Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths

[dusty]

I am about to read Dr. Echevarria's paper on 4GW which is published by the Strategic Studies Institute. I have read the 4GW theory that was put forward in the 1989 paper in the Marine Corps Gazette, and agreed with the author's points.

Have any of you read this paper, and if so, what's your opinion on it? Are there any certain points that I could keep in mind while reading this?
Read it here (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB632.pdf)

[John T. Fishel]

I have never been very impressed with 4GW theory and find myself in agreement with Echevarria's assessment. If one is interested in some innovative thinking on the subject a recent book, Networks, Terrorism, and Global Insurgency, edited by Robert Bunker and published by Routledge (originally as special issue of Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement - Vol 11 No 2/3 Winter 2002). Of particular interest is the lead chpter/article of Part Three, "Challenging the Hegemon: Al Qaeda's Elevation of Asymmetric Insurgent Warfare Onto the Global Arena" by Kimbra L. Fishel.

[Steve Blair]

I find some of the 4GW points interesting (mostly those articulated in "The Sling and the Stone," though I have reservations about his reliance on Mao), though overall I don't consider it a credible "generation." IMO what we're seeing is a convergence of 3GW with older terrorist tactics and an acceleration of media attention due to technological advances. I would say it's more of an advanced 3GW, but not the sweeping thing that 4GW advocates claim.

Also, I think there's a fair amount of ego invested in 4GW.

[J Wolfsberger]

I've read and learned a lot from it. DuPuy, in A Genius for War, discusses the way changes in lethality of the soldiers weapons - gladius to pike to musket to rifle to machine gun -- brought about what I would think of as generational changes in the art of war. In that light, 4GW strikes me as a phrase searching for a concept. I also agree with Steve, there's too much ego involved for my comfort.

[Old Eagle]

Echevarria's paper is a little too academic for me, but I take his points. The important thing in my mind, regardless of whether there are any generations of war, is that the war we are fighting now and that to which we will be subjected will be like those outlined by Tom Hammes. Echevarria mentions this fact several times in his paper, but it kinda gets lost among the explanations of the real meaning of the Treaty of Westphalia, etc.

Other points --
Yes, Clausewitz good
Yes, trinity good
Yes, Sun Tzu good

[Steve Blair]

Hammes is good, but as I've mentioned before I think he spends too much time on Mao and doesn't look back far enough to find other (and possibly better) examples of what he's talking about.

One of my gripes with 4GW theorists is that they spend far too much time talking about how "new" their theory is and how it encompasses everything and actually seem to spend very little time working on the actual details and application. A great deal of it seems to be a pissing contest to figure out who thought of what first. Hammes doesn't do this, but there are others out there who do. I've always figured it was just the basics of 3GW taken to a different playing field and with a few different gaps and surfaces.

[Jimbo]

I agree with the premise that 4th GW is a phrase searching with a concept.

Ever since I first truly started studying military history in college, the baseline arguement that was presented was one of tactics versus technology. This can further be explored more effectively in the framework that Willaimson Murray has used to describe innovations and how they change warfare. The most imporatnt aspect of which is that some have been technical changes and some have been political and societal changes. In the book he coauthored with Millet, they used a construct that there have been six militayr revolutions. The further argue that these military revolution are often tied to RMA's, but that a military revolution is the uncontrolled outgrowth from the fusio on the RMA, the manner in which the military does or does not utilize it, and how the society and political institutions adapt and change as well. Some examples were the atom bomb, levee en mass, and such. The Murray and Millet construct accounts for the Clausewitzian Trinity in the effects that these military revolutions bring about.

The problem with 4GW is the imprecision of the definiton. In the 1989 Marine Corps Gazeete article, Lind describes warfare in generational constructs, which are more vague and conceptual. This leads to disjointed interpretation by many readers. His description focus more on the concept of maneuver on the enemy, searching for the exposed flank. His generational construction use and action, reaction, counter-action methodology to explain the changes in generational warfare. Namely that each generational change is driven as a counter-action to the previous generations reaction. His generations read as judo moves to fight one another. When he hypothesized 4GW, he did not define it. Instead, Lind described the various forms it could take on in an attempt for an enemy to gain a strategic, operational, and therefore tacticla advantage over and enemy. In this he laid out the conept of asymmetry, or Judo for nation-states. He pretty much provides a three fork road intersection: guerilla/terrorism/LIC, WMD, and high tech dominance. This is great, and he even ties guerilla/terrorism to attacking the will of a people, but this really isn't anythting new, he just used a his own construct ostenibly to create continued traction for his maneuver warfare theory/writings. There is nothing wrong wiht this, but I think he would have been better off utilizing a pre-existing framework, and then arguing for an RMA/Military Revolution type construct.

COl Hammes wrote many articles on Mao, and is very well read on Mao and his methods. Therefore, 4GW , as of late, has had a very Maoist bent to it. I believe that is a fair criticism, but Maoist theory tends to be pretty universal. Sure there are other theoriists whose material influneces guerillas today, but Mao is probably the most comprehensive, especially in the tieing the military aspects of revolutionary warfare with the political aspects. The Vietnamese Dau Trahn construct provides a good campaing plan for Mao's strategic theroy. The point here is, do not assume that guerillas operate in a vacuum of information.

