ANSF performance 2015 onwards

[davidbfpo]

This is one of the five new threads on Afghanistan for 2015 onwards, its focus is ANSF performance.

There are a small number of OEF threads now closed on the:

1) ANA: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5384
2) ANP: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1584
3) ALP also appear in: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10562

I do appreciate that there can be cross-over between the new threads, notably how the NATO mission interacts with the ANSF and Afghan politics.

[davidbfpo]

Whatever happened in Helmand Province in this incident it is not encouraging:
Afghan police are investigating an apparent army rocket strike on a wedding party that killed at least 28 people, many of them women and children. Police in southern Helmand province were looking into how soldiers came to fire a rocket at a house where a wedding was being celebrated late on Wednesday, the deputy provincial police chief, Bacha Gull, said.
The rocket appeared to have been fired from an army checkpoint near the house in Sangin district as guests waited for the bride to arrive, he said.
Police were “keeping an eye” on two army checkpoints to determine whether the soldiers manning them were engaged in a firefight with Taliban insurgents at the time or whether they fired the rockets arbitrarily. The strike wounded 51 people.
Link:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/01/afghanistan-fatal-rocket-attack-wedding-party


Somehow I doubt we will learn the truth. Nor will it be simple.


(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/01/afghanistan-fatal-rocket-attack-wedding-party)

[davidbfpo]

One of the first comprehensive assessments of the ANSF, alongside the wider, mainly political context, by Professor Theo Farrell, of Kings War Studies, following a Q&A format:http://postwarwatch.com/2015/01/25/painting-a-mixed-picture/

This theme did strike me as odd, about the ANA:
Afghan army officers identify their primary mission as protecting the Afghan state in a very conventional sense. Their main concern is Pakistan, and the defense of Afghanistan against conventional Pakistani forces.....Yet this is not really what ANA commanders want to be doing.

[omarali50]

This is just a vague thought, but here goes:
Afghan army officers identify their primary mission as protecting the Afghan state in a very conventional sense. Their main concern is Pakistan, and the defense of Afghanistan against conventional Pakistani forces....


This sounds odd at one level (conventional attack from Pakistan being unlikely, insurgency being very real, etc) but at another level it seems like a possible source of asabiya and future stability. States and their armies are based on some notion of common identity and common mission. Counter-insurgency on behalf of the corrupt ruling elite may be their mission, but is a shaky basis for common purpose and asabiya. What works in other states will also work in Afghanistan (and vice versa, what does not work well elsewhere will not work well there either, in this context). This sense of mission may be a positive..

[davidbfpo]

I'd seen a headline on General Campbell restricting access to data previously published and missed its importance until this hitherto unkown blog comment appeared via Twitter:http://sunnyinkabul.com/2015/01/30/what-john-campbell-hiding-about-the-afghan-army/


What General Campbell doesn’t want us to know is that the army that’s supposed to be taking over for the US to fight all the terrorist things? It’s disappearing. Even faster than usual.

So why is the Afghan Army quitting in droves? According to the Americans, it’s because…
…high operational tempo, sustained risk, soldier care and quality of life, and leave issues. Afghan casualties increased since the ANSF took the lead for security in June 2013. Although combat losses comprise a relatively small percentage of total ANSF attrition numbers, reducing ANSF casualties remains both a top morale and operational priority for ISAF and ANSF leaders.
But what’s underlying that is the uncertainty the Afghan forces feel after only a few years of existence. They haven’t been around long enough to know what it means to fight on their own. For most of those years they had their hands held by the most powerful military in the world. And by holding hands I mean we brought death from above in the form of all the A-10s and the B-1s and the F-16s and all the exploding things in the air over Afghanistan.

[davidbfpo]

Sub-titled:
A week on the frontlines with the Afghan National Police.
Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/magazine/the-hardest-job-in-afghanistan.html?

A good read, if depressing.

[davidbfpo]

A NYT report:
Months after President Obama (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/o/barack_obama/index.html?inline=nyt-per) formally declared that the United States’ long war against the Taliban was over (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/26/us/obama-addresses-afghan-wars-end-on-christmas-visit.html) in Afghanistan (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/afghanistan/index.html?inline=nyt-geo), the American military is regularly conducting airstrikes against low-level insurgent forces and sending Special Operations troops directly into harm’s way under the guise of “training and advising.”In justifying the continued presence of the American forces in Afghanistan (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/afghanistan/index.html?inline=nyt-geo), administration officials have insisted that the troops’ role is relegated to counterterrorism, defined as tracking down the remnants of Al Qaeda (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaeda/index.html?inline=nyt-org) and other global terrorist groups, and training and advising the Afghan security forces who have assumed the bulk of the fight.
Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/30/world/asia/more-aggressive-role-by-us-military-is-seen-in-afghanistan.html

[Bob's World]

A power that creates and protects a government in some foreign place, cannot create a security force to effectively secure that de facto illegitimate government against some challenger who's forces perceive their cause as legitimate.

