1000 cruise missiles all at once to achieve your objective is going to be more successful than firing 100 on 9 consecutive days. or 8 or 7? Boyd discusses this problem in relation to OODA loops.

I think Col Warden is making a generality here... but it is supportable. Take your example - the cost of deploying troops to the field for 9 days is going to be 9 times the cost of deploying them for 1 day. Not as big an issue for you Navy folks, but everyone else pays...


Maybe urban legend, but supposedly he tells the story of a dogfight with a new pilot where he makes a complicated series of maneuvers, the response to which would lead to Boyd being on the youngsters 6. After completing the maneuvers Boyd is horrified to find the younster behind HIM. He asks the youngster how he figured out how to turn the tables. The youngster said "I had no clue what to do, I was gonna go left, then thought maybe right and all of a sudden there you were in front of me!"

Having been that guy once (OK, it might have happened twice), I will submit that one of the hardest opponents in BFM can be someone who is new and thus has no clue... because sometimes they will do something completely dumb, but if you take a second to ask "why did he do that? that was dumb..." it might just work!


You can make the OODA loop so much faster than your opponent that you end up outsmarting yourself, or paralyze him so much that he can't even surrender. With tipping point phenomena, you can't predict how much effect you need to effect the tip, or how much excess you applied after the fact. Sometimes incrementalism is also a political requirement.

Hmmm... agree on the political. If you've properly analyzed your opponent, then the inability to surrender should be immaterial, because you'll know when he's there and leave him a way to let you know he's done.


Again Warden's argument requires a very determinsitic world view to be correct. There are parts of an adversary "system" that operate that way, but on the whole they do not, and the parts that do may not always be politically acceptable because of collateral effects.

Again, Warden is not arguing that we're there now - only that we are getting closer, and should keep trying - and that we will not get closer if we give up because ground and seapower folks tell us it'll never work.


Now these criticisms should NOT be extended to "well, then you must mean we shouldn't even try". Criticism is not condemnation - it is the seemingly obvious caution that we should not try to apply a theory that indeed works against some parts of the some problems, to ALL parts of ALL problems.

Which is why Warden says we should see if we can make airpower work in a quick/less costly way, and if not, consider if we really want to go to war.


Some systems we have to try to understand in their holistic, complete, complex entirety, because simplification introduces errors that render overly simplistic models useless. Just because we want there to be an easy answer that we can apply airpower to simply, quickly and relatively bloodlessly doesn't mean that is possible. Everything we have learned from the last 10 years of war has demonstrated that the heady days of Joint Vision 2010, eliminating the Fog of war and mechanically applying combat power to centers of gravity win wars is folly. Either that or our best and brightest fighting these wars are criminally incompetent for not having achieved our desired endstate quickly and cheaply.

This goes back to the same point above.


When all is said and done, lets assume Warden is 100% correct. Then what? What changes?

How do we change Joint doctrine to use a language that "enables unconstrained use of airpower"? What things would a Warden designed Air Force do that todays Air Force doesn't do? How does our concept of war change if we assume airpower is a "strategic end-sate generating machine"? How does it harmonize our future growth with China so the rising tide floats all boats? How does it convince Iran to abandon its desire for nuclear power? How does it reduce the strategic risk of our excessive debt? In a multi-polar world what are the end-states we can achieve by compelling, coercing, or denying? Can airpower be a carrot instead of a stick? (other than by giving away!)

My thoughts on what Warden would answer: We focus on the endstate. Our concept changes to focus more on the desired ends and the quickest way to get there vs. a force/battle centric way of thinking. On China, fully funding a robust airpower capability would potentially allow you to deter Chinese military action, confining the competition to the economic realm- which after all is what US grand strategy has been about since World War II. As for Iran, it either deters them or gives you the capability to affect their regime leaders in a way that convinces them it's too painful to continue. Rather than focusing on hitting their nuclear program, how about we target the president, mullahs, and revolutionary guards through their extensive financial holdings? That's the difference Warden would promote. The debt issue is not a military one, so I agree that airpower can't solve that - although if Warden's ideal was realized, we could probably cut a lot of folks. I think that airpower can be a carrot - reference our current strategy of outsourcing containment of Iran by improving other folks' Air Forces in the gulf.

Probably the biggest lesson I have learned over the last year of hanging with the Army is that the Army doesn't like strategy. I'm not trying to attack- there's good reason for this. And this is not something I came up with - this is what the Army folks have told me (one of them is going to be a FA-59, or strategist). Again, the Army drives most joint doctrine and planning because it is the biggest service and normally the JFC. This is a big part of why Warden is saying we have a hard time thinking about airpower. This is what Warden is arguing against - again, he's not saying we're there now, but that we (airpower advocates) should keep trying to get there. He is not advocating bombing everything in sight- or even that bombing is always necessary - in fact, he wants to reduce the amount of direct kinetic damage.

Good discussion pvebber.

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff
03-10-2011, 05:42 AM
Let's use this as an example (and I read '91 here):
Saddam Hussein was caught in a miscalculation.
His withdrawal (the mission to be accomplished under UN mandate) would almost certainly follow if he understood his mistake. Offering him a way out that saves his face would likely reduce his resistance once he grasps the situation (and hurry the process up).

Uhhm, this is the guy who killed hundreds of thousands of his own folks in the Iran-Iraq war...


So what needed to be done? He needed to be convinced that the situation is serious. Air power eventually achieved this when he ordered a withdrawal (ground offensive was accelerated to interfere with the withdrawal iirc).

It did actually not take much to convince him that the coalition was serious. Diplomats could have paved him a nice way out of the mess and air power could have demonstrated political resolution with actual attacks. Those actual attacks could have been directed against his counter-strike capabilities in order to minimise the mess; attack aircraft airbases, SCUDs (the latter did eventually fail, of course), suppress long-range artillery (longer range than the ubiquitous D-30's).
This would have required some self-support of air power in form of the strike package support; SEAD, AEW, ECM...
The bombing of barracks, bridges, palaces, electrical nodes, tanks and bunkers was not strategically necessary (the CAS at Khafij was tactically useful, though).

You assume Saddam is a rational actor who cares about his people... I think that's a false assumption. Also, the second objective was to make sure Saddam could no longer threaten his neighbors - hence the CAS and AI. Your "demonstration" sounds a lot like McNarma and LBJ's "sending signals"... Most of the electrical and bunker targets were intended to degrade C2 of the Iraqi IADS, which is neccessary to do the rest of your list.


Now another version; air power in support of decisive land operations.
The scenario is roughly the same, but the decision is expected to lay in the hands of the ground forces (assumption: Hussein is too stubborn to yield to air power alone.
Air power softens up and deceives in order to prepare for a decisive land campaign advance: A near-encirclement of the occupation forces in Kuwait would almost certainly force Hussein to accept the need to withdraw. Alternatively, the encirclement could be completed in a more Clausewitzian approach of disarmament.

Again, I think you assume a lot about Saddam.


It should be obvious in both cases that I'm not intent on destroying a card house with some smart moves; I'm intent on defeating the will.
I look at personal preferences and assume somewhat purposeful decision-making within the limits of typical psychological malfunctions (such as cognitive dissonance or problematic group dynamics).
An enemy head of state only needs to be attacked if it itself is the problem or if by assumption a successor would be more inclined to bow to our demands. Aggressor politicians deserve a high explosive event, but killing them makes it damn hard to negotiate an armistice with them in the following days and weeks.

You are confusing Warden's model, Fuchs. Attacking the leadership ring doesn't neccessarily mean you kill them... you just have to affect them.


The 2nd kind of air warfare (in support of a decisive surface campaign) isn't truly strategic in my opinion, but rather a support campaign that works through the economy/infrastructure (WW2 examples). It's working only very directly towards victory:
Air power succeeds to pave the way for its exploits (SEAD, air superiority fight), air power affects the enemy at home (supply flow to OPFOR reduced), blue surface forces defeat red forces in battle more easily, red government accepts that it was overpowered militarily, its will is broken.
That's often way too indirect because more direct, more elegant, approaches are available.

Again, you seem to agree with Warden, but just don't like the way he wrote his arguement. The last line is pretty much his 5 rings model in one sentence...

V/R,

Cliff

Fuchs
03-10-2011, 09:07 AM
Uhhm, this is the guy who killed hundreds of thousands of his own folks in the Iran-Iraq war...

...this didn't seem to bother us and was not the subject of the '91 conflict.


You assume Saddam is a rational actor who cares about his people... I think that's a false assumption.

No, I assume Saddam was a mostly rational actor who cared about his power. There are many ways how someone like that can be threatened without threatening his people much.
The more someone wants to keep, the more you can threaten. The more you have destroyed already, the less you can threaten with destruction.


Also, the second objective was to make sure Saddam could no longer threaten his neighbors - hence the CAS and AI.

This was pointless, for Turkey was in NATO, Syria and Iran were powerful enough to defend themselves, Jordan is too close to Israel and it wouldn't have required a second lesson to teach him not to touch Kuwait or Saudi-Arabia. Who's left? Qatar and Bahrain? Same as Kuwait, plus he lacked the transport to invade them.
His ability to threaten neighbours would have been gone by a mix or military and political reasons anyway - without destruction of most of his heavy weapons.


Your "demonstration" sounds a lot like McNarma and LBJ's "sending signals"...

They were in the trap that they demanded too much, were seen as wanting to achieve even more (indirect rule) and being unable to hit most of the factories that produced for the war effort. The failure of a recipe under such conditions means nothing unless another recipe is known that would not fail.


Most of the electrical and bunker targets were intended to degrade C2 of the Iraqi IADS, which is neccessary to do the rest of your list.

I consider this as overrated. The Iraqi air defences were susceptible in many ways. The effort against the C2 was redundant.


You are confusing Warden's model, Fuchs. Attacking the leadership ring doesn't neccessarily mean you kill them... you just have to affect them.

...which will work about as well as the Bomber Command's bombing reduced work morale unless you have a good idea what effect has the best probability of success. That's what it's all about.
And someone here had hinted at killing leadership, that's why I referred to it.


Again, you seem to agree with Warden, but just don't like the way he wrote his arguement.

No, I don't agree at all, even if conclusions from my model can be misunderstood to be close to his.




I don't think they were shining examples of airpower strategy - especially the Luftwaffe.

They were example of good bang for the buck, success under adverse conditions and focus on the important.

Luftwaffe in May '40 (France Campaign) focused on one thing only: The success of the land campaign. It began with some pressure on the French air force and a fake Schwerpunkt and proceeded with all might to support at the real Schwerpunkt - Sedan. Only a few per cent diversionary missions were about something else than supporting the land campaign.
This choice of focus was proved to be correct in the process.
It was a peer/peer conflict (actually, Germany was even a bit weaker), the Luftwaffe was not clearly superior in quality (its losses were higher than the French and British ones!) - the one thing that deserved them a place in air war history as first greatly successful air campaign was the focus on a single mission.

Compare this with the miserable targeting of '99.
What exactly was the purpose of destroying a railway bridge if there were no army movements anyway?

Steve Blair
03-10-2011, 02:49 PM
While the Flying Tigers and Luftwaffe in May '40 accomplished great things, I don't think they were shining examples of airpower strategy - especially the Luftwaffe. But this is distracting us from the real point - your argument for better use of resources is exactly what Warden is arguing for - so you agree with his ends but not his means?

Warden's use of the Luftwaffe to illustrate his examples is one of the points (IMO) where he really goes off the rails. The Luftwaffe did exactly what it was designed to do, because the Germans had a different conception of airpower based on their experiences in World War I. Was it in line with Warden's vision? No. Does that automatically make it wrong? Certainly not.

Warden continues to chase the myth of warfare on the cheap (from our perspective, at least). He is also far too wedded to the idea that airpower can be decisive in any area, and if it can't we shouldn't get involved. If you read "The Air Campaign," you would think that the Air Force won the war in the Pacific all by itself and that the Battle of Britain was a failed defensive campaign. Warden is also (again IMO) far too linked to the idea that kinetic efforts should be divorced from political considerations, and far too often falls back on the "politicians tied our hands" argument when airpower doesn't work as advertised. Warden's theories work well in computer games, but I really think they fall short when put to the real world test.

pvebber
03-10-2011, 03:46 PM
Cliff, thanks trying to penetrate my thick seawater soaked brain!

I’ll try to give some specific responses as I get the chance. Some general philosophical differences we seem to be having:

The “why wouldn’t you want” argument. Your interpretation of Warden seems to be “given Warden might be right, why wouldn’t you want that to be the case”? This is a an increasing spillover from political debate to defense debate that I find very troubling. If you didn’t have to “choose 2” between quick, cheap and effective why wouldn’t you? Well because there are these things called the Laws of Physics and Economics… I don’t want to minimize your good arguments by painting them with that broad brush, but a warning from the school of hard knocks ;)

The “if it’s necessary, why not aim for sufficient”? A variation on the above that I think is at the heart of what many find off-putting to Warden’s arguments. For a Navy guy I’m considered almost an airpower heretic. I have probably read more Airpower doctrine and concepts than I’ve read Navy doctrine and concepts (of course there is so much MORE of it…shame on my Navy brethren for their paucity of operational thought…). I have some rather radical notions of Air-Sea Battle that get at changing how we think about “Fleet Power” (or more broadly to the Air-Sea partnership “Expeditionary power”). I just don’t see what the problem is that makes “airpower is necessary AND sufficient to achieve strategic ends” a desirable goal?

Definition of “strategy”. I have a copy of Military Strategy by Wylie on my desk. I find it the most personally influential single source on the subject. Its purpose is stated as :


“One purpose of this book is to try and demonstrate that it is possible to study warfare, and be both fundamental and practical about it, without dissecting a battle or counting bullets or tracing the route of the nth division on a large scale map. What is necessary is that the whole of the thin, all of war, be studied. The fragments of war, the minor parts of strategy, the details of tactics are quite literally infinite. We know from the hard experiences of the physical and social sciences that if the parts are not ordered in some prior way, are not held up to some broad concept, all we can do is remain the prisoner of raw data.”

So I am receptive to the notion of transcending ‘battle’ as a concept but leery of Wardens desire to “replace it” with some as yet undisclosed ‘vocabulary”. This could just be semantics, but there is a difference to between eliminating the notion of battle, and getting beyond it to understand concepts at a higher level of abstraction.

Wylies preferred definition of Strategy is:


"A plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment”.

Note that it places ends first, and “war” and “means” do not appear in this definition. Also, as someone previously stated, it is something that transcends the purview of the military.

So two issues of definition: First is the apparent assumption Warden makes that the airpower strategist should formulate the ends. This is argued from a “why wouldn’t you want” point of view rather than acknowledging that at least some, if not most of the time, the desired end state is given to the military strategist by politicians, war being the “extension of politics by other means”. So there is an implied control over the end state in Wardens definition of strategy that is desireable but unrealistic.

Second, while Warden argues that means should be left out of the discussion, the fact that “airpower” is invoked implies means. It seems he wants to have it both ways, he wants strategy to be elevated beyond means to the realm of ideas, just so long as those are AIRPOWER relate ideas.

He almost makes the reduction absurdum jump, but pauses at the brink in his historical discussion about unlimited mobility changing the nature of land power and battles. Lets replace “airpower” with “transporterpower”. Taken to the extreme his argument appears to be that the ultimate form of strategy would be to think in terms of “beaming effector things instantly wherever you wanted”.

When you want to compel an adversary to do your bidding, you analyze his “system” you create a set of exactly appropriate “effectors” and you simultaneously “beam” them into precise locations in his system to so that the adversary is compelled to do what you say. If your method of compulsion is to “collapse his system” then that would be possible. The problem is, as we saw in Iraq, does “collapsing his system” actual get you to a desirable end state? If you only partially collapse the system, how do you know that your “pulse of power” is going to exceed the tipping point of coercion and not just piss the adversary off and cause an undesired vertical or horizontal escalation? This gets to teh unrealistic assumptions behind the "parallel is always cheaper" argument - a problme of not knowing what you don't know, not of "well 5 is cheaper than 6 is cheapre than 9". How do know to pick 5 for your only pulse of power?Where is the “theory of action” that actually links the “transport plan” to desirable strategic end states other than “collapse” or “paralysis”?


The “what alternative do we have” argument. Thanks for pointing out I grabbed an old JP 3-0. The newer one brings up the idea of “design”. I knew there are many that think the ideas of design are implicit in good operational art. I tend to agree, but to the extent it helps folks understand good operational art, the design metaphor has value as an alternative to overpromising on the limits of planning.

I would say to those who say “he doesn’t really mean to be as wedded to prediction and determinism as you make it sound”; if that is true than he should avoid making statements like: “It also opens another very exciting possibility: conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood.”

Positing that as a “possibility” is only possible if one assumes a level of predictability about the future that is known to be unattainable.

More later...

slapout9
03-10-2011, 05:10 PM
Still busy, but pvebber instead of "battle" think Ambush or as the Army says create an "Overmatch" or a "Mismatch" between weapons systems or tactics. That is what he means by avoiding "Battle" or equal forces fighting each other.


Also, "bloodless" means killing who you want to kill..... but only those that you want to kill. Precision killing if you will. To make it current instead of a No-Fly Zones we should create a "No Qaddafi Zone"! Instant,precise vaporization of the problem child and his strange offspring:)


Gotta Go!

ganulv
03-10-2011, 07:53 PM
On China, fully funding a robust airpower capability would potentially allow you to deter Chinese military action, confining the competition to the economic realm- which after all is what US grand strategy has been about since World War II.

I don’t mean to come off as catty, but what is your metric for full funding? The U.S. military budget is already four to five times that of China’s. The federal government could spend even more on airpower, yes, but in a world of limited resources is there any realistic reason to argue that it should?

Even if your logic holds I don’t know that the U.S. really needs any more economic competition from China than it already has. :rolleyes:

pvebber
03-10-2011, 09:59 PM
Note the focus on forces in the above paragraphs- that is what Warden is arguing against. Additionally, I would say that joint doctrine is not always (or even often) neccessarily followed. Additionally, the JFC is normally an Army commander, and the Army doctrine is very force centric.

Joint doctrine is written from the operational level point of view - that of orchestrating ways and means to achive an end that is often (usually?) given. Some of Warden's fire appears to be aimed to bypassing the operational level and linking tactical action to strategic ends. The reference to force is about means in the strategic construct of "ends, ways, means". Do you think when he talks of "battle" that is really about the need to orchestrate ways and means against the adversary ways and means (ie the campaign?) and just skip to tactical action for strategic purpose?

If part of the solution Warden is proposing is to "chang ethe vocabulary" that comes by changing doctrine. Whether we follow it is immaterial, it is the source of "vocabularly" for any discussion.

The Army is only the JFC for land campaigns. With the exception of Iraq and Afghanistan, I think just about all the other CJTFs are Navy or Air Force?

Current doctrine in general tends to be "force centric becuase its aabout employinghte means we currently have.

It have been better for me to have invoked Joint concepts instead of Joint doctrine?


Again, Warden isn't saying that land or naval power won't work, or can't help- he is saying that airpower can be more effective in many situations. The fact that airpower can work doesn't mean that land or seapower can't.

Warden's argument seems to be that airpower alone has the ability to attack multiple CoGs in Parallel.

"Only within the last 75 years has airpower made it possible to attack multiple centers if gravity in parallel. Can there be any question that we desperately need to rethink war?"

One argue that seapower has had the ability to attack multiple CoGs for considerably longer than that, it depends on what you consider a CoG. We may well have been able to starve japan into submission in WWII had more attention been played to strangling her SLOCS rather than incinerating population centers (er, strategic sources of wartime labor).

Airpower is unable to reach many CoGs in the required capacity without seapower, so one could make many of the same arguments with seapower rather than airpower as the "effector of greatest economy".

Similarly, there are CoGs that you can't appropriately affect by breaking and instead requires a human being on the ground to appropriately influence. Airpower can't have tea with a tribal elder and convince him to plant alfalfa instead of poppys.

The arguments Warden makes are necessary ones, but the zeal to make them also sufficient to all cases is what rankles parochial hackles.


Warden argues that strategy should start at ends, then work backwards. The Joint Ops Planning Process starts at the ends and theoretically works backwards.

So what is he arguing with. He's won that battle! Why harp on it so much in the paper? IF its about Iraq and Afghanistan, well those were political wars whose ends were political animals that evolved over time for political reasons. Its almost like Warden is arguing that we should only fight wars that fall into the category he is himself defining. Sorry but military folk do get to put constraints on politicians in this country. And war is not always a matte of choice. The adversary gets a vote, and will endeavor to orchestrate situations that are outside Wardens' nice tidy "war box".

We are already so dominant militarily that there are only a handful of potential military rivals who would take us on militarily and in many cases the militaries of those countries are essentially "sacrifical anodes" that will be sacrificed on the alter of puplic spectacle for the express purpose of NOT letting us fight Wardens sort of sterile, bloodless war.


Warden would say that control drives us to strive for decisive battle to seize control of terrain, when we might be able to achieve our objectives by influencing the enemy's will. Subtle differences, but Warden is saying that attrition and battle are a part of our basic mentality in the US military.

The requirement to establish control and provide order to a state after we "Collapse it" is arequirement of international law. We can't just "break" a country, and then point our finger like Ming the Merciless and chide for their impertanane not giving us what we want. As we have seen in Iraq, the other side may decide to "collapse" on a schedule other than the one we plan for just to leave us in a quagmire and transition the battle to an irregualr playfield. Again Warden seems to imply a degree of predictability (you need predicatability in to to plan to the level Warden implies) than is possible.

It is not control that drives us to battle, but competition with the adversary. Warden ascribes to airpower (as many airpower theorists have done) an irresitibility to airpower. Based on what does airpower get to magically avoid enemy attempts to stop it? Last time I checked we did not transpporter bombs and despite the desire to avoid talking 'means' airplanes and missiles, though fast, are still requred to transit through increasingly capacble IADS systems and deal with adversary elements of airpower. Most consider those encouners to be "battles" and they can't be wished away.


In other words, the COA is developed based on the enemy forces expected actions. Again, the Army tends to drive most joint planning because they are most of the people involved.

Agin this is becasue of the pesky reality that the adversary has a strategy, and ways and means that are used to oppose us. When you have means, and the other guy has means, they will bump into each other in the execution of strategy. Despite the desire for immunity, airpower for the foresable future must engage in battles with enemy airpower just llike seapower and land power must.

Service drivers to palnning is very AOR specific. The Navy dominates PAC AOR planning.


True. Humans are complex. But you can still determine ways to affect them.

But how they will respond is unpredictable. For a test case, tell your wife that you are going use Warden's strategy to get here to do what you want.

Then again... don't :D

more later...

Cliff
03-11-2011, 01:01 AM
I don’t mean to come off as catty, but what is your metric for full funding? The U.S. military budget is already four to five times that of China’s. The federal government could spend even more on airpower, yes, but in a world of limited resources is there any realistic reason to argue that it should?

Even if your logic holds I don’t know that the U.S. really needs any more economic competition from China than it already has. :rolleyes:

Ganulv-

I was trying to respond to pvebber's theoretical China question... I agree that our absolute budget still is way bigger than China's, and the federal debt is a bigger threat than anything else- meaning budgets will get cut. Warden would argue that the airpower (again airpower is not just Air Force) budget should be boosted at the expense of other military accounts - and I was attempting to show how he might apply that additional airpower to the China scenario.

I think that given the current fiscal environment and our current commitments it is unlikely that any of the services will get a significant budget boost over anyone else. One feature of our current system is that everyone has supporters in the public and in Congress, meaning true tradeoffs are very difficult to get.

One note on budget, though - the USAF budget (proposed) for FY12 is $166B. Of that, $30.92B is not controlled by the USAF, but goes to joint organizations (a lot of classified stuff for three letter OGAs). Another $9B pays for space procurement for systems like GPS, comm sats, launchers that support the entire joint force (and a lot of other folks). That's a total of $39.92B, or 24% of the USAF budget that essentially goes to supporting the entire DoD. I'm not complaining about this - I just think folks don't realize how much money the USAF spends on space to enable the entire joint force. It's not all Raptors and white scarves! The Navy and Army are actually buying more aircraft in FY12 than the USAF.

V/R,

Cliff

Link to Budget docs:
Air Force Financial Management Budget Site (http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/)

Cliff
03-11-2011, 01:58 AM
The “why wouldn’t you want” argument. Your interpretation of Warden seems to be “given Warden might be right, why wouldn’t you want that to be the case”? This is a an increasing spillover from political debate to defense debate that I find very troubling. If you didn’t have to “choose 2” between quick, cheap and effective why wouldn’t you? Well because there are these things called the Laws of Physics and Economics… I don’t want to minimize your good arguments by painting them with that broad brush, but a warning from the school of hard knocks ;)

Agree that it is difficult... Warden's arguing to keep trying, though. :) Reality right now is effective and quick are possible but cheap the USG doesn't seem to be able to do. It will be very interesting to see what happens with the USAF's new Long Range Strike systems, as they are supposed to be affordable based on limiting requirements.


The “if it’s necessary, why not aim for sufficient”? A variation on the above that I think is at the heart of what many find off-putting to Warden’s arguments. For a Navy guy I’m considered almost an airpower heretic. I have probably read more Airpower doctrine and concepts than I’ve read Navy doctrine and concepts (of course there is so much MORE of it…shame on my Navy brethren for their paucity of operational thought…). I have some rather radical notions of Air-Sea Battle that get at changing how we think about “Fleet Power” (or more broadly to the Air-Sea partnership “Expeditionary power”). I just don’t see what the problem is that makes “airpower is necessary AND sufficient to achieve strategic ends” a desirable goal?

My Navy bro keeps telling us how the Navy doesn't have a lot of doctrine or planning processes... the contrast with the Army doctrine taught at CGSC is impressive from what he says. Air-Sea Battle will be very interesting... and I think it will involve a lot of airpower - which again is NOT (necessarily) Air Force. By Warden's definition, the Aegis is an airpower system, since it has the ability to control the air.


So I am receptive to the notion of transcending ‘battle’ as a concept but leery of Wardens desire to “replace it” with some as yet undisclosed ‘vocabulary”. This could just be semantics, but there is a difference to between eliminating the notion of battle, and getting beyond it to understand concepts at a higher level of abstraction.

A lot of discussion would probably be neccessary... and I agree that the heart of the matter is getting to the higher levels.


Wylies preferred definition of Strategy is... Note that it places ends first, and “war” and “means” do not appear in this definition. Also, as someone previously stated, it is something that transcends the purview of the military.

I think that someone was me. Although I must admit that Ken said it first. :) Right or wrong, the politicians own the grand/national strategy level.


So two issues of definition: First is the apparent assumption Warden makes that the airpower strategist should formulate the ends. This is argued from a “why wouldn’t you want” point of view rather than acknowledging that at least some, if not most of the time, the desired end state is given to the military strategist by politicians, war being the “extension of politics by other means”. So there is an implied control over the end state in Wardens definition of strategy that is desirable but unrealistic.

Hmm, this isn't the way I read it. He says that we must decide what we want the future to look like... but I don't see where the "we" has to be an airpower person. I agree that it will come from higher - I think the point is that once the end state is known, we should work backwards from there.


Second, while Warden argues that means should be left out of the discussion, the fact that “airpower” is invoked implies means. It seems he wants to have it both ways, he wants strategy to be elevated beyond means to the realm of ideas, just so long as those are AIRPOWER relate ideas.

Hmm. I think that is not the point... the point is that if we start with ends first, we likely will end up selecting airpower much more often than we have in the past:


This methodology allows us to select the most appropriate centers of gravity and then apply airpower (if appropriate) to produce direct strategic results. It

Obviously Warden is an airpower advocate, and as I have pointed out this article is aimed at folks who are involved in airpower. So yes, it is advocating increased use of airpower. But I think we need to take Warden at his word - he admits that airpower may not be used in all cases - but is asking that airpower professionals should keep working to make it more effective.


He almost makes the reduction absurdum jump, but pauses at the brink in his historical discussion about unlimited mobility changing the nature of land power and battles. Lets replace “airpower” with “transporterpower”. Taken to the extreme his argument appears to be that the ultimate form of strategy would be to think in terms of “beaming effector things instantly wherever you wanted”.

Yes, he is arguing that increased mobility increases effectiveness.


When you want to compel an adversary to do your bidding, you analyze his “system” you create a set of exactly appropriate “effectors” and you simultaneously “beam” them into precise locations in his system to so that the adversary is compelled to do what you say. If your method of compulsion is to “collapse his system” then that would be possible. The problem is, as we saw in Iraq, does “collapsing his system” actual get you to a desirable end state? If you only partially collapse the system, how do you know that your “pulse of power” is going to exceed the tipping point of coercion and not just piss the adversary off and cause an undesired vertical or horizontal escalation? This gets to the unrealistic assumptions behind the "parallel is always cheaper" argument - a problem of not knowing what you don't know, not of "well 5 is cheaper than 6 is cheapre than 9". How do know to pick 5 for your only pulse of power?Where is the “theory of action” that actually links the “transport plan” to desirable strategic end states other than “collapse” or “paralysis”?

Everyone is focusing too much on the kinetic effects... which Warden is not:

Warden:

The strategic approach gives us the freedom to consider and mix every conceivable way to change a center of gravity—a bribe, an aerial bomb, a hack, a proxy, a conference, an award, assistance funding, or a thousand other possibilities.


The “what alternative do we have” argument. Thanks for pointing out I grabbed an old JP 3-0. The newer one brings up the idea of “design”. I knew there are many that think the ideas of design are implicit in good operational art. I tend to agree, but to the extent it helps folks understand good operational art, the design metaphor has value as an alternative to overpromising on the limits of planning.

Sorry, I am a nerd for pointing that out... only noticed because your excerpt had MOOTW, and I have had the MOOTW pounded out of me (so to speak) over the last year. Design is an Army concept that was all the rage about a year ago... my impression is that it is still important, but a little less emphasized. We had a few lessons on it at CGSC, but it wasn't emphasized. From FM 5-0, 26 Mar 10, page 3-7:


Three distinct elements collectively produce a design concept as depicted in figure 3-1. Together, they constitute an organizational learning methodology that corresponds to three basic questions that must be answered to produce an actionable design concept to guide detailed planning:
�� Framing the operational environment—what is the context in which design will be applied?
�� Framing the problem—what problem is the design intended to solve?
�� Considering operational approaches—what broad, general approach will solve the problem?

The interesting thing to me is that the problem frame and environmental frame are not all that different from the models used in EBO - a way of understanding a complex problem. It does not stress the casuality as much, but it is not as different as many think.


I would say to those who say “he doesn’t really mean to be as wedded to prediction and determinism as you make it sound”; if that is true than he should avoid making statements like: “It also opens another very exciting possibility: conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood.”

Positing that as a “possibility” is only possible if one assumes a level of predictability about the future that is known to be unattainable.

Again, Warden is saying that speeding you attack reduces the ability of the enemy to react, and thus makes him more predictable (see his figure 3).

In my opinion, Warden is talking about how to plan... we have to have a plan, and try to reduce even complex systems to something we humans can understand. We then need to try and affect those systems... but the fact that Warden advocates a certain plan doesn't mean that's the end of it... once the plan is executed, there will inevitably be changes made and adjustments based on the enemy.

V/R,

Cliff

Ken White
03-11-2011, 04:54 AM
I realize everyone knows this but one item above hit a nerve. Speed and aggressiveness are needed at times and certainly have a place but they are not always beneficial. From Cliff:
Warden is saying that speeding you attack reduces the ability of the enemy to react, and thus makes him more predictable (see his figure 3).Boyd said somewhat the same thing. Both were fighter pilots and both understood the laws of physics and aerodynamics. One's experience can color one's thinking in subtle ways...

Aircraft must react in rather predictable ways (I would never say Airmen -- and Soldiers, Sailors and Marines -- tend to also do that :D ) but people, units, governments are far less predictable and can even be erratic...

My observation has been that on both a tactical and strategic levels, and with respect to efforts in war and other than war, that statement is far from universally true. In fact, speedy action aimed at creating a set of reactions can fail in its intent due to a variety of circumstances, nor least failure to successfully achieve your aim. Politics can intrude and delay effects...

The other guy can interfere. A fair example is our old bete noir, Saddam. He told us what he was going to do; give weapons to all, release the prisoners from the jails and wage unrestricted guerrilla warfare. He gave Medals to two Russian Generals (who advised him to do that) and we completely ignored or missed all that even though our admittedly kinetic action was rapid. Shock and Awe it was not...:rolleyes:

There is also nothing wrong with deliberately not being speedy to entice the competitor or opponent to overextend. Subadai did that repeatedly 800 years ago and he also at the time loosely controlled large Armies literally hundreds of miles apart (without GPS and Satcom, no video :eek: ). That doesn't mean it is a technique not still useful, particularly at the strategic level...

slapout9
03-11-2011, 06:00 AM
Joint doctrine is written from the operational level point of view - that of orchestrating ways and means to achive an end that is often (usually?) given.



pvebber, Warden doesn't believe in Joint Warfare as in everybody gets a piece of the pie. He believes in the designation of a "Key Force" similar to what the Marines believe in Maneuver Warfare, the designation of the "Main Effort".

Fuchs
03-11-2011, 11:06 AM
There are also obvious problem with a speedy campaign from the point of view of operational research.

One example; shall 100 cruise missiles be fired at once or over a period?
"At once" has survivability advantages (saturation), but also huge BDA and cost disadvantages; you don't know which one will hit, so you either accept that some targets will survive or you need to shoot several times at the same target, often wasting munitions on a target that was destroyed by the first shot already. You also need more launcher systems, which can be expensive (think of SSN-launched Tomahawks, for example).

pvebber
03-11-2011, 01:49 PM
Great discussion, wish I had more time...


In my opinion, Warden is talking about how to plan... we have to have a plan, and try to reduce even complex systems to something we humans can understand. We then need to try and affect those systems... but the fact that Warden advocates a certain plan doesn't mean that's the end of it... once the plan is executed, there will inevitably be changes made and adjustments based on the enemy.

But this not the "new" in this paper - its essentially the EBO argument.

The problem is it states a premise that is *WRONG*!

we may WANT to reduce complex sytems to something we humans can understand but this is a fool's errand! By their nature, complex systems are irreduble at a certain point and models that reduce them in complexity below that point by introducing cause and effect assumptions cease to be useful.

We seem to all be in agreement about the piece parts - its the way warden assembles them that appears to be the crux of the issue.

The purpose of a model is prediction. You set the dials and levers on the model, you turn the crank, and see what. IF you simplify a complex system to the point where it is "understandable" - ie you get predictable outputs from the inputs - then you have BROKEN IT. By definition you get different outputs from a complex system each time you turn the crank. That is called emergent behavior and is the key caracteristic the differentiates a complicated (but causally simple) system from a complex one.

Complex systems have the inherent property of surpring you.

There are apsects of complext systems that are simple. Like power grids and supply chains. BUt the entirety of system of the kind Warden represent with the 5 rings is not.

The anaolgy I see here is one to medicine. Warden appers to me as an oncolologist who is a practioner of chemotherapy.

He argues that the human body is a system and should modeled as a simple system, with obvious "centers of gravity" that a variety of chemo therapy drugs can effect.

He then makes the leap that the rest of medicine is being held back because it uses a vocabulary dating back to well before oncology even existed and chemotherapy was known.

Medicine has always been stuck in a paradigm of treating symptons in series, over time leading to long and costly hospital stays that are bankrupting health care.

Chemotherpy drugs can be simultaneously injected directly to the site of tumors and can effect individual genes and do all manner of miraculous things.

So to reduce the bankrupting cost of hospital stays, we need to redfine the nature of medicine to the realm of oncology, and adopt a strategy of simultaneously injecting chemotherapy drugs (well, if we think it helpful we can use radiation or other means - its not to say every treatment besides chemotherapy should be eliminated - but in order for chemotherapy to acheive its true capability...), and then follow up in out-patient clinics that are much cheaper.

After all its all about trying to jump directly from treatments to cures as quickly as possible with the lowest cost...

The rest of doctors look at this approach and go "is he fricken crazy...?!?!"

Yes, we need to understand the patient as a system - but a human is more than the sum of its parts it can only be simplified so far before the model of human is useless to guide diagnistics and treatment.

Yes oncology might be the most "intense" form of medicine, but there are a host of medicial problems out side oncology.

Yes chemotherapy is an indespensible form of treatment, but it is not applicable to every disease and it does not makes sense to redefine medicine to oncology becasue of a desire for chemotherapy to "reach its full capability".

Assuming that because hospitalization is expensive, that means that simultaneously injecting chemotherapy drugs, based on simplified models of how a human bodyworks, will be effective, is not a logical argument.

Particularly given the fact carrying the analogy perhaps too far, that you only actually treat a real patient every 10 or 15 years, the rest of the time you just deal with your simplified model and ASSUME that the results will apply to the real patient.

The individual parts of Wardens argument are sound. No one is arguing the 'necessary" part. Its the way he puts them together and says "and therefore... we need to redfine medicine, and completely change the way we treat disease, and if your patient's illness doesn't fit this mode, then we should not be treating them" that has us scratching our heads, like the doctors in the analogy.

slapout9
03-11-2011, 04:17 PM
"The purpose of a model is prediction."