On Echevariia, if you think this was dry, you should try having him for class right after lunch, not good.

The key point to take away from Cllausewitz is that many misunderstand his use of the total war construct, and that the famous quote that war is an extension of state policy by other means fits hand and glove with the description of insurgency as armed/violent politics.

[jcustis]

I have always thought 3GW, 4GW, and XGW are simple B.S. because it is nothing more than common sense and what is right in front of our face.

[Steve Blair]

I never had a problem with 3GW, in part because it was coupled with good practical examples and managed to point out things that were "right in front of us" but not necessarily understood.

[Stratiotes]

I read Dr. Echevarria's paper sometime ago and I can't recall particular points with which I disagreed at the time. I do remember it was a decent paper for the most part and I did not have too much heartburn with it. If memory serves, however, it seems to me he did what a lot of people do - clouded the differentiators in the definition of 4GW as opposed to guerrilla or irregular warfare. In that sense, I believe he missed the point and did not do much to discredit the 4GW side. I'll try to find some time to re-read it so I can be more specific. I believe Bill Lind did a response to it though and I'm pretty sure that's available at the DNI site.

As for the "new" side of 4GW - I don't think its really anything new and I don't believe others really think it is either. I think that what they are considering "new" is the fact that it has been given a label where it had none before. In fact, Bill Lind, one of the main proponents of 4GW theory, recommends Barb Tuchman's book on the 14th century as a tool for understanding 4GW better.

[Bill Moore]

I have been a supporter of 4th GW concepts up to a limit, but have grown more critical of the 4th GW mafia over time based on the identified petty ego problems. I also don't like categorizing wars by generation, to include the 1st through 3rd generation wars.

Whatever we call it in the end, I think our social, economic, information, and political environment has changed considerably since the end of WWII, which in itself changes the nature of war significantly. You'll see various comments throughout the site on so called 4th GW and little on 5GW.

I loved Wolfberger's comment that 4GW is a phrase searching for concept.

I think anytime you apply a label to war, you'll quickly find out that are being aspects of the conflict that don't fit into your definition or concept, so the label serves little purpose. For the long time SWC members, believe it or not, I'm actually a closet Clausewitz fan (hard for some to believe after my many rants against our officers who know nothing but Clausewitz), and his guidance was that the most important thing a political leader must do prior to commiting forces to war, is to understand the nature of the war he is going to fight (note this is very loosely paraphrased). 2d, 3d, and 4th GW constructs do not describe the nature of the war one is about to undertake in my opinion.

In short, I concur with many of the scattered ideas found in 4th and 5th GW articles and books, and think we would all be better off if we studied them, but they are far, far from complete theories.

[selil]

This may have been covered before, but I'm coming to a realization that generational taxonomies of warfare do not supersede a fundamental idea. As war has increased in scope and changed in techniques the precedeing techniques have not fallen away. Where stick and sword might have been tools long ago that doesn't mean a soldier sitting in a hole in Iraq won't use his k-bar should the need arise. Even using fourth generation assets like sattelite or imaging technologies to choose when to implement that weapon. In many cases it appears that people think of each geneartion suplanting the prior generation which is a voilaton of the analogy of generations. Generations build upon each other and are supported by each other much like grandpa helps, the father, who helps the son. Artifiical taxonomical derivitation creates silo's whereas in reality we're likely talking abotu a layer cake.

[wm]

This may have been covered before, but I'm coming to a realization that generational taxonomies of warfare do not supersede a fundamental idea. As war has increased in scope and changed in techniques the precedeing techniques have not fallen away. Where stick and sword might have been tools long ago that doesn't mean a soldier sitting in a hole in Iraq won't use his k-bar should the need arise. Even using fourth generation assets like sattelite or imaging technologies to choose when to implement that weapon. In many cases it appears that people think of each geneartion suplanting the prior generation which is a voilaton of the analogy of generations. Generations build upon each other and are supported by each other much like grandpa helps, the father, who helps the son. Artifiical taxonomical derivitation creates silo's whereas in reality we're likely talking abotu a layer cake.

I very much agree with your point about focussing on all of the tools of war that are being used. But there is more to the story--we are looking at a continuum instead of a layer cake IMHO.
A few years back, I wrote a response to Echevarria on the notion of Generational Warfare and submitted it to CSI but received no response from the good folks in Carlisle. I agreed with his position that 4GW has no “value-add” to our analysis of warfare. Unfortunately for me, a glitch in technology destroyed my only copy (silly me for not backing up more frequently).
My bottom line was that we ought to view warfare as a continuum (or perhaps a spiral) covering the amount of risk imposed on both combatants and non-combatants by technological changes that have improved weapons’ ranges. In early warfare, risk was greatest to combatants due to weapon range limitations. Sticks, stones, and swords all require combatants to get up close and personal with their opponents. Non-combatants usually are well out of harm’s way in such encounters. As technological changes produced weapons that could be used in indirect fire engagements, the risk to combatants using the weapons decreased but the risk of harm to non-combatants increased, especially as range increases allow for engagement with unobserved fire.
If we want to identify different forms/generations of warfare, we ought to focus on the degrees of risk to which each side is willing to expose both itself and the non-combatants. This idea of the degree of willingness to accept risk covers, in my humble opinion, the three aspects of the Clauswitzian Trinity. We could describe different types of warfare along my continuum by analyzing the ranges of the weapons used by each side, their willingness to risk their combatants, and each side’s willingness to risk injury to non-combatants.
Important things I did not address relate to non-combatants:
1. Whether to distinguish between the combatants ( e.g., those in my country versus those in my opponent’s country), and
2. If 1., above, is required, how to make such distinctions.

