The US & others working with Pakistan

[carl]

Omar:

That isn't a confusing paragraph.

You know better than me but these are some guesses as to some of the points you raised.

The military/feudal elites of Pakistan will contest Talibanization of the country, mainly because they would lose too much money and influence. That will open the way for a fight.

Said elites will not ask India for help. Emotional reasons mainly but if they did, that would be a tacit admission that Pakistan isn't really a country, but a very unruly child that must inevitably come back to mother.

If India were to chose this course, and it worked, they could bleed the Pak Army/ISI forever. Even if the impossible happened and Pakistan asked India to save it, India could. All these fabled Afghan fighters have only managed success in the last 40 years when they have had substantial outside assistance. They can't manage on their own. If India sponsored Taliban bleeding of Pakistan, then withdrew that sponsorship, Taliban is done.

Pretty calculating stuff but big boys rules rule.

Of course all these things are the best that could happen. The worst that could happen is the nukes start flying and 3% to 4% of the worlds population dies suddenly.

You are right, what on earth are those genii in Pindi thinking?

[omarali50]

For some reason, this video came to mind: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lqV_ExWj-bw
Jump to 3-30 seconds mark if you are impatient like me.

[carl]

Omar:

That is how you and me see it.

The general sahibs at GHQ probably feel more like this.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z0GFRcFm-aY&ob=av3e

[omarali50]

comment and link at http://www.brownpundits.com/?p=10

[Ray]

Attack on the drones


PAKISTAN yesterday warned Britain to help stop the American "Drone Wars" that are slaughtering hundreds of its innocent civilians.

Pakistan's High Commissioner to Britain Wajid Shamsul Hasan told The Sun in an exclusive interview that his country's relations with America are at their lowest ebb. ....

But he urged PM David Cameron to condemn US drone attacks on al-Qaeda and Taliban training camps in the north west of his country — dubbing them as "war crimes" and "little more than state executions".

Tough-talking Mr Hasan also declared Pakistan would have no choice but to support Iran if "aggressive" Israel attacks it.

But his immediate concern is the drones known to have killed 535 civilians, including 60 children, in three years.

Pakistan claims the real death toll is more than 1,000. The unmanned aircraft blast missiles at targets, directed by a computer thousands of miles away. ...

"They will have to at some stage take punitive actions to stop them. They have got means to take such actions to defend their own frontier and territories. ..

http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/4115452/Pakistan-blasts-lethal-US-drone-attacks.html


It appears:

1. Pakistan is livid at the killings of innocents through the Drone attacks as per their perceptions.

2. Pakistan will support Iran.

3. Pakistan wants Mr Cameron to intercede in these "war crimes" and "little more than state executions".

4. There will be punitive actions by Pakistan to stop these drone attacks.

What exactly can be the solution to ensure that the US' aim is achieved and yet, at the same time, Pakistan can calm their agitated people?

[davidbfpo]

What a diplomatic triumph for the Pakistani diplomat in the UK! Regardless of what he actually says The Sun's website does not even show the story on the home page. There are an amazing variety of other news worthy stories and photos. So his interview is IMO "shooting himself in the foot".

I have listened to him before, in person and on TV. He is full of bluster and rarely advances his nation's cause - leaving aside which part of the nation he represents. For his background as a journalist:http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=42711&Itemid=2

[omarali50]

LOL. The army and the PPP must have made a deal to get Wajid Shamsulhassan (who was reputedly one of Benazir's bagmen and knows where the cash is buried) to go off in this manner. Lack of media coverage in the West may actually be a desired objective in this case. From Wajid's POV the ideal situation is this:
1. He says whatever GHQ or PPP or both wants said.
2. There is suitable coverage in the Urdu press back home. But if the aim is to convince people in Pakistan (already primed by military-mullah alliance propaganda to blame the US for everything) that the PPP regime is not a bunch of CIA agents I dont think this will work because nobody believes they are really opposed to drone strikes (at least not for the reasons given). If the aim is to show loyalty to GHQ that wont help either, because no matter how many pro-army statements the PPP issues, it will still be mistrusted. If the aim is to raise the price of cooperation and get more money...well, that may work.
3. No big coverage in the Western media. They are not the target audience.

I have no idea what the plan is supposed to be. Maybe there is some real plan, maybe its just whatever the psyops geniuses thought they should do today. But someday the US may give up on whatever mysterious plan the US has in the region and what will happen then? Is there a plan for the day after in pakistan?
No one (not the US, not the Pakistani public, not even Tariq Ali except when it suits his political agenda) cares too much about civilian casualties, but if you think a third world army or corrupt third world elite cares more about civilian casualties than the evil CIA then I may have a bridge to sell you.

[Ray]

I was reading a book, 'The Wandering Falcon' by Jamil Ahmad, a Pak Civil Service officer who spent his time in the Frontier and Balochistan.

It does give an insight into the lives of the people out there and there concept of life, seasonal migration, the conflict between there traditional ways with real life and the total conflict between the two!

Somehow, it did help to understand (hopefully) a bit of what is the psyche that works out there.

[VCheng]

It appears:

1. Pakistan is livid at the killings of innocents through the Drone attacks as per their perceptions.

2. Pakistan will support Iran.

3. Pakistan wants Mr Cameron to intercede in these "war crimes" and "little more than state executions".

4. There will be punitive actions by Pakistan to stop these drone attacks.

What exactly can be the solution to ensure that the US' aim is achieved and yet, at the same time, Pakistan can calm their agitated people?

Much of the agitation is for domestic consumption only, to keep the faithful in line so that the Army is continued to be seen as the strong defenders of the Islamic Republic, when the reality is not all that robust.

[jmm99]

Hi Ray et al.:

Thanks to our favorite Brigadier (albeit you're the only one here :)) for the drone post re: Pakistan attempting to influencing the UK. Other factors (to the same effect as the Pakistani claims) are at work in the UK, as well as here in the US.

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/) has been pounding the drones - as its front page today shows. The TBIJ (About the Bureau (http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/who/)) is:


The Bureau of Investigative Journalism is a not-for-profit organisation based at City University, London, that bolsters original journalism by producing high-quality investigations for press and broadcast media.

The first of its kind in the UK, it was established in April 2010 with a £2 million donation from The David & Elaine Potter Foundation (http://www.potterfoundation.com/). ...

The TBIJ and the Obama Administration are engaged (verbally, of course).

Also engaged verbally with the Obama Administration on the same topic is Philip Alston (from this side of the pond), former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions. He has published a long article (164 pages), The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders (http://harvardnsj.org/2012/01/the-cia-and-targeted-killings-beyond-borders/), in the Harvard National Security Journal (http://harvardnsj.org/).

What effect all of this will have on the UK is not my department.

Its effect on the US (except for those like Alston who are already anti-drone) is likely to be minimal. Current US polls are running 80%+ in favor of President Obama's drone policy.

Regards

Mike

[omarali50]

Pakistan is, among other things, the hunting ground of the Ummah (or at least, of the stupidly rich segment of the Ummah who can afford private airstrips and hunting palaces in Pakistan, wildlife conservation be damned).
Occasionally, we try to even the score by hunting the hunters. IN this case, we got really lucky: http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/02/qatari-minister-looted-in-turbat/
60 million rupees may be peanuts for the petroleum minister of Qatar (a country that just paid 250 million dollars or some such for a painting by Van Gogh) but its going to make some poor Baloch or FC soldiers really happy. Unless they get caught, in which case ISI will probably cut off their balls and present them to the minister from Qatar.

[davidbfpo]

I too have heard of similar 'hunting' trips and having checked the exchange rate Rs.60m in US$ is 661k. That seems a lot of cash to carry for paying off all the expenses of the trip. Or is it an opportunity to make a donation to a cause some of those in the Gulf are reported as being sympathetic with?

[omarali50]

Qatar's causes tend to be "pro-western", so I dont think its that (unless, of course, there is a "Western" cause to which he was contributing, but then why not just quietly hand over the cash at the door of his lavish palace/rest-house?).
I was told by a friend in the civil service that large amounts of cash are standard with these people. They pay everyone in cash, they throw cash at the high-end prostitutes they bring in to dance at the rest-house, they tip lavishly...still, it does seem like a lot, so who knows. Maybe it was meant for some anti-Iranian group? and maybe this is not a way to hand it over, this is someone in the opposition (the jihadi faction of the ISI?) getting wind of it and arranging for the donation to be rerouted.
Who knows.
or rather, whoever knows isnt likely to tell.
But my default assumption is robbery and a prince who was carrying way too much cash.

[VCheng]

Don't these levels of guests have appropriate levels of both imported personal and locally provided security? I would not put some inside information leakage beyond the realm of possibility here.

[omarali50]

Brigadier (retd) Shaukat Qadir provides what is probably the official "good ISI' Version: http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_PAKISTAN_BIN_LADENS_LAST_DAYS?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT

[JMA]

And the Pakistanis try to keep all their options open...

Pakistan President Zardari visits India for talks (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17648622)

[Ray]

The Pakistan President and the Pakistan Govt is sinecure and redundant to policy making.

It is the Army that calls the shot.

As many of you would be aware that the Indian Govt shot down the Army Chief's contention over his age wherein he would have continued longer in office.

Thus there is a joke doing the rounds in India.

"The Govt decides the age of the Army Chief in India,

But the Army decides the age of the Govt in Pakistan!"

[davidbfpo]

The regular writer on these issues Ahmed Rashid is back on tour - in the UK - for his new book and it maybe of note to view a few reviews.

Introductory remarks from one critical review:
A sequel to his four earlier books on the subject since mid-90s, especially Descent into Chaos (2008), the study underlines the precariousness of the Pakistani state’s chances for survival and the urgent need for policy resolutions. It also explains the causes of the recent deterioration in US-Pakistan relations and how they can be rectified; pinpoints factors responsible for the failure of the Obama Administration’s approach towards Pakistan and the Afghan war; and suggests ways to stabilise Pakistan and achieve a lasting peace in Afghanistan, amid the withdrawal of US and NATO troops from the war-torn country by 2014.

For more:http://politicsinspires.org/2012/04/is-pakistan-a-bigger-problem-than-afghanistan-a-critical-appraisal-of-ahmed-rashids-pakistan-on-the-brink-2/

Peter Oborne writes:
Instead of writing very good books, he now writes very bad ones...Rashid has ceased to be a subversive reporter and instead has swallowed almost entire the conventional categorisation of the war on terror...Yet there is much of value in this book, which chronicles the collapse of relations between Pakistan and the United States over recent years. India, in a reverse of the Cold War system, has become the main regional ally of the United States.

Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/books/7777808/dangerous-territory.thtml

On Amazon.com there are supportive reviews:http://www.amazon.com/Pakistan-Brink-Future-America-Afghanistan/product-reviews/0670023469/ref=cm_cr_dp_see_all_btm?ie=UTF8&showViewpoints=1&sortBy=bySubmissionDateDescending

[omarali50]

Farhat Taj on the history of Talibanization of the tribal areas, shatters some myths: http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta3/tft/article.php?issue=20120420&page=6

[omarali50]

my article at 3QD: http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2012/04/saving-pakistan-and-india-omar-ali.html#more

[Bob's World]

Perhaps a glimmer of hope for Pakistan.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/04/08/imran-khan-may-become-pakistan-s-next-prime-minister.html

[davidbfpo]

Bob,


Our occasional correspondent Hamid Hussain has provided a commentary (on attachment) on Pakistan's emerging political situation, notably the guided emergence of Imran Khan's political party and yes, the role of the military / ISI.

Perhaps worth a return visit, Post 234 on the Pakistani Politics thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2912&page=12

[carl]

That Newsweek article made me laugh once or twice. It mentioned that once Imran Khan is elected he plans to order the Army to do something. (I started laughing again when I wrote that sentence.) That the author of the article could let that pass without expanding greatly upon it indicates that the author may be a little out of touch with Pakistani politics.

[omarali50]

Time for me to replug an old article about Imran Khan: http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2011/11/imran-khan-the-12th-man-rises.html

[Ray]

That Newsweek article made me laugh once or twice. It mentioned that once Imran Khan is elected he plans to order the Army to do something.

Some feel he is an Army stooge!

[Bob's World]

I don't know much about this man, but I do believe he makes some important points. Points that I think are important, and that he seems to stand for are:

1. That it is important for the leader of Pakistan to not be perceived as selling out his/her country by subjugating the interests of Pakistan and the Pakistani people to the interests of some foreign power in exchange for favor and economic benefit. Arguably recent leaders of Pakistan have done this with the US.

2. That it is important for the leader of Pakistan to reestablish the tradition of non-interference with the tribal populaces shared with Afghanistan and to refrain from excessive efforts to exercise governmental control over the same.

3. Pakistan is in a challenging situation, and must carefully balance relationships with powerful neighbors, such as China and India; while at the same time also balancing the often odd demands of far away powers such as the US. No easy task between these nuclear powers. To add a degree of difficulty most of us Westerners cannot fully appreciate is the relationships the government must manage with the many diverse and distinct populace groups that live within and expand across her borders.

4. No Pakistani leader will be able to make everyone happy or answer to every powerful party's demands. To attempt to make all happy will make none happy, and only failure can come of that. One must choose, and recent choices seem to have been poor ones for Pakistan. For Americans, we must learn that an honest "no" is a far better answer to live with than a disingenuous "yes."

[carl]

1. That it is important for the leader of Pakistan to not be perceived as selling out his/her country by subjugating the interests of Pakistan and the Pakistani people to the interests of some foreign power in exchange for favor and economic benefit. Arguably recent leaders of Pakistan have done this with the US.

2. That it is important for the leader of Pakistan to reestablish the tradition of non-interference with the tribal populaces shared with Afghanistan and to refrain from excessive efforts to exercise governmental control over the same.

3. Pakistan is in a challenging situation, and must carefully balance relationships with powerful neighbors, such as China and India; while at the same time also balancing the often odd demands of far away powers such as the US. No easy task between these nuclear powers. To add a degree of difficulty most of us Westerners cannot fully appreciate is the relationships the government must manage with the many diverse and distinct populace groups that live within and expand across her borders.

4. No Pakistani leader will be able to make everyone happy or answer to every powerful party's demands. To attempt to make all happy will make none happy, and only failure can come of that. One must choose, and recent choices seem to have been poor ones for Pakistan. For Americans, we must learn that an honest "no" is a far better answer to live with than a disingenuous "yes."

As to point 1. I think they already run that game on us. They talk all the time about the primacy of Pakistani interests, but then when they want the money, they say what good buddies they are. They choose to run the game.

As to point 2., I agree to an extent. They should stop supporting the expansion of the wild eyed Jihadis in the areas despite the opposition of the local people. The relatives of all the tribal elders killed by the Jihadis and the people represented by them would like that and would probably like to see a few killers come to trial.

Also, I read once that one of the problems of the border areas is that they are not subject to the same laws as the rest of the country. That results in some inequities.

As to point 3., no doubt.

As to point 4., I am somewhat puzzled. As far as I can see, there is no "leader" of Pakistan. The closest thing is Kayani sahib who is primarily interested in fostering the well being of his group, the army, everything else being secondary.

But your use of the word leader raises a question. Do you think it would be beneficial for Pakistan to have a system whereby there was something like a "leader"? Do you think the country would benefit if there was a civilian leader who could call up Kayani on the phone, tell him he wanted his resignation within 20 minutes, and be obeyed?

Your are darn right that we should learn to live with an honest no rather than a lying yes. But we have been the ones rewarding the lying yes, for years. Why on earth should they stop the lying yes if we give them money for it? That is our fault, not theirs. We're the frog, they're the scorpion.

[VCheng]

To me this excerpt seems pretty relevant:

from: http://dawn.com/2012/04/24/negotiating-with-america/




The US agenda included transformation of Pakistan’s armed forces and their mission. Relations with Pakistan would not have plunged so low if Washington had not embarked upon a policy to tame Pakistan’s military establishment. The coercive approach ran into a major crisis with Nato’s fateful air attack on the Pakistani border post of Salala. The Pakistan Army has since demonstrated that it can leverage its strength better than the hapless civilians devoid of popular support.

Given the present realities, the iron law of necessity demands that Pakistan and the US successfully negotiate the parameters of their future relations. In Pakistan, the project is endangered by two sets of people: a powerful lobby in the political class, diplomacy, economic ministries and the media that yearns to get back to a golden past that never existed and agitational groups that thrive on pathological anti-Americanism. In Washington, the threat comes from segments of the establishment that are still not willing to factor into policy Pakistan’s strategic concerns and the aspirations of its people to achieve a semblance of what the political scientists fashionably call ‘sovereign equality’.

[carl]

Translation of the passage quoted by VCheng "It's the Yankees fault and things would be so much better if they would just understand the Pak Army/ISI's strategic concerns." or more simply "Just do what we want and keep the money coming."

[VCheng]

Translation of the passage quoted by VCheng "It's the Yankees fault and things would be so much better if they would just understand the Pak Army/ISI's strategic concerns." or more simply "Just do what we want and keep the money coming."


Pakistan Army has perfected the milking of the foreign bogeyman concept to a high art over the decades, and is finding it to its purpose to paint the India-USA (Hindus and Jews - "Hanood-o-Yahood" in local parlance- what could be juicier?) nexus as the existential threat to its captive nation.

From USA's point of view, it will be a long hard struggle to bring this out-of-control nuclear-capable terrorist-spawning monster under some form of decent civilian control, given the absolutely horrible robber baron trash that passes as politicians these days in Pakistan.

Couple this with the increasingly insurmountable social problems ranging from water to power to education to the economy, and John Le Carre himself could not lay the stage for a more dramatic thriller for the next decade or two.

Am I being hyperbolic? Not at all, for I have some idea of what I speak about here.

[VCheng]

The following Op-Ed peice from DefPk gives an insight into the kind of thinking that pervades the Pakistani mindset these days:

http://www.defence.pk/drives-american-policies-strategic-aims-region-721/

excerpts:




Since the end of Second World War America has been constantly in a state of war. This strategy of endless war justifies the existence of its massive war industry. Nationalistic or religious unrest is fomented in its areas of “interest” followed by moving in as a “savior”, with or without a UN “mandate”. ........................

In the hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs held on February 8, 2012, the American designs on this region were brought into the open. What was before routinely dismissed as a conspiracy theory has now been clarified: “Let's stick it to the Pakistanis”.

...................

The larger picture is that this would eventually help them in isolating, containing and restraining China.

The current setbacks against Taliban are merely a nuisance for the Americans.

The region is ready for their next move: There is ample unrest. Iran is isolated and crippled under sanctions. It has hostile Sunni Arabs on its western side and an Afghanistan occupied by hostile American forces on its eastern side. Pakistan’s economy and law and order are in shambles, due to inept government and the American War on Terror.

With this single goal in mind, the American policy suffers from severe myopia. For now it doesn’t matter for policy-makers if:
- The Committee leaders holding the hearings and presenting resolutions calling for an independent Balochistan can even pronounce the name properly.
- The Committee Congressmen have enough insight about the people, its politics and geographical makeup; or
-The Baloch diaspora originating from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran have enough influence over their Congressmen. (If so, it would be welcome and can be used to legitimize America’s intervention.);

.........................

[davidbfpo]

VCheng,

As I have posted before what happens to Pakistan if the USA decides it has had enough and stops / reduces the flow of financial support?

One wonders if the Pakistani military are prepared to think through the implications of such a reduction for their own institution. The civil Pakistani economy may be able to replace some of the funding, although IIRC revenue raising is a little difficult.

[carl]

VCheng:

The USA can't do much about bringing Pakistan under decent civilian control. I would be thrilled if we would just stop giving money to the killers in the Pak Army/ISI. If we did that at least it might start them, only start them mind you, down the path to realistic thinking. Beyond that, I don't think we can do anything despite the people inside the beltway thinking we can guide and influence anybody, anywhere, anytime.

I didn't think you were being hyperbolic at all.

[tequila]

Carl - Given the effects of the Pressler Amendment and subsequent cutoff of aid in 1990, I think that may be rather wistful thinking. The Pakistani Army saw itself isolated and without Western patronage. Rather than spurring a reexamination of its institutional priorities, this only aggravated its paranoia about Western intentions, especially towards Pakistan's nuclear capability, and saw the growth of ties to China.

The negative effects of the 1990 cutoff probably weigh on policymakers' reluctance to completely cut off ties to the Pakistani military.