The purpose of Warden's model is to understand the system first, then create a set probabilities, not predictability. To find leverage points "COG's" in the system that will most likley create the end result you want.

slapout9
03-11-2011, 04:32 PM
"IF you simplify a complex system to the point where it is "understandable" - ie you get predictable outputs from the inputs - then you have BROKEN IT."



The whole point of War is to break it(the System). You want to physically break the system and then leave it broken or rebuild it as fast as possible.

slapout9
03-11-2011, 04:42 PM
"The anaolgy I see here is one to medicine."

That is a good analogy but Warden means something more like this. After a good Systems Analysis you would discover that this complex System is dependent upon electricity. To much electricity and you would stop the heart, but the proper amount of electricity would also RESTART the heart. Now you have found a COG(leverage point) which controls the entire System regardless of how complex it is. See the difference?

pvebber
03-11-2011, 06:00 PM
Slap,

Your 'understand' implies the ability to ascertain what the possible future states of the system are. If you can't do that you can't create probabilitiies. I actually had this discussion with Col Warden and we just not get past the point where acknowlegdes he needed te 'effect' what I was calling prediction (develp knowledge of what produces future states of the system) and simply disagreed that such a thing constithted 'predictin'. To him it was n ot 'prediction if you not 100 percent certain it was correct-like a physics equation.

He can define his terms how ever he wants, but point is that whatever you call i, the ability to project ahead in time the effect a set of perterbations will have on the future state of a complex system is not computable as a set iof probabilities. It would be nice if it were, but its not

My point about breaking is about the model breaking not about breaking the adversary system if you simplify the model of the system past the point of irreducibility it becomes b roken as a predictive tool (or that function that shall not be called prediction).

If your only desired effect is to 'kill the patient' then you are effectively engaging in nuclear warfare by conventional means.

Cliff
03-11-2011, 07:20 PM
Slap,

Your 'understand' implies the ability to ascertain what the possible future states of the system are. If you can't do that you can't create probabilitiies. I actually had this discussion with Col Warden and we just not get past the point where acknowlegdes he needed te 'effect' what I was calling prediction (develp knowledge of what produces future states of the system) and simply disagreed that such a thing constithted 'predictin'. To him it was n ot 'prediction if you not 100 percent certain it was correct-like a physics equation.

I would disagree that it isn't possible to determine what the potential futures look like. Again, you are falling into the trap Warden is arguing against- losing sight of the desired end state because we can't be sure exactly what will happen when we try to affect it. Yes, humans are human - not omniscient, falliable, and subject to react to events emotionally and not rationally. But you can still create a model of any system, and attempt to apply probabilities to it.

Take for example soil- it is a fairly complex system because there are all sorts of different materials that are part of it. Soils are pretty important to pretty much any infrastructure humans build. Yet a lot of what we know about soils engineering is simply theoretical models that allow us to model its behavior. We don't know the exact content, or even know exactly how it works - but with a certain degree of probability, we can use empirical data to predict how it will react. Yes, there are issues with the observer effects etc, but that doesn't mean you can't attempt to model a system's behavior.


He can define his terms how ever he wants, but point is that whatever you call i, the ability to project ahead in time the effect a set of perterbations will have on the future state of a complex system is not computable as a set iof probabilities. It would be nice if it were, but its not

Depends on how complex the system is and how good your data is.


My point about breaking is about the model breaking not about breaking the adversary system if you simplify the model of the system past the point of irreducibility it becomes b roken as a predictive tool (or that function that shall not be called prediction).

You are correct. But there are still potentially points where you can affect even a complex system. Additionally, it may be possible to pick COGs that are more predictable than others- obviously your level of confidence in your intel about a COG and its potential reaction to various effects has to enter into the decision making.

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff
03-11-2011, 07:39 PM
Great discussion, wish I had more time...

But this not the "new" in this paper - its essentially the EBO argument.

The problem is it states a premise that is *WRONG*!

we may WANT to reduce complex sytems to something we humans can understand but this is a fool's errand! By their nature, complex systems are irreduble at a certain point and models that reduce them in complexity below that point by introducing cause and effect assumptions cease to be useful.

So we should throw up our hands and give up? What do you suggest as an alternative?


We seem to all be in agreement about the piece parts - its the way warden assembles them that appears to be the crux of the issue.

The purpose of a model is prediction. You set the dials and levers on the model, you turn the crank, and see what. IF you simplify a complex system to the point where it is "understandable" - ie you get predictable outputs from the inputs - then you have BROKEN IT. By definition you get different outputs from a complex system each time you turn the crank. That is called emergent behavior and is the key caracteristic the differentiates a complicated (but causally simple) system from a complex one.

Again, potentially depends on what crank you pull. Some have more predictable effects than others.


Complex systems have the inherent property of surpring you.

There are apsects of complext systems that are simple. Like power grids and supply chains. BUt the entirety of system of the kind Warden represent with the 5 rings is not.

Like I said, the predictability is part of the information you should be making decisions on.


The anaolgy I see here is one to medicine. Warden appers to me as an oncolologist who is a practioner of chemotherapy.

[I deleted the middle of your analogy for space reasons, good analogy for your arguement]

Yes chemotherapy is an indespensible form of treatment, but it is not applicable to every disease and it does not makes sense to redefine medicine to oncology becasue of a desire for chemotherapy to "reach its full capability".

Except that oncology only affects cancer, while airpower has the potential to affect almost any situation involving the use of armed force (IE, airdropping HDRs to folks would be analagous to giving someone an IV of nutrients when their digestive function has ceased).

Additionally, as I have been repeating, Warden is not just talking about airpower - he is talking about changing how we approach strategy, then saying that the better strategic methodology will result in us using airpower a lot more because it is more effective. You are conflating his arguement about the strategic process with the effects of changing that process- they are separate ideas.


Assuming that because hospitalization is expensive, that means that simultaneously injecting chemotherapy drugs, based on simplified models of how a human bodyworks, will be effective, is not a logical argument.

Same comments as above.


Particularly given the fact carrying the analogy perhaps too far, that you only actually treat a real patient every 10 or 15 years, the rest of the time you just deal with your simplified model and ASSUME that the results will apply to the real patient.

I disagree. A better analogy would be surgery, where a surgeon might use simulations and operate on a cadaver to keep proficiency, with the cadaver being exercises. Additionally, I would argue that airpower is probably the best exercised and rehearsed element of the US military. While the army has NTC and JRTC, and the Navy does do JEFXs, I would argue that Red Flag is probably the highest level and most extensive rehearsal in the world. Not to mention a lot of studying of the real-world system going on in between.


The individual parts of Wardens argument are sound. No one is arguing the 'necessary" part. Its the way he puts them together and says "and therefore... we need to redfine medicine, and completely change the way we treat disease, and if your patient's illness doesn't fit this mode, then we should not be treating them" that has us scratching our heads, like the doctors in the analogy.

See above- separate the change in process from Warden's expected result that we will use airpower more. You're harping on the chemotherapy, when really Warden is saying the diagnosis is the important part.

The unfortunate part is that Col Warden has reputation of being an airpower advocate, which colors people's perceptions of any arguement he makes. It would be interesting to see what the reaction would have been had someone else written a similar paper.

pvebber, not saying you don't have valid points - I just have a different perception of the arguement. As I said, I conceed fully that the more complex a system is, the more difficult the application of Warden's theory will be - but again, that doesn't mean his points are invalid.

V/R,

Cliff

pvebber
03-11-2011, 08:32 PM
Cliff,

We seem to be at a glass half empty/glass half full stateof affairs.

Like I said I think we are in general agreement on the individual issues at the high level. We appear to be disagreeing on the extent of applicability.


I would disagree that it isn't possible to determine what the potential futures look like. Again, you are falling into the trap Warden is arguing against- losing sight of the desired end state because we can't be sure exactly what will happen when we try to affect it.

We agree that a "picture of a desired end state" is the place to start with planning. The disagreement is in the degree to which "probabilities" are involved. It is the differnece between what Karl Popper calls "propensities" or the actual physical interpaly of dependant causes that results in a sytem responding to a set of inputs outputs consistently falling within an observed set of frequencies and the Bayesian notion of probability as way to represent the degree of belief in the truth of a statement.

This gets into some esoterica of probability theory, but if you are going to rigorously pursue a scientific theory of war based on the perceived liklihood of the outcomes of a model based on a systems theory decomposition of an a set of dynamis relationships between entities (what Warden is calling a "system") Then you need to eventually "do the Math" and apply the appropriate theoretical tools.

This is another aspect of the discussion I had with Warden that left me a bit put off, his desire to discuss "theory at the theoretical level" and not be troubled to dig into the implications of that theory or the need to "roll up the sleeves" and find the devil's in the details. That is also what Gen Mattis saw as a shortcoming of EBO proponents in general and has been a hallmark in all the attepmts to implement EBO that I've seen.

In broad terms keeping "theory theoretical" is OK - until someone says that we need to throw out our vocabulary and rethink our concepts of doing business. At that point there needs to be a "here is the evidence demonstrating the failure of current system, and justifying the use of the proposed system." To quote a buddy inside the beltway "The 'why wouldn't you if you could' argument will get you in the door, on a slow day, but won't get you a dime in funding..."


Take for example soil- it is a fairly complex system

Soil is a complicated, but not complex system from a material point of view. Its "mechanics of materials" properties are "propensities" - the distribution of weights you can support on samples of a given soil type are a result of effects caused by the physical interactions of the component particles in the soil. Variation is due to inhomogenieties in the distribution of components, not because of relationship dynamics between the components.

You can 'understand soil' - ie determine how the state of a system involving loads placed on soil will change over time (prediction) because the causal chains the produce effects can be modeled in a useful fashion. Soil with never behave suddenly likee water, or concrete in an unexpected fashion.

That can not be said of complex systems like nation states or other social structures.


Depends on how complex the system is and how good your data is.

No, actually that's not true. Take Conways Game of Life, a cellular automata
'simulator'. There is no way, regardless of how much data you can collect, of being able to predict the future state of a gameby any method except direct execution. In other words it is a DETERMINSITIC system of irreducable complexity. You can't create a simpler 'model' of a game of life tableau than the tableau itself to discover the future state of the system from a given state. Or while there are algorithmic tricks to save unrequired CPU cycles computing the nth state, there is no way to skip directly from the n-th to n+m-th state, without computing the states in between.

Now since we do not know the "rules for real life" there is a fundamental "limit fo knowdege" that means that the future states of complex systems are not just unknowable, becasue we don't know enoigh information YET - and will theoretically knowable at some future time when we have enough information - but future states of Complex systems are fundamentally UNKNOWABLE in the absolute sense.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conway's_Game_of_Life



You are correct. But there are still potentially points where you can affect even a complex system.

This is where Baysian methods get people into trouble. They think that Bayesian methods give you "probabilities" that are really the same as "propensities" and not simply "degrees of confidence in an outcome given your confidence in the prior proababilities". In other words "probabilities" about the future state of sytems analyzed using Baysian methods have nothing to do with the actual system itself, but are simple mesures of the impplications of the confidence you have in your assumptions, carried through to a conclusion.

Or in other words, there is no physical theory that connects the future state to a prior state in a Baysian (or certain types of Markov models - which are just chains of bayesian models) system decomposition. (THese are types used in every actual implentation of a Systems Analysis tool for these types of "EBO-ish" problems). Its simply a "belief chain" of how confident we are that a series of "results" will result from a series of "effeects". A few have actual "propensities" associated with them, but the vast majority are simple numbers pulled out of an analysts butt, or worse - come to by a consensus of a BOGSAT because "well, there is no way we can think of to do it".

Meaning, "we really have no fricken idea what the causal relationship between this effect and this result is, but gee wouldn't it be great if it existed, and because we don't know, we'll only give it a confidence of 72%".

IF it is an excercise it really doesn't matter, so to look good its gets raised to 94%.

Yes you can affect a complex system, but then what - if you can't assess the relationship between 'effect' and 'result' how does that help get you to the cool "picture of your end state"?


Additionally, it may be possible to pick COGs that are more predictable than others- obviously your level of confidence in your intel about a COG and its potential reaction to various effects has to enter into the decision making.

This is another major pathology in current Systems theory applications to the real world. IT has varioous forms - "you look for your wallet under the street light because you can see there, even though you know you heardit dropp a block back in the dark" or the "This is the thing we all agree on as a potential effect to generate this cause, so therefore it has a high probability of actually being a cause." The implication of that is that if enough people agree on something, it then physically manifests itself (which is something sports fans in particular are susceptible to ;) )

And the most seductive "Doing this worked 3 out of the last 9 times we tried, a better success rate than any other, so lets do it again and assume it has a 33% chance of being effective. Try this with a coin you flip 9 times and then assume the result is the "actual probability of the coin". You will lose your bar money every time...

But are more than happy to act like it works in "real life"...becasue "what is the alternative"...

Not doing something you KNOW TO BE WRONG would be a start ;)

slapout9
03-11-2011, 09:02 PM
If your only desired effect is to 'kill the patient' then you are effectively engaging in nuclear warfare by conventional means.

That is why I said electricity(just one example) can be both used to kill the patient AND bring the patient back to life and it can be done very fast. IMO opinion most true COG's at the Systems level will tend to be dual use when it comes to affecting large Nation/State systems. That is what makes his theories so useful not just theoretical, they can be used to produce and protect the things of life or the things of death. Think Lighting bolt from the sky not nuclear weapons, although as you know I really,really like Major Kong from Dr. Strangelove;)

slapout9
03-11-2011, 09:14 PM
"This is another major pathology in current Systems theory applications to the real world. IT has varioous forms - "you look for your wallet under the street light because you can see there, even though you know you heardit dropp a block back in the dark" or the "This is the thing we all agree on as a potential effect to generate this cause, so therefore it has a high probability of actually being a cause." The implication of that is that if enough people agree on something, it then physically manifests itself (which is something sports fans in particular are susceptible to ;) ) "



That is not really Systems theory, that is Human behavior theory. That is why he has consistently said to stay away from such actions.

pvebber
03-11-2011, 09:38 PM
Again, potentially depends on what crank you pull. Some have more predictable effects than others.

How do you determine "predictability"? but thanks for not pushing back on need for predictability :)


Like I said, the predictability is part of the information you should be making decisions on.

The problem is if you only consider the predicable part you will an answer KNOWN TO BE WRONG for the system as a whole. Based on what information do you determine predictability? What sort of "exeriments" do you do and on what? THis is the sort of "next level of detail" - detatil that makes the theroy practical - that one never can seem to get to.


Except that oncology only affects cancer, while airpower has the potential to affect almost any situation involving the use of armed force (IE, airdropping HDRs to folks would be analagous to giving someone an IV of nutrients when their digestive function has ceased).

Cancer is analogous to a major conflict - which poses a "threat to our system - or that of an ally, which is the only context where we are talking about "breaking" an adversary's ability to resist and the Five rings.

This discussion is about Wardens' Contention that our concept of war needs to change, not about HADR. This is where the discussion gets so slippery - WE AGREE that airpower is necessary and can accoplish all sorts of REQUIRED things - things that NOBODY else can do. That is not whats controversial about Warden.

Its the implications he draws from it that "we are broken" and need a major reboot to get it right. The thesis statement again:



Regardless of airpower’s potential, it can never realize its real capability so long as it remains bound to an anachronistic view of war with an anachronistic vocabulary. On the contrary, if airpower is truly to come of age, it must do so in the context of a modern concept of war that associates the use of force as directly as possible with end-game strategic objectives, not with the act of fighting. If this is to happen, the operators of airpower must understand, believe, and teach end-game strategy as the foundation of airpower. Failure to do so will condemn airpower to suboptimization and deprive its owners of using force in such a dramatically different way that will achieve national objectives quickly and at minimum cost. To succeed, airpower advocates must stop trying to use airpower as a substitute for its military predecessors, connect it directly to strategic end-games, adopt a new vocabulary to match airpower’s promise, and become serious promoters not of machines but of ideas.

90% of the article is not cotroversial (other than why he sees the need to bring it up again) its the conclusion above, which doesn't seem to follow from his premises that is controversial.



You are conflating his arguement about the strategic process with the effects of changing that process- they are separate ideas.

EXACTLY and I'm AGREEING with most of his views on strategic process (with the exception of the degree of dependance on systems theory) , but DISAGREEING on what he sees as the effect!!! (in the sense what you need to do to achive the desired result.


I disagree. A better analogy would be surgery, where a surgeon might use simulations and operate on a cadaver to keep proficiency, with the cadaver being exercises. Additionally, I would argue that airpower is probably the best exercised and rehearsed element of the US military. While the army has NTC and JRTC, and the Navy does do JEFXs, I would argue that Red Flag is probably the highest level and most extensive rehearsal in the world. Not to mention a lot of studying of the real-world system going on in between.

Surgery is a tool, it is not class of disease. The structure of the anlogy was to point out that you have a pratictioner looking at a particular category of war (disease) in Warden's case compelling an adversary to do what you want by threatening to break or paralyze him - that is major war.

Your example of operating on a cadavor reinforces my point about the single sidedness of the whole framework! Doing surgury on a cadavor is "complicated" but not complex. You can practive technique, but learn nothing about the response of an actual patient to the shock of being cut open. Rehersal and exercises of any peacetime sort are heavily scripted - sure the individual pilots in Red Flag get to "freeplay" dogfighting to a great extent - but that is like operating on a cadavor - there is no actual response from the actual adversary! You learn a lot about surgery - the tactics of air combat and dropping ordnance, but you learn ZERO about how the enemy "live body" will reposnd to the actual surgery.

"Study of the real world system" is like observing the behavior of patients. It gives a certain level of information, but the probaility of a particular surgury being successful is NOT PREDICTABLE FROM practice on a cadavor and observatin of the human body. "Probabilities" in such cases are at best bayesian measures of belief, not actual physical propensities.


See above- separate the change in process from Warden's expected result that we will use airpower more. You're harping on the chemotherapy, when really Warden is saying the diagnosis is the important part.

And I agree that diagnosis is the most important part. I just don't want a guy diagnosing me that thinks he can learn everything required to be a good doctor by studying books and cutting open cadavors. And thinks the most effective treatment is to give me a handful of pills that will attack all my symptoms at once and will cure me i none fell swoop. There was a time when that was routinely done. It was called "patant medicine" and often resulted in the doctor getting run out town as "snake oil salesman" ;)

I'm harping on chemotherapy because that is what Warden is selling! (see thesis statement above again - if that is not what you consider the thesis statement, please let me know. I'm trying to argue about the paper and its specific arguments - and hopefully made clear the parts of Warden's theory I agree with, are in harmony with current joint doctrine and conceptual thinking and are not controversial.



The unfortunate part is that Col Warden has reputation of being an airpower advocate, which colors people's perceptions of any arguement he makes. It would be interesting to see what the reaction would have been had someone else written a similar paper.

That may be, but that desn't change the fact that the article is fundamentally about airpower advocacy, Warden's overall strategic theory doesn't have to be and I ask the question a different way - whatif Warden had made all the points, but with a thesis statment about how strategic theory has been outpaced in recent years by the unexplored ocean of NEW 'WAYS' transformational technology (MEANS) has given us. Can these new WAYS significantly affect the way we approach achieving ENDS?

If he asked that question, hoping to generate a discussion, then I think the result would have been far more positive. The fact he did not approach the paper from the point of view of "What are the implications of new WAYS on how we think about ENDS", but rather from the point of view of an airpower advocay piece, detracts from the broader applicability of his ideas on strategy and almost deliberately invokes a viceral "Here comes the Airpower Mafia starting to lay the ground work for the budget battle over the new Bomber". I fully concede that this is probably as much a bias effect as not...


As I said, I conceed fully that the more complex a system is, the more difficult the application of Warden's theory will be - but again, that doesn't mean his points are invalid.


If I can leave you with one notion that I hope you can seperate from the increasing parochialsm in my argumentation :eek::

Replace the notion that "complexity" is a continuum of "complicated-ness" with the notion that there is a threshold where a combination of "complicated" but casually simple systems reach a "point of no return" beyond which they are no longer "complicated arrangements of simpple things" but "Complex" entities that will no longer exhibit their full range of behaviors if they are simplified back below that line.

This is the fundamental, transformational idea that comes form complexiity science. It is what enables combinations of organic molecules to become life, nad what allows networks of entities that exchange information to create novel behaviors. If this fundamental property did not exist, we would not, and out societies would be incapable of surviving.

You can call BS on every other thing i've said in this thread. I can't begin to articulate the importance of making the cognitive leap between looking at the world as a collection of simply complicated things, and one of truely complex things.

pvebber
03-11-2011, 09:53 PM
That is why I said electricity(just one example) can be both used to kill the patient AND bring the patient back to life and it can be done very fast. IMO opinion most true COG's at the Systems level will tend to be dual use when it comes to affecting large Nation/State systems. That is what makes his theories so useful not just theoretical, they can be used to produce and protect the things of life or the things of death. Think Lighting bolt from the sky not nuclear weapons, although as you know I really,really like Major Kong from Dr. Strangelove

LIke I siad, if all you are interested in breaking or paralyzing the adverary, then that is OK, if you wnat to cure him of a disease you perceive him to have, electricity is necessary (to power gear) but insufficient (won't cure anything.

If your response to getting the adverssary to do what you want is to threaten to break or paralyze him, them you need to break open the nuclear warfare theory, becasue that is where you are - nuclear warfare by conventional means.

"You do what i want or I will impose such a compelling cost on you that you will not be able to afford resisting."

The opportunity for the use of such means are really, really limited :D



That is not really Systems theory, that is Human behavior theory. That is why he has consistently said to stay away from such actions.

No, its Complex Adaptive System theory. Which Human behavior theory is a subset of. Though its currently not understood to that level becasue humans are so complex. :eek:

Sorry but Wardens magic equation

outcome = physical x morale

is simply nonsense and the implication that you can ignore human behavior theory (the Complex part) by seting "physical to "0" is downright dangerous.

This is in effect saying that a problem has simple parts and complex parts and you can create an effect independant of the complex part by affecting the simple part. A complex system is either complex, or not, and the extent to which it has "simple" parts does not mean that affecting the simple parts wiill yield a simple response from the system.

The real world just doesnt wok that way.

Ken White
03-11-2011, 09:57 PM
Cliff:
But you can still create a model of any system, and attempt to apply probabilities to it.Can you define the 'you' quoted?

Can you insure that the 'you' involved will always be someone competent to make the judgements required?

I submit that if the answer to the first question is not 'whoever is in the chair at the time' and the answer to second question is not anyone of 'moderate intellect with experience in the efforts to be undertaken' then the concept is flawed. A strategic conceptualization that does not itself prepare to contend with the vagaries of humans is unlikely to provide an effective approach to dealing with problems or situations involving humans. If a concept takes an exceptionally capable person or persons to make it effective then it is likely to fail at any time employed by lesser beings. There are a lot of those about... :wry:

I've watched the US Army among others try to develop mechanistic theories to improve planning and other capabilities. None of them really worked well, mostly because attempts to make people think in mechanical terms, to apply metrics to everything, simply are rejected by most minds. Some people think like that, the vast majority do not and will subtly resist being forced to do so.

This question from Cliff deserves an answer and I'm sure pvebber has one:
So we should throw up our hands and give up? What do you suggest as an alternative?However, in the interim, my answer is "pretty much what we humans have been doing for thousands of years when confronted with complex systems -- make the best judgment possible with the information available at the time." The item in bold is to illustrate another flaw in the Warden approach; to return to his background, nations and people do not react IAW the laws of physics like airplane do thus perfect or near perfect information on which to make decisions will rarely be available. In fact, generally far from perfect information is available in small quantities and some of that may have been skewed by the opponent and there will assuredly be gaps and errors in that which is available. You cannot perform Slap's "good systems analysis" far more often than you can do so...

I've long observed and we all really know that flawed input leads to erroneous conclusions which in turn drive improper responses. To use Slap's analogy, if you think the electricity is important -- and it is not -- then you can screw up. Indeed, you may do more harm than good. Conversely you may go Iraq and deliberately not attack the power system so that it can be used by you or your new friends...:rolleyes:

pvebber:
..."theory at the theoretical level" and not be troubled to dig into the implications of that theory or the need to "roll up the sleeves" and find the devil's in the details.Interesting observation. While I have not had the pleasure of talking to Colonel Warden, I have in encountered people in all four services who unfortunately tend toward that approach. I've met a very few who could and would adapt their theory to cope with reality but they've been the exception. I mention that to address your subsequent point:
In broad terms keeping "theory theoretical" is OK - until someone says that we need to throw out our vocabulary and rethink our concepts of doing business.The current US Army training system was adapted from several civilian technical training theories designed ib the late 1940s to train assembly line workers. It was not appropriate for the Army even in the bad recruiting days of the mid 70s when it was adopted -- it is today totally inappropriate for a professional force. We still have it. It was a theory, it had neat slides, it was adopted by a less than stellar General (pun intended...) and as a result the Army has suffered -- I use the word advisedly -- for over 30 years with that theory. Our moderately well trained Army is as good as it is due to a lot of good leaders doing more than the system provided or required.

Point: It's not just a vocabulary issue, it's far more dangerous: 'neat' ideas get adopted and take on a life of their own.

Slap also says of Warden and applying his theory -- or any strategy -- to specious causes:
That is why he has consistently said to stay away from such actions.Yes, he has. So have hundreds of thousands of thinkers before him, to include many in recent time. Any intelligent person would heed such advice. Yet, we went to Viet Nam, to Somalia, to Afghanistan, to Iraq. I think that goes back to who sits in what chair and when...

It's a flawed concept. Not disastrous, just not particularly helpful in many situations. It has certainly use in some cases but it is not safely applicable universally. No theory is.

pvebber
03-11-2011, 10:32 PM
What is the alternative?

Here is a paper that gets at some of the issues:

http://www.necsi.edu/projects/yaneer/SSG_NECSI_3_Litt.pdf

(Puts on flak vest to ward off incoming salvos targteing Martime -centric context :D)

Cole
03-12-2011, 02:10 AM
Let's analyze COL (ret) Warden's perception that attack of the the Five Rings in the title above decreases in importance from left to right.

Leaders:
That's why we are conducting serial Predator/Reaper attacks in Pakistan and night raids in Afghanistan. Don't believe Pakistan would be nearly as receptive to parallel massive bombing of every madrassa and all of Northern Waziristan. The intelligence takes time anyway. It's hard to find a target from the air that does not want to be found. Should we have instead dropped a 2,000 lb bomb on Karzai's erring young relative and multiplied the collateral damage manyfold? Should we be bombing ISI leaders since they seem to be part of the problem? That would go over well.
Processes:
Believe that's why we attempt to replace the poppy-growing in Afghanistan with a different crop, and pursue better government as a solution to graft and warlords. It's difficult to encourage either from 40,000' or many miles off shore.
Infrastructure:
We know who gets blown up by IEDs or sniped trying to secure the host country's rebuilding efforts. The guy on the ground, not in the air or at sea. If you say, we don't need a guy on the ground, I would answer what happens when the enemy has invaded another country and still has guerillas, foreign fighters, and sympathizers staying behind? Do we abandon our allies? Now let's say the offending invader is Russia or China. Do we attack the infrastructure of invaded Ukraine or invader Russia. Russia is big and its hard to retrieve downed pilots there. They have nukes. China too! What happens to our infrastructure (Walmart) and oil supplies (Russia, Iran, Libya, Venezuela, Canada oops sorry).
Population:
Some would say that's why we have a population-centric strategy for locating the bulk of ground forces. It's more difficult to influence the population from 60,000' with a F-22 or B-2. Don't believe either has much of an EO/IR capability with stealth and altitude. How do they assure no collateral damage?

The British population increased its resolve as a result of WWII German bombing of London. A small diameter bomb can take minutes to travel multiple miles during which time targets may move near civilians or vice versa. With a "parallel" strategy and inability to perform BDA for multiple simultaneous targets, we miss failures and lose successes attributed as collateral damage by the adversary.

Fielded Forces:
Conveniently, this has the least priority because it the most difficult for airpower to accomplish. Bad guys can easily hide from airpower once their invasion is complete...and because of blitzkrieg-like ground invasions, they will nearly always be complete IN ALLIED TERRITORY, by the time a decision is made to do something about it.

So the author would say attack the leaders, processes, and infrastructure because they are more important. But the government we leave behind will simply go back to the original undesired behavior or fall again if we like that government, unless our ground forces have the opportunity to train their host nation replacements. It's insufficient to train only host nation pilots.

How long did it take us to find Saddam Hussein and would it take to locate Qaddafi or Kim Jon Il, or Chavez, or Ahmadinejad and Khameini? That last leader would go over well in the Islamic world.

If the leader is a tad crazy as many potential rogue nation leaders are, do they really care about processes and infrastructure? What if religious beliefs subscribe to an austere existence anyway, and jihadist sacrifice of the people is viewed as fully acceptable? What if they have nothing to lose anyway. Look at satellite pictures of North Korea at night to see how much electricity they have. If the enemy army is in allied territory, what stops them for living off the land and goods of the allie ala Sherman? If we ignore the fielded force sitting in allied territory ala Kosovo, and the leader is not as rational as Milosevich was, how does the war end?

Badly and with little accomplished I would respectfully submit. I would like to hear how the sniping would have stopped if NATO peacekeeping forces were not on the ground and if allied ground forces were not threatening a full scale invasion. We see how well we stopped leaders, processes, and infrastructure in Desert Storm without the full monte ground attack until completion. The Shiite populations didn't fare too well, either?

If instead of massive bombing of hidden enemies and hitting populations instead, or their infrastructure/processes (that will make long term friends) we instead attack the invading country on the ground, from the sea, and air...they are forced out of hiding where airpower, long range fires, and rapid maneuver can engage them. They are slowly choked of oil and exports by blockades. Our rapid build-up of ground forces by air initially, and eventually sea, protects ports and airheads from further invasion. Having adequate force remaining for stability operations, and keeping the "enemy" army intact and on our side to help stabilize prevents the problems that occurred in OIF and an initially neglected Afghanistan.

Just an alternative theory some call Joint and Combined Arms warfare and full spectrum operations.

slapout9
03-12-2011, 04:51 AM
Posted by Cole:"If instead of massive bombing of hidden enemies and hitting populations instead, or their infrastructure/processes (that will make long term friends) we instead attack the invading country on the ground, from the sea, and air...they are forced out of hiding where airpower, long range fires, and rapid maneuver can engage them. They are slowly choked of oil and exports by blockades. Our rapid build-up of ground forces by air initially, and eventually sea, protects ports and airheads from further invasion. Having adequate force remaining for stability operations, and keeping the "enemy" army intact and on our side to help stabilize prevents the problems that occurred in OIF and an initially neglected Afghanistan."

Cole, your right. You just described Warden's Gulf War 1 Strategy. Perfect 5 rings example, works exactly as advertised.

Fuchs
03-12-2011, 09:41 AM
Surely, Warden was in best Boyd tradition; vague enough that almost everybody can interpret his stuff at will, and come to the conclusion that he agrees with Warden.

pvebber
03-12-2011, 04:29 PM
Cole, your right. You just described Warden's Gulf War 1 Strategy. Perfect 5 rings example, works exactly as advertised.

Well, not EXACTLY, there was the whole ground invasion thing that according to the theory was not supposed to be necessary... It particularly sticks in the airpower theorists craw that the whole "leadership paralysis" thing was the supporting effort to enable a more effective ground campaign and not the supported end in itself. Well the Way to achieve the desired end itself.

Since its inception in Douhet, the dream of airpower theory is that it make the rest of the means of war obsolete. That belief is grounded in a set of assumptions about the superiority of the coercive form of strategy over cost imposing and incentivising strategies.

The differentiating characteristic of airpower is that it provides "action at a distance". Thats is its "super power" and its "achilles heel". No matter how attractive it is to think you solve any problem with action at a distance, it is in general necessary but insufficient. Redefining the problem set to include only those cases were it might be both necessary and sufficient is not the "attainment of its potential", but defining itself out of relevance in the mainstream.

TO focus the topic on the boards subject, how would the Warden approach of a "fully capable airpower" and "unconstrained link from effect to strategy" achieve and endstate like "Eliminate the influence of the Taliban from Afghanistan" in a single, parallel operation, or "remove the threat of pirate activity from the Horn of Africa"? How do you accomplish what I consider the new "mainstream" sort of endstate the military is is asked to accomplish, with "action at a distance"?

Fuchs
03-12-2011, 04:36 PM
Since its inception in Douhet, the dream of airpower theory is that it make the rest of the means of war obsolete.

Douhet wasn't totally off, he just didn't take into account that aggressors are almost always greedy and defenders quite often stubborn. Plus almost nobody dared to open Pandora's Box (C weapons) again after WWI.

Cole
03-12-2011, 07:59 PM
Posted by Cole:"If instead of massive bombing of hidden enemies and hitting populations instead, or their infrastructure/processes (that will make long term friends) we instead attack the invading country on the ground, from the sea, and air...they are forced out of hiding where airpower, long range fires, and rapid maneuver can engage them. They are slowly choked of oil and exports by blockades. Our rapid build-up of ground forces by air initially, and eventually sea, protects ports and airheads from further invasion. Having adequate force remaining for stability operations, and keeping the "enemy" army intact and on our side to help stabilize prevents the problems that occurred in OIF and an initially neglected Afghanistan."

Cole, your right. You just described Warden's Gulf War 1 Strategy. Perfect 5 rings example, works exactly as advertised.

Two points Slap:

1) Other than the 82n ABN, it took 6 months to sea deploy to Desert Storm which did not end the problem nor did the Iraq no-fly zone. What if Hussein had continued his attack into Saudi Arabia? Early airpower and airborne or SOF forces alone would not have stopped that. Even in 1991 in atypically open terrain, it took the ground attack to dislodge Iraqi forces from defenses and Kuwait so they were more effectively bombed and strafed. Assumptions that Hussein would fall did not pan out anymore than they are now in Libya. Multiple available options from air, land, and sea complement one another and cover multiple contingencies when things don't go as predicted.

2) An easy analogy for you is law enforcement. Is there any law enforcement agency that relies on aircraft or boats for anywhere near the bulk of its efforts. Of course not, because aside from cost (also an issue) even low flying helicopters and harbor ships cannot influence the bulk of the 24/7 ground efforts or respond to and deter crimes.

Ships are slow, vulnerable near the shore, and too far from many threat country interiors and their land-based forces and insurgents. Airpower at higher altitudes and faster speeds, often with a single pilot, cannot begin to locate and effectively target ground threats in complex or urban terrain even with effective electro-optical pods.

It takes someone on the ground finding targets for them, or a slower and lower flying helicopter or unmanned aircraft with a two-man crew and extensive combat arms, intelligence, and operations personnel cueing them to fullly exploit airpower. It takes ground forces able to survive close combat to force the enemy from cover and concealment to fully exploit air attacks and long range fires.

pvebber
03-12-2011, 09:17 PM
Douhet wasn't totally off, he just didn't take into account that aggressors are almost always greedy and defenders quite often stubborn. Plus almost nobody dared to open Pandora's Box (C weapons) again after WWI.

We came close in the heady early days of the nuclear era with the idea that nuclear weapons would make conventional war obsolete. The "potential" of modern airpower for some is to achieve this goal through "acceptable conventional means". Unfortunately making existential threats to bend others to one's will is a difficult thing to justify. There is more to war than the Halt scenario...

Cliff
03-12-2011, 10:53 PM
Sorry I am lagging this fight- not enough time to really keep up!


How do you determine "predictability"? but thanks for not pushing back on need for predictability :)

I think you have to have ways of defining the confidence you have in your understanding/information, combined with solid political/economic/social/scientific analysis of the available data.


The problem is if you only consider the predicable part you will an answer KNOWN TO BE WRONG for the system as a whole. Based on what information do you determine predictability? What sort of "exeriments" do you do and on what? THis is the sort of "next level of detail" - detatil that makes the theroy practical - that one never can seem to get to.

Just because you pick the most effective/predictable ways to affect a system doesn't mean the answer will be "KNWON TO BE WRONG" for the whole system. As for the "exeriments", see above- exhaustive analysis of the environment/system. For instance, see here (http://www.au.af.mil/bia/) for an effort to understand different human behaviors.


Cancer is analogous to a major conflict - which poses a "threat to our system - or that of an ally, which is the only context where we are talking about "breaking" an adversary's ability to resist and the Five rings.

Warden talks about affecting the system in this paper, not neccessarily breaking it. I think the cancer analogy is getting in the way.


Surgery is a tool, it is not class of disease. The structure of the anlogy was to point out that you have a pratictioner looking at a particular category of war (disease) in Warden's case compelling an adversary to do what you want by threatening to break or paralyze him - that is major war.

Your example of operating on a cadavor reinforces my point about the single sidedness of the whole framework! Doing surgury on a cadavor is "complicated" but not complex. You can practive technique, but learn nothing about the response of an actual patient to the shock of being cut open. Rehersal and exercises of any peacetime sort are heavily scripted - sure the individual pilots in Red Flag get to "freeplay" dogfighting to a great extent - but that is like operating on a cadavor - there is no actual response from the actual adversary! You learn a lot about surgery - the tactics of air combat and dropping ordnance, but you learn ZERO about how the enemy "live body" will reposnd to the actual surgery.

