Recognizing Distinct Types of Insurgency - "Know the type of conflict you are in."

[Bob's World]

There is an old saying in the infantry: "Every form of maneuver is frontal assault for the lead squad."

While that is true, and largely unavoidable, once one steps back and looks as the larger picture, the true essence of the maneuver being employed is revealed. But it sure looks and feels like a frontal assault for that lead squad.

This leads to the problem (and point of strategic disagreement I have with my good friend Bill Moore - we argue this over beers as well as on line) - everything that looks like war is not war. War is a specific form of violence between two or more separate political entities. As many brilliant military theorists note, "the nature of war is constant as it is rooted in human nature; but the character of war varies widely" (case by case for myriad factors of history, geography, cultures, technology, etc).

It is not about what the illegal actor wants that is important, it is WHY they want it. That is what determines both the nature of the problem and the nature of the cure. We tend to be far too symptomatic in our analysis. If something looks like problem A, apply solution A. The reality is that several types of problem might look like our symptomatic type A, each demanding a unique solution. This is the principle flaw in the AQAA construct and why the logic behind it has driven our strategic failure to date in dealing with illegal challenges to governance and stability

For example three broad categories of motivation for posing an illegal challenge to governance with very distinct natures demanding equally distinct solutions are:

1. Revolutionary insurgency to coerce change or illegally overthrow a domestic system of governance coming from an internal base of popular support. Largely a form of civil emergency, demanding a lead effort on the part of governance

2. Resistance insurgency to defeat or expel a foreign occupation (either physical or by manipulative policies). Typically a continuation of warfare demanding a lead effort on the part of military to defeat this segment of the population as one has likely already done with the government and security forces.

3. Profit motivated criminal activities designed to exploit some illicit market space with significant popular demand. This demands a blend of law enforcement and law reform to find the mix best for sustainable stability.

All three forms of motivation may be in the same place, the same organizations, and the same individual; and a smart governmental response appreciates the blend and creates an appropriately blended response as well. It is also important when studying motivations to stay at the macro level. Study why 1000 men join the insurgency, and one has 1000 stories. Step back and assess the macro motivation of the overall insurgency to assess the nature of the conflict at hand.

Resistance insurgency (not as USASOC and SOCOM define it in their UW doctrine) is a form of war. For me resistance is a unique form of insurgency that occurs in the context of war between two or more distinct political entities. The people often are the only ones left in the fight in rear areas as the formal forces are pushed back (think partisan warfare against the Nazis in their rear areas as they pushed the Soviets back); or the final gasp of a state once the Government surrenders and the formal forces are defeated (think the French resistance in France following their defeat by Nazi Germany and prior to their liberation by the Allies). This is a form of insurgency that is a form of war. The critical factors are the primary purpose for action, AND the nature of the relationship between the parties involved.

But many of the French and Ukrainian resistance fighters against the Nazi German invasion also had a separate line of insurgency motivation to fight. Revolutionary insurgency motivation against the illegitimate Vichy regime working for the Germans in France; and against the Soviet governance in Eastern Europe.

Revolutionary Insurgency often looks exactly like Resistance Insurgency - but is fundamentally different in nature. Revolution is internal to a single political system, and as such is more accurately a form of democracy than a form of war. Revolutionary insurgency must possess four components or it is something else.

1. It must be political in primary purpose.
2. It must be internal to a single political system.
3. It must rise from a base of support within a significantly aggrieved identity-based population within that political system (i.e., not a coup led by a disgruntled Colonel to quickly topple a government).
4. It must be illegal in form under the laws of the political system where it takes place.

Some key implications of these four core characteristics of Revolutionary Insurgency:
1. The only difference in nature between revolution and democracy is legality.
2. Violence is a tactical choice, and in no way affects the nature of the problem; so revolution can be violent or non-violent, it is still equally revolution if the four core components are present.
3. What is Revolution in Egypt or China (for example), is merely citizens expressing their concerns acting within their constitutional rights in the United States.
4. The fastest way to reduce revolutionary energy is to grant degrees of political empowerment to the population writ large, or extend those empowering mechanisms to the identity-based population acting out that may well be denied equal access to those mechanisms (need for the Voting Rights Act as part of the US response to the Civil Rights Movement). This must be done in a manner that makes sense in the context of the culture of the people involved (the US running elections in Iraq and Afghanistan; and helping to write constitutions for those places based upon OUR culture is not a good example of this).
5. Revolution can become war once the "cell divides" and a new political system emerges around the revolutionary leadership. (Current example, ISIL was a revolutionary insurgency against the governments of Syria and Iraq; but has separated and formed a distinct new political system; and now this is war between distinct states. This calls for an added caution - if we do "defeat" ISIL, the problem does not go away, it just reverts into a powerful, fragmented collection of revolutionary insurgencies).
6. If the primary purpose for action is to make profits through organized crime, and threats to governance are merely a side effect, or supporting line of operation to support that profit motivated illicit business, it is not revolution (or insurgency at all, IMO, as it requires a very distinct solution blending law enforcement and law reform to address, and is about profit, not politics).

So, after over a decade of debating COIN, perhaps it is finally time to pause and consider if we understand insurgency as well as is necessary to find the results we seek.

[slapout9]

It is a religious insurgency ( I.e. AQI and other Islamic radicals are trying to take over main stream Islam) we (USA) keep stepping in the middle of and say it is in our interest to do so when it is clearly not. Karpmans Triangle is deadly trap and we have fallen in to it.

[Bob's World]

Slap,

What is a "religious insurgency"?? I mean, I get it, that it that often the identity-based population group that is oppressed or discriminated against by the governance over them to the point they feel compelled to act out illegally to force political change is along religious lines, but to call that "religious insurgency" is to shift the focus from the problems of governance to a defining characteristic of one of the parties.

Historians often focus on the superficial. So if the rebelling population is Catholic and the population in power is Protestant, (as in Northern Ireland) they focus on that religious distinction, and not on the fact that Protestant England invaded and colonized Catholic Ireland and the resultant resistance against that perceived illegitimate foreign presence.

Historians often use terms loosely as well. The will use terms like "revolution," "insurrection," "emergency," "resistance," "insurgency," "rebellion," etc as if they all mean exactly the same thing, and I suspect just going with the one that sounds the best poetically.

As to radical Islam? One has to take a radical stance in one's rhetoric if one is going to take on the establishment. You can't just say "we stand for the same perspective as the government, but come risk your life and fortune to join us in an illegal challenge against that government."

Protestants were once the radicals. Now they are the WASPs that are synonymous for conservative and boring. This is why fixating on how a message is being corrupted for the purposes of running an insurgency is so dangerous. But I know why governments do it. Far better to get everyone focused on and excited about the outrageous aspects of the challenger's message, than to have them focus on the reasonableness of much of the political rationale for the insurgency itself.

So, I'll go on record right here. There is no such thing as "religious insurgency." (Other than the movement led by Jesus, that was totally focused on changing religion, and pointedly had no beef with the occupying Romans or Herod the Jewish agent of the Romans). Many insurgents use religion in their ideology, but that is the sales pitch, not the driver of the challenge.

[slapout9]

Galula said that are several types of insurgencies of which, a religious insurgency is one type. I can't remember the page number but it is near the front of his book.

The radical insurgency inside Islxam started in 1979 with the seizure of the holy mosque in Mecca and everything else we see today is an extension of that event.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I will back up one step and start at the beginning. War is always the same and it is based in human psychology, but it goes back farther than politics. I define war as deadly or potentially deadly organized violence committed by a subset of one group, whose actions are morally sanctioned by that group, against a discrete and identifiable other group with a specific objective or goal.

Now, the key at this point is that war, having its foundation in human nature, it has to have a purpose in human development. Since intergroup conflict, or primitive war, was a normal activity for humans in our ancient past (or among the surviving hunter-gatherers), what was their motivation? As it turns out, it was their basic need to survive and reproduce. Conflicts were the result of territorial incursions, retaliation for attacks, and to take women. Other humans invading your territory meant reducing the natural resources your group has to survive on. Letting an attack go unaddressed meant that your group was easy prey. Women were needed to bear children and war tended to be a male dominated activity. At a very basic level, it was the need to survive and reproduce that drove conflict.

