CAP in Iraq?

[LawVol]

I've read a few posts here that mention the Combined Action Program from Vietnam and I started wondering whether it could work in Iraq. So here's the question: Would a CAP program work in Iraq now? If not, could it have worked at some point after the fall of Baghdad?

It seems to me that it wouldn't work now because the insurgency is too entrenched. But could it have worked right after OIF I?

Could this progam have been combined with some sort of law enforcement program to instill and maintain law and order? I'd be interested in your thoughts?

[Old Eagle]

Without re-hashing the criticality the local population plays in COIN or playing the woulda, coulda, shoulda game, let me say that there is movement in the area of joint military-civilian action teams in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In AF, the original PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team) concept has matured over the years and provides a possible model for other environments. In Iraq, PRT is again on the table. There has been a lot of back and forth in the interagency arena over who ought to be doing what. In my mind, civilian experts need to be part of the advisory effort so that the Iraqis can assume more of the responsibility for their own destiny, sooner rather than later.

[Stan]

Evening LawVol !

I have tours almost everywhere, but never Iraq. 3 rotations in Afghanistan if that even matters, but our missions were different. Armed yes, but not there for a fight, rather clean up missions.

That said, I think a CAP would have helped the people who needed or wanted such a program, but I sincerely believe other elements and insurgents could have cared less.

To quote LTC William Corson from one of many USMC Vietnam era CAPs:
"Vietnamese people in some of the CAP hamlets still, twenty five plus years after-the-fact, hold annual memorial services for the young men who died to keep them and their children free."

CAP soldiers spent a lot of time learning not only cultural idiosyncracies in order to live among the Vietnamese, but at the same time, not offending them by ignoring their centuries old culture.

This is nothing new. The Army and DIA pounded this into our heads in the early 80's. Somebody was obviously paying attention to lessons learned.

Based on my experiences in Sub-Sahara and now Estonia, spending a little time learning the 'other's culture' helps out...so long as they care or even want it.

I don't think those who want our help in Iraq and Afghanistan have the courage to accept our help, be it a CAP or a newly built mosque.

Well, we all know what an opinion is :D

[Jimbo]

Iraq isn't ready yet. Unless, you want to wind-up on an internet site in a movie, if you catch my drift. (2X Tours in Iraq)

[Loggie]

Iraq isn't ready yet. Unless, you want to wind-up on an internet site in a movie, if you catch my drift. (2X Tours in Iraq)

Jimbo, I'll grant you that parts of Iraq may not be ready yet (read: most municipal areas south of Mosul/Irbil) but when you head out to some of the tribal areas which had been leaning toward the dark side in 2005-2006, there are pockets of absolute brilliance to behold. A key example is al Qaim (see story below) which is strikingly similar to the CAP program in Vietnam.

Insurgency grows quickly because it feeds on hopelessness and insecurity--it appeals to the lowest common denominators. Effective COIN is never fast, but with a solid mix of security , CA, and indigenous investment it tends to grow deeper roots than insurgency because it provides a survivable future for the population as a whole.

GD

Analysis: Al Qaim is island of stability
By PAMELA HESS
UPI Pentagon Correspondent

HUSAYBA, Iraq, March 7 (UPI) -- Al-Qaim is an oasis of stability in the chaos of Iraq. But it was not always this way.

This region on the western border of Iraq -- literally a stone's throw to Syria -- used to be what the U.S. Marines call "the Wild West." It was violent, out of control, and for awhile firmly in the grips in al-Qaida in Iraq and other Islamist insurgent groups.

Now, however, the markets are full; people are walking, shopping and building new homes, at least in Husayba, the major city in the area, and the surrounding villages south of the Euphrates River.

For the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, it is proof the tenets in the U.S. military's counterinsurgency manual published last year actually works.

That manual discusses how to win the low-intensity, long, small wars expected to characterize most conflicts the United States will engage in in the foreseeable future. At its heart, it counsels soldiers to win the loyalty and cooperation of the local people. It emphasizes restraint when dealing with civilians, precision when fighting insurgents, and jumpstarting the economy and political life, and helping provide basic services like water and power.