Just war theory (justice of war) requires that wars be fought to defend non-combatants. Just war (justice in war) also requires warriors to undertake risks to protect non-combatants. I think that any other way to describe warfare opens the floodgates to excessive carnage. The only value I see to be gained from Echevarria’s discussion about the pre and post-Peace of Westphalia periods is to note that responsibility for accepting risk and identifying who may be at risk changed somewhere about that time (at least in Europe).

[J Wolfsberger]

If we're seriously going to look at generations of warfare or Revolutions in Military Affairs, it seems we ought to begin by identifying those elements of warfare that would, could or should be the drivers. Here's my (strawman) proposal for the factors that have driven RMA in the past:

1. Individual lethality. Stabbing sword to pike/spear to etc.
2. Mobility. Stirrup, chariot, ship, etc.
3. Logistics. Contrast Scipio Africanus' campaigns in Spain and Africa with Henry V's campaign in France.
4. Intelligence/information.
5. Economic capability. What surplus does the social group/nation have available to prepare for and conduct warfare.

As I wrote, it's a strawman. What I would suggest is that any dramatic change in one of these, or other factors that might be added, will lead to an RMA.

The next argument I would make is that we are not, in fact, seeing a new generation of warfare on the part of al Qui'ida. Instead, we re seeing asymmetric warfare (not new) enabled and extended by global economic changes in finance, availability of industrial products, information availability, etc. (And having written this, and reread it, I realize somebody might well argue I've just made the case for a new generation.)

[Jimbo]

Wolf,

Shoot, move, communicate, and log are a construction, but they are mearly tools, they have to be examined in the context of their historical settings. Those are all useful lenses to utilize, but various developments in those areas did not necessarily revolutionize warfare at the time of inception (My head now hurts). The big unknown out there is information. I know what Cebrowski said (Ugh), but the current use of decentralized and globalized information methods might be the new change, who knows.

[dusty]

All interesting thoughts.. I haven't been able to finish the paper (work has demanded too much time) but I don't like Dr. Echevarria's way of thinking from the outset. His first paragraph says that 4GW theory gives him an opportunity to attack 'unfounded' doctrines... The key word, I think, is attack. Defend your current doctrines, but isn't an open mind with a critical thought process the best avenue of approach to refining doctrine? Unless the current doctrines embraced by US forces are perfect.

[wm]

the current use of decentralized and globalized information methods might be the new change, who knows.

If it is, I submit that this so only because it may allow leaders to gain more and better insight into the risks to which they expose their forces and those of their opponents. I submit that analysis of the 9 traditional principles of war--maneuver, mass, offensive, objective, security, simplicity, surprise, unity of command, economy of force--shows that all are ways of minimizing operational risk for one's forces.

Better, faster information flow at all echelons could allow us to stop doing things like dismounted patrolling and "recon by fire." It would also make it much harder for an opponent to catch us unawares while we might be able to inflict some serious hurts on our opposition were our information flow such as to allow us to get inside their decison loops--a construct pushed back in the 80s that still does not seem to have been actualized (at least not as far as I can tell in reading critiques on US operations in the 90's and the current decade).

[120mm]

I must admit that I've always found the desire to define and compartmentalize things into neat little boxes, especially something as chaotic and difficult to define as war, as incomprehensible.

I understand that we must be able to communicate concepts, but quibbling over what name to call a "kind of war" is foolish, to me.

"War as Art, and Not Science" is a concept that I can understand.

It's funny how everyone sees this differently....

[Hawkwood]

Guys,

We ignore the fact that Martin van Creveld and Bill Lind, the ideological fathers of the 4GW mafia and seemingly in competion to be known as the grumpiest military historian on the planet, have consistently been more correct than the pack in predicting how military events would unfold over the last 15 years. Wishing that they weren't just dosen't cut it, just as wishing that western forces with massive capability overmatch weren't strategically all at sea in the Middle East. The core point in the 4GW argument is that it is the collapse of the moral and legal construct of the state that gives the opponent their strength and that trying to put the state back together militarily won't work, the issues of info and lethality proliferation are second tier issues that support this anomaly.

Agree or not with the 4GW construct no one can argue that Armd Divisions, DDGX and F22 Wings, the ultimate evolutionary tools of western warfare, have much utility for the fight we face. Sure we can smash states but we are yet to prove we have the capability or will to build a state. The 4GW argument that it is our inability to conceptualise the issues rather than our military capabilities needs to be considered deeply rather than rejected because its advocates have the personaility of a wire brush.

