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Fabius Maximus
03-16-2007, 04:10 AM
With the permission of the SWC, this thread opens a discussion of an article posted on the Defense and National Interest website.

The Iraq insurgency has ended, which opens a path to peace
By Fabius Maximus.
March 13, 12007

http://www.defense-and-society.org/fcs/fabius_insurgency_ended.htm

Summary by Chet Richards, Editor of DNI: “The insurgency has indeed ended, but not for the reasons you might imagine.”

This article is the first in a series on a common theme: how America can survive and even prosper in an age in which 4GW is the dominant mode of warfare. It starts with our most pressing problem, Iraq.

It is a brief, hopefully provocative introduction -- recommending a radically different strategy for Coalition forces in Iraq. Following articles discuss these ideas and recommendations in greater detail. Criticism of my work on this site has in the past proved quite helpful in correcting and guiding me, and will prove so again. I thank all those who comment now, in advance.

Graycap
03-16-2007, 12:43 PM
I've read the interesting article and I think that you have some good points.

The center of my reasoning is how to reestablish some kind of order in a theater devastated by a 4GW war. This is the only way out of a 4GW disaster. Any kind of order is better than a freefire 4GW scene.

I think about solutions like the Bosnia agreement or the Lebanon after the Taef agreement.

For Europe the Dayton agreement worked well. The same, is true in my opinion, for Israel with the Taef agreement. The israeli error was to mantain an hopeless South Lebanon occupation that fueled the principal 4GW actor: Hizballah.

In my opinion the US should consider a role in Iraq very similar to the role that Syria played in Lebanon after Taef. A substantial control of the state with patronage of Saudi Arabia and Iran and with condition not to menace Israel.
Syria has been the only state to win over a 4GW environment in late '80. They played with every different actor in theater and used only a limited amount of firepower only to avoid victory of any actor, with decisive military actions in 1990-91 only when anyone was so exhausted that its intervention was substantially welcomed.

If the US could influence Israel in finding a workable solution with Syria, about Golan and Lebanon, this two steps, Iraq stabilization and Lebanon stabilization, could be a great success in a pincer manouver against the 4GW master: al-Qaeda.

Thank you for your attention. I'm only a newbie here and I feel a little bit afraid to post in such an informative forum. Sorry for my poor english since it's not my first language.

Graycap

Fabius Maximus
03-16-2007, 12:49 PM
Reply to a great question sent off-line ...

When the gov't disappears, losing so many attributes that it is not longer a real gov't in the eyes of its people, *all* the insurgencies end.

Insurgency is a rebellion against a gov't. No gov't, no insurgency.

In some areas, like the northern Kurd-dominated area, there appears to be a winner.

In others areas, such as the ungoverned zone called Baghdad, the fighting may continue or even intensify. There are other forms of civil war than "insurgency." These might be waged by any mix of conventional means, guerilla tactics, terrorism, etc.

The significance of this phase-change is not that we bury the dead differently. The "remedy" must different for each type of civil war. For example, a common COIN ops is suppressing local militias to build up the central govt's authority. Post-insurgency, the first is likely counter-productive -- the second probably impossible.

Stu-6
03-16-2007, 03:27 PM
If you defining the insurgency as fighting against a government then was there ever truly an insurgency in Iraq, since the government of Iraq never really controlled the country?

Maybe the time has come to accept a civil war in Iraq, at least for a while. The history of Iraq has been problematic from the start, we where unhappy with the status quo antebellum, a civil war and a fragment Iraq may not be so bad . . . all things considered. Who knows maybe in a ten-twenty years it may look like the Balkans not perfect but at least not a war zone.

Stratiotes
03-16-2007, 05:20 PM
Fabius, I have enjoyed your articles at DNI (I admit it, I'm a DNI junkie) for quite some time and this one is another winner. Thanks for posting it here.

As Stu points out, Iraq has always been rather problematic. The various "states" or "centers of culture" were combined in the early 20th century in what can be thought of as little more than a shotgun wedding. Their one uniting factor seems to have always been war - war against the European colonial ambition, war against Iran.... It seems doubtful to me that the various interests can remain united without war. Sad to say, the American occupation may be the one thing that will unite them in common cause eventually - to get rid of the American occupiers. Or, it may continue as civil war until they part ways or one "strongman" like Sadam Hussein rises to the top.

Sometime ago, the author, Steven Pressfield, did a column that was reprinted at DNI - "It's the Tribes Stupid." It is very enlightening I think on the idea of creating a democracy in our image there. The strongman always seems to be the only type of leader that "succeeds" at making something that resembles a government in such places.

dusty
03-16-2007, 06:21 PM
Fabius, I have to disagree with several of your statements:
Iraq has no Army, probably by our design to maximize their dependence on us.
In several cases, you cite the Iraqi Army as a non-entity, or at best, a puppet unable to move without CF approval. The Mahmoudiya and Sadr al Yousifiya areas were turned over to the Iraqis several months ago, and as an observer of that particular area, the effect the IA has had on the area is impressive.

How can we help in the brief period before we leave? I think setting a date for our departure has two detrimental effects. Whatever we try to accomplish will become that much more difficult, as we have lost credibility. And second, the high value bad guys just may go to ground, wait for us to leave, instead of us catching them now.

One last thing: The ideal of becoming neutral guardians is simply unfeasible. Armed infidels living on Islamic soil will always attract jihadists and the like. Offering monetary support, infrastructure or legitimacy in the eyes of the world are nothing but insults to a man who is driven by an ideology that is inherently opposed to you inhabiting his land.

Fabius Maximus
03-17-2007, 01:42 AM
Dusty, thank you for your comments.

One of the many ways in which war is a unique field of study is that (contra to Senator Moynihan) everyone can have not only their own opinion, but also their own facts. Amidst the fog, who knows? (Except for the folks at the front, who do not have this luxury)

As many folks have written, there is a strong basis for belief that there is no “Iraq” army as a combat force in being. There are Iraq army units that can provide security, in effect light duty occupation forces. These tend to desert or collapse when called to serious action.

Most of the effective forces wearing Iraq uniforms are regional/ethnic militia OR de facto private armies. The Kurdish Peshmerga is the best-known example.

On a deeper level, senior Iraq officials have repeated claimed that the Coalition commands the Iraq Army irrespective of their wishes. Such a force is more of a colonial militia than a national army.

I strongly agree with your next two points. I suspect we differ on the implications of these grim facts. We might never know who is correct, or what course we should take at this time.

This series of articles attempts to sketch a long-term geo-political strategy for America. If nothing else, in a small way they might help to stimulate a re-thinking of our goals and methods. Continuing on our present course seems destined, IMHO, for certain disaster. Sooner or later.

RTK
03-17-2007, 03:36 AM
With the permission of the SWC, this thread opens a discussion of an article posted on the Defense and National Interest website.

The Iraq insurgency has ended, which opens a path to peace
By Fabius Maximus.
March 13, 12007

http://www.defense-and-society.org/fcs/fabius_insurgency_ended.htm

Summary by Chet Richards, Editor of DNI: “The insurgency has indeed ended, but not for the reasons you might imagine.”

This article is the first in a series on a common theme: how America can survive and even prosper in an age in which 4GW is the dominant mode of warfare. It starts with our most pressing problem, Iraq.

It is a brief, hopefully provocative introduction -- recommending a radically different strategy for Coalition forces in Iraq. Following articles discuss these ideas and recommendations in greater detail. Criticism of my work on this site has in the past proved quite helpful in correcting and guiding me, and will prove so again. I thank all those who comment now, in advance.

It is what it is; why call it an article and not call it an OP-ED? You don't site resources, other than for filler quotes. It's a mixture rich in opinion and bubbling with exaggeration.

After 4 months of reading this stuff I still don't know where you get your "fact."

Fabius Maximus
03-17-2007, 03:48 AM
RTK,

As for how to label these, whatever. I'll accept "op-ed."

As for "facts", this op-ed builds on the previous ones. Please question any specifics, and I'll attempt to show the supporting evidence.

Of course, as mentioned previously, "facts" in a war zone are usually open to debate.

Like most folks looking at Iraq, we rely on the real analysts who collect from primary sources. Like Anthony Cordesman of CSIS. Have you seen his latest? It's worth a look.

The New Strategy in Iraq: Uncertain Progress Towards Unknown Goal
Center for Strategic and International Studies
March 14, 2007
7 pages

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070314_bushstrat_update.pdf

RTK
03-17-2007, 04:00 AM
RTK,

As for how to label these, whatever. I'll accept "op-ed."

As for "facts", this op-ed builds on the previous ones. Please question any specifics, and I'll attempt to show the supporting evidence.

Of course, as mentioned previously, "facts" in a war zone are usually open to debate.

Like most folks looking at Iraq, we rely on the real analysts who collect from primary sources. Like Anthony Cordesman of CSIS. Have you seen his latest? It's worth a look.

The New Strategy in Iraq: Uncertain Progress Towards Unknown Goal
Center for Strategic and International Studies
March 14, 2007
7 pages

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070314_bushstrat_update.pdf


Fabius,

I'm not going to question anything you write anymore. Obviously, as evidenced in this thread and a number of others I've called you out on, you haven't ever answered any of my questions anyway, nor have you ever been able to explain your operational relevance or insight (I've only been asking for almost three months [recall the Kilcullen Thread, http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1649&page=5 ]). Until you can, I'll count you as one of the multitude of so-called "experts" who continue to exploit the events in Iraq for personal name recognition or notarieity

Fabius Maximus
03-17-2007, 04:05 AM
Nice discussion of situation in Iraq in another thread in this forum. Makes many of the same points as in my op-ed. In more detail, of course.

Note the trend since the first report posted, the March 2006 "quarterly report to Congress." Toward unfulfilled promise, greater disorder and chaos.

The trend might be more important than any of the specifics.

US Policy, Interest, and Endgame
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=839

RTK
03-17-2007, 04:11 AM
Nice discussion of situation in Iraq in another thread in this forum. Makes many of the same points as in my op-ed. In more detail, of course.

Note the trend since the first report posted, the March 2006 "quarterly report to Congress." Toward unfulfilled promise, greater disorder and chaos.

The trend might be more important than any of the specifics.

US Policy, Interest, and Endgame
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=839

As usual, you ask for questions, then don't address them. I'm not really sure why you keep coming back here....

Fabius Maximus
03-17-2007, 04:19 AM
As usual, you ask for questions, then don't address them. I'm not really sure why you keep coming back here....

I am happy to answer any questions about Iraq that I discussed in my op-ed. Please assume I am slow and repeat your question.

The only thing in your post with a question mark was about the label "article" or "op-ed". And I accepted your term.

{My post about the other thread was not a response to your post.}

RTK
03-17-2007, 04:29 AM
One of the many ways in which war is a unique field of study is that (contra to Senator Moynihan) everyone can have not only their own opinion, but also their own facts. Amidst the fog, who knows? (Except for the folks at the front, who do not have this luxury).

Not sure your source for this, but I ask you again (as I have in previous threads) What are your qualifications and experience for making such a statement? Further, what exacty do you mean?


Most of the effective forces wearing Iraq uniforms are regional/ethnic militia OR de facto private armies. The Kurdish Peshmerga is the best-known example.

The Pesh have their own uniform, seperate from the Iraqi forces, with a green, white and red flag with a starburst in the middle. It looks nothing like an Iraqi uniform.

Additionally, I re-ask a question that I last asked on 30DEC2006 that you wouldn't answer: "what are your credentials and research methods to be able to intelligently write 20 articles over 40 months on Iraq?" I'm dying to hear the answer to that one. Further, if you're convinced you're right, why the psedonym?

Mark O'Neill
03-17-2007, 11:25 AM
Not sure your source for this, but I ask you again (as I have in previous threads) What are your qualifications and experience for making such a statement? Further, what exacty do you mean?

The Pesh have their own uniform, seperate from the Iraqi forces, with a green, white and red flag with a starburst in the middle. It looks nothing like an Iraqi uniform.

Additionally, I re-ask a question that I last asked on 30DEC2006 that you wouldn't answer: "what are your credentials and research methods to be able to intelligently write 20 articles over 40 months on Iraq?" I'm dying to hear the answer to that one. Further, if you're convinced you're right, why the psedonym?

RTK,

I agree. See my recent post in the TTP thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=11827#post11827).

Cheers,

Mark

Fabius Maximus
03-17-2007, 11:38 AM
I use "peshmerga" in the long-standing sense of armed Kurdish fighters, whose loyalty is to their ethnic group.

Some are in the uniforms of the Iraq national army; their true loyalty has been the subject of many articles over the past few years. A few quotes follow; more can easily be found on Google.

Perhaps the most famous: "Keeping Iraq Intact", CBS/AP (December 28, 2005)
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/12/28/iraq/main1166972.shtml

The soldiers said that while they wore Iraqi army uniforms they still considered themselves members of the Peshmerga - the Kurdish militia - and were awaiting orders from Kurdish leaders to break ranks. Many said they wouldn't hesitate to kill their Iraqi army comrades, especially Arabs, if a fight for an independent Kurdistan erupted.

…Afandi said his group had sent at least 10,000 Peshmerga to the Iraqi army in northern Iraq, a figure substantiated in interviews with officers in two Iraqi army divisions in the region.

"All of them belong to the central government, but inside they are Kurds ... all Peshmerga are under the orders of our leadership," Afandi said.


BBC (March 11, 2005)

Entering and leaving the area where the PKK camp is located is like crossing a border. The peshmerga of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, dressed now in their Iraqi National Guard uniforms, check all the cars coming in and out. There is even a customs official.

From The Scotsman (November 5, 2006)

Hamid Effendi, KDP minister for the peshmerga, has said, "The Arabs in southern Iraq struggle to build a new Iraqi army, but the Kurds already have one. The peshmerga wear Iraqi army uniforms, but they are still Kurds. We have about 60,000 peshmerga. And now they've got big guns"

This discussion is relevant today as Kurhish units of the Iraq national forces move to Baghdad as part of the surge. Much in the news; here is a balanced look:
Voice of America (Feb 16, 2007) "Iraqi Army Soldiers From the Kurdish North Head to Baghdad"
http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-02-16-voa27.cfm

Adding to the confusion;: many news accounts note that the peshmerga often do not wear uniforms.
New York Times (Feb 23, 2007)
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/27/international/middleeast/27militia.html/?pagewanted=1&ei=5070&en=3893f0ce7eeba790&ex=1174276800


The pesh merga are everywhere in Iraqi Kurdistan - along the highways, atop government buildings, riding in convoys. They wear a hodgepodge of uniforms, from traditional baggy outfits to desert camouflage hand-me-downs from the United States Army. There is one thing that appears to be consistent, though: they think of themselves as Kurds first and Iraqis second.

Fabius Maximus
03-17-2007, 12:12 PM
As usual, you ask for questions, then don't address them. I'm not really sure why you keep coming back here....

I write only by invitation. Hence the articles (or op-ed’s, if you prefer) on DNI. Hence this thread. Perhaps you should address your complaints to the SWC.

However, I said I would attempt to answer your questions.

First, I post here in order to receive useful feedback and criticism. That allows me to correct errors and do better in the future.

Second, why should anyone read my articles? What authority do I claim?

Everyone chooses what they regard as a legitimate source of authority. Max Weber classifies authority as charismatic (religious), traditional, or legal (bureaucratic rank, credentials). Perhaps one of those works for you. None of them works for me. I prefer to seek a different basis for belief: what works, what makes sense, what has supporting data. I care little for the source -- whether lord, priest, or serf.

I can only guess why people read my work. Perhaps it is best that I do not know!

1. My record as a forecaster is pretty good. (Not perfect, of course. I wish I was correct and that the US started withdrawing troops from Iraq in late 2006).

2. Perhaps they present interesting ideas or new perspectives.

3. Perhaps they provide some useful information.

Certainly not for entertainment. They are humorless and long (by web standards). Worse, they have been pretty grim (although this series is different).

I am sure we all agree that no style should or does work for everyone, as everyone seeks the truth in their own way.

SWJED
03-17-2007, 12:20 PM
I write only by invitation. Hence the articles (or op-ed’s, if you prefer) on DNI. Hence this thread. Perhaps you should address your complaints to the SWC...

Just to make sure everyone is on the same sheet of music here re "invitation" - Fabius Maximus asked if his DNI article was "worth posting to SWC." We said yes and suggested the link as the method.

RTK
03-17-2007, 12:52 PM
I write only by invitation. Hence the articles (or op-ed’s, if you prefer) on DNI. Hence this thread. Perhaps you should address your complaints to the SWC.

However, I said I would attempt to answer your questions.

First, I post here in order to receive useful feedback and criticism. That allows me to correct errors and do better in the future.

Second, why should anyone read my articles? What authority do I claim?

Everyone chooses what they regard as a legitimate source of authority. Max Weber classifies authority as charismatic (religious), traditional, or legal (bureaucratic rank, credentials). Perhaps one of those works for you. None of them works for me. I prefer to seek a different basis for belief: what works, what makes sense, what has supporting data. I care little for the source -- whether lord, priest, or serf.

I can only guess why people read my work. Perhaps it is best that I do not know!

1. My record as a forecaster is pretty good. (Not perfect, of course. I wish I was correct and that the US started withdrawing troops from Iraq in late 2006).

2. Perhaps they present interesting ideas or new perspectives.

3. Perhaps they provide some useful information.

Certainly not for entertainment. They are humorless and long (by web standards). Worse, they have been pretty grim (although this series is different).

I am sure we all agree that no style should or does work for everyone, as everyone seeks the truth in their own way.

Do you write your positions off of mainstream media accounts or have you been in Iraq since 2003 at all? The bottom line is it's either one or the other. Just by looking at the long list of fairly mainstream media resources for the Peshmerga item (which, in all actuality, you're using the term in way too general an application) I gather you've spent little, if any time, in Iraq and quite obviously haven't stepped foot in the northern provinces. I've worked with the IA, and I've worked with the Pesh. I've also worked with IA soldiers with Pesh backgrounds. There are huge differences between each of these catagories.

Additionally, your writings have always smacked of one who has bought into the mainstream media perspective. You highlight problems and seldom solutions. I have not once seen you use or highlight the infrastructure improvements along the SWEAT-MS lines, nor have you ever spotlighted the Iraqi Army units who are responsible for their own areas of operation. In short, you lack balance.

Lastly, you have long used your postings on this web site to attempt to gain readers to DNI. Let's be honest, most all of your posts have direct links to your DNI articles and very little outside of that. You've scantly addressed direct criticism, or even direct questioning. My summary of the 28 Articles was a direct response to your inability to understand their practical application in counterinsurgency operations and your failure to show examples of their futility beyond the 2nd article. Discussions are two ways. You effectively ignore the issues, especially when people whose jobs are to operate in that environment call you out. I'd prefer you'd just write on DNI (we know you're there) and quit asking permission to post here. If you won't address that which is asked of you, don't enter into the forum.

Ryan T. Kranc
CPT, AR

Reconnaissance Tactics Instructor
Armor BOLC IIII

tequila
03-17-2007, 01:03 PM
RTK - I was wondering if you could give any real-world examples of your experience with pesh vs IA. Every single media item I have read emphasizes that Kurdish IA have no hesitation proclaiming their ultimate loyalty to Kurdistan and the pesh. This item (http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington//16716510.htm)shows pesh officers getting salutes from IA soldiers and an IA major proclaiming his loyalty to the pesh, all in Kirkuk.

Now I am not going to privilege that over your own real-world experiences, so I definitely would like to hear your own take on the whole pesh vs IA and the ultimate loyalties of Kurdish soldiers in the IA, since to me this appears to be one of the ultimately crucial questions as to whether Iraq remains a single nation or not.

RTK
03-17-2007, 01:21 PM
RTK - I was wondering if you could give any real-world examples of your experience with pesh vs IA. Every single media item I have read emphasizes that Kurdish IA have no hesitation proclaiming their ultimate loyalty to Kurdistan and the pesh. This item (http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington//16716510.htm)shows pesh officers getting salutes from IA soldiers and an IA major proclaiming his loyalty to the pesh, all in Kirkuk.

Now I am not going to privilege that over your own real-world experiences, so I definitely would like to hear your own take on the whole pesh vs IA and the ultimate loyalties of Kurdish soldiers in the IA, since to me this appears to be one of the ultimately crucial questions as to whether Iraq remains a single nation or not.

In the 3d IA division, most of the leadership (BN and above) was from the northern provinces. Most had backgrounds that placed them with the Peshmerga in the 1990s. The a good majority of the jundis were Sunnis from Diyala and Babil provinces. I never saw issues.

