Edward Luttwak - Counterinsurgency as Military Malpractice

[Granite_State]

Recent article in Harper's, not a huge fan of his from what little I know, but some good points:

http://www.harpers.org/DeadEnd.html

[davidbfpo]

I've admired Luuwak's writings before, but this article is a painful read. His final paragraphs, with many illustrations from WW2 German actions stretch credibility. One small quote should enliven SWC:

'Is it therefore the case that counterinsurgency doctrine has been evolving backward, from the doubts of the 1950s to the certitudes of 1890? That is no accusation, alas, because one needs to go back even further to find convincing models of success in defeating insurgents by military means'.

davidbfpo

[Granite_State]

I've admired Luuwak's writings before, but this article is a painful read. His final paragraphs, with many illustrations from WW2 German actions stretch credibility. One small quote should enliven SWC:

'Is it therefore the case that counterinsurgency doctrine has been evolving backward, from the doubts of the 1950s to the certitudes of 1890? That is no accusation, alas, because one needs to go back even further to find convincing models of success in defeating insurgents by military means'.

davidbfpo

Agreed. But I think his larger point about the unsuitability of high-tech, conventional armies to fight small wars is worth repeating.

[Tom Odom]

Luttwak has been a consistently good writer on the Arab-Israeli Wars. In that capacity, he often looked at the issues of technology and war fighting. Two notable cases: the 73 War when the IDF's long-standing preference for CAS as flying artillery cost the Israelis dearly on the Sinai and the Golan fronts; and in the 82 invasion when rapid advances led to the decision to enter and seize Beirut on the assumption that maneuver warfare advantages for the IDF would play equally well in a city.

Best

Tom

[J Wolfsberger]

Luttwak is always worth reading, especially when you disagree with him. I haven't completely digested everything he says in the article, but here is a telling quote:" The armed forces of the most advanced countries, and certainly of the United States, all formidable against enemies assembled in conveniently targetable massed formations, are least effective in fighting insurgents. That was demonstrated in Vietnam in many different ways over many years..." If you want to know how the war looks to one of the (rare) intelligent members of Lower Manhattan's elite, this is a good read.

One further comment. He makes it clear that he sees strong parallels between the current war in Iraq and the 19th century Spanish guerrilla war against France. I agree that there are strong similarities, and possibly stronger than even he suggests. But his implied argument, that similarity of circumstances results in similarity of outcomes, seems weak.

[Old Eagle]

I love to read Ed Luttwak because he challenges me to really think through everything I have developed to that point in time. The theory of COIN as malpractice is exactly that type of challenge.

In the end, I believe that COIN has to evolve to meet the challenges outlined by Dave Kilcullen in his "Counter-insurgency Redux". We are not automatically doomed to failure, and history does not automatically repeat itself.

[roger29palms]

I haven't read the article yet but what I know of Mr. Luttwak is what I recall him saying on TV in an interview of talking heads before the beginning of the Gulf War in 1991. At the time, the Iraqis were preparing to fight WW1 with their forts and trenches. It was going to be a bloody fight for America as the Iraqi army was battle hardened, 4th largest military in the world, and so forth and so on. He certainly painted a gloomy picture for those about to attack Hussein's forces.
Mr. Luttwak certainly didn't understand the capabilities of our military then despite being portrayed as an expert by the program's commentator nor did he grasp what a ponderous and outclassed outfit it was that confronted us. During the Iran-Iraq war the LA Times had a telling article on the Iraqis' abilities. It stated that despite our advice to use their inherent mobility coupled with our satelite imagery giving them a bird's eye view of the Iranian's positions and likely intentions, they remained a timid army of little prowess and imagination.
All in all a surprising level of unawareness for an "expert". Perhaps he is more knowledgable now than then but I couldn't say.

Roger

[TROUFION]

Luttwak is probably most famous for his theory on Civil Wars: Let them Fight.

It will make you think so it is worth reading up on the theory. There are many contentious points to dig in on. Might be worth a seperate thread: Luttwak's let them fight theory of civil wars...

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=719130&contrassID=2&subContrassID=4

http://www.uruknet.info/?p=m30399&s1=h1

http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/Luttwak/luttwak-con0.html

Luttwak on Iraq: "One reason for optimism...is that the violence itself has been separating previously mixed populations, reducing motives and opportunities for further attacks. That is how civil wars can burn themselves out."

Luttwak on Civil Wars: "Civil wars can be especially atrocious as neighbors kill each other at close range, but they, too, have a purpose in this world - they can bring lasting peace by destroying the will to fight, and by removing the motives and opportunities for further violence."

Luttwak on COIN: "Occupiers can thus be successful without need of any specialized counterinsurgency methods or tactics if they are willing to out-terrorize the insurgents, so that the fear of reprisals outweighs the desire to help the insurgents or their threats."

[wm]

I believe Luttwak had a piece in Foreign Affairs a few years back on Iraq. Has anyone read it? If so, how does it square with his piece in Harpers?