The US tried and failed in the Philippines in the early 1900s; in Vietnam in the mid 1900s, and in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 2000s. Each with the building of partner military capacity as the corner stone to the strategy, each a complete failure.

This is not, by the way, in the much touted "Decade of War" lessons learned. We have not learned this lesson.

[omarali50]

"A power that creates and protects a government in some foreign place, cannot create a security force to effectively secure that de facto illegitimate government against some challenger who's forces perceive their cause as legitimate."

This is too broad a generalization. It depends on the power, the force they create and the enemy they face.
In this case, failure was not guaranteed. But of course, it COULD fail.
The tragedy is that it could have worked.

[Bob's World]

Broad indeed. But not too broad.

Please give me an example of where this has worked?

[Morgan]

I was under the impression that US efforts in the Philippines did work....? Messy to be sure but successful, yes? Wasn't it essentially a fairly peaceful US "colony" until 1942?

[Bill Moore]

"A power that creates and protects a government in some foreign place, cannot create a security force to effectively secure that de facto illegitimate government against some challenger who's forces perceive their cause as legitimate."

This is too broad a generalization. It depends on the power, the force they create and the enemy they face.
In this case, failure was not guaranteed. But of course, it COULD fail.
The tragedy is that it could have worked.

I'm with you on this and it takes us back to the wise saying that, "all models are wrong, but still useful." If someone becomes overly enamored with their model, it no longer serves its heuristic role. Clearly the USSR created a number of governments where its security forces held the line for decades. One could argue we did the same in Germany and Japan. In Vietnam, the government did hold against the insurgency, they couldn't hold against the superior conventional power of North Vietnam, and no this wasn't Phase 3 of Mao's insurgency model. You can also argue that the UK and France created a number of states and trained their security forces that have held the line.

If you're going to argue that they failed 50 to 100 years later, that is getting a bit petty and unrealistic. New issues emerge, history doesn't freeze in place.

If you look at the Arab Spring, any state that kept control of their security forces defeated the uprising, with the exception of Syria. Assad's government in Syria, to the surprise of many who embrace liberal social models, still exists.

Clearly these issues are much more complex than any simplistic model can explain. We need to use multiple modes as lens to try to understand, but also free ourselves from models to take a fresh look at the issue as it really is, without the bias of a model or ideology.

[Bill Moore]

I was under the impression that US efforts in the Philippines did work....? Messy to be sure but successful, yes? Wasn't it essentially a fairly peaceful US "colony" until 1942?

It was relatively peaceful, and we were relatively effective, but the Philippines in my view has never been peacefully united. It has always been a violent country with its various militias, insurgent groups, and criminal groups (both state and non-state). There have been rays of hope with the likes of Magsaysay and the current Aquino, but overall it is a still a basket case in many places due to high levels of corruption (and no it isn't culturally appropriate) and power struggles among different groups. It is just another example of state where simplistic models do not provide understanding or answers.

[davidbfpo]

Not a shock, but one wonders how long can the ANSF sustain itself:
Afghan security forces are suffering record casualties in their first battles against the Taliban since the U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan ended in December after more than 13 years. The number of killed and wounded so far this year is about 70 percent higher than during the same period last year, said Colonel Brian Tribus, director of public affairs for NATO’s Afghanistan mission.

Link:http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-03/afghan-forces-suffer-heavy-toll-in-first-battles-with-taliban

Interesting to note the ALP get a mention:
Ulumi said that local police have borne the brunt of the fresh Taliban offensive, which has targeted the northern provinces of Kunduz and Badakhshan (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-18/suicide-bomb-kills-33-at-afghan-bank-in-deadliest-attack-in-2015).

[Bob's World]

Bill,

Of course it was phase three of the insurgency that consolidated Vietnam. North and South "states" were a Western fiction created in the midst of an ongoing movement to liberate the whole of Vietnam from Western control.

I think it is you who are too infatuated with the official US perspective on our history, and that my model that exposes deep flaws in the thinking behind that perspective makes you uncomfortable. We need to get uncomfortable if we hope to get better. Thinking is like PT - if it doesn't make you uncomfortable, you are probably wasting your time.

The armies we have created to protect the governments we have created have all, without exception, folded like lawn chairs when pressed by a more legitimate force. Period. We can't even admit those challengers were more legitimate, yet alone that our political and security strategy failed.

[max161]

• Dau Tranh--Vietnamese Model
• 2 Elements--political and armed
• Opponent loses unless he wins both
• Organization is goal of Vietnamese variant
• Victory to side with strongest and most resilient organization
• New definition of Absolute War
• No such thing as a non-combatant
• People are an instrument of war
• Time is a critical element to ensure victory
• Importance of International support for Revolution

Douglas Pike, in his seminal work on the Vietnam War details the Vietnamese strategy of Dau Tranh (the “Struggle”) emphasizing that the strategy was beyond a purely military strategy but one which mobilized the entire population – a political struggle with the three now famous action programs (or “vans”): action among the enemy; action among the people, and action among the military. This was a comprehensive political-military strategy that had as a key element the psychological influence of its own people, its military, and that of the enemy. But the focus was not just on the enemy’s military force; it struck right at the heart of the enemy: the will of the enemy government leadership and its population.
Douglas Pike, PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1991), p. 216.