First off, a slight side note- at Red Flag there is an actual response from an actual adversary - in fact, the USAF has one of the largest and best resourced Aggressor forces in the world, and they use actual adversary tactics and operational doctrine. Nothing scripted about that. You are suggesting that the only way we can learn better ways of waging war is to actually wage it, and learn by trial and error. I am saying that would be a very wasteful and irresponsible way to operate, although I'll grant you that it seems to be the way we (the US) seem to like to operate. Part of why the USAF has been so successful is because of the culture of the debrief - the fact that (thanks to USAF Weapons School) most USAF warfighters have a structured way of debriefing where honest assessments are conducted of everyone's performance. These debriefs are brutal, and rank doesn't matter in them- in fact, in most cases an O-3 or junior O-4 is the one leading them. Additionally, these lessons are captured in training, and combined with the lessons captured in warfare are used to develop new doctrine and tactics. I would submit this is a much better technique than what we used in WWII - a bunch of theory that had been rehearsed but never really tested or exercise, resulting in the USAAF having to learn by trial and error.

Now I am not saying that this will completely take the enemy's choice out of the equation- far from it. But isn't it a pretty good idea to study all the possible choices the enemy could make, train against the most likely and most dangerous ones, and then develop ways of limiting the enemy's choices?

At some point we hae to make a decision on how we will act, so at some point we've done all the analysis we can and must decide based on potentially imperfect information. At that point we are operating off of our best guess of how the enemy will react to the different effects we attempt to have on his system. But the alternative is to do nothing- which may be a good choice, but many times won't lead to our desired end state.


"Study of the real world system" is like observing the behavior of patients. It gives a certain level of information, but the probaility of a particular surgury being successful is NOT PREDICTABLE FROM practice on a cadavor and observatin of the human body. "Probabilities" in such cases are at best bayesian measures of belief, not actual physical propensities.

See above. Yes we cannot assign with certainty a definite and completely accurate probability. But since we're humans and not omniscient, we always will be operating on imperfect information!


And I agree that diagnosis is the most important part. I just don't want a guy diagnosing me that thinks he can learn everything required to be a good doctor by studying books and cutting open cadavors. And thinks the most effective treatment is to give me a handful of pills that will attack all my symptoms at once and will cure me i none fell swoop. There was a time when that was routinely done. It was called "patant medicine" and often resulted in the doctor getting run out town as "snake oil salesman" ;)

See above - the cadaver is as you say practicing techniques and process against the most accurate representation we can make of our adversary, to include the human portions thereof. Most of doctor's knowledge of how the body reacts is based on scientific studies of past occurences. These are not perfect, and don't mean that your body will react exactly the same way (IE "side affects vary but may include...") Unless you never want to be treated by a doctor ever again, you will have to accept that the doctor is making the best guess at what the treatment should be - and in most cases is probably close to right.


I'm harping on chemotherapy because that is what Warden is selling! (see thesis statement above again - if that is not what you consider the thesis statement, please let me know. I'm trying to argue about the paper and its specific arguments - and hopefully made clear the parts of Warden's theory I agree with, are in harmony with current joint doctrine and conceptual thinking and are not controversial.

Don't disagree- that is the thesis. Your chemotherapy example is wrong- he is arguing for a different method of diagnosis, which will then lead to different treatment in many cases.


That may be, but that desn't change the fact that the article is fundamentally about airpower advocacy, Warden's overall strategic theory doesn't have to be and I ask the question a different way - whatif Warden had made all the points, but with a thesis statment about how strategic theory has been outpaced in recent years by the unexplored ocean of NEW 'WAYS' transformational technology (MEANS) has given us. Can these new WAYS significantly affect the way we approach achieving ENDS?

You'd still criticize him because he's Col Warden. :)


If he asked that question, hoping to generate a discussion, then I think the result would have been far more positive. The fact he did not approach the paper from the point of view of "What are the implications of new WAYS on how we think about ENDS", but rather from the point of view of an airpower advocay piece, detracts from the broader applicability of his ideas on strategy and almost deliberately invokes a viceral "Here comes the Airpower Mafia starting to lay the ground work for the budget battle over the new Bomber". I fully concede that this is probably as much a bias effect as not...

I think it is funny... as I have mentioned before, the USAF is the one service that it is "cool" to bash. You don't see the USMC, USN, or USA bashing each other to the same extent (especially here), but just mention airpower and watch the spears fly. I think a lot of this stems from the bad blood from the 50s when the USAF took msot of the money due to the decision to rely on the few nukes we had to allow a smaller budget... I understand that folks can't get accept the fact that maybe an article has validity even though it was written by an airpower advocate for the USAF's professional journal.


Replace the notion that "complexity" is a continuum of "complicated-ness" with the notion that there is a threshold where a combination of "complicated" but casually simple systems reach a "point of no return" beyond which they are no longer "complicated arrangements of simpple things" but "Complex" entities that will no longer exhibit their full range of behaviors if they are simplified back below that line.

I understand the concept- again I ask you what is the alternative? you essentially are saying that there's no way to envision a future and plan to try and reach it. If you really think that, then how are we (the military) to be ready for future conflicts? How do we ever achieve our objectives? I think a lot of our problems sometimes stem from the US military (and the USG's) penchant for making things more complicated than they need to be. See here (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/world/27powerpoint.html) for an example... This often results in us wringing our hands while we wait for perfect information. As Patton said, "a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week".

V/R,

Cliff

Backwards Observer
03-13-2011, 06:47 AM
I think it is funny... as I have mentioned before, the USAF is the one service that it is "cool" to bash. You don't see the USMC, USN, or USA bashing each other to the same extent (especially here), but just mention airpower and watch the spears fly.

This may sound unfair, and please correct me if I appear woefully misinformed, but out of the services mentioned, the USAAF/USAF is possibly the only one to have systematically engaged itself in the purposeful mass slaughter of civilians; yet it seems eager to cloak its existence in an aura of inerrant and pious purity somehow removed from the world 'red in tooth and claw'. My apologies if this comes across as "uncool" bashing.

Fuchs
03-13-2011, 10:45 AM
You seem to forget the Philippine insurrection and the Indian wars. The other services weren't saints either.

Backwards Observer
03-13-2011, 01:54 PM
You seem to forget the Philippine insurrection and the Indian wars. The other services weren't saints either.

You're a troublemaker.:) But perhaps you're right, I appear to have a very selective memory. As stated, it was possibly an unfair thing to say. Airpower, es tut mir leid.

pvebber
03-13-2011, 03:03 PM
I think Cliff and I are still having problems with our implicit assumptions and world views - the 'real problem' typically in airpower theory debates ;)


This may sound unfair, and please correct me if I appear woefully misinformed, but out of the services mentioned, the USAAF/USAF is possibly the only one to have systematically engaged itself in the purposeful mass slaughter of civilians; yet it seems eager to cloak its existence in an aura of inerrant and pious purity somehow removed from the world 'red in tooth and claw'.

I think the better criticism in respond to this is that the Air Force is the only service that argue that the other services are "theoretically" unnecessary.

To be fair, the other service argue precious little at all at the strategic level regarding their " xxxx-power"...

slapout9
03-13-2011, 04:06 PM
it took the ground attack to dislodge Iraqi forces from defenses and Kuwait so they were more effectively bombed and strafed. That is debatable because less than 50% of Warden's original plan survived the cut list.
Is there any law enforcement agency that relies on aircraft or boats for anywhere near the bulk of its efforts. Yes there is one I am personally familiar with the Alabama Marine Police a total water LE agency(they do have trailers and SUv's) to haul their boats to the launch but that is about it.

pvebber
03-13-2011, 04:14 PM
I'll offer the following as some background reading on some of the arguments I've made and where my world view comes from (interestingly many from the AWC strategic links page:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-thry.htm#strategymodels

On issues with Bayesian statisitics:

http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/badbayesmain.pdf

On issues with systems theory applied to warfare:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/vego_systems.pdf

Vego is the closest thing to a broad strategic seapower thinker that we currently have - though we have a number of "niche" innovators.

On use of metaphor:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/paparone_metaphors.pdf

Addressing the "so what else is there" argument:

Colin S. Grey one of the best on strategic thought (has written a great book on seapower so I like him ;) )

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/0910.pdf

and

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/1434.pdf

An Army view:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/forsyth.pdf

Kilcullen (interestingly calls for a different sort of "new lexicon" than Warden)

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/state/kilcullen_21c_conflict_may07.pdf

On the difference between a "choose the end state I want" (Warden) approach and the "be best prepared to deal with a range of possible futures (our predominant current model):

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/jfq58_39-44_junio-protz.pdf

On moving from a strategy based on "compel the adversary to do what I want" to "convince my adversary to share my interests":

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/threatkingdom.htm



On vocabulary:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au/faber.htm

On the decisiveness of force (book review and critical analysis):

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/2213.pdf


And for gluttons for punishment...On philosohical influences:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/pellegrp.pdf


Hopefully some interesting Sunday afternoon reading ;)

Fuchs
03-13-2011, 04:15 PM
I think the better criticism in respond to this is that the Air Force is the only service that argue that the other services are "theoretically" unnecessary.

Are you sure?

The navy could easily claim to be a full military with its naval + marine air and marine ground force...

slapout9
03-13-2011, 04:19 PM
You'd still criticize him because he's Col Warden. :) Yep!


I think it is funny... as I have mentioned before, the USAF is the one service that it is "cool" to bash. You don't see the USMC, USN, or USA bashing each other to the same extent (especially here), but just mention airpower and watch the spears fly. I think a lot of this stems from the bad blood from the 50s when the USAF took msot of the money due to the decision to rely on the few nukes we had to allow a smaller budget... I understand that folks can't get accept the fact that maybe an article has validity even though it was written by an airpower advocate for the USAF's professional journal. That is the real problem if his uniform was different color none of this would matter. Look at the Army ASCOPE analysis system which is basically the same thing (6 rings analysis). If Warden's uniform was a different color we could be looking at creating common ground between the two (basically the same ideas) for better overall understanding of the Enemy.....but no we are going to do that, we are going to play the "not invented here (service oriented)game". So the country and the services as a whole will suffer.

slapout9
03-13-2011, 04:25 PM
Colin S. Grey one of the best on strategic thought (has written a great book on seapower so I like him ;) )



Gray also wrote a paper saying Americas ONLY true future is Airpower:eek: You may not know this but Warden thinks and has written that we should consider ourselves an Air-Maritime nation. Air-Naval Startegy is good but he want like the idea of Air-Naval Battle. Battle is for suckers:wry:

slapout9
03-13-2011, 04:38 PM
Let's analyze COL (ret) Warden's perception that attack of the the Five Rings in the title above decreases in importance from left to right.



That is a good idea on how to learn the process. Don't want to be critical but you were a little off as to how you would actually do one. Want to do Qaddafi as a system so you can see what I mean?

pvebber
03-13-2011, 05:04 PM
The navy could easily claim to be a full military with its naval + marine air and marine ground force...

It could, but it doesn't ;)

And as you say the only reason it could is because it has an integrated force of air-, land- and sea- power capabilities. It could not argue the dominance of seapower the way airpower theorists do (if it did I would criticize it as vociferously as I do airpower dominance advocacy).

And there is the pre-airpower sea-power vs landpower debaets - but that was not about putting the other out of business, but in essence who was "supported and supporting".


That is the real problem if his uniform was different color none of this would matter.

If you'd follow along carefully, there is much of the THEORY side of Warden I have no problem with. Its what he claims the implications of the theory are where I cease willing suspension of disbelief...

Gray gets it - Airpower is an INDISPENSIBLE, NECESSARY part of America's future fighting force and without it as an enabler, the rest of the services are unable to play their role. I'm all over that!

That is a far different thing from saying that airpower will is SUFFICIENT to achieve our strategic goals.


Failure to do so will con#demn airpower to suboptimization and deprive its owners of using force in such a dramatically different way that will achieve
national objectives quickly and at minimum cost.

This statement is exemplary of the 'implication' problem. Even the 5-rings theory enabled the fog and friction of war to be lifted, there is nothing in the theory that justifies the leap from "what is good about the theory" to enabling the owners of airpower to use force ina "Dramatically different way" and bypass the need for "battle".


That is a good idea on how to learn the process. Don't want to be critical but you were a little off as to how you would actually do one. Want to do Qaddafi as a system so you can see what I mean?

Please - I'm all ears. I WISH I COULD BELIEVE. I am just a poor seapower sinner yearning for his soul to be saved :D

slapout9
03-13-2011, 06:30 PM
Please - I'm all ears. I WISH I COULD BELIEVE. I am just a poor seapower sinner yearning for his soul to be saved :D


If you have ever seen any business versions of the 5 rings I would be whats called an evangelist:) so ok, I still have chores to do today so I will start tomorrow. So until then it's time for some music. So here is Jewelle and "Who Will Save Your Soul"

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-LukEq643Mk

Marc
03-14-2011, 12:27 PM
That is the real problem if his uniform was different color none of this would matter. Look at the Army ASCOPE analysis system which is basically the same thing (6 rings analysis). If Warden's uniform was a different color we could be looking at creating common ground between the two (basically the same ideas) for better overall understanding of the Enemy.....but no we are going to do that, we are going to play the "not invented here (service oriented)game". So the country and the services as a whole will suffer.

I disagree, the 5 (or 6) ring analysis simply is not useful in many cases. It has already been mentioned that the model does not apply to law enforcement, counterinsurgencies and stabilization operations. However, many strategists have a tendency to discard these types of operations as military anomalies.

So let's do a relevant reality check: a blog wargame. How would Warden's theory work against Iran if the Iranian leadership chooses to apply a 2006 Hezbollah-style "Mosaic Defense"?



In 2005, the IRGC announced that it was incorporating a flexible, layered defense -- referred to as a mosaic defense -- into its doctrine. The lead author of this plan was General Mohammad Jafari, then director of the IRGC's Center for Strategy, who was later appointed commander of the IRGC.

As part of the mosaic defense, the IRGC has restructured its command and control architecture into a system of 31 separate commands -- one for the city of Tehran and 30 for each of Iran's provinces. The primary goal of restructuring has been to strengthen unit cohesion at the local level and give commanders more latitude to respond to potential threats -- both foreign and domestic. But the new structure would also make it difficult for hostile forces to degrade Iranian command and control, a lesson the Iranian military has learned by analyzing U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans.

The mosaic defense plan allows Iran to take advantage of its strategic depth and formidable geography to mount an insurgency against invading forces. Most of Iran's population centers and major lines of communication are spread out within the interior of the country. Iran's borders are ringed by rugged mountain ranges that serve as natural barriers to invasion. As enemy supply lines stretched into Iran's interior, they would be vulnerable to interdiction by special stay-behind cells, which the IRGC has formed to harass enemy rear operations.

The Artesh, a mix of armored, infantry and mechanized units, would constitute Iran's initial line of defense against invading forces. IRGC troops would support this effort, but they would also form the core of popular resistance, the bulk of which would be supplied by the Basij, the IRGC's paramilitary volunteer force. The IRGC has developed a wartime mobilization plan for the Basij, called the Mo'in Plan, according to which Basij personnel would augment regular IRGC units in an invasion scenario.

IRGC and Basij exercises have featured simulated ambushes on enemy armored columns and helicopters. Much of this training has been conducted in an urban environment, suggesting that Iran intends to lure enemy forces into cities where they would be deprived of mobility and close air support. Iran has emphasized passive defense measures -- techniques used to enhance the battlefield survivability -- including camouflage, concealment and deception.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/10/iran-primer-irans-military-doctrine.html#ixzz1GZlSR02Z

slapout9
03-14-2011, 07:18 PM
pvebber,sorry for the late start but here we go. Go to the link below and then go to chapter 3 for a good 5 rings analysis of how these systems are organized. Since Qudaffi is not much more than a Terorist leader IMO this is a pretty good template to start with.



http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/97-0393.pdf


Also bear in mind this paper was written in 1997, very far sighted as the capabilities that we are and will need in the future IMO, which is one of the key points in Warden's article.

slapout9
03-14-2011, 07:26 PM
It has already been mentioned that the model does not apply to law enforcement, counterinsurgencies and stabilization operations. However, many strategists have a tendency to discard these types of operations as military anomalies.



Not sure what you mean by the that? It was through LE that I first found out about it, I saw it up close and personal and it does work. It was taught to Couter Drug Task forces in the South, Mid-West and North.

Marc
03-14-2011, 07:45 PM
I saw it up close and personal and it does work. It was taught to Couter Drug Task forces in the South, Mid-West and North.

Ok, if the model works in counter drugs operations, then why are there still drugs in our streets?

slapout9
03-14-2011, 08:14 PM
Ok, if the model works in counter drugs operations, then why are there still drugs in our streets?

Funding-Manpower-Laws! Many people think LE organizations are funded like the military which is hardly the case. We often fight major crime organizations that have the funding capabilities of small countries or major corporations. And finally we have to do it within a very restrictive legal framework, criminals don't care what the law is,they don't have to worry about due process or collateral damage. So considering all that we do very well.

Marc
03-14-2011, 08:24 PM
Funding-Manpower-Laws! Many people think LE organizations are funded like the military which is hardly the case. We often fight major crime organizations that have the funding capabilities of small countries or major corporations. And finally we have to do it within a very restrictive legal framework, criminals don't care what the law is,they don't have to worry about due process or collateral damage. So considering all that we do very well.

Then we come to my original point (and BTW, Warden included it in his original article): "All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment."

It's not the politicians' job to provide funding, manpower and laws to fit the strategy. It's the strategist's job to come up with an effective strategy within the limits set by funding, manpower and laws.

pvebber
03-14-2011, 08:55 PM
Since Qudaffi is not much more than a Terorist leader IMO this is a pretty good template to start with.

I would argue that being the head of a nation, there is more to the "system" he is part of than what the paper describes for each of the five rings for a terrorist organization.

Libya has considerably more infrastructure and fielded forces, and most importatnly a population not of "bad guys" but of innocents that one would hope would be spared suffering to the extent possible.

Is it your intent to treat Libya itlself as the "state sponsor" in the context of Chap 3 Table 1?

I thought the big thing with Wardens new article is the need to picture the desired end state to start off. Before we start looking at systems shouldn't we define our desired end state?

Qudaffi = Dead is a "degenerate case".

slapout9
03-15-2011, 03:16 PM
Is it your intent to treat Libya itlself as the "state sponsor" in the context of Chap 3 Table 1?

I thought the big thing with Wardens new article is the need to picture the desired end state to start off. Before we start looking at systems shouldn't we define our desired end state?

Qudaffi = Dead is a "degenerate case".

1-No, as you point out Libya is NOT the system you want to attack but you need to make a systems map of the country in order to see what you should avoid attacking. From there you need to map the Qudaffi Mafia(using table1 as an example) and all it's elements and then decide what to Strike.

2-Yes, you should start with the desired end state, the political objective but that is usually something that is given to the military not something which they get to create.

3-If you notice the model is slightly different because it is older. The second ring is called the "Systems Essentials" ring as opposed to the "Processes" ring. I wished he(Warden) had never changed it myself. Systems Essentials gets right to heart of the concept of COG's or critical targets IMO. Essentials are physical inputs or/and physical production/conversion facilities. It is literally and physically something the System must have or it cannot operate. It is a good way to focus your thinking on what you should attack or not attack because of the resulting side effects. In fact once you map the System your final target list should be nothing but a list of the Essential COG's that the Sytem needs. From 5 rings to 1 so to speak:wry:

slapout9
03-15-2011, 03:18 PM
It's not the politicians' job to provide funding, manpower and laws to fit the strategy.
It's not? Where do you think funding and laws come from?

Fuchs
03-15-2011, 03:21 PM
You should not quote that selectively, for the answer followed:


It's not the politicians' job to provide funding, manpower and laws to fit the strategy. It's the strategist's job to come up with an effective strategy within the limits set by funding, manpower and laws.
(my emphasis)


A strategy that ignores the given limits and civilian guidance is crap, not a strategy. It's not to be funded, but to be scrapped in favour of a real strategy within the imposed limits.

slapout9
03-15-2011, 05:07 PM
You should not quote that selectively, for the answer followed:


(my emphasis)


A strategy that ignores the given limits and civilian guidance is crap, not a strategy. It's not to be funded, but to be scrapped in favour of a real strategy within the imposed limits.

You (emphasis mine)should read more carefully. I asked a question about what he(Marc) thinks a politicians job is? Where I live Politicians change funding and laws all the time because they are temporally elected officials they may not have an accurate understanding of the true nature and magnitude of the problem until it is explained to them in detail, at which time they may and often do make changes to funding and manpower and laws.

pvebber
03-15-2011, 05:07 PM
2-Yes, you should start with the desired end state, the political objective but that is usually something that is given to the military not something which they get to create.

Right, but doesn't Wardens desire to "start with strategy" imply that the military strategist should get to be the one to "picture the desired endstate"?


1-No, as you point out Libya is NOT the system you want to attack but you need to make a systems map of the country in order to see what you should avoid attacking. From there you need to map the Qudaffi Mafia(using table1 as an example) and all it's elements and then decide what to Strike.

Aren't we doing what Warden cautions against in presupposing that our means will be to strike something? Or are you using "strike" in a generic sense of "to affect"?


SO lets say our strategic objective is to remove "the Qudaffi Mafia" from power along with their ability to adversely impact the oppsition regime's assumption of power.

Where do we get the information we need to understand how deeply the Qudaffi Mafia is insuinuated throughout the country? If all the COGs live in Ring 2 of systems essentials where do we get the "map" of these things? What happens if the map is a really complicated thing like the one Cliff linked to regarding Af/Pak?

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/world/27powerpoint.html?_r=1

slapout9
03-15-2011, 05:11 PM
pvebber, really, really good questions. But I gotta go for now. I will respond as soon as I can, so keep thinking cause that is some really good stuff you bring up.

Fuchs
03-15-2011, 05:29 PM
You (emphasis mine)should read more carefully. I asked a question about what he(Marc) thinks a politicians job is? Where I live Politicians change funding and laws all the time because they are temporally elected officials they may not have an accurate understanding of the true nature and magnitude of the problem until it is explained to them in detail, at which time they may and often do make changes to funding and manpower and laws.

Again, read more carefully. I'll narrow down the emphasis from his quote:

"to fit the strategy"

Of course pols are supposed to set budgets (that's trivial), but not so "to fit the strategy".


----------

Politicians change every 4-6 years. That's a "duration of world war" interval. Any officer who thinks that he cannot adapt to their changes of effective restrictions in time should resign.

I expect a military to adapt in few weeks to at most a year. Everything in excess of a year is a too long reaction lag and testament of incompetence and/or organisational failure.

Obviously, this is a common illness of modern militaries. No military rises above "not good enough yet". They're all misguided, wasteful, ill-conceived and largely incompetent bureaucracies instead of the smart and agile warfare organisations the taxpayers deserve.

Marc
03-15-2011, 06:30 PM
It's not? Where do you think funding and laws come from?

Funding and laws can come from a variety of sources. Democracies fund their wars with taxes. Autocracies fund their wars with proceeds from raw materials (oil, gas, copper,...). Non-state actors fund their wars with drug trafficking, blood diamonds, racqueteering, religious fundraising or state sponsors. Laws can come from congress, the Qur'an, the barrel of a gun, or the politburo. All sources of funding and laws have their limitations. There are only so many taxes you can raise. There are only so many drugs you can sell. There is only so much oil you can pump up. The legislative process is equally restrictive. If you want to get a majority together to vote a health care reform, you cannot distract members of Congress with increased war burdens in Afghanistan. If you want to impose your idea of legislation on your population by terrorizing them, you cannot count on your army to prevent an invading army from conquering Baghdad.

A good strategy takes all these limitations into account in stead of lamenting that politicians fail to overcome them. Did Mao ever complain that his strategy was underresourced? No. He had nothing. He did some hard thinking to figure out a strategy to win a war with nothing and he won. Did Vo Nguyen Giap ever complain that Ho Chi Minh's funding and laws did not fit his strategy. No, he developed a strategy to beat the Americans with what the Vietnamese economy, communist state sponsors and his own people's ingenuity and stamina could provide.

Again, like Warden said himself: "All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment." It's not the politicians' job to provide funding, manpower and laws to fit the strategy. It's the strategist's job to come up with an effective strategy within the limits set by funding, manpower and laws.

pvebber
03-15-2011, 06:50 PM
Fuchs offers:


Of course pols are supposed to set budgets (that's trivial), but not so "to fit the strategy".

Unfortunatley we kind of get the worst of both worlds the way the system ends up working.

The President puts out a "National Security Strategy".

The military chiefs then creates supporting military strategies of various sorts (regional, service, roles and misions, etc.)

DoD civilians then provide an input to the President as to what they think it will cost to implement what they think address the Presidents objectives.

The President then tweaks it and sends it to Congress where a whole bag of worms is opened.

The President has a set of political objectives in establishing the NSS. The Military chiefs have a bunch of institutional objectives in its response. DoD can be a focusing, or diffusing lens on the uniformed input.

Congress has a entirely different set of objectives based on sending money to their various constituencies. They add and remove elements at will totally independant of any notions of "Strategy".

This lack of an overall source of "strategy" and a coherent "ways and means" approach to acomplishing it has been argued about going back to G. Washington.

The current climate is perfect example. We are still strategically adrift without a "picture of a desired end-state". The desire for a US militarily dominant into the far future is still out there, but now competes with the notion of a US that "leads the strategic consensus" rather than is simply dominant. That is good becasue we can't afford to be "militarily dominant" everywhere we might want.

We (and the world) is entering a period of fiscal austerity. We have over-promised and underdelievered for too long and over the next 10 years will pay the piper. (which is great for me becasue I want to retire in about 15 years which means my golden years will likely be on the upside the next positive wave ;) )

In how to deal with the inevitable budget reductions of the near future, the President, the Serivices, the DoD, and Congress are seperated by their varying objectives, so its not question of "Strategy driving funding" vs "Strategy constrained by funding" - we have neither effective strategy, nor an effective means of funding. So we will muddle along as we always have - with strategy and resources chasing each others tails like the gingham dog and the calico cat.

Ken White
03-15-2011, 07:23 PM
Obviously, this is a common illness of modern militaries. No military rises above "not good enough yet". They're all misguided, wasteful, ill-conceived and largely incompetent bureaucracies instead of the smart and agile warfare organisations the taxpayers deserve.At least as pertains to democracies, there is little prospect for change barring an existential war. I suspect that is to be tolerated and perhaps even admired a bit but it sure is frustrating, mostly because the politicians who literally force their militaries to that marginal state do not realize the limitations (and hidden costs) they impose upon themselves...

Cole
03-16-2011, 03:00 AM
Because some want to attribute probabilities and science to warfare and budget allocations, let’s look at some possible figures.

The first assumption balances probabilities for war over the next 20 years in various parts of the world. If the US chose option A with more air and seapower and showed no willingness to deploy ground forces to fight or deter terror, I would submit based on the abandonment of land troops in Lebanon, Somalia, and the cruise missile attacks of Afghanistan, failed no-fly zone over Iraq, and failure to act in Libya…all increase likelihood of a terrorist attack to .95 over the next 20 years versus only .85 if the U.S. continues terror deterrent efforts in places like Afghanistan, etc.

A similar hypothesis is that if we withdrew U.S. ground forces in South Korea, the loss of the tripwire effect would increase probability of war there. One could make a claim that a subsequent rush to Korea would involve greater ground losses than if we had forces there already. But I kept the losses the same but the probability of war higher with no forces there.

Finally, I acknowledge that increased spending on air and seapower would decrease an already extremely low probability of war with China. If a minor nuclear exchange occurred, it would be the same death toll regardless of which option we chose. Of course if no minor nuclear exchange occurred, losses would be far lower in both scenarios.

The last point is a primary one. The very high probability of another terrorist attack and subsequent war over the next 20 years must be balanced against the extremely low probability of war with China or Russia due to economic interdependency and MAD making it a lose-lose proposition. With MAD, even if we had limited conflict with either quasi-superpower, the probability is still pretty good that no nuclear exchange would occur.

Potential U.S. Deaths over next 20 years from warfare and/or terrorist attack
………………..Middle East…..…Korea……………China
Option A: [.95 x 8,000] + [.2 x 12,000] + [.02 x 100,000] = ?
Option A: 7,600 +2,400 + 2,000 = 12,000 dead
Option B: [.85 x 8,000] + [.1 x 12,000] + [.04 x 100,000] =?
Option B: 6,800 + 1,200 + 4,000 = 12,000 dead

Next since COL (R) Warden and other USAF proponents and sellers of AirSea Battle would argue for greater defense budgets for Air and Seapower, let’s look at what the above option A (higher air and seapower spending) compares to an option B with the more traditional equal spending between all the services.

For starters, air and seapower procurement is far costlier as are O&S costs than Army procurement and O&S expense. Army Manpower expense is admittedly higher. But because of the disproportionate costs of air and seapower, you can see how the U.S. could easily spend $2.5 trillion more than in a balanced approach over the next 20 years.

Service Defense Budgets over next 20 years in today’s dollars
……………Air Force…..Navy/Marines…..Army
Option A: $5 trillion + $6 trillion +$2.5 trillion = $13.5 trillion
Option B: $3.5 trillion +$4 trillion +$3.5 trillion = $11 trillion

Finally, as the war winds down, it is somewhat startling to see how rapidly some are talking about reducing Army size. The already highly disproportionate deployment rate of Army versus other services is unlikely to improve if Army manpower is seen as a billpayer to increase air and seapower spending.

The below figures are based on one 6 month deployment by the Air Force, Navy, and Marines every 30 months with the Army deploying for 12 months out of every 30 months in Option A (smaller Army, more spent on air and seapower) and for 12 months out of every 40 months in Option B (traditional near equal spending for all services) where the Army stays nearly as large as it currently is. Note that the Army still gets the raw end of the deal either way.

Deployed months over the next 20 years: Air Force (6 mths)…Navy/Marines (6 mths)…Army (12 mths)
Option A:…………………………………………………….48 months………………..48 months……………….96 months
(Decrease Army and slightly fewer AF/Navy/Marines)
Option B:……………………………………………………..48 months……………….48 months……………….72 months
(Keep Army ranks higher and slightly fewer AF/Navy/Marines)

Bob's World
03-16-2011, 11:16 AM
If the US desires to be a major continental power, build a large army. If the US desires to be a major global power, build a large Navy, and control the air and space above it.

The role of armies in peacetime is pretty narrow, and regardless of all the hype and current conflicts in 3-4 places, we are a nation at peace. The vast majority of those conflicts are elective; in that if they were medical procedures, our insurance wouldn't cover them.

Having sat at the big table (and banged my head on the same) in the QDR process; and worked the halls of the Pentagon vainly attempting to get each of the services to give two flying monkeys of concern over their statutory responsibility to fund all service-common aspects of Special Operations Forces, I understand the inter-service rivalry. All of the services are insanely biased and self-serving. None of them want to "lose" to a sister service in the grand priority and budget competition.

The Army (and the Marines, though this actually fits well within their wheelhouse) have latched onto Terrorism, Irregular Warfare, Asymmetric Warfare, Security Force Assistance, and every other bottle of snake oil they could pull of the shelf in an effort to stay in the game at a wartime footing in an era of peace. Frankly, treating peace like war may be good for the Army, but it is not healthy for the rest of the nation, and someone needs to throw the switch and side rail the crazy train.

As to Warden? Like all models, there is value in any model that helps one to organize their thoughts and to consider possibilities they might otherwise have overlooked. Employ Warden for that and it is helpful. Also like all models, if one comes to see them as some sort of magic machine that one can dogmatically follow steps A through Z to get to a perfect solution, one deserves what they get. Its a framework for thinking, and that is helpful, and that is enough.

slapout9
03-16-2011, 03:09 PM
Right, but doesn't Wardens desire to "start with strategy" imply that the military strategist should get to be the one to "picture the desired endstate"? By that I think he is talking about the problem of linkage. How do military objectives link to achieving the political end state.


Aren't we doing what Warden cautions against in presupposing that our means will be to strike something? Or are you using "strike" in a generic sense of "to affect"? Yes, strike was a poor choice of words "affect" is the proper term.



SO lets say our strategic objective is to remove "the Qudaffi Mafia" from power along with their ability to adversely impact the opposition regime's assumption of power.

Where do we get the information we need to understand how deeply the Qudaffi Mafia is insinuated throughout the country? If all the COGs live in Ring 2 of systems essentials where do we get the "map" of these things? What happens if the map is a really complicated thing like the one Cliff linked to regarding Af/Pak?



First the real problem as I see it, would be the opposition regime, you better get that one right or it is not going to matter much in the long run. To answer your question on "Qudaffi's Mafia" the problem as I see it, like all criminal/terrorist/insurgent/gang organizations is that it is essentially a Clandestine system. They don't have traditional Tanks,Ships,Planes and Bases. They alter the civilian environment(things,and locations) that are already there to be used for criminal/war activities. They use secrecy,subversion,deception to hide what and where they are.

Second you don't get a systems map from anywhere, you have to create it. That is why I say the model is not prescriptive(as many people say) it is descriptive. It lists the broad categories of the elements of all systems but you have to go and discover them yourself. That is generally going to be an Intelligence function. Hence the old saying Airpower is Targeting and all Targeting is Intelligence. I would change that to All Strategy is Targeting and all Targeting is Intelligence. It dosen't matter if it is doen by the Army,Air Force,or Navy.

Third the map you posted is....well just crazy IMO. How in the world would you use something like that. If you want to know what a usable map would look like there are a couple of ways to do it, but generally you are going to end up with a list of the essential people,places and things that they need to operate the system.

slapout9
03-16-2011, 03:16 PM
.

A good strategy takes all these limitations into account in stead of lamenting that politicians fail to overcome them. Did Mao ever complain that his strategy was underresourced? No. He had nothing. He did some hard thinking to figure out a strategy to win a war with nothing and he won. Did Vo Nguyen Giap ever complain that Ho Chi Minh's funding and laws did not fit his strategy. No, he developed a strategy to beat the Americans with what the Vietnamese economy, communist state sponsors and his own people's ingenuity and stamina could provide.



Both China and Vietnam had big Armies with alot of guns and a lot of ammunition. Now somebody paid for that and it wasn't cheap. I agree about the Laws, neither were concerned with laws, they had no political restrictions to worry about, all they were concerned with was wining.

Ken White
03-16-2011, 03:39 PM
...worked the halls of the Pentagon vainly attempting to get each of the services to give two flying monkeys of concern over their statutory responsibility to fund all service-common aspects of Special Operations Forces... Many years ago some of us told a lot of the "We need a SO service..." types to be careful what they wanted, they might get it...:D

Barbwire Bob may have persuaded Nunn and Goldwater but I'm not at all sure he did the Nation any favors...

It's hard to convince someone to give you money when you have your own pot which you don't share at all well and when you imply to the folks you want to give you money that they're lesser, pedestrian beings, isn't it... :wry:
I understand the inter-service rivalry. All of the services are insanely biased and self-serving. None of them want to "lose" to a sister service in the grand priority and budget competition.That's true and it applies to SOCOM-as-service as well. However, it's as much an effect of out pathetically poor budgeting system and a venal Congress as anything. The services are not blameless but Congress creates more problems than it solves -- not least by years of overfunding DoD.
The Army (and the Marines, though this actually fits well within their wheelhouse) have latched onto Terrorism, Irregular Warfare, Asymmetric Warfare, Security Force Assistance, and every other bottle of snake oil they could pull of the shelf in an effort to stay in the game at a wartime footing in an era of peace. Frankly, treating peace like war may be good for the Army, but it is not healthy for the rest of the nation, and someone needs to throw the switch and side rail the crazy train.Nor is it good for the Army or the Marines... :mad:

In their defense, they have not so much latched onto it as been forced to grab it. And truth be told, SOCOM has not helped in that.

Turf protection is a people problem. It isn't beneficial and it's a by-product of poorly crafted laws, a poorly functioning Congress -- and poor leadership. It is in part funded by such massive amounts of money being made available which inculcates greed -- our boom and bust way with money does not help. It also would not be such a problem if it were not tolerated, even encouraged...
As to Warden? Like all models, there is value in any model that helps one to organize their thoughts...Its a framework for thinking, and that is helpful, and that is enough.True dat.

Marc
03-16-2011, 04:31 PM
Both China and Vietnam had big Armies with alot of guns and a lot of ammunition. Now somebody paid for that and it wasn't cheap. I agree about the Laws, neither were concerned with laws, they had no political restrictions to worry about, all they were concerned with was wining.

slapout9,

Mao and Ho Chi Minh did not have big Armies when they started their fight against Tsjang Kai Tsjek's nationalist regime and French colonial rule respectively. They created these army from among the peasants with agitation and propaganda. It was only much, much later that these peasant insurgencies involved into big Armies with a lot of guns and a lot of ammunition.

I disagree with you that you agree with me about laws. I think you are missing my point. I did not say that our opponents do not have political restrictions to worry about. On the contrary. ALL power systems have political restrictions to worry about.

On restrictions of democratic power systems; see Harvey Sapolsky:

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4330354

On restrictions of islamist power systems; see Erik Claessen:

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090430_art017.pdf

On restrictions of autocratic power systems; see Norvell De Atkine:

http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars

slapout9
03-16-2011, 04:34 PM
Marc, thanks for the refernce points. I will read them and get back with you.

slapout9
03-16-2011, 04:46 PM
Marc, thanks for the refernce points. I will read them and get back with you.

I forgot to add I am and have been reading "The Unknown Story of MAO" by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday. Big book and hard to read but as the title says what we think and know about MAO as opposed to the rest of the story about MAO is different.

pvebber
03-16-2011, 07:11 PM
By that I think he is talking about the problem of linkage. How do military objectives link to achieving the political end state.