All of those efforts has been underway for years in al-Qaim, but it was not what made the difference. What changed was that the "terrorists" -- the term al-Qaim Mayor Farhan Tehad Farhan uses to describe the alliance of local fighters and foreign jihadists -- turned their guns and knives on the local people.

Farhan admits that when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, the residents of al-Qaim happily cooperated with the insurgents.

Camp Gannon, a small U.S. base in Husayba, sits at the end of Market Street.

"It was a gunfight all the way through. Sometimes they had to aerial resupply Camp Gannon because you just couldn't get a vehicle through," said Lt. Col. Scott Shuster, commander of the 3rd battalion, 4th Marine Regiment. "Gannon was Fort Apache."

"At first the Iraqi people were dealing with coalition forces as occupiers," said Farhan in his office in downtown Husayba. "The terrorist came to al-Qaim to fight the coalition forces, or the occupiers. After a while they exposed themselves by fighting the people of Iraq. They began killing Iraqi army and Iraqi people. They lost the support of the people. After that the people began to fight the al-Qaida members.

"We as people now deal with coalition forces and the Iraqi army a lot, because now we know what the terrorists are like. If they come here they will kill the innocent people. Now if you talk to any coalition forces they can tell you how much we cooperate with them," Farhan said.

If the experience of al-Qaim could be bottled and spread to the rest of Iraq, the key ingredient is the brutality of the adversary.

Had al-Qaida in Iraq, the organization presumed to be behind most of the terrorist activity in the town, not overplayed its hand, al-Qaim might still be the same killing ground for U.S. forces it was between 2003 and 2006.

But the last three years of restraint and dogged courtship of al-Qaim by a series of American units -- as well as their firepower -- set the stage for the locals to turn to them when they could no longer stand the murders and kidnappings.

That came in April 2005 when the 22 tribes in the region banded together to oust the terrorists, Farhan said. They were initially successful, but the insurgents regrouped, recruited additional fighters from Mosul and Ramadi and came at al-Qaim with a vengeance in September 2005.

"They were hoping to build an Islamic country in al-Qaim," Farhan said.

The insurgents had erected a sign near Husayba proclaiming it to be the Islamic Republic of al-Qaim, according to Shuster.

"These terrorists are really far from Islamic thoughts They pretend they are Muslims but they are so far from Islam because they are a bunch of killers and criminals," he said.

Abul Mahal, the main tribe in the area had for hundreds of years profited from all trade -- legal and otherwise -- at al-Qaim, had been pushed out of power.

That was when the tribes approached the U.S. Marines stationed in al-Qaim. If they would help rout the terrorists, the sheiks would set up a representative government and provide the seed corn for a police force, also representative of the tribes.

Al-Qaim paid a high price for initial embrace of the insurgency and then its decision to fight them.

According to Farhan, terrorists killed 749 people and gravely wounded 340. More than 6,250 houses were damaged in the fighting; 431 of them were razed to the ground. More than 400 shops were destroyed and 624 vehicles were damaged. These were not damaged by U.S. action but by the insurgents. Farhan keeps a careful inventory because he is seeking $67,071,415 from the Iraqi government to compensate the people for their losses.

Operation Steel Curtain took place in November 2005, a major offensive that ousted the terrorists and saturated the area with U.S. and Iraqi forces. It was "cleared," in the parlance of counterinsurgency doctrine, and then it was "held," through persistence presence. Having won a tactical victory over the locals by beating off the terrorists, they began the "build" phase, empowering local councils, sheiks and mayors with funding and projects to restore essential services and repair schools and clinics.

Shuster knows al-Qaida is not beaten, but he thinks there has been a change in the way the organization views al-Qaim strategically.

"I think al-Qaida in Iraq is in a lull here," said Shuster. "I think al-Qaida thinks the decisive battle is gonna be closer to Baghdad. They think al-Qaim is an area they must transit. But al-Qaida does not think they need to or should exert too many resources here that could be better applied closer to Baghdad."