I happen to agree with his assessment on the political nature of insurgencies and the power that coercion plays. If readers are willing to suspend their patriotism for a while, they might find some interesting reading on how the rebels coerced the loyalists (and vice versa) in the future US during the American Revolution in such places as the "Neutral Ground" in Westchester County, NY, in northern NJ (Mercer and Monmouth counties, e.g.), and in the Carolinas. Many readers probably know about Banastre Tarleton's "massacre" after the battle at Waxhaws, but the rebels were equally as evil in the South.
We might have even more evidence about rebel atrocities had the Howe brothers and Cornwallis been victorious--the victors, after all, usually do right the history books

[TROUFION]

Gotta give Luttwak some credit on catchy article naming. :D

This is one of his FA articles: link and summary below:

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19990701faessay990/edward-n-luttwak/give-war-a-chance.html

Give War a Chance
Edward N. Luttwak
From Foreign Affairs, July/August 1999

Article preview: first 500 of 2,793 words total.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary: Since the establishment of the United Nations, great powers have rarely let small wars burn themselves out. Bosnia and Kosovo are the latest examples of this meddling. Conflicts are interrupted by a steady stream of cease-fires and armistices that only postpone war-induced exhaustion and let belligerents rearm and regroup. Even worse are U.N. refugee-relief operations and NGOs, which keep resentful populations festering in camps and sometimes supply both sides in armed conflicts. This well-intentioned interference only intensifies and prolongs struggles in the long run. The unpleasant truth is that war does have one useful function: it brings peace. Let it.
Edward N. Luttwak is Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.


PREMATURE PEACEMAKING

An unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. This can happen when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively. Either way the key is that the fighting must continue until a resolution is reached. War brings peace only after passing a culminating phase of violence. Hopes of military success must fade for accommodation to become more attractive than further combat.

Since the establishment of the United Nations and the enshrinement of great-power politics in its Security Council, however, wars among lesser powers have rarely been allowed to run their natural course. Instead, they have typically been interrupted early on, before they could burn themselves out and establish the preconditions for a lasting settlement. Cease-fires and armistices have frequently been imposed under the aegis of the Security Council in order to halt fighting. NATO's intervention in the Kosovo crisis follows this pattern.

But a cease-fire tends to arrest war-induced exhaustion and lets belligerents reconstitute and rearm their forces. It intensifies and prolongs the struggle once the cease-fire ends -- and it does usually end. This was true of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, which might have come to closure in a matter of weeks if two cease-fires ordained by the Security Council had not let the combatants recuperate. It has recently been true in the Balkans. Imposed cease-fires frequently interrupted the fighting between Serbs and Croats in Krajina, between the forces of the rump Yugoslav federation and the Croat army, and between the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia. Each time, the opponents used the pause to recruit, train, and equip additional forces for further combat, prolonging the war and widening the scope of its killing and destruction. Imposed armistices, meanwhile -- again, unless followed by negotiated peace accords -- artificially freeze conflict and perpetuate a state of war indefinitely by shielding the weaker side from the consequences of refusing to make concessions for peace.

The Cold War provided compelling justification for such behavior by the two superpowers, which sometimes collaborated in coercing less-powerful belligerents to avoid being drawn into their conflicts and clashing directly. Although imposed cease-fires ultimately did increase the total quantity of warfare among the lesser powers, and armistices did perpetuate states of war, both outcomes were clearly lesser evils (from a global point of view) than the possibility of nuclear war. But today, neither Americans nor Russians are inclined to intervene competitively in the wars of lesser powers, so the unfortunate consequences of interrupting war persist while no greater danger is averted. It might be best for all parties to let minor wars burn themselves out.

THE PROBLEMS OF PEACEKEEPERS

Today cease-fires and armistices are imposed on lesser powers by multilateral agreement -- not to avoid great-power competition but for essentially disinterested and indeed frivolous motives, such as television audiences' revulsion at harrowing scenes of war. But this, perversely, can systematically prevent the transformation of war into peace. The . . .


www.foreignaffairs.org is copyright 2002--2006 by the Council on Foreign Relations. All rights reserved.

[J Wolfsberger]

I remember that FA article. I didn't think it was anywhere near as good as Give War a Chance (1992) by P. J. O'Rourke.;)

[Danny]

Troufion,

Of the three interesting Luttwak quotes you give, I cannot locate the third one in any of the links you cited.

[wm]

I was thinking about a Luttwak piece on disengaging from Iraq. I never got a chance to read it. I know he advocated withdrawal but am not sure if he used the same justification as his current Harpers argument.

[TROUFION]

http://www.harpers.org/DeadEnd.html

My bust, this was from the article that started Granite's thread

[Jimbo]

I think Luttwak is still a little too enamored with the Roman Imperial model.

[Menning]

I just read Luttwak's article. Some merit exists with his statements, however his writing is ultimately weak. Luttwak's article is full of generalizations and broad characteristics. These are not hallmarks of good writing. Furthermore, he displays lapses in logical thinking. German COIN during WWII was not really that effective. Look at insurgent campaigns in Ukraine or Yugoslavia and his assertions are blown to bits. As a journalist, I want a clear, concise take away lesson. He failed to provide this. His work is a rehash of other things he's already published. I happen to know other historians who echo my sentiments.

[Tom Odom]

German COIN during WWII was not really that effective.

Roger that and in many ways it was not "COIN" but rather full suppression backed with ethnic cleansing.

Tom

[Steve Blair]

Roger that and in many ways it was not "COIN" but rather full suppression backed with ethnic cleansing.

Tom

I would say German efforts were COIN in warped hindsight only. At the time they called the "bandit suppression," and the objective was to clear an area of anything that would hinder their post-conflict plans. They didn't even consider any sort of COIN as we understand it today (to include hearts and minds-type stuff) until it was far too late, and even then it was only backed by some within the power structure.

[SWJED]

On the SWJ Blog - Edward Luttwak’s “Counterinsurgency Malpractice” (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/04/edward-luttwaks-counterinsurge/) by Dave Kilcullen.