[slapout9]

• Dau Tranh--Vietnamese Model
• 2 Elements--political and armed
• Opponent loses unless he wins both
• Organization is goal of Vietnamese variant
• Victory to side with strongest and most resilient organization
• New definition of Absolute War
• No such thing as a non-combatant
• People are an instrument of war
• Time is a critical element to ensure victory
• Importance of International support for Revolution

Douglas Pike, in his seminal work on the Vietnam War details the Vietnamese strategy of Dau Tranh (the “Struggle”) emphasizing that the strategy was beyond a purely military strategy but one which mobilized the entire population – a political struggle with the three now famous action programs (or “vans”): action among the enemy; action among the people, and action among the military. This was a comprehensive political-military strategy that had as a key element the psychological influence of its own people, its military, and that of the enemy. But the focus was not just on the enemy’s military force; it struck right at the heart of the enemy: the will of the enemy government leadership and its population.
Douglas Pike, PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1991), p. 216.


Excellent post with great insights! To some extent these same principles were used in the Civil Rights movement. Communist were and are very adaptable depending on the local situation, while always keeping the larger goal in mind.

[max161]

In case you cannot download the attachment here is the text.

Political Struggle:

Dan Van - Action among your people - total mobilization of propaganda, motivational & organizational measures to manipulate internal masses and fighting units

Binh Van - Action among enemy military - subversion, proselytizing, propaganda to encourage desertion, defection and lowered morale among enemy troops.

Dich Van - Action among enemy's people - total propaganda effort to sow discontent, defeatism, dissent, and disloyalty among enemy's population.

Military Struggle:

Phase 1: Organizations and Preparation - building cells, recruiting members, infiltrating organizations, creating front groups, spreading propaganda, stockpiling weapons.

Phase 2: Terrorism - Guerrilla Warfare - kidnappings, terrorist attacks, sabotage, guerrilla raids, ambushes, setting of parallel governments in insurgent areas.

Phase 3: Conventional Warfare - regular formations and maneuver to capture key geographical and political objectives.


Obviously this is nothing new and pretty basic and has been (and continues to be) executed in various forms by various groups around the world.

[slapout9]

In case you cannot download the attachment here is the text.

Political Struggle:

Dan Van - Action among your people - total mobilization of propaganda, motivational & organizational measures to manipulate internal masses and fighting units

Binh Van - Action among enemy military - subversion, proselytizing, propaganda to encourage desertion, defection and lowered morale among enemy troops.

Dich Van - Action among enemy's people - total propaganda effort to sow discontent, defeatism, dissent, and disloyalty among enemy's population.

Military Struggle:

Phase 1: Organizations and Preparation - building cells, recruiting members, infiltrating organizations, creating front groups, spreading propaganda, stockpiling weapons.

Phase 2: Terrorism - Guerrilla Warfare - kidnappings, terrorist attacks, sabotage, guerrilla raids, ambushes, setting of parallel governments in insurgent areas.

Phase 3: Conventional Warfare - regular formations and maneuver to capture key geographical and political objectives.


Obviously this is nothing new and pretty basic and has been (and continues to be) executed in various forms by various groups around the world.

max161 thanks for posting this. Brings up points I have beeen saying for awhile about how the old school stuff still has a lot merit and all this new stuff ain't that new. Instead of struggling what to call this type of warfare call it what it used to be called. PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE.

It is behind the Marine Corps Gazette subscription paywall but there is an excellent article with good graphics you may like. The title is A Marine For All Seasons Maneuver Warfare vs. low-Intensity Conflict by LTC. H.T.Hayden September 1989 edition.

Thanks again!

[Bob's World]

Internal revolution, illegal politics, to coerce change upon or to force out some existing domestic system of governance, is indeed timeless. The specific approaches developed by Mao in China, and refined and applied in Vietnam by Giap, Ho, and friends, are but two of countless variations on how leaders have cleverly leveraged the energy that resides within a population perceiving itself as oppressed and with no legal ways available to address the intolerable problems in the relationship between those who govern, and those who are governed. It is a product of their times, situations, culture, geography and vision as leaders.

While often non-violent and low-key; these types of conflict can also bring the very worse forms of violence. Very much like domestic disputes within a family, which is a variation of this same type of internal conflict. War theory, as developed so well by theorists such as Clausewitz does not apply directly, but does lend a helpful context. The "American way of war" is very Clausewtzian in nature, and as we classify revolution as war (wrongly, IMO) it leads us to seeking victory over some threat, rather than resolution of the core problems. Our focus on seeking what we believe best for us also blinds our perspective.