[J Wolfsberger]

...yet to prove we have the capability or will to build a state.

Maybe that gets closer to the central issue. Anthropologists use a concept in cultural evolution named "aggregation." (Marc, please fix this if I get it wrong.) Groups of various sizes combine their interests to form clan, tribe, nation - larger groups. The current insurgencies (separating the total "insurgency in Iraq from the wider one) represent just such aggregations of interest, i.e. pulling subgroups into the larger one. The brilliance of the strategy implemented by Petreus, Kilcullen, et. al. lies in disaggregating the larger groups.

The rub is what comes next.

"Nation Building" seems to imply there's a clean white sheet of paper to work with. That's never going to be the case.

Maybe we need to think in terms of "re-aggregating" the subgroups into a new larger group. Thinking that way would have to force us into thinking in terms of both process and end state that line up more naturally with the local culture. For example, preventing idiocies such as sending men in to search the women's quarters.

Looking at it this way, debate over which generation of war we face doesn't contribute much.

[wm]

The core point in the 4GW argument is that it is the collapse of the moral and legal construct of the state that gives the opponent their strength and that trying to put the state back together militarily won't work, the issues of info and lethality proliferation are second tier issues that support this anomaly.

The 4GW argument that it is our inability to conceptualise the issues rather than our military capabilities needs to be considered deeply rather than rejected because its advocates have the personaility of a wire brush.

As I tried to indicate in my earlier posts on this thread, just war theory has, or should have, a major play in this discussion. States collapse, as you note, due to a loss of moral and legal legitimacy in the hearts and minds of the governed. Any attempt to resurrect failed states using other than the most "pure" (morally and legally speaking) efforts just will not cut it. I made my points about risk because measuring attitudes about risk to one's populace seems to be a good way of measuring the "apppeal" of the leadership of a given state (legitimate or otherwise--even AQ could be considered a state of sorts).
The story we tend to tell ourselves about governments is that we submit to them because they make our lives better somehow. When they cease to be good for us, we try to change them or get rid of them. This is not a new concept, nor does it require some hokey theory about different "generations" of warfare in order to be understood by the hoi polloi.

[wm]

"Nation Building" seems to imply there's a clean white sheet of paper to work with. That's never going to be the case.

Maybe we need to think in terms of "re-aggregating" the subgroups into a new larger group. Thinking that way would have to force us into thinking in terms of both process and end state that line up more naturally with the local culture. For example, preventing idiocies such as sending men in to search the women's quarters.


This line of thinking seems to be a variation on the missionary movement of the 18th and 19th Centuries or another way of taking up Rhodes' "white man's burden." We have gotten ourselves into the current state of affairs by forcing together coalitions of folks who didn't really want to be so forced. It is not our prerogative to reaggregate these sub-groups into other alignments of our choosing. It is up to the sub-groups to decide with whom they ought to aggregate. About all we should do is make sure that they have the opportunity to do so peacefully. We should not stand by as things like "ethnic cleansing" occur. As you point out, we need to be culturally astute enough not to make the kind of mistakes or idiocies, as you describe them, so that we don't end up adding more fuel to the fires we are trying to help contain and eventually extinguish.

I am reminded of the lessons I learned as a youth soccer coach: "The game is the greatest teacher. Rather than teaching them how to play, give them a controlled environment and let them figure it out from there."

[jcustis]

The core point in the 4GW argument is that it is the collapse of the moral and legal construct of the state that gives the opponent their strength and that trying to put the state back together militarily won't work, the issues of info and lethality proliferation are second tier issues that support this anomaly.

Good point, and one of the first times I have seen it put that way (not that I've dug too deeply into the theories).

[Bill Moore]

I definitely don't think the so called 4th generation of war has much to do with weapons technology, but as you stated the way the war is waged. Supposedly 3rd generation war was primarily waged against armies, under the assumption if you defeat the Army you defeat the nation's will indirectly. Yet WWII is usually demonstrated as the 3d generation example, especially the Germans strategy of rapid deep attacks (maneuver warfare). However, this is another example of a definition that can't hold its water. We not only defeated Germany's and Japan's military, we used conventional warfare to destroy their industrial base and indiscriminately target their population.

4th Generation Warfare, which emerged after WWII starting around Mao's time (though Mao actually started prior to WWII) is generally described as a more of a political war, where the actions are primarily directed to achieve political objectives, whether terrorist acts, or major offensives such as the Tet Offensive, or holding Fallujah and fighting to the death. With the exception of the Tet offensive the intent isn't to defeat the military, but rather defeat the political will of the target audience.

I guess you could also call this asymmetric warfare, but I don't think that fits, because we could do the same, we choose not to (an error in my opinion).

4th Generation Warfare isn't so much tactics, but rather a strategy change, and of course the strategy provides the frame work for your tactics. Technology enables a wider range of tactics, and so on.