Am I going to say that unabashedly there are zero issues - nope. I don't deal in absolutes quite like that. For all intents and purposes, it's not nearly the issue it could have been. You must remember that the real Kurdish radicals are actively fighting the Turks daily in the mountains.

In casual conversation, many of the Kurds expressed their desire for their own country, however, on multiple occassions they could have "thrown the game," so to speak, and never did. They're dedicated to ridding Iraq of the violence that plagues it. At least that was my understanding after spending my second year in Iraq with them

Fabius Maximus
03-17-2007, 01:25 PM
Do you write your positions off of mainstream media accounts or have you been in Iraq since 2003 at all?

I rely on primary sources almost exclusively, mostly media, NGO's, and government. When quoting officials and describing events, would you accept my personal observations, or prefer something with more credibility?


Additionally, your writings have always smacked of one who has bought into the mainstream media perspective.
The common objection to my 2003 & 2004 articles was that they contradicted reports in the mainstream media.


You highlight problems and seldom solutions.
A valid criticism and one I am addressing with this series of articles. It's easy to criticize; proposing solutions is more difficult. Of course, proposing solutions is inherently more speculative -- as I move from describing events to guessing what might work in the future.


Lastly, you have long used your postings on this web site to attempt to gain readers to DNI.
Again a valid criticism. This was raised for the first time in my previous SWC thread; since then I obtain in advance permission to post.


You've scantly addressed direct criticism, or even direct questioning.
This was raised in the last go-around, perhaps with some validity. Here I have attempted to specifically and clearly address questions. Including yours. Have I missed any?


I'd prefer you'd just write on DNI (we know you're their) and quit asking permission to post here.
It's not my place to decide what is appropriate for the SWC. That's for the folks running it to decide.


... your inability to understand their practical application in counterinsurgency operations
Please rebut or question! That's why I am here. Or ignore me, which is also OK. So far on this thread -- all this text! -- the only question was about the uniforms worn by Kurds. To which I replied. That was a fair test on a small but perhaps telling point of fact.


...which, in all actuality, you're using the term in way too general an application
Perhaps. The meaning of the term has shifted over the years. I checked current usage when writing my reply, and I think I used it in the commonplace sense. This is a minor point, however, as I think my meaning was clear -- which is the important thing.

Fabius Maximus
03-17-2007, 01:30 PM
I actually have the article in my file and overlooked it's significance!

SWCAdmin
03-17-2007, 01:49 PM
Just to make sure everyone is on the same sheet of music here re "invitation" - Fabius Maximus asked if his DNI article was "worth posting to SWC." We said yes and suggested the link.
In the wise words of Nick Nolte from one of my favorite movies (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B000F1IQIW?ie=UTF8&tag=smallwarsjour-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=B000F1IQIW), "What's life without a little salt, English?"

Certainly FM is spicing things up here, again.

He adds to our dialog and gets those juices flowing. He is a welcome member of our community. And a masterful teaser and baiter. So if he infuriates you, just say no. If you want to wrassle, have at it within our ROE (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/faq.php?faq=small_wars_council_faq#faq_conduct).

On his end, he clearly gains access to some articulate and opinionated folks who have first hand experience. No doubt which will inform (we hope) future prolific DNI "op-eds." Go, go RTK!

So our relationship is a win-win, but it always seems just a hair away from a smackdown.

All is great in this thread so far and much as expected. No problems or implied criticisms here. We'll see how the fleshpile develops.

J Wolfsberger
03-17-2007, 01:50 PM
...everyone can have not only their own opinion, but also their own facts.

Well, no. It looks that way some times, but only because there are a great many people who cherry pick facts to support their opinions. In those cases, actually collecting data, analyzing it and developing concepts or theories seems too much work.

One of the previous posters referred to the sweeping generalizations and unsupported assertions he found in your article. I'll admit I haven't read this article, and don't intend to. I did read earlier articles, by you and several others, at DNI. The previous poster nailed it dead on. In fact, several I read were so oriented toward attacking US defense policies and programs that they contradicted themselves. I wasn't surprised to find links, ties, what have you with Center for Defense (mis) Information. They have consistently gotten it wrong as well, and always in a way that somehow supports attacking US defense.

Here's a few comments on several of the topics touched on:

1. Kilcullen's 28 point are excellent advice to any soldier or Marine preparing to fight in a counter insurgency. If you think otherwise, invert them and see how much sense the result makes.

2. The value of the concepts of strategic corporal and Three Block War is not prescriptive, it is descriptive. They very accurately describe the situation our troops are in today. Again, if you think otherwise, try inverting them and see if the result makes sense.

3. 4GW strikes me as a phrase in search of a concept. Warfare has, indeed, changed over the millennia. 4GW doesn't explain much, if any, of the change. See my comment above about cherry picking facts.

I also have a suggestion. If you have a concept, insight, innovation, whatever to share. Write it here. Defend it here. I don't like being sent off to your website, then returning here for discussion.

RTK
03-17-2007, 01:51 PM
Please rebut or question! That's why I am here. Or ignore me, which is also OK. So far on this thread -- all this text! -- the only question was about the uniforms worn by Kurds. To which I replied. That was a fair test on a small but perhaps telling point of fact.


I'm talking about on the whole, not specifically isolated to this thread. The truth is, I've been waiting for 3 months for your response in the Kilcullen thread.

On 28 DEC you said that "I've given a close analysis of his text. Please give specifics as to my errors."

The point is that I did. I broke down each of the 28 Articles and showed real world application. You fell off the face of the earth after that. I gave specifics on each article. You never addressed them. No, there weren't question marks in the text, but there was plenty for you to refute.

SWCAdmin
03-17-2007, 02:32 PM
I'd prefer you'd just write on DNI (we know you're their) and quit asking permission to post here.
Again a valid criticism. This was raised for the first time in my previous SWC thread; since then I obtain in advance permission to post.
<snip>

I'd prefer you'd just write on DNI (we know you're their) and quit asking permission to post here.
It's not my place to decide what is appropriate for the SWC. That's for the folks running it to decide.
OK, time out.

I don't like the whole permission / implied endorsement thing that is going on here. There was and is no "advance permission to post," either required or granted. There was, and is here again, affirmation that this is a relevant topic and a welcome Council member. Nothing more, nothing less.

Our approach to the Small Wars Council is not to be gatekeepers on the front end, but to run an open community where relevance and worth, or at least interest and intent, is the key to access. We have been largely self-regulating and only occasionally apply revenge (i.e. after the fact) moderation.

Is this thread about a Small Wars topic? Yes. (except for some sidebar "process" rants like this)

Do we care that it refers to a source external to our board? Not really. We do that all the time. And while FM is certainly cross-promoting himself, we do that too, and there's nothing excessive, spammy, or abashedly commercial about this instance of it.

Does "presence" here, in and of itself, say anything more? No. Everyone's posts stand on their own merit.

Let the Games continue. Time back in.


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slapout9
03-17-2007, 02:40 PM
Bubba's SWC "Wrasslin Smackdown" results.
Winner and still champion RTK :D Final score 10+.
Loser FM, score 0. Penalty point added final score -1, reason lack of MO JO to support your arguments.

RTK
03-17-2007, 02:54 PM
OK, time out.

I don't like the whole permission / implied endorsement thing that is going on here. There was and is no "advance permission to post," either required or granted. There was, and is here again, affirmation that this is a relevant topic and a welcome Council member. Nothing more, nothing less.

Our approach to the Small Wars Council is not to be gatekeepers on the front end, but to run an open community where relevance and worth, or at least interest and intent, is the key to access. We have been largely self-regulating and only occasionally apply revenge (i.e. after the fact) moderation.

Is this thread about a Small Wars topic? Yes. (except for some sidebar "process" rants like this)

Do we care that it refers to a source external to our board? Not really. We do that all the time. And while FM is certainly cross-promoting himself, we do that too, and there's nothing excessive, spammy, or abashedly commercial about this instance of it.

Does "presence" here, in and of itself, say anything more? No. Everyone's posts stand on their own merit.

Let the Games continue. Time back in.

It's not that I'm questioning the posts' appropriatness. It's just that I expect open dialogue that addresses the issues. I don't feel that the Kilcullen thread ever really ended, as FM certainly did not redress the summary. My point is this: If you aren't going to address the issues brought out (whether there are question marks or not) then why engage in the first place. That's all I'm saying. FM is well within his rights to post on SWJ. Perhaps my earlier post was a bit less well constructed and too emotive.

Stan
03-17-2007, 03:34 PM
Slapout !
Glad you finally did it...I wanted to all morning :D

God, I hope I never get on RTK's bad side :rolleyes:

SWCAdmin
03-17-2007, 04:23 PM
Perhaps my earlier post was a bit less well constructed and too emotive.
Perhaps not. In the net.

I saw some "open dialogue that addresses the issues."

We need plenty of that.

Culpeper
03-17-2007, 04:53 PM
Fabius,

I'm not going to question anything you write anymore. Obviously, as evidenced in this thread and a number of others I've called you out on, you haven't ever answered any of my questions anyway, nor have you ever been able to explain your operational relevance or insight (I've only been asking for almost three months [recall the Kilcullen Thread, http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1649&page=5 ]). Until you can, I'll count you as one of the multitude of so-called "experts" who continue to exploit the events in Iraq for personal name recognition or notarieity


Been there. Done that. It seems to work.

Culpeper
03-17-2007, 04:57 PM
I rely on primary sources almost exclusively, mostly media, NGO's, and government. When quoting officials and describing events, would you accept my personal observations, or prefer something with more credibility?


The common objection to my 2003 & 2004 articles was that they contradicted reports in the mainstream media.


A valid criticism and one I am addressing with this series of articles. It's easy to criticize; proposing solutions is more difficult. Of course, proposing solutions is inherently more speculative -- as I move from describing events to guessing what might work in the future.


Again a valid criticism. This was raised for the first time in my previous SWC thread; since then I obtain in advance permission to post.


This was raised in the last go-around, perhaps with some validity. Here I have attempted to specifically and clearly address questions. Including yours. Have I missed any?


It's not my place to decide what is appropriate for the SWC. That's for the folks running it to decide.


Please rebut or question! That's why I am here. Or ignore me, which is also OK. So far on this thread -- all this text! -- the only question was about the uniforms worn by Kurds. To which I replied. That was a fair test on a small but perhaps telling point of fact.


Perhaps. The meaning of the term has shifted over the years. I checked current usage when writing my reply, and I think I used it in the commonplace sense. This is a minor point, however, as I think my meaning was clear -- which is the important thing.
This is what I'm talking about. I find it very irritating for someone to selectively quote and respond, which place the entire thing out of context by construct. The Emperor should be able to respond to a post and cite his arguments appropriately. This isn't the Mariah Carey Fan Club where the lambs fight back and forth and take each other's comments out of context just because they don't know how to write a proper rebuttal.

Fabius Maximus
03-17-2007, 05:05 PM
FM is well within his rights to post on SWJ. Perhaps my earlier post was a bit less well constructed and too emotive.

I agree with what you expressed both here and in the Kilcullen discussion. Posting from another site is, I believe, not discussed in the rules and therefore seems problematic. I did not ask then, but did so before starting this thread. I'm not sure where the "implied endorsement" view came from, as I doubt either of us thought that.

Web communities tend to spend much time on internal mechanics. I've read that some astonishingly high fraction of Wikipedia discussions are about its internal mechanics. It's a price paid for members taking the community seriously.

Since this has come up twice to my knowledge, adding a sentence about cross-posting might be useful. Just an outsider’s suggestion. (I hope it's not in there and I overlooked it in December)

As for previous discussions, the “Kilcullen” debate went on long past the point where I ceased to get anything from it. Not to mention the endless ad hominem attacks. Who was right or wrong I leave for the God or the SWC moderators to determine. I made what I considered a good faith contribution to a thread I started, not a life-long commitment. Like yourselves, I leave when the cost-benefit ratio becomes unfavorable.

So we’re back to this thread. If anyone has questions or criticisms on the article posted, I will make a good faith attempt to answer them. Like any opinion piece (another good call, RTK) it has errors, some of which people have told me about. If we're done, that's OK too.

Jedburgh
03-17-2007, 05:13 PM
I'm not going to question anything you write anymore....
Been there. Done that. It seems to work.
On rare occasions there is someone posting on the board who (because of tone, content or both) that I want to look up just so I can punch him in the face. At that time, for me at least, it is useful to recognize that not posting is probably the better response. The board does have a feature that can help with targeted aggression:

What are the buddy and ignore lists?

The buddy list is used to keep track of the friends you have made on this forum. By going to your "Open Buddy List" in "Quick Links" menu of the navbar, you'll be able to see which of your friends are currently online and send them a private message. Adding people to your buddy list also allows you to send private messages to multiple forum members at the same time. You may add any member of the forums to your buddy list by viewing their profile or by going to "Buddy / Ignore Lists" in your "User CP".

Ignore lists are used for those people whose messages you wish not to read. By adding someone to your ignore list, those messages posted by these individuals will be hidden when you read a thread.

Fabius Maximus
03-17-2007, 05:19 PM
I find it very irritating for someone to selectively quote and respond, which place the entire thing out of context by construct. The Emperor should be able to respond to a post and cite his arguments appropriately.

I do not understand the nature of your objection. If you could restate it, I'll respond. I do not spend much time here, or on any similar sites, so please tell me if I am violating some protocol.

I “selectively quote” so that you will know what I am answering, like repeating the question in a meeting. It’s just a pointer, not intended to summarize the previous comment – which is, after all, a scroll down on the screen.

There were 6 questions. On three I conceded the point. One question of procedure (info sources), which I answered. Two questions on small points, which I answered. If you find any of the answers inadequate, please tell me which one(s).

Fabius Maximus
03-17-2007, 05:28 PM
Occasionally there is someone posting on the board that I want to look up just so I can punch him in the face. At that time, for me at least, it is useful to recognize that not posting is probably the better response. The board does have a feature that can help with targeted aggression:

I will answer the questions already in progress, such as from Culpeper and RTK, but I think with Jedburgh's comment this thread has gone past any reasonable debate.

Just a parting thought, if this is how you respond to my fairly mild comments -- after all, calls for to build a federated state in Iraq &/or exit fast are common now -- the range of debate here will likely remain fairly narrow. It is your site, and your decision how to run it.

Jedburgh
03-17-2007, 05:47 PM
I will answer the questions already in progress, such as from Culpeper and RTK, but I think with Jedburgh's comment this thread has gone past any reasonable debate.

Just a parting thought, if this is how you respond to my fairly mild comments -- after all, calls for to build a federated state in Iraq &/or exit fast are common now -- the range of debate here will likely remain fairly narrow. It is your site, and your decision how to run it.
FM - don't take my comment personally. My point is, that if people are getting personally annoyed with you or with this discussion thread, then they need to either ignore your posts, or take it to PM or elsewhere.

Discussion is good - bickering is bad.

When posts are beginning to move in the direction of the latter, it significantly detracts from the usefulness of the thread. You know the old saw about "arguing on the internet...."

Fabius Maximus
03-17-2007, 06:05 PM
I am trying to answer your questions, often at some length. And am attempting to learn from my past mistakes on this site. Please try to meet me half-way. We might even learn something from each other. Who knows?

We disagree, that's fine. I think in terms of current American opinion, we're pretty close. Hence I find the attitude here surprising. Nor, in my opinion, does this encourage visitors to participate unless they share your views.

This is your part of the global sandbox, and you can play by any rules you choose. It seems a bit of waste to me, as there is a lot of knowledge here that could reach a wider audience with a friendlier attitude to strangers.

SWCAdmin
03-17-2007, 08:38 PM
What I’m thankful for….

Thanks to Jedburgh for pointing out the “don’t post when you can’t see straight” sage advice. And for clarifying that the initial vivid image there was illustrative of passions in general that might call for implementation of that strategy, rather than a specific allusion to our current thread.

Thanks to Fabius Maximus for being more responsive to direct questions, and for spicing up a lazy Saturday with some well crafted prose that pushes buttons. He has conceded some points in a gentlemanly fashion, and has not ever hidden his pretense that he is accessing our collective talents to help vet his works and fuel future ones. For those that don’t like that, see Jedburgh’s advice. For those who want to engage, he certainly seems willing and able!

Thanks to our members for getting over the pseudonym issue that plagued us at about this point in the last go-‘round. I’m glad we’re moving past that. SWC has made a conscious decision to allow for that in order to accommodate a more open discussion. We will not tolerate its use as an anonymizer from which to hurl insults, but that is not the case here. We respect the privacy of our members, and afford those who choose to use it the veil of pseudonymity in order to enable a frank discussion without repercussions to another life.

Thanks to the lads in Ireland for this nice Guinness in my hand on St. Patrick’s Day.


What I’d like to be thankful for in the near future…..

Continued passion from our members on these important issues when we feel they are being incorrectly bumper-stickered. Sometimes in the MSM, and God forbid maybe even here in these hallowed e-halls of the SWC. Channeled appropriately, of course.

An end to this whining about our rules, attitude, and range of debate here (e.g. posts 37,39). I have sensed a MASSIVE willingness in our members to listen to and learn from alternative views, just not to accept them as gospel without some critical analysis. It is not hostile or closed minded to ask for more than semantic support of a debatable statement, particularly when one’s firsthand observations do not fit with the conclusion. FM, in my opinion, that’s the bulk of what you’re getting here (and that’s what you want). And that is a very different thing than closing ranks on an outsider or a contrary viewpoint.

Another go-‘round on the next installment. FM indicated he would be developing some of these issues a little more in a planned series. Should make for a real party.

Another Guinness. OK, I think I will!

RTK
03-17-2007, 09:49 PM
I will answer the questions already in progress, such as from Culpeper and RTK, but I think with Jedburgh's comment this thread has gone past any reasonable debate.

Just a parting thought, if this is how you respond to my fairly mild comments -- after all, calls for to build a federated state in Iraq &/or exit fast are common now -- the range of debate here will likely remain fairly narrow. It is your site, and your decision how to run it.

Question: The title of the piece is "Good news - the insurgency is over!" but your article doesn't really talk about it. It doesn't really make much sense to me as it disavows all definitions of insurgency to say that it doesn't exist. Kinda like the Peshmerga thing. It seems that there are terms being thrown out haphazardly that have very finite meanings that you're using to overstate the case. Can you please explain in more detail exactly what is meant by this title and precisely what you mean by it?

Looks like I gotta restock the bourbon cabinet. Thanks for the entertaining St. Patricks Day.

Fabius Maximus
03-17-2007, 10:08 PM
Your question goes to the heart of the issue.

Wikipedia:

An insurgency, or insurrection, is an armed uprising or revolt against an established civil or political authority.

My dictionary:

insurgency: an organized rebellion aimed at overthrowing a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.

This op-ed gives is a syllogism. Perhaps two (loosely defined).

1. There is fighting.
2. There is no established national government.
3. Therefore the fighting is not an insurgency against the national gov't.

Here is the second one.

1. There are legitimate local governments in some parts of Iraq.
2. A national government must either have legitimacy or be composed of parts that have legitimacy.
3. Therefore the Iraq’s local governments are the basis we should work with to build a federated Iraq state.
4. Let’s stop attacking the militia and attempt to cut some deals.

Nothing original in these. These things have been said with increasing frequency during the past year. Perhaps this just frames the arguments a bit differently.

MountainRunner
03-17-2007, 10:09 PM
What I read in some of the rebuttals and questions to FM's "the insurgency is over" is that this is something of a semenatic game. Remember when Rummy ended the insurgency by, to the obvious discomfort and consternation of Peter Pace in one news conference (http://mountainrunner.us/2005/12/general_retreat.html) in particular, changing their name to the "Enemies of the Legitimate Governement"? How is Must we ask for the core purpose of the conflicting parties and how is the government really legitimated and by whom to have an insurgency?

What I find ironic about this thread is that strict semantic parsing is coming from a proponent of 4GW, which relies on extremely loose interpretations of history. If we applied the same fuzzy definitions of "fourth generation warfare" to this debate over "insurgency" (and don't get me started on the evil spawns of 5GW and 6GW), what would we have? I'm betting "insurgency".

RTK
03-17-2007, 10:31 PM
Your question goes to the heart of the issue.

Wikipedia:


My dictionary:


This op-ed gives is a syllogism. Perhaps two (loosely defined).

