Yemen 2016 onwards: an intractable war?

[davidbfpo]

I recently attended an advocacy group meeting on the Yemen, which had a variety of speakers and two UK-based SME made a particular impact. The meeting was under 'Chatham House Rules' so the SME remain anonymous.

Both agreed that the Saudi intervention is becoming their Vietnam, a quagmire where 'The poorest Arab country is being destroyed by the richest'. Yemenis share an Afghan characteristic in rejecting foreigners. The cost of the war is US$5-6 billion per month - this was attributed to a paper by Bruce Reidel. Too many armed group now exist, it is in their interests to continue the war and the Saudi coalition is yet to find competent local partners amongst he mix of tribes, military defectors and others. Since the Arab Spring the Saudis have opposed every change by repression, thir strategic interest in the Yemen is not to have a sovereign, stable nation-state.

Popular support for the intervention has disappeared inside Saudi Arabia and is often seen as inflicting 'severe damage at home and abroad'. Inadvertently the action has opened a public debate in the West over Western support for the Saudis.

So far the Saudi Army has been deployed to the border, with mixed results in fighting intrusions by the Houthi and recent urges of senior officers have put the better equipped National Guard under Army command, which led to rumours of dissent.

The ex-President Saleh led faction, with a good part of the Yemeni military, somehow remains fighting with the Houthi. One factor could be that Saleh's moves to defect from the Houthi coalition became known to the Saudis, but they failed to plan for him actually moving against the Houthi. This failure has been noticed by others.

'AQAP are the main beneficiary of the war' and the Mukalla bank raid, with a US$100m gained will fund them for years.

In 2008 the UAE =based and owned operator, DP World, leased Aden port for twenty years, paying a claimed US8 billion (which was never seen by Yemenis); they promptly closed the port and sacked staff. The contract was subject to negotiations to cancel in 2012. Put simply the UAE has an interest in Aden port not working. In a quick search I found two reports that supports this: https://www.hiiraan.com/op4/2017/apr/141555/lessons_for_somalia_dp_world_in_yemen_and_what_tha t_means_for_somalia.aspx (https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/10/13/a-double-edged-operation-for-uae-in-gulf-of-aden)
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/10/13/a-double-edged-operation-for-uae-in-gulf-of-aden

[davidbfpo]

Helen Lackner is the author of this article, which has a longer title and provides a summary of the situation today. I'd missed a Houthi negotiator is in Oman.

Link:https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/helen-lackner/on-wretched-third-anniversary-of-international-intervention-in-? (https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/helen-lackner/on-wretched-third-anniversary-of-international-intervention-in-?utm_source=Daily+Newsletter&utm_campaign=e3ed679c32-DAILY_NEWSLETTER_MAILCHIMP&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_717bc5d86d-e3ed679c32-407365113)

[davidbfpo]

Part 2 has a little politics, mainly on the support from the USA & UK for the coalition and the remainder is on the humanitarian crisis.
Link:https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/helen-lackner/wretched-third-anniversary-of-international-intervention-in-yem? (https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/helen-lackner/wretched-third-anniversary-of-international-intervention-in-yem?utm_source=Daily+Newsletter&utm_campaign=6fd06da6fb-DAILY_NEWSLETTER_MAILCHIMP&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_717bc5d86d-6fd06da6fb-407365113)

[Azor]

From The Aviationist: https://theaviationist.com/2018/03/26/scary-videos-show-malfunctioning-saudi-patriot-missile-fired-to-intercept-houthi-ballistic-missile-hitting-capital-city-riyadh-instead/


Saudi Patriot PAC-2 SAM battery in Riyadh fired MIM-104C Surface to Air Missiles at a Burkan 2-H SRBM (Short Range Ballistic Missile) in the night between Mar 25 and 26, 2018.

The SRBM was reportedly intercepted by one of the SAMs (at least 7 according to journalist Babak Taghvaee were launched) but at least two of them failed: one hit a resindential area (at the time of writing the number of casualties/fatalities is unknown), whereas another one exploded mid-air shortly after launch.