It makes sense that human needs were the drive behind human warfare. Human needs motivate human activity . Satisfying needs is necessary for human existence. War was an adapted strategy for humans. “A number of distinct, but overlapping evolutionary approaches to understanding collective violence (with a particular focus on war) have been developed in the last two decades. These approaches share a common assumption that warfare has been selected for in human evolutionary history, although they differ in terms of the hypothesized evolutionary function, and particular evolutionary trajectory of collective violence (citations omitted).” It is reasonable to assume that an adaptive strategy must somehow enhance survival. Therefore it makes perfect sense that a social animal would engage in a societal version of conflict to defend what they need to survive or even take from others the necessities of life if the opportunity presents.

So, war will not be about money, but it can be for power. It can be about anything that is a basic need - survival, reproduction, security, self-esteem, self-expression, autonomy. These are what we go to war over. So however you characterize it, its source needs to be found here. Also, war, as conducted by tribal groups, is a sanctioned activity. Crime is not.

[slapout9]

War is the use of force or FRAUD to obtain an object or goal. This obsession with just a use of force is why we keep loosing. We continue to wear blinders and cannot see the use of outright FRAUD as a Weapon. Every good cop knows this but few soldiers ever get it.

[TheCurmudgeon]

One other point. Assuming that humans psychological motivation for the collective act that is war is based in some need, there can be no "religious" war or insurgency. There can be a war based on identity and self-esteem - "our God is the one true God and yours is false" - but religion is not the true driving force. There is no human need for religion. So as long as that is what you are looking at you will never find the true origin of the motivation of the various actors.

[Bob's World]

Galula said that are several types of insurgencies of which, a religious insurgency is one type. I can't remember the page number but it is near the front of his book.

The radical insurgency inside Islxam started in 1979 with the seizure of the holy mosque in Mecca and everything else we see today is an extension of that event.

Slap, religion is one of the primary types of ideology employed in insurgency, but remember, Galula was a counterinsurgent, not an insurgent. He looked at the problem through the biased eyes of a foreign colonist. He grew up a Frenchman in Africa, and in his book he also said that the insurgency was never against France, only against the ineffective colonial regimes France had put in power. In short, for all of the good in Galula, he was just a man with bias and opinions just like you and I. I think he missed the ball on that particular insight.

As to the Middle East, the political revolts of the modern era against governance began long before 1979. Look to the Constitutional Revolutions in Turkey and Iraq in 1906-08; or the broad resistance energy against the Ottomans that Lawrence tapped into across the Arabian Peninsula and Levant in WWI. By 1979 the concerns with the how Saudi governance was heading were growing. One cannot separate governance from religion in the Middle East, but what you are pointing to are illegal challenges to governance.

But I could be missing something. Lets find an example purely about religion in deed, not just message, and lets discuss.

[Bob's World]

Remember, a main point of this thread is to discuss that most insurgency is not war at all. Resistance between two distinct political systems fits the war paradigm; but revolution within a single political system simply does not share the same nature that is common to war, even though it often shares the same characteristics. We need to deal with things for what they are, not for what they look like.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Remember, a main point of this thread is to discuss that most insurgency is not war at all. Resistance between two distinct political systems fits the war paradigm; but revolution within a single political system simply does not share the same nature that is common to war, even though it often shares the same characteristics. We need to deal with things for what they are, not for what they look like.

I would agree. Revolution does not fit into the definition of war, as long as it is fought within the same group. Not sure how to define it.

[slapout9]

The 1979 siege at Mecca was about Islam not being pure enough....was it not? So radical Islamist wanted to take over what I call mainstream Islam and convert it a pure form of Islam. At least in their eyes. So that seems like a religious insurgency to me. It was not about governance as much as about Islam IMO.

[Bill Moore]

I would agree. Revolution does not fit into the definition of war, as long as it is fought within the same group. Not sure how to define it.

Of course you can't define it, and you can't define war. You think war is this, and Bob can think I it is something else, and I can think it is completely something different. Slap thinks it includes fraud, which seems a bit of a stretch, but since doctrinal explanations no longer (if they ever did) address reality they have little utility outside of their legal context. In the U.S., and in the U.S. only, the government has certain war time powers it can leverage if war is actually declared.

We could all sit around a table drinking beer and find we actually agree with each other on many things, but we each call these things different names. This isn't a minor issue, the military can't be a true profession until it develops a lexicon that the entire force recognizes AND it adapts to the world as it really is. Falling back on Thucydides, Clausewitz, Mao, etc. is a start, but history didn't stop.

For the time being I'm sticking with the definition of war in JP-1, but even that falls short.

[davidbfpo]

I think this book review fits here, as it refers to a governing elite amidst an insurgency and a 'border war(s)' chaning course:
The regime had an efficient army and a repressive police force. Insurgency was minimal, despite hostile frontline states across the borders in Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Trade sanctions had reinforced Pretoria in its self-righteous isolation, incidentally ridding the country of foreign profit-takers. South Africa’s economy was Africa’s strongest. The sports boycott was irritating, but not remotely such as to induce Afrikaners to capitulate to a black majority....I could see no reason why this should change any time soon. The whites were entrenched....Then suddenly in 1989-91 came a revolution.

What happened next was equally crucial. De Klerk had a Damascene conversion, boldly and emphatically turning to reform. He realised that apartheid was losing intellectual and moral sway over the white minority. He could see the game was up. So-called “separate development” was administrative chaos, with black immigrants pouring into the lucrative mining sector and spreading south into the Cape Province. Most whites sensed change had to come, but they were terrified of what it might mean.
Link:http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/mar/04/the-end-of-apartheid-diary-of-revolution-robin-renwick-review

[TheCurmudgeon]

Of course you can't define it, and you can't define war. You think war is this, and Bob can think I it is something else, and I can think it is completely something different. Slap thinks it includes fraud, which seems a bit of a stretch, but since doctrinal explanations no longer (if they ever did) address reality they have little utility outside of their legal context. In the U.S., and in the U.S. only, the government has certain war time powers it can leverage if war is actually declared.

We could all sit around a table drinking beer and find we actually agree with each other on many things, but we each call these things different names. This isn't a minor issue, the military can't be a true profession until it develops a lexicon that the entire force recognizes AND it adapts to the world as it really is. Falling back on Thucydides, Clausewitz, Mao, etc. is a start, but history didn't stop.

For the time being I'm sticking with the definition of war in JP-1, but even that falls short.

But Bill, this is the root of the problem. Until we can decide on a definition we are going no where. The JP-1 defines war as a socially sanctioned violence to achieve a political purpose. By this definition, when O'Rielly claimed that he was in a war zone during violent street protest in Argentina where the people were seeking relief for political grievances, he was absolutely right - he was in the middle of a war.

Until we define our terms we will simply talk past one another.

My biggest problem with most of these discussions is that they are largely merely philosophical. There is very little "science" in Military Science. It is mostly history - arguing about this conflict or that. It never digs down to find a common root in all war.

This is why I feel that, before we start this conversation on how to categorize wars, we need to properly define war. Perhaps that is another thread, but I still feel it is important.

... while I am ranting, there is also precious little science in Political Science, so tying our definition to the political realm is only marginally helpful, and largely useless in insurgencies and revolutions.

[TheCurmudgeon]

This leads to the problem (and point of strategic disagreement I have with my good friend Bill Moore - we argue this over beers as well as on line) - everything that looks like war is not war. War is a specific form of violence between two or more separate political entities. As many brilliant military theorists note, "the nature of war is constant as it is rooted in human nature; but the character of war varies widely" (case by case for myriad factors of history, geography, cultures, technology, etc).

Colonel,

The paragraph above points to a logical inconsistency that has bothered me for some time. As you note, the "the nature of war is constant as it is rooted in human nature; but the character of war varies widely". Yet you return to the idea war is a between “two or more separate political entities”. My caution is in the use of “political entities” versus a more generic “separate, discrete, identifiable groups” may severly limit how some people see war.

