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Jedburgh
07-19-2006, 01:52 PM
From ICG: Iraq and the Kurds: The Brewing Battle Over Kirkuk (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/iraq_iran_gulf/56_iraq_and_the_kurds___the_brewing_battle_over_ki rkuk.pdf)

In drafting Article 140 of the constitution, Kurdish leaders believed they were gaining guaranteed acquisition of Kirkuk. However, because of the way the constitution was achieved – through a rushed process culminating in a political deal between the Kurds and a single Shiite party, SCIRI, to the exclusion of many other parties, communities and minorities, as well as civil society organisations and public opinion more broadly – it reflects imposition of a Kurdish template for Kirkuk rather than a consensus agreement. As a result, a Kirkuk referendum may not happen, certainly not by the December 2007 deadline, and Kurdish aspirations may well flounder.

For the Kurds, this deadline thus threatens to become a self-laid trap. Having raised expectations and convinced their people to defer their Kirkuk ambitions by a couple of years, Kurdish leaders must now deliver by the end of 2007 or meet their wrath. As a Kurdish official put it, “we concentrated so much on Kirkuk, we would lose face if we now lowered our position. This is the problem”.

This is a problem, however, not only for the Kurdish leadership, but for all Iraqis, as the Kurds’ failure to secure Kirkuk by lawful, constitutional procedure may drive them to reckless adventurism with the risk of violence, civil war and possibly (direct or indirect) foreign intervention...

zenpundit
07-19-2006, 10:02 PM
Former USG official ( I think State or NSC) Peter W. Galbraith has a new book out arguing, essentially, for a partition of Iraq.

The End of Iraq (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0743294238/sr=1-1/qid=1153346272/ref=sr_1_1/104-0494151-0535916?ie=UTF8&s=books)

Galbraith is best known from the chapters on the Kurdish genocide in Samantha Power's book A Problem From Hell: America in the Age of Genocide (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0060541644/sr=1-1/qid=1153346464/ref=sr_1_1/104-0494151-0535916?ie=UTF8&s=books)

Jedburgh
07-19-2006, 10:20 PM
Former USG official ( I think State or NSC) Peter W. Galbraith has a new book out arguing, essentially, for a partition of Iraq.

The End of Iraq (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0743294238/sr=1-1/qid=1153346272/ref=sr_1_1/104-0494151-0535916?ie=UTF8&s=books)
Other articles discussing that option have been posted on SWC here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=749) and here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=713)

Cordesman of CSIS has also just published another short commentary, Losing the War in Iraq? (http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_progj/task,view/id,715/)

Jedburgh
04-19-2007, 04:31 PM
ICG, 19 Apr 07: Iraq and the Kurds: Resolving the Kirkuk Crisis (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/iraq_iran_gulf/64_iraq_and_the_kurds_resolving_the_kirkuk_crisis. pdf)

....The U.S. needs to recognise the risk of an explosion in Kirkuk and press the Kurds, the Baghdad government and Turkey alike to adjust policies and facilitate a peaceful settlement.

The studied bystander mode assumed by Washington, the Kurds’ sole ally, has not been helpful. Preoccupied with their attempt to save Iraq by implementing a new security plan in Baghdad, the Bush administration has left the looming Kirkuk crisis to the side. This neglect can cost the U.S. severely. If the referendum is held later this year over the objections of the other communities, the civil war is very likely to spread to Kirkuk and the Kurdish region, until now Iraq’s only area of quiet and progress. If the referendum is postponed without a viable facesaving alternative for the Kurds, their leaders may withdraw from the Maliki cabinet and thus precipitate a governmental crisis in Baghdad just when the security plan is, in theory, supposed to yield its political returns....

tequila
04-19-2007, 04:39 PM
Note that Galbraith writes from a very pro-Kurdish vantage point, for understandable reasons. I think he also serves as a sort of advisor for one or both of the Kurdish parties.

SWJED
09-28-2007, 08:48 PM
Security May Trump Ethnicity in Kirkuk (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-kirkuk28sep28,1,4617719.story?coll=la-headlines-world)- Borzou Daragahi, Los Angeles Times.


A staunch Arab nationalist, Ismail Hadidi once dreaded the possibility that his ethnically diverse city would be swallowed up by the neighboring semiautonomous Kurdish region and cut off from the Baghdad government.

But the provincial councilman is also a practical man. And when he compares the chaos and violence in the Iraqi capital with the prosperity and peace next door in the three-province Kurdistan Regional Government area, teaming up with the Kurds doesn't seem like such a bad idea. He's even considering buying some property in the Kurdish enclave.

"The people of Kirkuk were afraid of this," said Hadidi, a Sunni Arab tribal leader. "But given the situation, I believe most people will move toward being part of Kurdistan, because what the people want above all is security."

Uncertainty clouds Iraq's future, but not so much here. The Kurdish region's exploding economic and political power has begun to shape northern Iraq's reality...

Jedburgh
11-09-2008, 04:41 AM
ICG, 28 Oct 08: Oil for Soil: Toward a Grand Bargain on Iraq and the Kurds (http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=47&fileid=04C68286-5066-0E8B-F5F8-649E885185E2&lng=en)

......Difficult negotiations over a provincial elections law in July-September 2008 were only the latest indication of the centrality of the Kirkuk question. A minority in Iraq, the Kurds have deployed all available legal and institutional mechanisms to facilitate their quest for Kirkuk. Still, they have failed to overcome the odds. The result has been a growing political standoff that is immediately destabilising – witness developments in and around Khanaqin in August-September – and, perhaps even more dangerously, challenges the foundations of the post-2003 order. The territorial dispute stems from a deeper Arab-Kurdish conflict that has its origins in the state’s creation almost a century ago and has yet to be settled, whether through accommodation or by force. At its core it is a struggle between rival nationalisms with conflicting territorial claims to border areas, which the two groups claim based on historical demographic presence rather than on established boundaries, which never existed. Today, the goal should be a negotiated, consensus-based accommodation enshrined in the constitution, ratified in a referendum and guaranteed by the international community.

Deadlocked negotiations over the hydrocarbons and related laws, the architecture of federalism and the constitution review, together with growing tensions in disputed territories such as Khanaqin, suggest that these negotiations ought to shift from their focus on single issues to a grand bargain. A comprehensive approach will demand painful compromises from key stakeholders – principally Arabs and Kurds – who will be unable to provide their constituencies all they had promised them. It also will require overcoming deeply entrenched fears and mistrust.....

RJS
12-16-2008, 10:26 AM
My understanding is Galbraith is a paid lobbyist for the KRG. He writes well though and as someone with experience in Kurdistan, I find he is very accurate in his assessment of the situation.

Jedburgh
01-19-2009, 03:17 PM
WINEP, 14 Jan 09: Kirkuk: A Test for the International Community (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2991)

On January 31, most Iraqis will go to the polls and express their political preferences in provincial elections (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/16/AR2009011604967.html), but four of Iraq's provinces -- the three governorates within the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG (http://www.krg.org/index.asp)) and Kirkuk province -- will not hold elections. Kirkuk's noninclusion is a symbol of its unresolved status, and its elections are on hold until the Council of Representatives (http://www.newsabah.com/attachment/000003708.pdf) in Baghdad passes a special election law. There is little impetus, however, for the different ethnic factions to compromise on such a law unless the international community strongly supports the process.....