[AdamG]

Saudi Arabia intercepts 7 missiles fired from Yemen, military officials say


(CNN)Saudi Arabia's air force intercepted seven missiles fired from Yemen on Sunday and, in the debris that rained down on residential suburbs from the interceptions, one man was killed, the Saudis said in a statement.
Coalition forces spokesman Col. Turki Al Maliki said the missiles were fired from Yemen at four target areas, and all the missiles were intercepted and destroyed, according to the statement.
This isn't the first time the kingdom was the target of missile strikes from neighboring Yemen, but it is the first time there's been a fatality on Saudi soil. After previous interceptions, the Saudis responded with airstrikes on the Yemeni capital of Sana'a. The response to a fatal incident such as Sunday's is likely to be even more punishing.
Three were aimed at the capital city of Riyadh, one was headed toward the southwest in Khamis Mushait, one along the southern border targeting Najran and two were headed for the southern city of Jizan.

https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/25/middleeast/saudi-arabia-intercepts-missile/index.html

[Azor]

Saudi Arabia intercepts 7 missiles fired from Yemen, military officials say


https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/25/middleeast/saudi-arabia-intercepts-missile/index.html

That is a rather uncritical regurgitation of Saudi propaganda...

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[CrowBat]

From The Aviationist: https://theaviationist.com/2018/03/26/scary-videos-show-malfunctioning-saudi-patriot-missile-fired-to-intercept-houthi-ballistic-missile-hitting-capital-city-riyadh-instead/
...and both are babbling nonsense (one because it's superficial and sensationalist, the other because of his illusions of grandeur).

During the night from 25 to 26 March 2018 (i.e. on the third anniversary of this war), the Missile Force of the Houthis has fired a number of ballistic missiles and rockets at Saudi Arabia. According to the Houthi-controlled SABA News, missiles used were Burkan-2H, Qaher-2M, and Badr. To make sure:

- Burkan-2Hs are rebuilds of various R-17s and Hwasong-6s imported by Yemen in the 1980s and 1990s (i.e. 'Scud' and North-Korean-made, 'extended range Scud'), then destroyed or damaged by the Saudi-led coalition in March and April 2015. They might contain parts smuggled in from Iran.

- Qaher-2Ms are old V-750 missiles of the well-known, Soviet-made SA-75M (SA-2 Guideline) SAM-system. Yemen has got over 800 of these in the 1970s and 1980s, and they really take no 'rocket science' to be deployed as 'ballistic missiles'.

- Badr (aka Badr-1) seems to be little else but a re-packaged BM-21 and/or BM-27s.

Following launches and/or intercepts have been reported:

- 3 missiles (obviously Burkan-2Hs) were fired at King Khalid IAP in Riyadh; all three were intercepted by MIM-104D/Fs operated by the Royal Saudi Air Defence Force (the RSADF is operating a mix of PAC-2s and PAC-3s).

Burkan-2H (photo from December 2017):
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- 2 missiles (type presently unclear) were fired at Khamis Mushayt, results unknown.

- 1 missile (Qaher-2M) was fired at Najran, and intercepted.

- 1 missile (Qaher-2M) was fired at Abha Regional Airport, and intercepted.

Qaher-2M (photo from early 2016):
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- several rockets (Badr-1) were fired at Jizzan airport 'and other targets' (SABA), results unknown.

Badr-1 (photo from 22 March 2018):
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As far as can be assessed by now, the warhead of one of Burkan-2Hs was intercepted quite low over Riyadh (that's what resulted in the video showing 'fireworks' (https://www.facebook.com/100018250413476/videos/183321775619502/?hc_ref=ARTMMgWcgeCfqKJbYrnrszEUkoSvT0KZXn-nHqp5VNqYXMgB0UEPHJIyqyvP5VkZPX0&pnref=story)): debris and shrapnel did cause quite some material damage. Worst of all: one person (an Egyptian expatriate worker) was killed, and at least two injured.

Furthermore, one of missiles fired by one of several RSADF-operated MIM-104 SAM sites protecting Riyadh, has malfunctioned (https://twitter.com/StratSentinel/status/978013802213060608) and crashed shortly after the launch. This one has hit an empty area (https://twitter.com/3gb_1/status/978019675903754240?s=21), without causing injuries or damage.

Primary problem in engagements of this kind remain these Burkan-2H missiles. They are so poorly manufactured, they are tumbling and falling apart on re-entry (and no: contrary to what various 'experts' and the NYT are reporting, Burkans are neither 'made by Iran', nor containing 'separating warheads': that's science fiction). The PAC-2/3 then targets each big piece with 1-2 missiles. That's why one Burkan-2 usually results in firing of 5-7 Patriot SAMs. In this case, the warhead of one of three Burkan-2H came quite low over Riyadh before it was finally hit (see the video with 'fireworks'). Thus, the shrapnel caused injuries and damage on the ground.

Final word: for all the hatred for the Saudis expressed in the social media, one could still remain sane enough to trust them at least to push the 'auto' button on their PAC-2/3s.

[Azor]

...and both are babbling nonsense (one because it's superficial and sensationalist, the other because of his illusions of grandeur).