Again I don't like the term generation in this context, but looking beyond that the 4th GW theorists make some good arguments. I think we're in the midst of great social/political upheaval, which is close to the clash of cultures, but I think more a redefining of the nation-state's role in the world. We (the human race globally) are rapidly developing new economic models that transcend the control of the state. Who butters your bread the state or your mulitnational Corporation? Individuals who wouldn't have a voice previously beyond their immediate social sphere, can now influence global communities. For example, Al Qaeda doesn't have to recruit directly, they provided a vision (we validated it with our response), an umbrella strategy, and Muslims worldwide can opt in if they choose. In other words they mobilize cadres/armies in every nation where there is a Muslim population vulnerable to this type of exploitation. This strains the nation state over time to the point it becomes incapable of maintaining control (in theory).

So far our response to this threat has been to go out and beat up a couple of Armies (Taliban and Iraq), which in my opinion simply made the situation worse, because we played into Bin Laden's hands, and provided a wealth of propaganda material. They appear to be getting stronger, while we are getting weaker in the sense of the moral and political will.

It isn't a generation of warfare, but we better wake up and realize that there are changes in the wind, and adjust to them accordingly.

[J Wolfsberger]

This line of thinking seems to be a variation on the missionary movement of the 18th and 19th Centuries or another way of taking up Rhodes' "white man's burden." We have gotten ourselves into the current state of affairs by forcing together coalitions of folks who didn't really want to be so forced. It is not our prerogative to reaggregate these sub-groups into other alignments of our choosing. It is up to the sub-groups to decide with whom they ought to aggregate. About all we should do is make sure that they have the opportunity to do so peacefully. We should not stand by as things like "ethnic cleansing" occur. As you point out, we need to be culturally astute enough not to make the kind of mistakes or idiocies, as you describe them, so that we don't end up adding more fuel to the fires we are trying to help contain and eventually extinguish.

I am reminded of the lessons I learned as a youth soccer coach: "The game is the greatest teacher. Rather than teaching them how to play, give them a controlled environment and let them figure it out from there."

I agree completely, and that was my point: The whole Nation Building attitude is a variation on the missionary movement. Our role should be limited to providing a level of stabililty that gives them time to sort out how they want to structure their society. We should focus less on "democracy" and think more along the lines of how a tribal council, for example, is representative of the people, and in a way that they are accustomed to.

[MountainRunner]

Just to throw this out there, but about a year ago I threw together a response to 4GW. I really liked Hammes book, but I had problems w/ 4GW in ways mentioned here on this list. My biggest complaint with xGW is it really doesn't tell us anything new. In fact, one proponent of it, when pressed to really define its distinctions that accords it as a theory kept dancing around and suggested I was trying to nail jello to a wall.

Here's the ending of my critique:


The theory of Fourth Generation Warfare fails when applied to reality and as a theory itself. It fails to prescribe, predict, describe, or explain behavior. Its explanations of relationships and ideas do not connect when exposed to historical realities. Ultimately, the analysis of past and present conflicts with this theory is of little value.
Fourth Generation Warfare is based on a false reading of history and a faulty understanding of the nature of conflict. The role of economic, ideological, and political ideas and efforts have always co-mingled with military might. The quantity of each would vary as required, resorting to military might as an extension of politics if necessary. At best, 4GW reminds us public diplomacy is more important than ever because of the need to interact at alternative levels. That is the best 4GW can contribute.
Generational warfare is based on technology and tactics. The Napoleonic shift a radical change in how and why wars were fought. With his destablizing impact on the nature of the state system at the time, how was what he did not 4GW? Generations of warfare are best described through technological and tactical changes. The Revolution in Military Affairs of Napoleon is remarkably similar to the RMA today, but with some aspects in reverse (professionalism -> amateurism -> professionalism). Fourth Generation War has 'happened' before and throughout time. It is how and why wars are fought. It simply does not offer anything new.


The critique, posted here on my blog (http://mountainrunner.us/2006/02/the_misleading_.html), started an interesting discussion. If you do read the blog post, I apologize in advance for typos and grammar.

[Mark O'Neill]

4th Generation Warfare, which emerged after WWII starting around Mao's time (though Mao actually started prior to WWII) is generally described as a more of a political war, where the actions are primarily directed to achieve political objectives,

4th Generation Warfare isn't so much tactics, but rather a strategy change, and of course the strategy provides the frame work for your tactics. Technology enables a wider range of tactics, and so on.

.

Bill,

Clausewitz 101. All warfare is political. States / Kingdoms / Religions / Societies do not wage war because they bored or have nothing better to do- they have a political end in mind.

Regarding a 'strategy' change - 4GW advocates are really chasing ground here.

I think folks are getting confused between operational method and strategy. I think some of this is a legacy from some people (predominately in the US I suspect) buying too much into Huntington's The Soldier and the State type thinking.

In Western democracies, despite what many of us in the military might think, politicians and national leaders decide strategy. Generals pick the operational method to achieve the strategic end they are given. If you doubt this, try and imagine the US military pursuing the war in Iraq if US political will changes and the President calls 'game over'...