Jedburgh
03-29-2011, 03:31 PM
ICG, 28 Mar 11: Iraq and the Kurds: Confronting Withdrawal Fears (http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/103%20Iraq%20and%20the%20Kurds%20--%20Confronting%20Withdrawal%20Fears.ashx)

....Given great uncertainty over how security conditions will develop along the trigger line (http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/88_iraq_and_the_kurds___trouble_along_the_trigger_ line.ashx) in the coming year, progress in political negotiations over the disputed territories’ status has become more imperative than ever. While neither Baghdad nor Erbil appears to have an interest in armed confrontation, and both sides seem intent for the moment to capitalise on the mutual goodwill that arose from formation of the new coalition government, the disputed territories conflict is so fundamental to Baghdad-Erbil relations that a single incident could trigger a dangerous escalation. The unilateral deployment of Kurdish asaesh in Kirkuk (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus102.pdf) city in November 2010 and of peshmergas / zerevanis into Kirkuk governorate in February 2011 were two such incidents. Violence has been avoided so far, in large measure because of the Baghdad-Erbil-U.S. security arrangement, but these moves stoked local anger as well as unease over the Kurds’ long-term plans; they could still give rise to violent response and will vastly complicate negotiations for a deal, especially if the Kurds’ military forces are not withdrawn to the Kurdistan region....
USIP, 28 Mar 11: Preventing Arab-Kurd Conflict in Iraq after the Withdrawal of U.S. Forces (http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%2086.pdf)

Summary
Since the fall of the former regime, in 2003, there has been continuous concern that fighting might break out between the Arabs and the Kurds over Kirkuk and the boundary of the Kurdistan Regional Government (http://www.krg.org/?lngnr=12&smap=01010000).
In response to requests to help manage tensions between the different security forces, General Odierno, then Commanding General of United States Forces-Iraq, developed a Joint Security Architecture, bringing together Iraqi Security Forces, Kurdish forces, and US forces to work against their common enemy, the al-Qaeda.
US forces are due to start pulling out of their conflict prevention role along the ‘trigger line’ that divides the Kurds and the Arabs in the disputed territories, by the summer of 2011. Unless new conflict prevention mechanisms are put in place, there is a real risk that tensions could boil over as people tire of waiting for a political resolution.

SWJ Blog
02-05-2016, 09:23 AM
Fewer Fighters in Iraq/Syria as IS Focuses on 'Third Capital' (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/fewer-fighters-in-iraqsyria-as-is-focuses-on-third-capital)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/fewer-fighters-in-iraqsyria-as-is-focuses-on-third-capital) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

SWJ Blog
03-14-2016, 05:21 PM
Peshmerga Commander Talks on Group's Anti-IS Strategy & Kurdish Peshmerga Fighters Waiting for Mosul Battle Plan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/peshmerga-commander-talks-on-groups-anti-is-strategy-kurdish-peshmerga-fighters-waiting-for-mos)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/peshmerga-commander-talks-on-groups-anti-is-strategy-kurdish-peshmerga-fighters-waiting-for-mos) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

SWJ Blog
12-14-2016, 07:00 AM
Islamic State's 'Battle Ready' Fighters Hit New Low (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/islamic-states-battle-ready-fighters-hit-new-low)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/islamic-states-battle-ready-fighters-hit-new-low) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
12-31-2016, 01:31 PM
Created for 2017. The 2016 thread had 219 posts and 45.8k views:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=23327

Thanks to Joel Wing for his updates and a few others who have posted here.

JWing
12-31-2016, 06:11 PM
New post in new thread. Mosul campaign day 75 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2016/12/mosul-campaign-day-75-dec-30-2016.html), 2nd day of official restart of operations. Very little movement and all the fighting is over areas already freed or entered in east Mosul.

JWing
01-01-2017, 05:11 PM
Happy New Year! Day 76 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-76-dec-31-2016.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
01-02-2017, 06:48 PM
Day 77 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-77-jan-1-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign review.

JWing
01-02-2017, 06:53 PM
Did my year end total (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/24079-reported-dead-and-39166-wounded.html) for casualties reported in Iraq in 2016. Came out to 24,079 dead and 39,166. Because of govt censorship of its losses the real figures are much higher.

JWing
01-03-2017, 04:02 PM
Day 78 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-78-jan-2-2016.html) Mosul campaign.

davidbfpo
01-03-2017, 11:15 PM
Worth reading: 'Baghdad Doesn’t Want You to Know How Many of Its Soldiers Are Dying' and for the unit at the front in Mosul:
The problem is, the constant fighting is bleeding dry the Golden Division. A Pentagon source told Politico that Iraqi Special Operations Forces “are suffering upwards of 50-percent casualties. The division could become combat ineffective in a little over a month, and perhaps even sooner".

Link:https://warisboring.com/baghdad-doesnt-want-you-to-know-how-many-of-its-soldiers-are-dying-f46adacb463c#.tez7oh96o

JWing
01-04-2017, 03:57 PM
Day 79 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-79-jan-3-2017.html) Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-05-2017, 03:48 PM
Day 80 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-80-jan-4-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-06-2017, 03:50 PM
Day 81 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-81-jan-5-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-07-2017, 05:25 PM
Mosul campaign day 82 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-82-jan-6-2017.html).

JWing
01-08-2017, 06:23 PM
Day 83 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-83-jan-7-2017.html) of Mosul campaign. ISF finally entered some new neighborhoods of east Mosul.

JWing
01-09-2017, 03:52 PM
Day 84 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-84-jan-8-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
01-10-2017, 03:59 PM
Day 85 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-85-jan-9-2017.html) of Mosul campaign. Looks like IS defenses in east Mosul finally crumbling.

JWing
01-11-2017, 03:51 PM
Day 86 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-86-jan-10-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-12-2017, 03:49 PM
Day 87 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-87-jan-11-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-13-2017, 03:55 PM
Day 88 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-88-jan-12-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-14-2017, 05:11 PM
Day 89 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-89-jan-13-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-15-2017, 06:53 PM
Day 90 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-90-jan-14-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-16-2017, 05:54 PM
Day 91 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-91-jan-15-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-16-2017, 05:57 PM
I just interviewed journalist Florian Neuhof who has been covering the Mosul campaign since it started. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/interview-with-journalist-florian.html).

JWing
01-17-2017, 03:54 PM
Day 92 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-92-jan-16-2017.html) Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-17-2017, 03:57 PM
I interviewed AFP's Ahmad Mousa on what he's seen in the Battle for Mosul. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/interview-with-agence-france-presses.html).

JWing
01-18-2017, 03:55 PM
Day 93 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-93-jan-17-2017.html) Mosul campaign. Complete collapse of IS in east Mosul.

JWing
01-19-2017, 03:48 PM
Day 94 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-94-jan-18-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-20-2017, 03:54 PM
Day 95 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-95-jan-19-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
01-21-2017, 08:28 PM
Day 96 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-96-jan-20-2017.html) Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-21-2017, 08:35 PM
I interviewed Reuters' Stephen Kalin on what he's seen while covering the Battle for Mosul. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/interview-stephen-kalin-of-reuters-on.html).