Both who?


..As far as can be assessed by now, the warhead of one of Burkan-2Hs was intercepted quite low over Riyadh (that's what resulted in the video showing 'fireworks'): debris and shrapnel did cause quite some material damage. Worst of all: one person (an Egyptian expatriate worker) was killed, and at least two injured.

Furthermore, one of missiles fired by one of several RSADF-operated MIM-104 SAM sites protecting Riyadh, has and crashed shortly after the launch. This one has hit, without causing injuries or damage.

How can you be so sure that it was the Burkan-2H warhead that caused damage and death/injury on the ground and not the errant PAC-2?


...contrary to what various 'experts' and the NYT are reporting, Burkans are neither 'made by Iran', nor containing 'separating warheads': that's science fiction)...Final word: for all the hatred for the Saudis expressed in the social media, one could still remain sane enough to trust them at least to push the 'auto' button on their PAC-2/3s.

Yet it is the Saudis themselves who are blaming Iran for the launch...

I am not anti-Patriot, as that crowd seems to have too much admiration for Russian and Chinese SAMs, despite greater recent US experience, and relatively successful experience at that. Moreover, the Saudis were apparently using PAC-2s rather than PAC-3s.

However, I thought that you would have posted here first about this event, and I thought that you of all people would appreciate the meme...

[Azor]

According to Twitter user @YemeniObserv , Yemeni (ostensibly Houthi) air defenses struck two UAE F-16s.

Source: https://twitter.com/YemeniObserv/status/978702442681561088

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[CrowBat]

Both who?'The Aviationist' & Taghvae.


How can you be so sure that it was the Burkan-2H warhead that caused damage and death/injury on the ground and not the errant PAC-2?
What can you see on this video (I've posted the link above): https://twitter.com/3gb_1/status/978019675903754240?s=21

...a Patriot hitting some densely-populated place?


Yet it is the Saudis themselves who are blaming Iran for the launch...Yes, like they always do - and although their own 'evidence' is proving them wrong, all the time.

No clue why do they still insist on that legend.

[Azor]

"Few hours ago, Houthi rebels tried to shoot down a UAE Air Force's F-16E Block 60 over Sanaa, Yemen by means of R-27T air to air missile launched from ground platform but they failed simply because the F-16 pilot launched flares."

Source: https://twitter.com/BabakTaghvaee/status/978761073078734854

[Azor]

'The Aviationist' & Taghvae.


What can you see on this video (I've posted the link above): https://twitter.com/3gb_1/status/978019675903754240?s=21

...a Patriot hitting some densely-populated place?

Yes, like they always do - and although their own 'evidence' is proving them wrong, all the time.

No clue why do they still insist on that legend.

Yet you collaborated once with Taghvae, no? Is the town not big enough ;)

To be honest, I can't tell what is the Patriot and what is the Burkan from the videos, but the video you linked to shows a smaller warhead than the "fireworks" one, which would suggest a Patriot interceptor.

Perhaps they are making the Houthis larger than life because the campaign has been harder than they imagined?

[CrowBat]

Yet you collaborated once with Taghvae, no? Is the town not big enough ;)I tried to cooperate with both of them over the time, just like I always try to cooperate and support sincere research through networking.

(That's, between others, why I'm meanwhile working as series-editor for four of Helion's @War book-series and helping with about 30 different projects covering diverse conflicts since 1945.)

Sadly, it turned out one is horny for sensations, and the other not only prefers to fantasise along his illusions of grandeur, but is foremost a vocal proponent of specific supremacist ideas.

#### happens, as they say: 2 on the 'minus side', 25+ on the 'plus side'...


To be honest, I can't tell what is the Patriot and what is the Burkan from the videos, but the video you linked to shows a smaller warhead than the "fireworks" one, which would suggest a Patriot interceptor. Well, if a video taken in Saudi Arabia shows a missile being launched, turning around and then crashing next to the place where it was fired, it could be that the conclusion is on hand: that's no Burkan-2H.

[Azor]

I tried to cooperate with both of them over the time, just like I always try to cooperate and support sincere research through networking.

(That's, between others, why I'm meanwhile working as series-editor for four of Helion's @War book-series and helping with about 30 different projects covering diverse conflicts since 1945.)

Sadly, it turned out one is horny for sensations, and the other not only prefers to fantasise along his illusions of grandeur, but is foremost a vocal proponent of specific supremacist ideas.

#### happens, as they say: 2 on the 'minus side', 25+ on the 'plus side'...

Interesting. I still believe that your location has spelled "Clapsback, Snarkland" wrong... ;)

I see that you cover Arab air force performance during Yom Kippur 1973, however, have you written much on IDF-IAF vs. SAM performance during the War of Attrition and in 1973? What of Falklands 1982?