1. There is fighting.
2. There is no established government.
3. Therefore the fighting is not an insurgency.

Here is the second one.

1. There are legitimate local governments in some parts of Iraq.
2. A national government must either have legitimacy or be composed of parts that have legitimacy.
3. Therefore the Iraq’s local governments are the basis we should work with to build a federated Iraq state.
4. Let’s stop attacking the militia and attempt to cut some deals.

Nothing original in these. These things have been said with increasing frequency during the past year. Perhaps this just frames the arguments a bit differently.

I guess if you don't believe there's a government in Iraq, then there's nothing I can do to persuade you otherwise.

I do staunchly disagree with you, and by stating that there is no government essentially says that 8.4 million voters (58%) in December 2005 don't count. That's more of a turnout than we have in the United States, but I guess they just don't count.

Culpeper
03-17-2007, 10:54 PM
I do not understand the nature of your objection. If you could restate it, I'll respond. I do not spend much time here, or on any similar sites, so please tell me if I am violating some protocol.

I “selectively quote” so that you will know what I am answering, like repeating the question in a meeting. It’s just a pointer, not intended to summarize the previous comment – which is, after all, a scroll down on the screen.

There were 6 questions. On three I conceded the point. One question of procedure (info sources), which I answered. Two questions on small points, which I answered. If you find any of the answers inadequate, please tell me which one(s).

It is your style of overusing the quote function. Dissecting a paragraph or several paragraphs is not necessary since you know how to write an articulate article than you can surely write an articulate rebuttal. We are not dummies and don't need to be quoted out of context with overkill, which starts a fight. I don't agree entirely with our SWC forefathers' assessment concerning your motivation. I think you work very hard on sharing your opinion in a very professional manner by writing up a study and posting an external link for those that wish to read it then resort to high school text messaging in response to criticism. It has been a long time since we had this discussion and I don't want to have it any longer. I read your papers. Every single one of them. I had quit responding until today. Looks like I fell off the wagon. That's my fault and not your's. So, please carry on. It is not my intention to make you feel unwelcome. But would you kindly respond to posts in the same manner you write your studies. It will make a more productive, informational, and entertaining thread. For example, when did you become interested in the civil war violence of Iraq? Was it before or after Saddam took power? Surely, you can answer those two questions in the form of a paragraph with plain text and in your own words without fooling around with the icon tools.

Fabius Maximus
03-17-2007, 11:29 PM
a proponent of 4GW, which relies on extremely loose interpretations of history.
I'll have to think about this. There must be a rebuttal, but I cannot imagine what it might be. Where is Lind when I need him?

I agree with you -- and like your phrasing -- about the evil spawn of 5GW and so forth. They seem like a good idea taken to the point of absurdity.


I'm betting "insurgency".
I'll bet on the other said of the question. Perhaps we lack the fine distinctions needed. What are other forms of civil war, other than insurgency?

RTK
03-17-2007, 11:57 PM
If your syllogism holds true, or is worth its weight in salt, then riddle me this:

If in 2003...

1. The United States Government overthrew the Saddam Regime in March 2003 thus irradicating the established government
2. There was fighting
3. Therefore there hasn't been an established government since 2003, but, since fighting was not directed at an established government, no insurgencey.

Under your definition, how could there ever have been an insurgency (you used the term "insurgent" as far back as November 2003). Under your narrow definition the insurgency never happened as there hasn't been, in your words, a government in place since Saddam was in power, therefore, no insurgency.

It doesn't make sense. It's John Kerry-esque. How can this be the case? Please explain....

Fabius Maximus
03-18-2007, 12:20 AM
Think of these terms – banditry, insurgency, civil war – as a diagnosis. The first diagnosis was fighting with a low level of political activity – by “dead enders.” As the disease progressed the threat assessment also escalated, and there was an “insurgency.” Now it has progressed to the point that the central government – for which we had such hope – appears non-viable. There is probably a specific word for the current condition, this specific type of civil war. (I wish I had thought of this when writing the text).

Continuing the medical metaphor, each diagnosis leads to a remedy. Now we are treating Iraq with counter-insurgency operations. If the disease has progressed, that might no longer be appropriate. A different form of treatment might be required.

As with 5GW, we cannot take this metaphor too far or it gets silly. (Do we ally with the cancers in each organ?) It's an illustration.

jonSlack
03-18-2007, 01:21 AM
Because the Iraqi government is still in its formative stages and not totally effective does not mean it does not exist.

A little perspective: In the US, our current Constitution was not adopted until 1787, over a decade after the Declaration of Indepence was adopted in 1776 and the Articles of Confederation became de facto law in 1777.

More perspective: In 1791 the federal government of the United States raised a force that was personally lead by President Washington to suppress a rebellion by whiskey distillers who were upset about an excise tax on thier products.

I shudder to think what would have happened if the government under the Articles of Confederation or President Washington under the Constitution had had to fight "dead ender" Tories financed and supported by the British government, an international network of religious extremists, heavily armed criminal organizations, and a homegrown organization of religious extremists covertly supported by neighboring country all at the same time so early in our history. Hell, I shudder to think what would happen if we had to do all that today on US soil.

PS: As a side note to the Whiskey Rebellion, I think the outcome is relevant today. The federal government attempted to suppress the rebellion with a conventional force of 13,000 Soldiers. The result was the arrest of 20 people, only 2 of whom were convicted of treason, and they were later pardoned by President Washington. The remaining rebels merely disappeared and distillers in areas outside of Federal control kept on distilling.

PPS: And on the causes of the Rebellion, the small distillers who bore the highest tax rate only distilled because the lack of infrastructure, a failure of government, made it impossible for them to transport their grain to market in any form other than distilled spirits.

RTK
03-18-2007, 01:24 AM
Think of these terms – banditry, insurgency, civil war – as a diagnosis. The first diagnosis was fighting with a low level of political activity – by “dead enders.” As the disease progressed the threat assessment also escalated, and there was an “insurgency.” Now it has progressed to the point that the central government – for which we had such hope – appears non-viable. There is probably a specific word for the current condition, this specific type of civil war. (I wish I had thought of this when writing the text).

Continuing the medical metaphor, each diagnosis leads to a remedy. Now we are treating Iraq with counter-insurgency operations. If the disease has progressed, that might no longer be appropriate. A different form of treatment might be required.

As with 5GW, we cannot take this metaphor too far or it gets silly. (Do we ally with the cancers in each organ?) It's an illustration.

Couple questions in following come to mind:

1. As one at the pointy tip of the spear, how do we remedy this, if it truely is the case?
2. Do you think the surge will work, even if it is "civil war?" Why or why not?
3. Were you ever under the impression that the government was viable? If so, at what point did they fail to be such? If not, doesn't that invalidate many of your writings over the past 3 years?

Bill Moore
03-18-2007, 01:53 AM
I'll meet you part way, as you may recall I made other posts on the SWJ Council where I also expressed by doubts that we're dealing with an insurgency, at least in the traditional sense as described by our doctrine. We executed a regime change, and we don't have much, if any, doctrine on that topic, but we do have some history with it, such as Panama, Haiti (successes, at least Panama), and numerous CIA sponsored regime changes.

However, since we did stand up a government (however ineffective) in Iraq, and since some Iraqis who want nothing to do with it are fighting it (not necessarily to overthrow the government, but to push the government out of their lives), at least part of the trouble in Iraq by definition is an insurgency. As DK wrote (still the best thinker in my opinion on the subject) we have a whopper of a problem with three types of conflict: insurgency, civil war, and terrorists (in this case separate from the insurgents, who also use terrorism as a tactic). The strategy for one problem makes the other worse and so on.

The real question is will our COIN doctrine work? First it is a crime we haven't really applied COIN doctrine until now (with the exception of certain units at some locals such as Tal Afar, but strategically we haven't). We have to secure the population and hinder freedom of movement for the insurgents, terrorists, and warring ethnic groups, so the strategy we're trying to apply now seems to be best suited to accomplish this. Do we and the Iraqis have enough troops? Enough politcal will? etc. I don't know. I also don't what the political solution is after we attain an acceptable level of security. However, the only reason I would throw in the towel at this point, is so our fighters could wipe the sweat off their brow, then get back to fighting. It is too early to state make a prediction either way.

Culpeper
03-18-2007, 02:24 AM
Bill, I agree with your post. I'm beginning to wonder if Donald Rumsfeld had a copy of the USMC Small Wars Manual sitting on his desk for nothing other than decoration. I believe that the term, "insurgency" is obsolete at this point. Religious, tribal, and civil rights warfare is more like it. Along with terrorist groups just to add a little Jihad to the mix. Let it be known to all awful regimes that the United States can and will topple your power and turn your entire country into utter chaos. No organization has ever won a war by solely concentrating on killing innocent civilians and the so-called insurgency started dying when Iraq established a government and started controlling propaganda.

Fabius Maximus
03-18-2007, 04:13 AM
As Jonslack and Bill note, insurgency is not an all or nothing thing. Rather, the "no insurgency" analysis suggests that the balance has changes such that we should adopt a new strategic direction.

The alterative to COIN -- perhaps the only alt other than load and leave -- is to attempt putting Iraq on the path that Jonslack describes in our history. America was not built as a top-down project, but from the bottom up. That is, it was built on a foundation of legitimate States and their governing elites. Only after the Civil War (aka the War between the States) was the national structure clearly stronger than the States.

That suggests, as Bill said, attempting to retain order. Except that in the “Federal” solution we would stop fighting the local militias. Instead work to cut deals with as many as possible. The political and security rails would run in parallel, not in series.

As usual, RTK asks some pointed but pertinent questions. Answers:

1. Do as described briefly above, and in more detail in my op-ed.

2. I do not comment on current ops. All that I’ll say is in the article, the Mao quote.

3. From the start I shared the opinion of the real experts, the A-team, in the 4GW community. Most were of this opinion before the war started that we can destroy a state but not build one. We’re in the era of “the decline of the state” as described by Martin van Creveld. Failed or wrecked states easily fragment into situations like the 30 years war, where many factions – divided among varying lines – fight one another.

This suggests another reason to stop fighting the local elites. If we do break them, that might not build the center. Rather it might initiate another round of disintegration. This is Lind’s worst case, where we have nobody to negotiate with.

RTK
03-18-2007, 04:44 AM
1. Don't buy, as you've gone into no detail, nor do you offer solutions.
2. Don't buy, it's as you have before. No substance to a real issue. You seemto shy away from these.
3. I don't believe you know what you're talking about. Perhaps after speaking firsthand to those who are power brokers you'd understand. You clearly don't.

jcustis
03-18-2007, 04:46 AM
3. From the start I shared the opinion of the real experts, the A-team, in the 4GW community.

Who are these folks?

I've weighed a federal Iraq pretty heavily in my mind for quite a while, but I still do not pretend to know what that actually gets us. What are the benefits to that versus an Iraq structured on a central government?

Ironhorse
03-18-2007, 12:40 PM
Seems like a magic pill solution to me. And too big a pill to swallow at this point.

JonSlack provides a nice summary of our own growing pains.

Iraq cultural experiences include the extremes of excessively concentrated central government power, and tribalism/localism with only loose and fleeting alliances based on specific issues or relationships. Compromise, a key to a federal system, is not in the vernacular.

For the metaphor crowd, I would say that this is NOT a case of just teaching an old dog a new trick, but one of not being able to make a horse drink.

The net of this cultural impasse, as I see it from my comfortable suburban living room at the moment, is that there is no feasible third way -- make Plan A work, or let there be civil war, but we can not realistically try to apply the political equivalent of the Triple Lindy just because we gooned up the early attempts at a strong central democracy.

Has anyone seen an outline for a federal solution, and path to get there, that they feel is workable? I.e. anything more than escapism and inventing a COA C, just becasue COAs A and B don't seem pat?

Fabius Maximus
03-18-2007, 01:51 PM
I agree with Ironhorse that the best metaphor might be “but one of not being able to make a horse drink.”

As Ironhorse and Jcustis have noted, re-building an Iraq state along Federal lines might not work. It's not clear that we know how to build a state, or even understand the dynamics involved. Again borrowing from Ironhorse (who used this in a different context), state formation is “a magic pill solution.” We try it over and over because all we have are these pills, and we hope they’re magic.

Look at what follows the collapse of empires in Europe (Russian, ottoman, QAustro-hungrey, German). Equally bad or worse was the process of state formation following de-colonization of colonies in SE Asia, India/Pak, Central and South America, and (horrific) Africa. Lots of wars until things sort themselves out. Some just never seem to sort out.

As Ironhorse says, many have not given up on the top-down approach in Iraq. Question: at what point would you say this approach has failed?

What does a federal Iraq get us? It's a bottom-up path to building a central gov't. It’s a plan “B.”

The only other solution is creating 3 smaller states. Kurdistan and Shia-land might work, although our allies the Turks might not like it. Also, as small, oil-rich states they might be too vulnerable to survive.

Unfortunately the third piece, central Iraq, looks to be a poor, multi-ethnic, war zone if left to its own resources.

RTK, this was an op-ed, advocating a change of direction. A turn signal, not an operational plan. This scenario calls for a “stand down the forces” and “get everyone around the table” process. The best that can be said for it is that sometimes it works. If it doesn’t? We give up and leave, or try something else.

This is of course just a guess, but I think domestic political considerations favor this course. It might be given more time to work than continued COIN.

Off-topic: Professor Colin Kahl of the Political Science Dept at the U of Minnesota wrote a brief on the evolution of our COIN ops in Iraq.
Posted on "Informed Consent"
Blog of Juan Cole, Prof History, U Michigan
http://www.juancole.com/

Stan
03-18-2007, 03:05 PM
Hello FM !

I have some reservations about your most recent posts.


Look at what follows the collapse of empires in Europe (Russian, ottoman, QAustro-hungrey, German). Equally bad or worse was the process of state formation following de-colonization of colonies in SE Asia, India/Pak, Central and South America, and (horrific) Africa.

I have worked in horrific Africa for many, many years and won't begin to pretend I could compare it with Iraq or Afghanistan. It's simply not possible.

I'm not sure why you plugged in the "Off-topic: Professor Colin Kahl".

Although his article is somewhat relative, it seems nothing more than an over-simplistic view of nearly five years, thousands dead and changes in command.

He commences with 'Theres a lot of confusion' about COIN and the US Military's approach since the fall of Saddam. Summarizes the whole sheebang with denial, learning curves, gettin' it and doing it and then has the balls to sum up with 'This shift makes sense from the perspective of COIN' and better yet, ends with 'What the briefing doesn't say is that it is also unclear whether employing COIN best practices will work in the context of not only a raging insurgency'.

Ya know, I didn't get anything out of that, at all :confused:

Lastly, why the sudden derailing into female soldiers ?
This would have been a good post all on its very own.

Regards, Stan

Jedburgh
03-18-2007, 03:20 PM
...Lastly, why the sudden derailing into female soldiers? This would have been a good post all on its very own.
Agree with the last statment. The post on female soldiers has been moved into its own thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2414)

SWJED
03-18-2007, 03:39 PM
... Off-topic: Professor Colin Kahl of the Political Science Dept at the U of Minnesota wrote a brief on the evolution of our COIN ops in Iraq.
Posted on "Informed Consent"
Blog of Juan Cole, Prof History, U Michigan
http://www.juancole.com/

Professor Kahl has been kind enough to grant the SWJ permission to post his e-mail, the following link also contains a link to the Andrew Krepinevich briefing that generated his e-mail - The Four Phases of the U.S. COIN Effort in Iraq (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/03/the-four-phases-of-the-us-coin/).

jcustis
03-18-2007, 03:47 PM
What does a federal Iraq get us? It's a bottom-up path to building a central gov't. It’s a plan “B.”

Okay, develop this a bit more if you can. What's that path look like? Who are the players at the bottom? This may be an op-ed for you, but I'd like to see youn bring some more depth to the writing before you steer in and out of the SWC, dropping landmines.

You state that a federal structure appears to be the only solution, and that our articles of Confederation offer a viable model. Why? I ask because I would caution anyone who wants to hang that hat of Iraqi progress on American models of governance.

We got into trouble because "bringing democracy to the people of Iraq" was a noble idea to some. Perhaps it is time to stop that seed. The Green Revolution brought good crops to other parts of the world, but it also made the rich richer, and widened the divide between them and subsistence farmers. A federal Iraq poses very hard questions which I'd like to see you answer beyond a few one-liners.

marct
03-18-2007, 03:57 PM
Hi FM,

I haven't been involved in this discussion for a variety of reasons, including a dress rehearsal and concert last night and another one today in Montreal. That being said, I do want to make a point that, I believe, needs to be addressed.

"Semantics" is absolutely crucial to any form of communication; it is not a "joke" as it appears to be presented by many people. "Semantics" is about "meaning", and he opposite of it is Humpty-Dumpty land where words mean what the author says they mean. This is one of the reasons why I almost always attempt to provide operational definitions of terms in my articles and, frequently, put in material about the etymological derivation of words.

Having said this, I want to highlight one comment you made in an earlier post:


I rely on primary sources almost exclusively, mostly media, NGO's, and government. When quoting officials and describing events, would you accept my personal observations, or prefer something with more credibility?

Every source you list is a secondary source, not a primary source unless what you are studying is media / NGO / Government representation of what is happening in Iraq. It is a secondary source precisely because it has been filtered through at least one, or more, interpretive schemas. In the case of the media, it is frequently a tertiary source when they are reporting on what someone else, such as a government, military or NGO figure has already analyzed.

In proper academic research, every layer of interpretation creates a new bias that must be resolved, and you do not do this. I think that this is one of the causes of friction here.

Anyway, I have to run - off to Montreal for another concert.

Marc

Fabius Maximus
03-18-2007, 04:18 PM
They are secondary sources, not primary.

For discussions about war zones we are to a large extent limited to these sources. Both sides of the debate can see them and assess their credibility. Also, for most of us they are our only sources through which to see the larger picture.

Anecdotal data – “annec-data” – can provide valuable context and insights, but is often difficult to build on.

RTK
03-18-2007, 04:26 PM
They are secondary sources, not primary.

For discussions about war zones we are to a large extent limited to these sources. Both sides of the debate can see them and assess their credibility. Also, for most of us they are our only sources through which to see the larger picture.

Anecdotal data – “annec-data” – can provide valuable context and insights, but is often difficult to build on.

Unless you placed a request to imbed with an operational unit in theater and saw this firsthand. You could probably go in country on your own and snoop about easily (quite a few have done this, to include guys like Scott Taylor).

That way you wouldn't have to worry about source filtering.

Ironhorse
03-18-2007, 04:34 PM
Re the federal model,
This is of course just a guess, but I think domestic political considerations favor this course. It might be given more time to work than continued COIN.

BINGO!

Domestic political considerations seek the impossible - clean wars, talk (AKA diplomacy) that "solves" the problem of those who have sworn a blood oath against your very existence, no abortions and no sex education but no unwanted babies, a military that welcomes rump rangers with open arms not closed fists, and COIN against an established insurgency that takes less than 10-20 years (our bad for letting it get established, but water under the bridge now :mad: ).

A course of action (in military planning process terms) has all those pesky little requirements like being complete, feasible, achieving the desired end state, etc. The amount of time that we might be willing to indulge it does not make an unworkable solution workable. Wanting it doesn't make it feasible. Even wanting it very badly. As has been so often said of late, hope is not a course of action. On the contrary, disatisfaction with things that are not sterile is at the root of our domestic disatisfaction now, and we would likely convey the same to the failing federal Iraq model once the brief honeymoon was over. (Come to think of it, maybe Karl Rove should let the Dems go for it to plot for 2012? ;) )

BREAK

A slight sidebar -

As Ironhorse says, many have not given up on the top-down approach in Iraq.

When did I say that? What is that?

But OK, if a strong central government is what you mean by top-down, that seems to be within our chosen COA. i.e. a part of our current ConOps.

Culpeper
03-18-2007, 05:44 PM
Professor Kahl has been kind enough to grant the SWJ permission to post his e-mail, the following link also contains a link to the Andrew Krepinevich briefing that generated his e-mail - The Four Phases of the U.S. COIN Effort in Iraq (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/03/the-four-phases-of-the-us-coin/).


This is right on.