Ironically, having something approaching normalcy and stability in al-Qaim -- the victory sought by counterinsurgent tactics -- makes finding al Qaida as it transits the area is much more difficult.

"Heavy-handed tactics like locking down an entire neighborhood and searching house to house, it doesn't work here anymore." Shuster said.

[Loggie]

Without re-hashing the criticality the local population plays in COIN or playing the woulda, coulda, shoulda game, let me say that there is movement in the area of joint military-civilian action teams in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In AF, the original PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team) concept has matured over the years and provides a possible model for other environments. In Iraq, PRT is again on the table. There has been a lot of back and forth in the interagency arena over who ought to be doing what. In my mind, civilian experts need to be part of the advisory effort so that the Iraqis can assume more of the responsibility for their own destiny, sooner rather than later.

OE--Can we make this happen without REALLY robusting our civil affairs capability? Civilians are great to have as subj matter experts, but USAID doesn't do so well when there are still bullets flying about. I'm a believer in civil affairs (lawyers, judges, hospital administrators, teachers, civil engineers, etc--in uniform, with weapons) being the logical partner in an action like Iraq, where we not only toppled the regime but de-Baathified the government (leaving "who" to run the government?) In post WWII Germany we realized that we needed a few "Nazis of convenience" to ensure a faster return to normalcy, and we had a HUGE army of occupation to ensure as smooth as possible transition back to peace. My opinion: our gap in Iraq is that the occupation is too small and the rebuilding too haphazard.

[tequila]

Let's not forget the critical role played by the Soviet Army in our occupation of Germany --- the Germans in our areas could look at the Russian occupation zone and see that things could be much, much worse. Resistance was futile in any case, but even if they had managed to eject Western occupiers they would only trade one foreign occupation for a far harsher one by their main enemy, the Russians.

[Maximus]

Great discussion.

Concur on the potential and proven benefit of CAP-type concept (i.e., US Marines/Soldiers pairing with indigenous forces and moving in among the people) in the Al Qaim AO. I've talked to many Marines that served in 3/6, at the platoon level, and they have nothing but great things to say about why the strategy worked and has changed the landscape in what used to be known as the "Wild West" for good.

A very similar CAP to that executed in Vietnam worked very well in Haditha back in spring 2004 (see http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/07/04/MNG4T7GMRL1.DTL). Problem came when CAP Marines were pulled for Fallujah I and then again for Fallujah II. This left the young and inexperienced police force alone to fight the insurgents. 19 Iraqi Police were subsequently hanged in Haditha's athletic stadium and then Al Qaeda in Iraq moved in. It's taken subsequent Marine units almost 3 years to re-build any level of trust back with the people in Haditha.

Also, Stars & Stripes has run multiple articles over the past months on how a CAP-type concept has significantly changed the situation in Ramadi (see http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=43042&archive=true). While Ramadi's not the nicest place on earth today, many parts in the N and away from central South have seen drastic improvements due to clear-hold (move in among people)-build. Similar in so many ways to CAP in Vietnam.

I've made my Marines read "Bing" West's The Village for the past year or so in preparation for Iraq. Attached are the focus questions that I give them beforehand and the answers that I use when leading the discussion group.

Please share thoughts.

[120mm]

OE--Can we make this happen without REALLY robusting our civil affairs capability? Civilians are great to have as subj matter experts, but USAID doesn't do so well when there are still bullets flying about. I'm a believer in civil affairs (lawyers, judges, hospital administrators, teachers, civil engineers, etc--in uniform, with weapons) being the logical partner in an action like Iraq, where we not only toppled the regime but de-Baathified the government (leaving "who" to run the government?) In post WWII Germany we realized that we needed a few "Nazis of convenience" to ensure a faster return to normalcy, and we had a HUGE army of occupation to ensure as smooth as possible transition back to peace. My opinion: our gap in Iraq is that the occupation is too small and the rebuilding too haphazard.