I spent a few hours recently, reading Edward N. Luttwak’s article in Harper’s Magazine, “Dead End: Counter-Insurgency as Military Malpractice”, and carefully thinking over his argument. It was a pleasant holiday from the reality of war here in Baghdad, and a reassuring reminder that there are still havens of calm (like CSIS, where Dr Luttwak is a Senior Fellow) where one can consider issues thoroughly and arrive at firm conclusions. From my viewpoint, here in Iraq, things somehow never seem quite so black-and-white.

Professor Luttwak is a famous defense policy expert, with publications on the Roman Empire, nuclear strategy, coups d’état and globalization, among others. He is not a specialist in counterinsurgency or the Middle East, but his opinions carry much weight and we should all welcome his recent foray into the field. I hope he will forgive this précis, but in essence he argues that “insurgents do not always win, actually they usually lose. But their defeats can rarely be attributed to counterinsurgency warfare, as we shall see”. The means he argues are most effective are wholesale reprisals and “out-terrorizing” the insurgents...

Would appreciate any comments to made both here and on the blog - again, thanks.

[Mark O'Neill]

Luttwak's article is weak in terms of justification of his position. The inaccurate and selective citation of historical example is an old rogues trick in any such polemical piece.

Increasingly I am getting tired of 'expert' advice from 'Terrorism' and 'COIN' experts from academia and the media who are not burdened by any practical experience.

I am also finding that these people are increasingly 'blood thirsty' in their recommendations. It is amazing how easy it is for these people to be profligate with others lives.

The disproportionate influence they seem to have on some opinion and policy makers is particularly worrisome. I for one would take more heed of Luttwak (and all the other polemicists) if they saddled up and joined the fight in some constructive way that transcends self promotion and media hits in 'Factiva'.

If they just want to be windbags they should stick to monday morning quarterbacking in their own small circle of acolytes, undergrads and interns, all of whom can assuage their egos as to their true genius.....

[marct]

Hi Mark,


Luttwak's article is weak in terms of justification of his position. The inaccurate and selective citation of historical example is an old rogues trick in any such polemical piece.

I should point out that selective citation is also standard practice in all forms of writing, whether academic or not. Sometimes it is done from "malice" (i.e. trying to "prove" a point) and sometimes it is just a factor of space restrictions - usually it's a combination of both (it's really a scale). In the case of Luttwak's article, I think he is a little to far for my taste towards the "malice" pole...


Increasingly I am getting tired of 'expert' advice from 'Terrorism' and 'COIN' experts from academia and the media who are not burdened by any practical experience.

Not many academics have that type of practical experience outside of various war colleges. A few cross over well from academia to the Terrorism and/or COIN areas; Montgomery McFate and Teri Wonder are good examples of this. Sometimes you get the cross from the military into academia; Dave Kilcullen and Brian Selmeski being good examples. Most of the time, however, the best you can hope for is that the academics will expertise in cognate areas and will be smart enough to ask for advice from people who actually do have the practical experience.


I am also finding that these people are increasingly 'blood thirsty' in their recommendations. It is amazing how easy it is for these people to be profligate with others lives.

I ran across an interesting phenomenon years ago when I was running my game design company. I would have people over to try out new games, or sometimes just play old ones for pleasure, and I was constantly amazed and disgusted with the casualty levels that ideologues would accept. I remember one large scale Napoleonic miniatures game I ran. One of the players (a "peace activist") commanding a wing of British troops, suffered nearly 80% casualties because he insisted on conducting wave front assaults on entrenched infantry and artillery batteries!

I've seen the same "mental shift" time and time again amongst ideological fanatics. Once they accept that violence is necessary to achieve their ideological goals, casualties are totally unimportant amongst "the People" as long as they live to implement "the Vision" :mad:.


If they just want to be windbags they should stick to monday morning quarterbacking in their own small circle of acolytes, undergrads and interns, all of whom can assuage their egos as to their true genius.....

Unfortunately, that's not how the academic game is played. Influencing policy makers translates out to increased grant money which, in turn, leads to increased status, more graduate students and professional honours :cool:.

Personally, I don't like that system, but that is the way it operates and you operate outside of it at your own peril.

Marc

[Tom Odom]

Not many academics have that type of practical experience outside of various war colleges. A few cross over well from academia to the Terrorism and/or COIN areas; Montgomery McFate and Teri Wonder are good examples of this. Sometimes you get the cross from the military into academia; Dave Kilcullen and Brian Selmeski being good examples. Most of the time, however, the best you can hope for is that the academics will expertise in cognate areas and will be smart enough to ask for advice from people who actually do have the practical experience.

I would add retired SF Lieutenant Colonel now Dr. Kalev "Gunner" Sepp to that list. He teaches at the NPS and was another of the COIN brain trust after his experiences in El Salvador. His COIN Best Practices (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/sepp.pdf) is to my mind very much the operational and strategic companion to Kilcullen's 28 at the tactical level.

To hear Dr. Luttwak at his best (or worst) see Bill and Dave's interview (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=13823#post13823)as played on ABC (Aussie Broadcast Co).


Best

Tom

[marct]

Hi Tom,


I would add retired SF Lieutenant Colonel now Dr. Kalev "Gunner" Sepp to that list. He teaches at the NPS and was another of the COIN brain trust after his experiences in El Salvador. His COIN Best Practices (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/sepp.pdf) is to my mind very much the operational and strategic companion to Kilcullen's 28 at the tactical level.