Phase 4: Doing it. None of this changed until January 2007, when Bush announced his intention to "surge" 17,500 additional forces to Baghdad (and 4,000 more to Anbar). More support troops have since been tapped to also go to Iraq. But, it is vital to remember, the surge is not the strategy -- it is a means to implement a strategy. The strategy is to to provide actual population security, tamp down sectarian violence, and create space for national reconciliation and reconstruction. To implement this strategy, Bush replaced Casey with Petraeus, who appears committed to implementing the COIN manual he co-sponsored, spreading American troops out into smaller bases from which they can work with Iraqi forces to provide local security. Moreover, even Odierno, the new MNC-I commander, appears to have learned something from his early mistakes, and he seems to be committed to treating the Iraqi population as the focus of operations.

As the Krepinevich briefing makes clear, this shift makes sense from the perspective of COIN best practices and the new COIN field manual. There are other successful approaches to COIN, including what the briefing calls "the Roman Strategy" ("make a desert and call it peace"), which was basically the approach Saddam used to prevent sustained insurgency in Iraq. But, as the briefing properly notes, adopting this approach (or even somewhat softer, but still highly coercive COIN practices, such as those used by the Americans effectively in the Philippines between 1899-1902), is incompatible with norms against targeting civilians embraced by the U.S. military and political leadership. So, with the Roman strategy off the table, that leaves the "clear, hold, and build" option. However, as the briefing makes clear, this strategic shift may simply be too little, too late. What the briefing doesn't say is that it is also unclear whether employing COIN best practices will work in the context of not only a raging insurgency (in Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala), but also a sectarian civil war (in Baghdad, Diyala, and increasingly Kirkuk), diffuse criminal anarchy and militia rivalry (in the South), and endemic separatist tendencies (in Kurdistan).

Fabius Maximus
03-18-2007, 05:50 PM
I appreciate the confidence shown in me by some of these posts, looking for me to write “the” analysis or give a solution for the Iraq War. I hate to disappoint you, but so far the best analysis of the Iraq war was written by van Creveld in the Transformation of War (1991) (in my opinion). And the war might not have a solution.

More seriously, this is just a 2100 word op-ed. At 188 lines, it is aprox 40% the size of Krepinevich’s Feb 27 presentation. Neither gives much supporting evidence. They are both what I call “pointers.”

While Krepinevich gives an overview, my text is an exercise in reductionism -- what a small part can tell us about the whole. This looks at the Iraq situation from one perspective (there are of course many others) to assess if COIN remains a suitable strategy. The rest of the text is background or context.

It sketches a syllogism (given in a previous post), using what I believe are widely (not universally) agreed upon “facts” about Iraq (hence the lack of supporting detail). They are roughly the same as in Krepinevich’s. Re-stating this in a different way…

1. The Iraq national gov’t is weak, and does not appear to be gaining strength

2. Political structures at the local level are acting as governments, and appear to be growing stronger.

3. COIN assumes we should suppress the local groups to build the national polity.

4. Given #1 and #2 above, successful COIN might no longer be feasible.

5. Therefore we should consider alterative strategies, using these local structures.

All abstractions are, in a sense, games of logic. To borrow from TE Lawrence, they are “foolish nonsense.” The rules of this game are to disprove either the assumptions or the logic. Of course, any reductionist effort might be futile if not representative of the overall situation. It is just an analytical tool.

Developing the alternatives (e.g., a federal Iraq) would be interesting. However, perhaps a bit pointless in that I suspect (see the end section) that we will not pursue them.

BTW – I recommend reading Krepinevich’s slides (link below)!

Fabius Maximus
03-18-2007, 06:01 PM
I agree with this, when it comes to forming your own views.

But I was speaking about giving evidence in a debate. I say I saw "A". You say you saw "B." Will you believe me, and change your view of Iraq? Also, since we only see bits of the whole, we both could be right.

Also, it is useful to quote official statements (esp. by military and political leaders) -- which I find quite useful. Here we (or at least, I) can only quote using secondary sources.

Repeating what I said at greater length in an earlier post, everyone has their own preference in determining what is reliable knowledge. Debating which method is "right" will, I suspect, accomplish nothing.

Culpeper
03-18-2007, 06:48 PM
I agree with this, when it comes to forming your own views.

But I was speaking about giving evidence in a debate. I say I saw "A". You say you saw "B." Will you believe me, and change your view of Iraq? Also, since we only see bits of the whole, we both could be right.

Also, it is useful to quote official statements (esp. by military and political leaders) -- which I find quite useful. Here we (or at least, I) can only quote using secondary sources.

Repeating what I said at greater length in an earlier post, everyone has their own preference in determining what is reliable knowledge. Debating which method is "right" will, I suspect, accomplish nothing.

The "philosphy" of nihilism is an excuse not to admit there might be a solution. It is a cop out and choosing to do nothing out of fear of failing. It is not enough to reach a point and simply renege by claiming the individual perception bugaboo.

jcustis
03-18-2007, 06:48 PM
FM,

Please, please bring it down a notch. I re-read your last two posts at least three times, and have no idea what you are tyring to say.

If nothing else, time spent drifting through some of the SWC's thread would tell one that there are very few widely agreed upon facts in any conflict. You leave this detail out, and that makes sense, but my critique of your writing is going to rest on one thing. You base it on supposition, and where I still do not believe you understand the likes of RTK, it is because supposition is dangerous.

And you had better believe it that if you want decent comment on your writing, or theses, or just wild ideas, you need to be open to a discussion of "reliable knowledge". Some people here base their lives on it, so it seems like you're dismissing the discussion out of hand.

I will also offer that few folks here (or most anywhere for that matter) like or appreciate reductionism when one is addressing the issues we face in Iraq. A SecDef was sent away for that sort of stuff, and the problem is so complex that you cannot filter it down into a neat package.


Did you at one time work for the CPA? That's an honest question.

Fabius Maximus
03-18-2007, 07:01 PM
I do not understand. I was expressing a preference in this kind of debate for secondary sources over primary experience. (both have value, of course). You speak of a "philosphy of nihilism." I don't see the connection.

As for "solutions", this text points to one. Not a promising one, in that I guess that we will not take it. The next few texts, as I said, discuss "solutions" at greater length. Just small steps.

Fabius Maximus
03-18-2007, 07:31 PM
If nothing else, time spent drifting through some of the SWC's thread would tell one that there are very few widely agreed upon facts in any conflict. You leave this detail out, and that makes sense, but my critique of your writing is going to rest on one thing. You base it on supposition, and where I still do not believe you understand the likes of RTK, it is because supposition is dangerous.

And you had better believe it that if you want decent comment on your writing, or theses, or just wild ideas, you need to be open to a discussion of "reliable knowledge". Some people here base their lives on it, so it seems like you're dismissing the discussion out of hand.

I will also offer that few folks here (or most anywhere for that matter) like or appreciate reductionism when one is addressing the issues we face in Iraq. A SecDef was sent away for that sort of stuff, and the problem is so complex that you cannot filter it down into a neat package.

1. We don't want to overuse the quote button, but it might help here. I cannot relate your comments to my post. I state my reading of the situation, sticking to views which are widely believed -- stating that they are not universal -- and show my logic. It's that kind of text. Easy to read and rebut.

If you don't like that class of work, or only if it is very long (including supporting evidence for all views), that's fine. I do not dis your opinion. However, readership often declines with length, and I suspect (guessing) that many of the posts here are by folks who have not read even my little piece. People write shorts b/ long things tend to be read less. Many have observed this dynamic at work in DoD. It was extensively discussed in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

2. As for "open to discussion of reliable knowledge" and "dismissing the discussion out of hand", perhaps you are reading someone else's posts. I am the one saying -- at length, attempting to fairly present the issue -- that many forms of knowledge work, and everyone has their own style. Others seem to be saying -- quite curtly -- that only their preferred form is right, and dismissing mine out of hand.

3. You say that few here like a reductionist view of the Iraq war. What is your point? It is the primary (not the only) method of analysis today in the physical and social sciences. For example, Kilcullen's professional papers (i.e., the long ones) are highly reductionist -- and are in my opinion deservedly highly praised.

"Godel Escher Bach" by Douglas Hofstadter has an excellent discussion of this. The physicist/mathematician Roger Penrose's has written extensively to attack scientists reliance on reductionism.

I do not take the extreme position -- as some in the sciences do -- that this is the only proper form of analysis. The opposite, a holistic approach, gives different and valuable insights. Nor is it an either/or distinction.

In my opinion, they are both just tools. A complete picture requires use of both.

jcustis
03-18-2007, 08:06 PM
I care not for Hofstadter or Penrose, and don't go there about Kilcullen.
I guess what I have failed to communicate is that your little part, does not in fact tell me about the whole...thanks.

Culpeper
03-18-2007, 10:34 PM
I do not understand. I was expressing a preference in this kind of debate for secondary sources over primary experience. (both have value, of course). You speak of a "philosphy of nihilism." I don't see the connection.

As for "solutions", this text points to one. Not a promising one, in that I guess that we will not take it. The next few texts, as I said, discuss "solutions" at greater length. Just small steps.


Like this... I don't understand that you don't understand. Therefore, we could both be right.

You resort to a nihilist approach when backed into a debate corner by stating there is no possibility of an objective basis for truth because we don't understand in the same way. You write up a study, state it is based on facts, and resort to a philosophical defense mechanism under debate that completely abandons the facts. There is nothing wrong with being skeptical but when you become skeptical of your own work as a means to an end than we have a problem. Next time you watch the movie Full Metal Jacket you should pay careful attention to the scene where the DI asks Private Joker if he believes in the Virgin Mary and how Private Joker handled that problem.

slapout9
03-18-2007, 11:38 PM
The link below is a short clip of the scene Joker that Culpepper is referring to.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4s9F7p3w9jQ

Fabius Maximus
03-19-2007, 12:30 AM
You resort to a nihilist approach when backed into a debate corner by stating there is no possibility of an objective basis for truth because we don't understand in the same way.

Thank you, that explains the confusion. I was refering to various ways of obtaining knowledge. Not that there is no objective knowledge.

Sometimes we use primary sources, sometimes secondary. Both have strengths and weakness. For example, two people can observe the same event and report it quite differently -- this is a classic first year law school lesson.

I do not see why is there is debate on this point.

RTK
03-19-2007, 02:06 AM
Thank you, that explains the confusion. I was refering to various ways of obtaining knowledge. Not that there is no objective knowledge.

Sometimes we use primary sources, sometimes secondary. Both have strengths and weakness. For example, two people can observe the same event and report it quite differently -- this is a classic first year law school lesson.

I do not see why is there is debate on this point.

Are you ever going to give your qualifications and background, as I've asked you previously on multiple occassions?

You stated a preference to secondary sources over primary sources in this type of debate. That makes absolutely no sense in any rational mind. I speculate that it is closely tied to the absence of any qualifying credentials after months of being asked.

Here's the bottom line: Would you want someone who read a book about packing parachutes pack yours or would you want the guy who's been doing it for years? I could do your job (all it seems to be is write a stream of thought with very few supporting facts). Could you do mine?

Fabius Maximus
03-19-2007, 02:22 AM
I too like to bat around these questions over a few brews. Here it seems a bit off-topic. It is important. Perhaps deserves its own thread, for those who like to discuss philosophy.

Epistemology: The study of what is meant by "knowledge". What does it mean to "know" something as opposed to merely having an opinion. This issue has been at the core of Western philosophy since before Socrates, since, until it has been answered, all other questions become unsolvable.

RTK
03-19-2007, 02:30 AM
I too like to bat around these questions over a few brews. Here it seems a bit off-topic. It is important. Perhaps deserves its own thread, for those who like to discuss philosophy.

Epistemology: The study of what is meant by "knowledge". What does it mean to "know" something as opposed to merely having an opinion. This issue has been at the core of Western philosophy since before Socrates, since, until it has been answered, all other questions become unsolvable.

You're skating around questions asked of you again.

I think talk like this is completely on topic. How can your position/opinion be taken seriously if you don't have a knowledge base on the topic? I could write an article for the New England Journal of Medicine on neurosurgery but it isn't going to be a very good article.

Fabius Maximus
03-19-2007, 03:05 AM
We got into trouble because "bringing democracy to the people of Iraq" was a noble idea to some. Perhaps it is time to stop that seed. The Green Revolution brought good crops to other parts of the world, but it also made the rich richer, and widened the divide between them and subsistence farmers.

That is out of the box thinking, the most radical insight I've seen in a long time. Much more so than anything in my text, which was pretty conventional thinking.

Thinking like that might lead to revising much of our foreign policy. IMHO, almost anything would be an improvement.

Worth it's own thread.

slapout9
03-19-2007, 03:08 AM
FM, I don't know where you studied Philosophy but Epistemology is the science of "how" we know something and the problem was solved a long time ago by a man named Aristotle. It is the evidence of the senses.
Below is a link that gives a brief description of the Objectivist Philosophy to include Epistemology and what it means.


http://www.aynrand.org/site/PageServer?pagename=objectivism_intro

Fabius Maximus
03-19-2007, 03:29 AM
In your circles it might considered insane to evaluate the Iraq War relying largely on information from DoD, VOA, CSIS, and the major media. Not so in mine. That’s OK by me.

I have attempted to be a good sport, reciting basic material from sophomore college courses, referencing famous experts on the process of science, and giving fairly long explanations of my analytical process.

I see nothing comparable from most of you, in detail or length. Again, that's OK by me, since I am confident that you are all reasonable and knowledgeable people – and that your analytical processes are least as good as mine.

But there I believe there is no way to resolve this kind of debate about the nature of knowledge. At this rate soon we’ll be debating how can we know if we’re disembodied brains in jar, and exchanging lines of dialog from the Matrix movies.

All I asked was for comments or challenges to the facts or logic in my little article. The first question was about the uniforms of the Peshmerga (an unusual but interesting start), and have gone off into the blue sky from there (amidst some challenging and relevant exchanges along the way).

Topic drift is a fact of life on the internet. I’ve done this as much as anyone over the years. However, in my opinion, this is drifting a bit far a field.

I am catching a plane soon and will be off-line until next weekend. Best wishes to all of your for a good week!

Culpeper
03-19-2007, 04:25 AM
In your circles it might considered insane to evaluate the Iraq War relying largely on information from DoD, VOA, CSIS, and the major media. Not so in mine. That’s OK by me.

I have attempted to be a good sport, reciting basic material from sophomore college courses, referencing famous experts on the process of science, and giving fairly long explanations of my analytical process.

I see nothing comparable from most of you, in detail or length. Again, that's OK by me, since I am confident that you are all reasonable and knowledgeable people – and that your analytical processes are least as good as mine.

But there I believe there is no way to resolve this kind of debate about the nature of knowledge. At this rate soon we’ll be debating how can we know if we’re disembodied brains in jar, and exchanging lines of dialog from the Matrix movies.

All I asked was for comments or challenges to the facts or logic in my little article. The first question was about the uniforms of the Peshmerga (an unusual but interesting start), and have gone off into the blue sky from there (amidst some challenging and relevant exchanges along the way).

Topic drift is a fact of life on the internet. I’ve done this as much as anyone over the years. However, in my opinion, this is drifting a bit far a field.

I am catching a plane soon and will be off-line until next weekend. Best wishes to all of your for a good week!

You elected to abandon the "facts or logic in [your] little aritcle", which directed the flow of this thread. You asked for "comments and challenges" and that is exactly what you received. You have forthwith relied on sleight of hand responses to keep you head above water. Take a little responsibility and quit belittling the group. You have made a grave error by underestimating the Small Wars Council and now you want to place blame on the group for "topic drift"? This is your thread and thus your responsibility. This is the hole you dug.


"I'm a faithfull follower of Brother John Birch
And I belong to the Antioch Baptist Church
And I ain't even got a garage, you can call home and ask my wife."

marct
03-19-2007, 06:05 AM
Well, I just got back from my concert in Montreal, and I see that things have shifted over into one of my favorite topics: epistemology.


I have attempted to be a good sport, reciting basic material from sophomore college courses, referencing famous experts on the process of science, and giving fairly long explanations of my analytical process.

And, in all honestly, your paper reads like something I would receive in a sophomore course. FM, you are misusing terminology again. Referencing "famous experts", what Weber called an appeal to Traditional Authority, gets you absolutely nothing in an article when all you do is mention their names without invoking their arguments. And, in all honestly, I have yet to see an adequate, again at the sophomore level, description of your methodology. For a methodology to be "valid" it must either be "accepted" by a discipline as valid or it must be spelled out in detail. If it is "accepted", then the detail is available in published writings by others, and you point to it by saying "I am using X methodology (see REFERENCES).


I see nothing comparable from most of you, in detail or length. Again, that's OK by me, since I am confident that you are all reasonable and knowledgeable people – and that your analytical processes are least as good as mine.

If people really want me to, I could transcribe my 9 hours of lectures on epistemology and meta-epistemologies and post them here, along with their ties into neural structures and evolved psychological mechanisms. Do you really want to start a debate about quantum consciousness and its relationship to objective "Truth"?


FM, I don't know where you studied Philosophy but Epistemology is the science of "how" we know something and the problem was solved a long time ago by a man named Aristotle. It is the evidence of the senses.

Hey, Slapout! I'll admit, I never really liked Aristotle - I always preferred Xenophon's Plato. Still and all, you're bang on with that comment! And, when we are dealing with something like the situation in Iraq or, for that matter, any situation where certain classes of facts are easily established via the senses, Aristotle is the place to start.

I would argue that it starts getting fuzzier as soon as we start imputing anything subjective to a "fact" (i.e. X attacks against troops during this period). In that case, we can certainly establish as a fact that X events took place that were interpreted as attacks by the reporters of the events, but not that they were interpreted as such by the "attackers". As an example of his, go back to 2003 with the "rifle attacks" with such "bad aim" - they were not viewed as "attacks by the Iraquis conducting many of them but, rather, as a way of regaining their honour (Ricks talks about this in Fiasco).


3. You say that few here like a reductionist view of the Iraq war. What is your point? It is the primary (not the only) method of analysis today in the physical and social sciences. For example, Kilcullen's professional papers (i.e., the long ones) are highly reductionist -- and are in my opinion deservedly highly praised.

Reductionism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductionism) is one, and not the primary, method of analysis in the social sciences. Reductionism is the analytic method of choice for social scientists who can't handle reality and tends to appear in most in the "theologically dominated" social sciences, e.g. sociology, political science and Anthropology - usually in its Marxist or Post-Modernist forms.

If you've read Godel Escher Bach, then you should be familiar with the concept of emergent properties of systems (it's a corollary of Godel's second theorum; the one that sunk Russell's analytic empiricism). And, if you have ever taken a course in physics, you should be familiar with he concept of "phase changes" - both of which are being used right now as ways of unifying natural and social sciences in a "complex", emergentist model. This is the type of model DK is producing, as you should know from his references in his major paper on modeling the Iraqi insurgency.


"Godel Escher Bach" by Douglas Hofstadter has an excellent discussion of this. The physicist/mathematician Roger Penrose's has written extensively to attack scientists reliance on reductionism.

And Roger has also written on the development of quantum consciousness (The Emperor's New Mind) as part of his debate with Dennet. So what? Pointing to someone and saying "I know one of their books" is not a "reference".

Earlier, you said

But I was speaking about giving evidence in a debate. I say I saw "A". You say you saw "B." Will you believe me, and change your view of Iraq? Also, since we only see bits of the whole, we both could be right.Certainly, except that you did not "see" the event, you saw a representation of the event. RTK's earlier comment about you embedding yourself in a unit, or just going over for a "look-see" is very germain: he has "seen" A, you have only "heard" of A and interpreted it as B (or, possibly, the representation of A that you saw was interpreted as B during its presentation). Your "evidence" is not equal in the logical sense and no appear to a traditional authority (in the Weberian sense) will make it so.

FM, let me make an observation, here. As you may or may not know, I am not now nor have I ever been in the military. As an academic and as a Canadian, I have quite different filters that I "see" events with from those of most of the people on the board. If I was going to write an "analysis" of what was happening in Iraq, this would be the first place I would turn. Because, despite having a PhD, being a theoretician, teaching epistemology, Anthropology and computer mediated communications (plus a few other areas, as well as being an expert on new religious movements, symbol systems and organizational culture) I haven't been there and many of the people on the SWC either have or are now over there.

I would have to be a freaking idiot not to take advantage of the wealth of experience these people have in the lived reality of Iraq (if you don't recognize that term, read Schutz and Luckmann, Structures of the Life World, 2 vols., Northwestern University Press). I teach my students that the mark of a true scientist is to test their ideas and the only way I would have to test those ideas would be to toss them out, like you are doing, and them modify them based on the data (input and commentary) I receive from people who actually have the knowledge.

Most of the folks here seem to be pretty okay with that model. Are you?