My reasoning is that, while war's nature has remained constant from the time two groups of hunter-gatherers attacked each other over access to some necessary resource (like women), the “political” realm is a relatively recent addition and has changed radically over our 15,000 years of civilized existence. For example, the Westphalian State is only a recent addition, less than 500 years old, yet it seems like the majority of people are stuck to the Clauswitzian dogma that war has to be between an extension of state politics. Using the term “political” creates a mental cage for some people that makes it hard to understand ethnic or religious violence – where war is based in a clash of identities, not politics.

Using the same logic, a revolutionary conflict can become a war once the disgruntled individuals coalesce into a group that no longer identifies with the larger society. I would argue that this is what happened in the American Revolution, where the population slowly changed from believing they were good English citizens whose rights as Englishmen were being trampled, to Colonist who had an identity separate from the Crown. You can see how this played out after we won independence and the need for a separate identity cause us to change the spelling of certain words, like color (from colour), so that we could have a clearly identifiable language of our own.

Just a thought.

[Bob's World]

When I say "political entities" or "political systems" I am not comfortable myself that those are the best terms, but to be clear, I do not mean this is limited to "states" or that the political system is run by some formal government, but that it is under a single system of governance.

Harry Summers derived a simple social trinity from Clausewitz in his "On Strategy" of "Government-Army-People." And yes, I realize this is related to, but is not, Clausewitz's "Remarkable Trinity," yet I think it does provide a simple model for what I mean by a single political system or political entity.

This can certainly describe a state, but it can also describe a tribe, and in fact, probably describes both the Hatfield clan and the McCoy Clan. So, violent conflict between any two or more such systems shares a common nature that we describe generally as "war."

But what if the conflict is within any one of those systems? Illegal competition (as defined by the rules and laws of that system) to coerce change upon, or overthrow of, the leadership (or "government") of that system. This is a thing of a very different nature than conflict between two separate and distinct systems.

As an internal insurgency (revolution) gains success, at some point the political system may well divide as any living cell does, into two or more distinct systems, each with their own complete systems of governance, population and security forces. At this point, if the contest continues, what was once revolutionary non-war becomes war. Defeat the governance of an emerging system, as we propose with our counter-ISIL strategy, and one does not "win" the war, all one does is convert the conflict from war back into revolutionary non-war once again.

When we don't identify this critical distinction, we do not plan for, recognize, or respond appropriately to these critical transitions in the nature of a conflict.

[Bob's World]

The 1979 siege at Mecca was about Islam not being pure enough....was it not? So radical Islamist wanted to take over what I call mainstream Islam and convert it a pure form of Islam. At least in their eyes. So that seems like a religious insurgency to me. It was not about governance as much as about Islam IMO.

Slap, I read a pretty good book on this a couple years ago, and as I recall without going back to do the research, the '79 movement in KSA that took the Holy Mosque in Mecca (and the separate but parallel movement to expel the Americans from Iran) were both extremely political in nature.

In the Kingdom the leader of the movement employed an Islamic ideology, and identified a young man who had the characteristics described in the Koran as prophet who would liberate the people to serve as the central selling point in his movement. The people who believed political change was necessary to that point had been deterred by law, state power, etc. But with the coming of this prophet they believed it was time to act. Power manipulation for political purpose, wrapped in religion. But at the heart, it was a political challenge and revolutionary non-war.

[TheCurmudgeon]

When I say "political entities" or "political systems" I am not comfortable myself that those are the best terms, but to be clear, I do not mean this is limited to "states" or that the political system is run by some formal government, but that it is under a single system of governance..

Sir,

I assumed as much. I can tell from you trouble defining revolutions.


Harry Summers derived a simple social trinity from Clausewitz in his "On Strategy" of "Government-Army-People." And yes, I realize this is related to, but is not, Clausewitz's "Remarkable Trinity," yet I think it does provide a simple model for what I mean by a single political system or political entity..

I still don't like the over-reliance on the Saint Clausewitz' trinity, so I will propose something different. Imagine a venn diagram with one large circle that represents the entire population of people, regardless of who they are. Marke that circle "all people." Inside of that place a smaller circle that represents the "people." What seperates this group of people from the larger domain of "all people" is some internally derived identity. It can be ethnic, religous, or political, but it is how these people seperate themselves from the larger domain of "all people." Inside of our circle marked "people" is a smaller circle marked "Army." The Army is that subset of the people who have been morally sanctioned to commit violance in the name of the people. I think this does a better job than a trinity, and it does not lock us into the Clausewitzian dogmatic defintion of war as an extension of policy.



As an internal insurgency (revolution) gains success, at some point the political system may well divide as any living cell does, into two or more distinct systems, each with their own complete systems of governance, population and security forces. At this point, if the contest continues, what was once revolutionary non-war becomes war. Defeat the governance of an emerging system, as we propose with our counter-ISIL strategy, and one does not "win" the war, all one does is convert the conflict from war back into revolutionary non-war once again.

When we don't identify this critical distinction, we do not plan for, recognize, or respond appropriately to these critical transitions in the nature of a conflict.

I agree, and that is one of the reasons we cannot find a good defintion of "winning." We have definitionally backed ourselves into a neverending war.

[Bob's World]

One thing I do believe strongly when it comes to defining things is that if one is creating something one can define that thing to whatever it is we want it to be; but, if instead we are seeking to understand some natural thing existing in nature, it is what it is, and will not conform itself to our cultural or institutional bias, or become what the senior man in the room declares it to be.

Popes and Generals are often made fools in this regard.

[TheCurmudgeon]

One thing I do believe strongly when it comes to defining things is that if one is creating something one can define that thing to whatever it is we want it to be; but, if instead we are seeking to understand some natural thing existing in nature, it is what it is, and will not conform itself to our cultural or institutional bias, or become what the senior man in the room declares it to be.

Popes and Generals are often made fools in this regard.

Truer words ...;)

... the reason I largely no longer bother with this stuff. My head is too bloodied from smaking it against tables and walls.

[omarali50]

On the question of Islam and ISIS etc

http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2015/03/isis-and-islam-beyond-the-dream.html

[Bill Moore]

But Bill, this is the root of the problem. Until we can decide on a definition we are going no where. The JP-1 defines war as a socially sanctioned violence to achieve a political purpose. By this definition, when O'Rielly claimed that he was in a war zone during violent street protest in Argentina where the people were seeking relief for political grievances, he was absolutely right - he was in the middle of a war.

Until we define our terms we will simply talk past one another.

My biggest problem with most of these discussions is that they are largely merely philosophical. There is very little "science" in Military Science. It is mostly history - arguing about this conflict or that. It never digs down to find a common root in all war.

This is why I feel that, before we start this conversation on how to categorize wars, we need to properly define war. Perhaps that is another thread, but I still feel it is important.

... while I am ranting, there is also precious little science in Political Science, so tying our definition to the political realm is only marginally helpful, and largely useless in insurgencies and revolutions.

So true, I think economic interests are political interests, so I don't see the disconnect with some TCNs conducting warfare (character of war) to achieve their criminal objectives. When people tell me this is war and this isn't with a high degree of confidence, I ask them a simple question. What is war? To date no one has been able to provide an answer. When they tell me war is an extension of politics by other means, then I ask them what is politics? No answer, unless it is someone clinging to the past assuming only states possess political policies.

Doctrine states warfare is subordinate to war, if that is true, then insurgencies, rebellions, and yes high levels of violent crime directed against a government and its citizens are all war. I don't have a problem calling them war, as you stated it is the character of warfare in a particular instance we need to differentiate. As long we cling to Cold War definitions of insurgencies and pretending criminal activity is always separate we will continue to ill-define the problem and develop inappropriate solutions.

As long as we forget what we're trying to achieve using war/warfare/military activities because we're overly concerned with underlying issues we can't change in most cases we'll continue to spin in circles. I think you and Bob tend to dismiss why do we fight? What are our objectives? How do we achieve them? The job of war isn't to make everyone love each other around the world, if it is, then we'll be broke (we are already) in a few more years.

[Bob's World]

Bill, our challenge is not due to a misunderstanding of "the job of war" - our challenge is that we too often apply a war solution to problems that are not war.

We then write off the resultant failures to any number of situations beyond our control, such as "complexity" or "ideology" or lack of political will.

But our PME institutions are full of the keepers of doctrinal inertia; think tanks are full of those paid to define reasons for success or failure in terms favorable to those who pay their bills, and politicians of every ilk are as unlikely to claim responsibility for failure as they are apt to claim credit for success.