Good call! I'm sure there are others as well.


To hear Dr. Luttwak at his best (or worst) see Bill and Dave's interview (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=13823#post13823)as played on ABC (Aussie Broadcast Co).

I've listened to it twice, now, and I have to say that Bill and Dave's Excellent Adventure is quite cool. You're right about hearing Dr. Luttwak on the program - as with you, I'm not sure if it's best or worst :wry:.

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Luttwak on the broadcast sounds like a mid-grade actor trying to play Henry Kissinger. Not very good.

In response to the academia versus military stuff, the more I see it the more I'm convinced that you need BOTH, in decent balance. Academics may lack experience, while military people may lack distance. The trick is to find the balance between the two.

[Tom Odom]

Luttwak on the broadcast sounds like a mid-grade actor trying to play Henry Kissinger. Not very good.

Ouch! Say what you think, Steve :wry:

I am happy to see that I have seen a number of promising officers headed west toward Monterey, CA and the Naval Postgraduate School...

I also encourage all ILE students--especially those without a Masters--to at least seriously consider the Masters program at CGSC.

I have for years--even when on active duty--pushed for the Army to include REAL FAOs in the pot for the War College versus essentially limiting FAOs to the correspondence course as has been the case. Hopefully some day the Army will realize that FAOs can offer much to their fellow students when it comes to strategy...

Best

Tom

[Steve Blair]

Ouch! Say what you think, Steve :wry:

Sorry...but that's the first thing I thought of when I heard him talk, and it just didn't get any better.:eek:

[John T. Fishel]

Many only partly related comments:

Dave Kilcullen's blog on Luttwak (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/04/edward-luttwaks-counterinsurge-1/) is spot on, perhaps a little too kind. We should recall how the French won the tactical and operational war in Algeria but lost the strategic war because they lost their legitimacy both internationally and in France.

Of academics who are also practitioners:
Lt. Col. David Last, PhD at the Royal Military College of Canada
Ambassador Edwin Corr at the U of Oklahoma
Dr. Walter Kretchik (LTC ret) at Western Il U
Dr. John Waghelstein (COL ret) emeritus Naval War College, teaches a course at Brown as well
General Fred Woerner emeritus at Boston U
Dr. Max Manwaring at SSI/Army War College
Dr. Tom Marks at SNSEE/National Defense University
Dr. Dave Spencer at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies
Dr. Wm. J. Olson at the Near East/South Asia Center for strategic Studies

Of some smart, knowledgeable "pure" acadeics:
Dr. Dick Schultz at Fletcher
Dr. Tony Joes at St. Joseph's University
Dr. Chris Madsen at Canadian Forces College

[Old Eagle]

FAOs can offer mush...?

Don't need FAOs for that, we have faculty!!

[SWJED]

Frank Hoffman of the USMC's Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) - LtCol USMCR (Ret.) - good stuff - deep thinker.

[Mark O'Neill]

I would add Steve Metz and Conrad Crane from Carlisle to the list and Bruce Hoffman from RAND.

[Tom Odom]

FAOs can offer mush...?

Don't need FAOs for that, we have faculty!!

Thanks for the proof reading. Maybe you care to comment on the point, which by the way is that most manuever officers who attend the War College have had little if any exposure to strategy beyond what little they happened to get in CGSC. The exception is the FAO field.

Tom

[Old Eagle]

Tom:

Since the "s" key is not next to the "c" key, I have to assume that you made a Freudian slip.

As with most FAOs, I was relegated to the corresponding studies version of the War College. One of my biggest disappointments, however, occured during a resident phase when one of my maneuver colleagues interrupted a discussion of strategy with the comment, "I don't want to know about this stuff! Just give me my mission and I'll figure out how to do it."

Another classic case was a PE to plan an operation --"assume that transit and overflight rights have been obtained". Several years later, while I was trying to negotiate transit and overflights for OEF with one of our FRIENDS, there are numerous times I wanted to just assume that they had been granted.

[Tom Odom]

You could be correct...

it may have been freudian....:eek:

Your examples are exactly my point as well....

One of my own personal failures was during Desert Shield and we were doing the Christians (Intel beriefers) versus the Lions (CSA,VCSA,DCSOPS,DCSINT etc etc) and the topic was Scuds. I had already briefed the DCSOPS (then LTG Reimer) and a special briefer came in and briefed Iraq Scuds. He did so purely from the tech side, per the DCSINT and A/DCSINT guidance, both of who were sigint types not analysts. When the briefer fiinished, General Reimer asked, "So the Scuds are not militarily significant?" The briefer with the DCSINT and ADCSINT nodding confirmed that the Scud threat was not militarily significant. I knew better; I had been writing about Saddam's Scuds as a political tool --and they were quite siginficant, coming quite close to provoking an Israeli counter-response and thereby derailing the coalition. I should have said something. I did not because we were told to follow the script. Bad decision.

best

Tom

[John T. Fishel]

I well remember advising my Leavenworth students who were FAOs in the mid 90s that their career choice was a crap shoot as far as promotion was concerned. If they played their cards right and were lucky, they might make LTC or COL. If they were very lucky they could get a star. If, however their timing was wrong, they could enjoy their assignments and retire as a Major. Then came OPMS 21 which seemed to regularize the promotion system. Now a FAO can expect to retire as a LTC or a COL. But we have seen the last of the General Officer FAOs - more than a pity, a tragedy. It was because GEN Fred Woerner was a FAO that we got post-conflict Panama right. And, it may not too far a stretch to say that we got everything after that either wrong or less than optimal because Generals Schwartzkopf, Hoar, Admiral Miller, and GEN Franks were not. (This is not to say that these Flags were either the same or got everything wrong or that they were totally responsible - they did have superiors like SECDEF Rumsfeld, after all...)