OK, given the political endstate I described, what are the associated military obectives?


Second you don't get a systems map from anywhere, you have to create it.

OK, so how do we get the information we need to make one? since they "They use secrecy,subversion,deception to hide what and where they are." Is this a national intelligence function or a military intelligence function? How do we know when we have enough to start doing some o that thar 'affectin' ?


Third the map you posted is....well just crazy IMO. How in the world would you use something like that. If you want to know what a usable map would look like there are a couple of ways to do it, but generally you are going to end up with a list of the essential people,places and things that they need to operate the system.

Hmmmm so if we are not going to actully moel system, how is it we are using systems theory to figure out what shold be on our list? The whole thing about a systems theory approach that Warden leverages is that if you understand the system holisitcally, you can "find the flaw in the deathstar".

However, if you don't have the plans to the deathstar how do you find the single point of failure vent to drop your photon torpedo down?

How do you know how to prioritize what goes on the list or "what they need to operate the system" without a model of this system to tell you what the CoGs are?

As far a the posted map goes, from what I've seen of these things, that is a REALLY simple one. Each of those little text boxes would have a map of similar complexity inside it, and similarly complex maps inside many of those. Wardens paper discusses a ROM of 1000 targets to affect the CoGs, out of "a whole list" that would number in the 10s if not 100s of thousands inthe case of a major power.

For Libya it would be perhaps an order of magnitude less, but you are still looking for 100s of target among perhaps 5-10 CoGs out of a potential target list of 1000s of items.

Appreciate you bearing with me trying to puzlle this out ;)

slapout9
03-16-2011, 07:24 PM
Appreciate you bearing with me trying to puzlle this out ;)

Keep going don't stop. You ask many of the questions I did. But you need to bear with me because retired LE folks have to have another job to keep paying the bills and I am the dog shift for awhile with no access to a computer. But I will answer in detail later today:)tonight. In the meantime read this from the SWJ Blog, it's a little complicated for my taste but he it is a start point. My way is better of course:D:D http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/a-theory-of-dark-network-desig/

pvebber
03-16-2011, 08:33 PM
Great article!

But I sense a bait and switch...The rings in figure 2 are different than the Warden rings...:p

pvebber
03-16-2011, 09:01 PM
I was talking to some folks around the ofice and it hit me that there is some touble with Warden's defintion of Airpower as:


To keep this simple, we will not talk about current service organizations. Thus, ground power is anything essentially tethered directly to the earth, including people, tanks, and artillery; sea power is anything that operates on or under water but does not include aircraft or missiles launched from ships; and airpower is anything guided that flies through the air and space, regardless of who owns it or its launch platform. If we want to avoid parochial arguments that confuse our assessment of the options, we need to stay with these definitions. After reaching conclusions, we can decide which organizations should own and operate the three types of power.

So is an ICBM or other ballistic missile "ground power" since it is not guided and comes from a ground launcher? But then a realtively short ranged guided artillery projectile or SAM would be "airpower"?

Does my ship, which is a seapower platform when it is firing ballistic rounds from its gun become an airpower platform when I load a guided round? If I put a rail gun on my ship that fires unguided rounds hundreds of miles is that rail gun seapower, but the shorter range Harpoon missile that only affects ships is "airpower"? Is a ship that only fires guided weapons an "airpower" platform?

How about a high powered laser? Is that that not airpower because its not guided, but a short range SAM is airpower becasue it is?

Can we come up with a better definition of "airpower" that perhaps uses some aspect of overall precision rather than just "guided"? And the notion that a crucial discriminator of "airpower" has to do with some function of "action at a distance"? Bt not all action at adistance? (ie the target matters?)

slapout9
03-17-2011, 02:31 PM
OK, given the political endstate I described, what are the associated military obectives? Kill Qaddafi and his inner circle,destroy or seize his personal assets and those of his inner circle. Do not attack the public in general or damage public assets.




OK, so how do we get the information we need to make one? since they "They use secrecy,subversion,deception to hide what and where they are." Is this a national intelligence function or a military intelligence function? Yes, National,Military and any other Intelligence source you can find.


How do we know when we have enough to start doing some o that thar 'affectin' ? Depends on the final effect you want to achieve.




Hmmmm so if we are not going to actully moel system, how is it we are using systems theory to figure out what shold be on our list? The whole thing about a systems theory approach that Warden leverages is that if you understand the system holisitcally, you can "find the flaw in the deathstar".

However, if you don't have the plans to the deathstar how do you find the single point of failure vent to drop your photon torpedo down? Just like the movie...remember somebody (intelligence source) gave them the blueprint for the deathstar.


How do you know how to prioritize what goes on the list or "what they need to operate the system" without a model of this system to tell you what the CoGs are? I would suggest you start with yourself. Make a list of what you need to operate, a five rings model of yourself. Now what would happen if one or more of the inputs were eliminated. For prioritizing I like C.A.R.V.E.R. myself. How Critical,Accessible,Recognizable,Vulnerable,Effect on people,Recuperable is the the target.


As far a the posted map goes, from what I've seen of these things, that is a REALLY simple one. Each of those little text boxes would have a map of similar complexity inside it, and similarly complex maps inside many of those. Wardens paper discusses a ROM of 1000 targets to affect the CoGs, out of "a whole list" that would number in the 10s if not 100s of thousands inthe case of a major power. Warden would call that a fractal analysis.....going from a broad concept to the perceptual concrete level of a physical target to affect. You can do that with the same 5rings model, you don't need to use the spaghetti map.


For Libya it would be perhaps an order of magnitude less, but you are still looking for 100s of target among perhaps 5-10 CoGs out of a potential target list of 1000s of items. I think you would be surprised just how much of that spade work has already been done.

slapout9
03-17-2011, 07:04 PM
pvebber, don't no why I didn't think of it earlier but for training/teaching purposes click on the link below for FM3-24.2 Tactics in COIN. Go to Fig. 1-2 for an example ASCOPE model..... you will like it:) then go to Fig. 6.2 to see an example of CARVER-P this is how to use it defensively but it can and should be used offensively, that is why it was originally created.
Hope this clears things up. Anymore questions or concerns just ask away.

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/coin/repository/fm3242.pdf

pvebber
03-18-2011, 04:33 PM
Combining a rereading of the COIN pub withthe latest in the series on "To design or not to design"

To design or not to design (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/to-design-or-not-to-design-pa3/)

A number of things come to mind.

The COIN manual (and Design constructs) look at systems theory as a means to identifying and understanding problems, not a way to implement specific solutions. This is a totally different construct than Warden's theory, which sees systems theory as an avenue to "reverse engineer" the "transfer function" that gets you from the current system state to the desired system state.

The COIN manual seems "list-centric" rather than "relationship-centric". Identifying components of the system is a necessary, but insufficient step in understanding the system. The more important piece (as far a influencing the system"is the relationships between components (and since they are not static, how they chang over time). This reinforces the role of sysems theory as part of IPB where you are trying to identify components, but the importance of components is a function of realtionships that are in general only incompletely know. The COIN methodolgy hhas no construct for building understanding of realtionships (the matrices are "anecdotal" in nature, not exhaustive).

The COIN manual is "battle-centric" it emplys an interative process of interactions with the adversary system (the 7 lines of operations) in a fundamentally linear way. It recognizes, at least implicitly, the broader issues I have with the Warden theory by reinforcing the long timeframes, the need for heuristic (trial and error) rather than algorithmic (pre-planned) solutions and the dangers of decoming too enamored with "strategic CoGs" at the expense of "tactical" ones (ie local problems can have strategic effect and soving strategic problems do not always "trickle down" to local effects).

The COIN manual is written from the point of view of the MDMP being sufficient to deal with the problem. What in the COIN manaul justifies Warden's calim of the need for a 'redo' of the planning process?

I am left feeling that we are very much in agreement about the role of systems theory and its limitations. I am not entirely satified withthe COIN manual and share Major Zweibelson's critcism of the Army interpretation of design. Bht my feeling is they are "on the right track" and understand the limitations and caveats.

Which unfortunatly doesn't answer the criticisms of Warden, namely:

Removing "the control circuit" is not a substitute for convincing those in control to change their behavior. Removing the "control circuit" (as we saw in Iraq) can open a Pandora's box.

The problem of understanding a complex system completely enough to "find the flaw in the deathstar" and get the easy win. The still more complex notion of the single pulse of power that shocks the system from an undesirable state to a desirable one is even more questionable given the problems we have found in trying to "tweak the system over time" to get to a desired state. If we can't incrementally move the system to a desired state, what makes us think a single set of effects performed quickly will do it?

The notion that airpower (badly-defined) has a property that allows this transfer functin to be instantiated more easily than ground power or sea power is justified how?


So thats where I am. Still an evil, parochial, "Warden Basher" I guess.

I'm off on travel next week with limited internet connectivity. (My Kindle)

Greate discussion, Thanks!

slapout9
03-18-2011, 07:04 PM
Combining a rereading of the COIN pub withthe latest in the series on "To design or not to design"



Couple of points before you go.

There is much more to Warden than just the rings.

Step 1 of Warden's Prometheus Process(thats what he calls now) is called DESIGN ;)the future, but nobody ever brings that up.

Step 2 is TARGET for success. The Rings analysis or mapping the system(s).

Step 3 is CAMPAIGN to win. Much of your concerns about relationships happens in this step. Additionally you will learn about Phases not a single pulse, also you will learn not to depend on single points of failure, that is the whole point of attacking multiple targets in parallel. You also will encounter the "Red Team" process.

Step 4 is FINISH with finesse. About achieving the end state which is the whole reason to do this in the first place.

pvebber
03-19-2011, 01:31 AM
called DESIGN the future, but nobody ever brings that up.

But you have to look at how someone uses the words and not what words they use. He also says not to rely on prediction, but then implies that you can create a plan to achieve a future desired state. The Prometheus process claims to allow you to control your destiny. The design concepts in military terms are all about balancing that which you can control with that which you can't. That is why it is as much art as science.

To create a set of specific actions that result in a specific future requires that the result of those actions is PREDICTABLE. If it is not, then you have no reason to believe that taking the action will result in a specific end-state.

Many of Wardens process laws are just plain wrong. Source: (http://www.audiobookslearning.com/31modern-prometheus-strategic-process-John-Warden-review.html)


The Prometheus Process is built on a group of natural laws of strategy as follows:

Every action affects the future TRUE, however what that effect is, more often than not, is not measurable and is part of causal nexus that is not decomposable.

Specific actions create a specific future FALSE There is no 1 to 1 correspondence in complex systems between individual actions and outcomes. An action may have no discernible impact on a system until a "tipping point" of accumulated actions occurs.

Every thing and every action happens in a system TRUE The universe is a very large system. Isolating sub-systems within the universe can lead to problems however...

All systems have inertia and resist change FALSE violates the laws of thermodynamics. All open, dissipative, systems are constantly trying to change to lower energy states. One definition of 'life' is a system that exhibits self-organization to higher degrees of complexity by expending energy.

All systems have Centers of Gravity TRUE in the practical sense of components whose high degree of interrelatedness make them more important than other components. FALSE in the absolute sense, a system can be composed of identical nodes with symmetric relationships and therefore none are more important than others.

Systems Change when their Centers of Gravity change TRUE, given the definition of CoG, but there can be components that exhibit "tipping point" behaviors that will become CoGs when they tip, but are discernible as such beforehand.

The extent and probability of system change is proportional to the number of Centers of Gravity affected, and the speed at which they are affected ABSOLUTIVELY POSILUTELY FALSE. Proportionality means linear, and the vast majority of systems are non-linear and DO NOT exhibit proportional responses. ONLY linear systems do.

All known systems and things have a beginning and an end
TRUE from a practical standpoint, but not absolutely true (The jury is still out on the nature of cosmogony - the origin of the universe)


Specific actions produce specific ends FALSE - a variation on the first law and suffers the same flaw. It also is not time reversible. A specific end is not the result of specific actions. It can also be the result of internal interactions within the system.


Step 2 is TARGET for success. The Rings analysis or mapping the system(s).

To be able to choose specific targets, the "mapping" of the system needs to be detailed enough to enable prediction of the outcome of affecting the targets. I have yet to see an implementation of that gets beyond "target list making". Making a list of targets, with at least having a "theory of action" fro WHY the elements of that list are important gets you the sort of ad hoc metric-chasing that has befuddled our efforts in Iraq and AfPak.

Either our best and brightest are incompetent, or an engineering design metaphor to creating a desired end-state JUST DOESN'T WORK IN ALL CASES.

The "rings of importance" construct (how ever many there are, and what you call the) is a useful framework for UNDERSTANDING the categories of components in a system and some general relationships between categories - but is WOEFULLY INSUFFICIENT for creating a desired endstate in a system of any real complexity.


Step 3 is CAMPAIGN to win. Much of your concerns about relationships happens in this step. Additionally you will learn about Phases not a single pulse, also you will learn not to depend on single points of failure, that is the whole point of attacking multiple targets in parallel. You also will encounter the "Red Team" process.

How can you plan the campaign if you don't learn about the relationships between components until to start taking action? This is what distinguishes the "realistic" applications of systems theory to military operations (iterative, continuing and evolving) with the "engineered" episodic" application Warden claims in his theory.

You attack multiple targets in parallel, and then what? how long do you wait to asses if your end state is achieved? I assume that if you don't then you plan and execute another episode of parallel attacks. We are eliminating "battle" remember so there is no "steady state" engagement with the adversary (that would be to "do battle" with him).


Step 4 is FINISH with finesse. About achieving the end state which is the whole reason to do this in the first place.

Sorry, but I can't help but recall Buzz Lightyear "falling, with style". From the "military Warden" and not the business guru this meant being magnanimous in victory and not imposing demeaning conditions on the defeated adversary that will fester into resentments and a rekindling of hostilities. That is just common sense, not systems theory.

This is a different strategic framework than the COIN or operational design frameworks.

It is also not in harmony with actual systems theory (for reasons given in the above discussion of warden's "laws".

I agree with you Slap on the usefulness of systems theory, again, I don't think the Warden theory is good systems theory, or good military art.

slapout9
03-19-2011, 04:39 AM
Well looks like I can't change your mind but maybe Walt can. Walt Disney Movie explaining the theory of Ring Warfare and how to win using Airpower.

Links to the Disney Classic from 1942 "Victory Through Airpower"

Part 7,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ZxofaUhd7Y&feature=related
Part 8
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zlr_HnLV2C4&feature=related
Part 9
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfaFkqhGggc&feature=related
Part 10
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuVkYtOy-1U&feature=related


Enjoy your trip.

Marc
03-19-2011, 10:14 AM
Well looks like I can't change your mind but maybe Walt can. Walt Disney Movie explaining the theory of Ring Warfare and how to win using Airpower.

This thread is difficult. the conversation about the validity and applicability of a strategy keeps evolving into a sterile discussion between believers and non-believers. To improve the exchange of ideas, I propose a mental war game.


We fast-forward the American Revolution War into the future. The thirteen colonies are under British rule in 2011.
Everything on the ground (weapons, tactics, vehicles,...) remains the same.
The British Crown receives five aircraft carriers, a manual on the application of the Five-Ring Strategy and John Ashley Warden III himself to lead the British forces at Her Majesty's service.
The use of the aircraft carriers would double the monthly burden of the war effort, but only for the duration of the war.


My question is the following: under these circumstances, would the British forces win the War of American Revolution and keep the thirteen colonies under British rule?

Cole
03-19-2011, 01:07 PM
This thread is difficult. the conversation about the validity and applicability of a strategy keeps evolving into a sterile discussion between believers and non-believers. To improve the exchange of ideas, I propose a mental war game.


We fast-forward the American Revolution War into the future. The thirteen colonies are under British rule in 2011.
Everything on the ground (weapons, tactics, vehicles,...) remains the same.
The British Crown receives five aircraft carriers, a manual on the application of the Five-Ring Strategy and John Ashley Warden III himself to lead the British forces at Her Majesty's service.
The use of the aircraft carriers would double the monthly burden of the war effort, but only for the duration of the war.


My question is the following: under these circumstances, would the British forces win the War of American Revolution and keep the thirteen colonies under British rule?

Not a legitimate scenario because views of what is acceptable vary depending on who employs the air/seapower.

If the colonists hugged populations, hid in the woods, used anti-ship ballistic missiles and diesel electric subs that waited for carriers to come to them, and hidden mobile radar air defense systems that engaged carrier aircraft and then shut down radars and repositioned...game on for the colonists. Plus, a more evolved colonist would simply move more inland with his leaders, processes, populations, infrastructure, and land-based aircraft and TBM...thus outdistancing carrier attacks.

Don't forget jamming GPS, attack of satellites, and an EMP attack of Hawaii, Guam, and Alaska...err I mean Britain and Canada. Lots of inflatable decoys out in the open will be sure to waste multiple bombs, followed up by air defense ambushes.

If the air/seapower didn't care about the population and bombed cities, infrastructure, and processes into oblivion, and bombed houses of perceived leaders killing their families (but not the leaders)...the British probably win. But the U.S. would never do that today, or would they per Warden's methodology? Russia appears to have leveled much of Chechnya to suppress that revolution. Gulbuddin Hekmatyr shelled Kabul and Russian bombers killed 24,000 in Herat early in the war. Did any of these methods solve the undlerlying problem and is the leader and his colonist lead followers still in power?

Would the colonists become meek, passive zombies following this slaughter...or increase their resolve and guerilla activities, not to mention terror attacks in Britain?

The bottom line Warden seems to miss, is it is virtually impossible to understand the ASCOPE and PMESII (whatever it is) operational environment without troops on the ground to report and attempt to understand those conditions. In addition, following the precision attacks, the underlying tensions remain and are aggravated by the need to rebuild...not a condition likely to endear colonists to the "homeland."

Plus cannot believe that any CoG analysis would ignore the intrinsic value of attacking key targets of the adversary's military! In a China scenario, for instance, air-to-air becomes largely irrelevant if you succeed in repeatedly attacking runways and airbases killing the enemy's aircraft and related logistics on the ground rather than in the air. Isn't that a 5 rings approach, largely ignored in the emotional desire to fight the white scarf war? Plus those attacks of airfields do not have to occur using fighters or manned aircraft. The enemy obviously can use the same methodology to destroy our few land-based airfields for fighters in a place like the Pacific where they are far and few between and well within range of TBM and ASBM.

pvebber
03-19-2011, 02:39 PM
Links to the Disney Classic from 1942 "Victory Through Airpower"

OK, so now a hard core attrition strategy is based on the Five Rings!?! This is the antithesis of Warden argument! If it can be all things to all people its just meaningless.

We are seemingly at a basic philosophical impasse about how the world works, and what the purpose of models of it are and when they are useful.



My question is the following: under these circumstances, would the British forces win the War of American Revolution and keep the thirteen colonies under British rule?

First is the desired endstate. DO the British just want to keep the Americans in the Empire, or do they want to return to the status quo ante? If you just want to keep them in the Empire then you negotiate out the grievances (with your carriers big sticks reminding the colonists of the stakes) and come to a compromise that increases American representation and tempers taxation without killing the golden goose. If you want to compel a return to the status quo ante, you have a problem that pretty much requires a use of force to compel.

Then you get WHAT do you try to affect?

The Five Rings strategy starts with leadership. Assuming the latter desired endstate, Warden would focus on trying to identify the revolutions leadership.

Problem 1: Applicability of Mao's Peoples war theory - do we believe that the American Revolution was the product of the Founding Father's actions, thus their elimination would decapitate the revolution and end it? Or was the emergence of the Founding Fathers the product of an idea that enjoyed significant enough grassroots support, that, like we see with Al Qeada - crunch all the leaders you want, more will step up?

I'll give Warden credit for not cutting off his nose to spite his face and he would employ lots of SOF ground forces and Intelligence assets to learn the identities and locations of the Leadership.

Problem 2: How do come up with the set of parallel operations when the system you are affecting is in a constant dynamic state?

This is the problem with "hold at Risk" strategies. You can typically only determine the identity and location of a small subset of a mobile target set. You might be able to attack Franklin, Washington and Hamilton one day, and then Adams, Jay and Madison the next. And once you strike a subset you tip your hand and may burn some of your intel assets and drive the leadership to a new operating pattern.

It becomes a sequential operation , not a parallel one.

And if the Americans are smart they will make sure any strikes cause a significant collateral damage to loyalists.

Problem 3 of the whole strategy - The enemy gets a vote. Warden assumes that you can observe and affect the adversary system in a detached way. The Red Team effort in his is what we call "Blue red team" which is looking for flaws in the Blue plan. He does not address "Red red Team" Which is an independent team PLAYING RED and coming up with how Red may play the game, not just what the flaws in the Blue plan are. How to deal with a sophisticated Red that gives you the information they know you desire - but use the fact they know how you will respond to it against you (ie the leadership turns out not to be at the "big meeting" but its "take your child to work day" or "model Government day"? The strategy assumes that you in essence know what the enemy is thinking.

Problem 4 of the strategy is related to the above - The Media gets a vote. Warden doens't include this at all in his theory and assumes that you can conduct your application of effects in a vacuuum of broader scrutiny and political context. The Colonists will play the "underdog card" and ensure that the British are portrayed in the media as evil, jackbooted nazis because they are DELIBERATELY ignoring your military forces and conducting political assassination and brutal destruction of your civil infrastructure. Buy the PLO playbook and add Christien Amonpur and Anderson Cooper to speed dial. Play up that "good guys" use their military to attack the other guys military ONLY and that means there can be on other characterization of the British other than EVIL.


The bottom line Warden seems to miss, is it is virtually impossible to understand the ASCOPE and PMESII (whatever it is) operational environment without troops on the ground to report and attempt to understand those conditions. In addition, following the precision attacks, the underlying tensions remain and are aggravated by the need to rebuild...not a condition likely to endear colonists to the "homeland."

This is the essence of the "theory meets practice" problem that I made WAY to philosoical :(. 5 Rings-like frameworks are importatn to understanding the problem, but the information you need to make them actionable is tremendous, fleeting and subject to contamination by an a sophisticated adversary.


Plus cannot believe that any CoG analysis would ignore the intrinsic value of attacking key targets of the adversary's military! In a China scenario, for instance, air-to-air becomes largely irrelevant if you succeed in repeatedly attacking runways and airbases killing the enemy's aircraft and related logistics on the ground rather than in the air. Isn't that a 5 rings approach, largely ignored in the emotional desire to fight the white scarf war? Plus those attacks of airfields do not have to occur using fighters or manned aircraft. The enemy obviously can use the same methodology to destroy our few land-based airfields for fighters in a place like the Pacific where they are far and few between and well within range of TBM and ASBM.

This is the essence of the "you don't get to eliminate battle from the vocabulary if the enemy chooses to fight them" problem. Interestingly the potential problem in the future China scenario that has everybody crying "AirSea Battle" is that - by wardens definition - Lanpower now out ranges airpower and can hodl it at bay. SInce unguided ballistic missiles are not "airpower" but land power by Wardens definition, the abilty to take out airbases at it nearly intercontinental ranges with ballistic missiles (and potentially even carrier at sea) you are left having to fight battles of access to even get your air power in play en mass.

The bottom is that you are hard pressed to come up with a success scenario "with little unplanned destruction or spilling of blood" that achieves your objectives using the actual 5 Rings strategy.

As Warden points out in his article, this would be a war you would not choose to wage because the strategy can't win with a high probability.

So just what types of "end-states" can the 5 rings strategy compel an adversary to choose? Like Walt Disney points out, ones where the desired endstate is "surrender". That construct is simply not useful in the real world any more.

Over to the Warden-istas. How do you address the problems?

Marc
03-19-2011, 04:43 PM
First is the desired endstate. DO the British just want to keep the Americans in the Empire, or do they want to return to the status quo ante? If you just want to keep them in the Empire then you negotiate out the grievances (with your carriers big sticks reminding the colonists of the stakes) and come to a compromise that increases American representation and tempers taxation without killing the golden goose. If you want to compel a return to the status quo ante, you have a problem that pretty much requires a use of force to compel.

Over to the Warden-istas. How do you address the problems?

pvebber,

Good discussion so far, but both from non-Warden-istas. Like you, I look forward to the first comment by a Warden-ista. To paraphrase Warden:

"If we see the American revolutionaries as a system, we first determine what the system needs to look like so that we can realize our future picture for it. London envisiones to keep the thirteen colonies under British rule and benefit from its wealth by raising taxes. With this choice of the desired overall system effect, the next step is to find the centers of gravity whose alteration will create the desired system change as directly (strategically) as possible. We start with the center ring and work from the inside to the outside to find the right centers of gravity. This is how we, Warden-istas solve this problem:" PLEASE STATE YOUR COURSE OF ACTION HERE.

slapout9
03-20-2011, 03:36 AM
OK, so now a hard core attrition strategy is based on the Five Rings!?! This is the antithesis of Warden argument! If it can be all things to all people its just meaningless.

We are seemingly at a basic philosophical impasse about how the world works, and what the purpose of models of it are and when they are useful.


pvebber, kind of cheap shot don't you think? I plainly pointed out it was the History! of the rings from 1942.

slapout9
03-20-2011, 03:43 AM
On restrictions of islamist power systems; see Erik Claessen:



Marc, I am really confused now. I read the article when it was first published and I just reread it again. I don't see anything new in fact didn't the Holy Roman Church operate in a similar fashion? The church operated the public welfare system and they certainly did a lot of preaching but they also had a military arm to keep the kings in check if need be.

slapout9
03-20-2011, 04:02 AM
The bottom line Warden seems to miss, is it is virtually impossible to understand the ASCOPE and PMESII (whatever it is) operational environment without troops on the ground to report and attempt to understand those conditions. In addition, following the precision attacks, the underlying tensions remain and are aggravated by the need to rebuild...not a condition likely to endear colonists to the "homeland." He doesn't miss it and has never said that ground forces would not be needed or don't have a vital role to play. Using Special Forces like we did in A's tan, Dropping Paratroopers to secure a COG or the Marines using a Helicopter Assault are all forms of Airpower. And if on the ground forces are need for ISR feedback he would have no problem with it. Because he is pro Airpower people think he is anit-Navy or Army he isn't. He just dosen't believe in taking the risk if it can be done from the Air but when it can not be done he has no problem with another service doing it. He understands Airborne Warfare as it was originally conceived better than most people in the Army.


Plus cannot believe that any CoG analysis would ignore the intrinsic value of attacking key targets of the adversary's military! In a China scenario, for instance, air-to-air becomes largely irrelevant if you succeed in repeatedly attacking runways and airbases killing the enemy's aircraft and related logistics on the ground rather than in the air. Isn't that a 5 rings approach, largely ignored in the emotional desire to fight the white scarf war? Plus those attacks of airfields do not have to occur using fighters or manned aircraft. The enemy obviously can use the same methodology to destroy our few land-based airfields for fighters in a place like the Pacific where they are far and few between and well within range of TBM and ASBM.
He has never said any such thing in fact he has said the exact opposite. He has said you may not have any choice but to attack the military ring, but when you do it should be analyzed just like any other system.


But keep asking questions all in all you seem to understand him fairly well. A Few tweeks here and there maybe needed.

Marc
03-20-2011, 10:58 AM
Marc, I am really confused now. I read the article when it was first published and I just reread it again. I don't see anything new in fact didn't the Holy Roman Church operate in a similar fashion? The church operated the public welfare system and they certainly did a lot of preaching but they also had a military arm to keep the kings in check if need be.

It is not my point that a religion running a welfare system is something new. My point is that strategists have to take political restrictions into account (wether new or age-old). ALL power systems have political restrictions to worry about.

Autocrats derive their power from the barrel of a gun, so they face the political constraint of coup-proofing to avoid that barrel being pointed at themselves, at the price of military effectiveness.

Democrats derive their power from the consent of the governed, so they face the political constraint of fighting within the bounderies set by elections, opinion polls, lawyers, and pressure groups, at the price of military sustainability.

Islamists derive their power from the obidience of the faithful, so they face the political constraint of consistency to avoid alienating people from their faith, at the price of military applicability.

Your analogy with the Holy Roman Church is correct. Like the Islamic duty zakat, Christians have the duty to help the poor, resulting in a welfare system that advances the obidience of the faithful. Throughout history, this obedience has allowed the church to mobilize against "the further enemy" (the crusades against Muslims in the Holy Land for instance) BUT NOT (and that is the point) against the "nearer enemy". When the renaissance popes tried to mobilize the faithful in an effort to further their worldly power in the Italian political chaos, they lost all credibility in the eyes of the faithful and sparked a christian revolution headed by Martin Luther and the protestants. Similarly, Islamists can easily mobilize Muslims to fight against the west, but they have difficulty to mobilize the faithful against Muslim autocrats. Muslim autocrats exploit this Islamist political constraint.


Over decades, the relatively moderate governments of Egypt and Jordan developed a delicate social, political, legal, military, and law enforcement apparatus to keep Islamist militant organizations in check. Conceptually, it takes the form of an arsenal of mutually reinforcing population control measures, and its focus is on the da’wa infrastructure, not on the jihadi operatives. The apparatus’s most important capabilities are to co-opt (parts of) Islamist militant organizations, to subject their da’wa activities to registration and licensing, to control their fund raising, to provide permanent surveillance of their cadres, and to intervene decisively when this surveillance detects preparations for a jihadi campaign.

A similar thing happened in Europe. After the renaissance popes and the protestant revolution headed by Martin Luther, a bloody thirty year war erupted in Germany. This war resulted in the treaty of Westphalia which is still the foundation of the current nation-state world political system. One of the pillars of this system was the principle "cuius regio, eius religio" in which each prince would have the right to determine the religion of his own state, the options being Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism. The power of this system is that the prince and the clergy can mobilize the faithful to fight a "further enemy", but that no priest or bisshop can mobilize the faithful against the prince.

Cole
03-20-2011, 03:41 PM
The Media gets a vote. Warden doens't include this at all in his theory and assumes that you can conduct your application of effects in a vacuum of broader scrutiny and political context. The Colonists will play the "underdog card" and ensure that the British are portrayed in the media as evil, jackbooted nazis because they are DELIBERATELY ignoring your military forces and conducting political assassination and brutal destruction of your civil infrastructure. Buy the PLO playbook and add Christien Amanpour and Anderson Cooper to speed dial. Play up that "good guys" use their military to attack the other guys military ONLY and that means there can be on other characterization of the British other than EVIL.

An example of what you described occurred during the recent Northern Waziristan attack that killed 40 with unmanned aircraft missiles. The Pakistanis promptly halt talks with the U.S., saying it was a meeting to discuss chromite mining between elders and Taliban. Unspoken was that the Taliban were attempting to tax the mining operation to gain funds for Afghan combat operations.

So in theory, it may have been a legitimate target, however, the elders representing the mining operation were no doubt under pressure to give up funds to the "good Taliban"...or else. This is a classic example where aerial ISR alone, and SOF/CIA operations alone are insufficient to gain the total picture. Innocent or CLAIMED innocents are brought into many an aerial attack situation if insufficient aerial ISR is all that is available without a parallel context of ground forces fusing their information with that of the UAS operator.

To counter Slapout's point that SOF/CIA/JTACs are sufficient, Bin Laden was able to escape because we had so few troops on the ground that even when calls came to reinforce the Tora Bora area, those ground forces were not available. Even with ample ground forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was not until the surge that we were fully able to cover all affected areas and threats. Small teams are insufficient when the insurgent can simply move elsewhere.

Today we see the successful use of cruise missiles and three B-2 bombers to attack air defenses and airfields. So why do we need a huge USAF when we have these asymmetric capabilities...and no place to launch lots of fighters and tankers from near China outside TBM range?

In addition, we see Admiral Mullen saying that Qaddafi's overthrow is not the objective. So guess my question is how is this different than the last Northern Watch/Southern Watch that lasted a decade without ousting Hussein or suppressing ground operations?

pvebber
03-20-2011, 03:48 PM
Slap, you posted:


Well looks like I can't change your mind but maybe Walt can. Walt Disney Movie explaining the theory of Ring Warfare and how to win using Airpower.

Links to the Disney Classic from 1942 "Victory Through Airpower"

You bring it up in the context of trying to change my mind about the issues with ring theory, by seemingly extending it in hindsight to any application of airpower.


pvebber, kind of cheap shot don't you think? I plainly pointed out it was the History! of the rings from 1942.

I certainly did not intend a "cheap shot" I was simply venting my frustration that any criticism can be parried by seemingly extending the scope of the theory well beyond the scope of what it seems Warden intended (Removing the need for protracted "battle" and getting straight to strategic effects quickly and efficiently.

Warden himself in the article pointed out that the 8th Air Force effort was an incomplete attempt to include CoGs in the war effort and did not follow the 5 rings theory.

I hope we can agree that WWII airpower - regardless how effective we assess it in hindsight - was "a protracted battle" to achieve an effect over a long, long time, and not "highly compressed, highly parallel, inside the opponents reaction time". So bring it up as illuminating Warden's theory when Warden himself casts it off as a bad example? That is my frustration.

I have stated repeatedly that the notion of affecting CoGs to reduce the efficiency of the adversary war production is non-controversial. What is controversial is the notion that it can be not necessary - but SUFFICIENT to win a conflict. Airpower was not in WWII, nor any other conflict. Why should we think that increased precision alone now makes it so.


He doesn't miss it and has never said that ground forces would not be needed or don't have a vital role to play.

Are these not Wardens arguments?

Ground forces can conduct only serial operations, which are to be avoided.

Ground forces must overcome adversary ground forces through battle in order to achieve effects and "battle" is not just to be avoided, but removed from our vocabulary.

The implication from Warden's theory is that ground forces are implicitly defensive in nature - they prevent enemy ground forces from attacking your airbases. Their role in the offensive should be as limited as possible.

I am open to other interpretations of what "removing battle from our vocabulary" and:


To realize the future picture, we must change the opponent system, which we do by affecting one or more of its centers of gravity. The resulting impact on the system will be a function of how quickly the cen#ters are affected. If we do so too slowly (se#rially), the system will probably find ways to repair itself, protect itself against further attacks, and begin its own operations against its opponent’s systems. Conversely, if we affect enough centers of gravity quickly enough (in parallel), the system will go into a state of paralysis, preventing it from re#pairing itself, protecting itself against future attacks, or making competent attacks against its opponent’s systems.

What could the offensive contribution of ground forces be in such a construct other than a limited SOF role in intelligence gathering and DA in support of air operations?


Using Special Forces like we did in A's tan, Dropping Paratroopers to secure a COG or the Marines using a Helicopter Assault are all forms of Airpower.

How do paratroopers and marines take CoGs without battle? OR is it that we must redefine battle as we have redefined airpower (The joke in MC02 was that the Air Force wanted submarines to put torpedo shots on the ATO because they were launched with compressed air :p)

What if the bad guys have an actual Army that actually defends its CoGs requiring more force than you can transport by air? (like tanks).



Because he is pro Airpower people think he is anit-Navy or Army he isn't. He just dosen't believe in taking the risk if it can be done from the Air but when it can not be done he has no problem with another service doing it. He understands Airborne Warfare as it was originally conceived better than most people in the Army.

This ignores the reality that the Defense budget is a zero sum game. If the air Force is to get the kit required to make his vision a reality, we need a helluva lot more than a couple dozen B-2s and a host of new strike capabilities with a VAST increase in capacity.

Do you really think he would be OK with giving up the Future bomber to build a new class of SSGNs as the deployer of choice of strike capability in future areas where land power outranges land based airpower?

If he thinks that "Airborne" operations are a means in and of themselves to achieve significant ends, then he did not learn the lessons of Viet Nam in terms of the roles and limitations of Air mobile operations.

Gotta sign out for a while now (and there was much rejoicing...yeaaaaa!)

I look forward to seeing some more discussion of the scenarios brought up so far. So far it seems that they gravitate to either "no holds barred" major theater war where the goal is coercion using a theory akin to "nuclear warfare by conventional means" , or "decapitation strikes".

If Wardens warning not to use airpower when it can't win preculed what's in between, then it is arguing itself into irrelevance in the main of future warfare.

pvebber
03-20-2011, 05:07 PM
Warden's theory at its root is about improving the use of CoGs and a systems thinking framework to make military operations shorter, more efficient and more effective. It assumes that faster more parallel operations are "better". Reducing the unknown (both known and unknown) is assumed to be a key enabler of the attaining the understanding of the enemy system required to do this. Working back systematically from a singular desired endstate is the strategic method.

There are circumstances where this is the preferred approach. In these situations "airpower" is the supported arm.

Army COIN and Design-inspired theory (and much of USMC "Distributed operations" theory) is about accepting that there will never be enough information to "solve" the military problems associated with irregular and hybrid warfare - or even fully understand the nature of the problems you are trying to solve until you "grab the tarbaby". You are stuck engaging in a serial "probing' of the system you are trying to understand/affect along a number of lines of operation that are iterative, heuristic, and unpredictable in their outcome. Evolving solutions over time to favorable shape a wide potential set of endstates is the strategic method

There are circumstances where this is the preferred problem approach. In these circumstances "landpower" is the supported arm.