The forces of strategic inertia are powerful.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Gentlemen,

as an aside, and for a little levity, I am happy to report that the foibles of doctrine writers exist even in the hallowed halls of academia. In this case, the question is where war comes from.


" Is it natural for humans to make war? Is organised violence between rival political groups an inevitable outcome of the human condition? Some scholars believe the answer is yes, but new research suggests not.


A study of tribal societies that live by hunting and foraging has found that war is an alien concept and not, as some academics have suggested, an innate feature of so-called “primitive people”.The findings have re-opened a bitter academic dispute over whether war is a relatively recent phenomenon invented by “civilised” societies over the past few thousand years, or a much older part of human nature. In other words, is war an ancient and chronic condition that helped to shape humanity over many hundreds of thousands of years?
The idea is that war is the result of an evolutionary ancient predisposition that humans may have inherited in their genetic makeup as long ago as about 7 million years, when we last shared a common ancestor with chimpanzees – who also wage a kind of war between themselves.


However, two anthropologists believe this is a myth and have now produced evidence to show it. Douglas Fry and Patrik Soderberg [umlaut over o] of Abo Akademi University in Vasa, Finland, studied 148 violently lethal incidents documented by anthropologists working among 21 mobile bands of hunter-gatherer societies, which some scholars have suggested as a template for studying how humans lived for more than 99.9 per cent of human history, before the invention of agriculture about 10,000 years ago.


They found that only a tiny minority of violent deaths come close to being defined as acts of war. Most the violence was perpetrated by one individual against another and usually involved personal grudges involving women or stealing.About 85 per cent of the deaths involved killers and victims who belonged to the same social group, and about two thirds of all the violent deaths could be attributed to family feuds, disputes over wives, accidents or “legal” executions, the researchers found. “When we looked at all the violent events about 55 per cent of them involved one person killing another. That’s not war. When we looked at group conflicts, the typical pattern was feuds between families and revenge killings, which is not war either,” said Dr Fry."

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/is-it-natural-for-humans-to-make-war-new-study-of-tribal-societies-reveals-conflict-is-an-alien-concept-8718069.html


I must admit that I am not a fan of Dr Fry and his theories. He has skewed the data so that deaths as a result of feuds and raids between tribal groups are not wars. I like to kid that he used the Correlates of War standards, at least 100 deaths - which would be the complete extermination of an average hunter-gatherer tribe.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I think you and Bob tend to dismiss why do we fight? What are our objectives? How do we achieve them? The job of war isn't to make everyone love each other around the world, if it is, then we'll be broke (we are already) in a few more years.

Bill, I don't dimiss why we fight, but we "fight" over a lot of things - I just beleive that what a group goes to war over is not always the same as why two individuals fight. To me, war is not simply a really big brawl. It is a collective social act that is morally sanctioned by the larger group in order to defend something that group values so much that it is willing to send its sons and daughters off to die for it.

I believe that if we can key in on that motivation, on why we fight, then we can begin to see solutions to all that "complexity."

[Bob's World]

So, most violence is not war. I am comfortable with that.

My primary thesis I am offering here is that political conflict within a single system of governance is fundamentally different in nature than conflict between two or more systems of governance. That conflicts between fit within how we have come to think of "war," but that those within really do not fit that paradigm.

I believe that when we make this distinction and stop waging war against these internal political conflicts that we will be far more successful in resolving the same.

[slapout9]

Slap, I read a pretty good book on this a couple years ago, and as I recall without going back to do the research, the '79 movement in KSA that took the Holy Mosque in Mecca (and the separate but parallel movement to expel the Americans from Iran) were both extremely political in nature.

In the Kingdom the leader of the movement employed an Islamic ideology, and identified a young man who had the characteristics described in the Koran as prophet who would liberate the people to serve as the central selling point in his movement. The people who believed political change was necessary to that point had been deterred by law, state power, etc. But with the coming of this prophet they believed it was time to act. Power manipulation for political purpose, wrapped in religion. But at the heart, it was a political challenge and revolutionary non-war.

Bob,
No it wasn't and that is the point. Islam is primary to politics, bad governance was going to be "fixed" by good religion. I would say all belief systems are primary to governance that is where we get into trouble. Good politics doesn't counter God only a Religious reformation can do that.

[slapout9]

So, most violence is not war. I am comfortable that.



That is pretty close......all war is based on deception. (mental fraud)!

[slapout9]

Slap thinks it includes fraud, which seems a bit of a stretch, but since doctrinal explanations no longer (if they ever did) address reality they have little utility outside of their legal context.


Bill,
I do believe that and so did Galula and so most LE people I know because we see gangs use it everyday. They firmly believe that if you get what you want by lying that is the way to go, if not then use violence.

[Bob's World]

The US Joint Pub 3-24 stands (shakily) upon this definition of insurgency:


Insurgency uses a mixture of subversion, sabotage,
political, economic, psychological actions, and armed
conflict to achieve its political aims. It is a protracted
politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control
and legitimacy of an established government, a military
occupation government, an interim civil administration, or
a peace process while increasing insurgent control and
legitimacy—the central issues in an insurgency.

The danger of lists: "Insurgency uses a mixture of subversion, sabotage,
political, economic, psychological actions, and armed
conflict to achieve its political aims." Or simply stated, an insurgent acts illegally, and a politician acts legally to achieve their political aims. To employ a list of examples of illegal ways an insurgent might employ puts blinders on the reader, and constraints upon the definition that are both unintended and unnecessary.

"It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy" I believe more accurately is an effort to coerce change in part or whole of a system of governance. It may be protracted, but could be quick. And "control"? This is a favorite word in our foreign interventions in the insurgencies of others because often WE seek control in those places - but we believe that in the US control belongs to the people, not the government. Then there is "legitimacy" - no word is used more often or has more meanings in the COIN business. There is legal legitimacy, a recognition by some formal body of the right of some system of governance to be in power. More importantly for purposes of insurgency, however, is the concept of political or popular legitimacy - the recognition in the population of the right of some system of governance to affect their lives. This is at the core of nearly every resistance and many revolutions. Some distinct segment of the population simply does not recognize the right of the existing regime to be in charge of them. Maybe they were excluded from full participation, or perhaps a foreign power picked the government or has somehow gained a corrosive degree of influence. How matters little, it is the perception that counts and must be understood.

"of an established government, a military occupation government, an interim civil administration, or a peace process"

These are VERY different things. An odd mix of internal and external forms of governance. By dumping all forms of insurgency into this single sack misses important nuances. By dividing by those that are within vs. those that are between one begins to craft a very important sorting out of the nature of things.

"while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy—the central issues in an insurgency"

A bold assumption. Sometimes people just want respect or dignity or justice. We need to be careful not to mirror image our concerns as an intervening power onto the population that is daring to challenge the governance we have so carefully crafted for, or protected from, them.

[slapout9]

Bill, I don't dimiss why we fight, but we "fight" over a lot of things - I just believe that what a group goes to war over is not always the same as why two individuals fight. To me, war is not simply a really big brawl. It is a collective social act that is morally sanctioned by the larger group in order to defend something that group values so much that it is willing to send its sons and daughters off to die for it.

I believe that if we can key in on that motivation, on why we fight, then we can begin to see solutions to all that "complexity."

I have been saying that since I have been here.....you must know the motive. So did Galula for that matter. In fact he really made a good point when he said that what defines an insurgency (as oppposed to some other violent action) is the cause (motive).

[slapout9]

On the question of Islam and ISIS etc

http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2015/03/isis-and-islam-beyond-the-dream.html

omarali,
Great post.

[Bob's World]

The weakest part of Galula is his perspective on the role of his own nation in the insurgencies he dealt with through his life. He could see the people and the domestic government with great clarity and insight, but was blind to causal role of France. He brought that blindness with him to the US and shared it with us, so that we too could be blind to the causal role of the US in the insurgencies we intervened within.


COIN should be limited to domestic operations only. Anytime one thinks they are doing "COIN" abroad they are likely acting in ways that will make the underlying problem worse for their efforts. This is true regardless of how inept the host governance is, or how non-existent it is. If you don't plan to stay and force the place and the people who live their to submit to your governance, then you are not the COIN force. Making that one small fix in US COIN doctrine would save us Trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and tons of influence around the globe.