[Granite_State]

Many only partly related comments:

Dave Kilcullen's blog on Luttwak (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/04/edward-luttwaks-counterinsurge-1/) is spot on, perhaps a little too kind. We should recall how the French won the tactical and operational war in Algeria but lost the strategic war because they lost their legitimacy both internationally and in France.

Of academics who are also practitioners:
Lt. Col. David Last, PhD at the Royal Military College of Canada
Ambassador Edwin Corr at the U of Oklahoma
Dr. Walter Kretchik (LTC ret) at Western Il U
Dr. John Waghelstein (COL ret) emeritus Naval War College, teaches a course at Brown as well
General Fred Woerner emeritus at Boston U
Dr. Max Manwaring at SSI/Army War College
Dr. Tom Marks at SNSEE/National Defense University
Dr. Dave Spencer at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies
Dr. Wm. J. Olson at the Near East/South Asia Center for strategic Studies

Of some smart, knowledgeable "pure" acadeics:
Dr. Dick Schultz at Fletcher
Dr. Tony Joes at St. Joseph's University
Dr. Chris Madsen at Canadian Forces College

I think T.X. Hammes is doing a PhD at Oxford right now.

[Granite_State]

Or DPhil, whatever they call it there.

[SWJED]

At the Club Troppo blog - Kilkullen, Luttwak and Why the Troops Should Leave Iraq (http://www.clubtroppo.com.au/2007/04/21/kilkullen-luttwak-and-why-the-troops-should-leave-iraq).

[SWJED]

By Frank Hoffman on the SWJ Blog - Luttwaks' Lament (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/04/luttwaks-lament/).


... A number of studies at RAND and at Harvard have attempted to come to grips with what appears to be an important cause or influence in human conflict. The literature on terrorism clearly documented a dramatic rise in the religious affiliation of terrorist organizations. A generation ago none of the eleven international terrorist organizations was religiously oriented. By 2004, nearly half of the world’s identifiable and active terrorist groups are classified as religious. Today, the vast majority of terrorist groups using suicide attacks are Islamic, displacing secular groups like the Tamil Tigers. Furthermore, religiously-oriented organizations account for a disproportionately high percentage of attacks and casualties.

History suggests that religious influences can escalate the forms, levels, and types of violence. Religion lowers inhibitions and reduces moral barriers to violence, including suicide terrorism. This results in more frequent attacks, greater and longer battles, and more casualties. Religious-based conflicts tend to made it difficult to attain any political compromise or settlements. Not surprisingly, according to a detailed analysis by Dr. Monica Duffy Toft at Harvard, religious civil wars last longer (roughly two years longer) than the average intrastate conflict, and produce four times as many total casualties...

[John T. Fishel]

Frank Hoffman's blog raises important questions about the role of religion in the current global (and Iraqi and Afghan) insurgency, and, most importantly, its place in the new COIN manual. I don't pretend to have an answer but, it seems to me, that the religious fanaticism of AQ and its ilk still do not wholly change the character of the insurgency. It is not as if we have not seen this before. There was an Islamist component to the FLN's war against the French in Algeria. The Moro Insurrection(s) in the Philippines were/are Islamist inspired, at least in part. Similarly, we have dealt with Islamists in Bosnia and Kosovo in recent years as part of the PKOs there. Finally, there is the religious component to the "Troubles" in N. Ireland. In none of these cases have the basic components of the classical approach to COIN brrrn negated. Moreover, David Galula wrote based on his experience in Algeria!
That said, I do believe that we need to look very closely at the religious base of the AQ/Jihadist/Islamist approach to war and insurgency. Although I doubt that the principles of COIN will change, I am equally certain that they will have to be adapted to fit the circumstances. As human beings we reason by analogy, but it is essential that we remember that ALL analogies are wrong - Algeria, Moros, Bosnia, Kosovo, N. Ireland are not Iraq and Iraq is not Afghanistan.

[marct]

I would certainly agree that the role of "religion" is a crucial component in the Long War scenario. It has also been a crucial component of most social movements in North America for the past 25 years (40 if we want to go back to the 1960's). For the moment, I would like to pick up on an observation Frank Hoffman made in is blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/04/luttwaks-lament/):


Religiously inspired or influenced conflicts may alter our usual prescriptions for counterinsurgency. Economic inducements and marginal material gains may not overcome someone’s sacred faith, grasp of life’s meaning, or strong sense of identity. School houses, soccer balls and smiles are not enough. Far too much of our theory is based within a Western mindset and assumes the existence of some cost-benefit calculation of self-interest that may not transcend all civilizations and cultures.

I would go much further and say that the fundamental role of "religion" is crucially misunderstod by most in modern, Western societies: religion is not a political ideology, although the reverse may be true. A "religion" is a symbol system that allows the believer to understand and make sense of "objective reality" which, unlike a political ideology, allows the believer to experience the "truth" of that interpretation. This is the key distinction that is often missed - religious systems start with experiential proof of their validity while ideological systems start with rational proofs.