Revolution manifests differently in every case, but does have common characteristics rooted in the commonalities of human nature that bind us as a species. In culture one finds the keys to tactical understanding; but it is in nature that one finds the keys to strategic understanding. Both are required for the design and application of effective COIN. The US approach in foreign lands tends to be overly lacking in both - as we are so blinded by our belief that what we bring is good, and that we are helping the people affected by our actions get to a better place, that we cannot see that we are denying them the self-determination that is the essential first step to a legitimate solution.

[max161]

Although I have posted this before on SWJ I will repost it for those who are interested in studying revolutions and insurgent strategies. This is a very useful resource for those who take the time to get to know it.

Assessing Revolution and Insurgent Strategy Project
http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts
http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/CasebookV1S.pdf


Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II 1962 - 2009.
http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/Casebook%20Vol%202%20%2004-27-12S.pdf


Human Factors Considerations of Underground in Insurgencies, 2d Edition, 2013, http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/HumanFactorsS.pdf


Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare, 2d Edition, 2013, http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/UndergroundsS.pdf

[Bob's World]

We will never get better at COIN, until we first get better at our understanding of insurgency.
Revolution, internal to a single system and non-war; resistance, the continuation of warfare by an undefeated populace in a clash between systems - and the fusion of the two when one goes abroad and attempts to create and secure a government more pleasing to that creator than to so many forced to live under it.

These are indeed great references, particularly when read for the facts they gather, organize and offer - and not for conclusions too often overly colored by the bias of our own culture, perspective and doctrine.

Highly recommended these as a cornerstone of references for all who study, think about, and engage in some way in these conflicts.

[davidbfpo]

It struck me that this section could apply to the democratic political process, with different words:
Political Struggle:

Dan Van - Action among your people - total mobilization of propaganda, motivational & organizational measures to manipulate internal masses and fighting units

Binh Van - Action among enemy military - subversion, proselytizing, propaganda to encourage desertion, defection and lowered morale among enemy troops.

Dich Van - Action among enemy's people - total propaganda effort to sow discontent, defeatism, dissent, and disloyalty among enemy's population.

A quick re-write: Mobilise your people and potential voters; keep interference to a minimum (domestic and external) and discourage your opponent's people and their voters.

[max161]

It struck me that this section could apply to the democratic political process, with different words:

A quick re-write: Mobilise your people and potential voters; keep interference to a minimum (domestic and external) and discourage your opponent's people and their voters.

It is all about politics whether in peace, conflict, and war. That is the thread that connects all of these human situations.

[Bob's World]

Democracy has four fundamental components:
1. Political in primary purpose,
2. Population - based,
3. Internal to a single system of governance, &
4. Legal in form.

Revolutionary insurgency shares the same fundamental components, except the 4th is "illegal" in form.

Thus, the fundamental distinction between revolution and democracy is legality.

Most revolutions occur when trusted, certain and legal participation in governance is denied to all or some identity - based portion of the population.

[davidbfpo]

I missed this film showing and talk @ The Frontline Club (London) and was reminded today:http://www.frontlineclub.com/tell-spring-not-to-come-this-year-the-transition-of-afghanistan-to-the-afghan-national-army/


directors Michael McEvoy and Saeed Taji Farouky follow an Afghan National Army (ANA) battalion for a year as they confront the transition of power in Helmand Province — one of the most unstable areas of the country.....The whole point was that for the past 14 years we’ve heard almost nothing from, not only the Afghans, but particularly the Afghan army. That’s why, he explained, there’s no voiceover in the film, which is told completely by Afghan soldiers. “It would be unjust for us to now speak on their behalf..said Taji Farouky.

A telling explanation:
Why they fight
Even though a soldier in the film complains at one point that he hasn’t been paid for nine months, and another says he hasn’t been on leave in four or five months, the battalion appears to remain committed to their mission.
“Unemployment is obviously pretty big in Afghanistan. Many of the soldiers are from the north and they would join up in big groups of lads from their villages just to find work,” McAvoy said, adding that the ANA is one of the most stable employers in the entire country.
Although that’s a big part of why many join up, “there is a genuine sense of national pride: ‘We are Afghan, the Taliban are enemies of Afghanistan. We genuinely want to be here to defend our country,’” he said. “I think it’s simpler when you’re fighting in your own country and you feel like you’re defending your own home than if you go on some foreign campaign.”
It’s a testament that they stick on, he continued. “They’re not paid very well, they don’t go on leave for ages, the food sucks — big time. The U.S. stopped paying for their food budget and the ministry of finance turned to the ministry of defence and said ‘well, we haven’t got any money.’ So basically they just cut the food budget in half. By the end it was a piece of bread for breakfast, a plate of plain rice for lunch, and then for dinner some sort of watery soup with essence of meat.

There is a very short film clip and I have not been able to find a full version (those on YouTube are deleted or behind a "wall").

Strictly speaking the film is from 2014, so should be in another thread, ah well Moderator's discretion rules.:wry:

[Colin Robinson]

Be a very interesting video to look at, I suspect.