[slapout9]

The weakest part of Galula is his perspective on the role of his own nation in the insurgencies he dealt with through his life. He could see the people and the domestic government with great clarity and insight, but was blind to causal role of France. He brought that blindness with him to the US and shared it with us, so that we too could be blind to the causal role of the US in the insurgencies we intervened within.


COIN should be limited to domestic operations only. Anytime one thinks they are doing "COIN" abroad they are likely acting in ways that will make the underlying problem worse for their efforts. This is true regardless of how inept the host governance is, or how non-existent it is. If you don't plan to stay and force the place and the people who live their to submit to your governance, then you are not the COIN force. Making that one small fix in US COIN doctrine would save us Trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and tons of influence around the globe.

That is very true. That is why I keep bringing up Karpman's triangle. When two people start fighting and a third person intervenes it can end up being a disaster for the intervening person since the original 2 combatants may unite and fight the third party together.


Galula also made this point it was ALL originally called Revolutionary War, Galula decided to change that slightly by calling it COIN and confusing everyone to a certain extent.

Revolutionary War=Political Action(non violent black proganda,fraud) + Guerrilla Action (violent action by armed civillians). The political was primary,guerrilla was secondary or supporting. Hence the famous 80% poilitical vs 20% military quote on COIN by Galula.

[Bob's World]

Revolutionary War=Political Action(non violent black proganda,fraud) + Guerrilla Action (violent action by armed civillians). The political was primary,guerrilla was secondary or supporting. Hence the famous 80% poilitical vs 20% military quote on COIN by Galula.

But that is just tactics. There are many paths (tactics) up the mountain (good governance), and when the government seeks to deny some segments of the population access to the mountain, or to block effective, legal routes up the mountain, the population will go without permission and cut their own path. THAT is revolution.

[TheCurmudgeon]

COIN should be limited to domestic operations only. Anytime one thinks they are doing "COIN" abroad they are likely acting in ways that will make the underlying problem worse for their efforts. This is true regardless of how inept the host governance is, or how non-existent it is. If you don't plan to stay and force the place and the people who live their to submit to your governance, then you are not the COIN force. Making that one small fix in US COIN doctrine would save us Trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and tons of influence around the globe.

I had to stare at this paragraph a long time with my head slightly askew while years of Army training butted heads with logic. Then, as my Army training lost the battle, I came to the conclusion that you are right.

I guess if we are doing COIN we are doing it really small and in an advisory capacity, assuming it is a true revolutionary insurgency and not an invasion masked as an insurgency (Ukraine) and it has not reached the point where the insurgents have declared a seperate state (ISIS). Am I reading you correctly?

[Bob's World]

For me one must apply the flagpole test.

Go the capital of the place you are at to deal with an insurgency, find the tallest flagpole and look to the top of that pole. If it is the flag of your nation, you are conducting COIN, but if is the flag of anyone else, you are not.

COIN is not unlike parenting. If you are at home dealing with your own children you are parenting. But if you go to a neighbor's home to help them with their children you are not parenting. To think you were parenting would lead to a disaster of undermining their role as parents and regardless of how good your intentions or actions, would probably not leave a functional family behind when you leave to go home.

We understand this intuitively in operations of the scale of a family - but for some reasons lose all common sense when we scale it to the national level, rationalize our actions with interests or threats, and label it "war."

But it is the same damn thing.

[Bob's World]

For the US, dealing with Ferguson effectively is COIN. Dealing with ISIL is not COIN for the US at all.

In fact, now that the Iraqi state has divided and a separate system of governance around ISIL has formed, it is not COIN for the state formerly known as Iraq either. It is truly, Civil War.

We love to use the term civil war as a measure of the scale of an insurgency, but that serves no purpose. When we use Civil War to identify when an insurgency has evolved so as to become a distinct system of governance, then it is helpful. What was once revolutionary non-war has become war. That in turn drives changes of strategy and tactics. The scale of operations, or the presence or absence of violence does not affect the nature of the problem. We focus on the wrong criteria.

Our current lexicon and distinctions have little strategic value or purpose.

[slapout9]

Revolutionary War=Political Action(non violent black proganda,fraud) + Guerrilla Action (violent action by armed civillians). The political was primary,guerrilla was secondary or supporting. Hence the famous 80% poilitical vs 20% military quote on COIN by Galula.

But that is just tactics. There are many paths (tactics) up the mountain (good governance), and when the government seeks to deny some segments of the population access to the mountain, or to block effective, legal routes up the mountain, the population will go without permission and cut their own path. THAT is revolution.[/QUOTE]

Yes,
It is the Cause that mobilizes the population that is Strategic and must be defeated. Which is why I say there must be an Islamic reformation just like Christianity had or this will never end.

[TheCurmudgeon]

We love to use the term civil war as a measure of the scale of an insurgency, but that serves no purpose. When we use Civil War to identify when an insurgency has evolved so as to become a distinct system of governance, then it is helpful. What was once revolutionary non-war has become war. That in turn drives changes of strategy and tactics. The scale of operations, or the presence or absence of violence does not affect the nature of the problem. We focus on the wrong criteria..

I agree - you cannot have a war without two clearly distinct entities; a clear "us" and "them". As long as we are all still "us," its not a war.


Our current lexicon and distinctions have little strategic value or purpose.

Yes, but the current lexicon has a larger budget attached to it. :D

[TheCurmudgeon]

Colonel,

How do you classify the post invasion phase? If it is Stability Operations, could some of the operational methods outlined in COIN adapted to a Stability Operation, assuming we are not planning on staying long enough to create a mini-merica.

[Bob's World]

Argh...not the "phase" word.

Better question, what is the natural human response to a foreign power invading their homeland and defeating their government and security forces? A blend of submission by some, collaboration by others, and resistance by the rest.

That means that those guys with the friendly faces welcoming you? They are high order traitors and opportunists in the eyes of most everyone else. The ones you'd actually respect are the ones who want to cut your throat. But we put the collaborators into power and then wonder why we are soon met with resistance insurgency against our foreign presence, and revolutionary insurgency against the de facto illegitimate regime we have put in power to serve our interests.

What do we call that phase? We delude ourselves that what we bring is so good, and that what we oppose is so evil, that there will be no resistance against us. We also believe that when we create a government that we think will be good for us and call it a democracy, there will be no revolution against it. But we are always wrong. Always.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Argh...not the "phase" word.

..

What do we call that phase? We delude ourselves that what we bring is so good, and that what we oppose is so evil, that there will be no resistance against us. We also believe that when we create a government that we think will be good for us and call it a democracy, there will be no revolution against it. But we are always wrong. Always.

Sir,

Don't think I am trying to inject COIN into other operations, but reality is that there will be something after the fight is done. I am a proponent of the WWII style Military Government until it can be turned over to civilian control. But I am not for the Bush/Rumsfeld "the locals can handle it" attitude that prevailed after we overthrew Saddam.

The Army is loath to accept this responsibility, even though it has been historically our job. "No, the Army fights and wins America's Wars, ... we do not enforce the peace!" Meanwhile, the Marine (the older and more mature fighting force) have been doing just this for years.

OK, now I am way off topic, but I think the concept needs to be a complete "soup to nuts" formula. No disrespect meant.

[Bill Moore]

Sir,

Don't think I am trying to inject COIN into other operations, but reality is that there will be something after the fight is done. I am a proponent of the WWII style Military Government until it can be turned over to civilian control. But I am not for the Bush/Rumsfeld "the locals can handle it" attitude that prevailed after we overthrew Saddam.

The Army is loath to accept this responsibility, even though it has been historically our job. "No, the Army fights and wins America's Wars, ... we do not enforce the peace!" Meanwhile, the Marine (the older and more mature fighting force) have been doing just this for years.

OK, now I am way off topic, but I think the concept needs to be a complete "soup to nuts" formula. No disrespect meant.

You can't blame the Army for the President's and SECDEF's decisions. If you recall the Army Chief of Staff proposed a much larger ground force for invading Iraq to stabilize it post conflict. He didn't suffer the Wolfowitz illusion that Iraqis would simply welcome us and embrace a western form of government. The Marines weren't stabilizing the Balkans or conducting any other significant stability operations within the past 50 years.