Marc

goesh
03-19-2007, 03:17 PM
I'm a faithfull follower of Brother John Birch
And I belong to the Antioch Baptist Church
And I ain't even got a garage, you can call home and ask my wife.
LOL! It's been too many years to count since I heard that song.

Steve Blair
03-19-2007, 03:47 PM
I think the poll question itself reveals the simplistic basis of the discussion. Iraq, IMO, has elements of an insurgency in some locations, but there is much else going on over there. I do not base this assertion on personal experience in the AO, but on examination of the posts here and elsewhere combined with my experience with history and the analysis of events based on historical methodology and background. Trying to lump something as complex as Iraq into a simple "is" or "is not" model is going to doom most constructive discussion to the sort of circular discussions we've seen here.

Proper historical analysis of events calls for an understanding of the environment (both physical and cultural) that those events take place in and around. Marc's mention of Ricks and his discussion of "badly aimed rifle fire" is spot on here. Events do not exist in a vacuum, nor do they always conform with convenient theories (such as 4GW, which I remain skeptical of). What may be considered the norm or progress in one area of Iraq (be it a physical province or thought process on the part of inhabitants) may be a setback or not carry over to another area.

That's at least part of the reason that I consider the basic poll question flawed, and by extension some of the reasoning offered in its defense.

Fabius Maximus
03-20-2007, 12:00 AM
Looks like some interesting posts here. Will look at them when I have time.

slapout9 -- Thanks for the link! Probably not too many SWC discussions range to include Epistemology, Aristotle, and Ayn Rand.

Also -- a flashback to an earlier discussion in this thread about difficulty of getting factual data about Iraq (also relevant to the primary vs. secondary sources debate):

Analysis: Iraq War's Statistics Prove Fleeting
By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post
March 19, 2007

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/18/AR2007031801587.html

Esp. significant, I think, is the last part about the numbers of our Iraq allies.

slapout9
03-20-2007, 12:26 AM
FM, your welcome. FYI we discuss things (Epistemology,Philosophy)of this nature all the time. There are some very intelligent people here, with a lot of MO JO! Enjoy your trip.

Fabius Maximus
03-20-2007, 01:14 AM
Probably not too many SWC discussions range to include Epistemology, Aristotle, and Ayn Rand.

One fun thing about this thread... if I said the "sun will rise tomorrow" someone would immediately deny it! In the spirit of the many micro-challenges to my little op-ed, I await with interest a list of SWC threads including "Epistemology, Aristotle, and Ayn Rand."

As for "There are some very intelligent people here", thank you for agreeing with what I just said. That is, perhaps, a first for this thread!

Fabius Maximus
03-20-2007, 04:15 AM
No time to deal with all of this now. Too much good material to look at here, and some requires a bit of thought. But this is too good to let pass ...
Weber called an appeal to Traditional Authority, gets you absolutely nothing in an article when all you do is mention their names without invoking their arguments.

You say "appeal to authority" like it's a bad thing. OK, what's the length of the Nile River? No appeals to authority, please.

That's an extreme example, of course. But not that different from what I did when challenged on my statement that modern science is generally reductionist. I quote some authorities. The alt is to whip out a quick 200 page PhD thesis.

Nor was my comment exactly an appeal to authority. I said that this was the consensus opinion, but I specifically cited a major figure taking the opposite side of the debate.

Also, this does not seem to me a significant point to debate. Reductionish/holistic was introducted just to distinguish the approach of my "brief, hopefully provocative introduction” from Krepinevich’s overview.

MountainRunner
03-20-2007, 12:20 PM
Going back to basics quickly, FM you wrote to offline queries at the beginning of this thread:


Insurgency is a rebellion against a gov't. No gov't, no insurgency.


From Chet's article directly


In between lies an ungoverned or disputed zone, a diverse ethnic and religious mixture. Since there is no longer a national government for Iraq (the Coalition destroyed it) and no government in the disputed zone, there can be no insurgency.

This is the foundation of Chet and your argument apparently, and the semantic issue many, such as myself, have found wanting. I'm not sure whose definition your using, and I'm interested to know, but a previous (CIA) definition was "a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations."

Requiring some kind of legitimacy really makes the determination of whether it is an insurgency messy and based on a specific POV, either yours or theirs. This is problematic when "they" are numerous groups.

Going back to basics, the foundation of Chet's, and by extension your, possibly makes your assertion true, however it creates so many problems that it is unworkable and unusable.

marct
03-20-2007, 01:06 PM
Hi FM,


No time to deal with all of this now. Too much good material to look at here, and some requires a bit of thought. But this is too good to let pass ...

I'll look forward to it.


You say "appeal to authority" like it's a bad thing. OK, what's the length of the Nile River? No appeals to authority, please.

Length: 6,695 km according to Wikipedia, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nile dl/20/3/2007

An appeal to authority is not, in and of itself, an invalid argument (forget "good" and "bad"). My point was that you had used an appeal top authority incorrectly. In order to use such an argument, you must reference not only the author, but the argument or fact and it must be in a manner that can be checked by others. An appeal to authority argument relies on an assumption of trust in the good faith of the authority figure and, at the same time, assumes that you have read their arguments and are incorporating them. What you did with the Penrose reference was toss the name out with no pointers to specifics as if it was, in and of itself, both self evident and unassailable.


That's an extreme example, of course. But not that different from what I did when challenged on my statement that modern science is generally reductionist. I quote some authorities. The alt is to whip out a quick 200 page PhD thesis.

But you didn't quote them, you referred to them, and not their work, which is a different thing. Simply referring to someone who is an expert does not make an argument.


Nor was my comment exactly an appeal to authority. I said that this was the consensus opinion, but I specifically cited a major figure taking the opposite side of the debate.

How can it be a "consensus opinion" if there are major dissenting figures and a "debate"? Besides that, "reductionism" is philosophically different between the natural and social sciences, a point you didn't note but one that is very important.


Also, this does not seem to me a significant point to debate. Reductionish/holistic was introducted just to distinguish the approach of my "brief, hopefully provocative introduction” from Krepinevich’s overview.

Why not? The communication of ideas / perceptions / emotions is at the heart of all writing, so it follows that when someone asks for input on a work, that there use of words etc. will be a major point of commentary.

Marc

Fabius Maximus
03-20-2007, 01:14 PM
Using technical definitions is problematic when posting on DNI. Due to the magic of the web they are read by people in a wide range of occupations and from many regions.

I use the general meaning of insurgency, as in most dictionaries (quoted earlier in this thread). I should have included this in the text (there basic errors are so obvious in hindsight, yet I overlook them so often).

As for the functional definition of legitimacy, that is explained in the article. Modern pol science has drifted from this (as you point out) vague concept to "attributes of government." While specific lists vary, there is a consensus on the key ones -- which I list. I think you'll agree that at this time the Iraq national or central gov't has few or none of these. The big question is, of course, how much time should we give it before considering "plan B."

As for "unworkable and unusable" you might be right. I'd be a fool would contradict Lawrence and be dogmatic on such swampy ground! I would, however, appreciate more detail as to why and how.

RTK
03-20-2007, 01:15 PM
Using technical definitions is problematic when posting on DNI. Due to the magic of the web they are read by people in a wide range of occupations and from many regions.

I use the general meaning of insurgency, as in most dictionaries (quoted earlier in this thread). I should have included this in the text (there basic errors are so obvious in hindsight, yet I overlook them so often).

As for the functional definition of legitimacy, that is explained in the article. Modern pol science has drifted from this (as you point out) vague concept to "attributes of government." While specific lists vary, there is a consensus on the key ones -- which I list. I think you'll agree that at this time the Iraq national or central gov't has few or none of these. The big question is, of course, how much time should we give it before considering "plan B."

As for "unworkable and unusable" you might be right. I'd be a fool would contradict Lawrence and be dogmatic on such swampy ground! I would, however, appreciate more detail as to why and how.

FM's definition from Webster's is the same as JP 1-02.

Fabius Maximus
03-20-2007, 01:42 PM
Marct, thank you for introducing this concept to the discussion. It might have many applications to the military arts (that is for another thread, perhaps).

Its relevance here is to the discussion of reductionism. The use of reductionist methods to understand high-level properties of systems is perhaps one of the triumphs of modern science. To use the metaphor in GEB, it has proved most fruitful to study the behavior of ants to understand the intelligence of the anthill.

Consider evolution, “solved’ by the development of mendelian genetics and later biochemistry (DNA, etc).

Economics, where the grand insights of previous generations are being replaced by mathematical modeling of social systems using specific human behaviors. The schools unable to do this, such as the Austrians, have steadily lost influence in this discipline to those viewpoints that work well with reductionism (e.g., neo-Keynesians).

Psychology, where the extreme reductionists of sociobiology and neuroscience increasingly dominate the discussion – and some even deny the existence of high-level phenomena such as intelligence.

The pursuit of artificial intelligence also shows this trend. Until the last few decades the major thrust was directly modeling high-level activities. Now the focus is on tiny behavior. Sight, hearing, movement, speech, decision-making in small domains using a small set of data and rules (expert systems). The evolution of programs to play chess illustrates this trend. As we all know, there are always exceptions to any trend, such as neural networking in AI.

A historical note to illustrate the role of reductionism in this area. One milestone in the modern study of emergent properties was the John Horton Conway’s “game of life.” (Scientific American, October 1970). Only four rules, but capable of displaying highly complex and sophisticated behavior. Got many people thinking how reductionist methods might apply to their fields

Fabius Maximus
03-20-2007, 03:17 PM
Marct, thank you for introducing this concept to the discussion. It might have many applications to the military arts (that is for another thread, perhaps).

What Marct might have had in mind when introducing this concept to the thread (just guessing) was that combat is a powerful instance of emergent behavior.

To over-simplify (am in a hurry), let’s contrast top-down and bottom-up perspectives.

Many factors encourage a top-down analysis in the military arts. The hierarchical command structure of most armies. The top-down perspective of space given by maps. The top-down view of time given by military history.

But combat outcomes result from bottoms-up activity. Such as the specifics of logistics and terrain. But most importantly, the behavior of soldiers as individuals.

The military professionals might learn from study of emergent behavior in theory and reality in other fields.

That is not a new insight, of course. Perhaps would be an interesting thread on SWC, if there is not already one. I for one would be interested in reading it (not competent to say much more about it, except after many brews).

RTK
03-20-2007, 05:16 PM
What Marct might have had in mind when introducing this concept to the thread (just guessing) was that combat is a powerful instance of emergent behavior.

To over-simplify (am in a hurry), let’s contrast top-down and bottom-up perspectives.

Many factors encourage a top-down analysis in the military arts. The hierarchical command structure of most armies. The top-down perspective of space given by maps. The top-down view of time given by military history.

But combat outcomes result from bottoms-up activity. Such as the specifics of logistics and terrain. But most importantly, the behavior of soldiers as individuals.

The military professionals might learn from study of emergent behavior in theory and reality in other fields.

That is not a new insight, of course. Perhaps would be an interesting thread on SWC, if there is not already one. I for one would be interested in reading it (not competent to say much more about it, except after many brews).

Specifically as we discuss COIN as a Troop/Company and below fight, mixed with the concept of the "strategic corporal" I think this is already happening. Interesting that many of the professionals who speak the most on this have a "soft science" background, such as anthropology, sociology, and psychology.

Fabius Maximus
03-21-2007, 12:16 AM
the concept of "phase changes" - both of which are being used right now as ways of unifying natural and social sciences in a "complex", emergentist model. This is the type of model DK is producing, as you should know from his references in his major paper on modeling the Iraqi insurgency.

A powerful point, and touches on what seems to be a theme in this thread: like guns, these abstractions are tools -- not magic wands. No one tool gets the job done.

Phase changes are an example of things than cannot be (a bit of overstatement) analyzed using reductionism. Another, perhaps more accessible example, is dropping grains of sand to form a pile. The pile will eventually collapse, and the dynamics of this cannot be determined by looking at the grains, but only at the pile.

Devising a strategy for the Iraq War might require a holistic perspective. We can bury ourselves in detail, and never see a way out.

For more on this see Malcolm Gladwell’s book The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference.

jcustis
03-21-2007, 12:36 AM
Devising a strategy for the Iraq War might require a holistic perspective. We can bury ourselves in detail, and never see a way out.

Yes, and no, no, no. We have the holistic approach, and it's secure the people.

Details are absolutely critical. Lack of that crushed us during the Phase IV transition in May of 2003.

RTK
03-21-2007, 12:42 AM
Devising a strategy for the Iraq War might require a holistic perspective. We can bury ourselves in detail, and never see a way out.



Huge differences between strategic, operational, and tactical details and bureaucracy, which is what I really think you're talking about. We've become mired in the later. We didn't have enough of the former to begin with.

Suffice it to say, if we'd done four years ago what we're beginning to do now or what was done in Tal Afar in 2005, perhaps things would have turned out differently. There are more than a few on this board who got to the outskirts of Baghdad and thought "what next" in mid-to-late April 2003.

Details aren't our problem. Lack of them were.

jcustis
03-21-2007, 12:45 AM
There are more than a few on this board who got to the outskirts of Baghdad and thought "what next" in mid-to-late April 2003.

Freaking Amen.

Fabius Maximus
03-21-2007, 01:35 AM
Can anyone comment on this?

Previous posts discussed that "everyone can have their own facts" about Iraq, as the data is so poor. That is, everyone except those at the "front." Note the news article posted below about this.

That is, our data about the situation in Iraq has often proved off by 10x or more -- even about critical factors. Statistical data from war zones do not have error bars, but this seems extreme. We had this problem in the Vietnam War, which probably to some extent contributed to our defeat.

For a current example, see this excerpt from the Iraq Study Group report.


In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq. The standard for recording attacks acts as a filter to keep events out of reports and databases. ... For example, on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals.
http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html

SWCAdmin
03-21-2007, 02:38 AM
Sure, I'll take a crack.

Ref earlier discussion on semantics.

Facts, data, and statistical data are not the same thing.

Not a perfect analogy, but ground truth, metrics regarding observations, and descriptive or sampling and extrapolating or interpolating approximations of those metrics are not the same thing.

Thus the (terrorist / jihadi / punk who knocked off the 7-11 / hit and run driver) had on a blue jacket. Observer B said "I think he was wearing a red jacket." Both are facts. The second one happens to be an incorrect observation, but still a fact (he really did say that) though not an accurate ground truth (saying it doesn't make it so). Good thing people always fill out surveys accurately, and there is no culture of deception of obfuscation, especially in the ME, or we'd never get any accurate statistics.

Fact is, 72&#37; of statistics are made up on the spot.

And maybe everyone can think they have their own facts, but only some of them are worth a damn.

SWCAdmin
03-21-2007, 02:43 AM
And thank God wars are not fought by statisticians.

Culpeper
03-21-2007, 03:58 AM
And thank God wars are not fought by statisticians.

A good example is that Robert McNamara doted on statistics and his "team" came pretty close to fighting a pure statistical war from the Executive Branch. Didn't exactly work out too well. Whiz Kids and all. McNamara wanted numbers. Made a lot a decisions based on statistical and analytical analysis.

Culpeper
03-21-2007, 04:21 AM
Can anyone comment on this?

Previous posts discussed that "everyone can have their own facts" about Iraq, as the data is so poor. That is, everyone except those at the "front." Note the news article posted below about this.

That is, our data about the situation in Iraq has often proved off by 10x or more -- even about critical factors. Statistical data from war zones do not have error bars, but this seems extreme. We had this problem in the Vietnam War, which probably to some extent contributed to our defeat.

For a current example, see this excerpt from the Iraq Study Group report.


http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html

I have a funny feeling that the likes of Pershing, Eisenhower, MacArthur, Marshall, Bradley, and even Patton would be be stating that the facts are irrelevant on the home front for the good of the war effort. What matters are results in the field and civilian think tanks are to be avoided. They would also wonder how we came to the point that over 3,000 KIA in 4 years had become the major war of our era. I'm saddened for the lost of our men and women on the front but this is in all aims and purposes has been a low intensity war as far as good guy casualties are concerned. The American public was very upset of the carnage of Tarawa but they knew there was going to be yet another bloody battle. And there was. More than enough. Iraq doesn't compare. I'll accept over 3,000 casualties in 4 years over Iwo Jima, Chosin Reservoir, or the entire Tet Offensive any day of the week. What is really sickening is that most Americans with a big mouth never even heard of these places. For example, from the initial build up in 1965 through 1968, America suffered nearly 36,000 KIA during Vietnam. Do we even have any MIAs in Iraq? I think there are a few but not too sure. So, we choose to believe what we want to believe whereas Iraq is concerned. For personal selfish reasons some folks want to portray Iraq as another Okinawa. Kamikazes and all. That fact that Iraq is eating its young is the real story here. Let's face it. Most of us don't have a need to know and we really aren't that important.

Bill Moore
03-21-2007, 04:29 AM
Facts in war are elusive, but perceptions are abundant. Initially I didn't count the bodies, or the number of reported killings, how many refugees I saw etc., all considered valid metrics by some pencil neck geek. When we got settled in and our systems matured we started capturing information, but it was obviously incomplete, it was only what we saw and heard (what didn't see and hear?), so one couldn't draw any conclusions from the so called data. You had to trust your gut instincts, which improved with time as you learned about your environment.

There is a saying that every soldier fights his own war, and only sees the war from his from his foxhole. That became very true for us in 2003, and every opportunity I would get I would ask an embedded reporter about how the war was going beyond the range of my 20/20 vision, because I had no access to news the first few weeks.

After we took our objectives, then we too had a moment to ponder the now what question, and when it became apparent higher wasn't going to provide it, we did what we thought was right.

It's called the fog of war, and you don't have to be comfortable with it, but if your going to walk in our boots, you better be able to operate in it.

We had a flawed strategy, that much is granted, but to be constructive, we need ideas for how to undue our mistakes, not empty philosophical quotes that have no relevance to the issue at hand. If those leading the fight now determine it can't be won, then I'll listen, but I won't listen to someone with unknown credentials.

tequila
03-21-2007, 08:19 AM
Do we even have any MIAs in Iraq? I think there are a few but not too sure.

Let's not forget Matthew Maupin (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matt_Maupin) or Ahmed Qusai al-Taayie (http://www.sanluisobispo.com/mld/sanluisobispo/news/breaking_news/16696048.htm).

Fabius Maximus
03-21-2007, 01:21 PM
Ed. by SWCAdmin, discuss this post and article in this new thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2435)
------------------

Just an FYI…

As a response to the oft-said -- and quite correct -- comment that my work just criticizes (easy, simple to do) but does not propose solutions (difficult, complex to do), the second in this series has been posted. This looks at geo-pol strategy. Use of force is discussed in the following two parts.

How America can survive and even prosper in the 21st Century
4600 words
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_america_prosper_GS-IV.htm

RTK
03-21-2007, 02:51 PM
Recommend new discussion in new thread.

slapout9
03-21-2007, 03:14 PM
Recommend new discussion in new thread.

I second that.

Fabius Maximus
03-21-2007, 03:32 PM
Recommend new discussion in new thread.

I posted this only as a specific reply to a point (a valid and important one, in my opinion) expressed several times in this (and earlier) threads, such as your post #19.

RTK
03-21-2007, 03:45 PM
I posted this only as a specific reply to a point (a valid and important one, in my opinion) expressed several times in this (and earlier) threads, such as your post #19.

That wasn't so pointed at you as the groundskeepers.

SWCAdmin
03-21-2007, 04:03 PM
Roger that, RTK and slapout9. That second article is broken off into this new thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2435). Continue here back on original topic (whatever that was :wry: ).

Culpeper
03-22-2007, 04:02 AM
Let's not forget Matthew Maupin (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matt_Maupin) or Ahmed Qusai al-Taayie (http://www.sanluisobispo.com/mld/sanluisobispo/news/breaking_news/16696048.htm).


To date we have 13 MIA. 2 military; 11 civilian.

http://www.aiipowmia.com/stats.html

I don't vouch for this website. Just found something high on the search engine with the information.

Fabius Maximus
03-22-2007, 02:08 PM
Looks like the GAO read my op-ed and issued a report supporting my assesment of Iraq. (Not really, but reads as if this is true.)

STABILIZING IRAQ
Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces
March 13, 2007
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07612t.pdf

To some extent the GAO supports all of these findings (excerpt below from my text):

The “Iraq Army” is in fact a lightly armed force consisting of
* regional militias organized along a religious (e.g., Shiite) or ethnic (e.g., Kurdish) basis,
* privately organized forces operating for the state, much like regiments in 16th or 17th century Europe,
* an army organized and run by the Coalition, typical of colonial forces in a bygone era.