The sort of 'strategy' change your refer to is nothing new. Any examination of the historical record regarding classical Greece, Persia and Rome shows similar /identical 'political' responses from people who opposed those hegemons. Was that 4GW?

I am firmly in the 4GW is 'bunk' camp. (We have a better word in Australia beginning with "W' , and rhyming with 'tank', that politeness prevents me from using). I think Mountain Runner is spot on regarding the utility / veracity of it as a 'theory'.

Mark

[Bill Moore]

Mark,

Yes, all war is political, but there is a difference. While I don't like the phrase 4GW, for now it will suffice. 4th GW warfare militants do not try to achieve their strategic objective by defeating an opponent's military, rather they target the moral and political will through (I think) a sosphisticated information campaign supported by armed/violent propaganda. We on the other hand try to redefine our threat as a traditional military threat and use relatively conventional tactics to counter him.

You also stated that the military develops a plan to achieve the political strategy. While that briefs well, it generally fails. What we in the military need to do is set conditions for political strategic success, and our politicians need to define what those conditions are. Defeating a mass social movement with the military will not happen.

Forget generations of war, I don't like them either. While I can't place my finger on it, there is something different. Then again, perhaps nothing is different, maybe the U.S. military got dumber and less creative over the years due our technical advantage and indoctrination, so we ended up creating a self imposed asymmetry that gives our enemy the advantage?

[MountainRunner]

4th GW warfare militants do not try to achieve their strategic objective by defeating an opponent's military, rather they target the moral and political will through (I think) a sosphisticated information campaign supported by armed/violent propaganda.
How was the American Revolution with its insurgent tactics against military, political, and economic targets of the counterinsurgent not 4GW? Our (American) use of seaborne mercenaries to take the fight home to the English caused economic pain through, for example but not limited to, substantially increased insurance rates of English shipping, the new requirement of insurance for English home port to home port shipping, and armed escorts for England-Ireland crossings.

This isn't a "fourth" generation but a style of tactics used frequently through history.

[Steve Blair]

How was the American Revolution with its insurgent tactics against military, political, and economic targets of the counterinsurgent not 4GW? Our (American) use of seaborne mercenaries to take the fight home to the English caused economic pain through, for example but not limited to, substantially increased insurance rates of English shipping, the new requirement of insurance for English home port to home port shipping, and armed escorts for England-Ireland crossings.

This isn't a "fourth" generation but a style of tactics used frequently through history.

Agreed. I also agree with Bill's proposition that the U.S. military has molded itself into something that gives a less-conventional adversary an asymmetric advantage. That said, I don't have a problem with the concept of warfare generations as a tool for historical analysis. I just don't see as dramatic a break here as there was in the transformation of warfare between World War I and World War II. This is more of a regression with more modern means and tools.

[wm]

I just don't see as dramatic a break here as there was in the transformation of warfare between World War I and World War II. This is more of a regression with more modern means and tools.

I would hesitate to use the term regression. The history of warfare is a history of an oscillation on a continuum or spectrum between two poles--limited war and total war. Definitions follow.
At one pole, Limited War is waged strictly between combatants--"professional" soldiers (folks who have devoted their lives to the profession of arms) try to kill each other.
At the other pole, Total War is a war of all against all--no holds barred, no means not allowed, and no targets off limits.
Over the course of history, I would suggest that wars have oscillated between these two poles, probably never reaching either one of them. Our ancestors may have gotten pretty close to each extreme. For example, the Wars of the Roses seem to have been very limited while action on the Eastern Front in WWII was pretty close to total war. Roman operations in the Third Punic War might also have pushed the total war envelope almost to its limit, as did campaigns of Union Armies operating under Grant and Sherman. Alexander the Great’s earlier campaigns, at least, also seem close to the limited end of the spectrum

A focus on the Peace of Westphalia as a generational watershed is a mistake. Rather than marking a generational shift in who may wage war, I think it marks a swing away from the near total war methods by which the 30 and 80 Years Wars were waged. Similarly, the French use of a national army/levee en masse in the Napoleonic Wars saw the beginning of the swing back towards total war that culminated in the 2 World Wars of the 20th Century. In the US at least, the shrinking of personnel in uniform in the armed forces after WWII, culminating with the all volunteer army concept of the early 70s and the slashed defense budgets of the Carter years marks the furthest oscillation to a limited war mentality since the dismantling of the Continental Army after the American Revolution. The Reagan years reflect a swing back toward the other pole.

What our opponents in GWOT are trying to force upon us is a return to a Total War footing. They propose a very rich target set. However, our very reason for engaging in GWOT prevents us from accepting that target set. For us to maintain any sense of legitimacy to our efforts, we have to keep denying the terrorists'/insurgents' offer. The effort to keep refusing to move to a total war footing sets up a huge tension within our Western perceptual apparatus, which does not normally espouse doing anything in a less than fully dedicated way.

Bottom Line: In GWOT, we are caught in the same type of quandary as that which surrounds our criminal justice system. On the one hand, we want to ensure that the guilty are punished. On the other, we do not want any innocents to serve time. So, we set up procedural safeguards that allow a lot of scofflaws to go unpunished for their crimes. And then, we complain about how bad our criminal justice system is at achieving a reduction in crime.