Loggie, your comments on a "robust" CA strike a chord with me. We need to seek out and find the more militant folks in soft skills (you'd be surprised how many doctors and lawyers I met in Iraq who wanted to take an M16 and "do their part" in combat) and the more creative thinkers in combat arms and roll them together into a coagulated "Civil Action Force". Arm them to the extent to where they could hold off a Level III threat for long enough to call in the Cavalry, and give them the mission of "making peace" in an area rather than "making war".

[LawVol]

Loggie and 120mm are in line with the idea I'm contemplating. We build a "soft-skill" team along the lines of a constabulary that would live amongst the locals like a CAP would. This team would be able to immerse themselves into the law enforcement, judicial, and penal systems to help facilitate and maintain law and order. This team would not only be able to perform their functions but also teach. I guess it would be similar to what the Marines did in Haiti long ago. They had a constabulary force lead by Marine Officers and NCOs. As the constabulary gained ground and experience, the local officers and NCOs took over. I think we can apply the same concept across the law and order spectrum. We could also augment with construction teams to restore necessary infrastructure or get stuff back up and running.

Maybe I'm just one of those soft-skill militants.:D

[tequila]

Excellent article on the current PRT structure (http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=13636)and its failure vs. CORDS in Vietnam.


PRT effectiveness ultimately depends on the ability to influence local governance. But there has not been, there is not now, nor will there soon be effective local government outside the Kurdish region—an area of relative stability to which this essay does not apply.

Actual local governance functions throughout much of Iraq are currently performed by non-formal but de facto political leaders rather than official local governments. Although de facto political leadership also existed in Vietnam, it was associated predominantly with the enemy insurgency and the United States was clearly on one side against another. That is a big difference with Iraq, where the coalition is attempting to broker a peace among a bewildering variety of unofficial, but locally powerful, political groups—including many who are associated with sectarian militias and are unlikely to welcome effective competition from PRT supported local governments.

Saddam’s Model Continued

Under Saddam Hussein, there was no legal provision for local governments. When public financing had to be disbursed at the local level, it was transferred from Baghdad to resident treasurers of the central government rather than to non-existent “local” governments. And such transfers were accompanied by detailed instructions about how and under what conditions funds should be disbursed. The primary responsibility of governors, and mayors, all of whom served as both party and government officials, was to ensure the compliance of government bureaucrats to Ba‘ath Party policies.

In the hope of fundamentally reducing the dominance of central government as an instrument of the Ba‘ath Party, a pre-invasion USAID document argued that local governments should establish interim democratic institutions within twelve months, and would need to have the power to impose taxes within 18 months. But in practical terms, that has not occurred. Although Iraq’s new constitution provides for the existence of local governments—and some marginal progress toward local decision-making has occurred—local officials are still barred from raising their own revenue. And financial transfers from the central government routinely suffer from very long delays. While local government had no brains under Saddam Hussein, now there are no arms or legs to actually implement policy.

That places PRTs in a classic dilemma. In the words of Department of State’s Robert Tillery, “by helping local governments more effectively address the needs of their citizens, they will gain the support of their people.” But there is no efficient Iraqi system for funding local governments or giving them the ability to generate employment or improve infrastructure. Such constraints are likely to lead PRT staff to try and “deliver the goods” themselves and that, in turn, will undercut the credibility of the very same local governments they are supposed to support. But that is not the worst of it.

PRTs are expected, again in the words of Tillery, to “transition from working with [Iraqi provincial governments] to spend U.S. money to working with them to spend Iraqi money”––a proposition that harkens back to earlier expectations that oil revenues would finance the war. But whatever else might be the case, substantially reduced U.S. funding of projects managed directly by PRTs will likely result in a performance closer to the languid beat of Iraqi public administration than to the accelerated rhythm of American expectations. And that problem is compounded by Iraqi perceptions that PRTs’ “technical assistance” is too much like the earlier role of the Ba‘ath Party.

Vietnam Remembered

Interestingly, the army’s new “Counterinsurgency” manual erroneously credits the wrong organizational arrangements in Vietnam—“CORDS” —as the model for PRTs. But CORDS, which is considered by many to have been a unique success, integrated all American military and civilian staff at provincial and district levels into a single unified structure.