Bill Moore
01-21-2017, 09:31 PM
I just interviewed journalist Florian Neuhof who has been covering the Mosul campaign since it started. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/interview-with-journalist-florian.html).

2. In just a few days the battle for Mosul has been transformed from a slow slog to a quick advance across most of the eastern section of the city. Why do you think the fight changed so dramatically?


Apart from the reasons given by the coalition - better coordination, more US SF assistance and better tactics - you now have considerably more capable forces in eastern Mosul after the arrival of the Rapid Response Forces and some able police units. And while sending in the GD ahead of everyone else was strategic nonsense, it did soften up ISIS defenses prior to the renewed push early in the new year. The Iraqis where able to replace their destroyed material and beef up their forces. ISIS on the other hand cannot resupply the east bank from the west any more, and has limited manpower in Mosul anyway.

I saw a lot more air support the last couple of times I went into Mosul, which might be a consequence of US special forces getting closer to the action. At the same time, the Iraqi forces are coming up with better ways to deal with suicide car bombers, which have been a real hazard during the past three months. The Rapid Response Forces for instance tell the inhabitants to park their cars across the road as soon as they enter an area, so blocking off avenues of attack. Those two things combined shifts the advantage back to the military in terms of guided ordinance.

Certainly good news at the tactical level, the Iraqi forces, with coalition assistance, appear to be adapting effectively and increasingly demonstrating the ability to defeat Da'esh despite their advantage of prepared defenses. One can only hope, that the Iraqi government has also adapting during this time, and is prepared to govern effectively once Mosul is liberated to consolidate this victory.

JWing
01-22-2017, 05:08 PM
Day 97 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-97-jan-21-2017.html) Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-23-2017, 03:59 PM
Day 98 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-98-jan-22-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

Red Rat
01-23-2017, 07:10 PM
The Rapid Response Division (Federal Police) did better than expected in Fallujah, but the Coalition footprint with it is limited and with that there is a lack of understanding of its capabilities. So far the only force with the ability to take, clear and hold complex terrain against a determined enemy has been the CTS. The CTS were always going to be the breach force for Mosul, the issue was more where the 'Hold" forces would come from and whether the Iraqis would be able to overmatch ISIS at the tactical and operational levels through multiple threats on multiple axis/fronts, something that to date they have struggled to do.

Iraqi operational reach is also something that has bedevilled offensive efforts. It is often not the case that the Iraqis do not have the materiel, but that they cannot manage it effectively. It is extremely difficult to cross-resource across Iraqi Army formations, and even more so across services (Iraqi Army to CTS, or Police), significantly exacerbating logistic coordination of operational efforts.

JWing
01-24-2017, 03:55 PM
Day 99 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-99-jan-23-2017.html) Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-24-2017, 03:56 PM
Iraqi forces are horrible at logistics. The whole system for Mosul is being run by the Americans.

JWing
01-25-2017, 03:55 PM
Day 100 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-100-jan-24-2017.html) of Mosul campaign. All of east Mosul liberated.

JWing
01-26-2017, 03:49 PM
Day 101 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-101-jan-25-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-27-2017, 04:08 PM
Day 102 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-102-jan-26-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-27-2017, 04:14 PM
Wrote two articles last night. Stats and analysis (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/violence-in-iraq-jan-1-21-2017.html) of security in Iraq first three weeks of January.

JWing
01-28-2017, 06:03 PM
Day 102 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-102-jan-27-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-29-2017, 06:46 PM
Day 103 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-103-jan-28-2017.html) of Mosul campaign. Iraqi forces worked with ex-Ninewa governor Nujafi's Hashd al-Watani forces and now issued an arrest warrant for him.

JWing
01-29-2017, 06:51 PM
Short piece on effect of Iranian propaganda on Iraq. Iraqis feel Iran trying to save them more than Iranians do. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/effect-of-iranian-propaganda-on-iraq.html).

JWing
01-30-2017, 04:04 PM
Day 104 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-104-jan-29-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
01-31-2017, 03:49 PM
Day 105 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/01/mosul-campaign-day-105-jan-30-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
02-01-2017, 03:52 PM
Day 106 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-106-jan-31-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
02-02-2017, 03:54 PM
Day 107 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-107-feb-1-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
02-03-2017, 04:03 PM
Day 108 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-108-feb-2-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
02-03-2017, 04:06 PM
I interviewed Niqash's Mustafa Habib about the job of securing east Mosul while attacking the west. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/securing-mosul-interview-with-niqashs.html).

JWing
02-04-2017, 06:45 PM
Day 109 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-109-feb-3-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

davidbfpo
02-05-2017, 03:19 PM
This film report (30 mins) maybe available in the USA via PBS, broadcast 31/1/17 and is filmed with the Golden Division i.e. Iraqi SOF:
As Iraqi forces attempt to retake Mosul from Isis, Guardian reporter Ghaith Abdul-Ahad joins their elite Golden Division on the frontline to examine the fight and its toll Go inside the Iraqi army's battle to take back the city of Mosul from Isis with Iraqi journalist Ghaith Abdul-Ahad. Ghaith reveals what retaking the city means for the future of his country. He will also discover the harsh realities of what it's like to live and survive under Isis – and under the Iraqi army.
The fight inside the city is brutal and slow, and losses are mounting with countless civilians and over 2,000 security personnel reportedly killed since the offensive began.
Iraqi special forces are leading the charge to liberate the city. We witness their struggle close-up, with the filmmakers even surviving a suicide truck bomb aimed at killing the group's leader Lt Col Muntadher, known to his troops as 'Steel'.
WARNING: Contains strong language and footage some viewers might find distressing
A PBS FRONTLINE (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline) production with Mongoose Films in association with The Guardian.Link:https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/feb/01/battle-for-mosul-iraq-isis-dirty-war-video

Or:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5woZG9fQtqo


The SOF are using small commercial drones and Ipads for operational C3I.

JWing
02-05-2017, 05:55 PM
Great long piece in New Yorker by reporter embedded reporter with a Rapid Response unit during the battle for Mosul. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/02/06/the-desperate-battle-to-destroy-isis

JWing
02-05-2017, 06:04 PM
Day 110 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-110-feb-4-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
02-05-2017, 06:07 PM
Monthly violence report in Iraq. I'm the only one keeping comprehensive casualty counts anymore after UN stopped. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/violence-in-iraq-january-2017.html).

JWing
02-06-2017, 04:00 PM
Mosul Campaign Day 111 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-111-feb-5-2017.html).

JWing
02-07-2017, 03:51 PM
Day 112 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-112-feb-6-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
02-08-2017, 04:00 PM
Day 113 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-113-feb-7-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
02-09-2017, 03:56 PM
Day 114 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-114-feb-8-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
02-10-2017, 04:00 PM
Mosul campaign day 115 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-115-feb-9-2017.html). East Mosul is looking like a besieged city with all the IS attacks even though IS in the one surrounded.

JWing
02-10-2017, 07:21 PM
Months after Fallujah liberated rebuilding barely begun because Iraqi govt is broke. https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/middleeast/falluja-iraq-isis.html?_r=0&referer=https://t.co/TDkq9Xd1Wf

JWing
02-11-2017, 05:40 PM
Day 116 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-116-feb-10-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
02-11-2017, 05:43 PM
Weekly security report (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/violence-in-iraq-feb-1-7-2017.html) for Iraq for the 1st wk of February.