Supporting the earlier comment about everyone "having their own facts about Iraq", the GAO notes lack of reliable data about the number and readiness of forces working "for" the Iraq gov't. "Ghost soldiers", indeed.

Fabius Maximus
03-22-2007, 02:20 PM
The following was a reply to a question by RTK:

3. From the start I shared the opinion of the real experts, the A-team, in the 4GW community. Most were of this opinion before the war started that we can destroy a state but not build one. We’re in the era of “the decline of the state” as described by Martin van Creveld. Failed or wrecked states easily fragment into situations like the 30 years war, where many factions – divided among varying lines – fight one another.

This suggests another reason to stop fighting the local elites. If we do break them, that might not build the center. Rather it might initiate another round of disintegration. This is Lind’s worst case, where we have nobody to negotiate with.

No longer theory or forecast, that is moving into the realm of fact. Probably a bad thing for us. For Iraq. For everyone in the ME region.

Shiite militia may be disintegrating
AP
March 21, 2007
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070321/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_al_sadr_defectors

Steve Blair
03-22-2007, 02:22 PM
Looks like the GAO read my op-ed and issued a report supporting my assesment of Iraq. (Not really, but reads as if this is true.)

STABILIZING IRAQ
Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces
March 13, 2007
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07612t.pdf

To some extent the GAO supports all of these findings (excerpt below from my text):


Supporting the earlier comment about everyone "having their own facts about Iraq", the GAO notes lack of reliable data about the number and readiness of forces working "for" the Iraq gov't. "Ghost soldiers", indeed.

"To some extent" is not the same thing as agreeing with you.:wry:

Fabius Maximus
03-22-2007, 02:27 PM
"To some extent" is not the same thing as agreeing with you.:wry:

I said they were "not really" agreeing with me. Still, nice of you to re-enforce this point. Too much clarity is always a good thing (paraphrase of Mae West).

RTK
03-22-2007, 03:58 PM
The following was a reply to a question by RTK:


No longer theory or forecast, that is moving into the realm of fact. Probably a bad thing for us. For Iraq. For everyone in the ME region.

Shiite militia may be disintegrating
AP
March 21, 2007
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070321/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_al_sadr_defectors

Which question was that? I've somehow lost track.

Stan
03-22-2007, 07:31 PM
Wasn't he suppose to go on vacation....like last week ?

Fabius Maximus
03-23-2007, 01:47 AM
The internet is everywhere, and I have a bit more time than I anticipated.

Fabius Maximus
03-23-2007, 04:31 AM
Couple questions in following come to mind:
1. As one at the pointy tip of the spear, how do we remedy this, if it truely is the case?
2. Do you think the surge will work, even if it is "civil war?" Why or why not?
3. Were you ever under the impression that the government was viable? If so, at what point did they fail to be such? If not, doesn't that invalidate many of your writings over the past 3 years?

A fracturing of the Shia might move Iraq away from a national gov't, away from a federal system, towards chaos. This was a major point of my text, that we should consider working with local elites -- not attempting to knock them down. Lind has also written about this.

RTK
03-23-2007, 10:54 AM
A fracturing of the Shia might move Iraq away from a national gov't, away from a federal system, towards chaos. This was a major point of my text, that we should consider working with local elites -- not attempting to knock them down. Lind has also written about this.

You mean work with local tribal leaders, sheiks , politicians, and Imams?

Gee, I never thought of that.

Fabius Maximus
03-23-2007, 12:58 PM
You mean work with local tribal leaders, sheiks , politicians, and Imams? Gee, I never thought of that.

We have fought Muqtada al-Sadr and many Sunni Arab leaders since the start of the war, and this has perhaps been the war's defining theme. Perhaps (who can say for certain?) this is the conceptual error leading to so much blood spilled and treasure waster, with nothing to show for it.

Don't feel personally responsible just because you never thought of it. Neither did the big folks in DC.

Martin van Creveld has some interesting things to say about this in his new book, The Changing Face of War.

RTK
03-23-2007, 02:20 PM
Don't feel personally responsible just because you never thought of it. Neither did the big folks in DC.



Evidently the sarcasm didn't come through the message as thick as I had laid it on while typing. Seems like what you're saying is very similar to what Kilcullen said in the 28 Articles. To insinuate this isn't happening is false.

The fact of the matter is that 80&#37; of the time in theater is spent engaging the local populace and their leaders. I had one MRE last time I was there. The rest of the time I either ate in the dining facility or at a sheik's house. Most (if not all) of the people I know did pretty much the same thing.

The bottom line is engaging isn't enough. Getting local leaders to take ownership of their community to minimize sectarian violence. That's a tougher sell, particularly in a society where poor performance reflects as a sign of weakness and shame.

Fabius Maximus
03-23-2007, 03:27 PM
If you believe that the Coalition leaders have seriously attempted to negotiate with Muqtada al-Sadr and the Sunni Arab insurgent leaders, fine. As I said earlier, in this war everyone has their own facts.

I doubt it. Nor do I see any indications of this in the public media or private analysis (i.e., think tanks, Stratfor).

That we have not struck such deals is a fact which I think will prove difficult to dispute.

Also, I doubt that local leaders have not taken "ownership of their community". The guys with guns seem to have done so quite effectively, if not according to our standards.

That they have not acted "to minimize sectarian violence" seems true, but obviously they do not believe this to be in their interest. Since they are the "world class experts" in their communities, I suspect we have to strike deals -- not attempt to "educate" them concerning their own affairs.

As for dining with local leaders, I (and everybody) agrees that this is tactically effective, to some extent. But not quite the subject under discussion.

Stan
03-23-2007, 03:37 PM
FM,
DoD has been doing this for years. Nothing new here. Just because you don't hear about it often enough, doesn't mean it's not taking place all over the world. You won't receive such information second hand, it comes from experienced soldiers.

RTK was and is personally responsible for every soldier under his command. I don't know if I could even explain that to you.

We're back to parachute packing. Do you want your's packed by a guy that reads newspapers, or by the guy that knows how to and does so with grave detail ?


Don't feel personally responsible just because you never thought of it. Neither did the big folks in DC.


Evidently the sarcasm didn't come through the message as thick as I had laid it on while typing.

RTK
03-23-2007, 03:38 PM
As for dining with local leaders, I (and everybody) agrees that this is tactically effective, to some extent. But not quite the subject under discussion.

If we're talking about tactical actions with strategic implications it's very much the subject under discussion. You can't seperate the two in this environment.

Steve Blair
03-23-2007, 03:40 PM
I also don't think DOD is responsible for checking in and reporting every move they make with private think tanks or the like. This whole discussion is becoming circular again.

Steve Blair
03-23-2007, 04:58 PM
Evidently the sarcasm didn't come through the message as thick as I had laid it on while typing. Seems like what you're saying is very similar to what Kilcullen said in the 28 Articles. To insinuate this isn't happening is false.

The fact of the matter is that 80% of the time in theater is spent engaging the local populace and their leaders. I had one MRE last time I was there. The rest of the time I either ate in the dining facility or at a sheik's house. Most (if not all) of the people I know did pretty much the same thing.

The bottom line is engaging isn't enough. Getting local leaders to take ownership of their community to minimize sectarian violence. That's a tougher sell, particularly in a society where poor performance reflects as a sign of weakness and shame.

Agreed. This has been heavily discussed both here and in other locations. To get back to one of FM's points, "Also, I doubt that local leaders have not taken "ownership of their community". The guys with guns seem to have done so quite effectively, if not according to our standards." - the guys with the guns are not necessarily the same thing as local leaders in the sense that RTK means (and if I'm mistaken in your meaning, RTK, please feel free to correct me). If the local leaders do not feel they can contain the outside influences, or extremists within their own organizations, they are most likely to step aside. And they also may not have been the first to assume control or direction within their areas. The complexities here are very deep and multi-faceted.

RTK
03-23-2007, 06:15 PM
the guys with the guns are not necessarily the same thing as local leaders in the sense that RTK means (and if I'm mistaken in your meaning, RTK, please feel free to correct me).

No need to correct you, Steve. You're all over it. How you interpretted it is exactly what I meant.

Steve Blair
03-23-2007, 06:43 PM
Cool. I was pretty sure that was what you meant, RTK, but didn't want to put words in your mouth.

As an aside, I noticed that FM quoted some questions you posed at one time. Were those ever really answered? I thought they were quite good, and also reasonable.

RTK
03-23-2007, 07:22 PM
As an aside, I noticed that FM quoted some questions you posed at one time. Were those ever really answered? I thought they were quite good, and also reasonable.

Not to my satisfaction. They were never specifically addressed.

Fabius Maximus
03-24-2007, 12:58 AM
If we're talking about tactical actions with strategic implications it's very much the subject under discussion. You can't seperate the two in this environment.
Please share with us if you have signed a treaty with Muqtada al-Sadr over dinner.

This has nothing to do with RTK's -- or anyone on this thread -- direct responsibilities in Iraq or who packs whose chute.

Deals on the scale we're discussing are made at high levels, based on strategic policy decisions made at senior DoD and White House levels. There is of course an interrelationship between tactics and strategy, but the distinction remains on a hierarchical basis. Based on available evidence, it seems likely to me that we have not altered our strategy, continuing the so-far failing strategy of attempting to suppress the insurgents. That's a guess -- most discussions about Iraq on SWC and other blogs are about guesses. Still, major policy changes make large waves. Of course, something might have changed so recently that the impacts have not yet appeared.

As for Steve Blair's point -- he is, of course, correct that deals can be made without public announcements. But if significant they would have had visible consequences during the past 4 years. Do you see any evidence of substantial deals with the leaders of the Mahdi Army or the Sunni Arab insurgents?

As for "the guys with the guns are not necessarily the same thing as local leaders" -- perhaps. Who can say on the basis of public information? At the least, an insurgency that remains so effective despite almost 4 years of massive Coalition COIN programs ... with little evidence of substantial external support (e.g., little or no anti-air) -- likely has deep local support. The long history of insurgencies suggests that they are typically plugged in, or perhaps even subordinate, to key elements of the local elites. That is an important foundation of their strength.

Fabius Maximus
03-24-2007, 01:13 AM
Not to my satisfaction. They were never specifically addressed.
I don't believe you questioned any specific aspect of my reply. I might have missed it, as there were several cross discussions going on.

RTK
03-24-2007, 01:47 AM
I don't believe you questioned any specific aspect of my reply. I might have missed it, as there were several cross discussions going on.

Only because I was fairly certain you knew that your answers weren't anywhere near sufficient.


Please share with us if you have signed a treaty with Muqtada al-Sadr over dinner.

You clearly don't understand the concept of the Strategic Corporal.


Do you see any evidence of substantial deals with the leaders of the Mahdi Army or the Sunni Arab insurgents?

See the work of COL MacFarland's 1/1AD in Ramadi over the past year. It doesn't happen by itself.

"When 1-1AD arrived in Ramadi last June, it was welcomed by six cooperative tribes and twelve hostile ones. Today, it boasts the support of 15 and the enmity of just three." http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20070219&s=kaplan021907

Steve Blair
03-24-2007, 03:00 AM
Please share with us if you have signed a treaty with Muqtada al-Sadr over dinner.

This has nothing to do with RTK's -- or anyone on this thread -- direct responsibilities in Iraq or who packs whose chute.

Deals on the scale we're discussing are made at high levels, based on strategic policy decisions made at senior DoD and White House levels. There is of course an interrelationship between tactics and strategy, but the distinction remains on a hierarchical basis. Based on available evidence, it seems likely to me that we have not altered our strategy, continuing the so-far failing strategy of attempting to suppress the insurgents. That's a guess -- most discussions about Iraq on SWC and other blogs are about guesses. Still, major policy changes make large waves. Of course, something might have changed so recently that the impacts have not yet appeared.

As for Steve Blair's point -- he is, of course, correct that deals can be made without public announcements. But if significant they would have had visible consequences during the past 4 years. Do you see any evidence of substantial deals with the leaders of the Mahdi Army or the Sunni Arab insurgents?

As for "the guys with the guns are not necessarily the same thing as local leaders" -- perhaps. Who can say on the basis of public information? At the least, an insurgency that remains so effective despite almost 4 years of massive Coalition COIN programs ... with little evidence of substantial external support (e.g., little or no anti-air) -- likely has deep local support. The long history of insurgencies suggests that they are typically plugged in, or perhaps even subordinate, to key elements of the local elites. That is an important foundation of their strength.

Once again I think you're confusing a number of points here, as well as showing what appears to be a selective understanding of insurgencies. Iraq is not a single insurgency: it is a number of them, mixed in with terrorist groups with no interest in a solution, some criminal elements interested only in plunder, and others with interests that may span all the elements listed above and add in a few of their own. COIN is effective against the insurgency; it has limited value against terrorist groups. Your comment about insurgencies being "typically plugged in, or perhaps even subordinate, to key elements of the local elites" is also misleading if not incorrect in a number of particulars. You would first need to define local, and then get into the question of which elite (most societies, even the most primitive tribal groups, have more than one functional elite) 'controls' them, although our own history indicates that often these elites have little control over the actions of some within the group (review Native American history if you doubt this; the actions of the Kiowa during the 1874 Buffalo War or the conduct of the Apache at just about any juncture of their history are but two examples).

Another thing that seems to get lost here is the fact that most effective COIN initiatives begin at the BOTTOM, with the sort of deals and meetings that RTK is mentioning. If you can sway and influence the tribal groups behind a leader, you don't NEED a treaty with that leader. By removing his local support you've rendered him ineffective. I would think with all your 4GW stuff you'd understand the value of the political indirect approach...flanking the fish, if you will, by chlorinating the water they live in. The true work, effort, and success in most COIN initiatives comes from the bottom and rises. It cannot be shoved down from the top.

slapout9
03-24-2007, 01:46 PM
One of the best explanations I have seen!


Another thing that seems to get lost here is the fact that most effective COIN initiatives begin at the BOTTOM, with the sort of deals and meetings that RTK is mentioning. If you can sway and influence the tribal groups behind a leader, you don't NEED a treaty with that leader. By removing his local support you've rendered him ineffective. I would think with all your 4GW stuff you'd understand the value of the political indirect approach...flanking the fish, if you will, by chlorinating the water they live in. The true work, effort, and success in most COIN initiatives comes from the bottom and rises. It cannot be shoved down from the top.

My 2 cents - we have more insurgents in the US Congress than ever before (Demo-rats) this business of a date certain and then we cut off the money is nothing but a guaranteed loss!!

Culpeper
03-25-2007, 02:23 AM
They're losers [Congress] . Idiots are using a small war for political gain instead of getting this thing completed correctly. First they screamed about the troops not getting enough and now they want to fight on a zero budget. Troops didn't have enough to begin with and now they come up with a budget of, "if you don't use it you're going to lose it." Let's see....You had one Humvee that you never took out on patrol. You lose it as well as the personnel assigned to it. That goes for the armor plating as well. It's called withdraw on paper. It's still a guaranteed loss. You got that right. Commander-in-Chief should veto their asses off.

Steve Blair
03-25-2007, 03:03 AM
Actually, this has been a trend that has been around for ages in the US political system. Go back and look at the Indian Wars and you'll see the same thing from Congress. It's something of a constant in the political cycle.

But the link to this is that Congress' actions (or lack thereof, depending on the situation) should not come as a surprise to ANYONE. Ignoring that reality in the planning process is part of the problem. The only way around it is to mobilize the public, or at least get them educated and involved. Congress doesn't like that, but at the end of the day it's the only sort of pressure that they will respond to.

Jones_RE
03-25-2007, 06:21 AM
The recent house measure is nothing but political theater. Democrats were elected, in part, to do something about the war. Because congress is by design a debating society they have responded with classic meaningless legislation. The measure won't reconcile with the Senate version of the same bill (so it won't even get to the oval office to be vetoed), but it will drag out negotiations.

As an aside, one thing most people forget when watching our two parties tear into each other is that U.S. foreign policy is generally stable regardless of who happens to be in charge of it. The words change, but the music stays the same. We can talk about democrats not supporting the troops, but if the roles were reversed an John Kerry was in the White House with a republican congress you'd see much the same action: democrats demanding that we support a wartime president and republicans calling for accountability.
As support for this position I could cite Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Desert Fox, etc. The party out of power (i.e. that doesn't hold the White House) opposes everything the President does - they're just harder to deal with when they control the legislative branch.

In any event, Congress has tried to manage every war the nation has ever fought, from the Revolution on, and we've mostly muddled through all right.

------------------
Ed. by SWC Admin -- post copied to new thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2465)in Politics in the Rear forum. If your comments are on that branch, follow it there (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2465).

Culpeper
03-25-2007, 05:12 PM
Last two posts are right on the mark.

My favorite story of Congress getting too involved is more on a personal level. David Crockett's political career was suffering so he thought he would go to Texas and get some headlines. He traveled to a place called The Alamo. News didn't travel very fast back then. He didn't even know they were completely surrounded until he was within the walls. Fate.

RTK
04-18-2007, 10:54 PM
Not that I'm complaining, but we haven't heard from FM for a while.

Wasn't he drafting a post to tell us how to win the war?

Fabius Maximus
07-06-2007, 01:38 AM
Now that would be something, to show how to do this. "Mission Impossible, the New Series."

My scribbling have more modest ambitions. The article that initiated this thread said two things.

1. Our strategic goals, as defined by President Bush, were no longer possible to achieve.
a. Building a pro-American Iraq government was almost impossible.
b. Building a strong national Iraq government was unlikely.
c. A stable “federal/state” structure was the best we could hope for.

The responses to this article indicated that this was a controversial view in March. Today it seems to be the common wisdom. That we’re arming the Sunni Arabs suggests that the US government agrees.

2. “No matter what we do, the Expedition to Iraq has failed. Only the scope of the failure, the price to be paid by the Iraq people and by us, remains uncertain. The long-term result of the Iraq War will depend on our reaction to this failure. That will tell us much about ourselves, and help determine what kind of America we leave for our children.” This, of course, remains controversial.

I have several articles in the pipeline expanding on #2. I am, however, guided by the emails I get. The series on development of the “insurgent handbook” received so many that I am writing one or two more on that subject.

Even that must wait. Killcullen’s recent article might be the most important geo-political article written this year. Perhaps this decade. Too early to say, but it might be this generation’s equivalent of Kennan’s Long Telegram. I hope to have something – rough thoughts at least – out next week.

New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/new-paradigms-for-21st-century/

SteveMetz
07-06-2007, 01:44 AM
“No matter what we do, the Expedition to Iraq has failed. Only the scope of the failure, the price to be paid by the Iraq people and by us, remains uncertain. http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/new-paradigms-for-21st-century/

For what it's worth, let's keep in mind what the strategic objectives were when we intervened: An intact Iraqi state which is not a state supporters of terrorism, does not threaten its neighbors and does not possess WMD.

slapout9
07-06-2007, 02:06 AM
Fabius, you mentioned something on the DNI website just a short time ago about a new Infantry manual that was written in secret for the DOD or something of that sort. I think you mentioned it would be published shortly. Do have any more updates on this?

Fabius Maximus
07-06-2007, 02:07 AM
Could we have exited at some point in the past and achieved these goals? If we returned to those modest goals, could we leave now?

Or have our goals grown -- as is so often the case during wars -- to justify our expenditure of blood and money? If so, where does this process end?

Consider the intital goals of the various european states in August 1914, a war which grew into the "war to end all wars." After the deaths of millions, nothing less would do.

Fabius Maximus
07-06-2007, 02:15 AM
Yes, it's in the pipeline. Hopefully after I finish the article about Kilcullen and the long war.

Here's the opening (current draft):

The first two chapters described how this is a poignant moment in history.

First, our foes are about to greatly increase their understanding of 4th generation warfare (4GW). This point in time is like that of conventional military theory after WWI, when the tentative beginnings of infiltration tactics were about to become blitzkrieg (aka maneuver warfare). Or guerilla warfare in the 1930’s, when Mao picked up his pen to write Basic Tactics – the handbook for People’s War. Soon someone will write "The Insurgent's Handbook."

Second, both we and our enemies are becoming aware that America’s governmental institutions appear structurally unable to effectively respond to 4GW threats.