The Navy is off being "The "Global Force for Good" and is happy to be a resource provider in support of either one :rolleyes:

Would Warden support that construct and a "why can't we all just get along" approach and accept that the two approaches have their preferred problem sets, both are necessary but insufficient to address the complete range of possible military operations and need to be integrated rather than in competition? (which is oh by the way basically what the Joint Operating Concept series describe).

slapout9
03-21-2011, 01:45 PM
Democrats derive their power from the consent of the governed, so they face the political constraint of fighting within the bounderies set by elections, opinion polls, lawyers, and pressure groups, at the price of military sustainability.



Ok, so where do Republicans get their power? Bad joke;)

I am starting to understand the confusion now. I probably should have said this or asked this. What laws or constraints was UBL acting under when he attacked America? I don't see any, he simply wanted to achieve a desired effect by any means at his disposal. There were no rules or laws or constraints that I could see or understand.

slapout9
03-21-2011, 01:54 PM
To counter Slapout's point that SOF/CIA/JTACs are sufficient, Bin Laden was able to escape because we had so few troops on the ground that even when calls came to reinforce the Tora Bora area, those ground forces were not available.



Like I said Paratrooper are Airpower not just SOF. So why is it Warden's fault that the Army didn't have a battalion of Paratroopers or Rangers ready to go?


Think Bill Laden could have outrun these guys? We don't have any real Airpower Soldiers. But we could have this is late 50's early 60's Airpower technology.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOVh-vlUius

Marc
03-21-2011, 02:50 PM
What laws or constraints was UBL acting under when he attacked America? I don't see any, he simply wanted to achieve a desired effect by any means at his disposal. There were no rules or laws or constraints that I could see or understand.

slapout9,

On the contrary. ALL power systems have political restrictions to worry about. Islamists, like UBL, derive their power from the obedience of the faithful. Therefore, UBL's strategies, operations and tactics have to be (perceived to be) consistent with Islam. For instance, UBL has conducted terrorist attacks in Saoudi Arabia (the Khobar Towers bombing). This attack was possible because it was directed against foreigners. However, it would be impossible for UBL to conduct a terrorist attack in Mecca during the Hajj, even if this would result into a much higher number of victims.

Marc
I insist that there is no confusion. Warden already stressed the fact that "All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment." I hope we can agree that this statement is correct and valid for any strategist. All power systems have political restrictions to worry about and it is the strategist's job to come up with a strategy within the bounderies of these restrictions. It is NOT the politician's job to change the political and physical environment to suit the strategy.

Marc
03-21-2011, 02:51 PM
What laws or constraints was UBL acting under when he attacked America? I don't see any, he simply wanted to achieve a desired effect by any means at his disposal. There were no rules or laws or constraints that I could see or understand.

slapout9,

On the contrary. ALL power systems have political restrictions to worry about. Islamists, like UBL, derive their power from the obedience of the faithful. Therefore, UBL's strategies, operations and tactics have to be (perceived to be) consistent with Islam. For instance, UBL has conducted terrorist attacks in Saoudi Arabia (the Khobar Towers bombing). This attack was possible because it was directed against foreigners. However, it would be impossible for UBL to conduct a terrorist attack in Mecca during the Hajj, even if this would result into a much higher number of victims.

I insist that there is no confusion. Warden already stressed the fact that "All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment." I hope we can agree that this statement is correct and valid for any strategist. All power systems have political restrictions to worry about and it is the strategist's job to come up with a strategy within the bounderies of these restrictions. It is NOT the politician's job to change the political and physical environment to suit the strategy.

Marc

slapout9
03-21-2011, 03:37 PM
I insist that there is no confusion. Warden already stressed the fact that "All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment." I hope we can agree that this statement is correct and valid for any strategist. All power systems have political restrictions to worry about and it is the strategist's job to come up with a strategy within the bounderies of these restrictions. It is NOT the politician's job to change the political and physical environment to suit the strategy.

Marc

I agree that he said it and I am sure he meant it but Is that quote from the most recent article? I don't seem to be able to find it in there. Within the context of Muslims attacking Muslims yes UBL has restraints but within the context of Muslims attacking infidels what restraints does he have? So because of that I don't see how a Strategist could come up with a solution.

Marc
03-21-2011, 06:05 PM
I agree that he said it and I am sure he meant it but Is that quote from the most recent article? I don't seem to be able to find it in there.

http://books.google.be/books?id=uTHj5Svoxx4C&printsec=frontcover&dq=magyar+karl+p&hl=en&ei=e5CHTcH-EIvqOYHmzdYI&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCkQ6AEwAA

Warden's original article starts at page 351. You can find the quote on page 353.


Within the context of Muslims attacking Muslims yes UBL has restraints but within the context of Muslims attacking infidels what restraints does he have? So because of that I don't see how a Strategist could come up with a solution.

The answer to that one is simple: if UBL only has restraints within the context of Muslims, you have to find a way to alienate Muslims from UBL and make them do the fighting for you. That was the whole rationale behind the "Sons of Iraq" strategy against Al Zarqawi and Al Qaeda in Iraq.

slapout9
03-22-2011, 12:40 AM
http://books.google.be/books?id=uTHj5Svoxx4C&printsec=frontcover&dq=magyar+karl+p&hl=en&ei=e5CHTcH-EIvqOYHmzdYI&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCkQ6AEwAA

Warden's original article starts at page 351. You can find the quote on page 353.



The answer to that one is simple: if UBL only has restraints within the context of Muslims, you have to find a way to alienate Muslims from UBL and make them do the fighting for you. That was the whole rationale behind the "Sons of Iraq" strategy against Al Zarqawi and Al Qaeda in Iraq.



Got it thanks I will re-read it tonight. I have a copy of a letter to the editor of our newspaper that Warden wrote in 2003 about what a mistake it was to disband the Iraqi Army because they would be needed for security on the ground.

Cliff
03-22-2011, 02:21 AM
The bottom line Warden seems to miss, is it is virtually impossible to understand the ASCOPE and PMESII (whatever it is) operational environment without troops on the ground to report and attempt to understand those conditions. In addition, following the precision attacks, the underlying tensions remain and are aggravated by the need to rebuild...not a condition likely to endear colonists to the "homeland."

I disagree that you have to have a huge ground force. Ground observers help, but the information you are referring to shouldn't be beyond the capabilities of the CIA, DIA, State, etc.


Plus cannot believe that any CoG analysis would ignore the intrinsic value of attacking key targets of the adversary's military! In a China scenario, for instance, air-to-air becomes largely irrelevant if you succeed in repeatedly attacking runways and airbases killing the enemy's aircraft and related logistics on the ground rather than in the air. Isn't that a 5 rings approach, largely ignored in the emotional desire to fight the white scarf war? Plus those attacks of airfields do not have to occur using fighters or manned aircraft. The enemy obviously can use the same methodology to destroy our few land-based airfields for fighters in a place like the Pacific where they are far and few between and well within range of TBM and ASBM.

What you are talking about is definitely a part of Warden's 5 rings, and obviously the first step in just about any conflict - see the Libya thread for the most current example.

That said, it's tough to keep a runway out of commission permanently, and you can't be sure that the other guy doesn't have some aux fields you missed - hence why air to air is important even after you've killed the runways.

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff
03-22-2011, 02:46 AM
Today we see the successful use of cruise missiles and three B-2 bombers to attack air defenses and airfields. So why do we need a huge USAF when we have these asymmetric capabilities...and no place to launch lots of fighters and tankers from near China outside TBM range?

Let's clarify... we do not have a huge USAF. The USN (227) and Army (236) are both buying more aircraft in FY12 than the USAF is (114)... we have a small USAF that is getting smaller.

Additionally, the B-2s could not have done what they did without the support of a lot of other aircraft- including fighters. B-2s are not invisible - meaning they are vulnerable to fighters.

Finally, Libya's IADS was not modern, nor was it robust... additionally, a lot of folks are trying to buy the same capabilities the US has, meaning they won't be asymmetric for much longer.


In addition, we see Admiral Mullen saying that Qaddafi's overthrow is not the objective. So guess my question is how is this different than the last Northern Watch/Southern Watch that lasted a decade without ousting Hussein or suppressing ground operations?

Northern Watch and Southern Watch DID suppress ground operations... or do you have an example of Kurdistan or the Shiite south being attacked while they were actually in effect? Finally, the goal of ONW and OSW was never to replace Saddam.. it was to protect the Kurds and Shiites from Saddam... it did a pretty good job.

Folks may not have liked ONW and OSW based on the policy, but they accomplished their objectives.

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff
03-22-2011, 03:25 AM
slapout9,

On the contrary. ALL power systems have political restrictions to worry about. Islamists, like UBL, derive their power from the obedience of the faithful. Therefore, UBL's strategies, operations and tactics have to be (perceived to be) consistent with Islam. For instance, UBL has conducted terrorist attacks in Saoudi Arabia (the Khobar Towers bombing). This attack was possible because it was directed against foreigners. However, it would be impossible for UBL to conduct a terrorist attack in Mecca during the Hajj, even if this would result into a much higher number of victims.

You assume UBL actually cares what the people think. I would argue that the actions of AQI are a good example of AQ being perfectly willing to break some eggs making their caliphate omlette.


I insist that there is no confusion. Warden already stressed the fact that "All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment." I hope we can agree that this statement is correct and valid for any strategist. All power systems have political restrictions to worry about and it is the strategist's job to come up with a strategy within the bounderies of these restrictions. It is NOT the politician's job to change the political and physical environment to suit the strategy.

Marc

You assume that the strategist and the politician are different. Again, this is not the case in our system. Politicians are the strategists. Our system intentionally separates the military from the other levers of national power, unifying them only within civilians that control the executive branch. This means that strategy is ultimately decided by politicians and their close advisors. This does mean, however, that our strategists have to adhere to political restrictions - because they are usually running for re-election.

Not all systems are constrained - again, restraint assumes a rational actor, and as pvebber has pointed out, people are not always rational.

V/R,

Cliff

slapout9
03-22-2011, 03:37 AM
What if the bad guys have an actual Army that actually defends its CoGs requiring more force than you can transport by air? (like tanks).



No problem as usual Airpower is the answer.
http://www.fantastic-plastic.com/Convair49CatalogPage.htm

Cole
03-22-2011, 06:17 AM
I disagree that you have to have a huge ground force. Ground observers help, but the information you are referring to shouldn't be beyond the capabilities of the CIA, DIA, State, etc.They don't have a good track record, and in the case of State, once the balloon goes up, they are not much help in providing intelligence.

There are too few CIA/DIA with the requisite language skills and area expertise, and technical intelligence and high altitude or space ISR are not all-seeing or all-weather. In places like China, North Korea, Lebanon, Iran, and Venezuela our CIA/DIA presence is no doubt small, the targets, area, and system is large, and terrain and underground facilities are not always conducive to high altitude and space ISR.


What you are talking about is definitely a part of Warden's 5 rings, and obviously the first step in just about any conflict - see the Libya thread for the most current example.The only part of the 5 rings it appears are being attacked are military targets, as of now. General Ham says we are not targeting Qaddafi...the Brits and French have their own ideas but fewer cruise missiles and fighters than we do. We have many cruise missiles fired from as few as four former nuclear missile subs and others from destroyers. Wouldn't the same missiles function equally well against China or Russia, particularly if stealth is added and munitions such as JASSM-ER? New long range stealth bombers also are planned.

Why spend a fortune defending conventionally against threats we are highly unlikely to fight due to economic interdependence and MAD? We have more than ample air and seapower for any other threat...and still more than enough for China with planned systems not requiring radical shifts in funding priorities.


That said, it's tough to keep a runway out of commission permanently, and you can't be sure that the other guy doesn't have some aux fields you missed - hence why air to air is important even after you've killed the runways.Don't buy that in Iran, North Korea and definitely not Libya or Lebanon. China might be tougher considering how fast industrious personnel rebuilt bridges etc, in Vietnam.

But with stealth bombers escorted by F-22, stealth JASSM-ER and cruise missiles, and future unmanned attack aircraft you can't hide an airfield from repeated attacks and soon fewer aircraft are there to launch. AWACS would rapidly identify other launch locations, and it is harder to move large fuel supplies and ordnance/maintenance facilities.

The mobile TBM able to take out OUR Pacific airfields are a much tougher target. What would we be doing now in Libya if Italy and others were not providing land airfields or if Libya had China's, Iran's, or North Korea's TBMs?

Cole
03-22-2011, 06:47 AM
Let's clarify... we do not have a huge USAF. The USN (227) and Army (236) are both buying more aircraft in FY12 than the USAF is (114)... we have a small USAF that is getting smaller.Because adjusted for inflation, a F-4 bought today would cost $13 million, not $140 million and counting with planned upgrades coming for F-22. Plus, AH-64Ds save lives daily in two conflicts. Have yet to hear of an F-22 providing CAS in Afghanistan or Iraq...or Libya. Perhaps the fact that they fly at 60,000 feet and have no EO/IR targeting capability is part of the explanation, not to mention maintenance expense in a desert environment.

With such capable and expensive aircraft, few threat nations can buy more than a few dozen less capable, and less stealthy Russian and Chinese attempts at stealth. In terms of annual defense budget, with the exception of China and Russia deterred by MAD, go all the way to Iran at 23rd to find the first potential foe, with a sub $10 billion annual defense budget and sanctions in place prohibiting them from buying modern aircraft. Ditto for North Korea with a similarly small defense budget. Libya's air force WAS a joke and doubt much remains. Twenty of the top 22 defense budgets are allies or ourselves to help deter Russia and China.

How long would it take Iran or North Korea to buy 180+ Russian or Chinese "stealth" aircraft at nearly $100 million each? 18 years if they could finance 10 per year at a billion a year...highly unlikely during which time we and allies also field thousands of stealthy F-35s, bombers, and unmanned aircraft.



Additionally, the B-2s could not have done what they did without the support of a lot of other aircraft- including fighters. B-2s are not invisible - meaning they are vulnerable to fighters.Flying at night with F-22 and F-35 escorts, what are the odds of Chinese or Russian "stealth" aircraft even finding our aircraft let alone fighting air-to-air? Stealth cruise missiles and JASSM-ER fired from B-52H and B-1B don't need an escort.


Finally, Libya's IADS was not modern, nor was it robust... additionally, a lot of folks are trying to buy the same capabilities the US has, meaning they won't be asymmetric for much longer.And again, you can argue all you want about not having a crystal ball but defense budgets don't lie. All realistic threats spend well under $10 billion a year which will never fund either a large air force, naval response, or IADS. We have ample air and seapower planned and programmed. You could easily argue that one or two less CVNs (6 of which typically sit vulnerable in just two U.S. ports) would finance the additional air and seapower without cannibalizing the Army.



Northern Watch and Southern Watch DID suppress ground operations... or do you have an example of Kurdistan or the Shiite south being attacked while they were actually in effect? Finally, the goal of ONW and OSW was never to replace Saddam.. it was to protect the Kurds and Shiites from Saddam... it did a pretty good job.

Folks may not have liked ONW and OSW based on the policy, but they accomplished their objectives.I heard an analyst/General admit that Northern Watch was more effective than Southern Watch. Shiites were targeted with WMD and remained oppressed. The Oil for Food program robbed the world of an oil source, just as the Libya no fly zone may eventually. It may have satisfied a stated objective. It did not solve the primary problem.

Marc
03-22-2011, 09:02 AM
You assume UBL actually cares what the people think . . . Not all systems are constrained - again, restraint assumes a rational actor, and as pvebber has pointed out, people are not always rational.

Cliff,

I do not assume anything. I say that ALL power systems have political restraints to worry about. I think that I can state as a fact (not an assumption) that Islamists, like UBL, derive their power from the obedience of the faithful and that therefore they have to worry about the political restraint not to act in an unislamic manner (like indiscriminately attacking Muslims). Whether UBL is rational enough to take this restraint into acount or not is a totally different matter. Restraint does NOT assume a rational actor. A rational strategist will take restraints and constraints into account and have a good chance to be successful. A strategist that is not rational will probably not take restraints into account and will probably be unsuccessful. In Iraq, Al Zarqawi did not take restraints into account, attacked Muslims indiscriminately, and suffered the consequences. Iraqi Sunnis turned against him and the Jordanian intelligence services did whatever they could to help the Americans find him.


You assume that the strategist and the politician are different. Again, this is not the case in our system. Politicians are the strategists. Our system intentionally separates the military from the other levers of national power, unifying them only within civilians that control the executive branch. This means that strategy is ultimately decided by politicians and their close advisors. This does mean, however, that our strategists have to adhere to political restrictions - because they are usually running for re-election.

Politicians decide about stategy, but they are not strategists. I think it would be an insult to General Petraeus' doctrinal and strategic efforts to say that the American strategy in Iraq after 2007 was developed by politicians. Because strategists develop strategy and politicians decide about strategy, it is necessary to organize an open and fruitful discourse between politicians and strategists. Examples of good discourses are Powell-Bush Sr and Petraeus-Bush Jr. There is plenty of literature about bad discourses. I've got two excellent examples if you're interested.

slapout9
03-22-2011, 03:24 PM
Marc,
I re-read the paper last night and yes I agree with you. But he is talking about our (US) system not the enemies. In fact all his writings have consistently said that you must focus on the physical side (physical restraints) because that is the only thing you can actually have some predictable effect on. Mental concepts such as laws,rules,ethics are subject to change and usually will (the holy man will receive a vision from God to change things) once the physical threat of destruction is brought into play. But just to be safe I am going to ask him. May not be this week and it will depend on his schedule but I am pretty sure what he is going to say, he even teaches it this way in his SMART Wars/SMART Strategies class.

slapout9
03-28-2011, 07:38 AM
You bring it up in the context of trying to change my mind about the issues with ring theory, by seemingly extending it in hindsight to any application of airpower.
I certainly did not intend a "cheap shot" I was simply venting my frustration that any criticism can be parried by seemingly extending the scope of the theory well beyond the scope of what it seems Warden intended (Removing the need for protracted "battle" and getting straight to strategic effects quickly and efficiently. It was supposed to be an Illustration of the evolution of Airpower. It has progressed a great deal since the original Rings/Wheel concept of mass area bombardment has it not ? And if we(US) keep at at it Airpower can and needs to advance further, the article is essentially about what Airpower needs to become.


Warden himself in the article pointed out that the 8th Air Force effort was an incomplete attempt to include CoGs in the war effort and did not follow the 5 rings theory.
I hope we can agree that WWII airpower - regardless how effective we assess it in hindsight - was "a protracted battle" to achieve an effect over a long, long time, and not "highly compressed, highly parallel, inside the opponents reaction time". So bring it up as illuminating Warden's theory when Warden himself casts it off as a bad example? That is my frustration. I hope I answered this in he above response.


I have stated repeatedly that the notion of affecting CoGs to reduce the efficiency of the adversary war production is non-controversial. What is controversial is the notion that it can be not necessary - but SUFFICIENT to win a conflict. Airpower was not in WWII, nor any other conflict. Why should we think that increased precision alone now makes it so. I agree it is controversial, but so was going to the Moon, but we did it.




Are these not Wardens arguments?
Ground forces can conduct only serial operations, which are to be avoided.
Ground forces must overcome adversary ground forces through battle in order to achieve effects and "battle" is not just to be avoided, but removed from our vocabulary.
The implication from Warden's theory is that ground forces are implicitly defensive in nature - they prevent enemy ground forces from attacking your airbases. Their role in the offensive should be as limited as possible. You are reading to much into the implication, Airpower is the delivery of people,things and information through the Air. In the sense of sending Air Soldiers to seize in tact some vital installation or person like a presidential palace or the president/king himself, so called ground forces will be vital.


I am open to other interpretations of what "removing battle from our vocabulary" and:

What could the offensive contribution of ground forces be in such a construct other than a limited SOF role in intelligence gathering and DA in support of air operations? I hope I answered this in the above statement.




How do paratroopers and marines take CoGs without battle? OR is it that we must redefine battle as we have redefined airpower (The joke in MC02 was that the Air Force wanted submarines to put torpedo shots on the ATO because they were launched with compressed air :p) LCAC's are technically Airpower.


What if the bad guys have an actual Army that actually defends its CoGs requiring more force than you can transport by air? (like tanks). Answered this on a separate post. But Helicopter Gunships are Airpower part of the point he is trying to make. I don't think tanks are a problem for them.





This ignores the reality that the Defense budget is a zero sum game. If the air Force is to get the kit required to make his vision a reality, we need a helluva lot more than a couple dozen B-2s and a host of new strike capabilities with a VAST increase in capacity.

Do you really think he would be OK with giving up the Future bomber to build a new class of SSGNs as the deployer of choice of strike capability in future areas where land power outranges land based airpower? So why is it Warden's fault or invalidates any of his theories because the DOD budget process is messed up?


If he thinks that "Airborne" operations are a means in and of themselves to achieve significant ends, then he did not learn the lessons of Viet Nam in terms of the roles and limitations of Air mobile operations. He learned them very well alot of people don't know this but for awhile he was a FAC(Forward Air Controller) assigned to the First Air Cav in Vietnam. His experiences in Vietnam had alot to do with him with coming up with better ways to think about Strategy.


Gotta sign out for a while now (and there was much rejoicing...yeaaaaa!) We are waiting your return:wry:.


I look forward to seeing some more discussion of the scenarios brought up so far. So far it seems that they gravitate to either "no holds barred" major theater war where the goal is coercion using a theory akin to "nuclear warfare by conventional means" , or "decapitation strikes".
If Wardens warning not to use airpower when it can't win preculed what's in between, then it is arguing itself into irrelevance in the main of future warfare.
He doesn't really like the Coercion theory, he thinks it is to unpredictable, I think I posted an article about that some time back.

pvebber
03-28-2011, 09:58 PM
I will recast my parting olive branch post as I think it gets to the main issues that we seem to keep talking past each other on...

Warden's theory at its root is about improving the use of CoGs and a systems thinking framework to make military operations shorter, more efficient and more effective. It assumes that faster more parallel operations are better than a protracted series of battles.

Working back systematically from a singular desired endstate is the strategic method. It is assumed that the information necessary to accomplish this is available through observation of the system.


There are circumstances where this is the preferred approach. In these situations "airpower" is the supported arm.


An alternative theory suggests that some classes of military problems are not fully understood by observation from a distance. To fully understand the nature of some problems you must "grab the tarbaby" and engage in a serial "probing" of the system you are trying to understand/affect along a number of lines of operation that are iterative, heuristic, and unpredictable in their outcome.

There will never be sufficient information about a system to mechanically "work backwards" from a single desired end-state. Evolving solutions over time to favorably shape a wide potential set of endstates is the strategic method.


There are circumstances where this is the preferred problem approach. In these circumstances "landpower" is the supported arm.


Would Warden support that construct and a "why can't we all just get along" approach and accept that the two approaches have their preferred problem sets, both are necessary but insufficient to address the complete range of possible military operations and need to be integrated rather than in competition?

pvebber
03-29-2011, 02:28 PM
The Libya Dilemma: The limits of Airpower (http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-libya-dilemma-the-limits-of-air-power/2011/03/25/AFfTVUYB_story.html)

Is this a case where Warden would say we should not have gotten involved becasue airpower can't be used in a decisive fashion?

Or is this a case of not using airpower "as it should"? Is so how should it have been used?

What is the "desired endstate" to be worked back from in the case of a coalition with distinctly different national interests? Whose end-sate do we work back from?


In this scenario, the West will ultimately confront the same dilemmas that arose before Sept. 11. How long can Western leaders continue an apparently indecisive air campaign in the face of pleas for escalation from allies on the ground? In Kosovo, NATO was on the verge of a divisive debate over escalating to a ground invasion when Slobodan Milosevic delivered the alliance from its crisis by folding unexpectedly. Will Gaddafi stand fast longer? If so, what then? Nothing in the ostensibly new Obama doctrine offers an escape from this underlying issue. Multilateral burden-sharing might make a stalemate look cheaper, but it cannot transform a stalemate into painless victory.

How does Warden's "new model Airpower" solve the dilemma?

slapout9
03-29-2011, 02:40 PM
What is the "desired endstate" to be worked back from in the case of a coalition with distinctly different national interests? Whose end-sate do we work back from?


Exactly, as the article points we should elevate the End to level we keep elevating the Means. Without a clearly defined Political Objective there is no way to properly organize your response, there is no way to properly choose which means(Air,Ground,Sea) to use.

slapout9
03-29-2011, 03:18 PM
How to get Daffy and his thugs.
Also shows how Slobodan Milosevic did not just mysteriously collapse, it was done with Airpower.


http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA462291&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

pvebber
03-29-2011, 05:44 PM
Exactly, as the article points we should elevate the End to level we keep elevating the Means. Without a clearly defined Political Objective there is no way to properly organize your response, there is no way to properly choose which means(Air,Ground,Sea) to use.

That doesn't answer the question.

When you have multiple competing end states among coalition partners, who gets to pick the "right" one?

In this case it seemd the "means" to impose a no-fly zone is a no brainer. But what is the braoder "end"?

Is it simply protecting cvilians without choosing sides?

Is it regime change?

Is it avoidence of an iraq-like on-going pro Gaddafi insurgency after his government falls?

Is it a "reboot" of the political state so oil and gas contracts can be re-negotiated?

Is it ensuring a democratic government replaces Gaddafi (meaning the current rebels may not be who what to ultimately win?)

Its easy to say the "strategy should be what you start with, but how do you actually do that in a complex real-world situation like this?

slapout9
03-29-2011, 05:57 PM
That doesn't answer the question.

When you have multiple competing end states among coalition partners, who gets to pick the "right" one?

In this case it seemd the "means" to impose a no-fly zone is a no brainer. But what is the braoder "end"?

Is it simply protecting cvilians without choosing sides?

Is it regime change?

Is it avoidence of an iraq-like on-going pro Gaddafi insurgency after his government falls?

Is it a "reboot" of the political state so oil and gas contracts can be re-negotiated?

Is it ensuring a democratic government replaces Gaddafi (meaning the current rebels may not be who what to ultimately win?)

Its easy to say the "strategy should be what you start with, but how do you actually do that in a complex real-world situation like this?


I agree it doesn't answer the question which is why the Libya situation is probably not going to end well. We just jumped in with Airpower and think this will make it OK, probably want. Which again is Warden's point Strategy has to come first before you decide on the means, whatever it may be. We have never defined what we (US) really want except for Daffy to be gone, whatever that means. Until that is clearly defined it dosen't matter how good your Airpower,Groundpower,or Seapower is, it is a mission with no end. Which from the most recent reports I have seen is exactly what it is turning into.

pvebber
03-29-2011, 06:13 PM
Let me try one more time...

Rewind to before we decided that using airpower as a means to establish a no-fly zone was the proper course of action regardles of where it lead...

What SHOULD have been done to try to reconcile the competing desired end-states the various participants had (have)? Is it the US gets to pick becasue we have the most toys? Should Italy becasue Libya used to be Italy's? France because its "neutral"?

What if there is no singular desired end-state but a range of possible outcomes that can all have a pro-adversary tint to them or a pro- good guys tint to them?

Do you acknowledge a dichotmy in strategic method MIGHT exist?




Also shows how Slobodan Milosevic did not just mysteriously collapse, it was done with Airpower.

Again the issue is not airpowers importance or effectiveness. I read Col Owens book on Deliberate Force. The take away was that it took WAY longer and was WAYYY more expensive than the Air Force predicted, but Airpower (with a little bit of pressure from a marginally effective KLA ground force...) did come through in the end.

You kep inserting things in the discussion that we are not disagreeing on in response to what we do disagree on. :confused:

slapout9
03-29-2011, 06:41 PM
Let me try one more time...

Rewind to before we decided that using airpower as a means to establish a no-fly zone was the proper course of action regardles of where it lead...

What SHOULD have been done to try to reconcile the competing desired end-states the various participants had (have)? Is it the US gets to pick becasue we have the most toys? Should Italy becasue Libya used to be Italy's? France because its "neutral"? I don't know what should have been done, but I do know it needed to be done before the military option was decided on. The Political Objective (what kind of peace do you want) has to be decided by politicians not the miltary. And you need to do it before hand. My personal opinion is this is all about Oil and the US should get out of the entire region! and concentrate everything we can to achieve total Independence on foreign oil.


What if there is no singular desired end-state but a range of possible outcomes that can all have a pro-adversary tint to them or a pro- good guys tint to them? Again that is the political arrangement that has to be decide by the politicians before the military option is chosen.


Do you acknowledge a dichotomy in strategic method MIGHT exist? No, I acknowledge a dichotomy in "Grand Strategic" method exist.



You keep inserting things in the discussion that we are not disagreeing on in response to what we do disagree on. :confused:
Sorry, will try not to do that anymore.

Marc
03-29-2011, 06:58 PM
Let me try one more time...

Rewind to before we decided that using airpower as a means to establish a no-fly zone was the proper course of action regardles of where it lead...

What SHOULD have been done to try to reconcile the competing desired end-states the various participants had (have)? Is it the US gets to pick becasue we have the most toys? Should Italy becasue Libya used to be Italy's? France because its "neutral"?

What if there is no singular desired end-state but a range of possible outcomes that can all have a pro-adversary tint to them or a pro- good guys tint to them?

Do you acknowledge a dichotmy in strategic method MIGHT exist?

Again the issue is not airpowers importance or effectiveness. I read Col Owens book on Deliberate Force. The take away was that it took WAY longer and was WAYYY more expensive than the Air Force predicted, but Airpower (with a little bit of pressure from a marginally effective KLA ground force...) did come through in the end.

You kep inserting things in the discussion that we are not disagreeing on in response to what we do disagree on. :confused:

pvebber,

It is always difficult to argue with a true believer. However, the quote below explains why.


I agree it doesn't answer the question which is why the Libya situation is probably not going to end well. We just jumped in with Airpower and think this will make it OK, probably want. Which again is Warden's point Strategy has to come first before you decide on the means, whatever it may be. We have never defined what we (US) really want except for Daffy to be gone, whatever that means. Until that is clearly defined it dosen't matter how good your Airpower,Groundpower,or Seapower is, it is a mission with no end. Which from the most recent reports I have seen is exactly what it is turning into.

The quote means that Warden and his strategy are right and that the politicians are wrong. This statement is smart. Two things can happen: ONE: airpower can force Qadhafi to his knees. In that case, Warden is right because his strategy worked. TWO: airpower can fail to force Qadhafi to his knees. In that case, Warden is right but the politicians failed to apply his strategy in the right way.

The trick to counter a true believer's circular argument is to find inconsistencies in Warden's text itself. That inconsistency is stated in Warden's original article:


All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment. In World War II the United States and her Allies imposed widespread destruction and civilian casualties on Japan and Germany; prior to the Gulf War, a new political climate meant that a proposal to impose similar damage on Iraq would have met overwhelming opposition from American and coalition political leaders.

In other words, a strategist cannot blame a politician for a failure in strategy to deliver the expected results. It is the strategist's job to come up with a strategy within the limitations of politics. It is not the politician's job to make realities fit the strategy.

Marc

pvebber
03-29-2011, 07:06 PM
I don't know what should have been done, but I do know it needed to be done before the military option was decided on. The Political Objective (what kind of peace do you want) has to be decided by politicians not the miltary. And you need to do it before hand. My personal opinion is this is all about Oil and the US should get out of the entire region! and concentrate everything we can to achieve total Independence on foreign oil.

What I'm looking for is the connection between Warden's desire for airmen to decide strategy as part of a direct connection from sortie to strategic end-state, and the reality that currently politicians do that and in generall can't come to consensus on it before the politically motivated desire to act overcomes the desire to think the whole problme through beofre acting (which may preclude action, because consensus at that level may never occur.)

Even if we achieve total oil independence, would not a bloodbath by Gaddafi while we sit on the sidelines and watch totally undermine our "strategy" of fostering democracy in the emerging world? I don't we care nearly as much about the oil in Libya as Fina Total (France) and Eni (Italy).



No, I acknowledge a dichotomy in "Grand Strategic" method exist.

What is your notion of the difference between "desired endstate" in Warden's mind and "grand strategic political objective"?

What about the construct I've outlined differentiating between situations where you work back from a sigular desired endstate and those when you evolve forward toward maximizing the benefit under a range of potential endstates? Is that "grand strategy" not "strategy"? Why would it only apply to "Grand Strategy" and not just "strategy".

Given one is the basic mindset of airpower advocates and the other the basic mindset of landforce advocates, it represents a dichotomy in "military strategy" not "Grand Strategy".

Warden's argument that I most strongly disagree with is to claim that only the former is "proper military strategy" and that if you must resort to the other, then you should reject military options.

Would you agree with that?

slapout9
03-29-2011, 07:20 PM
pvebber,have to go now, but will respond later.

pvebber
03-29-2011, 07:22 PM
The trick to counter a true believer's circular argument is to find inconsistencies in Warden's text itself. That inconsistency is stated in Warden's original article:

I know I'm not going to convert Slap :)

I'm trying to understand the mindset he has (know thine enemy :D) and why he is a "true beleiver" in the controversial ideas?

The controvertial issues raised by Warden's article being:

Why must we


expunge the words fighting, battle, shape the battlefield, battlespace, and the war fighter from our vocabulary,

in order to:


relegate the “means” of war to the last thing we think about, and to elevate the “end” to the pedestal of our consideration.


Regardless of airpower’s potential, it can never realize its real capability so long as it remains bound to an anachronistic view of war with an anachronistic vocabulary.

What is airppower's "true capability"? What is this "new vocabulary"?


If this is to happen, the operators of airpower must understand, believe, and teach end-game strategy as the foundation of airpower.

How is this relevant if politicians determine the end-game strategy, or a concensus as to what it is cannot be achieved before a requirement to act occurs?


To succeed, airpower advocates must stop trying to use airpower as a substitute for its military predecessors, connect it directly to strategic end-games, adopt a new vocabulary to match airpower’s promise, and become serious promoters not of machines but of ideas.

What are these ideas?


Airpower enables us to think about conflict from a future-back,
end-game-first perspective as opposed to one based on the battle obsession
of Clausewitz and his followers. It also opens another very exciting possibility: conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood.

What is it about airpower that will remove the "unknown unknowns" that create "unplanned destruction or shedding of blood". How do we become so cocksure that our plan is going to work?


How can you create a desired end-state and a causally-linked set of events that attain it with a high probability in cases where you are dealing with a complex system (where by definition there is no discernable causal nexus between events.)?

What is it that makes the notion of working back from a single desired end-state and evolving toward maximizing the "goodness" over a range of potential endstates incompatible? Why does one have to "win" over the other? Why can't we use the one that aplys best to a given situation and get the best of both worlds?

Cliff
03-30-2011, 02:18 AM
Because adjusted for inflation, a F-4 bought today would cost $13 million, not $140 million and counting with planned upgrades coming for F-22. Plus, AH-64Ds save lives daily in two conflicts. Have yet to hear of an F-22 providing CAS in Afghanistan or Iraq...or Libya. Perhaps the fact that they fly at 60,000 feet and have no EO/IR targeting capability is part of the explanation, not to mention maintenance expense in a desert environment.

So we should only organize/train/equip for the current fight?


With such capable and expensive aircraft, few threat nations can buy more than a few dozen less capable, and less stealthy Russian and Chinese attempts at stealth. In terms of annual defense budget, with the exception of China and Russia deterred by MAD, go all the way to Iran at 23rd to find the first potential foe, with a sub $10 billion annual defense budget and sanctions in place prohibiting them from buying modern aircraft. Ditto for North Korea with a similarly small defense budget. Libya's air force WAS a joke and doubt much remains. Twenty of the top 22 defense budgets are allies or ourselves to help deter Russia and China.

Not arguing with the budget comparison. Nevertheless, China's budget goes a lot farther... because their weapons are being made by Chinese, who get payed a lot less than the average American defense worker.

Your argument that MAD is sufficient for deterring China and Russia is a slippery slope... As we found out with the New Look, this severely constrains your options, and probably isn't a good idea. If China decides to start cutting off Japanese oil over a dispute, are we willing to threaten them with nukes? If the answer is no, then MAD is probably sufficient to insure US national survival, but not protect our national interests.


How long would it take Iran or North Korea to buy 180+ Russian or Chinese "stealth" aircraft at nearly $100 million each? 18 years if they could finance 10 per year at a billion a year...highly unlikely during which time we and allies also field thousands of stealthy F-35s, bombers, and unmanned aircraft.

A long time. Like I said above, they won't have to pay $100 million... because the folks making Chinese or Russian airplanes don't get payed as much as US workers. Again, China and Russia are more the issues, with Iran and NK being more manageable.


Flying at night with F-22 and F-35 escorts, what are the odds of Chinese or Russian "stealth" aircraft even finding our aircraft let alone fighting air-to-air? Stealth cruise missiles and JASSM-ER fired from B-52H and B-1B don't need an escort.

The odds are not 0. B-2s need to be protected if fighters are present. I'll leave it at that.


And again, you can argue all you want about not having a crystal ball but defense budgets don't lie. All realistic threats spend well under $10 billion a year which will never fund either a large air force, naval response, or IADS. We have ample air and seapower planned and programmed. You could easily argue that one or two less CVNs (6 of which typically sit vulnerable in just two U.S. ports) would finance the additional air and seapower without cannibalizing the Army.

According to the unclass 2010 report to Congress on China, the Chinese Air Force has over 327 fourth generation fighters... all of which are very capable. They have 252 advanced SAM systems... neither of these numbers include naval systems. I would submit that we currently have the minimum force required- in fact, it was classified as "moderate risk" in congressional testimony.