JWing
02-12-2017, 06:02 PM
Day 117 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-117-feb-11-2017.html)of Mosul campaign.

JWing
02-13-2017, 03:50 PM
Mosul campaign Day 118 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-118-feb-12-2017.html).

JWing
02-14-2017, 03:59 PM
Day 119 (Mosul Campaign Day 119, Feb 13, 2017)of Mosul Campaign.

davidbfpo
02-15-2017, 11:57 AM
A pessimistic overview from Professor Paul Rogers, here is one passage:
The Iraqi government now saying (http://www.iraqinews.com/iraq-war/international-coalition-attacks-strategic-locations-south-mosul/) that operations to clear the rest of the city are getting underway, with the CTS and three army brigades committed to the operation, supported by coalition air strikes and artillery. This might signal that IS faces imminent defeat – but there are other indicators which suggest otherwise. The worry is not just that it will take months to complete the task, but that the consequences for Iraqi security may be severe.
Link:https://theconversation.com/despite-reports-of-imminent-success-mosul-is-still-a-dangerous-flashpoint-72987? (https://theconversation.com/despite-reports-of-imminent-success-mosul-is-still-a-dangerous-flashpoint-72987?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20 for%20February%2014%202017%20-%2067634951&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20f or%20February%2014%202017%20-%2067634951+CID_7438c9a4d4077ee1a5a0450c4ad31c27&utm_source=campaign_monitor_uk&utm_term=Despite%20reports%20of%20imminent%20succe ss%20Mosul%20is%20still%20a%20dangerous%20flashpoi nt)

JWing
02-15-2017, 03:53 PM
Day 120 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-120-feb-14-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
02-16-2017, 03:55 PM
Day 121 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-121-feb-15-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
02-17-2017, 03:54 PM
Day 122 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-122-feb-16-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
02-17-2017, 03:57 PM
Weekly security report (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/violence-in-iraq-feb-8-14-2017.html) for 2nd wk of February in Iraq.

JWing
02-18-2017, 05:22 PM
Day 123 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-123-feb-17-2017.html) Mosul campaign.

JWing
02-19-2017, 05:50 PM
Day 124 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-124-feb-18-2017.html) of Mosul campaign. This morning PM Abadi announced attack on west Mosul had begun.

JWing
02-20-2017, 04:49 PM
Day 125 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-125-feb-19-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign. Comprehensive run down of 1st day of renewed campaign to take west Mosul.

JWing
02-21-2017, 03:53 PM
Day 126 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-126-feb-20-2017.html) of Mosul campaign. Outskirts of south Mosul reached.

JWing
02-22-2017, 04:15 PM
Day 127 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-127-feb-21-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
02-23-2017, 03:52 PM
Day 128 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-128-feb-22-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
02-24-2017, 03:54 PM
Day 129 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-129-feb-23-2017.html) of Mosul campaign. West Mosul finally entered.

JWing
02-25-2017, 06:23 PM
Day 130 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-130-feb-24-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
02-26-2017, 05:38 PM
Day 131 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-131-feb-25-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
02-27-2017, 03:56 PM
Day 132 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-132-feb-26-2017.html) of Mosul campaign. Weekly security report (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/violence-in-iraq-feb-15-21-2017.html) for Iraq. Finally an opinion piece (http://www.nrttv.com/EN/birura-details.aspx?Jimare=5118) I wrote for NRT from Kurdistan on the declining security situation in east Mosul.

JWing
02-28-2017, 03:51 PM
Day 133 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/02/mosul-campaign-day-133-feb-27-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
03-01-2017, 03:45 PM
Day 134 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-134-feb-28-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
03-02-2017, 03:54 PM
Day 135 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-135-mar-1-2017.html) of Mosul campaign. Plus 4,290 casualties (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/4290-dead-and-wounded-in-iraq-in.html) in Iraq in February.

JWing
03-03-2017, 03:52 PM
Mosul campaign day 136 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-136-mar-2-2017.html).

JWing
03-04-2017, 06:43 PM
Did an interview (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/the-battle-for-west-mosul-interview.html) with the BBC's Quentin Sommerville on the battle for West Mosul. He was embedded with the Emergency Response Division that moved from the south up the Tigris River into South Mosul.

JWing
03-05-2017, 05:08 PM
Day 137 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-137-mar-3-4-2017.html)of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
03-06-2017, 03:52 PM
Day 138 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-138-mar-6-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
03-07-2017, 03:51 PM
My latest interview (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/how-is-islamic-state-dealing-with-its.html) with Charlie Winter on how Islamic State media releases are dealing with its defeat in Mosul.

JWing
03-08-2017, 03:54 PM
Day 139-140 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-139-40-mar-6-7-2017.html) in Mosul campaign.

JWing
03-09-2017, 04:00 PM
Mosul campaign Day 141 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day141-mar-8-2017.html).

JWing
03-10-2017, 03:51 PM
Day 142 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-142-mar-9-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
03-11-2017, 07:02 PM
Mosul campaign Day 143 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-143-mar-10-3017.html) and weekly security report (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/violence-in-iraq-march-1-7-2017.html) in Iraq for March 1-7, 2017.

JWing
03-12-2017, 05:56 PM
Day 144 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-144-mar-11-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
03-13-2017, 02:58 PM
Mosul campaign Day 145 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-145-march-12-2017.html).

JWing
03-14-2017, 05:33 PM
Day 146 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-146-march-13-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
03-15-2017, 03:39 PM
Day 147 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-147-march-14-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
03-16-2017, 05:53 PM
Day 148 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-148-march-15-2017.html)of Mosul Campaign.

davidbfpo
03-16-2017, 09:47 PM
Just to give some perspective the WW2 Siege of Sevastopol (then in the USSR) lasted 199 days.
From:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Sevastopol_(1941%E2%80%9342)

JWing
03-17-2017, 06:07 PM
Day 149 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-149-march-16-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
03-18-2017, 04:47 PM
Day 150 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-150-march-17-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
03-19-2017, 05:33 PM
Day 151 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-151-march-18-2017.html) in Mosul Campaign.

JWing
03-20-2017, 03:50 PM
Day 152 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-152-march-19-2017.html) in Mosul Campaign.

JWing
03-21-2017, 04:41 PM
Security report (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/violence-in-iraq-march-8-14-2017.html)for 2nd week of March in Iraq.

JWing
03-22-2017, 03:44 PM
Day 153-54 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-153-54-march-20-21.html) in Mosul Campaign.

JWing
03-23-2017, 04:10 PM
Day 155 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-155-march-22-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
03-24-2017, 04:12 PM
Day 156 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-156-march-23-2017.html)of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
03-25-2017, 05:20 PM
Day 157 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/musings-on-iraq-day-157-march-24-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
03-26-2017, 08:56 PM
Day 158 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-158-march-25-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
03-27-2017, 02:57 PM
Day 159 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-159-march-26-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
03-28-2017, 02:53 PM
Day 162 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-162-march-27-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
03-29-2017, 02:54 PM
Mosul campaign Day 163 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-163-march-28-2017.html)

JWing
03-30-2017, 02:57 PM
Weekly security report (Violence In Iraq, March 15-21, 2017) for Iraq. The only comprehensive casualty report left.