You were asking about my research in regard to the AFL, after Sean's latest paper. My impression, backed by more recent research than Sean's, is that while DynCorp did pretty well, the collective training that PA&E did not.

The experience of trying to maintain a cordon around Mamba Point, and having it broken, will not have helped.

Regards
Colin

[Bob's World]

One cannot train a soldier to fight for what he does not believe in.

We always want to make these things objective and measureable. Create a government. Check. Create a military. Check. Employ military to preserve said government. Fail

There is a reason retention has always been horrible in Afghanistan. There is a reason the Taliban fighters fight rings around most ANA units. Legitimacy of the Taliban, and illegitimacy of GIRoA and the ANA. Legality does not equal popular legitimacy. Revolution and Resistance against foreign forces and the collaborating governments and forces they create in those foreign lands historically enjoy tremendous legitimacy across the rest of the society involved.

We need to stop believing that because what we bring is so good, that we will be exempt from this natural human response. The nature of our actions create the nature of the response. The character of our actions, and the character of what we seek to change does have a mitigating effect on the degree of that natural response. But nature is what nature is.

We see SecDef Ash Carter publicly criticizing the "Iraqi Military" for lacking the will to fight. That shows his own lack of understanding of this type of conflict. First, the state of Iraq and the Iraqi military have not existed in fact for months. What is left is a Shia remnant of that state. Second, this is a government WE created and a military WE created to preserve that government. To criticize these men and their lack of will, while not recognizing and appreciating the fundamental nature of the conflict and fundamental flaws of the system we created is our own failure. Our strategic failure of understanding far exceeds any failure of performance on the part of those we have seduced into those systems.

[davidbfpo]

In Helmand Province Now Zad has fallen and from The Long War Journal a report which starts with:
The Taliban overran the district center and several military and police installations in Now Zad in the southern Afghan province of Helmand yesterday. The fall of Now Zad is the latest in a series of setbacks for the Afghan security forces and government, which are struggling to maintain control of areas liberated from the Taliban just a few years ago.
Link:http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/07/taliban-seize-district-in-helmand-province.php

A wider story from the BBC:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-33557320

[davidbfpo]

From the Lawfare blog:
Editor’s Note: A few weeks ago, we ran a provocative piece by Stephen Watts and Sean Mann (http://www.lawfareblog.com/afghanistan-after-drawdown) (RAND analysts) in which they argued that in both its politics and in its development, Afghanistan is doing better than is commonly believed. Gary Owen, a civilian development worker who has spent the last several years working on the ground in Afghanistan, begs to differ. He paints a far gloomier picture of Afghanistan, arguing that the country and U.S. policy have a long way to go.

The first aricle:https://www.lawfareblog.com/afghanistan-after-drawdown

The second article:https://www.lawfareblog.com/sorry-folks-things-are-not-actually-going-so-great-afghanistan

A couple of "tasters":
Actually, it’s pretty clear how those forces will perform. In a word? Badly. Since the Afghans assumed control of the country’s security in 2014, more civilians have been killed, more soldiers have died, more Afghan troops have deserted than ever before, and security forces are still torturing one-third of their detainees.

Since most engagements occur among the population when one is countering an insurgency, this change in the rules of engagement means more innocent civilians are going to die as the result of actions by Afghan security forces. That’s borne out by the latest report on civilian casualties from UNAMA (https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/highest-civilian-casualty-figures-ever-unama-details-deaths-by-mortar-ied-suicide-attack-and-targeted-killing/), which found that throughout the first half of 2015, Afghan forces caused more civilian casualties than the Taliban did. And when they’re not busy leveling villages, Afghan forces are dying in record numbers.

[Bob's World]

While all of this is very unfortunate, it is certainly not unpredictable.

Governments and security forces established by a foreign power are going to be fundamentally lacking in popular legitimacy with a large segment of the society. Doubly true in a heavily patronage society like Afghanistan where life is so often an "all or nothing" affair. One is either in the right family or tribe to be rewarded by patronage, or one is not.

The have-nots are always waiting in the wings as a ready-willing and able guerrilla force to attach themselves to whatever foreign invader / manipulator happens to come along, be that Russia, Pakistan, Iran, the US or anyone else.

The US has tried three times now to employ a Democracy/Security Force Capacity strategy in support of de facto illegitimate governments of our design. Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. It is a proven failure of a strategy.

I used to think the British model of raising local security forces under the auspices of British legitimacy was a bad model. I was wrong. Security forces need to be in support of legitimate government, and while one can lend their legitimacy to a host nation forces; one cannot lend their legitimacy to host nation government.

If the US had employed the British approach to raising local forces as US forces, I believe strongly that those units would have performed far better than the illegitimate ones we helped to train for their own illegitimate governments.

Better yet, if we would have had the vision and risk tolerance to allow self-determination of governance and diplomacy with whatever emerged to take place - we likely would have secured our interests in ways that avoided the conflicts all together.