What subjects would an insurgent's handbook cover? That is, what do current 4GW organizations need to become serious threats to us?

slapout9
07-06-2007, 02:21 AM
Couple more questions. 1-Do you think we will attack Iran? 2-Do you think Israel will invade Syria? 3- What brought you to Alabama recently?

Fabius Maximus
07-06-2007, 02:39 AM
1. I do not believe we will attack Iran. That would require bipartisan support, which I doubt Bush can now obtain.

a. Public support for the Iraq War is draining away, which discourages elected officials' support for what is in effect an expansion of the war.

b. Support by Congressional leaders for an attack on Iran might seriously damage the Democratic Party coalition, which is already stressed by their leading candidates support for the Iraq War

c. Even Republican officials are backing away from President Bush's policies. He has made too many mistakes, both operational and political. I suspect the last straw was the failure of his attempt to force through a "comprehensive solution" to the immigration problem.

2. I suspect Israel will require time to rebuild both its military and political structures. Both were, I suspect, damaged by the victory of Hezbollah in Lebanon. They cannot afford many such losses.

But who can say what might happen? These days there are many desperate people in high places, who might take gambles that calmer folks would avoid.

Culpeper
07-06-2007, 04:25 AM
As constructive criticism I think all your points may or could be made easily moot. 911 set the precedence of the way our military will perform in the future. Iraq is an exception and merely a distraction to the overall picture due the demands of the press in a democratic society. The future holds a smaller military footprint, more humanitarian aid, more diversification in special forces, surgically killing bad guys, setting up bases in areas within close proximity of troubled areas of interest, training indigenous such as Yemenis commandos as well as small and large militias depending on demographics, indigenous coast guards, and so forth. All these things are coming to a form of maturity through the inevitable trial and error in places all over the world as a result of 911.

As for Iran, they are already sending troops across the border into Iraq. We are already in a state of war with Iran. It is the day of "brown and black" ops where national security trumps public opinion.

Certain Republicans are not backing away from Bush. They are asking for a change in strategy in Iraq. They have no problem with Afghanistan, Columbia, The Horn of Africa, Mongolia, The Philippines, and other places you may never heard of before. And what is happening in Iraq is nothing new. To quote from the USMC Small Wars Manual actually published in 1940.


During the initial phases of intervention, when the landing and movement may be opposed by comparatively large, well led, organized, and equipped hostile forces, the tactics employed are generally those of a force of similar strength and composition engaged in major warfare. If a crushing defeat can be inflicted upon these forces, the immediate cessation of armed opposition may result. This is seldom the case. Usually the hostile forces will withdraw as a body into the more remote parts of the country, or will be dispersed into numerous small groups which continue to oppose the occupation. Even though the recognized leaders may capitulate, subordinate commanders often refuse to abide by the terms of the capitulation. Escaping to the hinterland, they assemble the heterogeneous armed groups of patriotic soldiers, malcontents, notorious outlaws and impressed civilians, and, by means of guerrilla warfare, continue to harass and oppose the intervening force in its attempt to restore peace and good order throughout the country as a whole.

The USMC wasn't looking through a crystal ball in 1940. They merely, "wrote the book" on the subject. And with Iraq they were 100% correct. You may find this hard to believe but the previous Secretary of Defense had a copy of this manual in his office at all times. The biggest mistake this Administration has done is not properly educating the public on the basic aspects on what is being accomplished. Instead, they take a beating by the press that inspires Congress. As a nation we are uneducated concerning the basics on what is happening, what to expect, and what is in the future for national security operations. The public doesn't have a need to know every detail. That would be counterproductive for national security. A rudimentary understanding is all it would take to reverse public opinion polls. This is the fallacy of the Bush Administration.

Israel is generally always in a state of preparedness. We cannot gauge the latest actions of their capability since they violated their own manual of success. They won't do that again. Their politics will not jeopardize their understanding of preparedness and survival.

Iran could be attacked. Not necessarily in the same way we attacked Iraq. By that I mean much worse on one end and surgically on the other end. I'm certain their are several options on the table and Iraq was not or is not the endgame. I don't think this is a gamble of desperate people in high places. That is just too open ended. Nevertheless, it is a gamble of how soon we get down to eliminating bureaucratic roadblocks and take a serious look at what is working for us across the globe.

Ironhorse
07-06-2007, 10:28 AM
As a nation we are uneducated concerning the basics on what is happening, what to expect, and what is in the future for national security operations. The public doesn't have a need to know every detail. That would be counterproductive for national security. A rudimentary understanding is all it would take to reverse public opinion polls. This is the fallacy of the Bush Administration.
Yes and no, I think.

I agree that more public education would create more understanding which might create more tolerance for COIN best practices and hopefully less tolerance for the unreasoned opposition of them.

But I believe public opinion is mired in its evaluation of past operations as well as its expectations for the future. The two are not wholly separable in an objective water-under-the-bridge sort of way.

And in that past operations arena, there is a lot for the public and political opponents to question. Unfortunately, having a copy in your office is not the same as reading it and applying its lessons. Either that, or my copy is curiously missing the go light, shock and awe, de-Baathify and disband chapters.

Further education is, therefore, a two edged sword which would further expose those and other decisions, and the legacy they created.

goesh
07-06-2007, 12:41 PM
Amidst the rubble Nasrallah declared victory for hizbullah and some assumed in a matter of months their devastated infrastructure would be rebuilt and all their expended missles replaced and all their dead personnel reincarnated ready to go again. I fail to see the KIA count for IDF and the loss of some equipment as a defeat when there was no intent for occupation or even a conceived notion of altering Lebanon's political landscape via the assault. Bad tactics and the meddling of politicians at best makes it a draw. The perception of hizbullah victory certainly emboldened hamas now isolated in Gaza engaged in 2 fronts - IDF and Fatah. It generated an Isreali construction boom visa-via reinforcing homes and building bomb shelters and it resulted in new IDF leadership and political fallout. Those are not symptoms of defeat but lessons learned IMO.

Fabius Maximus
07-06-2007, 02:34 PM
Right or wrong, analysis of the political situation must be the first step when determining the likelihood of war. We see that in the literature from Boyd’s trinity of “people-ideas-things” and 4GW writers’ emphasis on the moral basis of war – back thru Clausewitz, Machiavelli, and Sun Tzu.

Discussing politics is guessing, even for professional politicos and their technicians – so my guesses could easily be wrong! Goesh could easily be right and the new IDF leadership ready to go. Although the political leadership looks weak, Culpeper could be right that in Israel this is less important than in other western states – and that President Bush retains sufficient political capital to order an air strike against Iran.


And what is happening in Iraq is nothing new.

How true! That insight is the basis for 4GW analysis of the Iraq War. Since Mao brought “4GW” theory to maturity, almost all foreign occupiers have been defeated and left – unlike internal insurgencies whose record is mixed (there are intermediate cases difficult to classify). There are deep structural reasons for this, beyond the reach of new tactics. Hence the prediction that our expedition to Iraq will end the same way. We all hope that proves to be wrong, but many experts believe that is the way to bet.

It is just a harsh reality, as in Tom Godwin’s story “The Cold Equations”.


It is the day of "brown and black" ops where national security trumps public opinion.

This too is nothing new. SOP during the cold war. That history also suggests that these ops often (usually?) become public knowledge. Today's communication technology probably makes this even more likely than during the 1950's & 1960's. Unfortunatley, many of them damaged domestic and foreign public opinion, more than offsetting their tactical gains.

Pragmatic Thinker
07-06-2007, 05:57 PM
I read with interest people's opinions regarding an Iran attack scenario, however, lets not dismiss the possbility of some economic action that would possibly hurt the current regime. I read with interest the following article http://www.iags.org/n050707.htm from the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, and they bring up several good points --

1) "...the debate in the West on how to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons should focus less on the risky military option, or the seemingly ineffective diplomatic option, and more on a comprehensive economic warfare strategy that targets Iran's energy sector. With oil exports accounting for half the government's budget and around 80 to 90 percent of total export earnings, the surest strategy to bring down Tehran's Islamic regime is to break its economic backbone...."

2) ..."U.S. sanctions have ensured that Iran's oil sector would not recover. President George W. Bush has renewed sanctions first imposed in 1995 by President Bill Clinton, citing the "unusual and extraordinary threat" to U.S. national security posed by Iran. These sanctions prohibit U.S. companies and their foreign subsidiaries from conducting business with Iran, while also banning the financing of development of Iranian energy resources...."

Bottom line, the sanctions need to be continued and enforced plus more pressure put on China and India for side-stepping the sanctions and working toward fulfilling their own energy shortcomings by working with Iran. There is currently a nationwide gas rationing program implemented in Iran which is causing riots and protests. I believe I see a recurring theme with the media in this country. As I am doing my daily lunchtime workout today I was treated by Fox News to an hour of LAPD chasing some woman who refused to pull-over for them....not a peep about Iran....shame, shame....

Regards, PT

Fabius Maximus
07-06-2007, 10:25 PM
there is so much provocative material in your post. Here are a few comments, just scratching the surface.

Proposing a “comprehensive economic warfare strategy” against Iran takes us back to debates from the beginning of the Cold War. That was Kennan’s vision of how to contain the Soviet Union, and he was not happy as his ideas were hijacked by the military.

It’s a powerful concept. It uses our leverage as the hegemonic power, without arousing the fears – and hence opposition – of other states that result from our use of military force.

Unfortunately, Iran holds much of the world’s remaining oil. That makes containment more difficult. To illustrate, what might be the major story of last month went unnoticed by most geo-political observers. I strongly recommend reading it.

“Top IEA official: without Iraqi oil, we hit the wall in 2015”
http://www.energybulletin.net/31397.html

While striking, this is only the most recent in a series of comments by leading officials of the International Energy Agency and the US’s EIA. They are becoming alarmed by accumulating data suggesting that global oil reserves are less than they anticipated.

Aggressive action against Iran, military and/or economic, will mean that we have taken down the two states with the greatest potential to increase oil production. We all know the implications.

Consider the global alliance to contain Iran as a form of the prisoners’ dilemma. We all gain by hanging together. But if this results in $150 oil, the reward for defecting – leaving the alliance, aiding Iran -- becomes attractive.

Culpeper
07-07-2007, 05:43 AM
Yes and no, I think.



Further education is, therefore, a two edged sword which would further expose those and other decisions, and the legacy they created.

There is never anything wrong with further education. Even at the opportunity cost of decision makers. Some people get killed and others get their careers ended as a result. We have already lost one Secretary of Defense. Others will eventually have to follow suit. I have lost most of my interest of political pressure where Iraq is concerned. The company language seems to be careful of stating Iraq must immediately end. I can read between the lines. There is more going on than most of have a need to know. I can accept that. Educating America on what needs to be done and how it needs to done should take precedence over the careers of decision makers. This will result in getting rid of those that have legacy on their minds and bring up those that are positive goal driven leaders. Eventually, those in the field will rise up in the ranks to fill this void. But in order for this to work, the average American needs to have a basic understanding of the situations we face. If the press is running stories that expose mistakes the end result should be improved national security and possibly, if need be, the loss of certain jobs for certain individuals. But it should not be viewed as a victory for one side of the debate. It should be viewed as an improvement to the war effort. No different than a CEO that has turned the organization into a failure and the qualified and motivated replacement bringing the organization back into a going concern. Most people view that as a positive and don't relish on the scandal itself after the positive results become a reality. The old piss poor CEO just becomes a side note at that point. Killing bad guys and civil affairs is just one side of the COIN. Getting rid of poor leaders and replacing them with experienced and respected leaders is the other side for a victory of sorts. Even WWII cannot be viewed as an absolute victory. It actually created the Cold War, which created the Korean and Vietnam Conflicts. As General Franks would put it, the end of WWII was a catastrophic success, just as he did with Iraq after the Saddam Regime quickly fell and we had to deal with what we a dealing with now.

Fabius Maximus
09-27-2007, 12:10 AM
Not that I'm complaining, but we haven't heard from FM for a while. Wasn't he drafting a post to tell us how to win the war?

Here it is. But not exactly, as you say, "how to win the war." (I wish we knew how to do that.) It describes one scenario for the war's end. I consider this the most likely end, but we all know the odds of correctly forecasting that.

After gathering dust on my desk for several months, now seems the approriate time to launch it.

By "the war" I mean the war in Iraq. The "Long War" is a larger issue, in which Iraq just one front of one theater. This is part 4 in a series of articles about the Long War. It is a sequel to or expansion of the article discussed on this thread.

Beyond Insurgency: An End to Our War in Iraq (http://www.defense-and-society.org/fabius/long_war_IV.htm)

skiguy
09-27-2007, 12:20 AM
I wish we knew how to do that
Now we do (http://www.amazon.com/Marine-Corps-Counterinsurgency-Field-Manual/dp/0226841510/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/103-9341805-1687023?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190852350&sr=8-1) ;)

Fabius Maximus
09-27-2007, 12:44 AM
Taking skiguy's comment to the next level, we could follow Martin van Creveld's advice: bombing insurgents with the thousands of copies of the thousands of manuals-guides-books-articles about fighting insurgencies.

But that would be too cruel. ;)

Unfortunately, these are all written by losers. If we'd win one, then we could write it up ("win" as foreigners fighting a domestic insurgency, fought after Mao brought 4GW theory to maturity).

jcustis
09-27-2007, 02:51 AM
Unfortunately, these are all written by losers. If we'd win one, then we could write it up ("win" as foreigners fighting a domestic insurgency, fought after Mao brought 4GW theory to maturity).

Please feel free to clarify, or else I fear this thread will take a nose dive in short order.

Fabius Maximus
09-27-2007, 04:09 AM
It's a historical fact, however shocking. Martin van Creveld discusses this at some length in the closing chapters of The Changing Face of War.

Since Mao brought 4GW to maturity, and more so as 4GW art has developed since then, insurgents have defeated foreigners. Other than in small and shallowly rooted uprisings, foreigners lose. Western, Asian, developed nations, emerging nations – it makes no difference. (domestic conflicts among locals are more complex to analyze).

There are borderline cases, as always in human events. Like Northern Ireland. But in general the record is clear.

So it follows that COIN manuals are written by folks who have not won these kinds of wars. That remains true until either we win one or our opponents write a manual for us.

4GW forces us to confront many harsh realities. Killing children-soldiers, suicide bombers, the clash of universal truths vs. revealed truths, the evolution of war perhaps making our military organizations obsolete.

None of this is new in history. Now it’s happening to us.

slapout9
09-27-2007, 04:13 AM
So you are saying we don't need a military?

jcustis
09-27-2007, 04:17 AM
So it follows that COIN manuals are written by folks who have not won these kinds of wars. That remains true until either we win one or our opponents write a manual for us.

Really?...And so you can say authoritatively that the book they wrote was wrong? There were not other factors that influenced events?

You're stating the obvious of sorts, but I believe that the argument you are trying to advance is flawed.

This whole COIN manual thing isn't another veiled dig at Kilcullen, is it?

And just a tip here FM, if you could for once post something without mentioning 4GW, you might be taken a bit more seriously.

SWCAdmin
09-27-2007, 06:58 AM
Here we go again :rolleyes:.

Or, perhaps, we won't get too carried away? Agreeing to disagree seems to be a critical survival skill here.

No need to keep trying to convert the altar boys here.

Mark O'Neill
09-27-2007, 08:35 AM
It's a historical fact, however shocking. Martin van Creveld discusses this at some length in the closing chapters of The Changing Face of War.

Since Mao brought 4GW to maturity, and more so as 4GW art has developed since then, insurgents have defeated foreigners. Other than in small and shallowly rooted uprisings, foreigners lose. Western, Asian, developed nations, emerging nations – it makes no difference. (domestic conflicts among locals are more complex to analyze).

There are borderline cases, as always in human events. Like Northern Ireland. But in general the record is clear.

So it follows that COIN manuals are written by folks who have not won these kinds of wars. That remains true until either we win one or our opponents write a manual for us.

4GW forces us to confront many harsh realities. Killing children-soldiers, suicide bombers, the clash of universal truths vs. revealed truths, the evolution of war perhaps making our military organizations obsolete.

None of this is new in history. Now it’s happening to us.


FM,


I would welcome a sensible exposition of your ideas about this issue rather than a tired recycling of vaguely articluated, second hand (and eminently contestable) opinions.

Thrill me with your insight.

Mark

skiguy
09-27-2007, 09:19 AM
So it follows that COIN manuals are written by folks who have not won these kinds of wars.

You may want to double check your facts. Are you trashing LTC Nagl too? :mad:..but I'll stay civil, diplomatic, and out of the discussion if you are actually taking a dig at him.

By the way,why do you hide behind some fantasy name when you write your "expert" analyses?

This post was written by me, Ken Adams

SteveMetz
09-27-2007, 10:06 AM
It's a historical fact, however shocking. Martin van Creveld discusses this at some length in the closing chapters of The Changing Face of War.

Since Mao brought 4GW to maturity, and more so as 4GW art has developed since then, insurgents have defeated foreigners. Other than in small and shallowly rooted uprisings, foreigners lose. Western, Asian, developed nations, emerging nations – it makes no difference. (domestic conflicts among locals are more complex to analyze).

There are borderline cases, as always in human events. Like Northern Ireland. But in general the record is clear.

So it follows that COIN manuals are written by folks who have not won these kinds of wars. That remains true until either we win one or our opponents write a manual for us.

4GW forces us to confront many harsh realities. Killing children-soldiers, suicide bombers, the clash of universal truths vs. revealed truths, the evolution of war perhaps making our military organizations obsolete.

None of this is new in history. Now it’s happening to us.

Your point is factually false:

Malaya
Palestine
Northern Ireland
Kenya
Oman
Iraq
Afghanistan
El Salvador

Second, it's irrelevant. In the post-colonial world, the only insurgency that pits what is seen as a foreign occupier against a domestic resistance force is Palestine. When foreigners are involved, they are normally in support of a local ally.

Third, I've always found the assertion that insurgents often or normally win to be patently wrong because there are hundreds, probably thousands of insurgencies that were defeated at an early stage which simply aren't well known because they were defeated.

Gian P Gentile
09-27-2007, 10:10 AM
Let me ask you this: Did we need the surge to get where we are at today? Would your assessment of conditions on the ground and proposal for future action worked in December 2006 before the surge began?

I disagree with your point that the American elite and populace will soon end the war. Sadly i think the ostenisble success of the Surge has created enough optimism within the right's base to maintain this tempo of military operations in Iraq Indefinitely; to the detriment of the American Army.

SteveMetz
09-27-2007, 10:16 AM
I disagree with your point that the American elite and populace will soon end the war. Sadly i think the ostenisble success of the Surge has created enough optimism within the right's base to maintain this tempo of military operations in Iraq Indefinitely; to the detriment of the American Army.

I see it differently. The whole purpose of the "surge" was to create "space" for political progress. If there is no demonstrable political progress (and, sadly, I don't think there will be), I believe the American public and Congress will say, "We gave them an opportunity. They didn't take it. We're outta here."

I think both Democrats and Republicans will base their argument on the damage the current operational level is doing to the force. I want to get a copy of the CSA's HASC testimony yesterday where, according to media reports, he made that point.

In my blog, I've compared the "surge" to the Phoenix program--a militarily successful operation that was, politically speaking, too late. If we done the surge in the autumn of 2003, it might have mattered.

SteveMetz
09-27-2007, 10:19 AM
I also wanted to add that I consider the question of whether the conflict in Iraq is or is not an insurgency a red herring. Insurgency is a strategy. Most conflicts involve multiple strategies; their relative importance can ebb and flow during the course of the conflict. To me, debating whether the conflict in Iraq is or is not an insurgency is like debating whether World War II was or war not amphibious war or strategic bombing.

Gian P Gentile
09-27-2007, 11:14 AM
Except for the fact that for almost all of them (the "American public and Congress") their sons and daughters are not dying daily on the streets and roads of Iraq.

SteveMetz
09-27-2007, 11:50 AM
Except for the fact that for almost all of them (the "American public and Congress") their sons and daughters are not dying daily on the streets and roads of Iraq.

I think that might affect the intensity of the opposition, but not the extent. The majority of the people who opposed the war in Vietnam did not have family there.

Kreker
09-27-2007, 11:52 AM
I want to get a copy of the CSA's HASC testimony yesterday where, according to media reports, he made that point.

Steve,
Here's the link.
http://armedservices.house.gov/hearing_information.shtml
Regards

SteveMetz
09-27-2007, 12:19 PM
Steve,
Here's the link.
http://armedservices.house.gov/hearing_information.shtml
Regards

Thanks. When I Googled the HASC, I got a different site. I was going to get a copy of the testimony from a buddy on the CSA staff.