JWing
03-31-2017, 03:52 PM
Day 164-65 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/03/mosul-campaign-day-164-65-march-29-30.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
04-01-2017, 07:00 PM
Security report (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/violence-in-iraq-march-22-28-2017.html) for Iraq March 22-28.

JWing
04-02-2017, 05:38 PM
Mosul Campaign Day 166-167 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-166-167-march-31.html)

JWing
04-03-2017, 04:41 PM
Day 168 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-168-apr-2-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
04-04-2017, 06:29 PM
Day 169 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-169-apr-3-2017.html)of Mosul campaign.

davidbfpo
04-04-2017, 08:48 PM
Taken from an IISS Strategic Comment (behind a pay wall), with my emphasis:
The Hashd al-Shaabi or Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU) arose in response to a fatwa by Sistani prompted by the fall of Mosul to ISIS in 2014. Sistani declared that 'whoever of you sacrifices himself to defend his country and his family and their honour will be a martyr'. PMU fighters number between 60,000 and 100,000 and are contributing 35,000 of the 90,000 fighters involved in the Iraqi government's current effort to retake Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, from ISIS. In November 2016, the Iraqi government accorded them official status as part of Iraq's security forces. Sunni Arab politicians characterised this development as evidence of Shia 'dictatorship' in Iraq that could increase extrajudicial killings and military brutality, weaken the Iraqi military establishment and deepen national sectarian divisions. In February, video footage emerged of Shia militiamen and Iraqi soldiers beating and executing civilians in east Mosul, and Amnesty International documented PMU atrocities in Fallujah in 2016. While the PMU consider themselves a religious movement of Iraqi national liberation, the Western media tend to describe them more calmly as an Iran-backed coalition of Shia militias. Officials and media of Gulf Sunni Arab countries regard them as an Iran-backed terrorist organisation. None of these three characterisations is altogether accurate, mainly because the PMU are heterogeneous. About half of the PMU are pre-existing militias, and about half are new outfits mustered by Sistani or other Iraqi politicians. Iran funds, supports and operationally supervises four of the largest groups in the PMU: Kata’ib Hizbullah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada and the Badr Organisation. The PMU also include the Peace Brigades, a group aligned behind firebrand Iraqi Shia cleric and politician Muqtada al-Sadr. Iraq’s holy shrines, controlled by Sistani, established three of the best-trained and equipped groups of the PMU: the Imam Ali Brigade, Ali al-Akhbar Brigade and Abbas Division. Their officers are nationalists aligned with the Iraqi government, and the Abbas Division was actually trained by Iraqi special forces. But Sistani’s religious authority gives him countervailing authority over these units, which, when he decides to exercise it, could have significant political consequences. Sistani’s disenchantment with former prime minister Nuri al-Maliki forced him from office. The PMU also now nominally include some Sunni tribal fighters and Christian militias.
Some PMU groups also receive money and military support from Iran's Quds Force, the covert expeditionary element of the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Many Iranians see Quds Force commander General Qassem Suleimani as a protector of Iran against the influence of ISIS and encroachment from Iraq and Syria. In mainstream Iranian political discourse, Iranian involvement in regional conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Yemen is justified as the forward engagement of ISIS and al-Qaeda before they reach Iranian territory.
Link:http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections/2017-6df9/shia-militias-in-iraq-59bf

JWing
04-05-2017, 04:01 PM
I interviewed (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/plight-of-civilians-in-battle-for-mosul.html) Amnesty International's Donatella Rovera about the civilian toll in the fighting in Mosul.

JWing
04-06-2017, 03:57 PM
Day 170-171 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-170-171-apr-4-5-2017.html) in Mosul campaign.

JWing
04-08-2017, 05:21 PM
Day 172-173 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-172-173-apr-6-7-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
04-09-2017, 02:59 PM
Monthly casualty report (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/6732-dead-and-wounded-in-iraq-in-march.html) for March 2017 in Iraq. 6,732 dead and wounded reported. Highest figure since December 2016.

Azor
04-09-2017, 11:46 PM
According to U.S. military sources, CJTF-OIR has killed 45,000 to 60,000 Daesh fighters to date and roughly 300 Al Qaeda fighters.

According to Airwars.org, CJTF-OIR has killed 3,000 to 4,800 civilians in Iraq and Syria to date.

Therefore, the 4.70% to 9.60% of the fatalities inflicted by the Coalition would be civilian.

Russia seems to be providing inflated numbers of the Daesh and Nusra killed since September 2015. What do you estimate to be the number of combatants and civilians killed by Russia?

JWing
04-10-2017, 02:47 PM
Don't track Syria so have no idea about civilian casualties caused by Russia.

JWing
04-10-2017, 02:52 PM
Mosul campaign (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-174-175-apr-8-9-2017.html) day 174-175.

JWing
04-11-2017, 02:49 PM
Day 176 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-176-apr-10-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
04-12-2017, 02:49 PM
Day 177 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-177-apr-11-2017.html)of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
04-13-2017, 02:46 PM
Mosul Campaign (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-178-apr-12-2017.html) Day 178.

JWing
04-14-2017, 02:51 PM
Day 179 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-179-apr-13-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
04-14-2017, 06:15 PM
Great report in CTC Sentinel (https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/defeat-by-annihilation-mobility-and-attrition-in-the-islamic-states-defense-of-mosul)about IS defenses in Mosul.

JWing
04-15-2017, 05:13 PM
Day 180 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-180-apr-14-2017.html) Mosul Campaign.

JWing
04-16-2017, 04:26 PM
Security report (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/security-in-iraq-april-1-7-2017.html) for Iraq 1st week of April.

JWing
04-17-2017, 02:56 PM
Day 181-182 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-181-182-apr-15-16.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
04-18-2017, 02:51 PM
Day 183 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-183-apr-17-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
04-19-2017, 02:53 PM
Mosul campaign Day 184 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-184-apr-18-2017.html).

JWing
04-20-2017, 02:55 PM
Day 185 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-185-apr-19-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
04-21-2017, 02:52 PM
Mosul campaign day 186 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-186-apr-20-2017.html).

JWing
04-22-2017, 04:25 PM
Day 187 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-187-apr-21-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
04-23-2017, 03:51 PM
Day 188 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-188-apr-22-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
04-24-2017, 02:54 PM
Security report (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/security-in-iraq-april-8-14-2017.html)for Iraq week of April 8-14, 2017.

JWing
04-24-2017, 02:58 PM
Day 189 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-189-apr-23-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
04-25-2017, 02:52 PM
Mosul campaign day 190 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-190-apr-24-2017.html).

JWing
04-26-2017, 02:48 PM
Day 191 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-191-apr-25-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
04-27-2017, 02:55 PM
Mosul campaign Day 192 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-192-apr-26-2017.html).

JWing
04-28-2017, 02:53 PM
Day 193 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-193-apr-27-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
04-29-2017, 03:01 PM
Security in Iraq (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/security-in-iraq-april-15-21-2017.html) April 15-21, 2017.

JWing
04-30-2017, 04:53 PM
Mosul Campaign day 194-95 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/04/mosul-campaign-day-194-195-apr-28-29.html).