The PRTs lack such unified structure and look instead more like CORDS’ short-lived and failed predecessor in Vietnam—the Office of Civil Operations (OCO). Like the PRTs, OCO was tasked with coordinating separate U.S. agencies at local levels. But effective integration is seldom obtained through coordination, because individual staff members almost always continue to respond to guidance from their separate parent agencies.

In addition, even if the PRTs’ strength in Iraq were to double to approximately 580 during the next few months, it would still pale by comparison to the more than seven thousand CORDS advisers in Vietnam during 1969. And given past experience in Iraq, even the substantially smaller number of PRTs would not be staffed by enough career civilians. Revealingly, Washington has begun advertising for consultants to join PRTs on time-limited contracts—further diminishing incentives for regular career staff to seek such assignments.

Organizational arrangements of course cannot assure victory, but without them failure is almost certain. The first civilian chief of CORDS, Robert Komer, concluded 35 years ago that a unified management and financing structure was introduced several years too late in Vietnam. That failure has been repeated in Iraq by an American administration that has refused to learn from past experience.

Rolling Back Ambitions

The fact remains that America’s ability to effectively conduct counterinsurgency operations has never been—nor is it now—an important part of American military doctrine or civilian thinking. But the Iraq war reminds us that failure to review past experience for useful insights can be disastrous.

The United States cannot effectively “build” foreign nations. Rather, it can only support governments or groups that have their own reasons for combating America’s enemies. American counter-insurgency efforts should therefore focus primarily on identifying effective governments that are at the same time relevant potential allies, are reasonably effective, and are under threat or are likely to be under threat. And direct support should be limited largely to the provision of financial and material resources.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, training is of only marginal importance and is most effective when limited to use of American equipment and software. When local allies require “capacity-building” before they can implement necessary political and economic policies, the prognosis cannot be good. Finally, creating effective counterinsurgency capacities requires establishment of a distinct career service to oversee ad hoc organizational arrangements that would respond to conflicts as they arise. That is a long way from where we are now.

[tequila]

Informative articles on the failure up to this point (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/23/AR2007022302049_pf.html)to build a civilian nation-building force and the corresponding failure in Diyala Province.

[LawVol]

The PRTs’ sweeping mission encompasses improved governance, establishment of the rule of law, completion of reconstruction and overall development of the economy. In practice, however, day-to-day operations are substantially more circumspect. The staff spends much of its time gathering local intelligence, hectoring Iraqi officials, monitoring contractors, negotiating ad hoc political agreements with local political leaders, and preparing a vast array of reports required by the various agencies that employ them. Unsurprisingly, they are torn by competing organizational cultures, objectives and incentives.

The quote above from the article tequila referenced is one reason why I see the need for a military-only team focused solely on law and order. As I see it, law and order consists of 3 elements: police, judicial, and penal. Focusing on this and initially using US military could alliviate some of the problems discussed in the article.

We have the skill sets. However, I am unsure of organization and manpower. In a small village, we could probably use a relatively small team. But when you're dealing with a Baghdad or Kirkuk, how many troops would be needed? I'm sure there is some rule of thumb for figuring the number of police needed per 1000 residents or the like. Anyone know?

[slapout9]

LawVol, In Alabama a ratio of 1 Police Officer per 1000 is considered normal. This is the recommendation of the League of Municipalities. The people that write a lot of general liability insurance for Police Departments. During a riot or disaster it will increase based upon the situation. In COIN environments it increases and the estimates vary depending upon who you agree with.

[RTK]

I'll work on something to show not only how this could work, but how it DID work. I commanded a troop with an Iraqi platoon task organized under me. I'm on vacation right now but should be back this weekend.

If Rob has access still, he may be able to pull my cc.com interview talking about this.

See you all soon.

[tequila]

LawVol, In Alabama a ratio of 1 Police Officer per 1000 is considered normal. This is the recommendation of the League of Municipalities. The people that write a lot of general liability insurance for Police Departments. During a riot or disaster it will increase based upon the situation. In COIN environments it increases and the estimates vary depending upon who you agree with.