[Ray]

1. That it is important for the leader of Pakistan to not be perceived as selling out his/her country by subjugating the interests of Pakistan and the Pakistani people to the interests of some foreign power in exchange for favor and economic benefit. Arguably recent leaders of Pakistan have done this with the US.

There is no doubt that the leaders of a Nation should not appear as if they have sold their nation to a foreign power or be taken to have subjected the country to vassalage.

However, when a country is solely dependent on a specific foreign country for sustenance as a Nation and requires that foreign country to remain relevant as a Nation, then one has to not live in denial of its sorry state.

If indeed the Pakistan’s are so concerned about their national pride, then they should do something for themselves as a starter rather than await dole to salvage them from pecuniary. Majority of Pakistanis don’t pay tax! It is not that they are poor, it is just that they evade paying tax!

Pakistan's transgender tribe of tax collectors
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-04-14/world/pakistan.tax.collectors_1_tax-collectors-tax-debtors-tax-deadline?_s=PM:WORLD

Pragmatic parasite
What happened to all the posturing in Pakistan on patriotism and sovereignty?
Most of Pakistan’s ministers, MPs and judges don’t pay taxes. On an average, a Pakistani MP is worth $9,00,000. The assets of its richest MP, Mahboobullah Jan of the ruling PPP, is worth $37 million, according to Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency. Nawaz Sharif paid no income tax last year.
http://expressbuzz.com/opinion/columnists/pragmatic-parasite/382290.html

The Secret Strength of Pakistan's Economy
Nasir’s business, his home, his power and water supply, and even the cup of tea Abid brings him don’t exist in Pakistan’s official figures. They’re part of another economy that doesn’t pay taxes or heed regulations. It probably employs more than three quarters of the nation’s 54 million workers and is worth as much as 50 percent of Pakistan’s 18 trillion rupee ($200 billion) official gross domestic product. And while the documented economy had its smallest expansion in a decade at 2.4 percent in the year ended June 2011, soaring demand for cars, cement for houses, and other goods shows the underground market is thriving.

http://images.businessweek.com/cms/2012-04-05/econ_pakistan15__01inline__405.jpg

If the US is bankrolling Pakistan’s survival, both economically and militarily, and that too a country that has an adage that there is nothing called a Free Lunch, one would feel that the US is indeed very restrained and doing its level best to keep itself in check, unless when the situation goes totally against US strategic and political aims.


2. That it is important for the leader of Pakistan to reestablish the tradition of non-interference with the tribal populaces shared with Afghanistan and to refrain from excessive efforts to exercise governmental control over the same.

Indeed that is a correct step. However, such areas cannot be totally divorced from the reality of the nation of Pakistan.

One cannot have laws that are repressive and totally freewheeling. At best, the tribal customs and traditions should not be tinkered, but even so, archaic laws that are out of step with Pakistan and even the world cannot be condoned as being non interfering.

The sovereignty of Pakistan has to run in all areas of Pakistan.



3. Pakistan is in a challenging situation, and must carefully balance relationships with powerful neighbors, such as China and India; while at the same time also balancing the often odd demands of far away powers such as the US. No easy task between these nuclear powers. To add a degree of difficulty most of us Westerners cannot fully appreciate is the relationships the government must manage with the many diverse and distinct populace groups that live within and expand across her borders.

What unique challenging situation is Pakistan in that is no applicable to every other country in the region?

If indeed, Pakistan has diversity, is it not applicable to others too? Say, India or China? India has no regulated border with Nepal and the population cross over either way at will.

Indeed tribesmen, who have had a freewheeling existence, will create problems. However, what is required is not let them loose and instead educated them to understand the realities of the world. If Christian missionaries could ‘tame’ the wild ones of the Orient and Africa or even early Europe, what prevents application of their formula (without proselytising) and tame the wild ones?

It is, however, politically prudent to keep the wild ones wild so as to extract the usual pound of flesh through blackmail, while the locals loot the Nation and yet stay afloat with US munificence!



4. No Pakistani leader will be able to make everyone happy or answer to every powerful party's demands. To attempt to make all happy will make none happy, and only failure can come of that. One must choose, and recent choices seem to have been poor ones for Pakistan. For Americans, we must learn that an honest "no" is a far better answer to live with than a disingenuous "yes."

In short, do I read that let the chaos continue and the US be bled white?

[Ray]

To me this excerpt seems pretty relevant:

from: http://dawn.com/2012/04/24/negotiating-with-america/



The US agenda included transformation of Pakistan’s armed forces and their mission. Relations with Pakistan would not have plunged so low if Washington had not embarked upon a policy to tame Pakistan’s military establishment. The coercive approach ran into a major crisis with Nato’s fateful air attack on the Pakistani border post of Salala. The Pakistan Army has since demonstrated that it can leverage its strength better than the hapless civilians devoid of popular support.

Given the present realities, the iron law of necessity demands that Pakistan and the US successfully negotiate the parameters of their future relations. In Pakistan, the project is endangered by two sets of people: a powerful lobby in the political class, diplomacy, economic ministries and the media that yearns to get back to a golden past that never existed and agitational groups that thrive on pathological anti-Americanism. In Washington, the threat comes from segments of the establishment that are still not willing to factor into policy Pakistan’s strategic concerns and the aspirations of its people to achieve a semblance of what the political scientists fashionably call ‘sovereign equality’.

From a Pakistani newspaper, such comments are natural.

In Pakistan, the civil govt is redundant. It is cosmetic.

The power in Pakistan grows from the barrel of the gun.

What options are there but to make the Pakistan military come to heel?

This very statement proves the point that the Army is the supreme authority in Pakistan and hence requires to be addressed:


The Pakistan Army has since demonstrated that it can leverage its strength better than the hapless civilians devoid of popular support.


The remainder part of the article is pure hogwash in English!

[Ray]

VCheng,

As I have posted before what happens to Pakistan if the USA decides it has had enough and stops / reduces the flow of financial support?

One wonders if the Pakistani military are prepared to think through the implications of such a reduction for their own institution. The civil Pakistani economy may be able to replace some of the funding, although IIRC revenue raising is a little difficult.

If the US stops giving money and arms, Pakistan will be in a cul de sac.

It will turn to China with the bowl. And that would not be to US' advantage.

China is keen to have the Pakistani pear drop into its waiting hands so that Pakistan has no options but to stop all terrorists going into China and upsetting her attempt to change the demographic pattern in East Turkmenistan and assimilating them into the Han culture.

However, China has no qualms about niceties and so it will drive a hard bargain. As it is China is in control of Northern Areas with its Army working overtime out there. Pakistan will be owned!

[Bob's World]

In short, do I read that let the chaos continue and the US be bled white?

Chaos can come as much from attempting to exert excessive or inappropriate control over things that are either uncontrollable or simply not one's business to control in the first place.

The US has determined that it must exercise control over the political out come of Afghanistan to make itself safe, and based on that decision they have tied the nation to an impossible task and have thereby elevated and extended violence in Afghanistan by elevating the Northern Alliance into power unnaturally, and equally unnaturally sustained them there; and have facilitated tremendous instability in Pakistan in the actions and expectations we have placed upon them to support this Quixotic quest of ours.

The Chaos we have created is arguably good for India, as it serves to weaken Pakistan and has created opportunities for India to envelop Pakistan in Afghanistan. But that also disrupts the balance of nuclear deterrence and could lead to catastrophic miscalculations by either or both of the parities.

We have chaos now. Dangerous chaos. And it is from misguided attempts to control things that should not be, and perhaps cannot be, controlled.

[carl]

Carl - Given the effects of the Pressler Amendment and subsequent cutoff of aid in 1990, I think that may be rather wistful thinking. The Pakistani Army saw itself isolated and without Western patronage. Rather than spurring a reexamination of its institutional priorities, this only aggravated its paranoia about Western intentions, especially towards Pakistan's nuclear capability, and saw the growth of ties to China.

The negative effects of the 1990 cutoff probably weigh on policymakers' reluctance to completely cut off ties to the Pakistani military.

I will concede that probably nothing but a smashing defeat at the hands of somebody or other or a national collapse will get the Pak Army/ISI to change their thinking. The problem with our policymakers reluctance to stop the money is they use it to kill us. I don't like my money being used to kill a guy I may have sat next to in a chow hall. If the money were completely cut off, at least they would have use their own or somebody else's money when they try to kill us.

There were some negative effects to the 1990 cutoff but those negative effects have to be weighed against the negative effects that occur with aid being given. To me no aid or aid is a tossup so we should save the money.

[carl]

The US has determined that it must exercise control over the political out come of Afghanistan to make itself safe, and based on that decision they have tied the nation to an impossible task and have thereby elevated and extended violence in Afghanistan by elevating the Northern Alliance into power unnaturally, and equally unnaturally sustained them there; and have facilitated tremendous instability in Pakistan in the actions and expectations we have placed upon them to support this Quixotic quest of ours.

The Chaos we have created is arguably good for India, as it serves to weaken Pakistan and has created opportunities for India to envelop Pakistan in Afghanistan. But that also disrupts the balance of nuclear deterrence and could lead to catastrophic miscalculations by either or both of the parities.

We have chaos now. Dangerous chaos. And it is from misguided attempts to control things that should not be, and perhaps cannot be, controlled.

You say we have facilitated instability in Pakistan. The Pak Army/ISI are playing a double game by sponsoring and supporting the Afghan Taliban & Co.. From what I read they are pretty careful not to upset the Pak Army/ISI because they could not succeed without that support. They don't make trouble in Pakistan. The Pak Army/ISI supports them to insure "strategic depth" for its own odd purposes. So how does all that translate into our actions facilitating instability in Pakistan?

Also how does something that advantages India, disadvantage us? India has its problems but if you are looking for allies, India is vastly superior; and they don't take our money and kill Americans with it.

And I don't understand how India can "envelop" Pakistan in Afghanistan. They surely aren't going to base an armored corps there to make a "cold start" easier. The use of the word "envelop" in that context is as strange as "strategic depth".

If India did "envelop" Pakistan in Afghanistan, how does that alter the balance of nuclear deterrence? Pakistan's nukes aren't based in Jalalbad. I don't see how it would change a thing.

Last question, aren't the Pak Army/ISI's actions in Afghanistan being taken because it "has determined that it must exercise control over the political out come of Afghanistan to make itself safe"?

[omarali50]

"the negative effects of the 1990s cutoff" are mostly posthoc propaganda from people who know what works best for the ignorant rich uncle that they want to "touch". The policy of using Jihadis was developed while aid was flowing in the 1980s and continued unabated and expanded when aid was cut off (and the cutoff officially had nothing to do with those policies)..the increase in Jihadist recruitment and usage was not a petulant response to the cutoff. It was focused on wresting Kashmir, creating an "area of influence" in Afghanistan/central Asia, developing muscle against domestic opponents and Islamicate fantasies (with differing proportions for individual policymakers). It was also thought that this policy, as long as it was mostly "India-centric", was not a "red-line" for the Uncle.

It is worth keeping in mind that the person across the table is also a person, with aims or ambitions of his own. And with the ability to churn out propaganda that serves to justify said aims and ambitions.
And to keep in mind that we have a bigger stake in knowing how to play the uncle than the uncle had in playing us. We are therefore naturally better at it.

[Ray]

Chaos can come as much from attempting to exert excessive or inappropriate control over things that are either uncontrollable or simply not one's business to control in the first place.

The US has determined that it must exercise control over the political out come of Afghanistan to make itself safe, and based on that decision they have tied the nation to an impossible task and have thereby elevated and extended violence in Afghanistan by elevating the Northern Alliance into power unnaturally, and equally unnaturally sustained them there; and have facilitated tremendous instability in Pakistan in the actions and expectations we have placed upon them to support this Quixotic quest of ours.

The Chaos we have created is arguably good for India, as it serves to weaken Pakistan and has created opportunities for India to envelop Pakistan in Afghanistan. But that also disrupts the balance of nuclear deterrence and could lead to catastrophic miscalculations by either or both of the parities.

We have chaos now. Dangerous chaos. And it is from misguided attempts to control things that should not be, and perhaps cannot be, controlled.

I reckon that if one has to bankroll a Nation to ensure its breathes, then one sure has a right to know how the money is spent and who spends the money and for what cause. And like it or not, dictate terms. To use an English idiom (without prejudice) - Beggars cannot be Choosers!

Now, it the money is given as charity, then it is a different matter. However, I am sure that the US taxpayer will not be delighted that the US has become Mother Teresa. Even Mother Teresa was driven by an aim and she sure dictated the terms.

If one is to foist any Govt, surely they will not foist a faction that is against the one who is foisting the Govt. That is logical. The US has operated with Pakistan ever since the CENTO and SEATO days and they have seen Pakistan up real close during the time when Pakistan played ball to oust the Soviets. It would be correct to believe that the US is aware of the chaos that Pakistan can create in Afghanistan. Hence, one would not expect US to foist a faction that will create such a horrifyingly untenable situation both in governance and in fighting AQ wherein the US loses on both fronts – fighting the AQ and organising the governance of the country.

I am guessing, but it would be logical that at least on one front the US wanted to keep a grip over the situation and the choice was in helping governance; and so of the two, they decided it was safer to have a Northern Alliance heavy potpourri to govern. It maybe added that the Northern Alliance is not one monolithic bloc.

I take it the aim of the US was to get rid of AQ in Afghanistan and not be concerned about Pakistan and its governance. Hence, if instability has been caused, it is not US’ fault! Surely, it is expected that Pakistan Govt and its Army knows how to maintain stability in their country. Or is it being suggested that Pakistan by birth is like a lost cow that has lost its bearing to return home at sunset? In this part of the world, cows roam free and return to the cowshed on their own to the cowshed, though at times, guided by little boys who job is to tend the cattle when grazing free.

Indeed, many outside the US have claimed that US actions are Quixotic. This is the first time a Westerner admits that the US is quixotic! If indeed that is the Gospel Truth, we live in real dangerous and illogical times! I, for one, do not feel that the US is quixotic. They are pursuing their national and strategic aims that are not to the liking of some. I, as a non US person, would admit that some of the policies of the US do make me uncomfortable, but then I am pragmatic enough to realise that the US Govt is not there to make me comfortable and instead make Americans comfortable, who vote them in!

Afghanistan is not advantage India, except that the terrorists are looking towards Afghanistan and less towards India. The force levels on the border with India do not indicate any appreciable change. It was and it still is a desire of India and any sane nation that Afghanistan remains an independent country charting its own destiny. Surely, that is what should be the desire of the international comity of Nations, or have I missed something?

In no way does an independent Afghanistan weaken Pakistan. At least, I have not been able to see the logic where Afghanistan weakens Pakistan, that is, unless of course it is believed that Afghanistan should be a part of Pakistan and to that end, if Afghanistan remains independent and not a part of Pakistan, it weakens Pakistan’s hegemonic ambitions. So, is it being advocated that it is kosher for Pakistan to be hegemonic?

This nuclear issue is another dramatic invention of those who have nothing else to offer for the sake of argument, but some alarmist romantic escapist claptrap. If the US and USSR did not have a nuclear conflagration, what makes one believe that Asians are not that wise as the Europeans and the US? Do people believe that we are genetically and racial born idiots?

If it was such an issue, then it should have occurred as recently as 1999 when Musharraf had to eat humble pie (or crow to use the US idiom) over Kargil! Musharraf has planned it way before in time. Benazir has vetoed it. Yet, Musharraf who has been wearing this idea on his sleeve got a hiding of his life and he would miss the opportunity to unleash his nukes lest he had to eat crow? Fortunately for the world, which may feel that Asians are genetically blessed as prize idiots, it was proved wrong. The Asians did appear blessed with equal sense as the Caucasians, if not more!

India does not have an continuous landmass to Afghanistan and so ‘enveloping’ Pakistan is another of those figments of imagination trotted out by those who are not seized of the issue in all its facets.

[carl]

"the negative effects of the 1990s cutoff" are mostly posthoc propaganda from people who know what works best for the ignorant rich uncle that they want to "touch"....

...And to keep in mind that we have a bigger stake in knowing how to play the uncle than the uncle had in playing us. We are therefore naturally better at it.

Omar: Thank you for those two paragraphs and I now stand corrected. I should have learned and remembered that on my own but didn't.

[carl]

This nuclear issue is another dramatic invention of those who have nothing else to offer for the sake of argument, but some alarmist romantic escapist claptrap. If the US and USSR did not have a nuclear conflagration, what makes one believe that Asians are not that wise as the Europeans and the US? Do people believe that we are genetically and racial born idiots?

If it was such an issue, then it should have occurred as recently as 1999 when Musharraf had to eat humble pie (or crow to use the US idiom) over Kargil! Musharraf has planned it way before in time. Benazir has vetoed it. Yet, Musharraf who has been wearing this idea on his sleeve got a hiding of his life and he would miss the opportunity to unleash his nukes lest he had to eat crow? Fortunately for the world, which may feel that Asians are genetically blessed as prize idiots, it was proved wrong. The Asians did appear blessed with equal sense as the Caucasians, if not more!

Ray, you don't think that the people inside the beltway, educated at the best schools and renowned for their tolerance and egalitarian outlook actually look down their noses at Indians and Pakistanis do you? That can't be. If it were it would have made it easy for them to be played for fools by the army of one of those nations for years and years.

[Ray]

I would not know.

But the manner in which people out here and the so called 'think tanks' so glibly talk about that it is ever so dangerous a place this Subcontinent is because they have nuclear weapons, does give the impression that people feel that fools inhabit the subcontinent.

While we are not that worried about the bodybags as some are, we still are worried about a nuclear conflagration!

[Bob's World]

Ray, a few thoughts:

1. Don Quixote believed his Ends-Ways-Means to be quite reasonable and rational. A warning of his saga is that sometimes others can see what we ourselves cannot.

2. The US believes that exercise of control over who/how Afghanistan is governed is essential to the denial of AQ sanctuary in the region; and that specific actions by Pakistan are essential to that end. Inappropriate foreign influence (as assessed by the affected populaces, not as intended by the foreign power), particularly when coupled with physical occupation and actions (but policy alone can be enough), usually triggers the "resistance response" among those affected populaces. We will know when we have tailored our policies and approaches to more appropriate Ends-Ways-Means when the resistance fades.

This is not just a post 9/11 effect in AFPAK; it is in my opinion the beating heart of the entire "war on terror" as US approaches to the Greater Middle East grew increasingly dated and inappropriate following the fall of the Soviet threat to the region. Our nearly "virtual presence" triggering a very real resistance among those populaces with growing revolutionary pressures internal to their respective states, and a belief inflamed by AQ that success with those revolutionary nationalist issues can only be attained once the resistance against inappropriate Western influence is won.

3. India does not need real estate in Afghanistan to make Pakistan feel enveloped, merely political influence and the physical presence of security forces. The US is so desperate for assistance on this mission that we seem blind to dangers of facilitating an Afghanistan-Indian relationship. The Northern Alliance, on the other hand, is fully aware that this is their next best solution to keeping Taliban influence out once the US withdraws. But then the Northern Alliance does not much care if India and Pakistan go to war because of it, so long as they get what they want from the bargain.

[Madhu]

Ray, they really believe that if they train military officers in the US, or sell them lots of expensive American weapons, or send lots of civilian aid, then they can change entire cultures and strategic outlooks. They being the Beltway foreign policy class, including the military.

And no one in that class of people--or the American military--will admit in this lifetime that they were psychologically misdirected.

But everyday people know, instinctively, what happened about a year ago. That telegraphed, more than any event in my adult lifetime, the basic fitness of that class. We got it. Most Americans got it.

Oops, another edit:

Sorry, I really didn't mean to direct that at you Tequila, or anyone else. I just don't understand why people keep repeating the same theories over and over, even when events bring the theories into question. I don't get it.

[Ray]

Ray, a few thoughts:

1. Don Quixote believed his Ends-Ways-Means to be quite reasonable and rational. A warning of his saga is that sometimes others can see what we ourselves cannot.

2. The US believes that exercise of control over who/how Afghanistan is governed is essential to the denial of AQ sanctuary in the region; and that specific actions by Pakistan are essential to that end. Inappropriate foreign influence (as assessed by the affected populaces, not as intended by the foreign power), particularly when coupled with physical occupation and actions (but policy alone can be enough), usually triggers the "resistance response" among those affected populaces. We will know when we have tailored our policies and approaches to more appropriate Ends-Ways-Means when the resistance fades.