[davidbfpo]

Late last week, a spokesman for the (US) Defense Department said that since January, a staggering 4,302 Afghan soldiers and police have been killed in action along with 8,009 wounded in what has by far been the bloodiest year for Kabul’s security forces since the ouster of the Taliban in 2002. Overall, 13,000 Afghan security forces have been killed (http://link.foreignpolicy.com/click/4961427.31030/aHR0cDovL2FiY25ld3MuZ28uY29tL1BvbGl0aWNzLzEzMDAwLW FmZ2hhbi1zZWN1cml0eS1mb3JjZXMta2lsbGVkLXllYXJzL3N0 b3J5P2lkPTMzMDk0NTM0/52543f88c16bcfa46f6e463fB89a20a30) over the past three years.

Link, via FP mailing:http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/13000-afghan-security-forces-killed-years/story?

[omarali50]

The current Afghan state has more legitimacy and more capability than any of its opponents. But may have major money issues if foreign support dries up.
The only way they can be defeated is if Western powers (aka US) has decided it is a better bet to have a Pakistan-run militia in power in Afghanistan (or if the US has decided a division of Afghanistan is somehow in their interest).
The US has that kind of leverage because it leads the support effort. Russia and Iran and India can support the Northern alliance but probably wont pay for the whole place.
Minus that kind of US treachery (no other word for it), this state will survive.
Bets?

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to WoTR for recirculating a commentary by Ben Anderson, once with the BBC & other outlets, now with VICE, for his June 2015 report on a visit to Helmand Province; the video (5 mins):http://www.vice.com/read/watch-host-ben-anderson-debrief-our-new-hbo-episode-about-afghanistan-869

The Q&A interview:http://warontherocks.com/2015/09/a-discussion-with-ben-anderson-of-vice-about-the-war-in-afghanistan/

I cannot readily find his film report, but this is his written report, which covers the ANSF, ALP and the Taliban:http://www.vice.com/read/notes-from-afghanistans-most-dangerous-province-102

[davidbfpo]

From WoTR:warontherocks.com/2015/09/how-to-lose-a-civil-war-lessons-for-afghanistan-and-syria/? (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/warontherocks.com/2015/09/how-to-lose-a-civil-war-lessons-for-afghanistan-and-syria/?)

I had missed this detail, hence my emphasis:
While Afghanistan’s situation is not yet as dire as that of Syria, Kabul’s decisions need to be shaped by a clearer recognition of what can be accomplished on the battlefield. The long-vacant position of defense minister needs to be filled with a permanent appointment.

Perhaps having a minister in Kabul means little given Afghan politics power lies elsewhere?

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to WoTR for this commentary by a RAND analyst, who has been "on the ground" and gives an excellent overview of the context:http://warontherocks.com/2015/10/the-fall-of-kunduz-and-what-it-means-for-the-future-of-afghanistan/?

He ends with:
What is readily apparent is that losing Kunduz city, even temporarily, has exposed a number of shortcomings within the Afghan government and security forces. In the aftermath of this, Afghan officials and their coalition partners need to ask some hard questions about where their efforts have gone wrong and what can credibly be done to recover from the most significant blow yet to the post-Taliban Afghan state.

[davidbfpo]

A lurid headline in today's Daily Telegraph 'Taliban seize British stronghold in Helmand as security unravels', as:
A Western official said Lashkar Gah.. was now “under serious military pressure”....As many as 400 fighters are advancing on Chah-e Anjir only around 10 miles from Lashkar Gah. Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11943684/Taliban-seize-British-stronghold-in-Helmand-as-security-unravels.html

The headline ignores the fact the UK left Helmand Province a year ago, so it is no longer a British stronghold.

[davidbfpo]

A short ISW report (8 pgs), with a map of Taliban activity across much of Afghanistan and the link:http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/afghanistan-threat-assessment-taliban-and-isis?

[davidbfpo]

Once again lurid headlines on the contest for Helmand, this time over Sangin and the reported deployment of UK & US SOF, plus 300 NATO advisers (with no combat role):http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/12063421/SAS-fighting-to-stop-Taliban-overrunning-Sangin.html?

Slightly more detail:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/22/much-of-sangin-in-taliban-hands-amid-reports-uk-and-us-have-deployed-special-forces?

Here is a key sentence:
About 65 per cent of the province is now under insurgent control, the head of Helmand's provincial council, Muhammad Kareem Atal, said.

[davidbfpo]

I have never been persuaded of such devices, but RAND does keep on producing:http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1273.html

The two key points for me:
Two factors remained absent in Afghanistan in 2015 but essential to success in historical COIN campaigns: disrupting flows of tangible support to the insurgents and a demonstration (and improvement) of commitment and motivation on the part of the Afghan National Security Forces, the primary COIN force since the coalition drawdown.

Three of the recommendations are laughable and have probably been said so many times before.

Would RAND or another other contractor "think tank" say "Enough, we've been there long enough, time to go"?