[Steve Blair]

I use the term regression more in reference to the preferred tactics, and then more in the sense of drawing lessons from past conflicts and applying them to current conflicts. I also consider the "all or nothing" mentality with warfare to be a mindset more common to the United States, and in particular the political machinery and the upper levels of the military command structure that responds to, and has been shaped by, that same machinery.

[Mark O'Neill]

,

Forget generations of war, I don't like them either. While I can't place my finger on it, there is something different. Then again, perhaps nothing is different, maybe the U.S. military got dumber and less creative over the years due our technical advantage and indoctrination, so we ended up creating a self imposed asymmetry that gives our enemy the advantage?

I have a lot of time for this view. It naturally aligns with the well developed / excellent ability that the American Military has at the operational level of 'conventional' war. It is human nature to practise and preach what we understand and are good at.

Must say that I am finding this thread enjoyable, it seems to be one of the more rational discussions of the 4GW 'thing' I have come across.

[John T. Fishel]

What seems to me to be particularly pernicious about 4GW is its claim to be something new. This thread is interesting for, among other reasons, its relevance to the whole subject of Small Wars. Reminds me of a slide that Bill Flavin of the Army PKSOI uses that he adapted from Bill Olson (now at the NESA Center of NDU) called ,in one iteration or another, "The 100 Names of LIC."

The trouble with the notion that the US focuses on high tech war to the exclusion of things that are not necessarily high tech is that it is ahistorical. The US military has always wanted to fight conventional wars v small wars even when its primary mission was the protection of the Western frontier. So, I submit that this reluctance is not only a function of a fascination with technology but a more deep seated desire to fight the wars GEN John Galvin called "comfortable."

[Steve Blair]

What seems to me to be particularly pernicious about 4GW is its claim to be something new. This thread is interesting for, among other reasons, its relevance to the whole subject of Small Wars. Reminds me of a slide that Bill Flavin of the Army PKSOI uses that he adapted from Bill Olson (now at the NESA Center of NDU) called ,in one iteration or another, "The 100 Names of LIC."

The trouble with the notion that the US focuses on high tech war to the exclusion of things that are not necessarily high tech is that it is ahistorical. The US military has always wanted to fight conventional wars v small wars even when its primary mission was the protection of the Western frontier. So, I submit that this reluctance is not only a function of a fascination with technology but a more deep seated desire to fight the wars GEN John Galvin called "comfortable."

This has always been a feature of US military thinking, going all the way back to Washington and his desire to meet the British in conventional line of battle. The fascination with technology is, in my view, an outgrowth of this trait. I believe that the fixation with technology also ties into the normally small size of the US military (another historical constant up to World War II). There may also be a control aspect as well, with the thought being that the side with the higher level of technology can somehow control the pace and even nature of the war being fought.

Just some pre-coffee thoughts.

[Bill Moore]

John I agree with your points, but I'm not sure that LIC is the right definition, but it is definitely close (I stole this one from Wikipedia because I'm too lazy to get up and look through my old FMs).

... a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of the armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. (Actually this one is pretty good)

Unconventional Warfare: defines UW as a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of short duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. (DoD definition, and it falls way short because it restricts the definition to military and paramilitary operations)

Wikipedia: (I like this one) is the opposite of conventional warfare. Where conventional warfare seeks to reduce an opponent's military capability, unconventional warfare is an attempt to achieve military victory through acquiescence, capitulation, or clandestine support for one side of an existing conflict. On the surface, UW contrasts with conventional warfare in that: forces or objectives are covert or not well-defined, tactics and weapons intensify environments of subversion or intimidation, and the general or long-term goals are coercive or subversive to a political body.

This is the point I was trying to make when I said 4GW is more focused on the political and moral, and the counter argument (from Clausewitz, oh my stomach hurts) is that all wars are political, but my counter is supported in the definition above, where it states conventional warfare seeks to reduce an opponent's military capability.

I still think (though there are changes in many DoD circles) the focus of our military is focused on defeating the enemy's fielded forces, and even elements of our Special Operations espouses a find, fix, finish mentality (a hyperconventional approach). While we have doctrine for COIN and UW, our decision making process (MDMP) generally applies to generally linear phased operations to "defeat" an opponent's armed forces. I will write more on this later, but I think it is our limited vocabulary that leads us down this path. You can't counter UW threats with a conventional war strategy (you're just punching into the air and having no effect, or worse in most cases creating a counterproductive effect by providing volumes of narrative to support the enemy's psychological campaign). I'm not saying conventional forces don't have a role, I am focusing on how they are employed.

Even in Special Forces, our historical doctrine (its evolving quicker than they can capture it in print) is "primarly" designed to facilitate guerrilla warfare (one subset of UW) in support of conventional forces (the fifth column approach), which means we to were somewhat stuck in the cold war paradigm.

How do we develop a real UW or irregular warfare capability?

More later, just something to dwell on over your morning coffee.

[TROUFION]

what is the difference between a 'comfortable' and an 'uncomfortable' war?