At the heart of this system of proof lie two key components: a set of "encapsulated" experience of the "Do X and Y will happen" variety where the result ("Y") is outside of the boundaries of "normal" (defined by that culture) and a "teacher" / interpretor figure (who may be a living person, a discarnate being or a book). One "teaches" A "student", then induces an experience, and then interprets that experience in light of the symbol system. This act of interpretation is crucial since it gives the experience "meaning" and places it as part of a coherent "whole". The ability to induce such a experience within the student validates other statements made by the teacher.

A part of this further validation is the, at times, unconscious adoption of the metaphysical assumptions underlying the symbol system that may or may not be overtly stated. For example, if I can induce a past life regression in you, you will, in all probability, start to consider that re-incarnation and karma may be valid. If I can induce a vision of people suffering in Hell, then you may start to consider that a) you only have one life, b) Hell is to be avoided at all costs, and c) that I can tell you how to avoid ending up there. Any competent symbolic Anthropologist who has specialized in studying ritual can induce either of these experiences in about 70-80% of people.

What we have at play here is what scholars of comparative religion call the dynamic between exoteric ("outer") and esoteric ("inner" or "hidden") knowledge. Sometimes, depending on how the religion is structured, some of the "esoteric" knowledge is out in plain sight: prophesying, possession state trances, speaking in tongues (aka glossolalia) are some of the more common examples of "esoteric" knowledge. Sometimes esoteric knowledge is fully hidden, although here are always symbolic indicators of it available in the exoteric form.

What, you are probably asking by now, does this have to do with COIN? The answer is simple: the entire concept behind winning Hearts and Minds is to generate "experiences" in the local populace that will be interpreted as supporting the "government". In effect, Hearts and Minds operations are an attempt to apply an "esoteric ritual" to a local population to support a political ideology. Ultimately, they will fail if the political ideology is not at least partially resonant with the religious system of the local population. By "resonant", I mean that the political ideology must have certain core concepts that are "proven" by the Hearts and Minds activities that are also "proven" by religious "rituals".

To take one simple, and current, example, let us consider the current situation in Al Anbar. In Islam, "wisdom" resides in certain lineages and people within those lineages (loosely the sheiks) and also within a certain non-lineage based class of "teachers" (imams, etc.; actually, this is a case of para-kinship where "students" take on their teachers' "lineage"). The "reality" of this is grounded in centuries (millenia in some cases!) of experience. Take advantage of it by working with it and you prosper. Spreading a totally alien ideology of absolute individual equality, something that is "proven" to be "false", and you will fail. I think that today's example of Al Anbar is a good example of how to succeed, in part because AQ started targeting sheiks while the coalition started supporting them.

Is this "religious"? Yes,it is. Look deeply enough into the culture and you will find that sheiks and Imams have certain "powers" and "abilities" that are sanctioned and interpreted by the religious tradition.

Marc

[tequila]

To take one simple, and current, example, let us consider the current situation in Al Anbar. In Islam, "wisdom" resides in certain lineages and people within those lineages (loosely the sheiks) and also within a certain non-lineage based class of "teachers" (imams, etc.; actually, this is a case of para-kinship where "students" take on their teachers' "lineage"). The "reality" of this is grounded in centuries (millenia in some cases!) of experience. Take advantage of it by working with it and you prosper. Spreading a totally alien ideology of absolute individual equality, something that is "proven" to be "false", and you will fail. I think that today's example of Al Anbar is a good example of how to succeed, in part because AQ started targeting sheiks while the coalition started supporting them.

Is this "religious"? Yes,it is. Look deeply enough into the culture and you will find that sheiks and Imams have certain "powers" and "abilities" that are sanctioned and interpreted by the religious tradition.

A couple of things to point out here. First, the "office" of shaykh is a purely tribal one with no religious basis. It is based instead on family connections, lineage, and to a certain extent personal charisma/expertise/merit/consensus, however one judges merit in this context. Shaykhs were around before Islam. Some shaykhs are powerful, some are not, and a shaykh's following can change over time as his power waxes or wanes.

Imams, OTOH, are religiously based, but their appeal is similarly based on a consensus judgment of the community, not on any inherent powers granted to them. No one appoints Sunni imams --- they are little different from Protestant preachers. Anyone who can afford a storefront can be a preacher with a church --- the same goes for an imam in Sunni Islam.

The Marines in Anbar always sought to work with both shaykhs and imams --- they just had an enormously difficult time sorting out which ones was powerful enough or trustworthy enough to deal with at any particular time. AQI, representing another foreign body with an appeal based on religion and revenge rather than tribal roots, has had to navigate the same tricky waters.

[John T. Fishel]

Well said, Marc, and a particularly good example. One problem that I have with this formulation is the complexity of the world in Iraq. The classic by Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, was clearly overly hopeful(?) but, nevertheless, pointed in a direction that we have seen throughout what used to be called - still is - the Third world. That is the compelling desire of many, perhaps most, people to modernize, not without a lot of pulling and hauling and backsliding but still movement in a more modern and usually secular democratic direction. So, among other things we find in Iraq is a traditional politico-religious power structure in Al Anbar along side modern secular politicians, businessmen, and professionals throughout the country. We won't win over both by the same appeals...

Gotta go teach class

Cheers

John

[marct]

Hi Tequila,


A couple of things to point out here. First, the "office" of shaykh is a purely tribal one with no religious basis. .....

If we look at the category of "religion" as separate from "society", you are quite correct. However, I would like to point out, that I was looking at it i the viewpoint that the distinction is invalid. Islam, as a religion, validates and upholds the role of sheik. As such, it is positioned within the religion in much the same way the Christianity used to validate, uphold and define the role of "father" or "mother", neither of which it "created".