The Army's new doctrine addresses the stability requirement, now we'll if they task organize and train for it. Even if they do it will mean little if policy makers continue to shy away from military governance. This is an example of point where we fail to use sufficient force or other means to achieve OUR objectives. Instead we do just enough to make it worse, and continue to do enough to make it worse instead of getting completely out of the way and letting locals settle it (it won't be pretty), or using sufficient force to impose our will. The lessons we'll take from this war are consolidated in a highly deficient COIN doctrine based on unsound theories. One could argue they are even based on political correctness.

While no one can predict the future, I hope we don't get involved in another long COIN operation. Frankly we suck at it, and it isn't the soldier or marine on point, it is our system. We just end up getting a lot of our kids killed and maimed, and prolong the suffering of the locals who are also killed and maimed. What do we have to show it for it anywhere? Why not try a different approach? Why are we afraid of implementing military governance when it is the right and humane thing to do?

[Bob's World]

Between "dominate the enemy" and "stabilize" there is a missing step :"prevent, resolve or defeat the resistance."

As I said up front, a resistance insurgency is a continuation of warfare, and the natural response of a population to a foreign invasion and occupation. One must either be very clear that this was a drive by punitive operation and that we are not staying for lunch, let alone to "stabilize"; or one must defeat or in some way deal with the resistance that will naturally result.

We tend to make matters worse by wishing away the resistance, and then putting an illegitimate government in place that motivates the rise of a revolution to go along with the resistance.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Trying to return to the topic, and agreeing the the early stages of a revolution is not war, what type of assistance could an outside element provide?

[davidbfpo]

Trying to return to the topic, and agreeing the the early stages of a revolution is not war, what type of assistance could an outside element provide?

There are a number of threads here that comment and debate what external parties / nations can do.

My immediate reaction was to offer Northern Ireland as an example. In 1969 it was a self-governing province and we now know from memoirs very few on the mainland actually knew what was going on. Indeed several politicains who did get involved thought it was a 'orrible place with 'orrible people who had a hsitorical memory not seen elsewhere.

So assistance without thought should be avoided. How long does it take for an advisory mission to really know the context?

Supplying copious amounts of CS gas for riot control is often an option before the level of insurgent / civil violence escalates.

Can diplomacy and NGO action get people on all sides to talk? Should an external actor open dialogue with all?

There is clearly a potential for any external actor to be identified as supporting the regime / nation-state. Is that clearly a plus?

[TheCurmudgeon]

So assistance without thought should be avoided. How long does it take for an advisory mission to really know the context?

Supplying copious amounts of CS gas for riot control is often an option before the level of insurgent / civil violence escalates.

Can diplomacy and NGO action get people on all sides to talk? Should an external actor open dialogue with all?

There is clearly a potential for any external actor to be identified as supporting the regime / nation-state. Is that clearly a plus?

I agree with being cautious, learning what is going on, not saying "you are either with us or against us," and taking your time in deciding how best to proceed. It may be that anything an external party does will simply exasperate the problem. Even an NGO that provides medical and food aid may simply be setting the conditions for the conflict to continue.

The identification of a third party outsider with one side or the other is a big problem. I am not sure there is anyone anymore who is truly neutral. I don’t even know if the UN can do it anymore.

[Bob's World]

What American leaders, policy and doctrine struggle to recognize, is that those affected by our actions care little for our good intentions.

We can appreciate why a Russian invasion of Afghanistan sparked a resistance insurgency against the Russian invaders and a revolutionary insurgency against the puppet regime they put in power; but we cannot fathom why the US invasion and installation of a puppet regime would create the exact same effect.

There will be matters of degree based on the character of one's actions, but the primary effect is rooted in human nature and driven by the nature of the action.

We must have an assumption that any occupation - be it a small unit doing a training event to build partner capacity, or a full blown regime change invasion - will spark some degree of resistance in some portion of the affected population. This is natural.

Likewise, we must have an assumption that any government we help to rise to power or to merely stay in power will spark some degree of revolutionary energy against them by some portion of the population. The greater the perceived popular illegitimacy of the government based on our actions, the greater the revolutionary energy and the broader it will be across the affected population. Again, this is natural.

Bottom line, is that American fecal matter is just as odiferous as anyone else's. Truth.

[Bill Moore]

We can appreciate why a Russian invasion of Afghanistan sparked a resistance insurgency against the Russian invaders and a revolutionary insurgency against the puppet regime they put in power; but we cannot fathom why the US invasion and installation of a puppet regime would create the exact same effect.

No truer words ever spoken, but if it is in our national interest (agree or disagree, it is the policy we have been given) to promote and protect the clown we put in charge, what's a girl to do?

[Bob's World]

Bill,

This gets to what I think "Whole of Government" really needs to mean: Not that we all pull together to try to sustain the unsustainable, or to fix the unfixable.

Rather, what it needs to mean is that we need to design feasible operations from the start at the policy level; and then work through all phases of execution to minimize the negative characteristics that will naturally occur due to the nature of our actions.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Bill Rather, what it needs to mean is that we need to design feasible operations from the start at the policy level; and then work through all phases of execution to minimize the negative characteristics that will naturally occur due to the nature of our actions.

So, how do we influence policy. I have been at the DA level for a couple of years now, and it seems like, if it is not a budget issue, it does not matter.

I guess I am asking - do you have any suggestions on how we influence the civilian side of the military-civilian relationship?

[Bob's World]

Who is the "honest broker"? That is a good question. I don't know. How does one be an honest broker when working within an organization that is by its very nature biased due to an overarching mission of advocating for a particular aspect of our total system?

That is like the proverbial camel making it through the eye of the needle. (the small gate in walled cites that could be opened at night after the main gate was closed).

The army is much more purely a war fighting service than any of the others. Particularly for maritime nations with no neighboring ground threat to have to respond rapidly to. So the army is on a quest for relevance that creates a tremendous bias. They seek to expand the definition of war. They seek to expand the perceived necessity for military engagement overseas in times of peace. They seek to sell a "land power" solution as to key to virtually every security problem.

It is little wonder our doctrine on conflict and war is so confused, when all of the cooks are working off of a different idea of what the proper solution looks like, and works mightily to craft the problem into the context of their respective solutions. Who is it that works to understand and frame problems for what they actually are?

The services like leaders and action officers who are grinders and who adhere strictly to the party line. Innovation is only wanted in the context of those two things. If you opt to be a thinker, then you will not be grinding as hard as your peers, and your thoughts will likely take you outside of the party lines. At that point you become a heretic and a pain in the neck, or even a threat, to those dedicated to head down grinding.

Know your boss, know your environment. Good bosses like good ideas and will know what they can and can't advance. It is a game of inches when all around you are running 100 miles per hour.

[Compost]

The Journal has a new item and slant on a recurring topic: ‘Reorganization is Imperative to Fixing Special Forces’ Bent Unconventional Culture’:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/reorganization-is-imperative-to-fixing-special-forces%E2%80%99-bent-unconventional-culture

The author focuses on language and linguistics as an important factor in the overall problem. That seems valid because although a political cartoon may convey a lot without words few people can succeed in doing the same. However the Pentagon has certainly managed to do just that.

(This item was intended for Doctrine and TTPS but threads such as Counter – Unconventional Warfare, Thrashing about is not a strategy, The Joint Planning Process were all closed. Active threads were preoccupied with COIN. This thread has the first appropriate title but have not read all its items.)

It’s now easy to distinguish the special trooper. “ Yes he’s the one wearing the big helmet and mosquito net with half a pair of opera glasses and the single ear headset for road safety, multi-colour sunscreen, big wristwatch and sweat bands and mittens, modish scarf over the blotchy but stylishly slit Jean Paul G stretch combo, the cowboy’s holster on the belt with the big knife and hatchet, handcuffs and baton and large bunch of coloured cable ties, with soft lunch bag and drink flasks. Then over the waistcoat with the rifle magazines, energy drink and fruit pouches there’s the cute shortie over-and-under shotgun between the speckled binoculars and the computer phone with a screen, the big rifle on one shoulder with a can on the end to keep out the rain and the vacuum cleaner squeegie thingie on the other shoulder together with the bent antenna. The coloured patches are to show who is the boss of each group and for all skills other than spoken and written American English and math. “

The Pentagon chiefs and their political chiefs - and similarly the chiefs of other ABCA nations - have apparently forgotten how to task organise, exercise and commit joint force units. One result has been the growth of Special Forces harvesting vitality and particularly extracting rather than extricating it from single service special units. If that continues SpecFor will become larger than the USMC leading each next set of chiefs to dream up a special SpecForCom.