FM 3-24 indicates a security force/population level of 20-25 counterinsurgents per 1000 residents in an AO, with appropriate caveats, with 20 as the minimum.

[slapout9]

Correction on Police ratios. It should be 3!!!! per 1000.:wry:

[Loggie]

Correction on Police ratios. It should be 3!!!! per 1000.:wry:

Or a 2:1 police to civilian ratio on Alabama-Auburn game weekend:)

[slapout9]

Loggie, You got that right!!!:)

[slapout9]

Lawvol, Here is a link to a Parameters article on force ratios in Stability operations.
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1995/quinliv.htm

[LawVol]

Slapout: thanks for the link. The article was very helpful.

If it's a 2-1 ration for the Iron bowl, I'd assume the same number when the Vols roll into Tuscaloosa. Those boys don't like us much!:D

[Maximus]

Great discussion.

Concur on the potential and proven benefit of CAP-type concept (i.e., US Marines/Soldiers pairing with indigenous forces and moving in among the people) in the Al Qaim AO. I've talked to many Marines that served in 3/6, at the platoon level, and they have nothing but great things to say about why the strategy worked and has changed the landscape in what used to be known as the "Wild West" for good.

A very similar CAP to that executed in Vietnam worked very well in Haditha back in spring 2004 (see http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/articl...G4T7GMRL1.DTL). Problem came when CAP Marines were pulled for Fallujah I and then again for Fallujah II. This left the young and inexperienced police force alone to fight the insurgents. 19 Iraqi Police were subsequently hanged in Haditha's athletic stadium and then Al Qaeda in Iraq moved in. It's taken subsequent Marine units almost 3 years to re-build any level of trust back with the people in Haditha.

Also, Stars & Stripes has run multiple articles over the past months on how a CAP-type concept has significantly changed the situation in Ramadi (see http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?...rchive=true ). While Ramadi's not the nicest place on earth today, many parts in the N and away from central South have seen drastic improvements due to clear-hold (move in among people)-build. Similar in so many ways to CAP in Vietnam.

I've made my Marines read "Bing" West's The Village for the past year or so in preparation for Iraq. Attached are the focus questions that I give them beforehand and the answers that I use when leading the discussion group.

Please share thoughts.

[SWJED]

1. Council member Strickland was trained to head a CAP unit for OIF and while he is very busy with SAW right know I hope he might find time to chime in here on this issue.

2. For those interested in the Vietnam CAP program I have a ton of resources in the Vietnam section (http://smallwarsjournal.com/reference/vietnam.php) of the SWJ library.

3. The Village remains my favorite book on the war in Vietnam.

[PhilR]

I have an entry in the "Vietnam" section on CAPs (an undergrad thesis that was "borrowed" in 1997, and next thing I know, scanned and posted on a CAP website), I want to comment on the lessons and potential utility of CAPs.

CAPs are great things for enhancing local security for the time that they are deployed, but the CAP, in and of itself, cannot train up an indiginous force to take over. We focus too much on that squad of Marines and forget all the "enablers" they bring to the battle. What does a Marine squad bring to its indiginous partner unit? Yes, its 10-14 capable fighters with a corpsman. More than that, however, they bring the following:

1. Assurance that the US wan't apply indiscriminate fires in the local area
2. Trained and capable reinforcing forces in case of an emergency (and because its a US unit in trouble, the cavalry will come)
3. MEDEVAC capability and linkage to a functional medical process.
4. Priority for CMO projects.

While there are other things, I believe that we need to look at building host nation capability much more holisitically. While we wouldn't throw a squad out without the above linkages, why would we expect an indiginous small unit to be any more successful without them?

My impression is that, in Iraq, we proceeded much to quickly in creating small units without thinking through the whole structure required of a capable COIN capability, in all its facets.

As was mentioned in one of the proceeding posts, CAP-type organizations in Vietnam worked great while they were in place, but did not set the conditions for GVN success after they left.