JWing
05-01-2017, 02:47 PM
Day 196 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-196-apr-30-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
05-02-2017, 02:51 PM
Day 197 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-197-may-1-2017.html) of the Mosul campaign.

JWing
05-03-2017, 02:52 PM
Day 198 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-198-may-2-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
05-04-2017, 02:52 PM
Day 199 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-199-may-3-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
05-05-2017, 02:50 PM
Day 200 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-200-may-4-2017.html) Mosul campaign.

JWing
05-06-2017, 05:17 PM
Day 201 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-201-may-5-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
05-07-2017, 04:27 PM
Mosul campaign Day 202 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-202-may-6-2017.html).

JWing
05-08-2017, 02:55 PM
Just published my 120th interview for Musings On Iraq talking with Alex Mello, Iraq security analyst for Horizon Client Access on how the Islamic State has fought the Battle for Mosul. Alex recently co-authored an article with Michael Knights for CTC Sentinel on the Mosul fighting. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/how-islamic-state-has-fought-battle-for.html).

Azor
05-08-2017, 10:40 PM
From Der Spiegel (http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/mosul-judges-try-to-bring-islamic-state-criminals-to-justice-a-1144790.html) in May - selected excerpts:


Although fighting is still ongoing in the western part of Mosul, and a half-million people are still trapped inside the old city, with insufficient food and water, an attempt to process IS atrocities is underway here, in the Court of United Nineveh.

Two judges are heading the investigations.

But mistakes happen again and again, and innocent people are taken into custody.

None of the 20 alleged IS supporters Yami interrogates on this day confesses to a crime. They all claim that they only watched, that they fled, performed harmless tasks, were hangers-on and were victims of circumstances. Few admit to possessing a weapon. Some say their fallen brothers or fathers were with IS, but that they themselves were not. And why should these men confess their guilt if there is no evidence? Or could it be that they are innocent?

"Ninety percent of all prisoners here are lying," Yami says. "If I could question them alone, they might tell me the truth. But now they spend a few days with the other prisoners, and then they know what to say in their testimony."

In order to prevent abuse, an amnesty law was enacted in 2016. Since then, anyone who can prove that he joined IS or another terrorist group against his will and did not commit any serious crimes is set free. Some 800 prisoners have benefited from the amnesty rule since the middle of last year.

According to the pro-EU and EU-funded Reshaping Europe blog as of December 2015:


...meaningful security screenings of refugees and migrants that have already entered EU territory are extremely hard to implement – in particular in the current chaotic situation where thousands of people reach the Italian and Greek shores every day. At the migratory hubs in these countries, the EU is trying to allow for a more orderly processing of refugees and migrants by providing coordinated and reinforced support by EU agencies like Frontex and EASO and Member States’ experts (‘hotspot approach’). This could also include intensified security screenings by, for example, systematically checking refugees against police data bases and anti-terror lists. But such measures will take time to be implemented. At the moment Italy, Greece or Croatia still do not even (manage to) fingerprint and register refugees in a systematic manner. But even if implemented properly, these procedures would security-wise still not live up to the US screenings. If EU Member States really wanted to put into place security checks similar to those of the US, they would have to detain refugees and migrants for many months after their arrival.

From 2013 to 2016, roughly 136,000 migrants have fled from Iraq to Europe. Given the Iraqis' inability to detect ex-Daesh fighters that have blended into the civilian population as well as the incomplete, missing or incorrect documentation for most Iraqi migrants to Europe, how can any EU or EU member state leader claim that there is an effective vetting process for these migrants?

Even if these former members do not commit terrorism in Europe, they are nonetheless war criminals who have "retired" to the generous welfare states of Europe in order to avoid justice at home.

This is to say nothing of former members of Iraqi Shia gangs that have joined the tide of humanity heading northwest.

JWing
05-09-2017, 02:54 PM
Day 203-204 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-203-204-may-7-8-2017.html) in Mosul campaign.

Azor
05-09-2017, 09:18 PM
By Michael Knights and Michael Eisenstadt at WOTR: https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/mini-hizballahs-revolutionary-guard-knock-offs-and-the-future-of-irans-militant-proxies-in-iraq/

Introduction:


As the war against the Islamic State enters the final stretch, with less than a quarter of Mosul left to liberate, the Iraqi government must decide whether to allow a residual U.S. military support mission to stay on in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi Shiite militias have already weighed in on the matter. In early May 2017, Jafar al-Hosseini, a spokesman and senior commander of the Kata’ib Hizballah militia, told Iranian state media: “If [the] Americans fail to leave Iraq [following the defeat of Islamic State] they will be in the crosshairs of the Iraqi Islamic resistance.” Statements such as these, delivered confidently with little fear of government reproach, raise the question: Who is really in charge in Iraq?

The future of Iraq’s Hashd al-Sha’abi, or Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and their constituent militias is one of the most consequential policy challenges facing the Iraqi government and its coalition partners, such as the United States. Raised by a religious fatwa and a political executive order, the PMF played a crucial role in stemming the advance of Islamic State in June 2014, eventually incorporating both Shiite and non-Shiite fighters. But the PMF consist of diverse elements. These include Iranian-backed Shiite militias, “shrine PMF” (whose leaders were selected by the quietist Shiite clergy in Najaf), and Sunni PMF. The latter two groups are assets for Iraq that will hopefully be incorporated into Iraqi Army, Counter-Terrorism Service and police forces. The Tehran-backed PMF, however, are a different matter and their future is a source of acute concern for Washington.

U.S. policymakers are particularly focused on the role that Tehran-backed PMF may play in Iranian efforts to remake parts of the region in its own image. One possibility is the Lebanese Hizballah model — entailing their transformation into political movements with military and social welfare wings, outside of state control but tolerated by the government. With the PMF formally incorporated as a temporary component of the Iraqi Security Forces there is also the possibility that the PMF could become a parallel official military institution akin to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran, to counterbalance U.S. and coalition-trained units in the Iraqi Security Forces.

What is the current and future relevance of these models to the Tehran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq? Our research indicates that some PMF elements with ties to Iran, such as Kata’ib Hizballah or Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, face an uncertain path and may continue their evolution towards the Hizballah model. Though presently at odds with Iran, the movement of Moqtada al-Sadr is, in many ways, probably the closest Iraqi equivalent to Hizballah. At the same time, the creation of an IRGC-like parallel military that answers to the country’s leadership is not very likely — at least at this time — in part because the Iran-backed Badr Organization is already determinedly converting elements of the Iraqi Security Forces into a parallel force not entirely under the control of the Iraqi prime minister. All of these eventualities present acute threats to shared U.S., Iraqi, and coalition interests and should be constrained through information operations, security force assistance, security sector reform, and political-economic assistance efforts, described in detail below...

JWing
05-10-2017, 02:49 PM
Security report (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/2677-killed-and-1742-wounded-in-iraq.html)for April 2017. Lull in Mosul fighting dropped casualty and attack statistics for the month.

JWing
05-11-2017, 02:55 PM
Two articles today. One is on security trends (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/iraq-security-charts-jan-2016-apr-2017.html) in Iraq from 2016 to April 2017. Violence is down across the country since Mosul campaign started. Lots of charts in the piece. The other is a Mosul update (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-205-206-may-9-10-2017.html) with only one section of the city left under IS control.