Possibly the long-term task organisation of SpecForCom - as distinct from strike-oriented single and joint force units - should consist of at the largest 100-person SpecFor teams each specialised in one language/ethno area with integral mobility using ag-bikes up to at most 3-tonne GP vehicles – some with discrete armour but without an electric generator for high capacity comms. Then as indicated or if needed promptly add for later subtraction sub-units from single forces as needed, exercise and deploy with no higher than a major in local command. Possibly a LTCOL with 6 staff in country and almost always at the embassy or consulate keeping tabs on several separate teams, but limited to 20 hours per week in the field. If not enough then more area-specialised teams and at most a Colonel with 10 staff at the embassy, again with at most 20 hours per week in the field. If still more commitment is warranted then send in a USMC force up to the size of a MAGTF.

The Pentagon knows that special forces have to be engaged in difficult business and that small can be useful. But it commonly scores B for effort and E for brain. SpecForCom has been enthusiastically and energetically glamourised and made popular with the electorate. And the Pentagon is now almost duty bound to continue feeding an overlarge gorilla when smooth and cut-down guerillas are needed. The way many politically contentious decisions seem to be made indicates that rectification is likely to be delayed until some administration after the current one has gone. Some pragmatists like Jean Larteguy might understand but many long-dead and some recently dead senior executives would be seriously displeased and for the long term.

So how might a SpecForCom be made effective or more effective without damaging the rest of a national security infrastructure ? Use skill in languages to determine suitability for what precisely or approximately ? Is that the right type of straight line for a reorganization and just how many straight lines are needed ?

[Bob's World]

Reorganization is what military leaders do when they know things aren't as good as they could be, but have no real idea what the problem is or how to fix it.

A couple of "simple" fixes:

1. We must change how we think. We are currently attempting to implement a national strategy that is essentially to sustain a status quo of a US dominated global system through a policy of attempting to convince others to think and believe and value more as we do. We do this in an era of accelerated power-shifting within, among and between systems of governance, when people everywhere are much more focused on attempting to be more like themselves, not more like us. The result: Massive strategic friction and associated US strategic frustration. It makes the world appear to be full of "threats."

So, the US must first gain a greater awareness of how the world actually is, and a greater empathy for the perspectives of others. We must then seek to avoid the empire-killing inclination of "Imperial overreach" and focus our interest more narrowly so as to better posture ourselves to hold onto what is truly important as hegemony naturally transitions to more multi-polar, regional systems of influence.

We must think in terms of interests, and problems; not in terms of problematic threats that become to us an "interest" simply because they exist and challenge our world-view.

2. Shift from reactive applications of SOF to proactive applications. Counterterrorism, Counter insurgency, FID focused on building partner CT and COIN capacity; etc. We are in the react mode and chasing threats. We never catch up, and our strategic goals, are mirage-like, in that no matter how hard we work, we never reach them. This is the problem of defining problems in tactical terms of named threats, and applying a reactive "strategy of tactics" to defeat and disrupt said threats. It is a treadmill we can't seem to get off.

A more proactive approach recognizes that the US is a nation at peace in a dangerous and evolving world. It is also a world full of pockets of revolutionary energy. This is a target rich environment for unconventional warfare-based approaches that rely on leveraging the insurgent energy within populations governed by others in order to advance one's own interests.

To implement such a proactive approach one would need a program of persistent, benign, transparent activity that placed special operators among the populations living in the places most critical to our truly vital interests. Not in some Embassy. Not in some military base teaching soldiers for the 20th time how to zero their rifle or clear a room. Not in some ninja squirrel clandestine operation. Just in plain sight, and focused on developing our own understanding, influence and relationships. This will gives us timely warning when some other independent (AQ, ISIS, etc) actor or state (Russia, etc) actor shows up to conduct their own UW; and also posture us to conduct whatever mission might someday come down the pipe from civilian authorities.

To do this requires gaining control over the SOF personnel system, so that SOF can protect, reward and promote those who do what is vital for SOF, but bizarre and unvalued by the services. It also requires SOF to turn the cart around from our current reactive, threat-centric mindset.

I do not hold high hopes for either to happen in time to avoid the cliff we are currently racing toward.

[Compost]

Say again Bob and more simply. No nation is ever actually at peace. Michael Howard recently and the Greeks millenia back had it correct. We just have to be a more more adroit and adaptive.

[davidbfpo]

A short, on the record talk by Canada's senior SOF officer last week @ IISS London:
The Afghanistan campaign saw extensive use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in a wide variety of roles, and spurred unprecedented technical and tactical developments. For Canadian SOF, this also included new command structures and considerable growth in size. While maintaining a clear, mandated role for domestic counter-terrorism, Canada’s SOF are developing important global roles, from delivering precision direct effects to building partner capacity. Amid much speculative media commentary, there is a need for a clear understanding amongst policymakers and the defence and security community of the capabilities and limitations of SOF, as well as their role in supporting conventional forces and other government agencies.


Interesting short bio for the speaker, with my emphasis:
Brigadier-General Michael Rouleau, Commander of Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM), will share his perspective on these issues. Enrolled in 1985 and later commissioned as a Field Artillery Officer, Brigadier-General Rouleau joined Canada's nascent SOF unit Joint Task Force 2 in 1994. Retiring to join the Ottawa Police in 1999, he re-enrolled following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. He returned to Joint Task Force 2, eventually serving as the Commanding Officer, followed by a number of strategic-level positions. He was promoted to his current rank and appointed Commander of CANSOFCOM in February 2014.
Link:http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2015-f463/june-9229/special-operations-forces-afghanistan-8bb8


Might be appropriate here.:wry:

[Bob's World]

Nations are rarely at war, which is not the same as an absence of conflict. The US has not been at war since 1945 - but we often have troops engaged in various conflicts here or there. Heck, we lose a cop every other day domestically. The world is a violent place, but violence does not mean war in most cases. The military over defines conflict as war, and our laws for conflict encourages that inappropriate behavior.

[Compost]

To implement such a proactive approach one would need a program of persistent, benign, transparent activity that placed special operators among the populations living in the places most critical to our truly vital interests. Not in some Embassy. Not in some military base teaching soldiers for the 20th time how to zero their rifle or clear a room. Not in some ninja squirrel clandestine operation. Just in plain sight, and focused on developing our own understanding, influence and relationships. This will gives us timely warning when some other independent (AQ, ISIS, etc) actor or state (Russia, etc) actor shows up to conduct their own UW; and also posture us to conduct whatever mission might someday come down the pipe from civilian authorities.

Say again again. What do you suppose is being attempted - not always well - when actors show up every day for a tryout/tryon or whatever ?

Getting back to the purpose of special forces, started on a list of personnel and skills needed for FMA style military assistance complementary and supplementary to Embassy work and assistance from other parts of government.

Sorted them out in alphapetic order and was surprised at what came out.
Biometricians and police liaison;
Economists, forensic accountants and business/industry liaison;
Ethnographers, historians and college/university liaison;
Hygienists and waterworks engineers and liaison to civil/rural organizations;
Intelligence analysts and military liaison;
Journalists, speech writers and media liaison;
Linguists and humint;
Medicos, surgeons and hospital liaison;
Military analysts (especially psych warfare) and liaison coordinated with that provided by military separately posted as Embassy staff.

Realise that several other skill sets have been neglected. For example wanted to include operational research, systems analysts, computer programmers and industry liaison with feet on the ground but decided some such might be sent as fly-in teams. Eventually got to military, tactics and weapons to supplement US marines usually assigned roles such as embassy protection. Believe that SWAT team could also handle guerilla liaison.