That said, you seem to miss my point. I'm not arguing for gutting the Army to buy more F-22s. I would have liked to have seen us buy the 40 more that were in the budget originally to give us a viable/sustainable force - but we didn't, and we're not going to get more. We need new tankers, new CSAR helos and the new bomber more, frankly. The big problem will be our F-16s and F-15s wearing out before we can actually buy F-35s (if and when we get to buy some).

As Secretary Gates said, another large land conflict is unlikely for multiple reasons. Based on the extreme distaste for "boots on the ground", I think the Libya model is much more likely to be the model. I would expect that SOF and adviser forces will be heavily used as well.

Given all of that, we do not have too large an Air Force - we have one that is just large enough to give us a moderate-high level of risk based on our stated national strategy. It is going to get smaller due to attrition and airframes aging out- and that is not a good thing.

As I have said before on this blog, the job of the USAF and USN is to make sure our wars stay small by being so good that they can't be beat. If we can't deter folks conventionally, we're left with nukes, as you mentioned...


I heard an analyst/General admit that Northern Watch was more effective than Southern Watch. Shiites were targeted with WMD and remained oppressed. The Oil for Food program robbed the world of an oil source, just as the Libya no fly zone may eventually. It may have satisfied a stated objective. It did not solve the primary problem.

Saddam used chems on Halabja in Kurdistan in 1988, as well as on the Iranians. There is evidence of his using Mi-8s to drop Sarin on Karbala in March of 1991. Again, all of this was PRIOR to the no-fly zones being enforced- they were established AFTER Saddam attacked the Kurds in the North and the Shiites in the South.

You are now changing the argument... ONW and OSW fulfilled their objectives at a relatively low cost relative to what troops on the ground would have cost. If the objective was regime change, that's a different story.

As I said above, I think we have more NFZs/No drive zones in our future - it is a (relatively) cheap way of stopping dictators from using their high-end military to slaughter their people, and doesn't have the stigma of boots on the ground. Sudan is a good example of a place where we might use this same strategy.

If you disagree with the political objectives, as others have pointed out that's a different story.

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff
03-30-2011, 02:41 AM
I've been a bit busy and am behind the power curve as usual.

Before I start, I want to say that I would not classify myself as a "Wardenista" in the sense that I don't think that the 5 rings model is all powerful and usable in any situation. As Col Warden pointed out, sometimes airpower won't be able to be used in some situations.

That said, I think his points about starting at endstate and making that the focus of your efforts are very valid. I also think that trying to do this in the most efficient way possible as quickly as possible is also a good idea. I happen to think that airpower can get the job done in many cases... and I agree with Col Warden that we should be trying to make airpower more effective rather than adapting it and limiting it to what traditional thought would have it be.


I know I'm not going to convert Slap :)

I'm trying to understand the mindset he has (know thine enemy :D) and why he is a "true believer" in the controversial ideas?

The controvertial issues raised by Warden's article being:

What is airppower's "true capability"? What is this "new vocabulary"?

I think Warden would say: The capability to act at the strategic level by bypassing fielded forces and directly affecting multiple centers of gravity in parallel. The new vocabulary is essentially focusing on ends and not battles.


How is this relevant if politicians determine the end-game strategy, or a consensus as to what it is cannot be achieved before a requirement to act occurs?

I assume that you mean politicians can't determine the end game.

I don't think we don't have an end game in mind in Libya. We surely do. Just because we can't talk about it publicly doesn't mean it's not there. I agree on the difficulty of defining the end state, but again I think that's for public consumption... I think the folks involved all have the same end state in mind, they just can't say it.

That said, if there is no end state, then I would argue we wouldn't get involved, as there's nothing to change.

If instead you mean that the long term endstate is undefined -IE we're not sure what we want Libya to look like, but we want to stop the slaughter- then I would argue that stopping the slaughter is still an end state. Refer back to ONW/OSW for a good example of ways to do this. OBTW, those campaigns did use elements of Warden's theory to achieve their limited ends - and they worked out pretty well - 0 US losses over 12 years, and the civilians protected.


What are these ideas?

The ideas Col Warden talks about in his paper. IE, end-state centric, parallel, affect COGs.


What is it about airpower that will remove the "unknown unknowns" that create "unplanned destruction or shedding of blood". How do we become so cocksure that our plan is going to work?

We continue to improve airpower theory, capabilities, and targeting and try to minimize collateral damage.


How can you create a desired end-state and a causally-linked set of events that attain it with a high probability in cases where you are dealing with a complex system (where by definition there is no discernible causal nexus between events.)?

pvebber, I think that it's very rare in human events for there to be no discernible casual nexus, especially in conflict. I agree that systems are complex, and casuality is not certain, but again I think that you are always calculating the most likely response when you talk about military force. Otherwise we would simply throw up our hands and give up on the whole business. The weather is not predictable with high accuracy beyond 24-48 hours.... but we still spend billions to get to a good-enough forecast. We also haven't stopped trying to improve our understanding or models. Why should something arguably just as important (using force to get our way) receive the same attention?


What is it that makes the notion of working back from a single desired end-state and evolving toward maximizing the "goodness" over a range of potential endstates incompatible? Why does one have to "win" over the other? Why can't we use the one that aplys best to a given situation and get the best of both worlds?

Warden is not saying that we can't... in fact, he says that we may be forced to. He is arguing that we should continually strive to to improve our means of reaching our desired endstate with minimum bloodshed.

I think this horse is about dead... you love complex systems theory and feel that nothing is predictable in human behavior. Essentially that means that you're relegated to a completely trial and error process. I am saying that we should continue to try and improve our ability to define an end state and reach it.

Slap pointed out 1942 as an example. Think about how far we've come since then... our ability to affect the enemy as a system is vastly improved- one B-2 can have the same effect as several hundred B-17s. Our intel has also improved massively. Is it perfect? Nope. But does that mean we should freeze things as they are and accept the status quo? I would hope not.

V/R,

Cliff

pvebber
03-30-2011, 01:57 PM
I think this horse is about dead... you love complex systems theory and feel that nothing is predictable in human behavior. Essentially that means that you're relegated to a completely trial and error process. I am saying that we should continue to try and improve our ability to define an end state and reach it.

NO!!!!

I'm arguing, as I've reiterated twice - that there are times when Warden's theory is applicable and times when it is not. Once again, I agree that airpower and airpower theory is necessary. We SHOULD improve airpower and airpower theory. Just not at the expense of giving up any and all alternatives.

I can't understand why one strategic method "has to" be the ONLY one we would want to use, or why airpower needs this manifest destiny to be the dominant means to use force in any and all situations.

Why can't we acknowledge that the more tools we have in our kitbag the better? Airpower will always have its limits, as will the "ends drives the means" strategic method. Land and seapower have their limits as does the "trail and error" approach to "wicked problems" and the maritime strategy focus on engagement to prevent problems before they become conflict.

All have their place, and their value. None are superior to the other in all cases and each needs to be the "supported" methodology when appropriate.

To do otherwise is to remove options and limits our ability to defend our nation and her interests abroad.

Fuchs
03-30-2011, 02:36 PM
What's lacking - at least in published form - is a theory that guides a decisionmaker in his strategy development in ANY scenario (including scenarios for inferior air powers).

Such a theory would need to take into account
- geography (distances mostly)
- blue and red strength (and ranges)
- blue and red material, political and cultural setup
- blue and red political intent and political leadership (and its preferences)

It should reliably tell when (any why) a certain approach will fail.

The much-hyped air power theories such as Warden's can at most become building blocks in such a general theory. I suspect he has no clue about several really important forks that such a general theory would have. His stuff represents only one perspective on the problem, and way too many people have fixated their view on the very same perspective.

Steve Blair
03-30-2011, 02:47 PM
NO!!!!

I'm arguing, as I've reiterated twice - that there are times when Warden's theory is applicable and times when it is not. Once again, I agree that airpower and airpower theory is necessary. We SHOULD improve airpower and airpower theory. Just not at the expense of giving up any and all alternatives.

I can't understand why one strategic method "has to" be the ONLY one we would want to use, or why airpower needs this manifest destiny to be the dominant means to use force in any and all situations.

Why can't we acknowledge that the more tools we have in our kitbag the better? Airpower will always have its limits, as will the "ends drives the means" strategic method. Land and seapower have their limits as does the "trail and error" approach to "wicked problems" and the maritime strategy focus on engagement to prevent problems before they become conflict.

All have their place, and their value. None are superior to the other in all cases and each needs to be the "supported" methodology when appropriate.

To do otherwise is to remove options and limits our ability to defend our nation and her interests abroad.

Very much agree!

slapout9
03-30-2011, 06:19 PM
NO!!!!

I'm arguing, as I've reiterated twice - that there are times when Warden's theory is applicable and times when it is not. Once again, I agree that airpower and airpower theory is necessary. We SHOULD improve airpower and airpower theory. Just not at the expense of giving up any and all alternatives.

I can't understand why one strategic method "has to" be the ONLY one we would want to use, or why airpower needs this manifest destiny to be the dominant means to use force in any and all situations.

Why can't we acknowledge that the more tools we have in our kitbag the better? Airpower will always have its limits, as will the "ends drives the means" strategic method. Land and seapower have their limits as does the "trail and error" approach to "wicked problems" and the maritime strategy focus on engagement to prevent problems before they become conflict.

All have their place, and their value. None are superior to the other in all cases and each needs to be the "supported" methodology when appropriate.

To do otherwise is to remove options and limits our ability to defend our nation and her interests abroad.


My schedule is still busy, so not much time. I will go into detail later. Strategy as Warden describes it is service independent! It works for the Ground,Sea or Air. Guerrillas seem to understand it instinctively. Also Warden talks about establishing the "Key" force which is just like what the Marines talk about as establishing the main effort and it very well could be the GROUND force but it all goes back to the political objective. If you want to Colonize a country and Warden has said this himself you will need a large Army, but he also cations about doing this because it will be very difficult,and expensive and in the end you may not get you to final political objective because you will create such hatred in the indigenous population that.......well it is just better not to do it. Gotta go but keep thinking and asking questions, on the whole they are very good and they do have answers:).

Fuchs
03-30-2011, 06:49 PM
If you want to Colonize a country and Warden has said this himself you will need a large Army, but he also cations about doing this because it will be very difficult,and expensive and in the end you may not get you to final political objective because you will create such hatred in the indigenous population that.......well it is just better not to do it.

Somehow I cannot resist the impression that this ranks among the least relevant arguments against an attempt to colonise a country.

Likewise, discussing it sounds to me like discussing how running against a wall is a bad idea because it damages the wall.


I wonder what it takes to care about such entirely irrelevant aspects of bad moves instead of about the really relevant ones?
The answer is probably not pretty.

pvebber
03-30-2011, 08:59 PM
Strategy as Warden describes it is service independent!

Yes, accepted into evidence. My prior characterization of an "airpower" strategic method and "landpower" strategic method are service independant also. In fact the labels in quotes only serve to highlight the source, not to limit applicability.

Why does that make the "ends drives the means" method better than all other strategic methods?

Why should we only have one strategic method?

An example of a problem set where an "ends drives means" approach won't work:

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/12/4252237/

The current Libya situation is one where the drive for action precludes taking the time to form concensus on the desired end state, so we are forced to use "trial and error" ("muddling thorugh" in the authors terms). The author argues this is the normal state of things, not the exception.

Should Adm Mullen has stuck to his guns when he said that establishing a no fly-zone over Libya was "too hard"?

What should his response have been to being dressed down by Sen McCain something to the effect of "We spend 700B$ a year on the military and it can't establish a no fly zone to ground a couple dozen POS aircraft over a tin pot third world dicator's third world country????"

"I would be derelict in my duty, Senator, to engage in such an endeavor without a clear vision of a desired endstate."

I don't think so...

Marc
03-30-2011, 10:31 PM
If you want to Colonize a country and Warden has said this himself you will need a large Army, but he also cations about doing this because it will be very difficult,and expensive and in the end you may not get you to final political objective because you will create such hatred in the indigenous population that.......well it is just better not to do it.

Still the same circular argument. Circular reasoning seems to be inherent in the defence of airpower. Warden's new article also contains a good example:


Very simply, whether in war or business, our normal approach to the time element is exactly backward: we ask ourselves how long something will take rather than decide how long it should take in order to create parallel effects and succeed at an acceptable cost. So important is this concept that we can use it to help determine whether or not we want to go to war. If we cannot or will not operate in the parallel domain, then we should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

The circular reasoning is the following: If we can win the war by applying Warden's strategy (creating parallel effects to put the enemy in a state of system paralysis), we should do so by using airpower and airpower only. Conversely, if we cannot win the war by applying Warden's strategy, we should avoid war altogether.

Let me give some examples:

There is a security and drugs problem in Colombia. The FARC destabilizes the country. Colombian cocaine is sold all over the country and even in front of the White House. What should we do? Well, let's ask John A. Warden. John A. Warden will probably say that the five-ring model does not apply to the FARC and that precision bombardements won't work. His answer will be:


We should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

Another example: There is a terrorist threat in the Philippines. The Abu Sayyaf Group, related to Al Qaeda threathens security in the entire region. What should we do? Well, let's ask John A. Warden. John A. Warden will probably say that the five-ring model does not apply to the Abu Sayyaf Group and that precision bombardements won't work. His answer will be:


We should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

One more example: Thanks to Warden's strategy, we were able to overthrow Saddam Hussain. Unfortunately, several emerging terrorist movements in Iraq do not embrace the concept of democracy. What should we do? Well, let's ask John A. Warden. John A. Warden will probably say that the five-ring model does not apply to the Al Zarqawi and Muqtada Al Sadr and that precision bombardements won't work. His answer will be:


We should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances). Unfortunately, we are already at war. Then John A. Warden will probably shut up and wait until an army general like Petraeus comes up with an army-centric strategy that works. After that, he will wait even more until the Americans withdraw from Iraq. Once that is achieved, he will wait still a little bit longer until people forget about Petraeus' successful strategy. Then, finally, he will write an article saying that:


Very simply, whether in war or business, our normal approach to the time element is exactly backward: we ask ourselves how long something will take rather than decide how long it should take in order to create parallel effects and succeed at an acceptable cost. So important is this concept that we can use it to help determine whether or not we want to go to war. If we cannot or will not operate in the parallel domain, then we should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

I don't buy it. Do you?... Really?

pvebber
03-31-2011, 12:28 AM
The current Libya situation is one where the drive for action precludes taking the time to form concensus on the desired end state, so we are forced to use "trial and error" ("muddling thorugh" in the authors terms). The author argues this is the normal state of things, not the exception.

I left out the link to the other articles:

On Grand Strategy and Libya (http://www.emerginghealthleaders.ca/resources/Lindblom-Muddling.pdf)

and

on muddling through (http://www.emerginghealthleaders.ca/resources/Lindblom-Muddling.pdf)

slapout9
03-31-2011, 08:38 AM
Why does that make the "ends drives the means" method better than all other strategic methods? It avoids the Alice In Wonderland situation. If you don't know where you are going anyroad will take you there.


Why should we only have one strategic method? Not sure I understand the question but it is a single process that will produce multiple Strategic options, a very good thing IMO when you are dealing with those pesky Complex systems you talk about.


An example of a problem set where an "ends drives means" approach won't work:

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/12/4252237/ I have been following the Design debate on the Blog. IMO they are going down the road of EBO. They will end up with something so complicated that it will end up being useless.


The current Libya situation is one where the drive for action precludes taking the time to form concensus on the desired end state, so we are forced to use "trial and error" ("muddling thorugh" in the authors terms). The author argues this is the normal state of things, not the exception. That is not a desription of a wicked problem, it is a description of a mistake IMO.


Should Adm Mullen has stuck to his guns when he said that establishing a no fly-zone over Libya was "too hard"? No he should have said in his professional military opinion that a No Fly zone will not accomplish the mission. But if the political objective is to protect the population he would do his sworn duty and create a Strategy to accomplish that mission and present it before him when completed.


What should his response have been to being dressed down by Sen McCain something to the effect of "We spend 700B$ a year on the military and it can't establish a no fly zone to ground a couple dozen POS aircraft over a tin pot third world dicator's third world country????" The response should have been "Tell It To The Marines":)


"I would be derelict in my duty, Senator, to engage in such an endeavor without a clear vision of a desired endstate."

I don't think so... See all the above

pvebber
03-31-2011, 07:31 PM
It avoids the Alice In Wonderland situation. If you don't know where you are going anyroad will take you there.

The most recent movie version being an excellent counter-example. The desired end-state may not be about "being anywhere", but what you believe your capability to act is when you decide to accept the role of protangonist in a confrontation. You may not have a clear understanding of what the outcome of the confrontation may be, just a moral understanding that if you do not decide to act, bad things will happen.

Warden appears to be saying that taking no action in such circumstatnces is preferrable to taking action that is not directly linked to achieving a desired end-state. In a moral vacuum this may be the most efficient, but the world does not exist in a moral vacuum.

In other words, building on your analogy (always dangerous :eek:) the Warden theory presupposes a known destination, a map, and the existance of roads that take you from where you are to where you want to be. That is indeed one subset of military problem. But it is not the totality of military (or policy) problems in general. The paper on "mudlding through" (above) explains this quite well. Sometimes there is only a vast desert and the knowledge that if you stay where you are, you will likely die. Going ANYWHERE is preferable to going nowhere.

(with an interesting anecdote in tax policy in the case of Reagan lowering taxes and getting a beneficial economic result and Clinton raising taxes and getting a benficial economic result. One view is that the act of making a decision in each case bouyed public confidence well above what the economic mechanics of the specifc decision would indicate.)


Not sure I understand the question but it is a single process that will produce multiple Strategic options, a very good thing IMO when you are dealing with those pesky Complex systems you talk about.

The question is: "given that the 'ends drives the means' is only one of many strategic methods, why should all others be ignored?"

Other methods provide multiple options as well, arguably superior ones when the "end" or the "problem" is not clearly defined (the pesky complex or 'wicked' problems).

What evidence is there for ruling the others out?


I have been following the Design debate on the Blog. IMO they are going down the road of EBO. They will end up with something so complicated that it will end up being useless.

EBO is a direct application of Wardens methodology, though with some pathologies introduced that are not attributable to his theory.

Design theories actually leave open the possibility of applying a Warden-like methodology, if it is appropriate. The key aspect design methods add (that some argue convincingly are already a part of 'regular' mission analysis and assessment) is a thorough examination of the problem and what sort of problem-solving strategies are amenable to it. It also has a direct impact on battle rhythm that is not sufficiently articulated, and potential the "difference-maker" in its application.

Key areas where it conflicts with Warden's theory are:

Questioning the validity of assumptions and implict knowledge.

Design methods treat assumptions and implicit knowledge as variables, not constants. Warden's theory has implict roots in bayesian inference - that you can "fill in" for missing information by making assumptions and applying a beleif metric to them. If you don't know something for sure, but belive something is true, you assign a confidence level to how strongly you believe it and that you now have a substitute for actual information.

This is a planning pathology arising from the common practice of "assuming your superiors assumptions are facts" for the purpose of lower level planning. This is the number 1 problem with EVERY actual instance of EBO I've seen utilized and is "hard-coded" into most of the EBO and EBO-based assessment tools I've evaluated. A good friend of mine from the Naval War College has made great strides, particularly withthe USMC, in fixing this, but with the unfortunate result of convincing senior officers that there are times they must say "we don't know" rather than "turning the Bayesian inference crank" on numbers with meaningless confidence and presenting them as "best approximation to truth" (but essentially known to be incorrect).

The key is to accept that you don't know what you don't know, and that much of what you think you know is actually wrong. Warden's theory leads one to use what they have and act on the assumption it is true and develop a single "transfer function" from current state to a single desired end-state.


Using multiple hypotheses for how a system can change (resulting in multiple potneital endstates) rather than a single one derived from "working backwards" from a single desired endstate.

Design admits that multiple perceptions of reality exist and that multiple hypotheses (transfer functions) may act on the current state to create a multitude of possible endstates and that artificially reducing that to a single case exposes you to serious cases of unintended consequences.

This requires the identification of desirable and undesirable characteristics of possible end-states, but accepts the reality that in many cases, you do not have sufficent control over all the variables in play to drive the system to a single desired end-state. You instead evaluate a number of characterisitcs, and try t increase the desirable ones nad decrease the undesirable ones, but in most systems any action will have a mixed effect that is dynamic over time. While not random "trial and error", it similarly can't simply "dial the good up and the bad down".


The construction of a "theory of action" for how those hypotheses can be evaluated over time, potentially reducing the number of potential endstates "in play" and increasing the proability of locking out undesirable ones and locking in desirable ones.

Wardens Rings are categories of things and while it is easy to place targets into the rings categorically, it is extremely difficult to establish the realitionships between the things within a ring, and even more difficult to establlish the realtionships between rings. The construction of a "theory of action" involves looking at flows among entities - information, materiel, personnel etc. to ascertain centers of gravity not based on what ring they occupy, but what the broader realtionship within the system is. THis is indeed a more complicated thing to accomplish than simply placiing tagets in categories and looking for "weak sisters" - but it is the level of detail needed to make systems theory "actionable" in more than a broad brush way. This level of detail is what gets you from Col Warden's statement that the only way to stop Iran's nuclear program was to "shut down their electrical grid" to the Stuxtnet viirus - an extremely precisly targeted attack on a very specific "flaw in the deathstar" that somebody likely spent years developing the required information to achive.


One is constantly reavaluating the problem framework and solution space to assess whether the planning process has been "overtaken by events" and a fresh look at the situation needs to be initiated.

Rather than artificially constrain yourself to short timelines becasue "its cheaper" design approches engage a problem over time to see if the an initial desirable outcome "has legs". It helps avoid a "mission accomplished moment" that the Warden methodology of going for quick success and declaring victory leaves one open to.


That is not a desription of a wicked problem, it is a description of a mistake IMO.

It was not meant as an example of a "wicked problem" but an example of a "common problem". (in fact a realtively "simple" one - but which is still highly politically problemmatic.


No he should have said in his professional military opinion that a No Fly zone will not accomplish the mission. But if the political objective is to protect the population he would do his sworn duty and create a Strategy to accomplish that mission and present it before him when completed.

What mission? In this case establishing the no-fly zone WAS 'the mission'. That the politicians have not yet reached concensus on the 'desired endstate' is immaterial to the military which is supposed to give a "jolly aye-aye and how high" when politicians give them a job to do.

You are basically saying that the military should tell their civilian bosses to go stick it when the task they are given does not meet a very narrow set of criteria. That violates our cherished tradtion of civilian control of the military.


The response should have been "Tell It To The Marines"


Really? REALLY?!?!? (http://www.hulu.com/watch/1794/saturday-night-live-weekend-update-michael-vick-really)

Fuchs
04-01-2011, 11:26 AM
Related resources:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/apty/aptytoc.htm

slapout9
04-01-2011, 04:35 PM
Really? REALLY?!?!? (http://www.hulu.com/watch/1794/saturday-night-live-weekend-update-michael-vick-really)

After typing for about 20 minutes I hit the wrong button:mad: so unitl later it can all be summed up by Detective Joe Friday-from Dragnet fame.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P6zrGKiEi68&feature=related

pvebber
04-01-2011, 04:53 PM
To paraphrase an old boss of mine: "This systems analysis stuff would be so much easier if the systems analysts would just stay the heck out of it".

What systems analysts are good for (http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_8GuMLAUMw0k/S7FBdfixccI/AAAAAAAAAiY/4nqlCy52UVc/s1600/interview_problem_solving.jpg)


I wish I had a nickel for every time that happened to me and I promise to do my replies in wordpad and copy and paste them in...but I never do it more than once...:rolleyes:

Cole
04-02-2011, 03:26 AM
So we should only organize/train/equip for the current fight?Shouldn’t we organize/train/equip for the most realistic fight? If so we have ample air and seapower for the rogue nations and no fly zones. We have ample air and seapower if North Korea crosses the DMZ, Hezbollah dirty-bombs NYC with Iranian help, or a Yemen terrorist sneaks chemical weapons into D.C. In any of those scenarios, the war that followed would not be all airpower. Higher ground casualties would result, exacerbated if budgets spend excessively where we have sufficient domination, and not enough rectifying vulnerabilities of “distasteful” but essential ground combat.

Business owners don’t spend excessively making their business completely fireproof because that is an extremely low probability incident. They buy fire insurance. We buy nukes to deter Russia/China…and reasonable air and seapower...but not at the expense of conflicts with 90% probabilities vs 1%.


Not arguing with the budget comparison. Nevertheless, China's budget goes a lot farther... because their weapons are being made by Chinese, who get paid a lot less than the average American defense worker.
They will pay $75-$100 million upfront…about half of an F-22 and closer to an F-35. Larger O&S and maintenance costs are well beyond most nation defense budgets and personnel skills. We see that Russia/India think they will export 800 Pak FAs. Who will buy them in quantity? The 50-100 sold to a few foes would barely leave the ground due to day 1 allied attacks, or a week of allied retaliation after the aggressor has his day. For less money, Nation X can buy many more TBMs that can hide, reload, and survive.


Your argument that MAD is sufficient for deterring China and Russia is a slippery slope... As we found out with the New Look, this severely constrains your options, and probably isn't a good idea. If China decides to start cutting off Japanese oil over a dispute, are we willing to threaten them with nukes? If the answer is no, then MAD is probably sufficient to insure US national survival, but not protect our national interests.

War games? Not sure if you are talking about arguments over islands/drilling location. But cannot imagine any scenario where China could/would blockade Japanese oil. They attacked Vietnam a few years back and were humiliated.

MAD precludes Russia and China from getting too bold. Other conflicts like Georgia are yawners and were somewhat self-provoked. Taiwan will fix itself due to unity leaders and economic simpatico. We could blockade China’s oil far more readily in the Straits of Mallaca if they did invade.


The odds are not 0. B-2s need to be protected if fighters are present.Reasonable statisticians comparing probabilities of a Soldier/Marine dying in current and future conflict versus hypothetical threats to a B-2 by a foe with 5th gen aircraft would see: less stealth, less numerous, lesser radars and night vision, less training & untested pilots, fewer tankers; airfields already hit by cruise missiles, stealth bombers, and attack UAS; few Chinese AWACs, unreliable engines, undercapable jamming/missiles….need I say more.


According to the unclass 2010 report to Congress on China, the Chinese Air Force has over 327 fourth generation fighters... all of which are very capable. They have 252 advanced SAM systems... neither of these numbers include naval systems. I would submit that we currently have the minimum force required- in fact, it was classified as "moderate risk" in congressional testimony.Even classified assessments can be questionable. Look how we exaggerated the threat of the Mi-25? Anyone with an agenda can exaggerate risk to push different priorities while realistic air and sea casualties are low at best in any scenario.

Meanwhile, real Soldiers/Marines/Sailors/Airmen on the ground are getting killed…not Airmen at altitude or Sailors at sea. Since the end of the Cold War, only ground combatants have faced serious risk. 327 fourth generation aircraft based on the F-16 and Su-27 could not down more than a handful of F-22/F-35, B-2s, or stealthy cruise missile/ UAS. None of those U.S. systems facing 252 advanced SAMs would experience losses approaching what Soldiers/Marines experience in one month of current/future combat….multiplied by 100 months.


That said, you seem to miss my point. I'm not arguing for gutting the Army to buy more F-22s. I would have liked to have seen us buy the 40 more that were in the budget originally to give us a viable/sustainable force - but we didn't, and we're not going to get more. We need new tankers, new CSAR helos and the new bomber more, frankly. The big problem will be our F-16s and F-15s wearing out before we can actually buy F-35s (if and when we get to buy some).It’s a zero sum gain budget environment with Iraq winding down, Afghanistan on a countdown, and Libya starting its upward spiral with a less than clear endstate and poor current results.
Planned tanker numbers were based on nuclear bomber requirements of 50 years ago. Current tankers are at half their lifespan despite advanced age and we never have used more than 300+ of the 500+ in any conflict, nor do we have the space to park them outside TBM range.

Given numbers of actual aircraft shot down in past decades, how many CSAR aircraft are required when MV-22/CV-22 already exist and plenty of MH Special Ops and Naval helicopters are fielded? Agree we need a new bomber but considering that only a handful of B-2s were required in Libya and stealthy Navy UAS and MC-X will exist, we may not need anywhere near 80-100 new stealthy bombers.

As Secretary Gates said, another large land conflict is unlikely for multiple reasons. Based on the extreme distaste for "boots on the ground", I think the Libya model is much more likely to be the model. I would expect that SOF and adviser forces will be heavily used as well.Believe the Libya model will prove not nearly as successful as some believe. Even if it is, it is atypical terrain and a minor threat. Try the same thing in the terrain of Lebanon, North Korea, Venezuela, or Ukraine, and try to find TBMs in Iran. Distaste for boots on the ground does not preclude that need in multiple much more likely conflicts than China/Russia. From the looks of unrest in the Middle East both now and in the past 20 years, more of the same is inevitable.


Given all of that, we do not have too large an Air Force - we have one that is just large enough to give us a moderate-high level of risk based on our stated national strategy. It is going to get smaller due to attrition and airframes aging out- and that is not a good thing.Proof lies in deployments required per service member. Any service that deploys less than the Army has more force structure than the Army proportionally.


As I have said before on this blog, the job of the USAF and USN is to make sure our wars stay small by being so good that they can't be beat. If we can't deter folks conventionally, we're left with nukes, as you mentioned...We would never use nukes in North Korea, Lebanon, Syria, Ukraine, or Venezuela. Airpower would supplant rather than dominate Joint firepower in those scenarios as the Israelis learned, and South Koreans and NATO understand. We have more than sufficient allied air and seapower advantages programmed to deter Russia/China. The rogue nations with unstable leadership are the ones most difficult to deter, and as Qaddafi’s actions show, no amount of air and seapower are a deterrent when we tell him we won’t go ashore with anything but the CIA and SOF/SF.


Saddam used chems on Halabja in Kurdistan in 1988, as well as on the Iranians. There is evidence of his using Mi-8s to drop Sarin on Karbala in March of 1991. Again, all of this was PRIOR to the no-fly zones being enforced- they were established AFTER Saddam attacked the Kurds in the North and the Shiites in the South. 1988 was well before Desert Storm. March 1991 was shortly thereafter because we stopped short of doing the job correctly…and settled on a NFZ.


You are now changing the argument... ONW and OSW fulfilled their objectives at a relatively low cost relative to what troops on the ground would have cost. If the objective was regime change, that's a different story.Add the wear and tear on aircraft that now must be replaced prematurely and cost of ONW/OSW to the cost of OIF to finish the job…not to mention higher gas prices due to “oil for food.”


As I said above, I think we have more NFZs/No drive zones in our future - it is a (relatively) cheap way of stopping dictators from using their high-end military to slaughter their people, and doesn't have the stigma of boots on the ground. Sudan is a good example of a place where we might use this same strategy.Maybe. Seem to recall the last time we sent cruise missiles into Sudan and Afghanistan, it didn’t work well. Bombing did not stop genocide in Bosnia. A NFZ won’t stop terror attacks or safe havens. NFZ won’t hinder Iran or Hezbollah TBMs or a DPRK attack across the DMZ. Russia could attack Ukraine and go to ground long prior to any decision to use airpower alone.

No fly zones and airpower/seapower have been incapable of ending warfare, terrorism, and irrational despots as we have known them over the past 50 years. By themselves, air and seapower won’t deter or end war over the next decades, either. Spending in that utopian pursuit would vastly increase the deficit and risk economic instability. Local economic community assistance due to air and seapower bases and manufacturing defense spending would benefit primarily our coasts where base costs are already inflated and other economic activities exist in greater abundance.

slapout9
04-02-2011, 04:31 AM
I wish I had a nickel for every time that happened to me and I promise to do my replies in wordpad and copy and paste them in...but I never do it more than once...:rolleyes:

Thats my problem I don't do wordpad I do yellow legal pad and file folders and index cards.:wry:

slapout9
04-02-2011, 05:27 AM
pvebber, will have to break my response into 2 sections, this "system" dosen't like long responses for some reason.



The most recent movie version being an excellent counter-example. The desired end-state may not be about "being anywhere", but what you believe your capability to act is when you decide to accept the role of protangonist in a confrontation. You may not have a clear understanding of what the outcome of the confrontation may be, just a moral understanding that if you do not decide to act, bad things will happen. Don't really see the conflict with Warden here?


Warden appears to be saying that taking no action in such circumstatnces is preferrable to taking action that is not directly linked to achieving a desired end-state. In a moral vacuum this may be the most efficient, but the world does not exist in a moral vacuum.

In other words, building on your analogy (always dangerous :eek:) the Warden theory presupposes a known destination, a map, and the existance of roads that take you from where you are to where you want to be. That is indeed one subset of military problem. Yes, he is saying that.


But it is not the totality of military (or policy) problems in general. The paper on "mudlding through" (above) explains this quite well. Sometimes there is only a vast desert and the knowledge that if you stay where you are, you will likely die. Going ANYWHERE is preferable to going nowhere. You are right Warden would never say that.


(with an interesting anecdote in tax policy in the case of Reagan lowering taxes and getting a beneficial economic result and Clinton raising taxes and getting a benficial economic result. One view is that the act of making a decision in each case bouyed public confidence well above what the economic mechanics of the specifc decision would indicate.) Didn't think much of the article. Read David Stockmans(Reagans budget director) new book. It was a failure and they new it, so they switched on purpose and applied Keysian economics for the DOD, and Reagan became the best Democrat the Republicnas ever elected.




The question is: "given that the 'ends drives the means' is only one of many strategic methods, why should all others be ignored?"

Other methods provide multiple options as well, arguably superior ones when the "end" or the "problem" is not clearly defined (the pesky complex or 'wicked' problems).

What evidence is there for ruling the others out? None, as I said ASCOPE is a dialect of the Ring-a-nese language and is sometimes easier to understand. There are other examples.




What mission? In this case establishing the no-fly zone WAS 'the mission'. That the politicians have not yet reached concensus on the 'desired endstate' is immaterial to the military which is supposed to give a "jolly aye-aye and how high" when politicians give them a job to do.

You are basically saying that the military should tell their civilian bosses to go stick it when the task they are given does not meet a very narrow set of criteria. That violates our cherished tradtion of civilian control of the military.



Admiral Mullen had know problem expressing his opinion to McCain about Gays in The military, why not say what that he thought about the operation being ill conceived and needed more refinement? And then if the President ordered action do something.

slapout9
04-02-2011, 06:01 AM
pvebber, here part 2 of my response.




EBO is a direct application of Wardens methodology, though with some pathologies introduced that are not attributable to his theory.
Agree

Design theories actually leave open the possibility of applying a Warden-like methodology, if it is appropriate. The key aspect design methods add (that some argue convincingly are already a part of 'regular' mission analysis and assessment) is a thorough examination of the problem and what sort of problem-solving strategies are amenable to it. It also has a direct impact on battle rhythm that is not sufficiently articulated, and potential the "difference-maker" in its application. Yes, it is very Warden like.


Key areas where it conflicts with Warden's theory are:

Questioning the validity of assumptions and implict knowledge.

Design methods treat assumptions and implicit knowledge as variables, not constants. Warden's theory has implict roots in bayesian inference - that you can "fill in" for missing information by making assumptions and applying a beleif metric to them. If you don't know something for sure, but belive something is true, you assign a confidence level to how strongly you believe it and that you now have a substitute for actual information.

This is a planning pathology arising from the common practice of "assuming your superiors assumptions are facts" for the purpose of lower level planning. This is the number 1 problem with EVERY actual instance of EBO I've seen utilized and is "hard-coded" into most of the EBO and EBO-based assessment tools I've evaluated. A good friend of mine from the Naval War College has made great strides, particularly withthe USMC, in fixing this, but with the unfortunate result of convincing senior officers that there are times they must say "we don't know" rather than "turning the Bayesian inference crank" on numbers with meaningless confidence and presenting them as "best approximation to truth" (but essentially known to be incorrect).

The key is to accept that you don't know what you don't know, and that much of what you think you know is actually wrong. Warden's theory leads one to use what they have and act on the assumption it is true and develop a single "transfer function" from current state to a single desired end-state. No, you can have multiple endstates with Warden and usually will.



Using multiple hypotheses for how a system can change (resulting in multiple potneital endstates) rather than a single one derived from "working backwards" from a single desired endstate. See above


Design admits that multiple perceptions of reality exist and that multiple hypotheses (transfer functions) may act on the current state to create a multitude of possible endstates and that artificially reducing that to a single case exposes you to serious cases of unintended consequences.

This requires the identification of desirable and undesirable characteristics of possible end-states, but accepts the reality that in many cases, you do not have sufficent control over all the variables in play to drive the system to a single desired end-state. You instead evaluate a number of characterisitcs, and try t increase the desirable ones nad decrease the undesirable ones, but in most systems any action will have a mixed effect that is dynamic over time. While not random "trial and error", it similarly can't simply "dial the good up and the bad down". That is pure Warden, where has he ever said anything different, in fact what you described is almost a direct quote(s) from some of his classes.



The construction of a "theory of action" for how those hypotheses can be evaluated over time, potentially reducing the number of potential endstates "in play" and increasing the proability of locking out undesirable ones and locking in desirable ones. Again pure Warden.