Is it defenition based: Comfortable = Clausewitizian: war is a competition between two opposing armies/nations. With each side wearing uniforms, operating similiar weapons, exercising similiar tactics and strategies. A clean battlefield where civilians don't exist or can be ignored or relocated without much complaint or issue.

And uncomfortable = muddy wars without set sides, enemies with no uniforms, no rules, dissimilar tactics and strategies etc.

Training: as a platoon and company commander I always thought we missed the boat in training, we executed the complex HIC training very well: in my case we roamed the swamps of Lejeune, the pine forests of Bragg and the Desert of 29 Palms and the Sierra Mountains unopposed by civil populations, gloriously assaulting the uniformed OPFOR with every conceivable high explosive. At our school houses we wrote OPORDS assaulting the Blue Ridge Mts to defeat Centralians and the people in the surrounding towns and villages better get out of the way. FASCAM sure why not, Cluster Munitions no problem. It was easy, it was relatively cheap. It was argued that HIC was the prefered form of war to train to because it was always 'easier' to ramp 'down' to LIC versus ramping 'up' to HIC. Those that argued the other point where looked on as people who missed the boat.

Look at the training of SF and SF type units. What do they prefer? CQB, direct action. Why? I argue that a regular infantry company with the proper CQB training can do this job at about 80-90% efficiency. (Delta force and the other high end units exist for a reason this is not a bash on them). But a regular infantry company struggles when training to conduct FID and the associated missions. FID requires maturity, and levels of initiative that are extremely difficult to teach an 18 year old Lance Corporal. This same LCpl can be taught to shoot the eye out of a gnat with much less effort.

The difference between 'comfortable' and 'uncomfortable' wars runs along the same line. It is much easier to teach warfighting in a sanitized environment than it is to teach in a chaotic one. My opinion on 4GW (and other theories of 'modern war') is that it reflects the introduction of human factors beyond the mano y mano of total war.

The perfect war (comfortable) is reflected in the Desert Campaigns of Rommel and Montgomery in WWII. Every weapon, limited to no civilian population, wide open desert terrain, two distinct sides and clearly deliniated front and rear areas.

The imperfect war (uncomfortable) a major metropolitan area with large suburbs, population in the millions, weak to non-existent infrastructure, intense factionalism, rampant lawlessness, multiple state and non-state actors influencing the decisions, multiple agendas and no set, or unclear sides.

[John T. Fishel]

Steve,
Not just Washington but Mao as well. There is no inherent conflict between conventional forces, decisive battle, and Small Wars but there are differences in when and where and how employed. Tom Marks does a good job in his discussions of Maoist insurgency. You may have something regarding the relationship between technofascination and the small historical size of the US military - I'll have to think a bit on that.
Bill,
LIC - and all the other terms - is/are a lousy descriptor of what we try to address in this forum. I tend to prefer Small Wars, if only because it was the first term used to describe the phenomena that caught on. But it really has problems too...
Bill and Troufion,
You are right that there is a strain in SF that focuses on commando stuff - ie highly effective, well trained, small unit conventional fighting. I used to describe it in terms of the 3 ethoses of SF. 10SFG saw special ops as UW - training partisans behind the lines in a conventional war as a adjunct to conventional forces a la WWII. 5SFG saw special ops as direct action along the lines of the Son Tay raid. 7SFG saw the special ops mission as FID. The lines blurred a bit with the activation of Delta, 1 and 3 SFG and other missions by the several groups. But there are still many who would rather do than train others to do.

Cheers

John

[slapout9]

S.P.E.C.T.R.E.

Special Executive for Crime and counter-intelligence,Terrorism,Revenge,and Extortion:wry:

[astyanax]

Guys,

We ignore the fact that Martin van Creveld and Bill Lind, the ideological fathers of the 4GW mafia and seemingly in competion to be known as the grumpiest military historian on the planet, have consistently been more correct than the pack in predicting how military events would unfold over the last 15 years. Wishing that they weren't just dosen't cut it, just as wishing that western forces with massive capability overmatch weren't strategically all at sea in the Middle East. The core point in the 4GW argument is that it is the collapse of the moral and legal construct of the state that gives the opponent their strength and that trying to put the state back together militarily won't work, the issues of info and lethality proliferation are second tier issues that support this anomaly.

Agree or not with the 4GW construct no one can argue that Armd Divisions, DDGX and F22 Wings, the ultimate evolutionary tools of western warfare, have much utility for the fight we face. Sure we can smash states but we are yet to prove we have the capability or will to build a state. The 4GW argument that it is our inability to conceptualise the issues rather than our military capabilities needs to be considered deeply rather than rejected because its advocates have the personaility of a wire brush.

I've read this article. The primary problem seems to be that Clauswitz deals with States as primary actors and Van Creveld and others (Lind, Robb, Peters, etc.) acknowledge that we are moving in a different direction. One can call this a new mode or an old mode (tribal) however one likes.

The author of the article doesn't address this. IMHO, he misses the whole point of 4GW, which at its root is a very important concept with a malformed name.

I agree with Hawkwood.