Fabius Maximus
09-27-2007, 01:59 PM
Really?...And so you can say authoritatively that the book they wrote was wrong?
No, you are making a prediction about the future. I said that the institution which produced it had not won a counter-insurgency (within the parameters I gave). That's a statement about the past.


So you are saying we don't need a military?
No, I believe and have written tens of thousands of words about the exact opposite of this. Learning to win at 4GW might be necessary for our survival.


Thrill me with your insight.
My post refered to a specific article -- part of a series. Reading that will give you chills and thrills. Swaping these bits of text back and forth doesn't seem to substitute for longer exposition. For a brief summary of my views, Steve Metz's comment #171 looks perfect.


Insurgency is a strategy.
I prefer to use definitions in JP 1-02 DoD Dictionary:
"insurgency — An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict."
Seems to fit Iraq, doesn't it?

SteveMetz
09-27-2007, 03:07 PM
I prefer to use definitions in JP 1-02 DoD Dictionary:
"insurgency — An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict."
Seems to fit Iraq, doesn't it?

I think that definition is horrible and have said so in writing. According to it, there was no insurgency in Iraq until June 2005. Plus it excludes the dozens of recent and ongoing insurgencies that aren't seeking to overthrow a government. Plus, there are other characteristics of insurgency other than subversion and armed conflict. Think about it--we were trying to get get Saddam Hussein's officers to turn on him while we were removing him militarily. By this definition, the U.S. government was an insurgency in March and April 2003.

Luckily, I convinced Con Crane of this when he was writing 3-24. He didn't feel he could just ignore the Joint definition so he just genuflected toward it and then ignored it.

I'm hoping that the new Joint doctrine, which is under development, will have a better definition.

Fabius Maximus
09-27-2007, 03:09 PM
Wash Post: "Senate overwhelmingly endorsed a political settlement for Iraq that would divide the country into three semi-autonomous regions."

It is a powerful conclusion to the original debate on this thread, the extremely heated opposition to my article forecasting that Iraq would fracture -- and that this would be a good thing.

This should also conclude a debate going back to my first post on SWC: that there is no national government in Iraq, in that it lacks the "attributes" of a real government. The Senate resolution caps a long series of US actions showing that the US government regards the Iraq national government as a useful fiction (an almost colonial mindset). Our mercs operate without supervision by the local govt, we build bases without consulting the local govt, we aid & strike deals with insurgents without consulting the local govt, etc etc.

Ken White
09-27-2007, 03:15 PM
Words fail me...

Fabius Maximus
09-27-2007, 03:26 PM
I too dislike many of the JP 1-02 definitions. But I use them, as I think it's important that we play with a common set of definitions -- otherwise it's Tower of Babel, revisited. These discussions are complex enough, rife with misunderstandings, without adding a new layer of confusion.

That's not to say debates on definitions are not important; just that unless stated otherwise I advocate sticking with the "book" meanings.

Stu-6
09-27-2007, 06:10 PM
Wash Post: "Senate overwhelmingly endorsed a political settlement for Iraq that would divide the country into three semi-autonomous regions."

The headline should be re-titled “senate recognises what already happened”

tolsen
09-27-2007, 08:11 PM
Third, I've always found the assertion that insurgents often or normally win to be patently wrong because there are hundreds, probably thousands of insurgencies that were defeated at an early stage which simply aren't well known because they were defeated.


I tend to agree with this. Many proto-insurgencies get nipped in the bud before they can blossom. Because of this they tend to get mentioned in the histories only in passing.

Malaya,Palestine,Northern Ireland,Kenya,Oman,Iraq,Afghanistan,El Salvador

Additional Trivia: I might also add the Soviet agricultural collectivization campaign in the late 20's - early 30's. The soviets tried very hard to hide the level of violent resistance from the outside world (and soviet urban citizens) so many people don't know how extensive it was and its hard to get exact figures on the real death counts but it now appears to have met more violent resistance than was previously imagined. IIRC, I remember reading that the <i>internal</i> Soviet count of their own dead - NOT peasants, but just the soldiers, state security, and police killed by peasants - exceeded 10,000 during the course of the flare up ... and the Soviets almost always under-counted even in their own documents.

SteveMetz
09-27-2007, 08:20 PM
Third, I've always found the assertion that insurgents often or normally win to be patently wrong because there are hundreds, probably thousands of insurgencies that were defeated at an early stage which simply aren't well known because they were defeated.


I tend to agree with this. Many proto-insurgencies get nipped in the bud before they can blossom. Because of this they tend to get mentioned in the histories only in passing.

Malaya,Palestine,Northern Ireland,Kenya,Oman,Iraq,Afghanistan,El Salvador

Additional Trivia: I might also add the Soviet agricultural collectivization campaign in the late 20's - early 30's. The soviets tried very hard to hide the level of violent resistance from the outside world (and soviet urban citizens) so many people don't know how extensive it was and its hard to get exact figures on the real death counts but it now appears to have met more violent resistance than was previously imagined. IIRC, I remember reading that the <i>internal</i> Soviet count of their own dead - NOT peasants, but just the soldiers, state security, and police killed by peasants - exceeded 10,000 during the course of the flare up ... and the Soviets almost always under-counted even in their own documents.

Bud nipping is the way to go. I believe that anytime the U.S. becomes involved in counterinsurgency, our policymakers have failed to do what they should have done.

skiguy
09-27-2007, 08:56 PM
our policymakers have failed to do what they should have done.

Yeah, like educating the general public what COIN is.

SteveMetz
09-27-2007, 09:04 PM
Yeah, like educating the general public what COIN is.

I think the Iraq situation is a classic example of this enduring conundrum with counterinsurgency: for a government (or ruling authority) to admit that it faces a serious insurgency, it has to admit that it made major policy errors. The natural tendency is to postpone such an admission as long as possible. But this gives the insurgents time to coalesce. I believe the situation in Iraq had reached a psychological "set" by late 2003 or early 2004. If we had admitted our errors and undertake the "surge" in the late summer of 2003, it might have made a difference.

skiguy
09-27-2007, 10:19 PM
I don't know,Steve. As one who is on the "front lines" of hearing civilian dissent everyday, that happened when people like Joe Wilson and Cindy Sheehan came into the picture. The nail in the coffin was Cheney saying "the insurgency is in their last throes" That was the beginning of the end of any chance this administration had for garnering major public support. Very sad.

Rank amateur
09-27-2007, 10:20 PM
If we had admitted our errors and undertake the "surge" in the late summer of 2003, it might have made a difference.

Or if someone had asked, "Why are we bringing freedom to people who hate our freedom?"

tolsen
09-27-2007, 10:33 PM
I think the Iraq situation is a classic example of this enduring conundrum with counterinsurgency: for a government (or ruling authority) to admit that it faces a serious insurgency, it has to admit that it made major policy errors. The natural tendency is to postpone such an admission as long as possible. But this gives the insurgents time to coalesce. I believe the situation in Iraq had reached a psychological "set" by late 2003 or early 2004. If we had admitted our errors and undertake the "surge" in the late summer of 2003, it might have made a difference.



I agree and it fills me with a mix of sadness and anger. How many people could still be alive if things had been done differently?

*Disclaimer: please tell me if I get to 'political' with this*

I'm not sure, however, that you can pin it all on the Administrations desire to avoid admitting mistakes. I understand the Administrations actions - CYA behavior is found in every organization. I still don't understand the comparable actions by the grassroots. Frankly, it looked to me like a lot of regular Americans didn't want to hear anything negative either. I was a war-supporter and participated in some blogs/forums/etc. inhabited primarily by other supporters and I can swear that even the grassroots reaction to anyone suggesting that we weren't "winning" was .... unpleasant. Almost no one wanted to hear it.

Sorry if this is too political - I'm new and I don't want to start an argument over spilled milk. However, I am interested in understanding it.

Why did people with nothing to lose personally react with such hostility, for so long, to allegations that we faced problems, even when those allegations were made in the name of fixing the problems and not just running away?

Rank amateur
09-27-2007, 10:47 PM
Third, I've always found the assertion that insurgents often or normally win to be patently wrong because there are hundreds, probably thousands of insurgencies that were defeated at an early stage which simply aren't well known because they were defeated.


I tend to agree with this. Many proto-insurgencies get nipped in the bud before they can blossom. Because of this they tend to get mentioned in the histories only in passing.

Which could be another way of saying that insurgents can only be defeated if they don't enjoy wide spread public support. Which means that the concept of stopping an insurgency to create "breathing space" for a reasonable political solution is putting the cart before the horse.

Switching topics, one of the cool things about this forum for me is that many of the things I've been thinking about are already being discussed. To me, there isn't an antigovernment insurgency in Iraq. There are many different groups divided by religion, class, politics, tribal ties etc. Almost all have some representation in the government and they almost all have militias.

Our objective is to get them to settle their differences politically instead of militarily, which I think is highly unlikely - no matter which tactics are used - because I've witnessed how difficult it is to stop politicians who believe they have the ability to "shock and awe" their opponents. Arming the heck out of the weak side might work, but MAD only seems to work with nuclear weapons, is contrary to do what I learned about the pre WW1 arms race in grade 11 history and if we really believed in MAD we wouldn't have a problem with Iran getting nuclear weapons.

Rank amateur
09-27-2007, 10:57 PM
However, I am interested in understanding it.

Why did people with nothing to lose personally react with such hostility, for so long, to allegations that we faced problems, even when those allegations were made in the name of fixing the problems and not just running away?

Human nature and group dynamics. Things that happen in any board room - look at how the music industry responded to MP3 - multiplied by 10 because the issue became political.

skiguy
09-27-2007, 11:03 PM
Why did people with nothing to lose personally react with such hostility, for so long, to allegations that we faced problems, even when those allegations were made in the name of fixing the problems and not just running away?
I was guilty of that myself. I wish I could answer why. I know one thing, I'm still participating on the same boards, but I'm losing friends. There isn't much they can say when you mention over 4 million people are now refugees. You can't block your ears to that and pretend it's not happening.
There's also a lot of hatred towards Arabs out there,and it's mostly from the Right. When I call them on it, I'm accused of being a terrorist sympathizer or falling for terrorist propaganda. If I'm feeling "uncivil" I just retaliate by calling them a racist.
Since I've been here and had my mind pried open, I'm noticing it a lot more and I'm also noticing how many just don't get it, including war supporters. They get excited when they hear about bombings and dead taliban, and don't take me wrong, a dead terrorist is a good terrorist, but too bad they didn't get as excited hearing about the meetings between Sunni and Shia tribal leaders.
tolsen, only speaking for myself, but you weren't too political. You're realistic.

jcustis
09-27-2007, 11:50 PM
:wry:
Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
Really?...And so you can say authoritatively that the book they wrote was wrong?

No, you are making a prediction about the future. I said that the institution which produced it had not won a counter-insurgency (within the parameters I gave). That's a statement about the past.

If we could steer this back into the realm of your original comment about COIN manuals and losers for a moment, your statement about the past is still WRONG.

You blew in here again and made a sensational statement, then returned to wordsmithing, so please humor me for a moment as I do not know what you are trying to say.

Are you negating the socio-economic, internal political, and information operations (at a national policy level) effects that factor heavily into lost COIN efforts? That seems to be the thrust of what you are saying when you literally discount COIN manuals as somehow unecessary because the "institutions that wrote them" did not win.

Just what institutions are you talking about?

Why the need to make a sensational statement if all you really meant to say that Iraq is getting worse, or that we need to take actions which represent a drastic departure from the current course?

There seems to be a fixation with the tools used to prosecute COIN and say they are useless, yet you are not recognizing the vast number of other influencing factors that impact on this complex environment. National public will comes to mind above all else, so what does the manual have to do with this?

You also never countered Steve's post regarding your errors in post #169. Kudos that his post #171 fits your views, but do you have any comment on #169? Inquiring minds want to know, and I couldn't stop myself from asking.

Fabius Maximus
09-28-2007, 02:16 AM
...I cannot relate your reply to what I said.


:wry:Are you negating the socio-economic, internal political, and information operations (at a national policy level) effects that factor heavily into lost COIN efforts? That seems to be the thrust of what you are saying when you literally discount COIN manuals as somehow unecessary because the "institutions that wrote them" did not win.

I'll take a shot at this anyway. I am not negating anything, just making a statement of historical fact (not gospel, history being a slippery thing). Whatever the social-political-info factors, the folks who write these manuals write from an institutional background of losing at 4GW. Nor did I say that COIN manuals are unnecessary. I have written dozens of articles saying just the opposite. But we do need a realistic perspective in order to see our peril. Harsh truths of 4GW.

As for the discussion of winners at the game of foreign occupiers vs. local insurgents, I was summarizing two articles I wrote about this, based on several chapters in van Creveld’s book. Things get dropped in this process of abstraction. Here’s a summary of an upcoming article of mine. I apologize for the length.

Consider only wars since WWII. Many things changed at that time, including Mao’s development of 4GW into a mature form.

For analytical purposes, we can say that since WWII 4GW’s come in two types, reflecting the degree of involvement of outside states (obviously there are many other ways to characterize 4GW’s).

1. Violence between a government and insurgents (both sides can comprise any number of factions; there can be more than 2 sides). Governments often beat insurgents, even insurgents with foreign assistance (although this improves their odds). The local government leads in such areas as making political reforms, setting tactics – and casualties, although it may have important or even decisive foreign aid.

2. Violence between two or more sides, where at least one is led by foreigners. We’ll call these wars of national liberation, locals vs. foreign occupiers (however well-intended, if foreigners lead they’re likely seen as occupiers by the insurgents). Insurgents almost always win these, with three special cases which should not obscure this key point.

First, many 4GW’s are still in progress, such as in Israel (Jewish immigrants taking and holding land, with quasi-cooperation of the colonial ruler) and Palestine (Israel still holds a few pieces). Iraq and Afghanistan.

Second, as always there are borderline cases. Like Northern Ireland -- how foreign are the English? Third, what is the minimum threshold? At what point does it become an insurgency? Do you consider as insurgents the violent leftist groups in Europe and America that operated 1970-2000?

The question frequently occurs of who is the “winner”: the locals or the western power giving assistance (e.g., the Malaysian Emergency). As an example, to help us to see both sides of the question, consider the American Revolution. Lincoln did not say “Four score and seven years ago France brought forth on this…” We could not have done it without France’s aid, but it was our victory.

slapout9
09-28-2007, 02:29 AM
FM, believe it or not I posted an article from (Military Review) sometime ago written in the 60's written by a German Professor who said almost the same thing. He said there are 3 types of insurgencies of which 2 out of the 3 will be won by the insurgency only a type 1 could be won by a major power. What was really unusual was the guy died just before the article was published so he could never go into detail on his theory.

jcustis
09-28-2007, 02:30 AM
Right...It becomes so clear now.

Fabius Maximus
09-28-2007, 02:33 AM
slapout9, do you have a name, title, or other reference? I would like to see (and cite) this.

One of my early descriptions of this is in a January 2007 article.
Part four of a series about the US expedition to the Middle East (http://www.defense-and-society.org/fcs/fabius_iraq_series_2006_part_IV.htm)

slapout9
09-28-2007, 02:35 AM
FM, here is the thread with alink to the article and the discussion that followed. The thread title is everybody wrong?


http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1565&highlight=wrong


The link is not working,but it is the October 1969 issue of Military Review. Title is "When Counter insurgents Cannot Win" by Otto Heilbrunn

Fabius Maximus
09-28-2007, 02:43 AM
Things changed in mid-20th century. Since then..

a. If there is a "real" government, insurgents probably lose -- unless they have significant help from outside, and esp if they have nearby sanctuaries.

b. If there is not a "real" government -- per the usual pol sci list of attributes of gov't to measure legitimacy -- and foreigners lead the war, then the insurgents will probably win (if they can work up to a reasonable size).

Foreigners never lead the war when there is a "real" government. Sometimes insurgencies take generations to resolve.

RTK
09-28-2007, 12:24 PM
Things changed in mid-20th century. Since then..

a. If there is a "real" government, insurgents probably lose -- unless they have significant help from outside, and esp if they have nearby sanctuaries.

b. If there is not a "real" government -- per the usual pol sci list of attributes of gov't to measure legitimacy -- and foreigners lead the war, then the insurgents will probably win (if they can work up to a reasonable size).

Foreigners never lead the war when there is a "real" government. Sometimes insurgencies take generations to resolve.

A few questions, FM. I'm trying to understand your above statement. Stay with me on this...

How you've defined "government" above: I'm assuming you're talking about National government. Do your two contingencies above relate to the local or provincial level as well? Would you consider the alliance of sheikhs in Al Anbar a "real" government or outside support and sanctuary?

Outside Support: How do you factor in the Iranian Qods force influence in the above two scenarios. I'd imagine they'd be part of outside support. What other groups would you include in the "outside support" label? Tribes, ethnic sects, the UN, OPEC, etc...?

Fabius Maximus
09-28-2007, 03:08 PM
...not as good as the questions, unfortunately.

The two articles I posted on this thread (March 13, Jan 27) discuss these complex questions in detail. Here are highlights.

I try not to reinvent the wheel. Experts have a well-developed literature on what makes a government real. Conceptually it is legitimacy. Practically it means how many attributes it possesses. Excerpt from the March report:

The more of these they possess, the stronger and more durable they are. The most important attributes:

Control of armed forces, or even monopoly of armed force in its borders.
The ability to levy and collect taxes.
An administrative mechanism to execute its policies.
Territory in which it is the dominant political entity.
Control of borders.
Legitimacy (not love) in the eyes of its people.

The national “government” of Iraq has, by most reports, none of these. It lives on oil revenue and US funding. Its ministries are controlled by ethnic and religious groups, parceled out as patronage and run for their “owners” benefit. The only territory it controls is the Green Zone, by the grace of the Coalition’s armed forces. Coalition forces and other foreigners are beyond its control. Coalition forces make critical decisions without its consent, often without even consulting it.

Both articles described how real governments are evolving at the regional and local levels. That's what "Iraq is fragmenting" means.

As for outside influences, the major foreign influence in Iraq is us (media reports often confuse this, writing as if we are Iraq forces). My latest article discusses our role in some detail. Iran, although public sources are inadequate to determine how large a role. Syria and Turkey. The others seem to have a marginal role: NGO's, UN, Kurds in Turkey and Iran, EU, Russia, China, etc. Any of this could rapidly change, of course.

The major wild cards are the Sunni Arab States. To what extent have they helped their brothers in Iraq? Since late 2003 I've written that the extent of insurgent air defenses is the key metric of their external support. From my 27 May 2007 article:

In four years of intense fighting the Sunni Arabs have been unable to obtain any substantial anti-air capability. This shows limited ability to beg, borrow, or steal funds – and also proves that they receive little aid from their brothers in neighboring states, despite claims of the Bush Administration. A serious anti-air capability might not prove decisive against the US, but would have improved their terms of engagement. US forces would either continue as is with greatly increased casualties, or adopt far less aggressive tactics.

Fabius Maximus
10-08-2007, 12:18 AM
I should have mentioned this in the earlier post.

Those of you familiar with counterinsurgency theory will recognize this is not an original analysis. It is both conventional and within the framework of FM 3-24. Here are a few brief excerpts showing this.

1. WWII as a bright line dividing insurgencies.

“The modern era of insurgencies and internal wars began after World War II.” (1-19)

“Clausewitz thought that wars by an armed populace could only serve as a strategic defense; however, theorists after World War II realized that insurgency could be a decisive form of warfare. This era spawned the Maoist, Che Guevara-type focoist, and urban approaches to insurgency.” (1-20)

More specifically, FM 3-34 notes the key role of Mao in bringing 4GW theory to maturity, although never using the term 4GW. See the extended discussion of Mao in 1-30 through 1-39, and the use throughout of Mao’s terms and concepts.

For example, Mao’s emphasis on political over military factors is rigorously adhered to – although attributed to Mao only in 1-123.

2. The key distinction between civil wars and wars of national liberation.

This distinction is frequently noted, although often not followed up in the analysis or recommendations. For example: “The exception to this pattern of internal war involves resistance movements, where indigenous elements seek to expel or overthrow what they perceive to be a foreign or occupation government.” (1-6).

An analysis of FM 3-24 treatment of these two kinds of insurgencies is beyond the scope of a brief note like this, but I point you also to 1-135, 1-147, and esp. 2-11. This contradiction is never addressed.