This is not just a post 9/11 effect in AFPAK; it is in my opinion the beating heart of the entire "war on terror" as US approaches to the Greater Middle East grew increasingly dated and inappropriate following the fall of the Soviet threat to the region. Our nearly "virtual presence" triggering a very real resistance among those populaces with growing revolutionary pressures internal to their respective states, and a belief inflamed by AQ that success with those revolutionary nationalist issues can only be attained once the resistance against inappropriate Western influence is won.

3. India does not need real estate in Afghanistan to make Pakistan feel enveloped, merely political influence and the physical presence of security forces. The US is so desperate for assistance on this mission that we seem blind to dangers of facilitating an Afghanistan-Indian relationship. The Northern Alliance, on the other hand, is fully aware that this is their next best solution to keeping Taliban influence out once the US withdraws. But then the Northern Alliance does not much care if India and Pakistan go to war because of it, so long as they get what they want from the bargain.

If Don Quixote is taken to be reasonable and rational, I take that you mean the US Administration is reasonable and rational when you call it being Quixotic. That is just what I was saying all along with the caveat that if seen pragmatically, US is doing things that suits her policies and aims even if the do not coincide with the policies of other countries and may even be diametrically opposite.

Some may feel that the show in Afghanistan is basically to deny the influence of AQ. Indeed, that is important since defeating the AQ will make the US safe from terrorist action. However, global action has shifted from Europe to the Asian continent, be it the Middle East, Iran, CAR, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, China and the nations around the South China Seas. Therefore, one wonders if the US is out in Afghanistan merely against the AQ. Some say that Afghanistan is the cockpit of Asia – occupy Afghanistan or have influence there and you can influence / feel the pulse of Asia!

In so far as Pakistan is concerned, could it be that the US felt that Pakistan would be an ally because the US bankrolled and militarily equipped Pakistan to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan? And that mirage turned sour since Pakistan was not the old Pakistan, but a Pakistan owned by the Taliban and their patrons in the Army and the ISI? And in the bargain, the US is doing everything so that the Prodigal’s Son comes home to roost?

The idea of ‘resistance response’ is interesting in the context of Pakistan. How is it that there was none of it when Pakistan sold itself to CENTO and SEATO? Obviously, the US miscalculated the Islamic oneness and anger of the War on Terror where to be a Muslim meant you had to take up arms or resist the Crusaders (as Bush used that word as is in the English idiom, without realising how sensitive that word is to the Islamic world!). This miscalculation hangs like an Albatross around the US’ neck! And do what the US might, the Pakistani population are now too indoctrinated through their madrassa men and the mullahs who are merely after the temporal and not the spiritual! The army knows which side of the bread is buttered and so they are hunting with the hounds and running with the hare and the Pakistan Govt remains moribund as they have done always historically! And the worse canard is that Pakistan is the one who has suffered the most because of terrorism – as if someone else foisted terrorists own them! Since they do not subscribe to the Bible, they conveniently forget – Sow and so shall Ye Reap!

Historically, India has ties with Afghanistan. Indeed, it is essential for India to be politically relevant in Afghanistan. It is the path to Central Asia, which is a happening place in today’s globalised world, be it for trade, natural resources or strategically. India has no military presence in Afghanistan and to believe it does, is yet another figment of imagination.

The US is in no way encouraging India – Afghanistan relationship. If they are, could you spell out, how? Are you suggesting that Afghanistan is some sort of a personal preserve of Pakistan? Should one not feel better is Afghanistan is independent without any other country’s influence? I cannot understand why some of you feel that Afghanistan belongs to Pakistan!

[Bob's World]

Ray

I don't write to overcome your bias, I realize it is deep-set in your very fabric and probably reasonable, but you miss most of my points.

I did not say Quixote was rational, I said he thought he was rational. There is a major difference.

I don't buy your assessment of Afghanistan's geostrategic situation though. I realize that when most things moved by land that Afghanistan was a crossroads for global commerce, but that largely ended once man turned to the sea to ship his goods. Now it plays an important role as a buffer between powers, but a buffer need not be particularly well controlled by anyone, and perhaps works best when it is bit of a stew of influence from the surrounding parties. Development of major pipelines, rail systems or roadways could elevate Afghanistan again as a crossroads, but that is one of many alternative futures, not a current reality.

As to Pakistan, I certainly recognize their are no clean hands there; but one cannot ignore the reality of fact that the most important populace group of the region straddles across the line Britain drew through their middle. Perhaps someday a more capable Afghanistan will exercise influence through that shared populace over Pakistan, but until such time it will logically be the other way. I see this as neither good nor bad, just the reality of the situation. My recommendation is that my government embrace that reality and work with it, rather than our position of the past 10+ years of attempting to force an alternative reality of our own making that we have convinced ourselves is better for us. Better to work with what naturally exists than to expend oneself attempting to force something that is not sustainable of itself.

[Ray]

Ray

I don't write to overcome your bias, I realize it is deep-set in your very fabric and probably reasonable, but you miss most of my points.

I did not say Quixote was rational, I said he thought he was rational. There is a major difference.

This is what you wrote earlier at Post #536


tremendous instability in Pakistan in the actions and expectations we have placed upon them to support tremendous instability in Pakistan in the actions and expectations we have placed upon them to support this Quixotic quest of ours..

I confess I am bit confused.

On the issue of Quixote, you claimed that US was Quixotic on which I commented it wasn't.

And to that you claim that you were implying that Quixote thought of himself as being rational.

What you have written above and underlined indicates that you claimed that it was US' Quixotic quest that you were stating. Therefore, where does the question arise of what Quixote thought of himself?

[Bob's World]

In that the US believes, like Quixote, their pursuits to be rational, but like Quixote, we tilt at what many others can clearly see to be mere windmills.

But I forget, that you too see ferocious giants where none exist. At least none that threaten any interest of the US. India has much more reason to engage to shape this region, but should perhaps best leave well enough alone as well. Is Pakistan a windmill or giants? I guess it depends upon where one stands and what their objectives are.

[carl]

I don't buy your assessment of Afghanistan's geostrategic situation though. I realize that when most things moved by land that Afghanistan was a crossroads for global commerce, but that largely ended once man turned to the sea to ship his goods. Now it plays an important role as a buffer between powers, but a buffer need not be particularly well controlled by anyone, and perhaps works best when it is bit of a stew of influence from the surrounding parties.

No, that is not completely correct. Afghanistan is not a crossroads for global commerce, but it is a crossroad for regional commerce. It is and will be that until you can dock a container ship in Tashkent. If you want to get something from Karachi to the Stans or vice versa, you have to mostly go through Afghanistan.

When you say a buffer works best when it is a bit of a stew of influence from surrounding parties, that seems like an excellent argument for frustrating the Pak Army/ISI's plans for making Afghanistan a vassal state, making sure the Northern Alliance retains influence and getting the Indians in, rather than keeping them out.


As to Pakistan, I certainly recognize their are no clean hands there; but one cannot ignore the reality of fact that the most important populace group of the region straddles across the line Britain drew through their middle. Perhaps someday a more capable Afghanistan will exercise influence through that shared populace over Pakistan, but until such time it will logically be the other way. I see this as neither good nor bad, just the reality of the situation. My recommendation is that my government embrace that reality and work with it, rather than our position of the past 10+ years of attempting to force an alternative reality of our own making that we have convinced ourselves is better for us. Better to work with what naturally exists than to expend oneself attempting to force something that is not sustainable of itself.

That is the fallacy of the false alternative. What you are saying is Afghanistan will make trouble in Pakistan or the Pak Army/ISI will make trouble in Afghanistan. I don't buy that at all.

Then once you establish the false alternative, you recommend (I think) we back the Pak Army/ISI because that is the way the world is naturally ordered. That choice is to further the aims of people who actively kill Americans. That is not a good choice.

[carl]

3. India does not need real estate in Afghanistan to make Pakistan feel enveloped, merely political influence and the physical presence of security forces. The US is so desperate for assistance on this mission that we seem blind to dangers of facilitating an Afghanistan-Indian relationship.

Probably it is not a good idea to base judgments or actions on how the Pak Army/ISI "feels" about something or other especially since their "feelings" don't appear to be firmly grounded in reality, their belief that Afghanistan can be used to provide "strategic depth" being one example. Another would be their feeling that the presence of (I assume) Indian security forces in Afghanistan envelops them since India couldn't support enough force there to make a difference.

What danger would an Afghan-Indian relationship pose to the US? There is none as far as I can see. We are supposed to base our actions on how it affects us so I don't see the big deal. The Pak Army/ISI may feel such a relationship poses a danger to them but their feelings shouldn't guide our actions.

[Bob's World]

Carl,

If you recall, Afghanistan was not a problem for the US under the Taliban and their Pakistani allies. Yes, AQ had sanctuary there, and that was a problem for us, but only because totally ignored it until they launched the attacks of 9/11 (which I doubt their host knew much about), and until we were forced to act quickly to figure out how to deal with reprisals on a non-state actor. We ignored the Saudi State that most of the attackers and leaders of AQ hailed from, and the Egyptian state; and instead made loose connections to bring our wrath down upon the Afghan and Iraqi states. I understand why we attacked Afghanistan, but believe we could have achieved at least equal effects against AQ without inflaming the region by expanding our fight to the Taliban.

I know if you leased a shed in your backyard to some guy who then went out and robbed a bank, you would not expect the police to come in and chase that guy off your property, and then take out their anger on you, throwing you in jail and your family out into the street, and then putting some homeless people from the area into your home in your stead. That is what we did in Afghanistan.

I know you don't like Pakistan. I on the other hand don't worry about if I "like" or "dislike" Pakistan, I simply assess that they acted rationally and reasonably in seeking to exert influence over Afghanistan through the shared Pashtun populace prior to 9/11; and that they acted rationally and reasonably in both agreeing to help the US in exchange for massive aid, while at the same time continuing to work covertly to do what they had always done as it was still the smartest way to address their interests as they reasonably defined them.

I cannot say that the US also action rationally or reasonably. I cannot say that the US had powerful interests to do what we did and are doing. I think we made mistakes in the heat of the moment and don't know how to get back on track. Pakistan plays a dangerous game with the US, but to be fair, it is not a game they asked to play, it is a game we forced them to play.

[Ken White]

...don't worry about if I "like" or "dislike" Pakistan, I simply assess that they acted rationally and reasonably in seeking to exert influence over Afghanistan...

...Pakistan plays a dangerous game with the US, but to be fair, it is not a game they asked to play, it is a game we forced them to play. (emphasis added / kw)Act in haste, repent at leisure as the Actress said to the Bishop. :wry:

Perhaps the Actress was / is simply better at the game than the Bishop... :D

Consider also that the Actress can be strongly independent and amoral; the Bishop has to engage in many compromises to maintain his appearance of sanctity if not sanity and to satisfy his synod and all those parishioners with different ideas... ;)

[Ray]

In that the US believes, like Quixote, their pursuits to be rational, but like Quixote, we tilt at what many others can clearly see to be mere windmills.

But I forget, that you too see ferocious giants where none exist. At least none that threaten any interest of the US. India has much more reason to engage to shape this region, but should perhaps best leave well enough alone as well. Is Pakistan a windmill or giants? I guess it depends upon where one stands and what their objectives are.

The short answer is did the US find the USSR a windmill or giants?



Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
...don't worry about if I "like" or "dislike" Pakistan, I simply assess that they acted rationally and reasonably in seeking to exert influence over Afghanistan...


If that be the case, would it not be that all nations acted rationally and reasonably?

Some would concede that Germany too acted rationally and reasonably by having the policy of Lebensraum and also increasing their 'strategic depth'!


it is a game we forced them to play.

One can take a horse to water, but it cannot make it drink!

What makes one feel that it was not Pakistan than made the US play their game, by creating conditions where the US had no option but to play the game?

[Madhu]

I don't write to overcome your bias, I realize it is deep-set in your very fabric and probably reasonable, but you miss most of my points.


Wow.

It's like Lord Churchill addressing Gandhi.

Omar Ali (not an American military officer, I know, but no one is perfect) has posted a very interesting article, representing the opinion of one particular populace with Pakistan (gee, populace is an interesting word):


Between 2003 to 2007, over 200 political activists, including tribal leaders in South Waziristan were target killed under mysterious circumstances never investigated by the government of Pakistan. The common denominator among them is that they all were anti-Taliban. Their families hold the ISI responsible for their killing. Many of the eliminated anti-Taliban people were local activist of Pashtun nationalist political parties, PMAP and ANP. Mahmud Achakzai, leader of PMAP, repeatedly visited Waziristan to attend the funeral ceremonies of his assassinated party workers.

http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta3/tft/article.php?issue=20120420&page=6 - the piece is titled, "Taliban are Pak Army proxies, not Pashtun nationalists - III

Translation: not all Pashtuns support the Taliban.

But at this point I am not going to argue about it anymore. OBL was found in Abbottabad and KSM was found in Rawalpindi. And the Saudis and the Pakistan military and its intelligence services have always worked together. I can think of lots of reasons people might ignore potential connections between the two --and to 9-11--but none of them are flattering to the holders of that opinion. Aw, relax, everyone, I'm talking about the Beltway. CYA might explain a lot.

At any rate, this is all rapidly becoming a waste of my time. It's been quite an education, though.

[carl]

It's like Lord Churchill addressing Gandhi.


Madhu: I stand in awe of your power with the language. That was great!

Please hang around.

[carl]

Carl,

If you recall, Afghanistan was not a problem for the US under the Taliban and their Pakistani allies. Yes, AQ had sanctuary there, and that was a problem for us, but only because totally ignored it until they launched the attacks of 9/11 (which I doubt their host knew much about), and until we were forced to act quickly to figure out how to deal with reprisals on a non-state actor. We ignored the Saudi State that most of the attackers and leaders of AQ hailed from, and the Egyptian state; and instead made loose connections to bring our wrath down upon the Afghan and Iraqi states. I understand why we attacked Afghanistan, but believe we could have achieved at least equal effects against AQ without inflaming the region by expanding our fight to the Taliban.

I do recall, but not what you recall (remember that scene in The Princess Bride where Inigo said to Vizini...). I recall the Embassy bombings in Africa and that guy who got caught at the border with the explosives and perhaps the U.S.S. Cole. I recall that was a problem for the US because AQ had sanctuary in Afghanistan and we couldn't get at them. I also recall that we tried with cruise missiles and AQ was a focus of the various intel groups and that Mr. Clinton regretted that he couldn't get Osama. That doesn't seem like totally ignoring to me but as Inigo said to Vizini...

AQ's host may not have known much about 9-11 beforehand but if they knew anything at all about it, they didn't tell us thereby making themselves complicit in the mass murder of Americans.

We expanded our fight to include the Taliban because after being asked politely, they didn't give up AQ. They could have avoided inflaming the region by giving up a mass murderer but they chose not to, with some encouragement by the ISI.


I know if you leased a shed in your backyard to some guy who then went out and robbed a bank, you would not expect the police to come in and chase that guy off your property, and then take out their anger on you, throwing you in jail and your family out into the street, and then putting some homeless people from the area into your home in your stead. That is what we did in Afghanistan.

I prefer to avoid the strained analogies. The actual situation was simple and clear enough. AQ was hosted by the Taliban. AQ killed thousands of Americans. We asked Taliban to give up AQ. They refused. We went after them both.


I know you don't like Pakistan. I on the other hand don't worry about if I "like" or "dislike" Pakistan,...

Well actually, you don't know I don't like Pakistan. I on the other hand do know. I asked myself that question and I believe I received an honest answer. I like Pakistan just fine. How can you not like a country that produces people like the Karachi cop and ambulance driver profiled in a video highlighted on this site some time back, or that produces hyper-brave men like the Pakistani journalist beaten to death by the ISI last year.

I do dislike, to put it mildly, the Pak Army/ISI; mainly the officer corps though, especially the high guys. The poor troops get betrayed by their officers probably more often than we do. I dislike the Pak Army/ISI as an institution because they kill Americans and they put a country composed of people like the cop, ambulance driver and journalist I mentioned at grave risk solely to preserve the privileges and power of the Pak Army/ISI.


...I simply assess that they acted rationally and reasonably in seeking to exert influence over Afghanistan through the shared Pashtun populace prior to 9/11; and that they acted rationally and reasonably in both agreeing to help the US in exchange for massive aid, while at the same time continuing to work covertly to do what they had always done as it was still the smartest way to address their interests as they reasonably defined them.

I cannot say that the US also action rationally or reasonably. I cannot say that the US had powerful interests to do what we did and are doing. I think we made mistakes in the heat of the moment and don't know how to get back on track. Pakistan plays a dangerous game with the US, but to be fair, it is not a game they asked to play, it is a game we forced them to play.

So the Pak Army/ISI is acting rationally and reasonably by pursuing a course of action that puts their country at grave risk. The US on the other hand hasn't been acting rationally and reasonably by reacting as we did to the attack on 9-11. Like I said about Inigo and Vizini...

I will concede however that we have screwed up royally in Afghanistan in the last 10 years. The biggest mistake being of course that we refuse to recognize the Pak Army/ISI as being the enemy and treating them accordingly.

[Ray]

There is nothing wrong with Pakistan.

Except for the fact that they want to hunt with the hounds and run with the hares at the same time!

In the bargain, they are themselves confusing themselves as to what they really want.

Good chaps otherwise!

[davidbfpo]

Carl's comment above included:
Well actually, you don't know I don't like Pakistan. I on the other hand do know. I asked myself that question and I believe I received an honest answer. I like Pakistan just fine. How can you not like a country that produces people like the Karachi cop and ambulance driver profiled in a video highlighted on this site some time back, or that produces hyper-brave men like the Pakistani journalist beaten to death by the ISI last year.

I posted this last year on the 'Pakistani Politics' thread, but do not have the journalist's details to hand.

Peter Oborne, one of the UK's best reporters IMHO, has been in Karachi, Pakistan's commercial capital and a huge city beset with problems:


In the last 60 years the population of Karachi has risen from 300,000 to nearly 20 million. The pressure for homes, water and food - compounded by high levels of unemployment - has lead to furious conflict between the rival ethnic groups, with around 1300 people killed in gangland violence last year.
His report is based on following an ambulance driver, employed by a charity and a shorter period with a police inspector, who states at least 100 of his officers have been killed in the past year.

The film clip on:http://www.channel4.com/programmes/u...ld/4od#3180510

The written summary is on: http://www.channel4.com/programmes/u...2011/episode-4

The links do work in the USA and a SWC viewer responded:
They should stop making cop shows about Americans and make cops shows about Karachi cops. That was something.

[carl]

The journalist's name was Saleem Shahzad.

http://warincontext.org/2011/07/04/us-officials-say-isi-murdered-pakistani-journalist/

[VCheng]

Interesting development, to say the least, perhaps showing that things might not have been so upright with the assailant's family as were made out to be:

from: http://dawn.com/2012/04/30/widow-mother-in-law-of-raymond-davis-victim-killed/




LAHORE: The widow of a Pakistani man shot dead by a CIA contractor last year in an incident that sparked a major crisis in American-Pakistani relations, was killed by her father on Monday for refusing to remarry, police said.

Zahra Faizan, 24, and her 50-year-old mother, Nabeela Shehzad, were allegedly shot dead by Mohammad Shehzad in Lahore after a family quarrel.

................

Zahra’s first husband, Mohammad Faizan, was one of two Pakistanis shot dead by CIA contractor Raymond Davis in Lahore in January 2011....................

[Ray]

VCheng,

That is logic for you!

Very modern!

Lost your husband. Marry again and get out of my house and life!

[VCheng]

VCheng,

That is logic for you!

Very modern!

Lost your husband. Marry again and get out of my house and life!


"Marry again and leave" is one thing, but to shoot her dead?

That, Sir, is way beyond any logic that I can recognize.

[Ray]

"Marry again and leave" is one thing, but to shoot her dead?

That, Sir, is way beyond any logic that I can recognize.

I was being sardonic!

The epsiode indicates that the Wild West has come to roost in Pakistan.

Maybe the woman told the father to take a hike. She forgot that the bloke had a rifle handy and was the fastest gun this side of Suez!:D

[VCheng]

I was being sardonic!

The epsiode indicates that the Wild West has come to roost in Pakistan.

Maybe the woman told the father to take a hike. She forgot that the bloke had a rifle handy and was the fastest gun this side of Suez!:D

I do realize your intent, but the depravity of the misogyny woven into the present day Pakistani society is simply beyond any such comment.

[tequila]

New report on this disgusting story:

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/world/asia/pakistan-blood-money-linked-to-widows-killing-police-say.html



The widow and mother-in-law of a Pakistani man killed by a C.I.A. (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/c/central_intelligence_agency/index.html?inline=nyt-org) contractor last year were killed Monday, apparently by the widow’s father, who may have feared that she would remarry and take the money she received as compensation with her, the police said. The families of the two men killed by the contractor, Raymond A. Davis, in January 2011 received hundreds of thousands of dollars of “blood money” in exchange for pardoning Mr. Davis, a common legal practice in Pakistan (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/pakistan/index.html?inline=nyt-geo). Mr. Davis said he shot the two men because they tried to rob him. The United States denied paying compensation to the families, but many believe it was simply routed through Pakistani officials. Zohra Haider, the widow of one of the men, wanted to remarry and was supported by her mother, said a police officer, Athar Waheed. But her father, Shahzad Butt, apparently killed the two women because he was outraged that his daughter planned to remarry and take her money to a new household, Mr. Waheed said. He is still at large, the police said.

[Ray]

Shocking to say the least.

Money is more important than life!

[omarali50]

see http://www.brownpundits.com/the-sausage-factory-is-falling-apart/

[davidbfpo]

There is some pleasure in reading such phrases as this:
11 rockets were fired by miscreants at the police

Link:http://docs.brecorder.com/top-news/1-front-top-news/56012-at-least-9-rockets-fired-at-police-official-injured-in-lyari-.html

One does wonder at some of the footage, taken on the police side of the "line", with plain-clothes police, some with head coverings, joining in the firing.

[omarali50]

On this blog, where people know such things, one can also note that shooting over a wall with an assault rifle (or an LMG) in the general direction of Lyari as all those policemen seem to be doing, is rather dumb.

[VCheng]

One could write a small thesis based on this photograph and its captions, I am quite sure:

http://farm6.staticflickr.com/5453/6998851348_57a40628bb_b.jpg (http://www.flickr.com/photos/vcheng552000/6998851348/)
What's the problem? (http://www.flickr.com/photos/vcheng552000/6998851348/) by vcheng552000 (http://www.flickr.com/people/vcheng552000/), on Flickr

[omarali50]

Vcheng, that looks photoshopped.

[VCheng]

Vcheng, that looks photoshopped.


No, the picture is from Gayari and believed authentic, only the captions were added later.

[davidbfpo]

Patrick Porter's forthright column that opens with:
THE conflict in Afghanistan has been Australia's longest war. Measured in time and complexity - if not in blood - it has been one of the hardest. But who or what have we been fighting?

The problem, allegedly, is the Islamist extremism that found a host in the world's poorest land. The solution is to empower this broken nation to govern and secure itself....For 10 years we have tried to combat poverty, corruption and state failure by birthing a strong Afghan government. Not an easy task in a country hard to govern from the centre, and where our favoured regime is an unloved kleptocracy.....But Afghanistan is not the centre of this war. This is primarily a war over - and against - Pakistan.

He ends with:
We wanted the war in Afghanistan to be about fighting one enemy within those borders. But we got an aggregation of other conflicts that spilled across borders, beyond our power to resolve. This may be the hardest lesson of all. Often the wars we want are not the ones we get.

Link:http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/where-lies-the-real-enemy-in-afghanistan-20120506-1y6yj.html

Patrick blogs on:http://offshorebalancer.wordpress.com

[omarali50]

Blowback from Afghanistan? http://www.brownpundits.com/blowback-from-afghanistan/

The fact that the "militants" in Waziristan were able to kill 14 soldiers, behead them, and hang two of the heads in the town, tells you volumes about the state of affairs.
Pakistan is paralyzed by its own ideological mythmaking. The army high command may know that an American withdrawal will not solve their "militant" problem, but they are frozen like a deer in the headlights.
its not looking good.
This, btw, is the guy who ghostwrote Musharraf's book: http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/05/05/comment/columns/the-worm-does-turn/
He is exactly the kind of person GHQ relies on to create a suitable national narrative for them. Read and despair.

[omarali50]

initial (extremely cynical) thoughts: http://www.brownpundits.com/kargil-ii-or-just-a-good-deal-in-the-bazaar/

[VCheng]

initial (extremely cynical) thoughts: http://www.brownpundits.com/kargil-ii-or-just-a-good-deal-in-the-bazaar/

Fair comments, but in the long run, Pakistan may have short-changed itself immensely:

from: Targets, not drones, draw ire from Pakistan: Weinbaum | DAWN.COM (http://dawn.com/2012/05/15/targets-not-drones-draw-ire-from-pakistan-weinbaum/)




...............

Do you see a future relationship between the United States and Pakistan after 2014?

Both the countries can ill-afford a complete separation. They will struggle to find those areas of common interest that serve their purpose. There should be no illusions that it is going to be a broad-based strategic partnership. It is going to be a narrowly construed and transactional arrangement.

Why can’t the two countries have a successful strategic partnership?

The military and the elements in the government are willing to develop a strategic partnership but the public opinion prevents it from happening. Political forces in Pakistan do not want a resolution of tensions between the two countries. Despite controlling the country’s foreign policy, the military in Pakistan involved the public and the media in key debates concerning the relations with the United States as was seen in the Raymond Davis affair. The Bin Laden raid and the killing of soldiers last November has created a set of expectations among the public which serves as the limiting factor for the policymakers.

................

Some sections of opinion in Pakistan believe that the United States is eying their nuclear program and would eventually take away the country’s nukes.

That is nonsense. Anything that weakens the government in Pakistan should be treated contrary to the US interests. The US needs a predictable partner. A partner that is distracted from issues cannot be an interlocutor in any kind of negotiations. If the US has to worry about Pakistan’s nuclear program, it would be for the fear of a break up within the Pakistani military. Does the US worry about it? Yes, it does. The US does not expect the imminent break up of the country but the consequences are catastrophic if junior officers (with support to Jihadi elements) turn on the senior officers causing a serious command-and-control challenge. Fortunately, we are not there at this point. It is not in the interest of the US or even India to deliberately weaken the Pakistani government or the military.

[Ray]

Pak blinks on Afghanistan routes, gets Nato invite for talks

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/Pak-blinks-on-Afghanistan-routes-gets-Nato-invite-for-talks/articleshow/13159783.cms

[Ray]

Pak 'terrorism accountability' bill introduced in US Congress

http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_pak-terrorism-accountability-bill-introduced-in-us-congress_1687800

[omarali50]

so says David Ignatius: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/pakistan-blew-its-chance-for-security/2012/05/16/gIQAdnRfUU_story.html

My comments at http://www.brownpundits.com/david-ignatius-is-beginning-to-get-it/

[carl]

Omar this was a comment by one JCW at Ricks' Best Defense about Mr. Ignatius' article.

"Sad to say that in my modest moments of acquaintance with the situation (off and on, 1978-88) I never met a single high-ranking government official who couldn't be conned by having the opportunity to watch the Khyber Rifles dance and sign the officers mess guest book alongside Arthur and Douglas McArthur, and many, many other famous folks (and one scruffy Army Major)."

He is referring to American government officials. That is about what you have always been saying the Pak Army/ISI does and what they still do. It still works.

(Curse you Rudyard Kipling and Tyrone Power for setting up the gullible Yanks.)

[omarali50]

News that strategic ally Pakistan may not make up with the US leads Nitin Pai to speculate about what next http://acorn.nationalinterest.in/2012/05/22/let-the-buzkashi-begin/

My comments: http://www.brownpundits.com/afpak-fak-ap/

This seems a risky prediction when so many people are predicting a breakdown, but I still think some sort of ugly unhappy compromise is likely.

[J Wolfsberger]

Meanwhile, Pakistani doctor who helped US in bin Laden raid sentenced to prison (http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/05/23/pakistani-doctor-who-helped-us-in-bin-laden-raid-sentenced-to-prison/)

I'm sure this will give a powerful boost to our intelligence efforts in the region. :rolleyes:

I wonder how they got his name? :mad:

Moderator's Note

Post copied to the thread on the effect of OBL's demise, so please comment there:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=13244&page=4

[VCheng]

These excerpts from an editorial in Dawn indicate that USA will likely find it difficult to move forward in its negotiations with Pakistan:

from: http://dawn.com/2012/05/23/back-in-the-fold/




..........With the focus in Chicago on the withdrawal phase in Afghanistan and the timeline for the reopening of the supply route through Pakistan, Pakistani officials somehow saw fit to once again raise the issue of an apology over Salala. Was this pandering to a domestic audience in Pakistan, a way of shoring up the fight for more money for utilisation of the supply route or a genuine demand by Pakistan reflecting the inflexibility of some inside, and close to, the security establishment?

As for the haggling over the price of the supply route, inexplicable as it seems but the Pakistani position really does seem to be ultimately about money — just a few hundred million dollars a year. ..........................But even if Pakistan does succeed in exponentially increasing the money flowing to the national exchequer for use of the supply route, is that worth the price Pakistan will likely pay in terms of lost goodwill and sympathy? What appears to be happening in Pakistan is a paralysis of sorts: the security establishment and the political government seem too afraid to break from positions they publicly took without necessarily thinking them through. .............

[omarali50]

From the horse's mouth: http://tribune.com.pk/story/383733/the-chance-we-did-not-miss/

[J Wolfsberger]

From the horse's mouth: http://tribune.com.pk/story/383733/the-chance-we-did-not-miss/

To paraphrase a South African editor from years ago, there is nothing more ridiculous than an American pundit in search of a quick fix to someone else's problems.

[omarali50]

This article may clear the "fog of war" a little: http://www.pakistankakhudahafiz.com/2012/05/23/subdue-the-enemy-without-fighting-4/

[carl]

Omar:

I couldn't get through that article after the author described the various muj groups fighting the Soviets as a "brilliant war machine."

[VCheng]

For all the stereotypical Pakistani proclamations that Americans are fat, lazy and stupid, I find it quite interesting that that Pakistan still does not realize the game is rigged, due to the vast asymmetry, such that heads USA wins, and tails Pakistan loses. The sooner Pakistan realizes that, the less painful the change in course will be, but change its course it must, at one point or another.

The rather clever "damned if you do, damned if you don't" (The DIYD^2) policy as I see it:

Insist on an apology for Salala = Paint your foreign policy into a corner
Forego an apology for Salala = destroy morale and lose prestige

Don't do an operation in NWA = harboring terrorists
Do an operation in NWA = get drawn into a bloody and costly conflict on own territory

OBL hidden by ISI = partners in 9/11
OBL not hidden by ISI = incompetent fools

Dr. Afridi sentenced for treason = prosecuting a hero who help kill OBL with the attendant fallout
Dr. Afridi let go = live with a growing number of spies and traitors working with impunity on own soil, and loss of domestic prestige

Close supply routes = change from ally to adversary
Open supply routes = be seen as being for sale

And I could go on, but one can get an idea that USA may not be as foolish as Pakistanis would like to think.

[ganulv]

OBL hidden by ISI = partners in 9/11
OBL not hidden by ISI = incompetent fools

My guess is that one day someone somewhere within the Pakistani government had an appointment with an American official who informed him that he knew that bin Laden was in Abbottabad and that both of them knew that there was only one non-negotiable in the U.S./Pakistan relationship. There was an agreement that blind eyes would be turned on 01 May 2011 to a raid that could be written off as a drone strike if need be. Big Problem #1: The execution was such that the drone strike narrative became untenable and Much Bigger Problem #2: The POTUS made a media event out of the killing without consulting anyone in Pakistan beforehand. Now, I doubt any of us will ever know the real story, but if the above were to be true how would that color the actions of the Pakistani government over the course of the past year?


For all the stereotypical Pakistani proclamations that Americans are fat, lazy and stupid, I find it quite interesting that that Pakistan still does not realize the game is rigged, due to the vast asymmetry, such that heads USA wins, and tails Pakistan loses. The sooner Pakistan realizes that, the less painful the change in course will be, but change its course it must, at one point or another.

So your advice is for the Pakistani government to be the State Department’s bitch?

[carl]

Ganulv:

That is a very good guess. The only part I think different is that it was never meant to be a drone strike. It was meant to be what it turned out to be from the beginning and the Pak Army/ISI knew it.

[ganulv]

Ganulv:

That is a very good guess. The only part I think different is that it was never meant to be a drone strike. It was meant to be what it turned out to be from the beginning and the Pak Army/ISI knew it.

Nor I, and I also think the Pakistanis knew so. I just think the cover story, if one was needed, was that it had been a drone strike. That would have given the Pakistanis plausible deniability regarding foreknowledge. I don’t know if there was any contingency plan for how to deal with something like the helicopter crash, but the point was moot after the White House announced the national day of celebration.

[omarali50]

How SHOULD the White house have spun it?

[carl]

Omar: They did pretty good with what they had. The Pak Army/ISI and us both maintained the fiction and the media in both countries went along with it. Whether that is because the media is too dopey to figure out the obvious or because they are covering for the govs, who knows? Neither gov could tell the truth of the matter, it would have embarrassed the powerful and important.

[Ray]

If Pak knew of the OBL strike, how come they have jailed the doctor who gave the info for treason?

[carl]

Helps keep the fiction alive. Scapegoating. Emotional need to blame it on betrayal. Pak Army/ISI habit of perfidy no matter the circumstance. Take your pick. They all fit.

[ganulv]

If Pak knew of the OBL strike, how come they have jailed the doctor who gave the info for treason?

If anyone ever deserved the Prometheus treatment (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6e/Gustave_Moreau_006.jpg/356px-Gustave_Moreau_006.jpg)more than Prometheus did it’s the good doctor. The fact that an MD and the best and brightest in the U.S. Intelligence Community were of the mind that al-Qaeda is a greater threat than Hep B (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hepatitis_b#Epidemiology) is a case study in dysgenics.

I take Dr. Afridi’s trial and conviction as evidence that he was not in the employ of the ISI under the assumption that they would never have risked him spilling the beans on them in so public a forum. And if he was not working for some element of his country’s government his and Bradley Manning’s defenders are on the same footing as far as I am concerned. Anyone trying to understand cognitive dissonance (http://www.salon.com/2012/05/26/the_imperial_mind/singleton/) need look no further that the government that could voice outrage over the one (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18202695) while detaining the other.

[carl]

I would not be surprised if Dr. Afridi was to serve only a few months and then some pretext was found to release him and get him to the US. From the CIA point of view that is a must because all the other potential Dr. Afridis in the world are watching.

[VCheng]

I would not be surprised if Dr. Afridi was to serve only a few months and then some pretext was found to release him and get him to the US. From the CIA point of view that is a must because all the other potential Dr. Afridis in the world are watching.

If USA can persuade China to let Cheng Guangcheng go, one can only assume that Dr. Afridi's incarceration for the time being serves a useful purpose for USA, namely allowing Pakistan to blacken its own face for a little bit longer.

[Ray]

If USA can persuade China to let Cheng Guangcheng go, one can only assume that Dr. Afridi's incarceration for the time being serves a useful purpose for USA, namely allowing Pakistan to blacken its own face for a little bit longer.


As I see it,The following requires consideration:

1. The OBL issue has made the Pak Govt, Army and ISI lose face with the public.

2. The Army and the ISI are taken to be the 'saviours' of the country. The OBL case was a body blow to both the Army and the ISI (the Govt is taken to be incompetent, corrupt and sold to the US and so not in the reckoning). It was unbelievable to the common Pakistani that there much acclaimed military could allow a foreign nation to violate the Pakistani airspace and at will come and kill the Islamic messiah OBL!

3. This is more so given the fact, unlike the world, the Pakistanis feel quite proud that Pakistan could hide OBL, a fugitive declared by the world and thus cock a snook at the mighty US. It is also a matter of glee for Pakistanis that the ISI while pretending to be with the US in their War on Terror was actually protecting the Muslim brothers and Islamic warriors against those who wished to decimate Islam.

Therefore, would not the fact that the Doctor who assisted the US be sentenced for treason a vindication that Pakistan, the Army and the ISI are actually saviour of Islam first and then other things necessary for political correctness?

Just a thought!

[Dayuhan]

I personally doubt that the Pak Army or ISI knew anything about the raid, for numerous and obvious reasons.

[omarali50]

I agree. The simplest explanation for the publicly known facts is that they had no bloody idea...not on that night at least.
Its always possible that some trusted US "friends" high up were secretly alerted by their "friends" to prevent a disastrous response, but I cannot see how there could have been any official contact..

[Ray]

What could be the reason that the Pakistani radars could not spot the helicopters infiltrating their airspace, carrying out the raid and then exfiltrating and take action thereof?

That is another mystery!

I wonder if the whole thing was as simple as it appears.

[davidbfpo]

How SHOULD the White house have spun it?

Still thinking that question through, but from my armchair it was obvious that the White House had not prepared for the media storm of a success or a failure. Similar points were made at the time of the OBL raid on the SWC thread.

I know there is the 'message' and the 'tools'.

What was disappointing regarding the 'tools' was for example the use of Geronimo as the operational name and the lack of a site model to "talk" the media through. In fact only recently have I seen an official photo of a model of the compound.

[omarali50]

What could be the reason that the Pakistani radars could not spot the helicopters infiltrating their airspace, carrying out the raid and then exfiltrating and take action thereof?

...

The Pakistani airforce chief claimed that his best radars were turned off because if he keeps them on all the time he has to replace very expensive parts every X hours. That sounds about right to me.
btw, there was a small news item in a Pakistani newspaper the next day about how the radar at Peshawar airport suddenly malfunctioned at 1 am or something. The guy on duty called someone higher up, his boss said push reset and nothing happened but htere are no flights that late so they were not exactly rushing and then at 2-30 or whatever it started working again.
Maybe Uncle Sam can do things like that.
Then again, I am not claiming I know what happened. Maybe Kiyani was told and stood down that night, but later reactions dont seem to bear that out.

[jmm99]

From the Washington Post, Verdict against Pakistani who helped track bin Laden: Guilty of militancy, not CIA links (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/verdict-against-pakistani-who-helped-track-bin-laden-guilty-of-militancy-not-cia-links/2012/05/30/gJQAbPir0U_story.html?hpid=z6) (29 May 2012):


PESHAWAR, Pakistan — A Pakistan doctor who assisted the CIA in tracking down Osama bin Laden was sentenced to 33 years in prison for conspiring with an Islamist militant commander, a verdict that could make it more difficult for Washington to argue for his release.

The judgment against Shakil Afridi debunked the widely held assumption that he had been convicted for his involvement with the American spy agency.
...
The verdict said Afridi was guilty of conspiring with a militant group led by commander Mangal Bagh. It said he gave money to the group and treated its leaders at a hospital in Khyber when he was stationed there. According to unnamed witnesses, he did this because of his “deep affiliation with the group.” Others, also unnamed, said the group planned terrorist attacks in Afridi’s office.

The verdict, which was passed down last week, found Afridi guilty of “conspiring against the state” and other charges. ....


(Mangal Bagh (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mangal_Bagh) - very short Wiki)

More detail from The News International, Court convicted Dr Afridi for links to Mangal Bagh (http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-14986-Court-convicted-Dr-Afridi-for-links-to-Mangal-Bagh) (30 May 2012):


PESHAWAR: As details of the order of the assistant political agent, Bara, convicting Dr Shakill Afridi on four counts of anti-state activities and sentencing him to 33 years imprisonment became available on Tuesday, it recommended that evidence of Dr Afridi’s involvement in activities linking him to foreign intelligence agencies be produced before another relevant court for further proceedings under the law.

The five-page order containing the detailed judgement by Assistant Political Agent (APA) Nasir Khan, who is also Additional District Magistrate, Bara sub-division, Khyber Agency, pointed out that his court could not take into account the evidence obtained by the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) regarding the involvement of the accused in acts associating him with foreign intelligence agencies due to lack of jurisdiction.
...
The order regarding the state versus Dr Shakill, son of Mewa Khan belonging to the Malikdinkhel Afridi tribe in Bara, Khyber Agency, noted that the accused was charged under sections 121-A, 123, 123-A and 124-A of the PPC under the 11-Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). It said the accused was produced before the court of APA Bara for further proceedings under the provisions of section 11 of FCR 1901 (Amended) 2011 after completion of investigation into the case.

According to the order, Dr Shakill Afridi was arrested on May 23, 2011 by the political administration of Khyber Agency on the basis of reports that he was involved in anti-state activities. It said the intelligence agencies had received reports that the accused was in league with the Mangal Bagh-led LI and members of the general public too had made complaints against him.

The order said the accused from May 24, 2011 was interrogated by the JIT, which normally includes officials from the intelligence agencies ISI, MI and IB, for five days. It added that later he was handed over to an intelligence agency for further probe. It said his trial in the court of APA Bara began on May 11, 2012.

The order said the case was referred to the counsel of elders, or jirga, for inquiry on May 12, 2012. It claimed the jirga gave ample opportunity to the accused for his defence. Finally, the order said the accused was produced in the APA Bara’s court and given a chance to answer the charges against him.

Explaining Dr Shakill Afridi’s links with the LI, the order said the JIT in its report maintained that he gave Rs2 million to the banned militant group while serving at the Tehsil Headquarters Hospital, Dogra, in Bara area and provided medical assistance there to the LI’s commanders Said Noor Malikdinkhel, Hazrat from the Sepah tribe, Wahid from the Shalobar Qambarkhel tribe and others.

The order said the accused was found guilty on all four counts and sentenced to 33 years imprisonment and fined Rs320,000. It added that all the sentences would run consecutively and the conviction should commence from the date of his arrest on May 23, 2011.

Of course, Al Capone was convicted of income tax evasion.

Regards

Mike

[ganulv]

What could be the reason that the Pakistani radars could not spot the helicopters infiltrating their airspace, carrying out the raid and then exfiltrating and take action thereof?

That is another mystery!

I wonder if the whole thing was as simple as it appears.

Most suggestive to me is that you had a helicopter go down hard followed by multiple shots fired and yet the team still had time to collect evidence before anyone in uniform responded.

[ganulv]

The Pakistani airforce chief claimed that his best radars were turned off because if he keeps them on all the time he has to replace very expensive parts every X hours. That sounds about right to me.

In other words he announced to the world, “We regularly leave the door unlocked, and by the way, here are the hours.” Was he immediately put up against a wall and blindfolded? If not, color me suspicious. Color me even more suspicious if he trots the same line out every time the Pakistani street gets restive over a drone strike.

[omarali50]

A theory about why supplies are still stuck.
http://www.brownpundits.com/why-is-pakistan-holding-out-on-nato-supplies/

What do you think?

[carl]

Omar:

You put point three in there for comic relief right? Other than that it sounds quite good to me, especially the money part.

[VCheng]

Concluding paragraphs from a detailed article with a good historical perspective:

from: What's Wrong with Pakistan? - By Robert D. Kaplan | Foreign Policy (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/whats_wrong_with_pakistan?page=full)




....................

And so we come to the core reason for Pakistan's perversity. The fact that Pakistan is historically and geographically well-rooted is only partially a justification for statehood. Although a Muslim frontier state between mountains and plains has often existed in the subcontinent's history, that past belonged to a world not of fixed borders, but rather of perpetually moving spheres of control as determined by the movements of armies -- such was the medieval world. The Ghaznavids, the Delhi Sultanate, and the Mughal dynasty all controlled the subcontinent's northwestern frontier, but their boundaries were all vague and somewhat different from one another -- all of which means Pakistan cannot claim its borders are legitimate by history alone. It requires something else: the legitimacy that comes with good governance and strong institutions. Without that, we are back to the medieval map, which is what we have now -- known in Washington bureaucratic parlance as "AfPak."

The term "AfPak" itself, popularized by the late diplomat Richard Holbrooke, indicates two failed states -- otherwise, they would share a strong border and would not have to be conjoined in one word. Let me provide the real meaning of AfPak, as defined by geography and history: It is a rump Islamic greater Punjab -- the tip of the demographic spear of the Indian subcontinent toward which all trade routes between southern Central Asia and the Indus Valley are drawn -- exerting its power over Pashtunistan and Baluchistan, just as Punjab has since time immemorial.

This is a world where ethnic boundaries do not configure with national ones. Pashtunistan and Baluchistan overlap with Afghanistan and less so with Iran. About half of the world's 40-plus million Pashtuns live on the Pakistani side of the border. The majority of the more than 8 million Baluchis live within Pakistan, the rest in neighboring Afghanistan and Iran.

In recent decades, the age-old pathways in this region have been used by Islamic terrorists, as well as by traditional traders. The link between Pakistan's premier spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and the so-called Haqqani network tied to al Qaeda merely replicates the arteries of commerce emanating from Punjab outward to southern Central Asia. Punjabis dominate the ISI, and the Afghan Pashtun Haqqani network is both an Islamic terrorist outfit and a vast trade and smuggling operation, unto the Amu Darya River to the northwest and unto Iran to the west.

Because al-Hind has historically been so rich in cultural and commercial connections, when modern states do not sink deep roots into the land, the result is a reversion to traditional patterns, albeit with contemporary ideological characteristics. The U.S. State Department and many policy analysts in Washington have proposed a new silk route that could emerge in the event of a peace treaty in Afghanistan. What they fail to recognize is that a silk route is already flourishing outward from Punjab -- it is just not oriented to Western purposes.

The longer the fighting goes on in Afghanistan and along the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderland, the weaker Pakistan as a modern state will become. As that occurs, the medieval map will come into even greater focus. Jakub Grygiel, a professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, points out that when states or empires involve themselves in irregular, decentralized warfare, central control weakens. A state only grows strong when it faces a concentrated and conventional ground threat, creating the need to match it in organizational capabilities and thus bolstering central authority. But the opposite kind of threat leads to the opposite result. Pakistan's very obsession with the ground threat posed by India is a sign of how it requires a conventional enemy to hold it together, even as its answer to India in the contested ground of Central Asia -- supporting decentralized Islamic terrorism from Afghanistan to Kashmir -- is having the ironic effect of pulling Pakistan itself apart. It is unclear whether invigorated civilian control in Pakistan can arrest this long-term process.

This process could even quicken. With the Soviets abandoning Afghanistan in the late 1980s and the Americans on their way out in coming years, India will attempt to fill the void partially by building infrastructure projects and providing support to the Afghan security services. This will mark the beginning of the real battle between the Indus state and the Gangetic state for domination of southern Central Asia.

At the same time, as Pakistan is primarily interested in southern and eastern Afghanistan, the part of Afghanistan north of the Hindu Kush mountains may, if current trends continue, become more peaceful and drift into the economic orbit of the former Soviet Central Asian republics, especially given that Uzbeks and Tajiks live astride northern Afghanistan's border with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. This new formation would closely approximate the borders of ancient Bactria, with which Alexander the Great was so familiar.

Indeed, the past may hold the key to the future of al-Hind.

[ganulv]

Concluding paragraphs from a detailed article with a good historical perspective:

from: What's Wrong with Pakistan? - By Robert D. Kaplan | Foreign Policy (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/whats_wrong_with_pakistan?page=full)

Kaplan has always struck me as someone who has done all of the reading and who can identify all of the important concepts. But his publicly available work tends to have a lit review feel to it. I’m not a South Asia expert, but I know enough about geographic theory to find his efforts to employ it pretty middlebrow, if not to say half-baked. I hope his Stratfor stuff is better than the stuff he puts out there for public consumption.

[omarali50]

Kaplan Bahadur's latest article is worse than half-baked. He has noticed that some intellectuals have cooked up "secular" justifications for its existence and he has built the whole article out of rather thin cloth. Facts that do not fit his theory neatly are ignored and facts that fit his thesis are picked out from wherever available.
Before Kaplan sahib takes offense, I would like to confess that I have a similar opinion about most posthoc geographic theories. Geography obviously has a deep influence on history, but history is also full of contingencies and exceptions. Pakistan is sui generis.

[omarali50]

btw, my own latest attempt at prediction and punditry...obviously not in Kaplan's class but being an amateur, I can afford to be more reckless.

http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2012/06/the-iron-guard-by-omar-ali.html#more

[omarali50]

I should have stayed away from the big shots, but i couldnt: http://www.brownpundits.com/?p=7108

[omarali50]

Things Fall Apart http://www.brownpundits.com/?p=7110

[omarali50]

My take on Ahmed Rashid's latest "no country for armed men" http://www.brownpundits.com/?p=7179

[omarali50]

Sharing a blog post about why some Pakistani liberals are always carrying on about the army: http://www.brownpundits.com/?p=7234

And one about ongoing anti-Shia terrorism in Pakistan: http://www.brownpundits.com/?p=7203

[davidbfpo]

Not a headline I expected to see, which starts with:
Every foreseeable ending to the Afghan war today—continued conflict with the Taliban, restoration of Taliban control in the southern and eastern provinces, or a nationwide civil war—portends nothing but serious perils for Islamabad. But judging from Pakistan’s behavior, it appears as if this fact has eluded the generals in Rawalpindi.

Link:http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/22/pakistan-s-impending-defeat-in-afghanistan/c6sn

Wishful thinking maybe, time will tell - if we are watching.

[davidbfpo]

A rare article on:
China is shelling out massive amounts of money and manpower to improve Pakistan's Karakoram Highway, the highest motorway in the world. The supposed gift to its neighbor is a perfect example of China's economic strategy of taking on short-term expenses for the sake of long-term benefits.

Some stunning photos and a reminder that nature can still dominate, oddly missing from the text:
Because the landslide created the lake, travelers and cargo must now transfer to boats to cross the 22 kilometers of the Karakoram Highway now underwater.

Link:http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/china-expands-karakoram-highway-to-pakistan-a-844282.html

[Ray]

The KKH is of strategic interest for China, and to some extent, of Pakistan.

Money will be of no concern to China to get the road operational at all costs.

[carl]

I suspect that that road is not commercially viable. The maintenance costs will be very high. Just snow removal in the winter will be a huge task and I imagine that keeping gas stations open at 4700 metres elevation is not at all easy. The photos depict very steep almost vertical slopes bordering the road in places. Rock fall mitigation in those areas is a never ending task involving steel nets, blasting, rock removal and still the rocks fall unpredictably and close the road and even on occasion crush cars. That is how it is in Colorado with I-70. In fact when the Interstate highway system was built it was advised that I-70 not follow the route it does and be constructed as it is because the maintenance costs would be so high. I imagine the length of road requiring rock fall mitigation on that road is far longer than along I-70 in Colorado. A road that high might require special trucks too. The total transport expense must be something.

This is a military supply road. But given the terrain and the expense and the vulnerability of all the bridges I wonder if it is even viable for that purpose.

Red China will pick up the maintenance expenses on the Pakistan part of the road but if they ever lose interest does Pakistan have the resources to maintain this thing?

David, the text did mention the lake and landslide but it was at the very bottom of the article.

[Ray]

THE LAST WALTZ


The conclusion: Instability in Afghanistan and some parts of Pakistan is essential to the calculus of checkmating Pakistan’s rise as a nuclear power. Bad governance is a catalyst to instability.


The way this environment shapes coincides with the US intention of withdrawing from Afghanistan. This could be a token gesture as mixed signals emanating from Washington and gunboat diplomacy suggest otherwise. Nowhere do US statements indicate an end to hostilities and transition to peace. To ensure that this withdrawal takes place quickly, Pakistan has to rethink and reframe its Afghan Policy and create a pause to set its house in order. Delay implies more problems.
http://www.opinion-maker.org/2012/07/the-last-waltz/

[Dayuhan]

I suspect that that road is not commercially viable. The maintenance costs will be very high. Just snow removal in the winter will be a huge task and I imagine that keeping gas stations open at 4700 metres elevation is not at all easy. The photos depict very steep almost vertical slopes bordering the road in places. Rock fall mitigation in those areas is a never ending task involving steel nets, blasting, rock removal and still the rocks fall unpredictably and close the road and even on occasion crush cars. That is how it is in Colorado with I-70. In fact when the Interstate highway system was built it was advised that I-70 not follow the route it does and be constructed as it is because the maintenance costs would be so high. I imagine the length of road requiring rock fall mitigation on that road is far longer than along I-70 in Colorado. A road that high might require special trucks too. The total transport expense must be something.

This is a military supply road. But given the terrain and the expense and the vulnerability of all the bridges I wonder if it is even viable for that purpose.

Red China will pick up the maintenance expenses on the Pakistan part of the road but if they ever lose interest does Pakistan have the resources to maintain this thing?

David, the text did mention the lake and landslide but it was at the very bottom of the article.

I have to wonder about it as well. The idea that Chinese goods will be trucked over the highway and exported through Karachi seems totally incompatible with reality. Most Chinese manufacturing is on the east coast and it's far cheaper and easier to simply load goods onto container ships and send them where you want them to go. There are good reasons why the old "silk road" routes fell into disuse, modern maritime transport is a lot cheaper, easier, more efficient. Just imagine the number of truckloads of goods required to fill one container ship, and the logistics of moving them from China's industrial east to Karachi...

I can see some goods destined purely for Pakistan using the route, but re-export through Karachi doesn't sound very practical.

Even as a military supply route there would be real limitations. Hypothetically, a prospective Chinese base at Gwadar or elsewhere could be supplied via this route without having to navigate waters that might be controlled by an enemy. That same enemy, though, would easily be able to close the KKH via sabotage or an air strike. Given the geography and isolation and the already demonstrated ability of a single landslide in the right place to force major rerouting and extended closure, it seems a very vulnerable route to be relying on in any strategic scenario.

Certainly the route is potentially useful to China, enough so to make it economically justifiable, but it's probably an exaggeration to call it a strategic game-changer.

PS: What people often fail to realize about these projects is that they form an effective way of moving money from the Chinese exchequer to Chinese companies, and often to favored individuals as well. The government pays Chinese construction companies to do the work. Subcontractors are involved. Lots of payments made, lots of convenient opportunities for some of that $400 million to wander away. If a project doesn't seem to make economic sense (not saying this one doesn't, but on a general level) and money still flies into it, there's a good chance that the project is largely intended to get money moving around so that some of it can be diverted. Corruption is very widespread in China and the amounts involved are large.

[davidbfpo]

I noted the WaPo report on cross-border artillery shelling by Pakistan of parts of Eastern Afghanistan, which I assume are a bit more than bickering and probably are in reprisal for Afghan incursions:http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/a-day-after-kabuls-warning-to-pakistan-more-cross-border-shelling-reported/2012/07/23/gJQAVpfB4W_story.html

Within the report is this more significant development:
Pakistan recently decided to revoke refugee status for nearly 3 million Afghans, meaning they will be deported by year’s end.

Now I am unconvinced Pakistan will deport 3m people, especially as many now live far from Afghanistan, IIRC the refugee camps have closed and Afghans, ironically, dominate the heavy overland transport industry. This could change if a hostile popular attitude appears, unlikely IMO and rather conflicts with the tradition of hospitality. Let alone the response of the more Ummah friendly political parties.

[Ray]

KKH is basically aimed, as I see it, is to ensure that Chinese imports ex Africa and Middle East, especially oil, has an uninterrupted route to China off Gwadar in case Malacca Straits is closed for any reason.

That is why they have the other route through Myanmar (rail and road) and are building extensive railway routes to CAR, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and so on so that strategic imports have a multiple entry point to China.

[davidbfpo]

I have opened this new thread on Pakistan's strategic position after the arrival today of two expert commentaries on the developing relationship between India and Saudi Arabia. With a passing reference to China, whose relationship with Pakistan has a few troubles.

There is an existing, long running thread 'The US & others working with Pakistan' and quite simply 'working with' is not what is happening. Plus some of the events involved have appeared in the thread 'Mumbai Attacks and their impact'.

Stephen Tankel has a FP Blog article 'Pakistan's sticky wicket: The India-Saudi link':http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/07/30/pakistans_sticky_wicket_the_india_saudi_link

Which ends with:
Finally, this event should cause concern in Islamabad and Rawalpindi about the degree to which continued tolerance of groups like Lashkar is creating unease among even its closest allies. China too has evinced concern - rarely and diplomatically, but nevertheless publicly - about the potential for Pakistan-based militants to threaten its own internal security. Saudi Arabia has now gone a significant step further. Neither country is about to abandon Pakistan, but nor is their commitment to Pakistan as absolute as some of its leaders might publicly claim or privately wish to believe.

The Jamestown Foundation has a short article 'A Challenge for Pakistan: Saudi Arabia’s New Counterterrorism Cooperation with India':http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39671&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=13&cHash=a5dbed00607d8b901541c7acbda9b477

This looks more closely at the Indian aspects.

Still missing on my "radar" is a good article on what exactly is the Pakistan-Saudi relationship, we know many of the linkages, but not how they weigh in the relationship. Any suggestions would be welcome.

I don't think Pakistan can lose friends such as Saudi Arabia or the Chinese and expect this is fully appreciated, especially as relations with the generous USA are prone to tension and in the near future could end.

[omarali50]

Since pakistan is probably willing to go to almost any extent (short of killing "good jihadis"...THAT we cannot do..cannot more than will-not) we should be able to hold on to these two allies. For example, we have not yet given China all of the Northern areas and probably havent physically sold a working bomb to Saudia. But if push comes to shove, we could do either. In short, we still have some things to sell before we hit rock bottom.
As the guy who jumped out of a plane without a parachute famously said at the halfway mark: "still doing OK"..

[carl]

PS: What people often fail to realize about these projects is that they form an effective way of moving money from the Chinese exchequer to Chinese companies, and often to favored individuals as well. The government pays Chinese construction companies to do the work. Subcontractors are involved. Lots of payments made, lots of convenient opportunities for some of that $400 million to wander away. If a project doesn't seem to make economic sense (not saying this one doesn't, but on a general level) and money still flies into it, there's a good chance that the project is largely intended to get money moving around so that some of it can be diverted. Corruption is very widespread in China and the amounts involved are large.

Good point.

[carl]

This is a NYT article from the day before yesterday.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/31/world/asia/haqqani-network-threatens-us-pakistani-ties.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20120731

It is filled with quotes of learned people cautioning that we really don't know if the Haqqanis and the ISI are in bed together and maybe the one is using the other more than it it being used and there are no good options blah blah blah.

I am reading Rashid's Descent into Chaos again (listening on tape) and it struck me when I read the NYT article that nothing at all has changed in the last 11 years. Nothing! There is even something in there about how the new ISI head goon is going to do some "relationship building" in DC with among others, Mr. Petraeus. They will probably get along really well, being fellow professional soldiers and all.

I am forever amazed that we can be had over and over and over again.

[Dayuhan]

KKH is basically aimed, as I see it, is to ensure that Chinese imports ex Africa and Middle East, especially oil, has an uninterrupted route to China off Gwadar in case Malacca Straits is closed for any reason.

That is why they have the other route through Myanmar (rail and road) and are building extensive railway routes to CAR, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and so on so that strategic imports have a multiple entry point to China.

How much oil or other bulk commodities could you reasonably expect to move across the KKH?

[carl]

How much oil or other bulk commodities could you reasonably expect to move across the KKH?

With a pipeline you probably could do a lot. I don't know if there is one or plans for one to follow the road. A properly run tanker truck op could probably do more than we might expect. They are bringing oil down from North Dakota right now by truck because the pipelines extant can't handle things and they wouldn't be doing that unless it paid. Perhaps studying how much the Burma and Ledo Roads were able to handle in WWII would give some idea of what could be done after making allowances for new tech and the winter wx.

[davidbfpo]

Originally Posted by Dayuhan:
How much oil or other bulk commodities could you reasonably expect to move across the KKH?

Posted by Carl:
Perhaps studying how much the Burma and Ledo Roads were able to handle in WWII would give some idea of what could be done after making allowances for new tech and the winter wx.

There is more recent example of overland bulk transport being used, although I have no details to hand.

Following the Declaration of Rhodesian Independence (UDI), with sanctions being imposed shortly afterwards, the Rhodesians stopped supplies of oil to Zambia via their railways and for a short time supplies were ferried in by plane. Overland road replaced this after a time and much later the Tan-Zam railway. IIRC only a small amount was moved and Zambia was forced to make concessions to get overland, rail-borne supplies re-instated.

Back to the KKH. Would the economics of moving oil overland be countered by building oil-fired power generation in Pakistan, using transmission lines parallel to the KKH?

[Ray]

The oil pipeline will run along the KKH alignment.

It will be cost effective compared to movement by road/ train.

They are also planning a rail link!

[Ray]

How much oil or other bulk commodities could you reasonably expect to move across the KKH?

If one is to believe the Chinese and the Pakistanis - a lot!

India moves a lot through equally difficult terrain to Ladhak and Siachen!

You must plan a trip to realise what China and Pakistan aims to do.

[Dayuhan]

Following the Declaration of Rhodesian Independence (UDI), with sanctions being imposed shortly afterwards, the Rhodesians stopped supplies of oil to Zambia via their railways and for a short time supplies were ferried in by plane. Overland road replaced this after a time and much later the Tan-Zam railway. IIRC only a small amount was moved and Zambia was forced to make concessions to get overland, rail-borne supplies re-instated.

Back to the KKH. Would the economics of moving oil overland be countered by building oil-fired power generation in Pakistan, using transmission lines parallel to the KKH?

Again you'd have to look at the comparative scale. China consumes 10mbpd of oil a day, most of it imported, and even a very large pipeline would supply only a small fraction of daily consumption.

Similarly, even a rail and highway to port link via the KKH that was in use 24/7/365 would carry only a tiny fraction of China's merchandise exports. Again, you have to look at infrastructure capacity relative to the overall scale of Chinese imports and exports, which are extremely large. Compare the size and capacity of Gwadar port to, say Shanghai, Shenzhen, or Quingdao and you get an idea of the scale. The 2nd stage of development at Gwadar is supposed to expand it to 12 berths. China's coastal ports have 650 berths for ships 10k tons and above, over 2500 in all.

I don't think it makes sense to look at any single transport link as a critical strategic element that China would rely on if, say, the SE Asian transit route through Indonesia and the Philippines (VLCCs and ULCCs don't use the Malacca Strait, not deep enough) were closed. It would be more accurate, I suspect, to say the Chinese are trying to diversify their access routes by developing as many alternatives as possible. In sum those alternatives are significant, though no single one of them would really be strategically vital. In energy terms, of course, the most significant would be the oil pipelines to Kazakhstan and to Siberia.

I don't really buy the contention that a Gwadar-KKH-China pipeline would reduce the risk of China's oil supply being cut off in the event of conflict with the US, as the port, shipments bound for the port, and the pipeline itself would remain vulnerable. In the event of a purely regional war (say with Vietnam or other SE Asian countries) it could be significant, but if the US (or for that matter India) were determined to cut off China's energy supply, they could still do it. The Kazakhstan and Siberian routes would be much more difficult to interdict.

[Ray]

China has acknowledged that Gwadar’s strategic value is no less than that of the Karakoram Highway, which helped cement the China-Pakistan relationship. Beijing is also interested in turning it into an energy-transport hub by building an oil pipeline from Gwadar into China's Xinjiang region. The planned pipeline will carry crude oil sourced from Arab and African states. Such transport by pipeline will cut freight costs and also help insulate the Chinese imports from interdiction by hostile naval forces in case of any major war.
http://hisamullahbeg.blogspot.in/2011/01/link-between-gawadar-port-and-kkh.html


KARAKORAM OIL PIPELINE
GAWADUR TO KHUNJRAAB PASS TO CHINA

PIPELINE CAPACITY : 12 MILLION TON/YEAR.
http://www.ssgc.com.pk/ssgc/media_center/presentations/pdf/karakorum.pdf

Any supply route will always be vulnerable.

[Ray]

Here is a link to the improving India Saudi relationship.

This would be an input that is of importance to Pakistan and so maybe relevant in context with this thread.

India and Saudi Arabia
http://intellibriefs.blogspot.in/2011/12/india-saudi-arabia.html

It maybe recalled the the Saudis handed over Abu Jundal, a mastermind of the Mumbai Blast, who was in Saudi Arabia on a Pakistan passport. It is said that the ISI wanted the deportation stopped, but the Saudis went ahead and deported Abu Jundal.


Better ties with Saudi Arabia helped clinch Abu Jundal deal

For the last six months, Pakistan had been on a


related stories
Jundal locates 26/11 control room in Karachi
diplomatic overdrive with Saudi Arabia trying to get Jundal back to their soil,...

Jundal had a Pakistani passport. "They used all sorts of tactics, put constant pressure on Saudi Arabia to get him back,".....

http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/Better-ties-with-Saudi-Arabia-helped-clinch-Abu-Jundal-deal/Article1-879865.aspx

[davidbfpo]

It is curious that General Kayani's Independence day speech back in August was missed by my "radar" and I think others here. In the last week I've read short references to it and so a FP Blog article acted as a reminder:
the Pakistani military's deadly tryst with jihadists began when Obama was a college student. Rawalpindi remains wedded to using jihadists, even as they point a gun at their own heads, though the Army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, recognizes the existential threat they pose and could be looking for a way out. In August, in his Independence Day address, Kayani condemned rising religious extremism and warned that jihadi militants could push Pakistan toward civil war.

A very brief report on his speech:http://tribune.com.pk/story/421855/militancy-poses-risk-of-civil-war-warns-gen-kayani/

[omarali50]

Too little too late?
The army (and the ruling elite in general) is stuck. They promoted Islam as a unifying and motivating force, but "Islam" is not a blank slate on which GHQ can write what it wants and not a word more. There is enough out there to make control difficult. Its not a conundrum that the braintrust at Paknationalists.com can solve, so they end up falling back on another round of faux-Islamization and deals with mullahs...all under the delusion that once the hated Americans leave, we will be back to the happy 90s. Its not likely to succeed.

btw, on current events of interest: http://www.brownpundits.com/2012/09/20/a-national-day-of-love-for-the-prophet/

earlier posts on this topic: http://www.brownpundits.com/2012/09/17/how-does-this-end/

http://www.brownpundits.com/2012/09/14/prediction-time-oh-say-can-you-see/

[Firn]

Again you'd have to look at the comparative scale. China consumes 10mbpd of oil a day, most of it imported, and even a very large pipeline would supply only a small fraction of daily consumption.

Similarly, even a rail and highway to port link via the KKH that was in use 24/7/365 would carry only a tiny fraction of China's merchandise exports. Again, you have to look at infrastructure capacity relative to the overall scale of Chinese imports and exports, which are extremely large. Compare the size and capacity of Gwadar port to, say Shanghai, Shenzhen, or Quingdao and you get an idea of the scale. The 2nd stage of development at Gwadar is supposed to expand it to 12 berths. China's coastal ports have 650 berths for ships 10k tons and above, over 2500 in all.

I don't think it makes sense to look at any single transport link as a critical strategic element that China would rely on if, say, the SE Asian transit route through Indonesia and the Philippines (VLCCs and ULCCs don't use the Malacca Strait, not deep enough) were closed. It would be more accurate, I suspect, to say the Chinese are trying to diversify their access routes by developing as many alternatives as possible. In sum those alternatives are significant, though no single one of them would really be strategically vital. In energy terms, of course, the most significant would be the oil pipelines to Kazakhstan and to Siberia.

I don't really buy the contention that a Gwadar-KKH-China pipeline would reduce the risk of China's oil supply being cut off in the event of conflict with the US, as the port, shipments bound for the port, and the pipeline itself would remain vulnerable. In the event of a purely regional war (say with Vietnam or other SE Asian countries) it could be significant, but if the US (or for that matter India) were determined to cut off China's energy supply, they could still do it. The Kazakhstan and Siberian routes would be much more difficult to interdict.

I pretty much agree with everything. If you look at the Chinese economic topography in context of the Asian geography and the location of much needed economic ressources like oil it is hard to imagine that the highway and pipeline link with Pakistan will play and important role in times of peace or bigger wars.

I guess it is partly to keep the Pakistani happy and partly to diversify the economic supply lines of military interest.

[omarali50]

Updated predictions: http://www.brownpundits.com/2012/09/20/a-national-day-of-love-for-the-prophet/

[omarali50]

and what actually happened http://www.brownpundits.com/2012/09/21/aah-to-be-loved-by-idiots/

(my predictions were not too far off the mark)

[davidbfpo]

This article opens with:
Vladimir Putin was due to visit Pakistan this week, but has postponed his trip indefinitely and given no reason for his decision. Sadhavi Chauhan believes, however, that this setback is no threat to increased Russian cooperation with Pakistan and other Central and South Asian countries.

It ends with:
The postponement of Putin’s visit is undoubtedly a symbolic blow to Pakistan's efforts to diversify its strategic allies and do away with its image of bandwagoning with America.... However, it needs to be stressed that Putin has postponed his trip and not cancelled it. ...... There is a definite rapprochement between the two, even though their current bilateral engagement continues to be limited.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/sadhavi-chauhan/russia-pakistan-relations-beyond-putin%E2%80%99s-cancelled-trip-to-islamabad

In a curious twist of timing the Pakistani Army go to Moscow:
...the Russian capital is set to welcome General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani on 3rd October. It is worth noting that his trip continues to be on course despite the cancellation of Putin’s visit.

[omarali50]

My take on US WOT as mother of all terrorism in Pakistan:

http://www.viewpointonline.net/us-occupation-mother-of-all-terrorism.html

[davidbfpo]

A short article by Bruce Reidel, hat tip to the Lowy Institute:http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/iit/bruceriedel

Nothing too startling, although the title suggests some expectation that India will become more engaged.

A few short excerpts:
Since 9/11, the U.S. has disbursed over $25 billion in military and economic aid to Islamabad....No other country except Israel has received so much American aid since 2001.

I'm not sure what economic aid means, budget support?

As SWC recognises the role of the Pakistani Army/ISI, this is of value (edited):
Finally, there is a shadow of Abbottabad haunting American-Pakistani relations. Days after the SEAL raid that killed the al Qaeda amir, a Pakistani journalist wrote that “of course the generals knew and they knew they could get away with it.” It was either ISI incompetence or complicity, neither of which is comforting.

On reading the article again I do wonder if the impact of drone attacks on radicalisation within Pakistan could alter India's calculus to avoid, along with other factors:
An American-Pakistan proxy war could become an Indo-Pakistan proxy war.

[Ray]

Since 9/11, the U.S. has disbursed over $25 billion in military and economic aid to Islamabad

Pakistan claims that they have spent way more than what they got fighting US' War of Terror.


SLAMABAD:
Pakistan’s economy can no longer sustain the cost of war as the money so far disbursed by the US to compensate the damages the country has suffered while fighting the war on terror is only 14% of the total losses, says a leading economist.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/462472/pakistan-can-no-longer-sustain-cost-of-war-says-expert/

http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakistans-war/217881-pakistan-can-no-longer-sustain-cost-war-says-expert.html

[davidbfpo]

Well sometimes things change, worth a read. Hat tip to Ryan Evans. the author ends with:
Without Pakistan reversing the reverse strategic depth it has given to the jihadists, this talk of ‘paradigm shift’ will remain hogwash.

Link:http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012%5C11%5C29%5Cstory_29-11-2012_pg3_2

[davidbfpo]

From FP Situation Report (in an email) and not a great surprise I'd wager:
But Lt. Gen. Mike Barbero, the head of JIEDDO, tells Situation Report he struggles with one thing that is much harder to control: stopping the flow of ammonium nitrate, used to make the overwhelming majority of the home-made explosives used against troops in Afghanistan, from entering the country from Pakistan.

Home-made explosives account for 83 percent of IED "events," defined as found, cleared or detonated, and of that, 72 percent is made with ammonium nitrate. One bag of it can produce seven or eight IEDs, he said. "It's a supply issue," Barbero said.

The problem is not new. But there is increasing frustration among American officials that the Pakistanis seem unwilling to help do anything about the problem. "They can and need to do more....The bottom line is, I know they could do more, it is an area so open for cooperation."

Among other efforts to slow the flow of the ammonium nitrate, Barbero has asked Pakistani fertilizer supplier FATIMA to add dye to their product, a relatively low-cost additive that will help border guards between Afghanistan and Pakistan identify the bags as bomb-making material. Even with an extremely porous border, that could make it harder for insurgents to transport the material, Barbero says. But efforts to get the Pakistani government to push the firm into adding the dye have not been successful, Barbero says.
"On the network and IED cooperation point there has been a lot of talk about cooperation with us, but there hasn't been any real cooperation," Barbero said of the Pakistanis.

[omarali50]

7 soldiers were kidnapped in Jand today. Thats about 50 miles from GHQ on the road to Kohat. Its in Punjab, not KP. Its East of the Indus.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/02/us-pakistan-soldiers-kidnapped-idUSBRE9010JB20130102

The most telling quote in the story is this:

..."Taliban commander Tariq Afridi, who has forces in the area, was not available for comment and no Taliban spokesman returned calls seeking comment."

In frigging Jand, there is a "taliban commander who has forces in the area".
This is close to real Pakistan. Actual middle class Punjabis could die one of these days.

Naturally I will plug my piece again: http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2012/12/the-state-withers-away-in-pakistan-.html#more

[carl]

Omar:

How much time do you figure Pakistan has?

[Bill Moore]

and what actually happened http://www.brownpundits.com/2012/09/21/aah-to-be-loved-by-idiots/

(my predictions were not too far off the mark)

Omar, does seem like the terrorists are increasing their activities again, but it still isn't near as bad as it was a few years back. It is accurate to say that Pakistani military will eventually clamp down like the did before after a long delay where they just admire the problem instead of doing something about it? Or are things different now in your view?

Could it be that they think they already won in Afghanistan and are now shifting their efforts to the Pakistan government? If so I suspect (maybe just hope) they're miscalculating.

[omarali50]

Carl, I dont think Pakistan is going anywhere. I think the state is still stronger than any terrorist group. I just regret that they themselves, needlessly and blindly, created most of the problems facing them today. And I regret that in their obsession with India they have prolonged things and delayed things until the rot was worse and harder to clear out. But in spite of all that, I think the state's odds of survival are still in positive territory. I am not as optimistic as I was 2 years ago, but I still find it hard to imagine Pakistan falling apart.
But it will be ugly. And will probably get much worse before it gets better. Not just terrorism but general law and order and everyday politics and infighting and the endless hate-fest with India. I think MANY problems (and not just the terrorist threat) are worse than our army wants to admit (even to themselves) and that many of their assumptions (like things improving once America pulls out) are flawed. But again, even with flawed assumptions and bad ideas, they can still pull through.
Maybe its wishful thinking on my part, but I base this back-handed optimism on the fact that very pathetic states have won out over determined insurgencies and massive internal disorder more often than insurgencies and disorder have defeated even pathetic states (long stalemates and decades of bad governance are another matter).
Bill, I think (based on nothing more than guesswork and reading the news) that the "bad jihadists" may feel that GHQ has sold them out for sure and its do or die time.
btw, there seems to be a feeling of "strategic victory" in GHQ alongside all the doom and gloom. Its hard to figure out why, but all my paknationalist friends seem to think a great victory parade is going to happen rather soon...

[davidbfpo]

From FP's Situation Report: From JIEDDO, good news on the flow of bomb-making materials from Pakistan. In December, Situation Report reported on the frustrations of Lt. Gen. Mike Barbero....Well this week, he issued a statement: things have gotten better.


While I stand by my testimony [in December], in recent weeks I've seen positive developments in discussions with the Fatima Group, the Pakistan-based producers of calcium ammonium nitrate. Fatima confirmed to me in writing that it has suspended sales of [calcium ammonium nitrate] fertilizer products in the border provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, affecting 228 dealers in those areas. I'm encouraged by their actions and remain hopeful this step will have positive and significant near-term impacts with respect to diminishing the IED threat not only to U.S. and coalition forces on the ground in Afghanistan, but to Pakistan's civilians and security forces as well." Fatima has also agreed to create a "reformulated product" that renders calcium ammonium nitrate "more inert and less explosive," Barbero said, and thereby "diminishing its effectiveness as an IED precursor material," calling such a long-term solution a "true scientific breakthrough.

Working with allies and friends clearly takes time!

[davidbfpo]

In the midst of a very long FP article 'The Inside Story of How the White House Let Diplomacy Fail in Afghanistan' by vali Nasr, are a few gems:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/04/the_inside_story_of_how_the_white_house_let_diplom acy_fail_in_afghanistan?page=full


IN OCTOBER 2010, during a visit to the White House, General Kayani gave Obama a 13-page white paper he had written to explain his views on the outstanding strategic issues between Pakistan and the United States. Kayani 3.0, as the paper was dubbed (it was the third one Pakistanis had given the White House on the subject), could be summarized as: You are not going to win the war, and you are not going to transform Afghanistan. This place has devoured empires before you; it will defy you as well. Stop your grandiose plans, and let's get practical, sit down, and discuss how you will leave and what is an end state we can both live with.

(Then). Kayani's counsel was that if you want to leave, just leave -- we didn't believe you were going to stay anyway -- but don't do any more damage on your way out. This seemed to be a ubiquitous sentiment across the region. No one bought our argument for sending more troops into Afghanistan, and no one was buying our arguments for leaving.

He ends with:
They know the truth: America is leaving Afghanistan to its own fate. America is leaving even as the demons of regional chaos that first beckoned it there are once again rising to threaten its security.

America has not won this war on the battlefield, nor has the country ended it at the negotiating table. America is just washing its hands of this war. We may hope that the Afghan army the United States is building will hold out longer than the one that the Soviet Union built, but even that may not come to pass. Very likely, the Taliban will win Afghanistan again, and this long, costly war will have been for naught.

[carl]

From FP's Situation Report: From JIEDDO, good news on the flow of bomb-making materials from Pakistan. In December, Situation Report reported on the frustrations of Lt. Gen. Mike Barbero....Well this week, he issued a statement: things have gotten better.

Working with allies and friends clearly takes time!

A Pakistani company said they did something and the US military issued a statement that things are well now.

I don't mind us being fools as much as I mind our insistence on bragging about it.

(The "true scientific breakthrough" part is a nice touch. It should put some real pop into a power point presentation.)

[davidbfpo]

A taut critique by Sarah Chayes, which includes:
What this account is missing -- what so many such accounts are missing -- is the humility and intellectual honesty to take a candid look inward, to strive for a nuanced assessment of our shared missteps, in what I, like Nasr, believe will be a grim outcome for Afghanistan, and ultimately for international security.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/12/what_vali_nasr_gets_wrong_obama_afghanistan?page=f ull

[bourbon]

Breaking Up Is Not Hard to Do - Why the U.S.-Pakistani Alliance Isn't Worth the Trouble (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138845/husain-haqqani/breaking-up-is-not-hard-to-do?page=show), by Husain Haqqani. Foreign Affairs, March/April 2013.

With the United States and Pakistan at a dead end, the two countries need to explore ways to structure a nonallied relationship. They had a taste of this in 2011 and 2012, when Pakistan shut down transit lines in response to a NATO drone strike on the Afghan-Pakistani border that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. But this failed to hurt the U.S. war effort; the United States quickly found that it could rely on other routes into Afghanistan. Doing so was more costly, but the United States' flexibility demonstrated to Islamabad that its help is not as indispensable to Washington as it once assumed. That realization should be at the core of a new relationship. The United States should be unambiguous in defining its interests and then acting on them without worrying excessively about the reaction in Islamabad.

The new coolness between the two countries will eventually provoke a reckoning. The United States will continue to do what it feels it has to do in the region for its own security, such as pressing ahead with drone strikes on terrorist suspects. These will raise hackles in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, where the Pakistani military leadership is based. Pakistani military leaders might make noise about shooting down U.S. drones, but they will think long and hard before actually doing so, in light of the potential escalation of hostilities that could follow. Given its weak hand (which will grow even weaker as U.S. military aid dries up), Pakistan will probably refrain from directly confronting the United States.

A provocative article from Pakistan's former Ambassador to the US. Some context about the author:

Commentary: Geopolitical conundrum (http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/de-Borchgrave/2013/02/22/Commentary-Geopolitical-conundrum/UPI-30321361531048/), by Arnaud de Borchgrave. UPI.com, Feb. 22, 2013.

[carl]

David and Bourbon:

Those were two quite outstanding articles. Thank you both for highlighting them.

[davidbfpo]

A few weeks ago I posted a review of 'Ask Forgiveness No Permission: The True Story of an Operation in Pakistan's Badlands' in the thread on Pakistani Internal Security, which is reproduced in Part 2.

Last week The Spectator published a review of the BBC's veteran Pakistan correspondent, Owen Bennett-Jones, which is more a commentary on working with Pakistan and it ends:
Of course, you could argue that his militia was politically controlled — but just not by the country that picked up the bill to pay for it.

Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/books/8894021/who-was-in-control/

Part 2

A modern Lawrence, with locals in choppers

A new book on:
an ex-Royal Navy pilot, led a 25-strong force of specially-recruited (Frontier Corps) Pakistani soldiers raiding Taliban camps, hunting down kidnap victims and detaining suspected al-Qaeda militants (in 2003).


Lt Cdr Leedham tells his story in a new book, Ask Forgiveness Not Permission....The inspiration for his instructions came from the writings of Lawrence of Arabia. “These guys really did perform..I used a lot of Lawrence doctrine. I know it sounds a bit hokey but I did.”.....the model he used — small teams of local fighters with tight security protocols that prevent tip-offs to militant leaders — could still be used to hunt terrorists even as Western forces pull out of the region.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...t-Taliban.html

The UK Amazon has six rave reviews and the Foreword is by Frederick Forsyth:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Ask-Forgiven.../dp/1903071674

It appears not to have been released yet in the USA:http://www.amazon.com/Ask-Forgivenes...Not+Permission
__________________

[carl]

Here is a link to an article that Madhu pointed out to me. It is about working, no, dealing with, no, doing whatever it is we do with the Pak Army/ISI. It has the most wonderful title-Malice in Wonderstan.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2013/05/13342035

[omarali50]

Hallelujah!

http://www.viewpointonline.net/what-next-for-the-taliban.html

[davidbfpo]

Christine Fair wades into the fray with a ten point article on War on the Rocks, none of the points made will come as a surprise here:http://warontherocks.com/2014/01/ten-fictions-that-pakistani-defense-officials-love-to-peddle/

[MoorthyM]

Christine Fair wades into the fray with a ten point article on War on the Rocks, none of the points made will come as a surprise here:http://warontherocks.com/2014/01/ten-fictions-that-pakistani-defense-officials-love-to-peddle/

Perhaps.

However, the real overlooked point is that, arguably, Pakistan has been able to get away for decades because the U.S.-based expertise on Pakistan hasn’t been up to snuff.

Unfortunately, this deficiency continues to this day, with none other than Dr. Christine Fair herself muddying the waters.

For example, in an article (title: "Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Pakistani State") published in Survival over two years ago, she suggested this: “Containing Pakistan per se is not feasible, nor is attempting to do so even desirable.”

Now, an opposite advice in her latest article published in lawfare blog: “[The U.S. should] develop more coercive tools to contain the threat that Pakistan poses to itself and beyond.”

As Amb. Husain Haqqani points out in his new book Pakistan's strategic outlook has changed little in almost four decades. And yet, our eminent political scientists are yet to figure out what makes Pakistan tick!

With al-Qaeda variety now resurgent, policy-makers in the US and in Europe must be wondering who they can turn to for advice.

[davidbfpo]

A rather critical commentary by a Pakistani writer on his nation's greatest weakness:http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-234932-Bartering-sovereignty-for-money (http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-234932-Bartering-sovereignty-for-money)

[omarali50]

I am sure most people have seen this by now

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/magazine/what-pakistan-knew-about-bin-laden.html?smid=tw-share&_r=1

She says surprisingly little about the US end of this axis; were they incompetent or complicit? Is there a third choice?

Anyway, it seems the end is nigh (for the US as worldcop and/or imperial power, depending on how you look at these things). That may not be a bad thing for the US. I suspect American culture is not really ideal for either job. Better to stick to things the US understands better.
But it may be bad news for many others.
Would it be correct to say that China is to be the most likely cop in the "Afpak" region? or will there be a free for all with Russia, India and smaller regional powers all having a go?

[carl]

Omar:

Thanks for the link. I had not seen that.

Incompetent or complicit? Both. Initially incompetent. You yourself well described one of the ways the Pak Army/ISI played them, the whole romance of the Raj bit. That was but one facet of the incompetence.

But they aren't completely stupid people and that is where the complicit comes in. When they realized they been had and more importantly what fools they had been to have been had so completely, they became complicit because they had to cover that up. Their primary motivation became avoiding embarrassment, hundreds of dead 21 year old NASCAR fans and thousands of dead Afghan and Pakistani dirt farmers were small price to pay if the right people continued to look good.

So after that it took on a life of its own. It is almost as if the multi-stars and genii inside the beltway were blackmailing themselves. The Pak Army/ISI didn't have to do anything to keep the deception going. Once it was set up it ran on its own.

The only price they had to pay was to give up OBL. Somehow we found out on our own where he was, sort of probably. They let us confirm it and then they let us take him. That was it. They give up one obsolete guy and the game went on. They won in exchange for Mr. Obama getting to say we got him.

Maybe you are right the Americans as presently constituted can not be what we were. It will be bad for the world though. There is no other country suited to maintain the system of free oceanic navigation the British and us set up and maintained. Bad for us too as an island trading nation.

[jcustis]

I am sure most people have seen this by now

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/magazine/what-pakistan-knew-about-bin-laden.html?smid=tw-share&_r=1

She says surprisingly little about the US end of this axis; were they incompetent or complicit? Is there a third choice?

Anyway, it seems the end is nigh (for the US as worldcop and/or imperial power, depending on how you look at these things). That may not be a bad thing for the US. I suspect American culture is not really ideal for either job. Better to stick to things the US understands better.
But it may be bad news for many others.
Would it be correct to say that China is to be the most likely cop in the "Afpak" region? or will there be a free for all with Russia, India and smaller regional powers all having a go?

That article is derived from a book which I will be sure to order once it comes out.

I was just in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. One of our movements took us just a few blocks from the Red Mosque, and we passed by ISI HQ multiple times. I have a growing interest in the US-PAK relationship, especially since I served in south Helmand (where the smugglers and insurgents were usually detained with pocketfuls of rupees!)

[carl]

jcustis:

I have a question.

What is the general opinion amongst the guys you work with and deployed with about of the Pak Army/ISI in Afghanistan? Are they agnostic? Do they believe they are the enemy, they are a friend? Are they just resigned? What do they think?

[jcustis]

That's a question with a few layers Carl, and it merits a thoughtful reply. I will try to draft one this weekend.

[flagg]

I am sure most people have seen this by now

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/magazine/what-pakistan-knew-about-bin-laden.html?smid=tw-share&_r=1

She says surprisingly little about the US end of this axis; were they incompetent or complicit? Is there a third choice?

Anyway, it seems the end is nigh (for the US as worldcop and/or imperial power, depending on how you look at these things). That may not be a bad thing for the US. I suspect American culture is not really ideal for either job. Better to stick to things the US understands better.
But it may be bad news for many others.
Would it be correct to say that China is to be the most likely cop in the "Afpak" region? or will there be a free for all with Russia, India and smaller regional powers all having a go?

By the author's own word she had the story of Pakistani support for the Afghan insurgency since 2007 and the story on Pakistani support for OBL since 2012.

Why the 7+ and 2+ year delay on the respective/combined stories?

I'd rather know the clearly very long story of going to print behind this story.

Why now?

Why not then?

I'm assuming massive pressure from the US Administration due to US reliance on Pakistani logistics support for Afghan operations.

[carl]

That's a question with a few layers Carl, and it merits a thoughtful reply. I will try to draft one this weekend.

Thank you sir.

[jcustis]

jcustis:

I have a question.

What is the general opinion amongst the guys you work with and deployed with about of the Pak Army/ISI in Afghanistan? Are they agnostic? Do they believe they are the enemy, they are a friend? Are they just resigned? What do they think?

I first need to put out the qualifier that there are no "general opinions" about the US-Pak relationship where I currently work. Everything supports (or certainly should support) the Theater Strategy, and folks tend to favor specific terms and phrases when you get into the security cooperation/assistance side of things.

Having said that, most I speak with recognize it is complex, delicate, and sensitive to a terribly wide range of things that can't be controlled all that easily, like public opinion. Trying to put things into a box and characterizing Pakistan as a friend or enemy is too simplistic, in my opinion.

I believe that military professionals tend to look on each other kindly, no matter the tensions between policymakers/politicians, and that is the reason why the US-Pak military relationship is stronger and both sided aim to increase cooperation to make it more efficient and certainly relevant to current threats.

Folks in the building understand the situation Pakistan faces, the balance the Pak military strives to achieve in the frontier between eradicating radicalism and insurgency while not creating more radicals. I don't know enough about the connections between the conventional military and the ISI to lump them together, but I do appreciate the claim that things turned upside down on 9/11 for both countries.

The US has the luxury of leaving. The Pak general or admiral who has attended our various war colleges or perhaps specialized courses, cannot say the same.

Some appreciate the complex Pak-Indian relationship and how it can be a predictor of Pakistani foreign policy behavior, but it tends to be overshadowed by other headlines, like an Abbottabad raid.

We seem to share the belief that we must find a way to get past this.

Now, things were very different when I was in Afghanistan. The Taliban were the enemy--the 50m target. At a battalion level, where things a tactically-focused, there just isn't a lot of time to think about the strategic relationships and dramas, even if they are known. I would say that if they did consider Pakistan an active supporter of insurgents who were in our neck of the woods, they were resigned to the fact that there wasn't anything they could do about it and there more immediate worries, like the daily patrolling effort and getting home in one piece. I don't recall having a conversation with the battalion commander about the topic, and it certainly never came up between me and the operations officer, even though we all stood barely 10 kms from the border during an Oct raid.

I have to qualify this by reminding that the lethal smuggling problem, mixed in with the narcotics smuggling across the porous southern border (in name only) was our focus. We faced the same in northern Iraq and had early on let go of any angst that the border was not better controlled on the Pak side.

I'd have to root through my posts in the '06-'09 era to see if I had a worry about the ISI-Haqqanni nexus claims, but I don't recall reading the "Godfather" article until perhaps early 2013? I had a sense of the accusations, and the wringing of hands over what to do, but I suppose that is because I hang out in spaces like the Council, rather than prepping for Fantasy Football Leauge season.

Make sense? I want to be sure I get to your question, so feel free to ask for clarification.

[carl]

jcustis:

That well answered my question. I can well understand the outlook of the guys on the line who have other things to thing about. What concerns me greatly is the attitude of the ones you currently work with.

I must put this in the right way. I don't want to jump on you for giving me a frank opinion of what you see. That said, it seems to me the people you work with are letting professional sympathy get in the way of a frank assessment of the Pak Army/ISI, its structure and its actions. When you say people in the building understand the situation Pakistan is in, what I hear is those people have bought the Pak Army/ISI line despite the huge amount of open source information available making it clear that they are a straight up enemy. Now maybe I am wrong about that but I'll stand by it. When you say that fighting professionals upon whom we depend upon for our protection from the beasts that stalk the world can't see what the Pak Army/ISI is and has been after 13 years and seeing the dead that come from that, that scares me. It makes me think there is something wrong with the ability of at least a segment of the American military to see things straight. We can get away with that in Afghanistan, sort of, but we won't get away with that if we have to go up against Red China some day. It's scary.

Again I thank you for providing an honest opinion. It is of great value because I can more understand that actions of the multi-stars may not be wholly because of a lack of moral character, those actions seem also to reflect a serious flaw in our military's ability to perceive things that are.

All of this is my honest opinion and I hope you don't hold it against me.

[jcustis]

Don't worry; everyone has things straight.

There are elements of things going on that I'm never going to talk about, and you'll likely never hear about. Balanced against the menagerie of things which constitute a foreign policy (and security cooperation/assistance strategy is just one bit managed by the .mil side), the goings on in my realm are probably the last thing to focus on.

I imagine, for example, that development strategies and other civilian-led pillars of COIN have a lot more relevance in Pakistan at the moment.

[ganulv]

Folks in the building understand the situation Pakistan faces, the balance the Pak military strives to achieve in the frontier between eradicating radicalism and insurgency while not creating more radicals. I don't know enough about the connections between the conventional military and the ISI to lump them together, but I do appreciate the claim that things turned upside down on 9/11 for both countries.

After the May, 2011, raid on the Mehran naval station (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13495127) there was some talk that there was an inside job element to the attack. That seemed a little out there to me. I asked a Pakistani friend of mine, a Political Science professor, what she thought. I was expecting she would tell me something about the nature of rumors and paranoia in the Pakistani media, so I was quite surprised when she told me she thought it was perfectly plausible and that it was her impression that there was more than a little factionalization in the Pakistani military and paramilitary forces.

Now, as far as I know there ended up being no evidence that the Mehran attack was an inside job in any way. And my friend was not claiming to have any inside track information on that event in particular or the situation in general.* But I did come away from the conversation with the notion that it is probably worth considering that while the Pakistani security professionals might all be on the same team that they might not all be reading from the same playbook. (Of course there are a variety of opinions within any institution, but I mean something beyond minor differences of opinion.)

*She does have family members who have served as officers in the Pakistani military, though of course many Pakistanis of her class and status do.

[omarali50]

Unfortunately this is in Urdu, but i am sure there are a few people in the US who can understand Urdu. They should take a look at this video. It is the unadulterated Paknationalist viewpoint, not what is put out for American consumption. This is NOT the consensus view of the establishment. The establishment has other views within it. But this view is by no means a joke, nor is it as "fringe' as many people seem to think. It is worth paying attention to...especially the question of why it is being promoted at this point; today, not 5 or 10 years ago.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvkYjpCZwq0#t=74

[carl]

After the May, 2011, raid on the Mehran naval station (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13495127) there was some talk that there was an inside job element to the attack. That seemed a little out there to me. I asked a Pakistani friend of mine, a Political Science professor, what she thought. I was expecting she would tell me something about the nature of rumors and paranoia in the Pakistani media, so I was quite surprised when she told me she thought it was perfectly plausible and that it was her impression that there was more than a little factionalization in the Pakistani military and paramilitary forces.

Now, as far as I know there ended up being no evidence that the Mehran attack was an inside job in any way. And my friend was not claiming to have any inside track information on that event in particular or the situation in general.* But I did come away from the conversation with the notion that it is probably worth considering that while the Pakistani security professionals might all be on the same team that they might not all be reading from the same playbook. (Of course there are a variety of opinions within any institution, but I mean something beyond minor differences of opinion.)

*She does have family members who have served as officers in the Pakistani military, though of course many Pakistanis of her class and status do.

Did they ever get the whole story on that attack?

[davidbfpo]

Carl asked:
Did they ever get the whole story on that attack?

IIRC the official Pakistani report was "leaked" and is within this thread. It was quite damming. Obviously I maybe mistaken.:eek:

[ganulv]

Did they ever get the whole story on that attack?
I am assuming they did. I am also assuming we never will. :D

[davidbfpo]

A succinct explanatory comment on WoTR; which ends with:
Ultimately, the point here is not to legitimize Pakistani conspiracy theories. Rather, it is to highlight how U.S. policies in Pakistan often strengthen—and validate—anti-American narratives that Washington would much prefer to undercut.

Link:http://warontherocks.com/2014/03/four-pakistani-conspiracy-theories-that-are-less-fictitious-than-youd-think/

[omarali50]

LOL. I wonder if Mr Kugelman has been picked up by paknationalist psyops yet? His work will be much cited in the days to come. If national security types get credit for citations, this will transform his ratings completely.
I do realize that he means well, but I am not sure what the meaning is supposed to be? what is the lesson here?

Not that it matters. We are about to win a strategic victory (probably with US support as Kerry and company arrange an honorable exit). But as I asked in 2011, what then? What if we win?

http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2011/10/what-if-we-win.html

[ganulv]

LOL. I wonder if Mr Kugelman has been picked up by paknationalist psyops yet? His work will be much cited in the days to come.

And? If not his, someone else’s.


I do realize that he means well, but I am not sure what the meaning is supposed to be? what is the lesson here?

One lesson would be to keep things in perspective. Don’t sacrifice big picture, long term success at the altar of the crisis of the moment. Anyone who thinks endangering the closing round of decades of work towards eradication of polio from our planet was worth the risk if it meant getting a DNA sample from OBL (talk about risk aversion; were there not multiple lines of evidence that lead the U.S. Intelligence Community to that compound? why the need to nail it down that tightly?) is ignorant or a moron. But this is a nurse’s son speaking here.

[omarali50]

On polio I absolutely agree that the CIA should not have added fuel to the anti-polio vax fire, but I would point out that the ban against polio vaccination has been there since 2007, well before poor Dr Afridi and his team of health visitors tried to get DNA. The campaign against polio vaccine started even before the 2007 ban on vaccination in Waziristan. You can read more about the Polio Jihad here: http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2013/12/the-polio-jihad.html

I am curious, what do you think was the big picture that was missed in Pakistan?

Again, I would add that I dont think the US did a good job. Far from it. I now think the US was not culturally or institutionally capable of obtaining a really good outcome in the region and would have done much better to stay out. Long distance punishment of hostile governments, support to their enemies and carrots to buy them out would have been cheaper and at least as effective, probably far more so. But the US public wanted a war after 9-11 so there was a war. By now the blood lust has settled, so the whole exercise is looking pointless.
But I dont think the mistakes were the ones Kugelman thinks were mistakes. (To be fair, I am not sure what he thinks. I dont think he has spelled out his "lessons learned" in that article).

[davidbfpo]

As the USA reduces its presence in Afghanistan The Long War Journal's blog has this intriguing story, which starts with:
The US military turned over Latif Mehsud, formerly a senior commander in the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, to the Pakistani government within the past week. Latif was snatched by US forces from Afghan intelligence officials in the Afghan province of Logar in October 2013.

Link: http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/12/us_transfers_taliban_commander.php#ixzz3LLYN0Fxk


Just whether as a 'bad' Pakistani Taliban leader he remains in custody is a moot point.

[davidbfpo]

The following BBC News report acted as a catalyst to post Christine Fair's WoTR piece. Working with Pakistan has hardly gone away!

The BBC headline 'Mumbai attack suspect Lakhvi released on bail in Pakistan', this man has been in custody since 7 December 2008, days after the Mumbai attack:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-32250763

His detention was reportedly symbolic rather than actual; with LET visitors, internet access and the like. As we know, especially for India, symbols are important.

Christine Fair has a very clear stance on Pakistan, which is critical and the WoTR piece is an effective update:http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/groundhog-day-in-u-s-pakistan-relations/?singlepage=1

Her aim is:
The United States needs a more realistic policy towards Pakistan. In this essay, I argue why these decades-long policies have long failed and I put forward several propositions that should inform a new policy towards a state that is the problem from hell.She ends:
In the end, such a realistic policy towards Pakistan may not result in a Pakistan that behaves better in the policy-relevant future. However such a policy will at least spare the American public the continued indignity of subsidizing Pakistan’s most dangerous policies, several of which account for thousands of dead Americans and many more injured in the Afghan war.

[Ray]

His detention was reportedly symbolic rather than actual; with LET visitors, internet access and the like. As we know, especially for India, symbols are important.

David,

Symbols are not important in India.

The dispensation of law as per the criminal code, rules and procedure are.

In India is you are in prison, then you do not get the privileges of the open society at large.

Lakhvi has all facilities of open society available to him while in Jail and he also fathered a child in Jail.

I wonder if that is symbols or miscarriage of justice.

Which country allows a terrorist organiser such facilities?

I am sure none in the West.

The Prosecution, it is said, did not present the case well leaving loopholes that the Pakistani Judges exploited to free this man.

[blueblood]

ISLAMABAD:
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s two-day visit to Pakistan has been replete with flowery rhetoric extolling mutual love between both countries, but the name chosen for a new joint think tank has left some social media users in titters.

Dedicated to research on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a $46 billion dollar plan linking China’s restive west to the Arabian Sea, the newly inaugurated Research and Development International (RANDI) organisation has been widely pilloried because its acronym sounds like “whore” in Urdu and Hindi.


http://tribune.com.pk/story/873511/twitter-giggles-as-pakistan-china-launch-randi-think-tank/

People are having too much fun at twitter and other fora because of RANDI. Some are assuming that the name is deliberately chosen by the Chinese. Earlier Shireen Mazari, a "security expert" created a think tank called
P.I.S.S(Pakistan Institute of Strategic Studies).:D

[omarali50]

The hashtag #RANDI was number one on Pakistani twitter today, so the joke has been widely shared. English acronym fails have a long history in Pakistan. The first incarnation of the genocidal anti-Shia party "Sepah e Sahaba Pakistan" (soldiers of the (prophet's) companions, Pakistan) was named "Anjuman Sipah e Sahaba" (ASS) "Party of soldiers of the (prophet's) companions".
what is different in this case is that the thing was started as an English language title, not an off-chance weirdness of translation from Urdu to English.
Some people think the Chinese are in on the joke, but of course that too is a joke (Pakistan, like the old Soviet Union, is very joke-happy and there is a joke for every possible political and military development): from what I can tell the Chinese are generally clueless about the cultural nuances of Pakistan (and about Middle eastern societies). So clueless that their imperium may make US imperialism look subtle and deeply knowledgeable..perhaps in the same way that some people look back to the British (with their insatiably curious, astonishingly successful and "proof of the pudding" street-wise "soldier-sahibs") as imperial wizards compared to the easily fooled but highly arrogant Americans.
On the other hand, the Chinese are known to be able to count money, so their actual losses may be less than what the Americans sank into their adventures in imperial policing.
Pakistan has almost certainly promised Big-Big more than Pakistan can possibly deliver. But then again, Big-Big and his accountants may or may not buy the spiel, but they will not sink real money till they see some real returns on early pilot efforts. GHQ will have to up it's game after the first round of investments, otherwise, "you broke it, you pay". Uncle Chin will not extend credit forever...

[davidbfpo]

A short article via the Lawfare blogsite, whose Editor writes:
The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has long been ugly. Pakistan’s efforts to control and influence Afghanistan have played a major role in advancing radical groups like the Taliban and fomenting unrest in Pakistan itself. The last few months have seen signs of improvement, but Pakistan’s policies will not be easily changed no matter how self-defeating, as its perceived strategic interests and domestic politics are both intertwined with radical groups. Khalid Nadiri of SAIS explains the logic of Pakistan’s actions in Afghanistan and why a true rapprochement between the two countries is likely to remain elusive.
Link:http://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/04/the-foreign-policy-essay-explaining-pakistans-self-defeating-afghanistan-policy/

The author concludes, optimistically IMHO:
In short, matching deeds to words will be a critical requirement for peace in Afghanistan and, by extension, in Pakistan. If Afghanistan is to become stable, it will be a country that maintains active and cordial but independent relations with all of its near and far neighbors and is not used to objectively threaten any other country. In return, Afghanistan’s neighbors would have to refrain from interfering in its internal politics. Such a situation could provide extraordinary economic benefits and open up new political possibilities. Afghanistan and its key partners, including the United States, will need to forge a political formula that provides for regional cooperation. But to get there, Pakistan needs to act in line with its own commitments.

[davidbfpo]

Omarali50 posted two days ago on the Afghanistan, its neighbours and non-NATO nations thread, with my emphasis and I didn't recognise what CSF stood for:
China is still in the "1950s" phase of being big brother to Pakistan. Their strategy is likely to be to wait for their man in Islamabad to deliver the peace and strategic depth and free bauxite he promised.
It takes a while to get to to CSF suspension level. Sometimes it takes decades. (Chinese are fast learners though :) )

Thanks to WoTR Stephen Tankel explains that US relations with Pakistan, notably its military, is about to undergo a change:
The visit came on the heels of an announcement that U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter declined to certify that Pakistan had taken adequate steps against the Haqqani network[/URL], which is believed to be responsible for a recent spate of attacks in Afghanistan. Unless Carter reverses this decision, Pakistan’s military is out $300 million in what is called “Coalition Support Funds.” That still leaves $600 million in authorized money on the table for the fiscal year, and that money is unlikely to be withheld. The financial loss of $300 million is not inconsequential, but the political symbolism of the decision is the real story.
Link:[URL]http://warontherocks.com/2015/08/is-the-united-states-cutting-pakistan-off-the-politics-of-military-aid/? (http://www.voanews.com/content/us-no-decision-on-blocking-military-aid-to-pakistan/2926949.html)

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to WoTR for a long review by Myra McDonald of the Indo-Pakistani relationship after the latest two attacks, an Indian air force base and the Indian consulate @ Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan:http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/on-india-pakistan-hope-for-the-best-and-prepare-for-the-worst/?

A nice pithy ending passage, with my highlight:
the United States should ensure that despite the multiple distractions in the Middle East, it is properly prepared for a fresh crisis. China has been helpful in the past in managing Pakistan — though a strategic rival of India, China has no interest in seeing a major war on its doorstep. The United States should build on that, while continuing to encourage nuclear confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan. In other words, it needs to hope for the best and prepare for the worst. It will be in a stronger position to do that if it remains very clear-sighted about how little has changed since those days of the Kargil War. With every new army chief that takes office, Washington somehow convinces itself Pakistan has turned a corner. It never does.

[omarali50]

I have a piece arguing that talks should continue, but with eyes open (and with realistic secondary aims even if the primary aim fails)

http://brownpundits.blogspot.com/2016/01/pakistan-and-india-2016-to-talk-or-not.html

Excerpt:


10. I obviously hope it works at the first level. As a Pakistani, I would much prefer that the security establishment comes to its senses and the country manages to get out of the jihadi violence cycle (none of which will be easy in any and every imaginable scenario). I don’t think war is in the interest of the Pakistani OR Indian elite or their long-suffering common people. Very narrow sections of the elite may believe it is in their benefit to stoke conflict, but they are narrow sections in both countries...that is exactly the reason why there is an opening.
That may be hoping for too much. But miracles are possible. I am afraid that the core Islamicate region is in the throes of a major civilizational crisis. As a major Islamic state, we share in that crisis, over and above our India-centric adventures. But we are also part of Indic civilization and our divorce from that civilization is not complete. If we can move back into that orbit (NOT back into the Indian state, just back into Indian orbit) we will have many problems to solve (the largest collection of really poor, malnourished, poorly governed people in the world for example) but at least we will not have to solve the Islamic political crisis just to continue living. That will be a major relief and a huge step forward. For that to happen, we need to make peace with India. For that to happen, both India and Pakistan will need to try (even at the cost of transiently looking bad to their own nationalist constituency) some very patient and competent maneuvers. That sounds like a tall order.
But we have to hope.

[davidbfpo]

The Pakistani prime minister's adviser on foreign affairs has indicated in a talk at Washington's Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) that the leadership of Afghan Taliban is living in Pakistan.

Aziz said: "We have some influence on them because their leadership is in Pakistan, and they get some medical facilities, their families are here. So we can use those levers to pressurise them to say, 'come to the table'."
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-35719031

[davidbfpo]

After he mayhem in Lahore, targeting Christian children celebrating Easter, although the BBC reports most casualties were Muslim; the Pakistani state has responded. This article is a backgrounder:https://theconversation.com/pakistan-bombing-what-is-jamaat-ul-ahrar-56888?

A BBC report:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-35910124

Note the Pakistani Army appear to have decided to respond in the Punjab, a province currently dominated by the Prime Minister's party.

[omarali50]

After he mayhem in Lahore, .. the Pakistani Army appear to have decided to respond in the Punjab, a province currently dominated by the Prime Minister's party.

This seems to imply that the Prime Minister is less interested than the army or that the army is taking an unusual/leading role in some virtuous action. This is a bit misleading (though understandable, given the fact that people overseas are mostly getting their information from sources that the army has long mastered and manipulated); one aspect of Pakistani internal politics is reliably unchanging: that the army will use any and all crises to further elbow the civilians aside and to undermine their authority, usually in self-defeating and completely unnecessary ways (unnecessary in the sense that the civilians are frequently not resisting "the right thing", though there can be rare exceptions to that). Thus the first thing the army did after the latest horrendous attack is to start sending out press releases and tweets via the ever vigilant and extremely efficient ISPR about how it has started taking action in Punjab and to make sure that their supporters/agents in the media amplify this unilateral action and undermine the credibility of the counter-terrorism department and police (both of which have in fact been active recently against the terrorists) as much as possible. When the hapless (more hapless in PR, than in law enforcement) civilian regime tried to point out that these were joint operations and that they were fully on board, the army chief supposedly stated that the army was NOT doing any joint raids. Every retired air marshal and general has been on TV making sure everyone gets the message.
This would all be fine if the army was as capable in this area as they pretend. But they have a long long history of pushing aside civilians (frequently corrupt and modestly incompetent civilians) and failing to do what even the corrupt civilians were managing to do. Thus everything from the Water and Power authority to the Railways to everyday policing deteriorated under army rule (they have also deteriorated under civilian rule, the story is unpleasant all around, but part of that is also due to how the army has undermined civilian institutions for decades, undermining trust in them and tolerating corrupt politicians who do its bidding while making sure anyone half-effective is cut to size).
In the case of the police and the administration the issue is not just that the army does not really know how to handle stuff even at the British Raj level (which outdated level is about the best the civilian administration could manage), but that the army introduces dual responsibility in administration; everybody knows the real power lies with the army, but the civilian chief or police are still responsible on paper, so both sides have no incentive to take any responsibility. It never works well, but the army will do it anyway.
This is more of the same.
They would do much better if they cooperated with the civilians (pushing, if necessary, from behind the scenes, in the national interest; but then again, who does that?) but that is never job 1. Job 1 is grabbing more power.

[omarali50]

I turned this comment into a blog post..

http://brownpundits.blogspot.com/2016/03/the-army-is-on-job.html

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to WoTR for an article which explores, even explains, why for the first time a US drone strike occurred in Baluchistan - hitting the Afghan Talban leader:http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/why-did-washington-wait-so-long-to-take-its-drone-war-to-baluchistan/

Here are two passages:
The bottom line is there’s no reason to believe the United States would pass up a golden opportunity to take out a leader of the Taliban insurgency simply for the sake of diplomatic niceties.....President Obama did suggest (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/world/asia/obama-mullah-mansour-taliban-killed.html) that killing Mansour was simply meant to pave the way for the Taliban to agree to reconciliation talks with Kabul.

[davidbfpo]

I had not seen reports of the Afghan and Pakistani border guards exchanging gunfire @ Torkham border crossing, in the Khyber Pass and Pakistan then closing the border there:
... the recent bloody border clashes between the Afghan and Pakistani military forces illustrate the common aversion of the Afghans towards their antagonistic eastern neighbours, Pakistan. The incident, which left three border guards and two children dead on the Afghan side of the Torkham crossing in eastern Afghanistan, stirred anger throughout the country.
Link:http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/06/pakistan-double-games-afghanistan-160619065803423.html? (http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/06/pakistan-double-games-afghanistan-160619065803423.html?utm_content=buffer49157&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer)

(http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/06/pakistan-double-games-afghanistan-160619065803423.html?utm_content=buffer49157&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer)
The author is an Afghan analyst.

[davidbfpo]

There has been a "lot of water has flowed under the bridge" since the last post, notably the advent of President Trump and the US-Pakistan relationship appears to have changed - even if General Mattis suggests a deal is still possible.

The Soufan Group's latest briefing provides a good overview and is even optimistic.
Link:http://www.soufangroup.com/tsc-intelbrief-afghan-campaign-threatened-by-u-s-pakistan-tensions/

Forum veterans will recall this relationship has had "hard times" before and Pakistan has "turned the tap off" on overland transportation of supplies from Karachi to Afghanistan. The alternative route, the Northern Distribution Network, is fraught with issues and I understood it was no longer actually working.
The old, closed thread on logistics:Supply routes to Afghanistan (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/Supply routes to Afghanistan)

Just how the non-Afghan campaign, waged by the military and contractors can manage with overland transport is a moot point. Yes some items can be flown in, others cannot and would Pakistan still allow overflying?

A July 2017 WoTR article, thanks to a lurker:https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/the-war-in-afghanistan-and-considerations-of-supply/

[davidbfpo]

Two viewpoints, one from Londonistani (UK national, now @ Chatham House) who knows Pakistan over many years working there and the second by Richard Olson, a former US Ambassador to Pakistan & SRAP.

Londonistani examines the strategic situation Pakistan is in now minus US support, an often ambivalent China, India being a perceived capable enemy neighbour and an inability to fund what it wants to do.

Link:https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/changing-sponsors-won-t-solve-pakistan-s-problems

Mr Olson ends with:
The United States can address Afghanistan only with a political initiative. The ultimate answer to the Pakistan conundrum is to start a diplomatic initiative to bring peace to Afghanistan by opening talks with the Taliban. Much of diplomacy is taking away the other side’s talking points, or excuses.The Trump administration has publicly stated that it sees the conflict ending only through a negotiated solution. It is difficult to understand why no such diplomatic initiative had been started.
Link:https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/09/opinion/pakistan-trump-aid-engage.html


Whatever one thinks of President Trump talking to the Taliban is not going to happen; though others may and the Afghan state talks to all manner of people - that is their way of resolving conflicts.

[davidbfpo]

The sub-title says it all:
For the past fifteen years, Pakistan’s intelligence service has simultaneously been one of the C.I.A.’s best—and worst—partners in fighting terrorism.
Link:https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-cias-maddening-relationship-with-pakistan

[davidbfpo]

Mmmm, not sure what is going on here; astute diplomat move or obtaining an alternative insurer?
As for the road signs that is weird!
Link:https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-changing-signposts-pakistan/29061698.html

[davidbfpo]

From SWJ an article from VOA that starts with:
Pakistan says it is reassessing strained ties with the United States, a move that could lead to halting supply lines into Afghanistan where American troops are fighting insurgents to stabilize the war-ravaged country with the help of NATO allies. Foreign Minister Khurram Dastgir Khan made the remarks to VOA exclusively a day before an international task force is to place Pakistan on a terrorism-financing watch list at the urging of U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration, a move likely to fuel Pakistan’s economic troubles.
Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/pakistan-mulls-blocking-us-supply-lines-afghanistan

[davidbfpo]

Pakistan’s challenging regional environment has taken some new turns and new government of Prime Minister Imran Khan is trying to cope up with these challenges. Government’s major advantage is that it has no clash with the dominant army. In many areas of foreign policy, it has ceded significant ground to the army.


Pakistan is in a difficult spot on three issues. First is rapid pace of negotiations between Taliban and Americans with projected quick withdrawal of American troops, second is isolation of Iran and third is potential entanglement in intra-Arab rivalry with United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia on one and Qatar on the other side. Pakistan is facing these regional challenges in the background of internal political instability and very serious economic downward trend. Part of political instability and associated economic meltdown is due to self-inflicted wounds. Departing from the normal process of check and balance, judiciary and army played an active role in tuning up the system that will have its own set of consequences. It has widened the political gulf and added new fissures.


Regional challenges of Pakistan are directly linked with American policies. We are living in a Trumpian world that has sowed a lot of confusion on all fronts. Every country and non-state player is adjusting positions at such a rapid speed that it is hard to make sense of every move. Pakistan is also caught in this Trumpian world on several fronts.

US policy is in disarray with no coordination between different government agencies. President Trump is using single point agents without full institutional support behind these efforts. In many cases, some power centers of Washington are diametrically opposed to President’s efforts. It is probably right time for withdrawal of American troops from both Syria and Afghanistan. Trump may have realized what Christopher Fettweis wrote in 2008 in his book Losing Hurts Twice as Bad that “bringing peace to every corner of the globe, even those whose stability we have wrecked through our own incompetence, is not necessarily in the strategic interest of the United States”. However, the method in which it is being done has confused both allies and foes. American intelligence agencies are publicly disagreeing with Trump that is unprecedented. In late January 2019, in a hearing at Senate Intelligence Committee, Director of National Intelligence and heads of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA) and Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) contradicted Trump on security issues. They told the committee that Iran was still abiding by the nuclear deal. Trump had pulled out of the deal stating that Tehran had broken the deal. Furious Trump sent his twitter tirade saying that ‘the intelligence people seem to be extremely passive and naïve when it comes to the dangers of Iran. They are wrong’.

Trump announced withdrawal from Afghanistan without input from any other institution. Trump appointed Zalmay Khalilzad nick named Zal to negotiate directly with Taliban. He is given a single point agenda of quick withdrawal. He is the right person for such byzantine intrigues. Pakistan’s cooperation on Afghanistan front is completely handled by the army.

Pakistan put pressure on Taliban leaders in Pakistan to sit with the Americans. Some members of the civilian government tried to get Taliban agree to come for at least one meeting with Zal in Islamabad so that government could get credit both domestically and internationally. However, Taliban wiggled out of the offer. Taliban are playing their cards deftly by exploiting competing interests of Pakistan, Afghan government, Iran, United States and Russia as well as intra-Arab rivalry. Initial meeting was scheduled in Jeddah and later Abu Dhabi but when these governments put pressure on Taliban, they hitch hiked on Qatari wagon. Ironically, now Pakistan is doing what United States wanted all along and doing it free. I doubt if they will get a thank you note from the Americans. Pakistan is worried that high likelihood of instability in the aftermath of quick American withdrawal will have significant social, economic and security fall out for Pakistan, therefore current exercise is more in self-interest. Afghan chessboard is in the process of being rapidly re-arranged. Constructive work needs to be done diligently to avoid another cycle of civil war, however history and ground realities should always be kept in mind.

Rewind the clock two decades and we will see that a similar crew of Afghans was gathered in Taif; Saudi Arabia and had to be put in a prison for a night to agree to who would be their spokesperson. Forget about anything else. In another round, all were pushed inside the most holy building of their religion; Ka’aba where they swore that they will stop bloodshed and signed on their most holy book Quran. When they returned to their homeland, they brought the destruction that surpassed the punishment inflicted by Russians on Afghans. How much trust one can put on a signature on a piece of paper negotiated with an infidel. In the end, this matter will be settled by Afghans and on their own terms and by their own methods. Time will tell whether it will be around the camp fire with legal and religious arguments or settled with long knives. This will determine the future of their next generations.

In view of Pakistan’s precarious economic situation, it has very little room of maneuverability to keep out of anti-Iran block. Pakistan has deep religious connection with holy places of Saudi Arabia as well as dependence on remittances from expatriates living in Saudi Arabia and UAE; the leaders of anti-Iran camp in the Arab world. In contrast, there are no meaningful economic relations with Iran. Iran has deep relations with Pakistan’s archrival India and especially running of anti-Pakistan covert operations from the Iranian port city of Chabahar ticked off army brass. However, Shia Muslims of Pakistan that constitute 10-15 percent of the population have sectarian affinity with Shia Iran as well as deep antipathy towards Saudi Arabia in view of history of sectarian wars on Pakistani soil.

Trump has gathered anti-Iran hawkish crowd in his administration. A conference on Middle East is scheduled in Warsaw February 12-13. It was an anti-Iran conference but with cool reception, it was called conference on Middle East security and stability. Iran was not invited as it was on the menu and not on the guest list. Lebanon and Palestinian Authority boycotted the conference. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made an eight-day tour of the region and kept on the old message that this international conference was to discuss Iran’s regional and international threats. In view of confusion about the agenda as well as deep division in the Middle East as well as Europe, it will be a gala for speeches. However, optics will be bad for the streets of Muslim world where Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be in attendance with foreign ministers of Arab countries for projects conceived by Trump. American presidents have never won any popularity contest in Muslim world, but Trump has broken all the records and I doubt if any future president can match it.

[davidbfpo]

In late 2016, former Pakistani army chief General Raheel Sharif was appointed head of a Saudi inspired Islamic Military Alliance Against Terrorism (IMAT) but widely perceived as a joint front against Iran. It was viewed with concern in Pakistan. Parliament had passed a unanimous resolution against joining in fratricidal wars and the whole exercise was done clandestinely with no discussion on pros and cons of this decision. There was also significant negative opinion inside the armed forces. In view of this negative environment, Raheel kept a very low profile. Suddenly, he landed in Pakistan on 10 February with a delegation of IMAT and had meetings with army chief, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, foreign minister and Senate chairman. If this visit is ground work for a more robust involvement in regional snake pit, then it is not good news for Pakistan. Saudi Crown Prince Price Muhammad Bin Salman will be visiting Pakistan on 17 February and it is expected that he will sign several lucrative economic deals. What is expected of Pakistan has not been spelled out?

Events of last five years with rise of sectarian groups on many battlefields should be note of caution for everyone. Sunni and Shia fighters from Pakistan have joined the fight. Pakistani Salafi fighters joined Daesh in Syria and fought there. Shia from Pakistan were recruited for protection of Shia holy sites in Syria. Pakistani contingent is named Zainabiyuon Brigade while Afghani Shia contingent is named Fatimayoun Brigade. Exact numbers are not known but when these fighters come back home, they will be more lethal than locals for two reasons. First, they are battle hardened from the ferocious fights and more importantly have developed international connections. Tackling them inside Pakistan can be a difficult exercise.

So far Pakistan has cashed on intra-Arab rivalry and milked feuding princes. It has secured loans from Saudi Arabia and UAE as well as some economic benefits from rival Qatar. However, such measures have limits and Pakistan needs to be very careful so that it does not get bruised in this brawl of the Princes.


Pakistan serious economic troubles are forcing it to take some decisions that are desperately needed but can have its own set of consequences. It is important to have informed debate on these issues as well as coordinated effort with saner elements of the civilian government. Otherwise, if army is perceived to be the driver of these foreign policy decisions then it will be blamed for the negative fallout.