And yes am aware that a low form of organisation can be to try and squeeze many functions into one place but the results can with common sense planning prove useful. Just keep some things elite and highly valued but small.

[davidbfpo]

Compost,

I like the list. Missing are prison staff trainers, if not adequate prisons - construction staff maybe available, designers and the like maybe not. And cartographers, little can be done without maps even in this so called digital age.

I have assumed pre-trial detention and imprisonment are the route being taken, not "catch, kill or release".

A key factor is understanding how country actually 'X' works and the extent of non-national / local access such as the IMF, banks, airlines, media and NGOs. Will they talk to you? Is there an overseas community? Sometimes the answers are closer than you think.

[Compost]

David,

Agree on custodial staff but that’s one of the rotten tasks for which well-trained MPs are intended. Almost outside my experience but was once apprehended speeding inside a Bien Hoa base and literally only weeks after briefly visiting a POW stockade run by the ARVN. Agree combination of undeclared and non-uniformed conflict warrants trial in civil courts.

Totally forgot cartographers. That’s another good reason for unscripted exercises where the loading schedules are not pre-planned. In many but not all instances arms-length commercial/civil arrangements can get some resident services on side. Intend to play tennis tomorrow and planning not to be back for a while.

[Bob's World]

We need aptitude far more than skills. The role of Special Forces is not to fix broken governance, but rather to understand and leverage the energy that broken governance generates within the populations it affects.

Sure, we can reverse engineer those skills to help some partner with their COIN (FID for us), but too often this is to prop up some government we have either created, or simply protect and enable to avoid making the changes necessary to reduce the negative energy their governance creates.

Insurgency is simple. Understanding and leveraging its energy is art - but thinking one can mechanically"fix" it with technical skills is folly rooted in the arrogance of the past several hundred years of Western imposition on the governance of others for Western interests.

[Dayuhan]

Late to the table, but a few points...

I agree with Slap's earlier point on "religious insurgency". This is an actual thing. Probably the most obvious act of religious insurgency in Western history would be Martin Luther nailing his theses to the church door in Wittenburg, challenging the Catholic hierarchy and accelerating a struggle for leadership of the Christian faith. That struggle of course spilled over into the political sphere and caused a great deal of violence and bloodshed. ISIL is a religious insurgency because it is setting itself up as a contender for leadership of the Islamic religion, directly challenging all other contenders for that title. The declaration of a Caliphate was more an act of religious insurgency than it was an act of political insurgency: by declaring a Caliphate ISIL demanded the fealty of Muslims around the world. We tend to see ISIL as a political challenge to the West because we see everything relative to the West, but it is fundamentally a challenge for leadership within Islam.

The idea of "good governance" is something we need to approach with caution, because all too often we assume that our idea of good governance is universal, which it is not. We tend to think that good governance can be achieved with a structural solution that provides all groups with input into the political process and protects the rights and interests of all groups. When the groups in question define good governance as "we rule and they die", the result is a fairly fatal degree of dissonance.

A discussion of what's been lacking in recent American military excursions abroad would necessarily be long and wide-ranging, but to me one critical and often overlooked deficiency is clarity of purpose. We never seem entirely clear on what we are trying to achieve, or why, or for whom. Our goals change in midstream, and we often seem to get tied up in believing our own rhetoric. Nations use force to achieve political goals, and victory is won when the goals are achieved. If the goals are uncertain, ephemeral, or aspirational, victory is unlikely from the start.

[Compost]

Here’s a cartoon that could almost have been devised for your views. Two specfor troopers walking toward a sign ‘Practise Village’. One is saying “There’s too many of us and the walls don’t seem to be moved much”. Close by two USMC are jogging toward a sign ‘Sneaker Range’ with sweat or tears dripping from their eyes.

That just about says it all. Even at a stretch your pushing FID as polemical rather than military liaison between a large and a small country that have some interests in common. Naturally agree with Dayuhan that evangelism often - and possibly always - is a dangerous excess.

[Compost]

Should have noted the troopers were wearing goggles. Also it's not victory that's needed because if one is careful it's success.

[Bill Moore]

Late to the table, but a few points...

The idea of "good governance" is something we need to approach with caution, because all too often we assume that our idea of good governance is universal, which it is not. We tend to think that good governance can be achieved with a structural solution that provides all groups with input into the political process and protects the rights and interests of all groups. When the groups in question define good governance as "we rule and they die", the result is a fairly fatal degree of dissonance.

A discussion of what's been lacking in recent American military excursions abroad would necessarily be long and wide-ranging, but to me one critical and often overlooked deficiency is clarity of purpose. We never seem entirely clear on what we are trying to achieve, or why, or for whom. Our goals change in midstream, and we often seem to get tied up in believing our own rhetoric. Nations use force to achieve political goals, and victory is won when the goals are achieved. If the goals are uncertain, ephemeral, or aspirational, victory is unlikely from the start.

Regarding the part I bolded, I think the underlying issue is failure to treat our excursions like the wars that they are. Some assert that the military is treating these excursions as war and using Clausewitz as a guide for strategy. The reality seems quite different, instead our military treats these excursions as a form of social engineering with vague ideas of self-determination, democracy, human rights (now includes gay rights), free market systems, and so forth. We get so caught in up in nave discussions about legitimacy (for whom?) that we forget the original purpose that we employed military force to achieve in the first place. What U.S. interest were we protecting or pursuing? What was the role of the military in achieving those objectives?

I do agree that no all conflicts are wars, but our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were certainly wars, as was Vietnam and Korea (despite labeling them as police actions for political purposes). With the exception of DESERT STORM where we had a limited objective, we didn't fight to win. In fact, it appears we no longer seek to defeat an adversary, instead we now throw money and ideology at our adversaries hoping to defeat them by co-opting them into our way of life. We have senior officers stating that if we just give the adversaries jobs they'll quit fighting (proven to be a false assumption repeatedly), or we simply have to win the battle of the narrative (even if true, we have demonstrated no ability to do this), or if we just install a democratic form of governance the people will pursue their objectives through a legal process. That wasn't true in the U.S., and we have one of the most advanced democracies in the world. We had a Civil War, and numerous terrorist groups in the 60s and 70s active in the U.S.. Why would that be true in countries that have a longer history of ethnic hatred and a high percentage of illiteracy?

Today we rarely hear or see any real effort to defeat the adversary using force. We promote the false belief that force doesn't work. Apparently the idea of using force isn't clever enough for those who see themselves as self-styled strategists who have a special understanding of the world that others can't grasp (also known as insanity). President Obama claimed we can't defeat ISIL with force, instead we have to promote better ideas. Listening to the radio I heard a counter argument to this view, which was that Nazism was only defeated by force. They weren't going to be defeated by better ideas. Why do assume that those who oppose us can't be true believers in their cause?

Our non-war approach results in years of ineffective operations at great cost to no discernible end. Instead of protecting or furthering our interests we simply deplete our human and financial resources, not to mention our reputation globally. The eating soup with a knife fans will mindlessly argue we just need to keep doing the same thing for another decade or two, and we'll win, but win what? Whether war would work or not regarding our current threats is debatable, but the way we're conducting operations now clearly is not working.

[Dayuhan]

our military treats these excursions as a form of social engineering with vague ideas of self-determination, democracy, human rights (now includes gay rights), free market systems, and so forth. We get so caught in up in nave discussions about legitimacy (for whom?) that we forget the original purpose that we employed military force to achieve in the first place.

I agree, but I think this problem starts at the policy level, and is well entrenched before the military takes it over.

When we talk about "legitimacy", we often assume that what is pursued is legitimacy in the eyes of the population of the area in which we intervene. Politicians are often more concerned with legitimizing the excursion in the eyes of their own populace, and I think that many of the more aspirational goals and more egregious restrictions that the US adopts are much more about establishing legitimacy in the eyes of the American voter than about any concern over local legitimacy. Again, this goes back to clarity of purpose and honesty in the face of our own rhetoric.


Today we rarely hear or see any real effort to defeat the adversary using force. We promote the false belief that force doesn't work.

Whether or not force works depends entirely on the goals we are trying to achieve. There are goals that can be achieved with force, and there are goals that can't be achieved with the use of force. Again, being clear on what goals we pursue and why is a good start.