Wardens Rings are categories of things and while it is easy to place targets into the rings categorically, it is extremely difficult to establish the realitionships between the things within a ring, and even more difficult to establlish the realtionships between rings. The construction of a "theory of action" involves looking at flows among entities - information, materiel, personnel etc. to ascertain centers of gravity not based on what ring they occupy, but what the broader realtionship within the system is. THis is indeed a more complicated thing to accomplish than simply placiing tagets in categories and looking for "weak sisters" - but it is the level of detail needed to make systems theory "actionable" in more than a broad brush way. This level of detail is what gets you from Col Warden's statement that the only way to stop Iran's nuclear program was to "shut down their electrical grid" to the Stuxtnet viirus - an extremely precisly targeted attack on a very specific "flaw in the deathstar" that somebody likely spent years developing the required information to achive. Don't you see a conflict here?Above you said you cannot know for sure what is(elements,rings,etc.) in the system with any certainty. If that is the case (which I don't believe) how could you possibly know the "flows" in the system. How could you know the "flows" in the system but not know the targets (elements,entities) of the system? As for level of detail , again that is a fractal analysis and Warden talks about that in some detail. May want to check your quote to. I remember him talking about that and I think is more like "a way to shut down the grid' not the "only way". But maybe I am wrong.



One is constantly reavaluating the problem framework and solution space to assess whether the planning process has been "overtaken by events" and a fresh look at the situation needs to be initiated. That would certainly happen during the Design phase of Warden's theory and it would be continuous during the whole Campaign.


Rather than artificially constrain yourself to short timelines becasue "its cheaper" design approches engage a problem over time to see if the an initial desirable outcome "has legs". It helps avoid a "mission accomplished moment" that the Warden methodology of going for quick success and declaring victory leaves one open to. Sounds more like a way to get more funding for a failed operation than any kind of advanced Strategy process.....nah I don't buy it myself.

pvebber
04-02-2011, 08:22 PM
Well now I'm confused.

Warden's theory proposes that we work backwards from a single desired endstate. Except that we can have multiple desired end states and usually will.

Warden's theory proposes that we take no action that does not lead to our desired end state. Except that we can take actions that are not discernible in their effect until after the fact and which change our target desired end state.

Wardens theory produces parallel courses of action by working back from a desired endstate. Except that a series of hypotheses about possible qualities a desired end state might have and and explored in a sequential fashion is "pure Warden".

A theory can not be all things to all people and be useful.


Don't you see a conflict here?Above you said you cannot know for sure what is(elements,rings,etc.) in the system with any certainty. If that is the case (which I don't believe) how could you possibly know the "flows" in the system. How could you know the "flows" in the system but not know the targets (elements,entities) of the system?

You can't know for certain what all the elements of the system are. That does not preclude you from knowing parts of the system, including flows, in great detail. I'm not the one with a theory that requires complete knowledge of the system being affected so that one: "opens another very exciting possibility: conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood".

No conflict at all, because I'm not assuming everything is fundamentally knowable. I'm saying that nothing is completely knowable.

slapout9
04-03-2011, 04:07 AM
Well now I'm confused. No you 're not, but you may have been Hornswoggled.:)


Warden's theory proposes that we work backwards from a single desired endstate. Except that we can have multiple desired end states and usually will. I have never read or heard him say single. Here is an example, Gulf War 1. Iraq out of Kuwait. The Iraqi army still able to defend Iraq but no real offensive capability. Regional Stability is not disturbed. Oil flow to the rest of the world would not be significantly interrupted. Multiple endstates. Did that from memory so I may be a little off but you get the idea.


Warden's theory proposes that we take no action that does not lead to our desired end state. Except that we can take actions that are not discernible in their effect until after the fact and which change our target desired end state. If you want to look at it that way I guess you can, but do you know the Sun will rise tomorrow until it happens...No, but it is a really good bet it is going to.


Wardens theory produces parallel courses of action by working back from a desired endstate. Except that a series of hypotheses about possible qualities a desired end state might have and and explored in a sequential fashion is "pure Warden". I did not see the word "sequential" in your original post, if it is there I stand corrected. If you do it in parallel it would be pure Warden.


A theory can not be all things to all people and be useful. Might be true and it might not. I whole purpose behind the Systems Thinking movement was to come up with a universal way to understand All Systems by all people. To find the universal factors of all Systems to be used by all people.



You can't know for certain what all the elements of the system are. That does not preclude you from knowing parts of the system, including flows, in great detail. I'm not the one with a theory that requires complete knowledge of the system being affected so that one: "opens another very exciting possibility: conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood". Where does Warden say you have to have complete knowledge? The whole idea behind parallel attack is to realize that not everything in the system is knowable, but there are certain elements that will have to be there in order for the System to accomplish it's purpose. If you are going to attack someone you have to have person(s), weapon(s),location(s),etc. they have to be there or nothing will happen.


No conflict at all, because I'm not assuming everything is fundamentally knowable. I'm saying that nothing is completely knowable. Neither is Warden in fact in his first article "The Enemy as a System" he addresses that very concept. Again from memory he says something to the effect you will never know everything but you can know enough to make decisions. Again I am paraphrasing but I think that is pretty close.

pvebber
04-03-2011, 03:50 PM
I have never read or heard him say single

In his article:


The best approach to strategy starts with a future picture, determines the systems and centers of gravity that must change to realize that picture,
takes into account the impact of time, and preplans an exit.


And in his popularization thee "Prometheus Process"( from Prometheus website (http://www.venturist.com/Elements%20of%20Strategy.htm):


The first (and importantly first) step in strategic thinking is to identify the future that you want to create. In the Prometheus Process, the desired future is called the Future Picture. It is a very hard, very objective, very measurable picture of the future you want to create. In the Prometheus Process, you break the Future Picture into 12 separate elements that ensure a balanced future embraced by all.

Not "identify a set of futures", or "characteristics applicable to desirable futures" (plural) but "a" or "the" (singular) future. If he intends that "the" future picture is actually a set of pictures, one would think he would not cast the discussion in singular terms.


If you want to look at it that way I guess you can, but do you know the Sun will rise tomorrow until it happens...No, but it is a really good bet it is going to.

How much in military operations can you know with the level of certainty that you know the sun will rise? What happens for instance AFTER you take out an adversary's leadership? SUch knowledge is crucial to a Warden inspired decapitation strike. If the only thing we are thinking about is separating the C2 head from the military body, how do we know the result will be "paralysis" and not a whole host of insurgents going to ground and taking on a long term irregular strategy?

In such a case a parallel decapitation strike may create a larger, longer term problem than if we allow the leader to stay in charge and lose his army in a sequential series of battles. Has the Iraq war been cheaper in the long run because than if we had destroyed Saddam's army in the field rather than convince the core of it to go underground?


I did not see the word "sequential" in your original post, if it is there I stand corrected. If you do it in parallel it would be pure Warden.

Sequential operations is implicit in the need to "evaluate over time" i.e you poke the system, see how it responds, poke it again, see how it responds, and eventually you can produce a theory of action for how the system responds. You can't in general have that kind of knowledge a priori (as the muddling through paper argues) which highlites an important clarification in my argument you have helped me understand.


Where does Warden say you have to have complete knowledge? The whole idea behind parallel attack is to realize that not everything in the system is knowable, but there are certain elements that will have to be there in order for the System to accomplish it's purpose. If you are going to attack someone you have to have person(s), weapon(s),location(s),etc. they have to be there or nothing will happen.

You are correct - the issue is not about "completeness" of knowledge, it about "a priori" knowledge or the knowledge that you can have before you try to affect the system about how the system will respond. My previous use of "complete" has been from the point of view of how much knowldege you can have about how a system will respond to a stimulus, before you apply the stimulus.

The implication of Warden's parallel operations in a short period of time is a tremendous amount of a priori information about the system. Information that the alternative strategic methods believe is not discernible until you "experiment" on the system - forcing a sequential engagement, evaluated over time.

I think this is at the crux of much of the criticism - the "correlation equals causality" assumption implicit in:


If we want to change our opponent as a system to conform to our objectives, then the most direct approach entails affecting opponent centers of gravity closely related to the objective.

In the actual usage of EBO in my experience, the "relatedness" between objectives and centers of gavrity (and what effect we will have on CoGs) is not based on "real systems analysis" but on establishment of a Bayesian belief network of what the planners BELIEVE these relationships are. This beliefe network is then substituted for actually a priori KNOWLEDGE about the system where it is not available.

I've figured out that much of my criticism comes from seeing this problem first hand enough times to question the sanity at times of those operating this way. When questioned, one gets disturbingly close to "if I believe strongly enough that these realtionships exist, then they actually must exist".

So the issue becomes perhaps not a problem with Warden's theory, but in the practicality of implementing it, and the problems with how I've seen otherwise really smart people goon it up.

SO how would Warden recommend dealing with situations where there is insufficient a priori knowledge to actually know with high confidence (not high 'BELIEF') to bee comfortable that a parallel operation will actually achieve the desired end state?

AT that point does he shift over to a more "evolutionary" strategic method, as you seem to indicate, or would he argue to canx the operation because of the known unknowns, let alone the unknown unknowns?.

How does that decision calculus work in Warden's theory?

slapout9
04-03-2011, 06:30 PM
pvebber, before we go any further is this where the idea came from that Warden believes that everything has to be knowable? Is this what you perceive as the the original argument?



Under these circumstances, morale was to the physical as three is to one. In fact, the physical was largely the "physical" of the individual soldier and it was almost impossible to separate the intangibles like morale, friction, and fog from the physical. Today the situation is significantly different; the individual fighter has become a director of large things like tanks, aircraft, artillery pieces, and ships. Fighters are dependent on these things, these physical things, to carry out the mission. Deprived of them, the ability to affect the enemy drops to near zero. Whether the equation has changed to make the physical to be to the morale as three is to one is not clear. That the two are at least coequal, however, seems likely. The advent of airpower and accurate weapons has made it possible to destroy the physical side of the enemy. This is not to say that morale, friction, and fog have all disappeared. It is to say, however, that we can now put them in a distinct category, separate from the physical. As a consequence, we can think broadly about war in the form of an equation:
(Physical) x (Morale) = Outcome

In today's world, strategic entities, be they an industrial state or a guerrilla organization, are heavily dependent on physical means. If the physical side of the equation can be driven close to zero, the best morale in the world is not going to produce a high number on the outcome side of the equation. Looking at this equation, we are struck by the fact that the physical side of the enemy is, in theory, perfectly knowable and predictable. Conversely, the morale side the human side is beyond the realm of the predictable in a particular situation because humans are so different from each other. Our war efforts, therefore, should be directed primarily at the physical side. copied from "The Enemy as a System" by Colonel John Warden

Ken White
04-03-2011, 07:20 PM
However, I think it's important to emphasize this item of which you are both aware. It's from Slap's Warden quote:

"...we are struck by the fact that the physical side of the enemy is, in theory, perfectly knowable and predictable..."

Not to take that out of context, I agree with the statement as well as what goes before and comes after. Warden's a smart guy. He uses the words "in theory."

Fighter Jocks are great folks. One of my best friends was once one, many good acquaintances are or were. However, most pilots suffer from two minor problems as war fighters (IMO, obviously...); they're conditioned to using checklists and what they do relies on knowledge and acceptance of the theory and laws of Physics. Problem with that is you cannot develop a checklist for people activity and war fighting is an art, not a science. A rather lawless art at that... :D

Back to the "in theory" bit. That's the rub -- theory and actuality often differ, intelligence is rarely adequate to the degree he envisions and that entails making assumptions. That's always dangerous and the Intel guys won't ordinarily do it, they're rather -- excessively, some say -- cautious that way. :rolleyes:

That leaves the final stategery up to the decider -- who will decide based upon his gut feeling and his assumptions rather than on the precision that Warden's strategy demands for best execution. We have literally seen that in operation several times over the past ten (20 ? Back even unto DS/DS?) years when several decision makers had the power but not the knowledge to make decisions (and that in a system that strongly militates against disagreeing with the Boss). :wry:

Warden's theories have merit, his process is sensible in some situations. Neither his nor any other 'system' has the route to the always best solution. Nor is anyone likely to develop a better idea because, as he said: "Conversely, the morale side the human side is beyond the realm of the predictable in a particular situation because humans are so different from each other..." Totally true. Might work better if every 'implementer' (and every opponent...) was another Warden -- they have not been and will not be.

His follow on to that last quote: "Our war efforts, therefore, should be directed primarily at the physical side" goes circular -- we're back to needing quite accurate physical Intel. We've almost never had that and are even more unlikely to do so in the near future... :(

pvebber
04-04-2011, 12:10 AM
we are struck by the fact that the physical side of the enemy is, in theory, perfectly knowable and predictable.

Yes that and several things in the Prometheus Process.

Also from "Battlefield of the future" Chap 4 on Airpower Theory for the 21st century (which contains a great many of the points in Warden's current article) looking from the other direction:


When we want more information, we pull out subsystems like electrical power under system essentials and show it as a five-ring system. We may have to make several more five-ring models to show successively lower electrical subsystems. We continue the process until we have sufficient understanding and information to act. Note that with this approach, we have little need for the infinite amount of information theoretically available on a strategic entity like a state. Instead, we can identify very quickly what we don’t know and concentrate our information search on relevant data.

Which indicates that while we don't need information about everything, relatively simple decomposition will provide all the information one might need. Getting to what Ken brings up, this is a very Newtonian, mechanistic view of the world, which only applies to a small subset of physical systems, like electrical grids.

slapout9
04-04-2011, 05:20 AM
Especally with the Backward planning always using the worst case scenario quote you put up somewhere that I can no longer fine:(






Back to the "in theory" bit. That's the rub -- theory and actuality often differ, intelligence is rarely adequate to the degree he envisions and that entails making assumptions. That's always dangerous and the Intel guys won't ordinarily do it, they're rather -- excessively, some say -- cautious that way. :rolleyes:




Ken, further down he also says this about modeling sounds like pvebber tag line.


The Five-Ring Model
To make the concept of an enemy system useful and understandable, we must make a simplified model. We all use models daily and we all understand that they do not mirror reality. They do, however, give us a comprehensible picture of a complex phenomenon so that we can do something with it. The best models at the strategic level are those that give us the simplest possible big picture. As we need more detail, we expand portions of our model so that we can see finer and finer detail. It is important, however, that in constructing our model and using it, we always start from the big and work to the small. copied from "The Enemy as a System" by Colonel John Warden


I am beat..... you guys will just have to wait till tomorrow.

slapout9
04-04-2011, 05:23 AM
Getting to what Ken brings up, this is a very Newtonian, mechanistic view of the world, which only applies to a small subset of physical systems, like electrical grids.

Oh No:eek:I should have known, you are one of those Quantum Physics guys. Till tomorrow.

Fuchs
04-04-2011, 10:25 AM
intelligence is rarely adequate

War is about breaking will - especially breaking the will of the opposing leaders. They're also known as government / cabinet / head of state. Intelligence on these should be available.

The Warden stuff and generally most U.S. air power strategy stuff is still conditioned by the WW2 trial and error story when the U.S.A.A.F. fought against governments with an unusually extreme determination and struggled to get its targeting right (ball bearings maybe? no, aircraft factories maybe? no, steel production maybe? no. Hey, targeting the fuel industry did the charm!).

The American way is too much about targeting and understanding targets. These strategies don't look enough at the leadership's character, which should be step #1.

For example, we didn't need a five rings or other method in 1999, but a Russian prime minister who told Milosevic that Russia will not intervene and some near-constant (and rather unacceptable) pressure on the government of Yugoslavia. The actual targeting did not decide about the outcome, or the duration of the conflict's hot phase - it was only decisive for the extent of material and human damages.

pvebber
04-04-2011, 12:54 PM
We all use models daily and we all understand that they do not mirror reality. They do, however, give us a comprehensible picture of a complex phenomenon so that we can do something with it. The best models at the strategic level are those that give us the simplest possible big picture. As we need more detail, we expand portions of our model so that we can see finer and finer detail. It is important, however, that in constructing our model and using it, we always start from the big and work to the small.

This view represents a reductionist view that one can understand how a system works by dismantling its parts and isolating the causes and effects of each.

Not all systems are reducible in this way because of system-wide interactions that are lost when you isolate component systems. So there is fundamental disagreement about the viability of his "best" model description.


Oh NoI should have known, you are one of those Quantum Physics guys. Till tomorrow.

YEs, my GS series is actually 1310 "physicist" :cool:

I feel like we are refighting the Bohr-Einstein dabates over the nature of quantum mechanics :D or the Copenhagen vs Many Worlds interpretation arguments more recently. :eek:

slapout9
04-05-2011, 06:03 PM
This view represents a reductionist view that one can understand how a system works by dismantling its parts and isolating the causes and effects of each.
Not all systems are reducible in this way because of system-wide interactions that are lost when you isolate component systems. So there is fundamental disagreement about the viability of his "best" model description.


But isn't War fundamentally about breaking PHYSICAL systems? Isn't that what it is all about? Like Warden says if you break enough physical systems the enemies will to fight isn't going to matter very much because they will be physically incapable of resisting. After the War is over you can get into transforming or redesigning Systems but that needs to happen in some kind of a peaceful and stable environment.

Fuchs
04-05-2011, 06:06 PM
But isn't War fundamentally about breaking PHYSICAL systems? Isn't that what it is all about? Like Warden says if you break enough physical systems the enemies will to fight isn't going to matter very much because they will be physically incapable of resisting.

I'm not sure - was this irony/sarcasm?

Ken White
04-05-2011, 08:51 PM
I too am perplexed (as usual... :D ).

While that breaking of physical systems may in some cases be practical and therefor correct, my recollection is that there have been few occasions where it worked and that far more often one thing or another intrudes on the breaking physical entities process and insufficient damage is done to the minds of the opponent -- they just dig deeper and keep fighting... :o

Those things that intrude and thus deny the success or accuracy of the idea are both friendly and enemy. Perhaps more of the former... :wry:

Fuchs
04-05-2011, 09:05 PM
There's also the fundamental problem that the more you break, the less your opponent has left to lose.

There were furthermore periods in European warfare where breaking things was pretty much irrelevant (not the least because the people of the time were not fixated on their tools of war since the enemy had the very same anyway). There were even wars in which actual fighting was of negligible relevance, while threats (such as to the enemy's supply depot line), diseases and the lack of supplies (such as the lack of food in besieged fortresses or in a siege camp) were of great importance.

The focus on 'breaking things' was uncommon even in naval warfare well into the late 19th century when explosive shells had finally pushed firepower into dominance over boarding for good (there were still some battleships captured instead of sunk at Tsushima!).


The whole focus on the tools and weapons of war and their destructive power is afaik a product of WW2.

Just an example; there's a civil war in Cote d'Ivoire right now but breaking things is of marginal relevance there.

pvebber
04-05-2011, 10:17 PM
But isn't War fundamentally about breaking PHYSICAL systems? Isn't that what it is all about? Like Warden says if you break enough physical systems the enemies will to fight isn't going to matter very much because they will be physically incapable of resisting. After the War is over you can get into transforming or redesigning Systems but that needs to happen in some kind of a peaceful and stable environment.

Ah! Now we see the violence inherent in the system!

Help! (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOOTKA0aGI0)


The strategic approach gives us the freedom to consider and mix every conceivable way to change a center of gravity—a bribe, an aerial bomb, a hack, a proxy, a conference, an award, assistance funding, or a thousand other possibilities.

But only one example is a kinetic attack! This is obviously your evil plan, to make me lecture you on Warden and thereby assme the mantle of Wardenista myself. Fiendishly Clever!

War is fundamentally about convincing someone (or multiple people) to do something they don't want to do. There are some exceptions (i.e. Revenge), but in general its either "Give me something" or "stop doing something".

Killing people and breaking things is a way to achieve those ends that Warden suggests we don't have to resort to:


Knowing the strategic objective, we start looking for the means to achieve it. Our choices would range from war defined as bloody and destructive to cajolery of some kind. In the middle of this spectrum, we might find something (currently nameless) that makes it physically impossible for a possessor of something we want to withhold it but involves little or no bloodshed and destruction. To make discussion easier, let’s call this “bloodless force.” If we had this option at a reasonable cost, we would probably choose it in those instances when cajolery failed and when we could not reasonably argue that we should take the bloody war path as a first choice.

and


When we engage in conflict, we should always make our strategic objective the creation of a better peace. Normally, in a better peace the vanquished do not bear such hatred for the victors that another trial becomes inevitable. One way of reducing postconflict enmity involves lessening the suffering and recovery time of the defeated party. Traditional wars have perverse and long-lasting effects, but airpower may someday offer an alternative.

and


The objective of a conflict is to achieve a future picture, not to kill and destroy.

So we have a litany of appeals to "bloodless force" and as some have jokingly proposed "a theory of powerpoint power" (you just have to send the enemy the powerpoint detailing how you are going to dismember him, in parallel, and he will have no choice but to submit :eek: )

Yet we have a concept (outcome = physical (simple) X morale (complex))that deals only with physical systems and intentionally divorces "the hard part" because, well, its too hard. You can't bribe, cajol, confer with, give money or power to a physical gizmo.

All you can do is make so it doesn't work, or physically seperate it from the things it needs to work, or work upon. At the end of the day, if you restict yourself to physical systems, you pretty much restrict yourself to breaking them or breaking the connections to other things.

So one has to wonder just how literally Warden means us to take "bloodless"? He talks about airpower being the prefered means because it can "delievery energy with great precision". Yet seems to want to avoid to the extent possible killing people and breaking things. Particularly when he talks about things like:


In a few cases, we may find that just one or two will prove adequate, but in most instances we must affect several in a relatively compressed period of time. Notably, even in a large system such as the United States or China, the number of targets associated with strategic centers of gravity is rather small—considerably fewer than 1,000, more than likely.

If you do paralyze China by taking down their leadership, power and transportation networks (I would be amazed if that was 10,000 targets, let alone 1000, but I'll suspend disbelief , how many people will die from second order effects, even if none are killed in the initial attack? These do not seem to register on the airpower body count. This gets us once again to "nuclear warfare by conventional means" - the destruction of a states ability to function as a penalty for not doing what we want. WHy would such an attack not trigger a nuclear response by a country so equipped?

But, they will not, and they are not going to resent us for it, because everbody starved to death or sickened, rather than get blowed up by a bomb.

Of course if we sent them the powerpoint, they have nbody to blame but themselves :wry:

slapout9
04-06-2011, 06:05 PM
Ken, Fuchs, PVebber, I don't think you guys are confused, by the questions ask you are seem to be getting it. A couple of tweaks may be needed :wry:Especially the critical importance of the Navy as Warden pointed out in the article and as Fuchs brings up.




But only one example is a kinetic attack! This is obviously your evil plan, to make me lecture you on Warden and thereby assme the mantle of Wardenista myself. Fiendishly Clever!



No evil plan intended, just good discussion.

Here is a better example of breaking a physical system by bloodless means. The first 911 attack against our (USA) ring#2 Systems Essentials.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VCLRlVxOH-Q

And the "Moral Equivalent of War." It was an attack on our Physical System of Oil Dependence but no shots were fired. And they(OPEC/Arab Nations) won this one!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-tPePpMxJaA

Starting to see how it can be done? Like I have been saying our Enemies understand Ring theory and Systems Warfare very well. We seem to struggle with it. Much to our peril IMO.

pvebber
04-06-2011, 07:58 PM
No evil plan intended, just good discussion.

I was being funny ;)


Especially the critical importance of the Navy as Warden pointed out in the article and as Fuchs brings up.

The only reference to Navy's in Warden's latest piece is:


Readers need no reminder that one of the world’s truly great empires grew largely on the back of a Royal Navy that frequently won “wars”—or prevented them—by its mere presence.

An interesting testimony to a "non-Warden-like" strategy, particularly since the success of the Royal Navy was extremely improvisational, (ie it did not come from advnacing toward a future vision, but maintaining a status quo), it was very sequential (based on the time it took for infomation to travel, and the seasonal wind cycles), and was not system - theory based, but based on engagement with "forces" though often in the form of merchnatmen, not warships. The East India Company and its cargo were as important a form of "seapower" to the rise of British power as the '74 and its powder and shot.


Here is a better example of breaking a physical system by bloodless means.

No its simply a "revenge" attack against a "center of gravity". There was no strategy involved, it was simple revenge for having supported the ISrealis in the 73 war.

Nothing was "broken". They simpy reduced supply so costs would go up. They where not trying to force us to do anything, they simply wanted to cause fiscal pain.


And the "Moral Equivalent of War." It was an attack on our Physical System of Oil Dependence but no shots were fired. And they(OPEC/Arab Nations) won this one!

Hardly one of our "Great Moments in Strategic Thinking"... Like the war on poverty, the war on hunger, the war on drugs, or the war on people who don't sport enough colored ribbons, etc, this is war as metaphor, not "real" war.

To claim the Arab Oil Embargo as an example of the use of Warden's strategy is to claim that any activity involving centers of gravity is an example. And what is the role of airpower in such situations?

And by what measure did anybody "win"? They took a course of action that would impose financial cost on us, and we have since demostrated that it was a foolish thing to have done (a statment justified by the fact they have never done it again...). Pissing off your customers is invariably bad for business, no matter how indispensible you might think you are to them.

The fundamental non sequitor is still there. To the extent Warden's theory is about bloodless war (desired!) it is not about airpower. To the extent it is about airpower, it is not about bloodless war (not desired!). To the extent that it is bloodless, it is not about the physical, but the moral (too hard!) and to the extent it is about breaking things and killing people (simple), it must drive that factor quickly to zero. That leads to the resentment and bad peace one is trying to avoid.

And even in that context bloodless is a narowly defined thing, becasue if you are really going to "go to war" using a rapid series of parallel operations, you are not going to emply an oil embargo that takes months to years to achieve any strategic effect.

Trying to be all things in all ways, it ends up being "doing what you can against CoGs and hoping for the best (ie my desired picture of the future).

It just doesn't hang together.

slapout9
04-07-2011, 05:17 AM
pvebber, don't mean to be snarky but were you alive during the embargo? :confused:You do know that they physically stopped shipping oil at any price. It was not just a price embargo it was a physical embargo. I remember days when you could not get gas anyplace at any price and when you could there was usually a limit (rationing).

Backwards Observer
04-07-2011, 09:14 AM
Ken, Fuchs, PVebber, I don't think you guys are confused, by the questions ask you are seem to be getting it.

Slap, not that it matters what I think, but you seem like a good guy and Warden comes across as sincere; however your admonition that others are slow to 'get' the Theory of Bloodless Airpower while dropped ordnance is still chopping up folks in SEAsia seems uncharitable.

The following articles may be considered controversial:


We heard a terrifying noise which shook the ground; it was as if the earth trembled, rose up and opened beneath our feet. Enormous explosions lit up the sky like huge bolts of lightning; it was the American B-52s.
— Cambodian bombing survivor


Recorded using a groundbreaking IBM-designed system, the database provided extensive information on sorties conducted over Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Clinton’s gift was intended to assist in the search for unexploded ordnance left behind during the carpet bombing of the region. Littering the countryside, often submerged under farmland, this ordnance remains a significant humanitarian concern. It has maimed and killed farmers, and rendered valuable land all but unusable. Development and demining organizations have put the Air Force data to good use over the past six years, but have done so without noting its full implications, which turn out to be staggering.

The still-incomplete database (it has several “dark” periods) reveals that from October 4, 1965, to August 15, 1973, the United States dropped far more ordnance on Cambodia than was previously believed: 2,756,941 tons’ worth, dropped in 230,516 sorties on 113,716 sites. Just over 10 percent of this bombing was indiscriminate, with 3,580 of the sites listed as having “unknown” targets and another 8,238 sites having no target listed at all.

Bombing Cambodia - The Walrus (Canada) - October 2006 (http://www.walrusmagazine.com/articles/2006.10-history-bombing-cambodia/)

Bombs Over Cambodia (pdf) - Yale - October 2006 (http://www.yale.edu/cgp/Walrus_CambodiaBombing_OCT06.pdf)


Benedict F. Kiernan (born 1953 in Melbourne, Australia) is the Whitney Griswold Professor of History, Professor of International and Area Studies and Director of the Genocide Studies Program at Yale University. He is a prolific writer on the Cambodian genocide. Kiernan has also published prize-winning work on the global history of genocide.

Ben Kiernan - Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben_Kiernan)


Taylor Owen is Post Doctoral Fellow at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, UBC. His Doctorate is from the University of Oxford where he was Trudeau Scholar. He has been a lecturer at the Trudeau Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto, Research Fellow at the Center for Global Governance at the LSE, Fellow in the Genocide Studies Program at Yale University, was an Action Canada Fellow, has an MA from the University of British Columbia, and has worked as a researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and the International Development Research Center.

Taylor Owen Bio - taylorowen.com (http://taylorowen.com/)

***


The KR Tribunal is a national court, so I guess it makes sense that they are not allowed to put countries on trial. But that is not very satisfying to a lot of people in Cambodia. The folks about to be put on trial are already pointing fingers of responsibility at the US and China while the local farmers still can’t quite believe that one of their own could have killed so many.


From the Cambodia Daily, 25 September: The total weight of bombs that the US dropped on Cambodia during its war with Vietnam may have been five times greater than previously thought, according to a new academic study.

The bombing of Cambodia also began in 1965, more than three years earlier than is widely believed, according to historians Taylor Owen and Ben Kiernan whose analysis of US Air Force data released in 2000 appear in the October issue of Canada's The Walrus magazine.

Air Force data indicates that 2,756,941 tons of bombs were dropped in 230,516 sorties over 113,716 sites between 1965 and 1973, the authors say.

This surpasses the bomb weight dropped by the allied forces on all combat theaters during the whole of World War II, which totaled 2 million tons, they write.

...Information Minister and government spokesman Khieu Kanharith said the bombing encouraged rural Cambodians to join the Khmer Rouge. But he said he was not concerned with the numbers of bombs dropped. "We are Buddhists...so we try to forgive and forget," he said.

US Embassy spokesman Jeff Daigle could not be reached for comment.


Uh, forgiving and forgetting is probably a wise choice under the circumstances...

Who Is To Blame? - Trials and Denials In Cambodia - 9/30/2006 (http://trialsanddenials.blogspot.com/2006/09/who-is-to-blame.html)

Graphic: Sites Bombed by the US Air Force in Cambodia, 1965-73 - 113,716 Sites - 230,516 Sorties - 2,756,941 Tons of Ordnance

pvebber
04-07-2011, 02:44 PM
pvebber, don't mean to be snarky but were you alive during the embargo? You do know that they physically stopped shipping oil at any price.

We can start another thead to discuss the embargo if you want. As it pertains to the argument, whether I was alive or not is immaterial. They tried the embargo in 1967 to deter us from supporting Isreal in the 67 war. It was uncoordinated and inconsistently applied so it accomplished little.

I was wrong in describing the 73 embargo as "revenge" with no objective. Knee-jerk on my part I apologize for. It was imposed in retaliation for our aid to Isreal, as a cost-imposing strategy to cause us to end our support to Isreal. It failed to do that. It achieved an effect that we both remember well, but 'causing an effect' is not 'achieving an objective'.

OPEC did not end production, it raised the price and cut production in a series of increments. Wikipedia says a total of 70% in price and 25% in cut production. Oil, being a fungible commodity, can't be "cut off" by the supplier, it just gets redistributed by other customers once they take delivery. Stopping "direct shipments" doesn't mean much, except adding a "pass through tax" as the customer base redistributes what they get at a modest profit. There was a shortage, but not a "stoppage of shippin goil at any price".

The response was not a give in to the OPEC demands, but an INCREASE in aid to Isreal. So from the point of view of achieving a desired outcome, the embargo backfired. Warden might argue it failed because it used a physical CoG to affect the moral domain, and by not being sufficiently cost-imposing, allowed us to adapt and overcome it. It didn't 'break' anything, it just casued an incovenience that we were able to weather. Hence the issue with "bloodless war". It works on that darned, complex, "moral" term in the equation.

Back to the topic, I'll reiterate the problem with a focus on physical destruction:

The fundamental non sequitor is still there. To the extent Warden's theory is about bloodless war (desired!) it is not about airpower. To the extent it is about airpower, it is not about bloodless war (not desired!). To the extent that it is bloodless, it is not about the physical, but the moral (too hard!) and to the extent it is about breaking things and killing people (simple), it must drive that factor quickly to zero. That leads to the resentment and bad peace one is trying to avoid.

This seems to be a fundamental inconsistency in Warden's theory?

Backwards Observer
04-08-2011, 02:42 AM
Sorry for going off topic, but here's another useless thought. If US evangelical Christians, senators and congressman feel compelled to do the Jesus thing in foreign countries; maybe putting together a program with the USAF to help Cambodia dispose of some of that ordnance would be helpful. Perhaps this is already being done. If so, Praise the Lord!

Link to a New Zealand company doing UXO clearance in Cambodia and Laos among other places:

Phoenix Clearance Limited Website (http://www.phoenixclearanceltd.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=1)

Female Bomb Disposal Technicians - Phoenix Clearance (http://www.phoenixclearanceltd.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22%3Apcl-latest-news&catid=4%3Anewsflash&Itemid=1)

Pic: Laotian UXO Clearance Lady.

slapout9
04-08-2011, 08:54 PM
We can start another thead to discuss the embargo if you want. As it pertains to the argument, whether I was alive or not is immaterial. They tried the embargo in 1967 to deter us from supporting Isreal in the 67 war. It was uncoordinated and inconsistently applied so it accomplished little. The reason I asked is in the past I have found it hard to discuss just how effective it was unless they some personal experience about it(part of the 5 minute attention span America seems to have). OPEC was formed in or around 1960 I believe and in 1967 they had not really become a real threat but by 1973 they were extremely effective. It is also a very concrete example of an attack on a System. The target chosen did not just have a tactical target effect, it had a Strategic System Wide effect, it bypassed our Ring#5 miltary forces and went straight to the inner rings of our country as Warden talks about. It Affected our Leadership, our System Essentials and our Population, some which have lasted to this day.


I was wrong in describing the 73 embargo as "revenge" with no objective. Knee-jerk on my part I apologize for. It was imposed in retaliation for our aid to Isreal, as a cost-imposing strategy to cause us to end our support to Isreal. It failed to do that. It achieved an effect that we both remember well, but 'causing an effect' is not 'achieving an objective'. No need to apologize, knee-jerk reactions are common to all mankind:wry: but I disagree with your conclusion. There was a very clear Arab objective and that was to stop the Israeli counter-attack by conducting a Strategic Systems Essential Ring #2 attack against their supporter(The US) and it worked exactly as you described (that type of strategy is listed in Warden's The Enemy as a System) and as they (OPEC) wanted it to.


OPEC did not end production, it raised the price and cut production in a series of increments. Wikipedia says a total of 70% in price and 25% in cut production. Oil, being a fungible commodity, can't be "cut off" by the supplier, it just gets redistributed by other customers once they take delivery. Stopping "direct shipments" doesn't mean much, except adding a "pass through tax" as the customer base redistributes what they get at a modest profit. There was a shortage, but not a "stoppage of shippin goil at any price". Again that is exactly what they wanted to do and I disagree Oil is or at least was not fungible, the demand is/was basically inelastic as the economist say.


The response was not a give in to the OPEC demands, but an INCREASE in aid to Isreal. So from the point of view of achieving a desired outcome, the embargo backfired. Warden might argue it failed because it used a physical CoG to affect the moral domain, and by not being sufficiently cost-imposing, allowed us to adapt and overcome it. It didn't 'break' anything, it just casued an incovenience that we were able to weather. Hence the issue with "bloodless war". It works on that darned, complex, "moral" term in the equation. We did give into OPEC demands. Israel was going to be overun until US Airpower resupplied them with one of the most massive Air Lifts ever accomplished(Israel owes it life to American Airpower) and then when Israel counter-attacked the embargo was placed against the US and in a matter of days we saw a cease fire. But the Arabs were not satisfied and when the embargo was lifted in 1974 OIL had tripled and shortly after the stock market would crash(50% loss in value due to OIL) and we would enter one of the worst recessions we have ever had until 2008.


Back to the topic, I'll reiterate the problem with a focus on physical destruction: It is about very precise destrcution. Not carpet bombing (unless that is the political objective) more like a laser beam burning through a five dollar part of a million dollar machine.


The fundamental non sequitor is still there. To the extent Warden's theory is about bloodless war (desired!) it is not about airpower. To the extent it is about airpower, it is not about bloodless war (not desired!). To the extent that it is bloodless, it is not about the physical, but the moral (too hard!) and to the extent it is about breaking things and killing people (simple), it must drive that factor quickly to zero. That leads to the resentment and bad peace one is trying to avoid.

This seems to be a fundamental inconsistency in Warden's theory?

No, the article is in 2 parts first is Strategy which is independent of any service the second part is about the future of Airpower, about Precision of impact and Precision of Effect.

pvebber
04-09-2011, 03:58 AM
It is also a very concrete example of an attack on a System. The target chosen did not just have a tactical target effect, it had a Strategic System Wide effect, it bypassed our Ring#5 miltary forces and went straight to the inner rings of our country as Warden talks about. It Affected our Leadership, our System Essentials and our Population, some which have lasted to this day.

Or it was a case of "if you only have 1 card to play, you don't need systems analysis to play it". Just because in hindsight, you can look at the US as a system, and interpret things other people do in terms of system effects, doesn't mean that at the time, they were thinking in terms of system theory.

In any case it appears you have retreated from the notion that war is only about breaking PHYSICAL systems. I will agree to disagree on how good an example the oil embargo is and revel in my (moral) victory ;)


It is about very precise destrcution.