[davidbfpo]

Some classic Afghan quotes on this decision

The commander of the Afghan army's 215th corps, Mohammad Moeen Faqir:
Their presence in the area did not mean anything...We will use them in battle with enemies in other parts of Helmand province

Citing Abdul Jabar Qahraman, presidential envoy for security affairs in Helmand
There wasn't any deal....We learnt that there was no need to continue the fight in that area.
Link:http://news.yahoo.com/afghan-troops-pull-strategic-helmand-district-072916177.html?

[davidbfpo]

A short BBC report from Helmand Province:
It's almost two years since British Forces pulled out of Helmand. I watched them leave. At the time we were told by both politicians and senior military officers that the Afghans were ready to take care of their own security. Hindsight proves they were wrong
(Concludes) Helmand shows that, without international support, it can unravel as fast as lightningLink:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-36941267

[davidbfpo]

A WaPo article, by a former Marine, from Helmand; it is hardly encouraging on the ANSF, which need Allied help (mainly US and some Germans):https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/10/16/band-aid-on-a-bullet-wound-what-americas-new-war-looks-like-in-afghanistans-most-violent-province/

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to WoTR for identifying this Army Times piece on the Afghan Air Force (AAF):http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/afghanistan-air-force-civilian-casualties


...according to the United Nations’ latest assessment is responsible for a troubling pattern of botched airstrikes that have led to a stunning rise in civilian casualties.
Compared to 2015, last year the loss of innocent life caused by Afghan-initiated airstrikes doubled to 252, according to the U.N.From my "armchair" the AAF is hampered by things like these:
the A-29, which joined the Afghans' fleet only last year, currently lacks the sophisticated communications equipment to make it truly effective in a close-air-support role. In fact, the aircraft can radio their operations center only within a 14-mile radius, U.S. officials said.

Last summer, NATO and U.S. forces introduced a program to train Afghan tactical air controllers who guide pilots to their targets. The training lasts about four weeks......To date, the program has graduated 30 students, with ongoing courses in Helmand and Logar provinces. By the start of the next fighting season, in April, officials anticipate there will be more than 40 Afghan tactical air controllers qualified to coordinate airstrikes.

[davidbfpo]

Babatim aka Tim Lynch, an ex-USMC officer who was seven years "outside the wire" in Afghanistan, has a blog on his experiences and today an update was spotted - as he seeks funds to enable a return trip to Helmand, to accompany a small USMC contingent. See Post 201 & 212 on:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5975&page=11

The update has a comment on the ANA in Helmand, plus this on the preparation of the Marines:
....both Carter Malkasian and Mike Martin have been working with the Task Force to help them sharpen their understanding of the human terrain and inter-tribal conflicts in the Helmand. This was the best news I’ve heard in a long while. If you’re interested on gaining a thorough understanding of the inter-tribal dynamics that drive the cycle of violence in the Helmand Province there are just two books you need to read. The first is War Comes To Garmser (https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/16240911-war-comes-to-garmser) written by Carter Malkasian, an American and the second is An Intimate War (https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/20531226-an-intimate-war) by Mike Martin who is British. Both men spent years on the ground in the Helmand and both are fluent Pashto speakers.Link:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=6239#comments

[davidbfpo]

After last week's attack on an ANA base @ Mazar-e Sharif, BBC News asks 'Can Afghan military turn the tide in Taliban fight?' and here is a "taster" passage:
Last year a record number of Afghan forces were killed - 6,800 in total. That is three times the losses of American forces during the entire 16 years of this conflict. And many thousands more Afghan military personnel were either invalided out of service or simply deserted.
It emphasises once again the key problems the Afghan forces face: inadequate training and a lack of commitment from recruits, exacerbated by terrible conditions, corruption in the officer class and poor air support.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-39705124

From my faraway "armchair" the cumulative impact of deaths, injuries and desertion since the ANA was reborn or reformed must now be sizeable. Having a significant number of ex-veterans, even if they served for a short time, would normally have an internal impact - there appears to be none.

Given the political performance of the GIRoA; which is described briefly in the article - why would any soldier think his life is valued?

So, casting caveats aside, the answer to the question is No.

If the ANSF cannot 'turn the tide' what is our strategy as their allies? A question and sometime debate seen in other threads in this arena.:mad:

The latest Soufan briefing asks similar questions, here is one point from BLUF:
In what is already the longest-running war in American history, the Trump administration faces the prospect of an unending combat commitment with increasing costs and diminishing returns.
Link:http://www.soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-a-worsening-u-s-quagmire-in-afghanistan/

[davidbfpo]

A first-hand report by a journalist in Helmand, or those town still controlled by GIRoA. Though the title implies this is a 'America can't win' the focus is on the Afghans, so the USMC presence is not included. Needless to say it is not optimistic.
Link:https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/03/afghanistan-war-helmand-taliban-us-womens-rights-peace

[davidbfpo]

Within a report on DoD contractor waste this gem, which reflects how Afghanistan works alas, with my emphasis:
Sigar has long criticised the Pentagon for wastefulness during the US’s longest war. In January, it told a Washington thinktank there was evidence that Taliban leaders had told their commanders to buy fuel, ammunition and weapons from Afghan soldiers because it was cheaper.
Link:https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/aug/02/us-plan-to-improve-afghan-intelligence-operations-branded-a-457m-failure

[davidbfpo]

A typically thorough assessment by Anthony Cordesman, from CSIS; the full title being: 'Afghan Desertions in the U.S.: Assessing the Desertion and "Ghost Soldier" Problem in Afghan National Security Forces'.
Link:https://www.csis.org/analysis/afghan-desertions-us-assessing-desertion-and-ghost-soldier-problem-afghan-national-security

On my first reading there is much more than the ANSF, such as the population explosion and need to create 400k jobs per year!

A couple of sentences:
Afghanistan lacks coherent political leadership, and the World Bank governance indicators rank it as one of the worst governed and most corrupt countries in the world....The problems not only affect the morale, motivation, and leadership of Afghan defectors in the United States, they have a major impact on every soldier, policeman, and local policeman in Afghanistan.....At the same time, the other side of the story is the mix of pressures that can force men into the security services regardless of their loyalty until the real-world strains of combat, corruption, casualties, and being deployed far from home leads them to desert or leave. Afghanistan has become the equivalent of an economic nightmare for all too many of its citizens.

[SWJ Blog]

The Case for Counter Insurgency ‘Light’ in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-case-for-counter-insurgency-%E2%80%98light%E2%80%99-in-afghanistan)

Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-case-for-counter-insurgency-%E2%80%98light%E2%80%99-in-afghanistan) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).

[davidbfpo]

The cited SWJ Blog linked above IMHO contains some facts that reinforce concern that the ANSF serving the GIROA:
By the fall of 2017 GIRoA only controlled territory containing less than 60% of the population which was down from over the 70% they held in 2016, and down from the 80% they held in 2014 when the lead for security operations transitioned from NATO to GIRoA. The remaining 40% was either controlled by the Taliban or was considered "contested". The ANDSF were incapable of recapturing the contested portions of the country, or those portions under Taliban control without increased levels of U.S. support.

From 2010 to 2012 the U.S. led coalition conducted a full spectrum, comprehensive COIN campaign aimed at defeating the Taliban...The coalition, along with the ANDSF, was driving the Taliban, GIRoA had control over approximately 80% of the country, and security, governance, and basic services were largely in place. The ANDSF were maturing, and the transition of responsibility for security operations to Afghan control was underway. So what went wrong?For more explanation and a new strategy see the full article:https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/02/05/the_case_for_counter_insurgency_light_in_afghanist an_113012.html

[davidbfpo]

Cross-posted from the thread on the Taliban.

A report from the probably independent Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) on the recent attack on Farah city. It opens with:
An attack on Farah city had long been feared. For years now, the Taleban have been taking control of the provincial capital’s outlying districts and inching their way towards the central hub. For a few days in mid-May, it looked as though the Taleban were about to take Farah city, which would have been their most significant military triumph since capturing Kunduz for two weeks in 2015. Their strategy of consolidating control over rural areas then digging in at a provincial centre’s outskirts before launching an attack appears to be an increasing trend. While they lost the battle in Farah on this occasion, the Taleban still pose a serious threat to the area. AAN co-director Thomas Ruttig together with Ali Mohammad Sabawoon, Rohullah Soroush and Obaid Ali unpack the attack and its aftermath.
This is the first of two dispatches examining the recent attack on the city of Farah. This first dispatch focuses on the attack and its aftermath. The second contextualises the attack in light of post-2001 developments in Farah.

It ends with:
With regards to Farah, the fact that the Taleban were only pushed back to positions just outside the provincial capital from where they started their attack means that new attacks can be expected. Farah is only one example for a situation that prevails in at least a quarter of Afghanistan’s provinces.
Link:https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/surrounding-the-cities-the-meaning-of-the-latest-battle-for-farah-i/

[davidbfpo]

The author is:
Tamim Asey is the Chairman of the Institute of War and Peace Studies (IWPS). Previously, he served as Deputy Minister of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

It is a curious article which seeks to provide an answer to:
Back in 2004, when Afghan and American generals were laying the foundations for the post-Taliban Afghan army and security forces the number one question in the minds of everybody around the table was “who will pay for it?” In those days, it was assumed the burden would fall on the United States and its allies, but that calculation is changing fast with President Trump in office and war fatigue across the capitals in Europe. Today, the answer is simple: Afghans will pay for it through revenues from its vast natural resources and geographical position combined with a national conscription system.
Link:https://globalsecurityreview.com/economizing-defense-roadmap-sustainable-afghan-security-forces/

Sorry from this faraway armchair the answer is bizarre - when will these revenues come on stream? Leaving aside the likelihood others will divert such revenues.