JWing
05-12-2017, 02:47 PM
Day 207 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-207-may-11-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign. Battle is reaching final phase.

JWing
05-13-2017, 06:28 PM
Day 208 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-208-may-12-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
05-14-2017, 04:02 PM
Mosul campaign Day 209 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-209-may-13-2017.html).

JWing
05-15-2017, 02:52 PM
Day 210 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-210-may-14-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
05-16-2017, 02:50 PM
Day 211 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-211-may-15-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

davidbfpo
05-16-2017, 07:59 PM
Taken from a recent IISS Strategic Comment on 'The Battle for Mosul', but behind a paywall:
The erratic performance of pro-government forces has hindered the Iraqi government’s effort. .....Despite the gross disparity in numbers, progress has been slow because Iraqi units have been plagued by desertions, and most large Iraqi units and many of the paramilitary units have been slow to launch attacks and have failed to follow through in the face of ISIS resistance. The motley composition of pro-government forces has also produced command-and-control problems.
On account of these erratic capabilities, a very small portion of the overall offensive force – perhaps only 6,000 troops at any one time – has actually come into contact with the enemy.
Finally, ISIS’s extensive use of smoke screens – produced by burning thousands of tires or, in one instance, igniting a sulphur plant – made the targeting of ISIS strong points and vehicles a problem. Heavy winter rains exacerbated this challenge.
(Finally) The upshot is that in terms of countering ISIS, Iraq’s stability could be months, if not years, away.
Link:http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections/2017-6df9/the-battle-for-mosul-18a7

JWing
05-17-2017, 02:47 PM
Day 212 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-212-may-16-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
05-18-2017, 02:54 PM
Day 213 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-213-may-17-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
05-19-2017, 02:49 PM
Mosul campaign day 214 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-214-may-18-2017.html).

JWing
05-20-2017, 03:07 PM
Mosul Campaign Day 215 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-215-may-19-2017.html).

JWing
05-21-2017, 03:27 PM
Security report (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/security-in-iraq-may-1-7-2017.html)for Iraq 1st week of May

OUTLAW 09
05-22-2017, 12:38 PM
DER SPIEGEL photographer Ali Arkady documents Iraqi security forces abducting, torturing, raping, and killing civilians around Mosul.

Describes "competition" among Federal Police & ERU: Police described raping particularly beautiful woman, ERU also wanted to raid the place.

Story carried in Spiegel Online....in German....

Basically the Shia units were fear in driving the Sunni's out de facto ethnic cleansing

BTW...the US had problems with the Federal Police even in 2006 in Diyala ...as they were mainly Shia....in a largely Sunni Province

AND from the photos the Shia torture techniques have not changed much from 2006...

OUTLAW 09
05-22-2017, 02:31 PM
DER SPIEGEL photographer Ali Arkady documents Iraqi security forces abducting, torturing, raping, and killing civilians around Mosul.

Describes "competition" among Federal Police & ERU: Police described raping particularly beautiful woman, ERU also wanted to raid the place.

Story carried in Spiegel Online....in German....

Basically the Shia units were fear in driving the Sunni's out de facto ethnic cleansing

BTW...the US had problems with the Federal Police even in 2006 in Diyala ...as they were mainly Shia....in a largely Sunni Province

AND from the photos the Shia torture techniques have not changed much from 2006...

Our friends that we knew so well from 2006 Badr Corp......

Arkady says he received death threats, brought his family to safety before releasing evidence of the crimes he documented. Now lives abroad.

His account was published in this week's SPIEGEL Magazine. No English version available yet AFAIK.

German version: https://magazin.spiegel.de/SP/2017/21/151254648/?utm_source=spon&utm_campaign=centerpage#…

JWing
05-22-2017, 02:54 PM
Mosul campaign Days 216-217 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-216-217-may-20-21.html).

OUTLAW 09
05-22-2017, 05:51 PM
Our friends that we knew so well from 2006 Badr Corp......

Arkady says he received death threats, brought his family to safety before releasing evidence of the crimes he documented. Now lives abroad.

His account was published in this week's SPIEGEL Magazine. No English version available yet AFAIK.

German version: https://magazin.spiegel.de/SP/2017/21/151254648/?utm_source=spon&utm_campaign=centerpage#…

@DerSPIEGEL #Mosul: A detained Sunni soldier said he was abducted and raped by the #PMU in #Mosul "because I'm a Sunni. They hate us."

@DerSPIEGEL #Mosul: #Iraq|i Shia Captain Omar: "Oh, we did everything. We took Sunni men & women and looted their houses."

@DerSPIEGEL #Mosul: Reporter: "They (#PMU) tortured a Sunni father. Then they tortured his 16-year-old son and executed the son in front of his father."

JWing
05-23-2017, 02:48 PM
Day 218 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-218-may-22-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
05-24-2017, 02:51 PM
Day 219 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-219-may-23-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
05-25-2017, 02:49 PM
Day 220 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-220-may-24-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
05-26-2017, 04:15 PM
Day 221 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-221-may-25-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
05-27-2017, 03:17 PM
Day 222 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-222-may-26-2017.html) Mosul Campaign.

JWing
05-28-2017, 04:41 PM
Mosul campaign Day 223 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-223-may-27-2017.html).

JWing
05-29-2017, 03:11 PM
Day 224 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-224-may-28-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
05-30-2017, 02:53 PM
Day 225 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-225-may-29-2017.html) Mosul campaign.

JWing
05-31-2017, 02:47 PM
Day 226 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/05/mosul-campaign-day-226-may-30-2017.html)Mosul Campaign.

JWing
06-01-2017, 02:48 PM
Day 227 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-227-may-31-2017.html) Mosul Campaign.

JWing
06-02-2017, 04:33 PM
Day 228 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-228-jun-1-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
06-03-2017, 03:22 PM
Day 229 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-229-jun-2-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
06-04-2017, 02:56 PM
Day 230 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-230-jun-3-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
06-05-2017, 02:56 PM
Day 231 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-231-jun-4-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
06-06-2017, 02:51 PM
Mosul Campaign Day 232 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-232-jun-5-2017.html).

JWing
06-07-2017, 02:59 PM
Day 233 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-233-jun-6-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
06-08-2017, 03:55 PM
Day 234 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-234-jun-7-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
06-09-2017, 04:27 PM
Mosul campaign day 235 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-235-jun-8-2017.html).

JWing
06-09-2017, 08:57 PM
May 2017 casualty report (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/2001-killed-1459-wounded-in-iraq-in-may.html) in Iraq. Fewest incidents of 2017 and casualties have slowly declined.

JWing
06-10-2017, 04:07 PM
Day 236 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-236-jun-9-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
06-11-2017, 03:20 PM
Day 237 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-237-jun-10-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
06-12-2017, 04:02 PM
Day 238 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-238-jun-11-2017.html) Mosul campaign.

JWing
06-13-2017, 05:42 PM
Mosul campaign Day 239 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-239-jun-12-2017.html).

JWing
06-14-2017, 03:29 PM
Day 240 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-240-jun-13-2017.html) Mosul Campaign.