Yes, but to reduce the PHYSICAL side of the outcome equation to ZERO you need to strike lots and lots of targets. That is lots of broken stuff, even if it only has little holes in it breaking it. IF you break an electrical system nationwide, yes you may have done it by breaking a 5$ part, but without power, people will die and bad things will happen, and they will still hold you responsible for shutting their country down and ruining their economy, despite how economically you destroyed it. A devastating effect is a DEVASTATING, regardless of its cause.


No, the article is in 2 parts first is Strategy which is independent of any service the second part is about the future of Airpower, about Precision of impact and Precision of Effect.

But the two parts have to hang together if it is to acheive Warden's intent:



Regardless of airpower’s potential, it can never realize its real capability so long as it remains bound to an anachronistic view of war with an anachronistic vocabulary. On the contrary, if airpower is truly to come of
age, it must do so in the context of a mod#ern concept of war that associates the use of force as directly as possible with end# game strategic objectives, not with the act of fighting. If this is to happen, the opera#tors of airpower must understand, believe, and teach end#game strategy as the foundation of airpower. Failure to do so will con#demn airpower to suboptimization and de#prive its owners of using force in such a dramatically different way that will achieve national objectives quickly and at minimum cost.

The strategy provides the context for airpower's coming out party. Once again the strategy is valuable, the argument has not been made convincingly that it apply's universally to all military problems, or is necessarily better than other strategic methods. Airpower is useful, but not omnipotent and assuming that it is until proven otherwise is not a logical approach as it invites accepting great risk by being disproven only by tragic outcomes, or the expenditure of vast sums.

I don't feel you've satisfactorily addressed the criticisms made to this point. I'm not saying the strategy is "bad" or that airpower does not have value. I'm saying the strategy is but one of many ways to skin the proverbial cat, and that airpower is tool that does not have any more "potential" to be applied to "any problem until proven otherwise" than a hammer does. I will continue use my hammer to drive nails, but turn to a screwdriver to turn screws and a saw to turn one piece of wood into two pieces, despite the fact my hammer can also do those tasks, just not as effectively.

slapout9
04-10-2011, 05:55 AM
.

Or it was a case of "if you only have 1 card to play, you don't need systems analysis to play it". Just because in hindsight, you can look at the US as a system, and interpret things other people do in terms of system effects, doesn't mean that at the time, they were thinking in terms of system theory. Maybe, but it worked so good they did again in 1979 when Iran pulled bascially the same stunt.


In any case it appears you have retreated from the notion that war is only about breaking PHYSICAL systems. I will agree to disagree on how good an example the oil embargo is and revel in my (moral) victory ;) Retreat! Hell we just got here.(I think some Marine said that) War is about AFFECTING Physical systems, you get 2 points for my poor choice of words;).




Yes, but to reduce the PHYSICAL side of the outcome equation to ZERO you need to strike lots and lots of targets. That is lots of broken stuff, even if it only has little holes in it breaking it. IF you break an electrical system nationwide, yes you may have done it by breaking a 5$ part, but without power, people will die and bad things will happen, and they will still hold you responsible for shutting their country down and ruining their economy, despite how economically you destroyed it. A devastating effect is a DEVASTATING, regardless of its cause. Then those people should be very carfull about attacking my country in the first place.





But the two parts have to hang together if it is to acheive Warden's intent:

The strategy provides the context for airpower's coming out party. Once again the strategy is valuable, the argument has not been made convincingly that it apply's universally to all military problems, or is necessarily better than other strategic methods. Airpower is useful, but not omnipotent and assuming that it is until proven otherwise is not a logical approach as it invites accepting great risk by being disproven only by tragic outcomes, or the expenditure of vast sums. I don't think he is saying that at all, it's more like we need to find out what all Airpower can truly do, because we have just "assumed" (often because of current technology limits) it has limits, instead of finding out what they actually are.


I don't feel you've satisfactorily addressed the criticisms made to this point. I'm not saying the strategy is "bad" or that airpower does not have value. I'm saying the strategy is but one of many ways to skin the proverbial cat, and that airpower is tool that does not have any more "potential" to be applied to "any problem until proven otherwise" than a hammer does. I will continue use my hammer to drive nails, but turn to a screwdriver to turn screws and a saw to turn one piece of wood into two pieces, despite the fact my hammer can also do those tasks, just not as effectively. If you read the article Warden says something to the effect that when people say Airpower can not solve the problem what they really mean is that Military power can not solve the prolem.

Marc
04-10-2011, 10:07 AM
If you read the article Warden says something to the effect that when people say Airpower can not solve the problem what they really mean is that Military power can not solve the prolem.

Slapout9,

that is indeed the sentence that closes Warden's circular reasoning. His exact phrasing is:


If we cannot or will not operate in the parallel domain, then we should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

In summary: airpower is the best way to win a war and if it is not, we should not go to war. Allow me to present one concrete example of the implications of this type of circular reasoning. As Warden concedes himself:


Offhand, I can think of only one thing that airpower cannot do and that some other form of military power can: physically take people into custody.

This means that, if Warden had been President George W. Bush's strategist in 1989, Manuel A. Noriega would still be the dictator of Panama. To paraphrase Slapout9's statement: "when people say Airpower can not bring democracy to Panama what they really mean is that Military power can not bring democracy to Panama." Well, if you read a history book about Panama, I think you will have to admit that the facts contradict Warden's circular reasoning.

pvebber
04-11-2011, 12:14 AM
War is about AFFECTING Physical systems

Affecting physical systems is but one WAY of conducting war. War, I'll say again, is about getting someone to do what you want, stop doing what you don't want, or simply revenge. It is waged against people, which is why "leadership" and not physical infrastructure is at the center of Warden's five rings.


Then those people should be very carfull about attacking my country in the first place.

What if they didn't attack your country, but you require them to do something, or stop doing something? (We are Good guys so don't do the revenge thing...)

OR is your interpretation of Warden that we should only engage in war if we are physically attacked?


I don't think he is saying that at all, it's more like we need to find out what all Airpower can truly do, because we have just "assumed" (often because of current technology limits) it has limits, instead of finding out what they actually are.

So is the Air Force remiss in conducting war games and exercises that address these things? I've been the Red Cell lead for the last 3 or 4 AFRL futures wargames and they addressed a remarkable array of things that airpower might do. Are these efforts somehow insufficient? Col. Warden has been involved as a guest speaker at at least one of these as I recall (one of the opportunities I got to chat with him). They are constantly "finding what they actually are".

Airpower has demonstrated that it has limits. That is a fact. Technology has acted over time to reduce those limits, but they have to demonstrate that they do so. Just as the advance of technology has removed limitations on land and seapower. Capabilities have to be proven, not taken as fact until disproven. We can't afford, particularly now, to do otherwise.



If you read the article Warden says something to the effect that when people say Airpower can not solve the problem what they really mean is that Military power can not solve the prolem.

This is a view that gives in to the "dark side" of tacticizing war. What I mean by that is the idea that achieving tactical objectives is necessary and sufficient to achieve operational objectives,and operational objectives are necessary and sufficient to achieve strategic objectives. In its most extreme form it denies the operational level and claims tactical objectives are necessary and sufficient to directly achieve strategic objectives.

The Viet Nam war, where the North lost nearly all tactical battles, yet won the war, serves as a counter example.

It tends to frame warfare (the ways of conducting war) in terms of picking targets and breaking them (or seizing them). Operational Art is not seen as necessary, because ,done quickly and pervasively enough, the strategic outcome can be achieved without the "enemy ever getting a turn".

This sounds a lot like Warden's view. And it suffers from myopia to the potential ways the adversary can 'take their turn' in ways that render airpower either irrelavant, or take advatage of over aggressive utilization of it.

The reality of modern war is that the cases where the adversary can be indiscriminately attacked to the point of paralysis are extremely rare. By international law, if you "break it you own it". You can't just cause a country to stop functioning and then just say "serves you right for pissing me off". You can get to the "mission accomplished" moment, but as we have seen, that doesn't mean you have achieved your war objectives.

slapout9
04-12-2011, 04:23 PM
Marc and pvebber. I had a close encounter with the dentist yesterday:( not up to speed yet, so I will respond later.

pvebber
04-12-2011, 06:46 PM
Hope you recover quickly!

Somethings to think about:


The limitations of systems thinking (http://www.tms-americas.com/pdfs/Limitations_of_Systems_Thinking.pdf)

a partial pdf (can't find the rest) slides 6 and 7 being the important ones

and

Dark side of systems thinking (http://tmsamericas.wordpress.com/2011/01/26/a-dark-side-to-systems-thinking/)

and how potential adversaries look at strategy in very different terms than we do.

We play chess and football, they play Go and Soccer (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB378.pdf)

Marc
04-12-2011, 08:28 PM
Marc and pvebber. I had a close encounter with the dentist yesterday:( not up to speed yet, so I will respond later.

Get well soon. All the best.

Ken White
04-12-2011, 10:52 PM
It won't help but you won't care. :D

(Get well, Podner)

Cliff
04-13-2011, 03:59 AM
Shouldn’t we organize/train/equip for the most realistic fight?

Cole,

I'm not arguing that we need significantly higher investments in airpower... only pointing out that we have just barely enough, and can't afford to lose anymore.


We buy nukes to deter Russia/China…and reasonable air and seapower...but not at the expense of conflicts with 90% probabilities vs 1%.

Again, this would put us in the same trap as we found ourselves in with the New Look- nuke 'em or appease 'em.


Reasonable statisticians comparing probabilities of a Soldier/Marine dying in current and future conflict versus hypothetical threats to a B-2 by a foe with 5th gen aircraft would see.

It's simple risk management. With only 20 B-2s, we can't afford to lose many.


Even classified assessments can be questionable. Look how we exaggerated the threat of the Mi-25?

Assume you meant MiG-25. Since we have flown against Flankers in live fly exercises, we know the actual capes of the aircraft.


Meanwhile, real Soldiers/Marines/Sailors/Airmen on the ground are getting killed…not Airmen at altitude or Sailors at sea. Since the end of the Cold War, only ground combatants have faced serious risk. 327 fourth generation aircraft based on the F-16 and Su-27 could not down more than a handful of F-22/F-35, B-2s, or stealthy cruise missile/ UAS. None of those U.S. systems facing 252 advanced SAMs would experience losses approaching what Soldiers/Marines experience in one month of current/future combat….multiplied by 100 months.

Cole, I think you're being a little bit unreasonable here, perhaps because I'm not making my point very clearly.

The issue with losing air superiority isn't the folks in the air that will get killed... The problem is the damage the enemy can do to everything else- ground troops, the Navy, bases, civilians, infrastructure. Oh by the way, no more RPA intel, no C-17s to deliver supplies, no ships to bring in fuel, etc etc. While the strategic corporal is a reality, most corporals screwing up an engagement will not result in massive loss of human life. Not saying that we'll necessarily lose the war... but we will lose a lot of people, and we probably will not achieve our objectives without air superiority. Again, probability is lower - consequences are WAY catastrophic in terms of national interests.

I think you are underestimating the capabilities of the enemy. I've trained against this threat... it is not a pushover.

I will re-iterate again... I'm not calling for abolishing the Army and letting the Air Force do everything itself- I am simply pointing out that we have a USAF that is just big enough to achieve a moderate level of risk.

I agree that the risk to folks on the ground has been great over the last 10 years. I respect and honor all those who serve. But I think it's a little cheap to use that fact to say that we shouldn't worry about risk on the high end of conflict.


It’s a zero sum gain budget environment with Iraq winding down, Afghanistan on a countdown, and Libya starting its upward spiral with a less than clear endstate and poor current results.
Planned tanker numbers were based on nuclear bomber requirements of 50 years ago. Current tankers are at half their lifespan despite advanced age and we never have used more than 300+ of the 500+ in any conflict, nor do we have the space to park them outside TBM range.

Current tankers are becoming increasingly expensive to maintain. New tankers will also allow basing further from the threat while still delivering significant fuel offloads. Are you really trying to say we don't need new tankers? If we can't get the Joes to the fight, or get the troops their supplies and equipment, how will you fight your counterinsurgency you think is likely?


Given numbers of actual aircraft shot down in past decades, how many CSAR aircraft are required when MV-22/CV-22 already exist and plenty of MH Special Ops and Naval helicopters are fielded? Agree we need a new bomber but considering that only a handful of B-2s were required in Libya and stealthy Navy UAS and MC-X will exist, we may not need anywhere near 80-100 new stealthy bombers.

Ask the folks in A-Stan what they think about the USAF having dedicated CSAR aircraft... I think you'll find they like having the robust CASEVAC capability.

As for the bombers, we need to have enough that they are not a silver bullet force- see points on B-2 fleet above. Remember that next gen bomber will replace B-2s, B-1s, and some B-52s, not just B-2.


Believe the Libya model will prove not nearly as successful as some believe. Even if it is, it is atypical terrain and a minor threat. Try the same thing in the terrain of Lebanon, North Korea, Venezuela, or Ukraine, and try to find TBMs in Iran. Distaste for boots on the ground does not preclude that need in multiple much more likely conflicts than China/Russia. From the looks of unrest in the Middle East both now and in the past 20 years, more of the same is inevitable.

Agree that terrain in other places is more difficult. I don't think that changes the fact that the appetite for boots on the ground is 0. As multiple folks have pointed out, our strategy is set by politicians. I doubt any President any time soon will commit significant land forces if he can avoid it. Again, I am not saying this WILL NOT happen, only that it is unlikely.


Proof lies in deployments required per service member. Any service that deploys less than the Army has more force structure than the Army proportionally.

I really have a problem with this. The USAF was deployed WAY more than the Army from 1991-2001... but you didn't see folks complaining and saying that the Army should be cut to give the USAF more force structure.


We would never use nukes in North Korea, Lebanon, Syria, Ukraine, or Venezuela. ....The rogue nations with unstable leadership are the ones most difficult to deter, and as Qaddafi’s actions show, no amount of air and seapower are a deterrent when we tell him we won’t go ashore with anything but the CIA and SOF/SF.

I agree on no nukes... point being that you have no options if you only have nukes which you don't want to use and you don't have some conventional capability.

I would submit that we're not trying to deter Qadaffi... if we were doing that, we'd be doing things in a little more direct way. I think everyone understands we're trying to use the minimum force possible to keep him from attacking cities.


1988 was well before Desert Storm. March 1991 was shortly thereafter because we stopped short of doing the job correctly…and settled on a NFZ.

Cole, we did not enforce the NFZ till after March 1991. We explicitly let Saddam fly his helicopters (we can discuss the reasons why we did that if you want). Northern and Southern Watch were 100% effective once instituted in protecting the Kurds and Shia from attack. If you have evidence to the contrary, please present it. Continuing to make false statements with no evidence is not productive.


Add the wear and tear on aircraft that now must be replaced prematurely and cost of ONW/OSW to the cost of OIF to finish the job…not to mention higher gas prices due to “oil for food.”

Getting Saddam out of power was not the objective of the NFZs. You are correct on the wear and tear, but that's already included in the costs in terms of phase hours. I would say that none of the aircraft have really been replaced prematurely... unless you think 30+ years (at the shortest) is a premature replacement for a high performance aircraft.


Maybe. Seem to recall the last time we sent cruise missiles into Sudan and Afghanistan, it didn’t work well. Bombing did not stop genocide in Bosnia. A NFZ won’t stop terror attacks or safe havens. NFZ won’t hinder Iran or Hezbollah TBMs or a DPRK attack across the DMZ. Russia could attack Ukraine

Airpower has the ability to affect all the situations you mention above. Cruise missiles are not a good substitute. Bombing did stop the genocide, it just happened too late due to a lack of political will.

Again, I'm not arguing we don't need an Army... I'm saying we need to face the reality that because airpower in uncontested situations is lower risk (as you have harped on repeatedly) our leaders will probably tend to use it more frequently than massive landpower when they can. Obviously if the DPRK invades the South we will need massive landpower. But that's not the situation I'm discussing...


No fly zones and airpower/seapower have been incapable of ending warfare, terrorism, and irrational despots as we have known them over the past 50 years. By themselves, air and seapower won’t deter or end war over the next decades, either.

I rest my case. See above, you are completely missing my point, probably because I didn't make it clearly. NFZs don't end wars, or terror, or change governments. Airpower can end SOME wars... but again I'm not saying it can do that in all cases. Not arguing for increased spending at the expense of the Army... simply saying that the USAF is at about the minimum level we can afford if we want to continue to be a superpower. Without air superiority we would end up losing a lot more troops on the ground in any contested scenario. We lost 3000 folks in under 2 hours on 9/11 due to a loss of air superiority. That was accomplished with four airliners. Think of what actual weapons could do.

I should probably be happy that folks think the way you do- it is a result of the fact that the USAF and USN have been so successful in the air over the past 30 years. I just would hate to count on being lucky to achieve the same results in the future.

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff
04-13-2011, 04:15 AM
Fighter Jocks are great folks.

Aww, shucks... I didn't know you cared, Ken! ;)


One of my best friends was once one, many good acquaintances are or were. However, most pilots suffer from two minor problems as war fighters (IMO, obviously...); they're conditioned to using checklists and what they do relies on knowledge and acceptance of the theory and laws of Physics. Problem with that is you cannot develop a checklist for people activity and war fighting is an art, not a science. A rather lawless art at that... :D

These are problems? Just kidding. I agree about the checklists. I also agree about the physics. Disagree about the people... at least where air-to-air folks like Warden (he was a FAC early on but finished up as a F-15C guy) are concerned. One of the awesome parts of air-to-air fighting is that you are constantly faced with a different problem precisely because the other guy is also trying his best to kill you. Good air-to-air pilots understand the human dimension and try to use it to their advantage. There's a good deal of art to it... Not to say that there aren't good TTPs, or that some folks don't use them like cookbooks. I think that's true in any military effort, though- TTPs exist as a starting point, and how far beyond them you get depends on how capable you are at progressing.


Back to the "in theory" bit. That's the rub -- theory and actuality often differ, intelligence is rarely adequate to the degree he envisions and that entails making assumptions. That's always dangerous and the Intel guys won't ordinarily do it, they're rather -- excessively, some say -- cautious that way. :rolleyes:

Agree on the intel!


That leaves the final stategery up to the decider -- who will decide based upon his gut feeling and his assumptions rather than on the precision that Warden's strategy demands for best execution. We have literally seen that in operation several times over the past ten (20 ? Back even unto DS/DS?) years when several decision makers had the power but not the knowledge to make decisions (and that in a system that strongly militates against disagreeing with the Boss).

Valid, I think Warden would argue that we should work on this.


Warden's theories have merit, his process is sensible in some situations. Neither his nor any other 'system' has the route to the always best solution. Nor is anyone likely to develop a better idea because, as he said: "Conversely, the morale side the human side is beyond the realm of the predictable in a particular situation because humans are so different from each other..." Totally true. Might work better if every 'implementer' (and every opponent...) was another Warden -- they have not been and will not be.

Interesting point on the implementer mattering...


His follow on to that last quote: "Our war efforts, therefore, should be directed primarily at the physical side" goes circular -- we're back to needing quite accurate physical Intel. We've almost never had that and are even more unlikely to do so in the near future... :(

Good intel is a must. I still argue that knowing the end state you want to achieve should be the starting point... even if you can't know EXACTLY how to get there it is probably best to have a direction.

Good insight Ken, thanks.

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff
04-13-2011, 04:41 AM
Slap, not that it matters what I think, but you seem like a good guy and Warden comes across as sincere; however your admonition that others are slow to 'get' the Theory of Bloodless Airpower while dropped ordnance is still chopping up folks in SEAsia seems uncharitable.

I think Warden would agree with you B.O., and point out that maybe we could have bombed some targets in NVN (ala 1972) instead of Cambodia... Warden is not saying that warfare is bloodless now. He is saying that the potential is there and we should keep trying to get there.


The following articles may be considered controversial:

Why? We bombed the heck out of Cambodia, Laos, and S. Vietnam- more ordnance there than on NVN if I recall correctly. It wasn't pretty. Warden argues we should try and avoid repeating this in the future. I agree.

Cambodia could be a very depressing place based on its' history, but isn't because the people there are so happy and friendly. You have to admire their resilience.

V/R,

Cliff

Backwards Observer
04-13-2011, 05:39 AM
Warden is not saying that warfare is bloodless now. He is saying that the potential is there and we should keep trying to get there.

Warden is a visionary, I'm just a random internet clod. My humble suggestion would be that a deeper understanding of how different cultures interact in their own regional contexts rather then attempting to template a system over them might help reduce the confusion and/or chopping. If not, then a better way of persuading/restraining folks than unloading millions 'o' tons of bombs on subsistence farmers would certainly be desirable. I know that's not how it's done no more, just sayin'.


Why?

To be honest, who knows what the f**k is or isn't controversial anymore. Not too long ago, there seemed to be a controversy over who was actually a human being and who wasn't. Wait...folks still ain't sure? Well, there ya go. Maybe we're all just systems. Does that mean some systems are more equal than others?


Cambodia could be a very depressing place based on its' history, but isn't because the people there are so happy and friendly. You have to admire their resilience.

If by 'happy and friendly', you mean 'made a virtue out of region-wide trauma', then sure. I think I know what you're trying to say, er, that is, I think I know what I'm trying to say..

Cliff, I appreciate your taking the time to reply. I gotta say, flying around in the heavens sure seems to make for an enviably upbeat outlook, I say this sincerely. Thanks again.

Ken White
04-13-2011, 03:20 PM
Aww, shucks... I didn't know you cared, Ken! ;)I duz -- but it's totally like play-tonic. Not to say you can't get the random kiss to make sure the ungodly are paying attention. ;)
One of the awesome parts of air-to-air fighting is that you are constantly faced with a different problem precisely because the other guy is also trying his best to kill you. Good air-to-air pilots understand the human dimension and try to use it to their advantage. There's a good deal of art to it...Unquestionably and most of you guys almost certainly do that one on one bit at altitude far better than would I. You even excel at the small groups in conflict thing. The problem I've noted is when multiple groups doing different things on the ground intrude in the air oriented bubble, things sometimes get connfoozed and much the skill set falls into the non productive (sometimes even mildly counterproductive... :rolleyes:) realm. Skill sets have specificity by definition.
I think that's true in any military effort, though- TTPs exist as a starting point, and how far beyond them you get depends on how capable you are at progressing.Totally true. There are green suiters with skill sets not amenable to close combat or even generic land warfare. To include, regrettably, some in high places.
Interesting point on the implementer mattering...That's really the only thing that is slightly more important than good or at least adequate Intel -- the wrong guy in the job will almost inevitably make flawed decisions. The Military personnel system with its strong tendency to make like Peas in the Pod militates (bad pun...) a median personna. Mediocrity is akin to median. We need round pegs for round holes -- you can put a square peg in a round hole but it's less than optimum and it'll be smaller than desirable...
Good intel is a must. I still argue that knowing the end state you want to achieve should be the starting point... even if you can't know EXACTLY how to get there it is probably best to have a direction.And I certainly agree. I suspect Warden, Slap and pvebber can also agree. the issue then becomes which of us is the designated Elector of Directions...

The implementer, acting on the Intel available...

Be careful up there... ;)

slapout9
04-13-2011, 06:36 PM
It won't help but you won't care. :D

(Get well, Podner)

Best advice I ever recieved:)

slapout9
04-13-2011, 07:06 PM
In summary: airpower is the best way to win a war and if it is not, we should not go to war. Allow me to present one concrete example of the implications of this type of circular reasoning. As Warden concedes himself:

Marc, he says usually in the article not always.




This means that, if Warden had been President George W. Bush's strategist in 1989, Manuel A. Noriega would still be the dictator of Panama. To paraphrase Slapout9's statement: "when people say Airpower can not bring democracy to Panama what they really mean is that Military power can not bring democracy to Panama." Well, if you read a history book about Panama, I think you will have to admit that the facts contradict Warden's circular reasoning.

No, it doesn't. It means what he said that if you want to take someone into physical custody then you will need another type of military force besides Airpower.

Marc, a great deal of what Warden talks about is from the late 50's and early 60's. Parallel attack in Army speak is Distributed Operations. Planing back wards from the Future Picture picture is the same thing I learned and as Ken has pointed used to be taught as Back Planning in the Army. Warden will tell you himself that pretty much everything he has said has been around for a while, he is just bringing it back up as a way forward for our country. Having grown up in that era and seen some of the plans for what our country was going to be as opposed to what it has become I am a true believer. We have never truly exploited Air and Space Power like it could be done and the Army has nothing to fear from that.

General James M. Gavin used to say this "Never send a Soldier when you should send a guided missile." That is a simplified version of what Warden is saying, except now we are entering a world where we should be exploiting precision of impact and precision of effect. Again if you read some of the older Army Airborne Warfare theories you will find there are a lot of similarities and a few critical differences that if we exploited them we would end up being very complimentary forces.

Marc
04-14-2011, 09:31 AM
Parallel attack in Army speak is Distributed Operations. Planing back wards from the Future Picture picture is the same thing I learned and as Ken has pointed used to be taught as Back Planning in the Army. Warden will tell you himself that pretty much everything he has said has been around for a while, he is just bringing it back up as a way forward for our country.

Slapout9,

Forgive me, but I will not be fooled by your statement that army operations are some kind of subset to Warden's five-ring/parallel attack strategy.


We have never truly exploited Air and Space Power like it could be done and the Army has nothing to fear from that.


I disagree with you twice.

FIRST, If you truly study Air and Space Power, you should do so with an open mind. This means that you have to be aware of the Air Power capabilities as well as its shortfalls. Warden's article demonstrates an unjustified optimism with regard to the former and a complete blindness for the latter. Read the quote below.


In other words, we should at least begin with the presumption that airpower can carry out any military task. If we fail to do so, we create a self-fulfilling prophecy and don’t even examine the possibilities because “everyone knows” we have always used bayonets guided by human beings as the preferred tool and that will “never change.” Offhand, I can think of only one thing that airpower cannot do and that some other form of military power can: physically take people into custody.

Offhand, I can think of several things that airpower cannot do and that some other form of military power can: nation building for instance, or conduct counterinsurgency operations in Colombia and the Philippines, or remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The most important thing Air Power cannot do is terminate conflict. Sorry, but I do not see how Air Power alone could have successfully concluded the conflicts in 1991 en 2003 in Iraq or the conflict in Panama in 1989.

SECOND, there is a strong tendency to turn this debate into an Air Force - Army pissing contest. Those opposed to Warden's arguments often hear things like "the Army has nothing to fear from Warden's strategy". Sorry, but the fact that the Army has something or nothing to fear from Warden is irrelevant. It does not increase or decrease the validity of his reasoning.

pvebber
04-14-2011, 09:42 PM
...because he states his strategy in his Posture Statement to Congress (http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/04%20April/Willard%2004-12-11.pdf) not in terms of a "future picture" but as an "evolving posturing of forces" that is realtionship-centric:



USPACOM thus embraces a theater strategy that leverages an evolving force posture. In concert with other government agencies, this posture is designed to simultaneously hedge against traditional and asymmetric challenges as well as advance alliance and partner-nation relationships. Extensive analyses clearly indicate a need to build an integrated posture framework that prioritizes adjustments by maximizing strength, balancing and biasing disposition, and sustaining readiness in all sub-regions (Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania).

The "future picture" strategy applies to situations akin to chess, where you are competing with an opponent to create a particluar endstate (the king being checkmated) it does not apply to Go where a player trying to achieve a predetermined end state will always lose to a competent player that works to maximize his shi or the potential opportunity implicit in his arrangement of stones (forces) and act upon those opportunities when it is most benficial, not in accordance with a particular timetable or to achieve "victory" in a particular area of the board.

Col Warden does not look at war as a game of Go, which is very dangerous as that is the game or primary adversary in the Pacific invented. Thankfully, Adm Willard appears to understand this.

Or is he falling victim to outdated thinking? Should he be stating what we want the Pacific security picture ot look like in the future and work back from it? Should he decide what that future picture might be? Can anybody or any group? If we can't state a desired future picture for a region like the Pacific, where does that leave the Warden strategic mandate?

slapout9
04-15-2011, 04:04 PM
Forgive me, but I will not be fooled by your statement that army operations are some kind of subset to Warden's five-ring/parallel attack strategy. I don't expect you to be fooled. And no it isn't a subset, it is the same set, just by another name.






FIRST, If you truly study Air and Space Power, you should do so with an open mind. This means that you have to be aware of the Air Power capabilities as well as its shortfalls. Warden's article demonstrates an unjustified optimism with regard to the former and a complete blindness for the latter. Read the quote below.

I have a very open mind, perhaps you should open your's to some Army Aviation history. Link is posted below.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NpFg9JVvyEE&feature=related

The first part is overall summary and description of capabilities of the time period, about 1958 I think. At around the 19 minute mark things will start to get interesting. Some of the quotes from this section. The goal was to create an "Air Task Force completley independant of the ground." "The Army Commander will no longer be attached to the ground." "Flying Soldiers moving in all 3 dimensions."


Offhand, I can think of several things that airpower cannot do and that some other form of military power can: nation building for instance, or conduct counterinsurgency operations in Colombia and the Philippines, or remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The most important thing Air Power cannot do is terminate conflict. Sorry, but I do not see how Air Power alone could have successfully concluded the conflicts in 1991 en 2003 in Iraq or the conflict in Panama in 1989. Airpower alone couldn't have and Warden would not argue that it could have, but in the future that may not be the case. The Air Force could be better at nation building (as far as the physical aspect) than a lot of people believe. They did extensive studies in the 1950's on how to rapidly rebuild a nation after a nuclear attack.


SECOND, there is a strong tendency to turn this debate into an Air Force - Army pissing contest. Those opposed to Warden's arguments often hear things like "the Army has nothing to fear from Warden's strategy". Sorry, but the fact that the Army has something or nothing to fear from Warden is irrelevant. It does not increase or decrease the validity of his reasoning.
I certanly agree on that. It's supposed to be a discussion/debate not a contest.

slapout9
04-15-2011, 04:18 PM
Affecting physical systems is but one WAY of conducting war. War, I'll say again, is about getting someone to do what you want, stop doing what you don't want, or simply revenge. It is waged against people, which is why "leadership" and not physical infrastructure is at the center of Warden's five rings. I am not making myself clear. Everything in the rings is pysical including people, I am not just talking about ring 3 Infrastructure. Influence a physical leader is affecting a physical system.

.


What if they didn't attack your country, but you require them to do something, or stop doing something? (We are Good guys so don't do the revenge thing...) Interesting question....revenge or some would call it justice?


OR is your interpretation of Warden that we should only engage in war if we are physically attacked? Yes, attacked or confirmed pending attack.




Col. Warden has been involved as a guest speaker at at least one of these as I recall (one of the opportunities I got to chat with him). They are constantly "finding what they actually are". They are, that was actually one of Warden's jobs in the Air Force.


Airpower has demonstrated that it has limits. That is a fact. Technology has acted over time to reduce those limits, but they have to demonstrate that they do so. Just as the advance of technology has removed limitations on land and seapower. Capabilities have to be proven, not taken as fact until disproven. We can't afford, particularly now, to do otherwise. Agree





By international law, if you "break it you own it". You can't just cause a country to stop functioning and then just say "serves you right for pissing me off".
This is kinda the point about physical systems....the fact is we can do that....we may choose not to but it is a choice on our part.It is just a physical fact of reality that at anytime we have that capability.

slapout9
04-15-2011, 04:24 PM
Dark side of systems thinking (http://tmsamericas.wordpress.com/2011/01/26/a-dark-side-to-systems-thinking/) Yes, there is a dark side mostly you can fall into the trap of trying to turn eveything into an IBM machine.....not good.


and how potential adversaries look at strategy in very different terms than we do.

We play chess and football, they play Go and Soccer (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB378.pdf)

I read that paper when it came out but I will read it again, very interesting stuff by the way.

slapout9
04-15-2011, 04:26 PM
...because he states his strategy in his Posture Statement to Congress (http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/04%20April/Willard%2004-12-11.pdf) not in terms of a "future picture" but as an "evolving posturing of forces" that is realtionship-centric:



Finally got it downloaded, let me read it before I respond.

pvebber
04-16-2011, 01:11 AM
Everything in the rings is pysical including people, I am not just talking about ring 3 Infrastructure. Influence a physical leader is affecting a physical system.

I think of war (and societal systems) in terms of physical, cognitive and information domains. The information domain mediates interaction between the physical and cognitive.

The Rings theory is an anthropomorphic construct - it treats nation and social systems as human analogues. The leader is the brain, processes are neural, endocrine, digestive, etc. Infrastructure is the musculature and skeletal systems, populations are various cellular structures and forces are the immune and regenerate systems.

This framework (I don't believe it is a model because it only categorizes components, offering no insight or explanation of function) has a "brain" but no "mind". This is not unexpected considering the stated desire to separate physical from "morale" (cognitive in the broader framework). If one turns this back into human terms, it says that you can compel the mind, by stunning or damaging the body.

That is a rather discomforting analogy.

Just as I don't think that physically attacking the body is an effective way to change someone's mind, I don't that that purely physical attacks will achieve strategic objectives of any sophistication. Breaking a body can prevent it from functioning, but will not necessarily get the mind to agree with you. It also is not a very good way to set conditions that will lead the person not harboring resentment against you after you "target their centers of gravity" to convince them to "give in" to you.

Its not "just physical" unless your objective is simple destruction. If you are trying to achieve a strategic goal other than destruction, then you MUST accept that you can't isolate the physical from the cognitive as no matter how "precise" you are, affecting the physical does not have a predictable result in the cognitive.


This is kinda the point about physical systems....the fact is we can do that....we may choose not to but it is a choice on our part.It is just a physical fact of reality that at anytime we have that capability.

Not if you want to achieve the sort of EXIT Warden talks about (ie one that sets conditions for a constructive peace, not instigating a cycle of violence.
If someone burns your house down to get you to comply (or just burns the 10 objects in it most dear to you), the fact they didn't kill your kids is not likely to endear them to you.

The British could have just killed Ghandi, or massacred his followers. Why didn't they? If you divide the physical from the morale, there is no reason not to employ force as efficiently as possible to achieve an end. Machiavelli would be down with that...


They are, that was actually one of Warden's jobs in the Air Force.

So I guess he must consider that he failed at it??? We have numerous processes in place that do this. Are they not working? If "treat airpower as limitless in applicability" is the solution, what is the problem? How do you implement that?

slapout9
04-17-2011, 04:44 PM
This framework (I don't believe it is a model because it only categorizes components, offering no insight or explanation of function) has a "brain" but no "mind". That is why he calls it mapping the system. It is a map nothing more or less. Understanding function is a differant step.


Just as I don't think that physically attacking the body is an effective way to change someone's mind, I don't that that purely physical attacks will achieve strategic objectives of any sophistication. Breaking a body can prevent it from functioning, but will not necessarily get the mind to agree with you. It also is not a very good way to set conditions that will lead the person not harboring resentment against you after you "target their centers of gravity" to convince them to "give in" to you. I can tell you from personal experience it works very well.....In LE we call them TASERS:) they take any will to fight right out of the person. We need Military level TASERS!


Its not "just physical" unless your objective is simple destruction. If you are trying to achieve a strategic goal other than destruction, then you MUST accept that you can't isolate the physical from the cognitive as no matter how "precise" you are, affecting the physical does not have a predictable result in the cognitive. That is exactly why you need to stay in physical area....you can't analyze someones intentions...it is impossible, he may lie to you.....but you can analyze CAPABILITIES and be prepared to disable,disrupt or destroy them.




Not if you want to achieve the sort of EXIT Warden talks about (ie one that sets conditions for a constructive peace, not instigating a cycle of violence.
If someone burns your house down to get you to comply (or just burns the 10 objects in it most dear to you), the fact they didn't kill your kids is not likely to endear them to you. It depends on WHO's house you burn down....the rest of the population may love for doing just that!


The British could have just killed Ghandi, or massacred his followers. Why didn't they? If you divide the physical from the morale, there is no reason not to employ force as efficiently as possible to achieve an end. Machiavelli would be down with that... He was a smart guy. But that is really Warden's ultimate point War is the final option never the first,second or even the third. It is only justifiable when you need to eliminate a threat to your survival.




So I guess he must consider that he failed at it??? We have numerous processes in place that do this. Are they not working? If "treat airpower as limitless in applicability" is the solution, what is the problem? How do you implement that?
I think he was transferred to another job before he finished.



Nicolo Machiavelli, in the Prince, opines that "...men when they receive good from whom they were expecting evil, are bound more closely to their benefactor...". Courtesty of Surferbeatlle from the SWJ Blog.....like I said Nicky was a smart guy....so is Surfer.

slapout9
04-17-2011, 04:52 PM
Or is he falling victim to outdated thinking? Should he be stating what we want the Pacific security picture ot look like in the future and work back from it? Should he decide what that future picture might be? Can anybody or any group? If we can't state a desired future picture for a region like the Pacific, where does that leave the Warden strategic mandate?

In this case it is neither. The Admiral (very correctly) realizes he is reporting to a bunch of Politicos who's major concern is getting reelected. So the best thing to do is get all the hardware you can and try to be prepared for as many differnat situations as possible.

IMO, the solution(s) to the China (Pacific region) are Economic not military and we are very weak in that area and will probably remain so as long as we keep believing in this "Invisible Hand Economic Stuff."