Imams, OTOH, are religiously based, but their appeal is similarly based on a consensus judgment of the community, not on any inherent powers granted to them. No one appoints Sunni imams --- they are little different from Protestant preachers. Anyone who can afford a storefront can be a preacher with a church --- the same goes for an imam in Sunni Islam.

Sure, and how do membes of the culture react to a storefront preacher? The shear act of setting themselves up establishes them within a broad religious tradition and conveys a certain type of legitimacy. Again, this is a case where the office, however a person comes to fulfill it, has a particular form of legitimacy and "access" to the "esoteric" (or "sacred" if you prefer).


The Marines in Anbar always sought to work with both shaykhs and imams --- they just had an enormously difficult time sorting out which ones was powerful enough or trustworthy enough to deal with at any particular time. AQI, representing another foreign body with an appeal based on religion and revenge rather than tribal roots, has had to navigate the same tricky waters.

Yup, and they blew it badly by their actions.

BTW, I'm really glad you responded the way you did :D. I think that one of the key problems with trying to work in material on "religion" into the new FM is the very different conceptualizations that are running around: "individual believer" (the North American "standard"), "social believer" (for want of a better term; the standard in most of the Muslim world), and academic.

Marc

[marct]

Hi John,


Well said, Marc, and a particularly good example. One problem that I have with this formulation is the complexity of the world in Iraq. The classic by Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, was clearly overly hopeful(?) but, nevertheless, pointed in a direction that we have seen throughout what used to be called - still is - the Third world. That is the compelling desire of many, perhaps most, people to modernize, not without a lot of pulling and hauling and backsliding but still movement in a more modern and usually secular democratic direction. So, among other things we find in Iraq is a traditional politico-religious power structure in Al Anbar along side modern secular politicians, businessmen, and professionals throughout the country. We won't win over both by the same appeals...

Thanks. And you're absolutely right that it is an incredibly messy situation. One of the examples I sometimes use with my students is the Sultinate of Brunei. They are trying to steer an interesting course between tradition and modernization. Admittedly, the oil revenues help a lot :wry:! Still and all, there are many models for "modern", not just the liberal-democracy that we now hae in the West.

The issue of "secularization" is, in and of itself, a fascinating one. Certainly the image of a "secular society" that is being portrayed by AQ is at odds with the reality of most actual secular societies. In reality, most Western nations are "secular" at the social level, but allow for individual "sacrality", all the while imposing broad constraints on the inter-social forms of that sacrality. The "classic" measures of a secular society that come out of te sociology of religion are, to my mind, pretty useless; e.g. Church attendance, which is only a valid indicator of church attendance (it says nothing about purpose of attendance or strength of belief)! I think that Andrew Greeley's attempts at reformulating the basic survey instruments are very much needed - too bad most haven't been adopted :wry:.

Have fun with the class!

Marc

[tequila]

If we look at the category of "religion" as separate from "society", you are quite correct. However, I would like to point out, that I was looking at it i the viewpoint that the distinction is invalid. Islam, as a religion, validates and upholds the role of sheik. As such, it is positioned within the religion in much the same way the Christianity used to validate, uphold and define the role of "father" or "mother", neither of which it "created".

This sort of depends. I would argue that this greatly depends on context. Islam has an explicitly anti-tribal emphasis in that it posits the community of believers as having far greater weight than blood ties. Numerous examples abound in the early Islamic texts of believers forswearing tribal or familial ties to follow the Prophet. We can see this in a more modernized context in the clash of values between tribal elders in the Pushtun south who endorsed traditional values of Pushtunwali vs. school-educated Taliban who pushed a semi-Deobandi sharia that explicitly clashed with it.

A similar clash often occurs within Christianity, for instance when "social" Christians become much more ardent or much less ardent than, to follow your example, their parents. Matthew 10:37 and all that.



Sure, and how do membes of the culture react to a storefront preacher? The shear act of setting themselves up establishes them within a broad religious tradition and conveys a certain type of legitimacy. Again, this is a case where the office, however a person comes to fulfill it, has a particular form of legitimacy and "access" to the "esoteric" (or "sacred" if you prefer).

Obviously when one assumes a religious mantle, one puts oneself into a societal idea of what a religious leader should be. However, these leaders do not automatically garner a following simply by setting up shop, especially in the context where there is competition for believers. They must at the same time fit within the prevailing social context for belief while also setting themselves apart.

[Merv Benson]

Marc's insights are always interesting.

Another way of explaining the rise of the Sheiks is the attempt to impose al Qaeda's weird religious beliefs on a population that rejects them. Al Qaeda's strategy draws a great deal on Shari'a law in that both rely on brutally cruel and unusual punishment for those who do not obey. As resistance increases the level of punishment increases. When you start punishing those who do not think they are deserving and that have the means to resist, you have a problem.

I think you also have to be concerned about the cynical manipulation of religion. The communist infiltration of the militant Buddhist movement in Vietnam in the early 60's did much more damage to the government than their military did during the same time period. What is more is that the US diplomatic corps and media unwittingly aided them by pushing the South Vietnamese to "political reconciliation" with a group that was acting in bad faith and kept moving the goal post with each compromise by the government.

[marct]

Hi Tequila,


This sort of depends. I would argue that this greatly depends on context. Islam has an explicitly anti-tribal emphasis in that it posits the community of believers as having far greater weight than blood ties. Numerous examples abound in the early Islamic texts of believers forswearing tribal or familial ties to follow the Prophet. We can see this in a more modernized context in the clash of values between tribal elders in the Pushtun south who endorsed traditional values of Pushtunwali vs. school-educated Taliban who pushed a semi-Deobandi sharia that explicitly clashed with it.