[CrowBat]

Well, I certainly do not like being repeatedly plagiarised by somebody who tends to sensationalise superficial info - and then declares me for arrogant when I complain.

Anyway, re. 'IDF/AF vs SAMs': you might want to check this one (https://www.amazon.com/Arab-MiGs-Attrition-War-1967-1973/dp/0985455411) (something like a 'review' of what can be found there, is available towards the bottom of the thread here (https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/81tjg5/why_has_soviet_tech_preformed_so_badly_in_the/)). A more in-depth study is to follow the next year.

'Falklands' is kind of 'interesting to read about, but not interesting to research' from my POV: there are people in far better position to research and write about that topic.

[CrowBat]

Back to the topic - and from: Yemen’s Terrorism Barrier (http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/75588) - comes the best explanation for the crucial failure of the US, Western in general, but the Russian and so many other failures in the 30+ years of 'War on Terror' (of course, officially declared 'only' in 2001):

Crucial points:


Nadwa al-Dawsari discusses her recent Carnegie article on relations between tribes and Al-Qa‘eda in Bayda governorate.
...

Michael Young: You recently wrote an article for Carnegie titled “Our Common Enemy: Ambiguous Ties Between al-Qaeda and Yemen’s Tribes.” What was your main argument in the article?

Nadwa al-Dawsari: My main argument was that tribes are not in bed with Al-Qa‘eda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), as is often perceived. On the contrary, tribes have played a critical role in preventing AQAP from establishing a strong presence in the country and I gave an example from Bayda governorate. I argue that tribes still see AQAP as a threat but have come to tolerate the presence of the terrorist group during the war because they—the tribes and AQAP—have a common enemy in the Houthis. The essence of my argument is that for as long as the tribes are forced to push the Houthis outside their areas, they will not be able to keep AQAP at bay as they did before the war.

MY: How extensive is AQAP’s integration into tribal culture, so that it’s difficult to isolate the group from tribal society?

ND: The common narrative among Yemen analysts is that tribes are armed, violent, lawless, and anti-state. This perception has often led people to believe that tribes offer a welcoming environment to AQAP. This perception is also quite common among urban Yemeni elites who look down on tribes and see them as “uncivilized.” In reality, tribes are far from lawless and they are governed by customary law, a very sophisticated and well-developed system that helped them deal with conflict and maintain order over the centuries until today.

Just because the tribes are armed, it doesn’t mean they are violent. Yemeni tribes have arms, but they also have rules and customs that regulate the use of arms so that they don’t cause harm to tribal communities. Today, a tribal area such as Ma’rib, which has historically had an abundance of arms and a limited state presence, is relatively stable and safe, compared to Ta‘iz and Aden that had little arms before the war and are now devastated by violence and internal conflicts. The difference is that tribes have rules to govern the use of arms. Urban areas don’t.

Also, tribes resolve conflicts through mediation and peaceful conflict-resolution mechanisms. They rarely resort to violence and only do so when faced with a direct threat to their existence or when they want to defend their territories. What AQAP stands for—the ideology, the violence, the desire to undermine the state’s presence—goes against the essence of tribal culture and customary law.
...

MY: How would you judge the role of the United States in trying to contain AQAP in Yemen? Has it been effective, or has it made matters worse?

ND: I think if U.S. counterterrorism operations were effective we wouldn’t have sees AQAP still present in Yemen today. The U.S. has relied on short-term security operations in Yemen, rather than focusing on the underlying causes that allowed AQAP to expand. The drones have indeed killed most AQAP leaders in the country, but the group is hardly defeated. The U.S. provided military support to the late Ali Abdullah Saleh to fight AQAP. But Saleh was not serious about fighting the group and instead used it to undermine his political opponents and maintain a steady flow of counterterrorism assistance from the West. This, in turn, made him a stronger dictator, which fueled the grievances that AQAP tapped into to spread and gain influence in the country.
...


...which in turn means also that:

- the Saudi policy of depending on ideology-driven groups (like Moslem Brotherhood, various Salafist movements etc.) for regaining influence in Yemen, is as wrong as that of the USA, but,

- overall war effort against the Houthis is the right decision, simply because the Houthis have completely destroyed the tribal structure in northern central Yemen (just like the Marxists did the same in southern eastern Yemen of the 1970s-1980s); while,

- the Emirati strategy of cooperating with local tribes might appear as 'wrongdoing', and 'supporting separatists', but is the key to success.

[davidbfpo]

The article asks:
But are the Iranians really behind these, or are they modified missiles from North Korean in origin?

I think this is a key passage:
In this article I take a closer look at the Burkan 2-H and how its increased performance was achieved. I do this using computer simulations of ballistic missile trajectories, with missile parameters based on properties of the Scud from open sources and an analysis of photographs and a launch video. The simulations confirm the similarities with the Iranian missile: a Scud-variant with the size and initial acceleration of the Burkan 2-H can only fly from Northwest Yemen to Riyadh if it carries as much propellant as the Qiam-1. Other versions of the Scud do not fit the data.

(Ends with) All in all, even without a detailed forensic investigation of the wreckage, it seems unlikely these missiles originate from anywhere other than Iran.

The author is Ralph Savelsberg is an associate professor at the Netherlands Defense Academy in Den Helder, specializing in missile defense.
Link:https://breakingdefense.com/2018/05/houthi-missiles-the-iran-connection-scuds-are-not-dead-yet/

[Azor]

From "Proving Ground: Iran’s Operational Strategy in Syria" by Nicholas Hargreaves-Heald (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/proving-ground-irans-operational-strategy-syria):


Following the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, Iran began to provide extensive aid to the Houthis, a group of Zaidi Shi’ites from the mountains of Yemen who were engaged in a civil war with the Yemeni government and the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). By 2016, the Houthis had seized a significant amount of Yemeni territory, including ground bordering Saudi Arabia. Iranian support, which was intended to develop the Houthis into a massive security threat to Saudi Arabia, followed the classic Quds Force TAA formula. Iranian training (which continues today[30]) has reached thousands of Houthi rebels[31], including Houthi women who have been mobilized to fight invading GCC forces.[32] Interestingly, this training has largely been provided by Iranian proxy organizations, such as Lebanese Hezbollah[33] and Liwa Fatemiyoun, a group of Afghan Hazaras recruited from Afghan refugee camps in Iran. [34] Iranian military aid to the Houthis has included sniper rifles, RPGs, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and various small arms, in addition to more sophisticated weapons technology. American officials have assessed that Iran has provided the Houthis with short-range, Iranian made Qiam and Shahab-2 ballistic missiles to attack Saudi Arabia, Iran’s principal adversary in the Arabian peninsula.[35] The Houthis have launched dozens of these missiles (and others based on their design) at Saudi targets such as the al-Yamama Palace (December 2017)[36], the city of Najran (March 2018)[37], the capital city of Riyadh (March 2018)[38], and the Jizan Regional Airport (April 2018).[39] Authorities have also assessed that Quds Force provided the technology for the Houthi’s explosive, remote-controlled “drone boat”, which they used to attack a Saudi warship on January 30, 2017[40], and the use of an explosive-laden Qasef-1 “suicide” drone to attack a Saudi Patriot batteries in February, 2017.[41] On top of this, Quds Force has been reported to advise Houthi leaders off the battlefield, and encourage them to launch kinetic operations against GCC targets. [42]

There are, however, some indications that Iranian operations within Yemen are not limited to Quds Force’s standard TAA approach. Over the course of the last year, over forty IRGC (it is unclear whether these are Quds Force or IRGC-GF operatives) and dozens of Hezbollah casualties have been reported in Yemen.[43] While many of these casualties have been reported as the result of GCC airstrikes against Houthi targets far behind the front lines, almost a dozen have been reported to take place within a mile of active combat zones and front lines. Such casualties would suggest that Iranian forces are either actively participating in combat in Yemen or advising Houthi rebels close to the battlefield.[44] So far, however, there has only been limited evidence to support this hypothesis.[45]

[AdamG]

DUBAI: The Saudi-led Arab Coalition targeted Iran-backed Houthi militia positions along the western coast of Yemen, Saudi state-news agency SPA reported.
Yemen’s official news agency reported that the coalition raids killed 70 Houthi militants as Yemeni resistance forces advanced toward Hodeidah airport and harbor.
It was also reported that 21 militants were captured, while Houthi weapons and military vehicles were destroyed in the raids.

http://www.arabnews.com/node/1314641/middle-east

[davidbfpo]

A useful map and chronology via AEI.
Link:http://https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/2018-red-sea-coast-offensive

The Soufan Group has a 47 pg. report 'The Forgotten War: The Ongoing Disaster in Yemen'.
Link:http://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Report-The-Forgotten-War-The-Ongoing-Disaster-in-Yemen-The-Soufan-Center.pdf

[davidbfpo]

Two experts provide some answers; with Gregory Johnsen and Fatima Abo Alasrar, from the Arabia Foundation.
Link:http://www.arabiafoundation.org/arabia-comment/the-battle-for-hodeidah-two-views-on-whats-at-stake/

[AdamG]

Arab states launch biggest assault of Yemen war with attack on main port
Reuters / Wednesday, 13 June 2018 10:40 GMT

* Saudi-led coalition launches attack on Yemen's main port
* Houthis say they hit coalition barge
* Port is main route to feed 8.4 million on verge of famine (Adds resident quotes, port activity, context)

http://news.trust.org/item/20180613090136-veud3

[davidbfpo]

As the media focus returns to Hudaydah, the key port for food supplies, this BBC News article has a map (too large to insert) on the current situation in the Yemen.
Link to a background article:https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-44471977 andhttps://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-44491710

[davidbfpo]

A summary of a recent AQAP statement via BBC Monitoring (no link is provided to the original source):
Al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQAP) has released a lengthy interview with its leading figure Khalid Batarfi, commenting on various aspects of the conflict in Yemen and the jihadist group's current position and future plans. The written interview conducted by AQAP's media arm al-Malahim was published on 20 June via AQAP's media outlet on the messaging app Telegram. Batarfi has been the face of AQAP since most of the group's top figures, including its former leader, died in US drone strikes in 2015.
Link:https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c1dpdb8k

Presumably there are clues within for the expert and reader.

[davidbfpo]

Via a Tweet by Michael Knights, with my emphasis:
Lots of fronts operating right now. I would expect airpower to be ramping up a lot, and artillery support. It is not the sleepy optempo we had even three months ago. Elements of six Saudi Land Forces, SANG, naval and border brigades operating inside Yemen now.
Link see:@Mikeknightsiraq (https://twitter.com/Mikeknightsiraq)

[Azor]

Stratfor Situation Report: https://worldview.stratfor.com/situation-report/yemen-houthis-hit-saudi-oil-tanker?utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=article


Houthi forces in Yemen who claimed to be targeting a Saudi warship struck a Saudi oil tanker in the RedSea, causing slight damage.

Why It Matters: Because attacks on oil tankers often alarm the international community, the incident could give the Saudi-led coalition a new justification for military action in Yemen.

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For Background:

Stratfor Assessment: Missiles Remain a Potent Houthi Weapon (https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/missiles-remain-potent-houthi-weapon?utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=article)



Despite continuous pressure from Saudi-led air operations, Houthi and Saleh loyalists in Yemen continue to pose a threat using ballistic missiles.
It appears that local engineers have been able to modify ballistic missiles to increase their capabilities, and continue to have access to stockpiles to further their activities.
There are no indications that rebels are near the indigenous production of missile systems, however. At this point Houthi and Saleh missile capabilities remain entirely dependent on existing stockpiles and foreign supply.

[AdamG]

Here we go again with the opening monologue from the ROAD WARRIOR (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9n29c-q3_8Q) playing over the evening news.


DUBAI (Reuters) - Saudi Arabia said on Thursday it was suspending oil shipments through the Red Sea’s Bab al-Mandeb strait, one of the world’s most important tanker routes, after Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis attacked two ships in the waterway.

https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-yemen-security/saudi-arabia-halts-oil-exports-in-red-sea-lane-after-houthi-attacks-idUKKBN1KF0WN

[davidbfpo]

A short paper (19 pgs) by Elisabeth Kendall, a SME on the Yemen and who has visited parts recently. The Summary explains:
Regional conflict and internal chaos have allowed militant jihadi groups to rise and flourish in Yemen. This paper analyzes two f the most prominent such groups, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State in Yemen (ISY), by scrutinizing the factors that led to their respective ascents, and examining the challenges and pressures that have caused their respective declines. By comparing and contrasting their operations, respective styles of leadership, and varying levels of community integration, this paper charts the path of jihadi militancy in Yemen and assesses its future in Yemeni politics and society.

Link:https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/MEI%20Policy%20Paper_Kendall_7.pdf

[davidbfpo]

Hardly a surprise, this AP report covers several places in the Yemen.
Link:https://apnews.com/f38788a561d74ca78c77cb43612d50da

[AdamG]

Saudis intercept Al Houthi missile Al Houthis have launched 176 ballistic missiles towards the kingdom so far

Riyadh: Saudi Arabia’s Royal Air Defence Forces intercepted a ballistic missile launched by Iranian-backed Al Houthi militia towards the kingdom, the Arab coalition command said in a statement. No injuries or casualties were reported.

https://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/yemen/saudis-intercept-al-houthi-missile-1.2267700

[AdamG]

Report to Congress on Yemen Civil War
August 28, 2018 8:03 AM

The following is the Aug. 24, 2018 Congressional Research Service report, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention.

From the report
This report provides information on the ongoing crisis in Yemen. Now in its fourth year, the war in Yemen shows no signs of abating. On June 12, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition, a multinational grouping of armed forces led primarily by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), launched Operation Golden Victory, with the aim of retaking the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah. The coalition also has continued to conduct air strikes inside Yemen. The war has killed thousands of Yemenis, including combatants as well as civilians, and has significantly damaged the country’s infrastructure. According to the United Nations (U.N.) High Commissioner for Human Rights, from the start of the conflict in March 2015 through August 9, 2018, the United Nations documented “a total of 17,062 civilian casualties – 6,592 dead and 10,470 injured.” This figure may vastly underestimate the war’s death toll.

https://news.usni.org/2018/08/28/report-congress-yemen-civil-war

[AdamG]

WASHINGTON — U.S. Navy sailors seized more than 1,000 AK-47s from a small, disabled boat in the Gulf of Aden this week after boarding the vessel to determine its nation of origin, service officials said Thursday.

Sailors aboard the guided-missile destroyer USS Jason Dunham on Monday observed unmarked packages being transferred onto a skiff from a small, masted sailing vessel, known as a "dhow." U.S. sailors boarded the craft Tuesday to investigate, according to Navy officials. The skiff was sailing in international waters near Yemen without flying a country’s flag and determined to be “stateless,” the officials said.

https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/navy-seizes-1-000-ak-47s-after-boarding-stateless-vessel-near-yemen-1.545177

[davidbfpo]

This is a 'long read' via CTC, by Michael Knights who has visited the Houthi areas and is an interesting read on how they fight, not the fighting itself.

The Abstract:
Abstract: The Houthi rebels have been at war with the Yemeni government almost constantly since 2004. In the first six years, the Houthis fought an increasingly effective guerrilla war in their mountainous home provinces, but after 2010, they metamorphosed into the most powerful military entity in the country, capturing the three largest cities in Yemen. The Houthis quickly fielded advanced weapons they had never before controlled, including many of Iranian origin. The story of how they moved from small-arms ambushes to medium-range ballistic missiles in half a decade provides a case study of how an ambitious militant group can capture and use a state’s arsenals and benefit from Iran’s support.
Link:https://ctc.usma.edu/houthi-war-machine-guerrilla-war-state-capture/

[davidbfpo]

An article in Newsweek and for once Eastern Yemen, the province known as Hadramawt, with the the port city of Mukulla is the focus.
Link:https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-approach-to-yemen-is-challenged-as-country-splinters-and-government-vanishes/2018/09/21/93470fc6-b6ae-11e8-ae4f-2c1439c96d79_story.html?

[davidbfpo]

Via Lawfare Gregory D. Johnsen, a SME; the Editor's foreword:
The war in Yemen has gone from bad to worse, leaving tens of thousands dead and hundreds of thousands of civilians at risk from disease and malnutrition. The war's complexity rivals its brutality, with a dizzying array of actors with discreet and shifting agendas. Gregory Johnsen of the Arabia Foundation describes the three wars Yemen is facing: the struggle against terrorism, the civil war, and the regional struggle encompassing Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran. Each has its own dynamics, and together they are shattering Yemen.

He ends with:
There is, simply put, no longer a single Yemen. There are multiple Yemens and no single individual or group capable of re-uniting them into a coherent whole. Yemen has too many groups with too many guns to ever be a unified state again. The civil war, which has taken a back seat to the regional conflict over the past three years, will eventually resume at full force. And when it does, the fighting it produces will be bloody and protracted.
Link:https://www.lawfareblog.com/yemens-three-wars

[davidbfpo]

Via WoTR Gregory D. Johnsen has a short commentary on AQAP, it ends with:
Contrary to the picture painted by the numbers, AQAP is the weakest it has ever been. Decimated by drone strikes and challenged by rivals, its international terrorist side is a shadow of its former self. Only its domestic insurgency side — bolstered by Yemen’s messy war — is growing. If this side can be reduced and contained, AQAP can be defeated. But if it is allowed to remain and continue to grow, the group may be able to resurrect the international side of its organization and become a global terrorist threat once more.
Link:https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/the-two-faces-of-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula/

[AdamG]

Thirty-five Yemeni and international NGOs called Wednesday for an "immediate cessation of hostilities" in Yemen, where they warned 14 million people were now "on the brink of famine".

The joint appeal was signed by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Action Against Hunger, CARE International, Oxfam, Doctors of the World, and Yemeni organisations, according to a statement.

"With 14 million men, women and children on the brink of famine -- half the country's population -- there has never been a more urgent time to act," the statement said.



Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/afp/2018/11/yemen-conflict-aid.html#ixzz5WI0x4U2g

[davidbfpo]

An article from Lawfare by a SME, although the focus is Yemen there is a wider application. Daniel Byman as Editor adds:
...it has lessons for similar efforts when allies wage "limited" wars. Far from being an efficient, low-cost use of resources, Rand argues that these wars are not likely to achieve the results Washington wants, yet will implicate the United States in whatever goes wrong.
Link:https://www.lawfareblog.com/extricating-united-states-yemen-lessons-strategic-perils-partnered-operations

[davidbfpo]

Fascinating commentary on the Yemeni conflict and the role of the Sudan - mercenaries for the coalition - which is fraught with problems. The sub-title is a reminder of the past:
The Saudis and UAE bribed Sudan's president to send Janjaweed fighters to be cannon fodder in Yemen. It's not working out.
Link:https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/saudi-arabias-blood-pact-with-a-genocidal-strongman-houthis-bashir-sudan-yemen-uae/

Now just why a 'conservative' website would carry this I know not.

[davidbfpo]

A refreshing, first-hand account of a visit to the front line near Hodeida by two German reporters. Here is a "taster" passage:
What is currently taking place in Yemen can hardly be described as a fight between a government and insurgents. That would require a functioning state with an army and an internationally recognized government. But none of that exists any longer. Exile President Hadi can't even fly to Aden without obtaining Saudi Arabia's permission. He's little more than a fig leaf for the proxy war Saudi Arabia and the UAE are waging on Yemeni soil against their archenemy Iran, which backs the Houthi rebels.

Link:http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/war-and-pestilence-the-ongoing-fragmentation-of-yemen-a-1243730.html

[davidbfpo]

Recommended by a "lurker" as an excellent reporter; Ghaith Abdul-Ahad. It is a 'long read' and is based on what is happening in Aden. He is not complimentary about the UAE's role and their local allies - who appear to be more akin to bandits.
Link:https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/21/yemen-uae-united-arab-emirates-profiting-from-chaos-of-civil-war?

[AdamG]

Washington (CNN)The terrorist behind the 2000 attack on the USS Cole is believed to have been killed in a US airstrike in Yemen on Tuesday, according to a US administration official. Jamel Ahmed Mohammed Ali Al-Badawi was an al Qaeda operative who the US believes helped orchestrate the October 12, 2000, attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 American sailors.
The official said all intelligence indicators show al-Badawi was killed in a strike in Yemen as a result of a joint US military and intelligence operation.

https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/04/politics/uss-cole-al-badawi-killed/index.html?no-st=1546725552

[davidbfpo]

An article (10 pgs) from the free, online journal Perspectives on Terrorism, by Elisabeth Kendall, a SME from Oxford University, who has been on the ground in the Yemen.
Link:https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2019/issue-1/kendall.pdf

[davidbfpo]

Via Lawfare and the Editor's Note explains:
Yemen’s war, the world’s deadliest active conflict, has no end in sight. Many of its chief protagonists—including the Houthis, whose ties to Iran and hostility to U.S. allies put them at the center of the conflict—are not well understood. Sama’a al-Hamdani, the director of the Yemen Cultural Institute for Heritage and the Arts, does a deep dive on the Houthis. She details their goals and divisions, as well as how they might be induced to join Yemen’s nascent peace process.
Link:https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-houthi-faction-yemen

[davidbfpo]

Nervous of the crisis in the Gulf or the beginning of the end for the UAE role in the Yemeni Civil War? Now six days ago Reuters reported:
The United Arab Emirates, a key member of the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen, is scaling back its military presence there as worsening U.S.-Iran tensions threaten security closer to home, four western diplomatic sources said.
Link:https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-exclusive/exclusive-uae-scales-down-military-presence-in-yemen-as-gulf-tensions-flare-idUSKCN1TT14B

Followed up since, notably this in WINEP commentary. Here is a "taster":
In short, the UAE argues that its drawdown is not just because of war fatigue, but also because its mission is largely complete in the south, and the conflict with the Houthis is now in the hands of UN negotiators rather than coalition military forces. Outside observers are often less generous in their view of the UAE’s decisions and efforts, however.
Link:https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/uae-drawdown-in-yemen-may-isolate-saudi-arabia

Incidentally another military partner, Sudan, may have to review its reported fourteen thousand strong commitment, given the issues back home as the military hold onto power.