JWing
06-15-2017, 10:04 PM
Day 241 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-241-jun-14-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
06-16-2017, 05:49 PM
Mosul campaign Day 242 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-242-jun-15-2017.html).

JWing
06-17-2017, 03:50 PM
Mosul Camp Day 243 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-243-jun-16-2017.html).

JWing
06-18-2017, 03:28 PM
Mosul campaign day 244 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-244-jun-17-2017.html).

JWing
06-19-2017, 03:55 PM
Mosul campaign Day 245 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-245-jun-18-2017.html).

SWJ Blog
06-19-2017, 06:11 PM
Mosul Old City Battle Goes House to House as IS Fighters Defend (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mosul-old-city-battle-goes-house-to-house-as-is-fighters-defend)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mosul-old-city-battle-goes-house-to-house-as-is-fighters-defend) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

JWing
06-20-2017, 04:19 PM
Just did my 121st interview for Musings On Iraq with journalist Wladimir van Wilgenburg over his recent trip to Ninewa's Sinjar which is split between Kurds, Hashd, and the PKK. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/sinjar-dispute-between-hashd-and.html).

JWing
06-21-2017, 03:15 PM
Mosul Campaign Day 246-247 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-246-47-jun-19-20-2017.html).

JWing
06-22-2017, 03:43 PM
Day 248 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-248-jun-21-2017.html) Mosul campaign.

JWing
06-23-2017, 03:36 PM
Day 249 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-249-jun-22-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

davidbfpo
06-24-2017, 09:45 AM
Quentin Somerville, BBC News, and his colleagues have a photo-essay 'The Secret Lives of IS Fighters', sub-titled: 'Three young IS militants lie dead on the banks of the River Tigris. They left behind personal photos and documents which reveal the extraordinary story of their private lives.'
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/is_fighters

Some points to note, including an Iraqi infiltrator in IS.

JWing
06-24-2017, 03:14 PM
Day 250 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-250-jun-23-2017.html) Mosul campaign.

JWing
06-25-2017, 02:48 PM
Day 251 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-251-jun-24-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

SWJ Blog
06-26-2017, 12:44 PM
Immediate Lessons from the Battle of Mosul (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/immediate-lessons-from-the-battle-of-mosul)

Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/immediate-lessons-from-the-battle-of-mosul) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

JWing
06-26-2017, 03:36 PM
Day 252 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-252-jun-25-2017.html) Mosul campaign.

SWJ Blog
06-27-2017, 11:01 AM
Mattis: After Raqqa, Syrian Battlefield Will Only Get More Complicated (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mattis-after-raqqa-syrian-battlefield-will-only-get-more-complicated)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mattis-after-raqqa-syrian-battlefield-will-only-get-more-complicated) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

JWing
06-27-2017, 03:40 PM
Day 253 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-253-jun-26-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
06-28-2017, 03:30 PM
Day 254 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-254-jun-27-2017.html) Mosul Campaign.

JWing
06-29-2017, 03:23 PM
Day 255 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-255-jun-28-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
06-30-2017, 04:05 PM
Mosul Campaign Day 256 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/06/mosul-campaign-day-256-jun-29-2017.html).

SWJ Blog
07-01-2017, 02:23 PM
After Mosul and Raqqa Fall, Where Will Next Battle With IS Be? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/after-mosul-and-raqqa-fall-where-will-next-battle-with-is-be)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/after-mosul-and-raqqa-fall-where-will-next-battle-with-is-be) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

JWing
07-01-2017, 03:20 PM
Mosul campaign Day 257 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/07/mosul-campaign-day-257-jun-30-2017.html).

JWing
07-02-2017, 03:02 PM
Day 258 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/07/mosul-campaign-day-258-jul-1-2017.html) Mosul campaign.

SWJ Blog
07-02-2017, 05:25 PM
The Battle for Raqqa and the Challenges after Liberation (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-battle-for-raqqa-and-the-challenges-after-liberation)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-battle-for-raqqa-and-the-challenges-after-liberation) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

JWing
07-03-2017, 03:29 PM
Day 259 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/07/mosul-campaign-day-259-jul-2-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
07-04-2017, 04:26 PM
Day 260 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/07/mosul-campaign-day-260-jul-3-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
07-04-2017, 04:27 PM
Almost forgot I also just did an interview with RAND's James Dobbins about whether the Pentagon adequately prepared for postwar Iraq. Dobbins was part of a group that got briefed on the Defense Department's plans in Jan 03. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/07/did-pentagon-adequately-prepare-for.html).

JWing
07-05-2017, 03:55 PM
Day 261 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/07/mosul-campaign-day-261-jul-4-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
07-06-2017, 03:34 PM
Day 262 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/07/mosul-campaign-day-262-jul-5-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

JWing
07-07-2017, 03:25 PM
Day 263 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/07/mosul-campaign-day-263-jul-6-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

JWing
07-08-2017, 05:01 PM
Day 264 of Mosul campaign.

JWing
07-08-2017, 08:34 PM
Just finished security wrap up for June 2017 in Iraq. Violence is at lowest level seen in years across the country except for Ninewa due to Mosul battle. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/07/3230-dead-1128-wounded-in-iraq-june-2017.html).

SWJ Blog
07-09-2017, 10:13 AM
A Fraction Of Mosul, Syria's Raqqa No Less Challenging (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/a-fraction-of-mosul-syrias-raqqa-no-less-challenging)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/a-fraction-of-mosul-syrias-raqqa-no-less-challenging) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

JWing
07-09-2017, 04:09 PM
Day 265 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/07/mosul-campaign-day-265-jul-8-2017.html) of Mosul campaign.

davidbfpo
07-10-2017, 10:48 AM
From the footage on TV here most of Mosul looks wrecked, hardly a city ready for normal life and just who will rebuild it?

Via Twitter yesterday, from Ali Soufan, this report was recommended, although Robin Wright is to me an unknown quantity and she ends with:
In other words, a military rout of ISIS may only pave the way for the comeback of a more powerful Al Qaeda.
Link:http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/mosul-falls-what-is-next-for-isis

Other comments I have read have referred to the 40% loses to Iraqi national forces, presumably Army, Police and SOF. There has been little reporting on the PMU's activities for months.

One newsreel clip showed civilians leaving the last strongholds and for a short moment a soldier with a French flag on his uniform holding a small child. Other clips have shown what appear to be Iraqi soldiers with G3 rifles and the French Army's standard rifle (name lost).

JWing
07-10-2017, 03:32 PM
The 40% losses was for the Counter-Terrorism Forces/Golden Division.

JWing
07-10-2017, 03:36 PM
Day 266 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/07/mosul-campaign-day-266-jul-9-2017.html) of Mosul Campaign.

SWJ Blog
07-10-2017, 09:16 PM
Battle to Retake Raqqa a Desperate House-to-House Fight (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/battle-to-retake-raqqa-a-desperate-house-to-house-fight)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/battle-to-retake-raqqa-a-desperate-house-to-house-fight) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

JWing
07-10-2017, 09:35 PM
I just interviewed Ret. Col. David Witty about how the Mosul campaign went. Here's a link (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/07/reviewing-battle-of-mosul-interview.html).

JWing
07-11-2017, 03:42 PM
Mosul Campaign Day 267 (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2017/07/mosul-campaign-day-267-jul-10-2017.html).