Really good points, and they highlight one of the real problems with talking about any religion in a monolithic way. Another good example of this, in a non-combat setting, is the "role" of FGM in various cultures. The debates surrounding it matches the clash between local culture, religious validation, modernization, etc.

I've been looking at the history of Christianity for anlogues of the Taliban for a while, now, and I think I may have found one: the fraticelli (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fraticelli)of the 14th century. It's certainly not an exact analogy, but it may be a usefull one in some ways.


A similar clash often occurs within Christianity, for instance when "social" Christians become much more ardent or much less ardent than, to follow your example, their parents. Matthew 10:37 and all that.

Sure, and it occasionally flashes up in various revitalization movements; the Shakers are one example as is the Unification Church and Jones' little cult. On the whole, though, other textual components which usually fit in with the local culture better (e.g. Ephesians 5:21- 6:4).


Obviously when one assumes a religious mantle, one puts oneself into a societal idea of what a religious leader should be. However, these leaders do not automatically garner a following simply by setting up shop, especially in the context where there is competition for believers. They must at the same time fit within the prevailing social context for belief while also setting themselves apart.

Quite true, although I think that it is important to also note that, in times of rapid social upheaval and turbulence, the range of what will fit into the social context is much greater than it is during a period of social stability. Some of this is just going to be people grasping at straws, but it is still a well recognized phenomenon.

The actions of "setting themselves" apart is, as you note, a crucial one. How they do this must also tie in with the "experiences" they offer their followers, and that has to fit into the religio-cultural matrix: the myth structure if you will. The closer the match, the more likely they are to gain a following.

Marc

[marct]

Hi Merv,


I think you also have to be concerned about the cynical manipulation of religion.

Very true, and one of the quintessential dangers of social movements of any form since I have yet to come across a social movement that was not, at some time, manipulated by cynical opportunists to their own advantage :(. I have, however, noted that most religions contain ways of "testing" and "challenging" any "received wisdom", and IMHO, this is one of the things I think we need to be looking at quite seriously in our current conflict.

Marc

[SWCAdmin]

At the Club Troppo blog - Kilkullen, Luttwak and Why the Troops Should Leave Iraq (http://www.clubtroppo.com.au/2007/04/21/kilkullen-luttwak-and-why-the-troops-should-leave-iraq).

I tried 4 times to comment there, couldn't do it. And twice to contact them through their form, couldn't do it.

I sure hope our site doesn't throw those curve balls to folks.

Here's what I wanted to say:



No insider tip from SWJ (http://smallwarsjournal.com) to LTC Dave Kilcullen. We heard Dr. Luttwak's portion of Stan Correy's piece at the same time the rest of the world did. Actually, maybe a little later because we're behind all the folks Down Under due to those pesky time zones.

I believe you can take his response at face value as something he dashed off quickly upon hearing the show, in a brief "break" from doing his darn demanding job.

Another blog entry (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/04/luttwaks-lament/) posted recently on our site, this time from Frank Hoffman who we're pleased to have join our consortium of bloggers, further discusses Dr. Luttwak's observations. And we've had a thread discussing the Harper's article running for some time here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2380).

[SWJED]

1 May National Review's The Tank - Does the Middle East Really Matter? (http://tank.nationalreview.com/post/?q=N2U2MGQyOWVmNWU2YTUzZjQ0ODA5YmE3NTBmMDhmNDQ=).


No, not really, if you follow the provocative argument articulated by Edward Luttwak of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the cover piece of the May 2007 issue of Prospect. Luttwak takes skeptical view of what he calls "'five minutes to midnight' catastrophism" of the sort practiced by the late King Hussein who "would warn us that with patience finally exhausted the Arab-Israeli conflict was about to explode, that all past conflicts would be dwarfed by what was about to happen unless, unless…"

May 2007 edition of Prospect - The Middle of Nowhere (http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=9302) by Edward Luttwak.


Why are middle east experts so unfailingly wrong? The lesson of history is that men never learn from history, but middle east experts, like the rest of us, should at least learn from their past mistakes. Instead, they just keep repeating them...

[Tom Odom]

OK I took my pill...

I swallowed the castor oil...

I got my tetanus shot...

And I had a root canal....


I would do any of those, again. Just don't make me read more tripe like this from Luttwak. We need to get Congress to give him a "writer's subsidy" like peanut farmers. Pay him not to write. We'd be better off,

Tom

[SWJED]

13 May Commentary Magazine blog - Not a Dead End (http://www.commentarymagazine.com/contentions/index.php/boot/424) by Max Boot.


I’ve been traveling a lot so have only now gotten around to reading “Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice,” Edward Luttwak’s article in the February issue of Harper’s. As usual with Luttwak, the article is thought-provoking and stylishly written. It’s also almost entirely wrong.

The blog of the Small Wars Journal has already posted two trenchant critiques of the article, by two of the leading counterinsurgency experts in the world: Dave Kilcullen, a former lieutenant colonel in the Australian army now working as an adviser to General David Petraeus in Baghdad, and Frank Hoffman, a retired Marine lieutenant colonel and a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia.

I won’t repeat most of what they have to say, except to note that Kilcullen scores a devastating hit when he observes that Luttwak is critiquing an early draft of FM 3-24, the Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual...