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horatius
04-01-2007, 08:25 PM
We talk about I/O, PsyOps, cultural awareness, etc. but what is our message? In Iraq and Afghanistan, there is no specific guidance as to why we are in Iraq. What EXACTLY are our squad leaders supposed to tell locals?
1. We are here to liberate you - what does the USG define as liberty? A situation in which everything is legal except for those actions that impinge upon another's life, liberty or property is the basis for English Common Law vis a vis the philosophy of John Stuart Mill but it assumes an individual based society. Iraq and Afghanistan are family based societies. How do we bridge this gap?

2. We want rights!! Rights are limitations the nation places upon the state - not priviledges the states gives to the people. Iraqis want more priviledges. Until they internalize that it is the nation that is soverign, not the state, they can not have any rights.

3. Equality. What kind? There is equality of outcome which is the basis of communism - small c. Equality of opportunity works in America and is a very protestant idea but is it acceptable to Muslims or Arabs?

4. Capitalism. This incredible system is based on the self serving individual. As long as the aforementioned actor wants to maximize his utility, he will move himself to a position in which he has a sustainable, comparative advantage and be able to amass as much wealth as possible. Collectively, the actions of self serving people benefit all as long as wealth maximization is the collective goal. Again, how can this work in a family based society?

5. Democracy. The buzz word. The magic cause. Government is the organization in society with a monopoly on force. Representative democracy is but a means for the nation to select those who decide on how force in wielded in a society. A person's sole act of power in a democracy is in voting. The only difference between a democracy and a monarchy is a vote. After that, one is still subject to the will of the government. Why is that so good? Why would this work in other places?

6. The problem is Arabs and Pashtuns do not know how they can be Arabs, Muslims and embrace all of the above. WHAT IS OUR GUIDANCE ON HOW TO ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS?????

Until higher puts out a pub that explains where in the Koran we on the ground can look to bridge these questions, it is not possible to do IO, PsyOps or control the population - the goal of COIN. Therefore, until we actually have an idea, something to sell, we are incapable of winning.

Remember, if you are out looking for bad guys, you are losing. The goal is to control the population and the population needs a message. They need an idealology and Al Qadea has one and is pushing it hard.

Last point - the way in which we answer these questions changes neighborhood by neighborhood because each Imam and Sheik see the world a little bit differently. Until we have an intelligence picture that frames our message, we are not going to be able to tailor or actions effectively.

RTK
04-01-2007, 10:10 PM
The bottom line is that we're there to provide safety and security to 26 million people who deserve it as much as anyone on earth. Each day we spend working on the sewage, water, schools, electrical infrastructures, trash removal, medical coverage, and overall security is a day closer to a free and independent Iraq.

Culpeper
04-01-2007, 10:35 PM
Remember, if you are out looking for bad guys, you are losing. The goal is to control the population and the population needs a message. They need an idealology and Al Qadea has one and is pushing it hard.


That is incorrect.


"The problem is to start organizing the participation of the population in the struggle. The way to do this is by placing local leaders in positions of responsibility and power."

One cannot accomplish this without looking for Al Queda in Iraq as well as delivering a "message" to the population. Seeking out and destroying Al Queda in Iraq does not equal losing. Neither does the fact that Al Queda in Iraq has an ideology. Al Queda has always had a message but they have never been winning. And they are beyond the point of just not losing simply because Iraq has a governing body that controls the propaganda. Intercepted messages from al-Zarqawi himself clearly show that he was seriously considering taking Al Queda's struggle somewhere else other than Iraq. Why? Because "they" were losing.


"The counterinsurgent cannot achieve much if the population is not, and does not feel, protected against the insurgent."

Seeking out and destroying the insurgent is a prime ingredient of the counterinsurgent's recipe. Also, hasn't it occurred to you that Al Queda in Iraq is unable to work on projects in basic fields such as, "economic, social, cultural, and medical fields, where the results are not entirely dependent on the active cooperation from the population"? So, I don't see where Al Queda in Iraq's "message" is providing them with any comfort in their own struggle against the counterinsurgency. By-the-way, what is Al Queda's message in Iraq?

horatius
04-02-2007, 12:02 AM
RTK - what does a free and independent Iraq mean? Why do they deserve anything? What does freedom mean? We use these words without a clear definition and thus we do not have a message.

Culpeper - Trinquier, Gulula, and Krepenivich all disagree with you. The direct approach to destroying the insurgent does not work.

Seeking out and destroying the insurgent is not a prime ingredient in the counter insurgent's methods. This did not work in Vietnam, Algeria or any where else.
The mission is to secure the population. After they feel safe, the fish will have been separated from the water. It is when the bad guys seek us out because we are separating from the population that we can measure our success. Ambush patrols and the like in hopes of "generating and maintaing contact" is absurd and does not work.

How do you know AMZ's traffic was not a deception? How do you know it was in response to us and not local Iraqis pressuring him to move to another place? We are not winning in Iraq. Attacks are through the roof.

horatius
04-02-2007, 12:08 AM
Culpeper -
You never mentioned how we answer the Iraqi's dilemma of how to balance his ethnic and religious dogma with our ideology.

Culpeper
04-02-2007, 12:34 AM
Culpeper -
You never mentioned how we answer the Iraqi's dilemma of how to balance his ethnic and religious dogma with our ideology.
I didn't answer the question because it is moot to the point you want to make. Our ideology does not have to balance with the Iraqi population. Don't we want the Iraqis to choose their own destiny? Isn't that ideology universal and not limited to the United States of America?

Culpeper
04-02-2007, 12:35 AM
Culpeper - Trinquier, Gulula, and Krepenivich all disagree with you. The direct approach to destroying the insurgent does not work.





I was quoting Galula.

Maximus
04-02-2007, 12:42 AM
Great discussion. I'm with Horatius on this one. No one ever explained to me what I was trying to get the Iraqis to buy into. I tried to sell RTK's "free and independent Iraq", but exactly what does this mean? I'd argue it means very different things depending on where you're operating in the country. In Shia areas, "free and independent Iraq" was generally accepted; not the same when I was in Sunni areas. What about up north with the Kurds, who are perfectly content with "free and independent" Kurdistan? What's our message to the Sunni Arabs? Of late I think it has something to do with a message of inclusion: splitting oil revenues, allowing most former Ba'athist back into the government, etc. But for the past 3-4 years, most Sunnis felt that our "cause", if there was one, didn't benefit them in the least bit. Thus we helped create/spread the Sunni insurgency.

WRT Al Qaeda in Iraq having a message and the people buying it... I'd say this was definitely the case in Anbar for a long time. Most either bought Al Qaeda's message or were intimidated enough to let the fish hide amongst them UNTIL 2 things happened: 1) Al Qaeda in Iraq misjudged the family/tribal system and killed the wrong people; 2) we stopped playing "whack a mole" and instead began moving in with the people (starting w/ Al Qaim and now just about everywhere in Anbar) with a primary focus of controlling/securing the populace in a way that would make Galula, Trinquier, Krepinevich, Komer, Colby and others proud.

Big picture for me on the subject though--I know your average squad leader or platoon commander patrolling the streets still doesn't know exactly what we're trying to "sell" as our cause or narrative, be it in Iraq, America or globally. Thus we're violating Kilcullen's article #21: Exploit a single narrative. This isn't a good thing when our junior Marines/Soldiers are the ones with the most face time with Iraqis.

jcustis
04-02-2007, 01:30 AM
Big picture for me on the subject though--I know your average squad leader or platoon commander patrolling the streets still doesn't know exactly what we're trying to "sell" as our cause or narrative, be it in Iraq, America or globally. Thus we're violating Kilcullen's article #21: Exploit a single narrative. This isn't a good thing when our junior Marines/Soldiers are the ones with the most face time with Iraqis.

Exactly one of my frustrations too, even though I'm a couple of years removed from my second rotation over there. I think that when you look at all the servicemember generated media out there (blogs, message board posts, etc.) you are still going to find a lot of folks who were at the tip of the spear yet still don't have a basic level of respect for the average Iraqi on the street. It is getting a bit more balanced, but when you stop and take a serious look at a few trends, it's ridiculous in some ways.

Take for example the so-called "morale patches" that can be found and discussed at certain tactical forums. One of the recent ones is Arabic lettering stitched in a variety of colors to represent the phrase/word "Infidel". There are contractors and servicemembers who think it's chic to wear the patch in full view, and I saw a post from one Soldier who stated that he only moved the patch when some LNs became agitated. It is beyond me that it even came to that, so yes, we are failing at the single narrative and certainly failing to educate the troops that we are doing something not just because the general/special orders say so, but because it is elemental to success in the fight.

I also think that there is a certain divide that arisen between the various ranks (although I can't point to the exact level of the schism) and echelons of troops. REMF and Fobbits are despised now in much the same way they were in Vietnam, and higher headquarters are equally villified when they generate new fragos. I think it began with the lack of armor for vehicles and Rumsfeld's "Go to war with what you have," comment.

I concur totally that the bottom line may be security and stability, but to many at the tip it might hold the same degree of clarity that 4GW holds for me (absolutely none). Let's add a twist to the line of thought...how much does it matter?

Does a single narrative ensure that the troops take their eyepro off when talking to an Iraqi, and that they hand out sweets rather than throw it to the ground for children to pounce on? Regardless of the single narrative that might try to exploit, is the average Iraqi buying what we are selling?

Culpeper
04-02-2007, 01:34 AM
Big picture for me on the subject though--I know your average squad leader or platoon commander patrolling the streets still doesn't know exactly what we're trying to "sell" as our cause or narrative, be it in Iraq, America or globally. Thus we're violating Kilcullen's article #21: Exploit a single narrative. This isn't a good thing when our junior Marines/Soldiers are the ones with the most face time with Iraqis.

Please don't tell me you are assuming that the most important elements of military leadership that you pointed your finger at above are inept of situation awareness both strategic and tactical? Oh, no. You didn't write that by mistake. A vast chunk of the Small Wars Council are currently holding these positions or have held them in the past.

Also, we have always shown bravado. The balance is a two way street. They saw off heads. We paint crap on walls. Why shouldn't the average Iraqi understand this as well. Or are they too inept or sensitive to understand?

Maximus
04-02-2007, 01:59 AM
Culpeper,

Not sure what you're trying to say.

My simple point is this: My Marines and I conducted some 500 patrols in Iraq. No one ever explained to me exactly what message we were trying to transmit. In fact, my mission statements were normally something to the effect of: "you have to conduct 4 patrols tomorrow." Rarely was I given specifics on where, why, who I was trying to influence, what I was supposed to say ("beyond don't promise anything"), etc. The best I got was normally just to show a "presence."

Reflecting on my experiences now, I think every time I went on patrol, I should have been trying to sell a "cause" whether this being strictly that of the coalition or that combined with the Iraqi government, depending on the timeframe. Unfortunately, all too often patrols consisted of me asking Iraqis what they needed, their response being clean water, electricity, and security, my writing it in a book, continuing on the patrol, and "higher" telling me to tell the Iraqis to be patient.

I talk to Capts, Lts, Sgts, etc. frequently that are about to leave on deployment or just returning. It's rare that they can explain tribal breakdown, who their enemy really is, and any decent history of their specific AO. This isn't their fault. The info often isn't provided. As a result, most Marines/Soldiers conducting patrols don't know the "cause" they should be promoting nor do they know enough about the history of their AO so that they can say things that the people might rally behind. Simply saying I bring you freedom and democracy just doesn't cut it.

You seem like you might have a good handle on the subject. If you were patrolling the streets in the Shia south in 2 hours and stopped to talk to an Iraqi, what "cause" would you try to promote? If in Sadr City, how would you try and explain that your patrol offers more security than the Mahdi Army? What about if you were in Anbar or in Tikrit? What if you were in Irbil? When you're interacting with the Iraqis how would you make the patrol more than simply a "presence" patrol? What "cause" would you push so that they eventually would tell you who the insurgents or terrorists are?

Ender
04-02-2007, 02:43 AM
I think that when you look at all the servicemember generated media out there (blogs, message board posts, etc.) you are still going to find a lot of folks who were at the tip of the spear yet still don't have a basic level of respect for the average Iraqi on the street.

I was frustrated with this very same subject when I was a Lance Corporal during my first deployment... I felt then and still feel now there are three basic types of Iraqis, the ones who would love us no matter what, those who would hate us no matter what and all of the rest, the majority, who were undecided. We have moved some of the middle to our camp and that is great but we have also pushed a great number away because we can't get our most fundamental messages out.

Every day the lower enlisted ranks are being asked some very hard questions about intentions and policy, by the Iraqis themselves, and it is assured that if we don't have a unified message at the top, the bottom will not all be singing the same tune. That can't be good for anyone when you are getting Message A in Baghdad but your brother-in-law is getting Plan B in Ramadi. In essence this is exactly what is happening.

Culpeper
04-02-2007, 03:12 AM
There is this "Maximus Biguss Dickus" that I confused you with. I thought he just shortened his screen name and was carrying on as usual. I didn't bother to see you were new to SWC and in fact a part of the leadership you described. Welcome aboard.


You seem like you might have a good handle on the subject. If you were patrolling the streets in the Shia south in 2 hours and stopped to talk to an Iraqi, what "cause" would you try to promote? If in Sadr City, how would you try and explain that your patrol offers more security than the Mahdi Army? What about if you were in Anbar or in Tikrit? What if you were in Irbil? When you're interacting with the Iraqis how would you make the patrol more than simply a "presence" patrol? What "cause" would you push so that they eventually would tell you who the insurgents or terrorists are?

By improvising and barring any outright insubordination of orders:

#1. Security

#2 By example. It won't happen in one patrol.

#3 Same thing in Anbar, Tikrit, or Irbil.

#4 This would go, as you described beyond a presence patrol, and would have to employ improvised classic Combined Action Company techniques, which I won't go into detail since you are a Marine and already know this subject.

Maximus
04-02-2007, 03:19 AM
You hit the nail on the head, Ender. I couldn't agree more on your breakdown of the Iraqi people, regardless of AO. The same probably holds true in any COIN fight.

This whole discussion brings to mind a video from the NY Times that I watched a few months back: http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/world/20061102_MEDIC_FEATURE/blocker.html (click on the "politics" icon 3rd from right). We talk about "strategic" Cpls, Sgts, Lts, etc., yet too often fail to provide these warriors with the training and information they need to truly be "strategic" Marines. In the video, the Sgt doesn't talk at all about a unifying message or "cause" to the Iraqi man. In fact, just the opposite: the Iraqi asks the Sgt about how he feels on most likely being sent home after the mid-term elections.

What message is this sending to the Iraqi people? Back to the initial question in this thread: what's our message?

Maximus
04-02-2007, 03:41 AM
Culpeper,

No problem at all.

Concur on your basic theme during patrols. And also agree that a lot of this ultimately should involve some variation of combined action companies/platoons. I think we're moving rapidly in this direction now, although I know of a few units that are still operating without Iraqis.

The bigger issue for me though comes back to the Sgt in the NY Times video and for my Marines on our patrols. Aside from saying we're here to provide security (which I agree is essential), what else are we saying? What are our jabs and knock-out punches in the war of ideas that our junior Marines, by this I mean everyone at the company level and below, should try and exploit? In Vietnam, the pacification program eventually had an IO campaign that consisted of security, and also land, rice, local leadership, local elections, etc. Seems like our IO campaign in Iraq only goes as far as security.

I posted something on the Gazette forum (http://www.mca-marines.org/forum/showthread.php?t=34) that addresses this subject. From my perspective it seems like we're handing the IO component of the war to the enemy without putting up much of a fight. I know we can do better.

Culpeper
04-02-2007, 04:23 AM
I just don't understand how something so basic and well documented is left so much out of implementation when we find ourselves in this type of counterinsurgency warfare. The topic is so basic for SWC that it staggers my mind that it is taking so long for those in involved in high places to start implementing counterinsurgency tactics in planning. It has taken far too long to start working on the right path. "Catastrophic Success" was an understatement by Gen. Franks. Nevertheless, the types of infrastructure improvements we both cited can only be achieved by the counterinsurgency in Iraq without the total support of the population. In other words, the insurgent cannot provide it. Elements like Al Queda cannot provide this without total support from the population. And they are not getting this type of support. We should consider ourselves lucky. That some sort of invisible hand has gave us extra time to get organized. If there is a major failure of no common message for the Iraqi people than it should be left up to the junior leadership to decide what that message should be. This would require the higher brass and civilian leadership to shut up and listen.

It would be nice to keep this important topic centered on Iraq on a micro level rather than a macro level of the entire region for the gains on the macro level are at the expense of the Iraqi people themselves and should be part of a different topic; i.e. what happened to Iraq is worrying the leadership of Syria and Iran on a more personal level.

Bill Moore
04-02-2007, 05:15 AM
Until higher puts out a pub that explains where in the Koran we on the ground can look to bridge these questions, it is not possible to do IO, PsyOps or control the population - the goal of COIN. Therefore, until we actually have an idea, something to sell, we are incapable of winning.

I think you are correct, and many of our citizens and soldiers still think everyone wants to be like us. Some of our folks just can't believe that some folks in the world find our system and our values replusive (not just Al Qaeda). If a democracy in Iraq is not achievable (and I'm not aware of democracy ever being forced on anyone before successfully, except perhaps Japan), then what is it we want to achieve? What are our national interests in Iraq? We have strategic oil interests, we want to deny safe haven to terrorists, we desire to avoid a humanitarian disaster, we want regional stability (suppports the previous three objectives), etc.

During the cold war we took a much more Machivillian approach to achieving our strategic objectives, even if that included putting our bastard in office (our supporting the one already there, like Marcos in the Philippines). In contrast, in Iraq we pursued our interests by attempting to implement a political revolution (not evolution). Outsiders can best generate revolutions by spreading ideas, not trying to impose them with the bayonet. While there are elements in Iraqi society that obviously buy into this dream, we are now at the point where we have done what we can, and now a local leader (a Ghandi like figure capable of mobilizing all Iraqis under an Iraqi identity) must surface, and carry the idea to completion.

Al Qaeda, like us, also wants to impose revolutionary change on Iraq, but their advantage is their political revolution is not totally alien to the Arab culture. Furthermore, when you are living in a terrible state of chaos, then any feasible option that gets you out of it will start looking appealing. Terrorism works for this very reason when it is executed within a band of excellence, but there is a limit, and if it is used in excess it backfires, and that is what we're seeing in parts of Iraq, especially in Al Anbar province now. The Sunni's in Anbar were Al Qaeda's closest allies in Iraq, but they are now turning against them because the AQ uses terrorism in excess and as predicted by AQ's original leadership, AQ would loose if this revolution practiced the excesses of the past. In the end we won't defeat AQ, they'll defeat themeselves.

So we have two competing revolutionary ideas being imposed on the Iraqi people by two different outsiders, and neither are exceptionally attractive or successful at this point. This is the ideal point for an Iraqi leader to stand up with an Iraqi solution and offer the Iraqi people a way out.

I don't think AQ will win if we pull out or stay. I actually think AQ could be defeated quicker if we pull out, because certain rules of warfare will be disregarded. However I think the potential blood bath from civil war like conflict if we pull out will be more than we want to risk. In the end we are still a decent people and ultimately we still want the best for the Iraqi people. Of course that is what makes this war so damn frustrating.

RTK
04-02-2007, 05:24 AM
RTK - what does a free and independent Iraq mean? Why do they deserve anything? What does freedom mean? We use these words without a clear definition and thus we do not have a message.



"What applies in one province isn't necessarily the case in another."

Security is security, regardless of what context or where you're talking about. In many cases, establishing some sort of law and order is all that's missing from the 'free and independent' realm.

Why do they deserve it? Because in a lot of different ways we robbed them of it 4 years ago. It's unethical to leave them the steaming s**t sandwich to take a huge bite from now.

Freedom - In layman's terms, it to have the ability to do what you want to do without the risk of getting beheaded because you're of a specific ethnic set.

goesh
04-02-2007, 02:06 PM
"What applies in one province isn't necessarily the case in another."

Security is security, regardless of what context or where you're talking about. In many cases, establishing some sort of law and order is all that's missing from the 'free and independent' realm.

Why do they deserve it? Because in a lot of different ways we robbed them of it 4 years ago. It's unethical to leave them the steaming s**t sandwich to take a huge bite from now.

Freedom - In layman's terms, it to have the ability to do what you want to do without the risk of getting beheaded because you're of a specific ethnic set.


It makes sense to me to tell the Iraqi people just that - 'we are here to try prevent you from getting blown up because you are a Shi'ite or Sunni or because you neighbor is. The Quarn says innocent people are not supposed to be murdered' . I suppose it would help if that could be said in Arabic but then it's easy for me to sit here safe and sound, fat and sassy and offer advice.

marct
04-02-2007, 05:37 PM
Every day the lower enlisted ranks are being asked some very hard questions about intentions and policy, by the Iraqis themselves, and it is assured that if we don't have a unified message at the top, the bottom will not all be singing the same tune. That can't be good for anyone when you are getting Message A in Baghdad but your brother-in-law is getting Plan B in Ramadi. In essence this is exactly what is happening.

And the situation is exacerbated by the global media as well, so it's not only what is said in Baghdad and Ramadi, but also New York, Washington and London. I do have to agree with Horatius' original point that there isn't a coherent message; at least one that isn't 99% rhetoric :wry:. I think we saw a slightly different situation in Afghanistan, although the behind the scenes maneuverings to stop the restoration of the monarchy in the 2003 Loya Jurga made that questionable. The "message" needs to be spelled out in a series of "We are here to do X" and "We will know that X is done when Y happens".

On a related note, is anyone collating the questions that are asked about intentions and policies? There was a tactic worked out in the late 1970's for elections where these questions would be funneled to a local office and, if they matched prepared policy statements, copies of those statements would be hand delivered the next day. If there wasn't such a statement, the person who received the question would still go back the next day and say something like "We take your question seriously and it has been sent off to our policy committee to try and get an answer for you". Even when there was no policy and no one wanted to make one, within the week the person would be contacted again and told that no such policy can be developed until X, Y or Z happens. It strikes me that his type of tactic would work equally well in raq.

Marc

Jedburgh
04-02-2007, 07:45 PM
...My simple point is this: My Marines and I conducted some 500 patrols in Iraq. No one ever explained to me exactly what message we were trying to transmit. In fact, my mission statements were normally something to the effect of: "you have to conduct 4 patrols tomorrow." Rarely was I given specifics on where, why, who I was trying to influence, what I was supposed to say ("beyond don't promise anything"), etc. The best I got was normally just to show a "presence."...
Presence Patrols aren’t so much delivering a serious ideological “message”, as they are primarily intended as a low-level tactical show of force with our physical presence a psychological reinforcement of existing security. Of course, if the security situation is in the crapper, and the members of the patrol are in full turtle gear and continually on armed alert while palavering with the locals, the only message being reinforced is the total lack of security.

On the other hand, the patrol should not be in the business of "selling" anything - or pushing any sort of ideological "message". Actions speak louder than words.

Anyway, getting to my point sideways, a critical and truly valuable aspect of such patrols is collection - both passive and active. If the patrols are not being pre-briefed and debriefed every time they go out, something ain’t right. Max's summary of his mission brief indicates piss-poor leadership (Not on your part Maximus, on the part of those giving you your orders).

In an ideal world, such collection would be linked to the full spectrum of military-interagency cooperation, which, if effectively implemented, would do far more good than trying to have a bunch of Joes spread an ideological “message”.

Leveraging collection to roll up and kill bad guys is something everyone understands - or at least is cognizant of the possibility. Using patrol reporting to target infrastructure projects, humanitarian aid, veterinary assistance, ol’fashioned MEDCAPs, etc. - even relatively minor (but more personal) assistance like returning with needed repair parts, school supplies, or bringing along a specifically requested tech/specialist the next time provides clear evidence that the troops were listening when the indig were talking – if the follow-up is timely. Listening – and responding – when they need something is the best way to set it up so that you will be able to listen to info needed to roll up and kill bad guys. But in order to listen to needs, you gotta get there. We're the big guys, we control the conversation - ignore the political and ideological (unless you have an IR that points that way) and go direct to their problems.

In sum, Joe shouldn’t be worrying about what “message” to send. He should have a crystal clear mission each time he goes out, covering both aspects: Be fully briefed on what he’s supposed to be looking for and reporting back on, as per indicators pointing to bad guys. And be fully briefed on what non-kinetic capabilities can be brought to bear so he understands what to look for to help put a boot in USAID, NGOs and the other sunshine-and-butterflies folks to render needed assistance. As regards “relatively minor” assistance, our guys have shown themselves on innumerable occasions to be empathetic to the plight of ordinary Iraqis and have lent of their own belongings and resources to help them out. This needs to be more formalized, so it can be properly exploited.

The hard part, as always, is not with Joe – but with the leadership and getting all the players to cooperate, and to do so in a seamless and timely fashion. But when it works, it works. Really.

RTK
04-02-2007, 10:51 PM
A quick aside on presence patrols: If you assign a task and purpose, they're more than just "providing presence." They're gaining intelligence, providing reconnaissance, or adding to security operations. Presence patrol, as I've said before, translates in my mind to "trolling for RPG."


Let's look at this on the larger scale and widdle it down.

If you look in terms of Lines of Operations (LOOs), which should all inter-relate;

and ...

If you take the big 5 LOOs...
a. Combat Operations
b. Information Operations
c. Civil-military Operations
d. ISF Operations
e. Economic Development

A smart unit is going to have a plan of action for each of the LOOs and how they are going to improve in their specific AO. Now understanding what I do tactically in the "Combat Operations" LOO is going to have some potential blowback in the "Civil-Military" realm, potentially all the way up to the operational and possible even the strategic level, then it so follows that if I don't go into the fight taking all 5 of the LOOs into consideration and factor in the second and third order effects of each then I'm probably in for a rather unproductive year. Let's take a quick look at a skeleton hypothetical endstate for each for a BN's year tour (long range goals from the day after RIP/TOA):

a. Combat Operations: Cut IEDs in half on specific lines of communication in my AO; Cut mortar attacks by 1/3; Capture or kill 10 high value targets (HVTs) on my unit's "black list;" Incorporate IA/IP into all operations, making all operations combined coalition force patrols.

Summary: I have to make my goals attainable and quantifiable. Quantitative and tangible goals are easier to assess, so it's easier to mark progress.

b. Information Operations: Issue 2 good products (leaflets, posters) a month denouncing attacks on civilians; reinforcement of civil-military projects through education of what improvements are made; televised city council meetings once a month; televised sheik/tribal leader meetings once a quarter; An "Iraq's Most Wanted" type show, much like 1/25IN maintained in Mosul; Unit talking points each month talking about where the AO has been and where it's going; IA/IP recruiting posters; Traffic Control Point (TCP) awareness handouts (what do I do if I come upon a CF checkpoint, what is expected of me, etc); Tiplines

Summary: The big one here, obviously, is the bold point. I know for a fact that they're out there. I remember each month getting the Regimental talking points in a FRAGO. They were based upon whatever MNF-I Effects was putting out that month. It's like Ragu; It's in there. Sometimes we need to put our nuggets together and put it into something usable at our level.

c. Civil-Military Operations: School improvements in 80% of AO's gradeschools (chalkboards, new books, writing utencils, etc); 18 hours electricity a day; Trash removal services twice a week; Unemployment cut by 25%; No breaks in potable water service (whether bottled or piped); medical supply enhancement at rural clinics; new x-ray machine for local hospital; road/bridge improvements

Summary: Some fairly ambitious endstates here. Improving quality of life is the overarching goal. In some cases, restoring things to "the way things used to be" is success and will be seen as success by the locals. Improving anything in the SWEAT-MS realms will go a long way. It's like we talked about with Dr. Kilcullen's 28 Articles - proliferation of small projects is beautiful, quantifiable, and cheap. But it's still improvement nontheless.

d. ISF Operations: Turn over no less than 50% of the AO to ISF at the end of the year; fully equip and man the IA BDE my unit partners with; fully man and equip the IPs in the towns I work; All IPs are graduates of IP Academy; IP vehicles have ballistic glass; All American patrols are combined with IA/IP, though IA/IPs will patrol independently with an American QRF; Integreate MiTT and IA leadership into MDMP; Conduct combined targeting and effects meetings with IA leadership

Summary: The goal here has to be getting the IA/IPs into the independent operating mode - otherwise, what's the point? If when you enter your AO your unit conducts 25% of your patrols with IA, by the end of the year, you should be operating without the IA or IPs 0%. Certain covert exceptions are made - chances are you're not in that kind of a unit. Equipping is a huge part of this LOO. How can they fight if they have nothing to fight with or protect themselves with? It's your job to figure out how to breakdown the bureaucracy and get them what they need.

e. Economic Development: Reopening of town's glass plant which employed 30% of the town before the war; Cut unemployment by 25% through project employment (trash removal, construction, etc); force protection measures around market areas;

Summary: A good area to put the resident economist in a staff position looking for a way to contribute. For all intents and purposes, we need to find a way to pour money back into the community to jumpstart economic development. Buy some chi, have a goat for dinner, haggle for a new rug.


What does all this mean? Success must be exploited and the successful story should be told. Telling the story of success must be an intricate part of your IO campaign. Let the people see the good being done and then leave it up to them to decide which direction they're going to support. The Overarching aspect of all of this is your ability to provide security to the people. The quicker you are at determining the enemy course of action, the better you will be in keeping him from even getting to the start point (again, it goes back to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, which works fundamentally in COIN like it does in the tank on tank battle - it's just a different accplication).

marct
04-03-2007, 12:03 AM
Hi Ryan,


What does all this mean? Success must be exploited and the successful story should be told. Telling the story of success must be an intricate part of your IO campaign. Let the people see the good being done and then leave it up to them to decide which direction they're going to support. The Overarching aspect of all of this is your ability to provide security to the people. The quicker you are at determining the enemy course of action, the better you will be in keeping him from even getting to the start point (again, it goes back to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, which works fundamentally in COIN like it does in the tank on tank battle - it's just a different accplication).

Really good examples! The only thing that I would comment on is that the AO is also the international perception of the geographic AO. By way of example, this could be accomplished by having an AO website or youtube channel, along with dedicated accounts for accepting donations to help in the reconstruction. Such a site could be set up by a central group sing open source software and the updating could be done easily.

Marc

Jedburgh
04-03-2007, 02:35 AM
A quick aside on presence patrols: If you assign a task and purpose, they're more than just "providing presence." They're gaining intelligence, providing reconnaissance, or adding to security operations. Presence patrol, as I've said before, translates in my mind to "trolling for RPG."...
Excellent post, RTK - only I'd replace "or" with "and". Intel collection, recon and adding to security are inextricably linked on any patrol in this environment. The critical factor in determining patrol effectiveness is always the leadership. On that point, your last sentence seems to aptly describe how Max states he was sent out on his patrols.

...if I don't go into the fight taking all 5 of the LOOs into consideration and factor in the second and third order effects of each then I'm probably in for a rather unproductive year...
Extremely important observation. Now put that at the patrol level and leverage it every time they go out.

...I have to make my goals attainable and quantifiable. Quantitative and tangible goals are easier to assess, so it's easier to mark progress....
Understandable, and good to a degree (works for the OERs, eh) - but in its clarity it is also dangerously restrictive. I've always hated stats.

Cut IEDs in half on specific lines of communication in my AO - If the number of IED attacks are halved, but the remainder are better targeted and more destructive, is the OER still good? To me the realistic goal is to disrupt or destroy the network; kill or capture the bad guys. Roll up the cells that plan, build and emplace the damn things. The same goes for mortar attacks. But that's not so easy to say in a brief quantitative bullet statement that can be referred to when it comes time to put pen to paper at end-of-tour.

Capture or kill 10 high value targets (HVTs) on my unit's "black list" - Bodycount BS. Hell, when we get really lucky, the prime SOB we roll up isn't on anybody's damn list. Does that mean he doesn't count when it comes OER time? Or, more often, it is not a single "HVT" that really makes a difference, its one or two lower-level cell members that are effectively exploited and lead us to rolling up a local network. That often has a far greater operational impact than picking up someone who is listed as an HVT.

My feelings about stats in IO are only slightly less strong than for leaning on them in combat ops. However, civil-military, ISF and economic arenas are a bit different - I think that stats are better tools in those areas, although you still have to be careful with them.

RTK - I really think you're squared away in your thinking. This is just my personal vent against the larger Army's overheavy focus on stats. Y'know - my quantitative vs qualitative pet peeve.

Bill Moore
04-03-2007, 03:22 AM
...I have to make my goals attainable and quantifiable. Quantitative and tangible goals are easier to assess, so it's easier to mark progress....

I agree with Jed on this one, we don't need to make anything quantifiable, and this is where our measures of effectiveness approach is failing us. I remember a former Stryker commander who was wounded (I think the during the first Styker rotation) and he had a popular DVD where he was ranting about presence patrols, he didn't understand the task/purpose, so why were they doing them? It was a perfect indicator of where the conventional army mindset was at that time.

Providing a "perception" of security and peace of mind is not quantifiable, but absolutely essential in winning over the population. Presence patrols do that and much more. They should follow basic rules, such as not following any patterns of route and timings, be task organized differently occassionally, and patrol members should conduct frequent interactions with the population to get a sense for what is happening on the street. It is hard to provide presence when you're sitting in a tank, though it does make a statement.

You can quantify combat patrols with meaningless numbers such as number of patrols, number of EKIAs, etc. and make that look like progress on a briefing slide, but we all know that doesn't mean squat. Some leaders need to be retrained to trust their inutition and not stats on a power point slide. You can sense effectiveness once you know your operational area, but you can't always (if ever) quantify it.

Maximus
04-03-2007, 03:27 AM
As always, great discussion. Lots of great information/ideas in these posts. Couldn’t agree more with Marc’s point about collating this info and having units apply concepts in training and in-country.

A few comments on a few of the posts… RTK thanks for comments on the Big 5. Will use much of what you said when instructing. A few questions though based on each LOO:

Combat Ops: Nothing specific on disrupting enemy IO campaign. I’m assuming this is implied, but might help to spell out for your patrols. For example, task patrols to find info on all potential media/internet capable shops, houses, mosques in AO. Purpose: to eliminate the En’s ability to influence the masses through broadcasting his tactical successes or overall message via leaflets, radio, news, or over the internet. Accomplishing this task could prove more useful than capturing/killing 10 suspected HVTs (concur with Jedburgh here). Plus, it might help figure out insurgent network from town-to-town or even from “your” town into Syria, Sudan, Morocco, Iran, Saudi Arabia, etc.

Info Ops: Again great points. I might add explaining in a way that can be understood at the local level how the national government and/or politics benefit the average Iraqi. This ties into the importance of us understanding our enemy’s “cause” so that we can devise a legitimate counter “cause” locally and nationally (and globally?).

One more point on this… I think it’s just as important for us to broadcast our message locally as it is to transmit our actions back to the American people. Unfortunately, 4-5 years into this fight, I still have a very difficult time finding our “good” deeds on the internet. It’s rare to find a squad, platoon or company posting its efforts to re-build a school(s), sharing a friendly meal with an Iraqi tribe, executing a MEDCAP, etc. If all the American people can find at youtube.com, liveleak.com, etc. is X unit in a firefight, surviving an IED attack, putting an AT-4 through a door to make entry, well then how can we fault the American people for doubting that much good is being done in Iraq (I know there’s a ton of good (humanitarian/CA type stuff) being done by our Marines/Soldiers; however, I’m still frustrated with myself for not videotaping and posting on the internet).

Civil-Mil Ops: Please share ideas for cutting unemployment by 25%. This would be huge on the ground.

Related topic from Jedburgh’s comments on the patrol leader’s job should be on locating potential places for NGOs, USAID and others to act on. Concur 100%. Problem though is that I saw 1 NGO in Iraq (WFP) and as best I know, it’s not around anymore. Civilians aren’t volunteering in large numbers for this fight; after all, we’re (military folks) having to fill many of the PRT billets. I think the reality is sometimes the patrol leader needs to locate sites and distribute funds and help supervise project completion (I often did). Not optimal considering I wasn’t trained to do this.

ISF Ops: Great points again, but nothing on ensuring ISF establish relationship with the populace. This might be a moot point if operating with a police force comprised of Iraqis from the same town, but if not, I think this should be a top priority. After all, the best intel normally comes from the people. No relationship generally means limited to no legit intel. My mind comes back to The Village when thinking about this subject. Maybe a goal for your ISF unit should be to have each patrol share a cup of Chai with at least 4 familes throughout the patrol. Over the course of your tour, this would guarantee direct contact on a continual basis with every Iraqi in your AO.

Economic Development: Interested to hear everyone’s thoughts on giving Marines/Soldiers the option to live off the people. I know of a battalion in the formerly “Wild West” of Anbar that had great success with this approach. Buying food locally helped stimulate the economy, build relations, gained info/intel, cut down on coalition convoys, made Marines appreciate the AO more, etc. Does anyone have any experiences either in Iraq or elsewhere with this strategy? I know my unit was strictly forbidden from doing so.

Great collective comments on presence patrols. I think “presence” patrols can be effective if, as many of you identified, they’re given a clear task and purpose. I think a lot of this should tie right back into your IO campaign though. Any time a squad goes on patrol it’s sending a message. Leaders have to make sure it’s an effective one--Marines/Soldiers walking or driving around with nothing to “sell” or no “cause” to promote in conversations with the locals are in many ways just a moving target. IO and intel focus must be clearly understood at the “strategic corporal” level b/c this is the level where the most info will come from.

Cops in the US do “presence” patrols all the time. In fact, in Washington D.C. cops are forced to drive around with sirens on always b/c of the proven deterrent effect. That said I think cops in the US have many advantages on their side: deterrence comes from people knowing there’s a legit justice system in place; general “buy-in” from people, cops understand local culture, common language, etc.

Last point overall and one of the biggest takeaways for me on this thread… Marc, great idea on the AO website. In my ideal world, we’d have AO websites in English and Arabic showing our and the Iraqis’ “good” deeds, with a button right beside it for donations. This is an IO campaign on an international level.

Locally, nothing beats personal example and what the Iraqis see with their own eyes. On the global level though, perception is reality. I think we need to plan for both.

marct
04-03-2007, 03:50 AM
Hi Maximus,


As always, great discussion. Lots of great information/ideas in these posts. Couldn’t agree more with Marc’s point about collating this info and having units apply concepts in training and in-country.

That was definitely one purpose for creating such a net presence, but I think you actually noted the other point for it a touch later...


This ties into the importance of us understanding our enemy’s “cause” so that we can devise a legitimate counter “cause” locally and nationally (and globally?).

One more point on this… I think it’s just as important for us to broadcast our message locally as it is to transmit our actions back to the American people. Unfortunately, 4-5 years into this fight, I still have a very difficult time finding our “good” deeds on the internet.

Bingo! I suspect that this difference in ways of talking about it comes from our backgrounds. For me, the natural assumption was that "we" (MNF, etc.) build 'net based sites that push our ideological message (actually, it's more of a set of principles than an ideology - 'nother thread...) for multiple reasons. One crucial component of that is showing the world that "we" are doing "good deeds" and "they" (AQ) are just a bunch of irhabi / terrorists who will kill anyone at any time.


Locally, nothing beats personal example and what the Iraqis see with their own eyes. On the global level though, perception is reality. I think we need to plan for both.

Yup. And the same goes for globally: nothing beats what people see with their own eyes. I was really glad to come across the MNF channel on YouTube but, as I've mentioned to some people, I would really like to see local sites.

A lot of that desire (to see local sites) has to do with a natural human desire to personalize a situation. What we see on television is a sound byte world that has no ongoing continuity. What we could see at mosul.ia.iq would be somethin very different. It would make "them" real to "us". It takes advantage of the very real desire of most people to help other people, as long as it doesn't hurt too much (okay, I know I'm sounding like a liberal - so sue me :D). The effect it has, however, is to produce a cognitive dissonance between the irhabi rhetoric and the lived reality.

Marc

RTK
04-03-2007, 05:31 AM
Since my daughter woke me up screaming about monsters I'll throw a few things out here. I'll have better answers in the morning when I'm more with it and can take a look at how incoherent this post is about to be. A few things need tending to, however, before they unravel as I'm thinking of them.

First, I wrote this in about 15 minutes without a lot of thought - or at least not the amount of thought I would throw into it if I was a BN S3 laying out my commander's strategy for the year. Admittedly, I'm spending more time on this post than I did with the first. I was trying to illustrate the point that all 5 LOOs are linked and effect each other. I'm not saying that I'd use all the points, they just sounded pretty decent for the illustration.

Second, I agree with you on the stat piece. I don't do bodycounts, and I hope it didn't come across that way. I go with quantifiables if they're qualitative not for OER bullets, but because for PFC Joe Smith in A Team, 2nd squad, 3rd PLT, B Troop, it's easier for me to see success and progress by hitting marks on the wall rather than "using the force" in believing what I'm doing is right, good, and just. Cutting IEDs in half in key areas will precipitate another move on the part of the insurgent - the key point needs not be the fact that I'm seeing half the IEDs I once was, the takeaway is making sure I'm conducting the assessment and IPB properly to figure out where the other half are going and neutralizing them before they do damage. Cutting IEDs either means I've taken out cells or they're moving the IED somewhere else. I need the intel network to figure out which is the case.

Totally agree with you on the 10 HVT piece. Success is measured in cells taken down, not necessarily people. Another example of something I would have caught had I spent more time on this. I see (and I'm kicking myself for it) that I didn't talk about HUMINT sources at all. This is huge.

Thirdly, counter-IO. I guess I saw this as part of "our" IO program. Showing the populace the good that's happening - how life is better than it was 3 months ago. Taking leaflets with the pictures of children killed in a VBIED bombing and explaining that AQIZ or some other insurgent group is responsible. I think each of these fit into a counter-IO plan, maybe sometimes without even specifically addressing it. I may need help developing this one a little. Marct's idea, while so simple, is so brilliant that I have punched myself in the stomach four times since reading it for not thinking of it myself. It's almost too easy. Like maximus says, on youtube or liveleak I can see soldiers pushing over portalets, firing a TOW at a building, or surviving an IED, but I can't find them (unless I really look) interacting with kids, building a school, or anyone of the other good things we do every day. This is usually the "touchy-feely" type chainletter ppt presentation that you only get in certain circles.

Fourthly, unemployment. If I hire a bunch of guys to start picking up trash on the sides of the roads I'm taking care of a few things - I'm taking away his time to attack me and I'm putting money in his pocket. I don't have to set him up with a corner office in the town tax office, I just need to get him work. There are many industrial complexes in Iraq that haven't operated for 4 years. We need to get them back on line. The glass factory in Ramadi comes to mind. Hell, it's on a FOB (or, at least, it was at one time). Working with the sheiks and tribal leaders, figure out what it was the town was doing for a living before the war. Then find out why they're not doing it now. Bridge the gap, eliminate the delta, pour a little CERP on top, and see what happens. Chances are, it's not a huge reason, other than some have been conditioned to a mindset of entitlement or handout and are waiting for someone to kick them in the butt. Others have no place to go. Give them one. Get a youth center started.

Fifth (I think), building relationship with the populace: My thinking is this - if you're not going to interact with the populace, why go out on patrol? Isn't that kind of the whole point behind clear-hold-build? In the clear phase, which is really a shaping operation for hold and build, personal interaction in many cases will build the strategy for how the second two phases will take place. I took this for granted because it was automatic for my guys. I'll have to articulate that if the Army ever sees it fit to allow me to be an S3.

Sixth, living off the populace: Joe buys stuff. Whether it's allowed or not, Joe buys stuff off the populace. Use the discretionary money in this direction. Pay out of pocket (what's 30 cents among friends?). I bought DVDs from the bazars. I wish I'd bought more rugs (and I'm going to get smart on how to figure out handmade rug quality before I go back next time). Unfortunately, I think a lot of these transactions went away once AAFES came into theater in mass at the middle to end of OIF I. Obviously, if you were outposted in a town or the middle of nowhere without AAFES you did what you could on the economy. I think it helps. It may not seem like it, but in retrospect I'm sure it did.

I'm beginning to drone and I think my daughter has assessed the monsters as not present. I hope that helps clarify some of what was written. If I missed anything you addressed Marct, Jed, Bill, or Maximus, please let me know.

I think I actually fell asleep momentarily while writing this last night - I found a sentence that started and never ended. I've cleaned up what needed cleaning - fire away.

RTK
04-03-2007, 12:38 PM
Hi Ryan,



Really good examples! The only thing that I would comment on is that the AO is also the international perception of the geographic AO. By way of example, this could be accomplished by having an AO website or youtube channel, along with dedicated accounts for accepting donations to help in the reconstruction. Such a site could be set up by a central group sing open source software and the updating could be done easily.

Marc

I'm with you on this, except that I would argue that the international perception is part of the AI (Area of Interest). It influences my AO, but isn't necessarily within the boundaries of something I can directly affect on a day to day basis. I'd see the youtube channel as a shaping operation to influence or mitigate the AI's influence or effect upon my AO.

Maximus
04-03-2007, 01:32 PM
Ryan: I think we're all on the same page. Thanks for clarifying and spending the time to add a few more ideas. I hope the monsters go away. My daugher often has the same occur at 3AM:).

Everyone else-- thanks much. This is amongst the best threads I've seen on the site. Will start pushing this thread through the USMC as best I can. We've got to address these problems and implement ideas ASAP. Semper Fi!

goesh
04-03-2007, 01:56 PM
-perhaps half the unrest/violence could be ended with gainful employment. It is about impossible to stay focused on resentments, anger, suspicion when physically exhausted from a day's hard work. Food and sleep become the priorities. Add to that the satisfaction of having accomplished something and providing for the family. The work bond in a fair environment of decent pay for meaningul work with good supervisors is almost as strong as the bonds of family and kinship. Work projects supervised and administered by CAP units should be on equal footing with training, PR/IO and routine security/interdiction. If a Cpt/Lt and 1st Sgt. can run a unit, they sure the hell can run some Iraqi work projects too.

marct
04-03-2007, 02:34 PM
Hi Ryan,


I'm with you on this, except that I would argue that the international perception is part of the AI (Area of Interest). It influences my AO, but isn't necessarily within the boundaries of something I can directly affect on a day to day basis. I'd see the youtube channel as a shaping operation to influence or mitigate the AI's influence or effect upon my AO.

On the whole, and certainly in the sense of the entire global perception, I would agree. One of the nice pieces of research, like the wheel, that has been popping up over (and over again! in) the past 20 years or so is the concept of a "diasporic community" that is linked together by communications nodes. As the communications technologies change (i.e. changes in bandwidth, transmission speed, source / reception symmetries, etc.), we see a shift in how these diasporic communities interact on a day-to-day basis and how this changes individual member's sense of "consciousness". Very roughly, low bandwidth, low transmission speed and technologies with a broadcast bias e.g. TV, Radio, the printing press, etc.) have a tendency to make it easier to perceive a group as "them" (think "classic" WWII or Soviet propaganda). High bandwidth, high transmission speed and highly interactive technologies make it easier to perceive a group as "us" (SWC :eek:). This latter effect is exactly what is driving the international AQ recruitment strategy.

So, let's flip it around and go back to an hypothetical mosul.ia.iq site. As long as there is high bandwidth, i.e. a lot of content, high transmission speed, i.e. the content changes rapidly, and high interactivity, i.e. people around the world can "get involved", then we can use these technological effects to our advantage at both the local and global levels (the process is called "glocalization"). In effect, we are creating a "virtual community" that is focused on a geographic community.

Now, let's follow up on a couple of other facts:
There are a lot of ex-pat Iraqis who either come from or whose ancestors came from Mosul (or any other locale), and who still have family there.
Many Iraqis have a very strong sense of "family", even the ex-pats and their descendants (the "diasporic community), and this would give them a "place" to interact with, find out about, and help their relatives.Doing "good works" on the ground is, I think we all agree, a very successful strategy. But does this mean that it must be the MNF that actual does them and pays for them? I think the answer is actually "no", as long as the MNF facilitates them. So, for example, let's suppose that Mosul needs a primary school, plus all of the associated supplies. What is to stop our hypothetical mosul.ia.iq from having a VBulletin forum with a projects section including a project aimed at building such a school, including accepting donations, volunteers, etc.? Nada :D.

What would that do? Well, in addition to all the local stuff, it would let a primary school in Boise or Des Moines "adopt" the project; it would let a civil engineer in Montreal "donate" blueprints; and, more importantly, it would let the Mosul diasporic community see that they can help their relatives by doing something other than sending money to so-called "charities" like Hamas and Hizbollah. Ideally, the entire financial side would be totally transparent as well.

This is the type of symbolic warfare strategy I'm thinking about - one that takes advantage of diasporic communities and current technologies, and one that has a spin off effect of spiking the soi-dissant "liberals" guns by showing the world all the good works that are going on. Most people, I think would agree with the comment that "actions speak louder than words", but if a large part of the target audience can't "hear" that speech, then it has no effect on them.

Marc

marct
04-03-2007, 02:52 PM
Tequila just posted about an interesting site similar to part of what I was talking about here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=12823#post12823). It's a youtube based "documentary". Thanks Tequila!

Marc

Ender
04-03-2007, 10:50 PM
And the situation is exacerbated by the global media as well, so it's not only what is said in Baghdad and Ramadi, but also New York, Washington and London.

Amen, I couldn't agree more and feel that this factor unnecessarily compounds an already difficult situation. The rub is that there is very little that can be done by the squad leader in relation to New York, Washington and or London's spin campaign, but he has absolute control over the product he is delivering in Karmah, Fallujah and Baghdad.

Maximus posted two links on here that help make my point. In the NY Times link http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/world/20061102_MEDIC_FEATURE/blocker.html reporter C.J. Chivers highlights a reality in which the squad he was with had little or no understanding of the macro level, the big picture or even of their own chain of command. I contend that the Lcpls, Cpls and Sgts in his squad could never be trained to talk intelligently about geo politics or a potential shift in our foreign policy without sounding like and coming off as complete fakes and frauds. You could give them all the lines and provide all of the answers but there will always be a part of him or her that does not see it as relevant to them, so they will never be as effective as if their heart were in what they were asked to talk about while on patrol.

So what do we do when a very LARGE percentage of our lower enlisted ranks (often some of the loudest and most frequent mouthpieces) are ambivalent about WHY we are doing what we are doing? I think part of the problem can be and is currently being solved by training, (cultural awareness and current events school circles that require participation etc... ) but that the rest of the enlisted level's problems will be solved by shifting the product we are sending our teams and squads out with.

We are looking for big solutions and I think the discussion here is some of the very best thinking I have heard about the subject but there are steps that can be taken RIGHT NOW to change our message. While few Sgts know the line of succession for our presidency or can recite the Preamble they do have someone or something back home that they love or are proud of. Forget "THE MESSAGE", just get them out there talking about the things they know and love here at home. Safety, security, education, opportunity and economic stability are universal concerns that matter almost everywhere and they can be expressed more clearly and in more human terms than "policy and procedure." We could lay down some baseline rules about what not to talk about (I can not speak for the Army, but the LAST thing we need is a bunch of Marines on open mic in Iraq :) ) such as sex, drugs and rock and roll or their preference for the Israeli's, and the rest I think could be safely considered fair game. Many Marines, Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen do not even attempt to converse with the Iraqis beyond where they can find the nearest insurgent. This is due in large part to the belief that we have nothing in common with them. "They don't even use toilet paper" was what I heard from my guys at the beginning of their first deployment. (Their tune changed) Get your troops out there and just get them talking, not just about missions and policies but as service members who are also human(e) and you MIGHT be surprised to see attacks drop in your area. Once we figured out how to approach a home, deal with a homeowner etc... and became more culturally aware we noticed that our attacks dropped and our usable intel rose. This I believe has a great deal to do with the fact that we were not, out of ignorance or ambivalence, creating new enemies.

The second link http://www.mca-marines.org/forum/showthread.php?t=34 is where its at. The key to Iraq's future is in its children. Win them and you win the parents easier than you would without the kids. Win them and their future is assured. I made a point (and I was not the only one) to befriend (I mean genuinely BEFRIEND) the young boys and girls over there and I know we made a difference. Let me tell you if you have never seen a 210lb former linebacker, (my ATL) get schooled by a six year old in soccer, then you haven't lived!

Merv Benson
04-03-2007, 11:55 PM
Michael Yon (http://www.michaelyon-online.com/wp/rubs-3.htm) notes television media is turning down embed assignments because they have no way to protect their equipment from being stolen by some of the "workers" at the FOB's. He has had other posts indicating how difficult our forces make it for embeds. Anyone else have any experience with this?

Ender
04-04-2007, 12:42 AM
I never personally heard of or witnessed any theft of equipment or outright hostility towards the embeds but there was always an underlying resentment and hostility when we had to take an embed along as an attachment. By the end of my last deployment I would have four times as many attachments in one of my patrols (engineers, interpreter, ISF, Civil Affairs etc...) as I would Recon Marines and while it always felt like babysitting to my guys the only time they would get truly pissed is when we would have to take a reporter along.

120mm
04-04-2007, 07:47 AM
I have tons of empathy for "Joe" though, as he (correctly) has figured out that the media is the enemy. It is counter-intuitive to ask "Joe" to observe a "neutral" as not the enemy. (At the fundamental level in conflict, an individual truly is either "with us or against us.")

But, embedded media can be useful, so how do you "sell" things which are counterintuitive to "Joe" who does not have the distance to see things in shades, rather than in black or white.

marct
04-04-2007, 01:25 PM
Hi 120,


But, embedded media can be useful, so how do you "sell" things which are counterintuitive to "Joe" who does not have the distance to see things in shades, rather than in black or white.

That is the $64k question,isn't it :wry:? Before taking a swot at an answer, let me lay out some observations.

The media are targets for the irhabi.
The very concept of the media as a "check" on government is a Western one that is part of the core Anglo complex values.
The vast majority of the embedded media appear to have followed the ROE restrictions (barring a couple of doofs who got bounced).Now, to my mind, this means that embedded media can be perceived as "neutral" in the immediate conflict, but "friendly" in the overall conflict (sort of like Canadians in Iraq at the moment :D).

I suspect that we cold "sell Joe" on that perception, especially if we can get agreements from the embedded media that they will take to Joe and his buddies "off the record" about

what the social role of the media is supposed to be, ad
how Joe and his buddies play a part in that drama.Marc

marct
04-04-2007, 01:42 PM
Hi Ender,


Amen, I couldn't agree more and feel that this factor unnecessarily compounds an already difficult situation. The rub is that there is very little that can be done by the squad leader in relation to New York, Washington and or London's spin campaign, but he has absolute control over the product he is delivering in Karmah, Fallujah and Baghdad.

Actually, I have to disagree with you here. I certainly agree that a squad leader in Mosul has pretty much zilch influence on the broadcast media, but that was why I was talking about interactive media. The last round of presidential elections in the US showed how powerful the Net 2.0 technologies can be (remember the Howard Dean blog sphere?).

Increasingly, people are getting their news and information, and building their communities online. This is where a squad leader can actually have a totally disproportionate effect, globally as well as locally. Could this affect the spin campaigns coming out of New York, Washington and London? Sure it can, if for no other reason than the ability of broadcast journalists to get accurate information without having to travel there.

Think of what that would mean the next time that "General" Pelosi opens her mouth with some pronouncement that is clearly, and visibly, contradicted by not only the troops on the ground but also the local inhabitants and the diasporic community. If there a series of local,interactive "community" sites available, it would have a very interesting effect on the political spin because the broadcast media don't really care whose blood they go for.

This spin off effect is one of the basic points behind the electronic democracy movement - interactive,accessible sites act as a check and balance on the spin of politicians. The real problem with this, however, is that the entire idea is so radically different from the "normal" concept of IO that it is very hard for any Industrial Age military organization to accept or implement it.

Marc

ps. Just saw this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=12891#post12891) that SWJED posted - it makes my point for me.

marct
04-04-2007, 03:06 PM
An interesting article by Austin Bay that deals with the effects of the technology on politicians is available here (http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/04/an_armed_liberal_asks_the_iraq.html).

Marc

tequila
04-04-2007, 03:34 PM
The issue of self-selection appears to be at work with that particular series.

Recent polling done in Iraq appears to contradict the message being released and also has the advantage of being scientifically done by multiple organizations.

http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf

http://abcnews.go.com/images/US/1033aIraqpoll.pdf

http://www.opinion.co.uk/Documents/FINALTables.pdf

Ender
04-04-2007, 04:04 PM
Hello Marc!

I love reading your posts and enjoy chewing on the product of your academic pursuits :)


Actually, I have to disagree with you here. I certainly agree that a squad leader in Mosul has pretty much zilch influence on the broadcast media, but that was why I was talking about interactive media. .


I think that is an excellent distinction and I must admit that my mind was solely focused on what you defined as "broadcast media" when I typed that post. In relation to the broadcast media and the $64,000 question it is not that they are perceived as "neutral" but as being the real enemy. I know a number of Marines who would feel much safer having to escort insurgents on a patrol than they would a reporter. The image is that no single entity has done more damage to the US military that the US media and it is very difficult to shake hands and say let's play nice this time. There is a history there and while not all enlisted guys are rocket scientists they do have an innate sense of where the threat is coming from. As I mentioned in another post it is not as though I served with intellectual shut-ins either and even the guys with degrees who should know the importance of reporting felt as though they were just as likely to hanged by the reporter as they were to be shown in a good light.

By highlighting the ambivalence of Joe I hope I have not painted him in an overly harsh or idiotic manner. While some may be very black and white the majority do see (some of) the finer distinctions. I think today's enlisted ranks are probably the most educated, most interactive and most technologically savvy force we have ever had. It would be too easy to paint everyone under E-5 as being ignorant and ignore the very real and very justified fears they possess of the embeds. Our troops have very little faith in the media in every single form it assumes and they have good cause.

For my first deployment to Iraq we took the USS Bataan over and something about having a month or so on ship helped us not just to prepare for war but to also prepare us for peace on the way back. My second deployment was between Sep 04 and Apr 05ish and we flew both ways. Literally one day I was on a combat patrol in Anbar and the very next I was flying home. I mention this because after the second deployment, after we got home and turned on the television and got on the net we thought we had lost "the war" overnight. The image being beamed onto tv screens and laptops ran completely contrary to what we KNEW in Iraq The perception is not that the media is an equal opportunity hunter for blood but that they are blatantly biased and enslaved to the fickle whims of an ignorant population who do not want the truth.

In regards to the interactive media I again have to say this is an angle I was not considering when I wrote and is the subject of much excitement for younger Americans. My poli sci classes are charged with 20 somethings who BELIEVE they can make a difference on the next election and they are right. It is no coincidence that YouTube is one of the hottest things going for young Americans and as long as this can be harnessed in a productive, positive manner there is nothing Washington, New York or London can do about the NCO's with a video recorder strapped to their helmet. If we were in effect allowed to be, (who is going to stop us right?) our own reporters we would be far more effective in getting our message out.

What can not happen with the interactive media and the troops is exactly what is happening though. For every fluffy, pink, Downy fresh video out there showing troops surrounded by Iraqi youth are five more "Moto" movies that depict every hit, raid, mission, explosion, body part and horrible experience they witnessed. Now I love a good moto video as much as the next Marine but 99 times out of 100 it would be perceived as extremely offensive by even moderates here and in Iraq. This splinter of the interactive revolution is in effect our answer for, or the catalyst for all of the home movies being put out by the "insurgency" over there.

Someone mentioned here on SWC, in effect that our troops more often than not don't need to be told what to do as much as they need to hear what not to do. This is a key component to enlisted psychology and to avoiding your Abu Gharaibs and the like. We have No No lists already but for every offense that is not clearly laid out on the list there is an opening for the Joe to push the boundaries. I would put "No video taping of casualties for personal purposes" at the top of my list as I personally feel the public viewing of their (very guilty) brothers and uncles being killed by us has done as much damage as Abu G. and the like. Those caught breaking the rules should have their "guts stomped in" by nearest NCO or SNCO and expect to have their ass in a permanent sling until they can be proved as trustworthy.

As I team leader I stomped guts. I mentioned that my guys showed up in Iraq with a very poor attitude towards the populace but I MADE them change their minds by equating even minor offenses with something as serious as falling asleep on watch. My logic was that both falling asleep on watch and unnecessarily provoking people through stupid or ignorant acts were just as likely to get us killed and or cause us to "lose the war." If insensitivities were portrayed as disloyal to the Corps and cause I doubt many would step up and disobey.

If the content of the videos could be trusted I dont see why we couldn't send every platoon out with a couple camcorders... let them film all they want and then have a small unit whose purpose is to edit all of the material that is sensitive or boring and put it together in a hot format... their goal? Create two products, one for us back here and one for them over there. The Iraqis love to see pictures of themselves and their children and if we went around handing out Arabic dvd's of every soccer game, luncheon and social interaction we had with them over a period of X number of months it would go a long long way to personalizing the message. A thought.

Ender
04-04-2007, 05:02 PM
Which makes me think that we really do not need to '"create" a message, the material is already there and it is displayed every day in patrols all across Iraq. We just have to assemble the pieces, wrap it and send it. If we forgot about the message and just put the stuff out there the data would speak for itself.

marct
04-04-2007, 05:05 PM
Hi Ender,

I enjoy your posts very much as well: they are really helping me to grok exactly how people are viewing "the media".


I think that is an excellent distinction and I must admit that my mind was solely focused on what you defined as "broadcast media" when I typed that post.

Honestly, the more I see and the more carefully I read many of the posts here, the more convinced I am that military institutions are "stuck' in the broadcast mindset. Maybe it's just the upper echelons, but I was watching a 60 Minutes segment on CENTCOM's net team and I just couldn't believe my eyes and ears. I found it truly hard to comprehend that it was not being viewed as a battlespace. Then again, I've been involved in the net and online communities for over 20 years (pre-WWW), so I know I'm biased :D.


In relation to the broadcast media and the $64,000 question it is not that they are perceived as "neutral" but as being the real enemy. I know a number of Marines who would feel much safer having to escort insurgents on a patrol than they would a reporter. The image is that no single entity has done more damage to the US military that the US media and it is very difficult to shake hands and say let's play nice this time.

Hmmmm, it's worse than I thought, then. Do you know if anyone has actually studied this (i.e. interviews, focus groups, etc.)? If someone has, I wold really like to look at their data. If they haven't, I would like to set up a research project to do so. I know I'm showing my academic side, here, but I thin that this is a really important issue!


By highlighting the ambivalence of Joe I hope I have not painted him in an overly harsh or idiotic manner.

Not at all! Any time there is a reaction this strong, there is an underlying reason (or reasons) for that reaction. Having such a reaction just means that Joe is human and, in all probability, frustrated as snot about something. I'd like to find out exactly what he is frustrated about so that the causes can be addressed.


While some may be very black and white the majority do see (some of) the finer distinctions. I think today's enlisted ranks are probably the most educated, most interactive and most technologically savvy force we have ever had. It would be too easy to paint everyone under E-5 as being ignorant and ignore the very real and very justified fears they possess of the embeds. Our troops have very little faith in the media in every single form it assumes and they have good cause.

Again, I agree. Let e point out that most webheads also think the broadcast media is a crock as well and have little or no patience with them.


For my first deployment to Iraq we took the USS Bataan over and something about having a month or so on ship helped us not just to prepare for war but to also prepare us for peace on the way back. My second deployment was between Sep 04 and Apr 05ish and we flew both ways. Literally one day I was on a combat patrol in Anbar and the very next I was flying home. I mention this because after the second deployment, after we got home and turned on the television and got on the net we thought we had lost "the war" overnight. The image being beamed onto tv screens and laptops ran completely contrary to what we KNEW in Iraq The perception is not that the media is an equal opportunity hunter for blood but that they are blatantly biased and enslaved to the fickle whims of an ignorant population who do not want the truth.

Oh, Gods what I could do with such a quote!!!!!! Sorry, I've spent most of my academic career looking at the effective use of rituals, symbols and communications systems in changing perception, and your story about the ship time just tagged off every one of those models!

Let's talk about your last comment for a minute:


The perception is not that the media is an equal opportunity hunter for blood but that they are blatantly biased and enslaved to the fickle whims of an ignorant population who do not want the truth.

That's a pretty harsh judgement, and I'd really like to know how widespread it is and what, if any, exceptions are made. I'm not saying that it is inaccurate, though :wry:.


In regards to the interactive media I again have to say this is an angle I was not considering when I wrote and is the subject of much excitement for younger Americans. My poli sci classes are charged with 20 somethings who BELIEVE they can make a difference on the next election and they are right. It is no coincidence that YouTube is one of the hottest things going for young Americans and as long as this can be harnessed in a productive, positive manner there is nothing Washington, New York or London can do about the NCO's with a video recorder strapped to their helmet. If we were in effect allowed to be, (who is going to stop us right?) our own reporters we would be far more effective in getting our message out.

Which is, to my mind, a much better option than allowing the broadcast media to do it ;). I really think that this would be a much better option all around: it bypasses he broadcast media, it likes dispersed communities together, and it is something that can only be done well by the grassroots. In effect, we would be creating the cyber-strategic corporal.


What can not happen with the interactive media and the troops is exactly what is happening though. For every fluffy, pink, Downy fresh video out there showing troops surrounded by Iraqi youth are five more "Moto" movies that depict every hit, raid, mission, explosion, body part and horrible experience they witnessed. Now I love a good moto video as much as the next Marine but 99 times out of 100 it would be perceived as extremely offensive by even moderates here and in Iraq. This splinter of the interactive revolution is in effect our answer for, or the catalyst for all of the home movies being put out by the "insurgency" over there.

I think there is a place for these types of video clips, but it would probably be best to restrict it to a highly limited segment: "What has AQI done for you lately" and show the aftermath of the last car bomb.


Someone mentioned here on SWC, in effect that our troops more often than not don't need to be told what to do as much as they need to hear what not to do. This is a key component to enlisted psychology and to avoiding your Abu Gharaibs and the like. We have No No lists already but for every offense that is not clearly laid out on the list there is an opening for the Joe to push the boundaries. I would put "No video taping of casualties for personal purposes" at the top of my list as I personally feel the public viewing of their (very guilty) brothers and uncles being killed by us has done as much damage as Abu G. and the like. Those caught breaking the rules should have their "guts stomped in" by nearest NCO or SNCO and expect to have their ass in a permanent sling until they can be proved as trustworthy.

Agreed. the use of shaming in pastoralist cultures is tricky - you have to separate out the effect of shame on the individual and shame on the family. For example, gratuitously showing "... their (very guilty) brothers and uncles being killed..." insults the entire family and the clan. Clan honour is invoked and calls for blood vengeance. On the other hand, if someone has publicly abjured, say, IED making/planting and taken an oath to that effect and then they are caught, well, that also requires blood vengeance - against hem for bringing dishonour to their family and clan. In that case only, such a video might be worthwhile with the support of their family and clan.


If the content of the videos could be trusted I dont see why we couldn't send every platoon out with a couple camcorders... let them film all they want and then have a small unit whose purpose is to edit all of the material that is sensitive or boring and put it together in a hot format... their goal? Create two products, one for us back here and one for them over there. The Iraqis love to see pictures of themselves and their children and if we went around handing out Arabic dvd's of every soccer game, luncheon and social interaction we had with them over a period of X number of months it would go a long long way to personalizing the message. A thought.

Good idea, although I would also suggest that they be integrated into a glocal web site.

Marc

Ender
04-04-2007, 05:15 PM
Hi Ender,

I enjoy your posts very much as well: they are really helping me to grok exactly how people are viewing "the media".

Ok you were cool before but with the Heinlein/Stranger reference, my esteem has shot even higher!

marct
04-04-2007, 05:19 PM
Ok you were cool before but with the Heinlein/Stranger reference, my esteem has shot even higher!

LOLOL

So, when do we start seeing the Corps running an H&MP course :D.

Marc

Ender
04-04-2007, 05:30 PM
LOLOL

So, when do we start seeing the Corps running an H&MP course :D.

Marc

At this rate, VERY soon! ;)

I really think you are on to something with this bypass the broadcast bubbas approach and go straight to "grass roots." I go to the University of Colorado at Denver (only slightly less liberal than Boulder) and if I had a dime for every time I heard "grass roots" re: Obama or some other politician I would not be in school now. Just the words have a magnetic appeal to people my age and I know that if a grassroots campaign were instituted not by Marines and Soldiers, but by "brothers, fathers, cousins, boyfriends and grandfathers" it would at least get us in the door with my peers. After that the message WOULD sell itself.

marct
04-04-2007, 05:45 PM
Hi Ender,


I really think you are on to something with this bypass the broadcast bubbas approach and go straight to "grass roots." I go to the University of Colorado at Denver (only slightly less liberal than Boulder) and if I had a dime for every time I heard "grass roots" re: Obama or some other politician I would not be in school now. Just the words have a magnetic appeal to people my age and I know that if a grassroots campaign were instituted not by Marines and Soldiers, but by "brothers, fathers, cousins, boyfriends and grandfathers" it would at least get us in the door with my peers. After that the message WOULD sell itself.

Something like that happened here in Canada with the "Red Fridays" campaign. Basically, our last government downplayed what we were doing in Afghanistan and there was a "popular revolt" - wear something red on Fridays to show support for or troops (our British heritage don't you know ;)). All in all a great, and ongoing, campaign that had the added benefit of confusing some of the socialist "youth" :p.

Getting the "friends and family" involved in such a campaign would be the way to go. You mentioned that you were taking (teaching?) poli sci classes, and it would be interesting, as an exercise in practical politics, to see if you could get some of those 20 somethings to start in on this. If they are anything like the ones I teach, they are probably frustrated with the media and more than willing to help with any type of project that exposes media bias and corruption.

Marc

Ender
04-04-2007, 06:33 PM
Something like that happened here in Canada with the "Red Fridays" campaign. Basically, our last government downplayed what we were doing in Afghanistan and there was a "popular revolt" - wear something red on Fridays to show support for or troops (our British heritage don't you know ;)). All in all a great, and ongoing, campaign that had the added benefit of confusing some of the socialist "youth" :p.

Marc,
I heard about this! I am friends with a Canadian military couple who are stationed down in the Springs and while they are the first to admit that the CF are nowhere near as large as ours, and that the average Canadian thinks about enlistment far less often than us, the Canadians as a whole will NOT tolerate cannibalism of their own. Over the last year I have grown to understand and appreciate our "Northern Neighbors" a great deal more and think the U.S. could do with some very heavy cultural sharing in relation to opening channels between the two. On the macro level I know tremendous steps have already taken place, notably down in the Springs but am eager, even hopeful, to see what can be shared and learned on the micro level.


You mentioned that you were taking (teaching?) poli sci classes, and it would be interesting, as an exercise in practical politics, to see if you could get some of those 20 somethings to start in on this. If they are anything like the ones I teach, they are probably frustrated with the media and more than willing to help with any type of project that exposes media bias and corruption.

Taking classes, and I agree it would be very interesting if I could present it in a politically neutral manner, keeping the sights aligned on the evils of broadcast media without having spill over. I think the students here are very similar to the ones you teach but while they are VERY frustrated with the popular press here, they are even MORE pissed at George W. (Due in large part...drum roll... to the popular media!) so it would have to be calculated in such a manner that the focus does not shift to targets of opportunity. I could see some of my peers wanting to replace popular media bias with their own (if they were allowed) so if the intent were strictly designed as an offensive approach, a "velvet covered hammer" (get too visceral and people get turned off) agianst media bias (as opposed to a coup of the Fourth estate by Frat Boy Freddie who has aspirations for 2028) I could see quite a number of people here in Denver getting on board.

My problem is I suffer from a diamond in the rough syndrome and while I may have potential and a number of ideas, I do not however know the first thing about how to get something like this off the ground. I can sell anything but wouldn't know where to start... thoughts, ideas? (From anyone?)

Given the state of mind I have been in for the last few months if I were given a cardinal direction and a plan, I could make a serious impact here on the Denver students. It is no accident that the DNR is coming here, this area is a hotbed of potential and ideas and if something took off here it WOULD catch.

Joel

marct
04-04-2007, 07:58 PM
Hi Joel,

I'll have to think about strategies for a bit since the US and Canada are different enough that I doubt the ones I'd use would work. basically, if I was going to do it up here, and I just might, I would

give people a specific time/space focus: say, Mosul in 2006;
then get them to compare and contrast three different media outlets coverage of hat area;
then I would get them to look for material actually produced by people on the ground there during that time period.Ideally, the exercise would be used as a way to get my students to figure out what the bias of each source was. As an academic exercise, it would probably work (it did last summer).

Marc

horatius
04-04-2007, 09:55 PM
Jedburgh wrote, "On the other hand, the patrol should not be in the business of "selling" anything - or pushing any sort of ideological "message". Actions speak louder than words."

This is absolutely, completely, totally wrong. This is an old mindset that has been obsolete for 40 years and if we continue with it, we are going to lose.

Every patrol is selling something. First they are selling an idea. An idea for which people will risk their lives by giving us intelligence on the enemy. An idea that is REINFORCED BY ACTIONS - the MEDCAPs, infrastructure projects, etc. that you mentioned.

Before those actions can take place, before a patrol sends out a "Psychological Presence" it needs to understand why we are doing a MEDCAP and what psychological message we are sending.

There are Islamic NGOs that do MEDCAPS, build schools, hand out books. However, their message is based in Salafist, Wahhabi Islam and encourages its people to kill all non Muslims.

The reason we need an official, unified message is exactly for this reason. What does freedom mean? Someone wrote we are here so Sunni do not kill Shiia. Does this mean our intervention in Iraq is based on intra-Iraq religious tolerance. How do you know those people are interested in religious tolerance? They need to pick up what we put down.

Freedom. Freedom to do what? Freedom from what?

In counter insurgency, the most important thing a patrol does is sell an idea. America is an idea. Marines jump on hand grenades for an idea, a feeling, a belief. So do jihadists. Every action we take must be in support of selling our ideology. It is from this ideology that we can tailor the means by which we sell it -sometimes with a gun, other times with a band aid on a block by block, neighborhood by neighborhood battle.

Jedburgh
04-04-2007, 11:42 PM
Well, Horatius, you managed to completely misunderstand - or ignore - my entire post. What I stressed was exactly developing that "idea" in the head of the indig - going beyond mere security and showing that we care about their well-being and their future.

But for a patrol to go out and attempt to engage in discussion and debate over ideology with the indig is simply stupid. Even "talking points" put out by higher to be pushed when so engaged can be dangerous (rhetorically speaking) and turned on Joe. A wise old soldier once told me never short-change a whore or argue with an Arab. However, there are elements that will engage the indig in this manner - but it is not appropriate for the patrol level.

But I'll accept your term of "selling" as in the selling of such ideas by our actions. If you re-read my post you'll see that is what I was trying to put across. As well as the complex coordination that such perception management by deed requires, in order to be effectively implemented and leveraged from the patrol level.

But I do strongly disagree with you on this point: we should not be "selling" our ideology. Effective use of perception management in this environment is more pointed towards getting the sectarian / ethnic/ tribal/ clan / political factions to understand that they need to work together peacefully in a unitarian state. This damn sure is a difficult, complex and often frustrating task - more so now than a year ago. And we are not necessarily pushing them toward any pre-designated US or even western template - the indig need to figure it out, and we're just helping them along. You can not force feed someone your ideology.

horatius
04-05-2007, 12:51 AM
Jedburgh,
It is on this point of squad leaders talking ideology that we disagree. Most ideology is fed - not forced as in at the tip of a gun - but fed. That is why Arabs are the way they are we are the way we are.

Foreigners do not have to buy our ideology wholesale. If we explain it - in terms that are meaningful to them (which is the other side of my first post) - they will be more receptive to all of our Actions.

We do not have to argue with Arabs. We must discuss, we must engage about God, family, individualism. If squad leaders can not tell them that they are the descendants of Ishamel and we are the descendents of Issac so we are therefore brothers, that squad leader is untrained.

Although Genesis 16 says that God cursed Ishmael and he will hate everyone and everyone will hate him is a point that we do not have to bring up.

If squad leaders can not sit and talk with Iraqis and explain that we understand their dilemma of not knowing how to balance being Arab, Muslim and western - in that I mean live under secular law and move to a more individual based economy instead of a family one - because we are all immigrants and our ancestors faced the same problems - he is untrained.

Your old soldier friend probably didn't want to get into these ideas because he was, well, old. He was of the obsolete mindset that says soldiers kill people and break things. We are here to use kinetic force or "win hearts and minds" if you are a SOF type.

It is impossible to win hearts and minds unless you can look a man in the eyes and explain to him how the two of you are in the same boat and on the same journey with God, family and nation.

On the modern battlefield - this is the one after Korea - the most important fight is the war of ideas. Killing people, breaking things, healing folks and building stuff fall under the umbrella of working toward a unified ideological goal. As with previous generations of warfare, things are becoming more decentralized and it is now on the shoulders of our smallest tactical unit - the squad - to engage people at EVERY LEVEL simulateously.

Your proposed system of just focus on ACTIONS - the one that we have been at for 45 years - HOW IS IT WORKING???

jcustis
04-05-2007, 01:27 AM
If squad leaders can not sit and talk with Iraqis and explain that we understand their dilemma of not knowing how to balance being Arab, Muslim and western - in that I mean live under secular law and move to a more individual based economy instead of a family one - because we are all immigrants and our ancestors faced the same problems - he is untrained.

That's one of the problems. I don't think many men on the street really see a dilemma at all. The youth may be trying to balance things, but the family man isn't, in my opinion.

I agree with you generally on the your economic point, but I again disagree that we don't even have an individual based economy. Look at how many extended families live under one roof here in the states, or how many children stay at home until they are 35, the way in which fathers pay for weddings, we go into debt to get kids into college, etc. Our economy is most definitely a family one, even if children don't remain under one roof for the same length of time that they are tied to the purse strings.

My point goes back to my longstanding sentiment that an Iraqi may not care what we say. Just look at the most gang-infested areas of major cities. At some point, folk just don't give a damn what message you put out. You still have to work the issue, but don't expect the silver bullet.

Cori
04-06-2007, 03:27 PM
I'm new here, so let me first by way of introduction explain that I'm an academic whose research focuses on press coverage of the GWOT (and specifically terrorist and insurgent attempts to manipulate the coverage.) I think the idea that even (perhaps especially) small units should carry cameras at all times is a terrific one -- I've suggested it myself, although to Civil Affairs folks, not combat units. Reading this thread, and now that the MNF-I YouTube channel is up, it seems to me everyone ought to be running around with cameras, and the idea that the military ought to be providing their own footage, straight to the Internet, of all these "good news stories" is so good I'm planning to, you know, steal it. (Footnoted, of course.)

That said, I am very, very disturbed by the attitudes expressed here regarding accepting embedded reporters. God knows, I've been plenty critical of the coverage, early and often. But folks have got to understand that, as much excitement as there is about the web, the numbers tell the tale: it is still the case that the vast majority of Americans get their news from the mainstream media. As an example, close to thirty million people still watch the network's nightly news shows, and year after year a large number of the top sites on the Internet are actually associated with traditional media outlets -- in other words, same content, different platform, such as Cnn.com, nytimes.com and so forth. You can't just throw up your hands and refuse to deal with them, because, particularly this far out from the draft when so many Americans have no other way to find out about the war other than what they get from the press, (because they may simply not know someone in uniform) the media are the military's conduit to the American people, period, dot.

Now, it seems to me your only option is to try and forge a relationship with the press given that, and the simple fact is that the quality of embedded reporting, over and over, is an order of magnitude better than that which comes from reporters who aren't embedded. Would you rather have stories which come complete with context, or stories that lack context?

With all due respect, relations with the press need to be considered "mission critical," and the military has to work those relationships, encourage them, make sure reporters understand what it is that's going on while they're with units, why it's important, so on and so forth.

This doesn't mean a unit has to accept every single request for an embed from every single reporter -- but to blanket reject the very notion of embeds, to simply reject the press out of hand -- again, with all due respect, that's a very, very risky approach.

Merv Benson
04-06-2007, 04:41 PM
Welcome Cari,

There is no doubt that reporting has been critical to the US's ability to make war. In Vietnam for example it was critical in undermining the war effort and led to disastrous consequences for the Vietnamese. Mark Moyar's brilliant new book, Triumph Forsaken describes how reporters directly contributed to the coup and assassination of Diem. They also fellled for the Buddhist "sectarian violence theme" which was in fact the work of communist infiltrators in the Buddhist movement.

Then there is Tet where they turned an American and Vietnamese victory into a strategic defeat. Big Story analyzes the reporting of this event and gives the facts that should have been reported.

I come away from this with the belief that we need to provide reporters with a course that explains how errors in reporting have consequences that can not be corrected with a retraction or an apology. They are every bit as critical as decisions made by commanders.

However, I agree with your assessment on the value of embeds. They do the best reporting and one reason is that they get the input of knowledgeable troops who not only provide context, but can enlighten them on what it means. It was an embed that first reported on the red on red action in Anbar a couple of years ago, and people are beginning to comprehend the significance.

As for the cameras, they are a double edge sword, because a picture does not always provide context. A camera can lie. It want tell you why.

RTK
04-06-2007, 05:01 PM
My experience with reporters in theater is that the more open and honest you are with them, the more favorable their article is about your unit. If you try to hide something or prevent them from seeing your AO for what it is, they pick up on that pretty quickly. The article will probably be written in a manner or method which you don't necessarily agree with.

Cori
04-06-2007, 08:52 PM
I agree completely with the last two posts. (And let me say that The Big Story is a superb, and a very important study, that's important not only in terms of the history of Vietnam but also as a study of mistakes the press should guard against when covering any war. I still assign it to the graduate students I work with, some of whom come over from our J-School, and it's a crying shame it's gone out of print. Anyone reading it will come away as a better reader-of-press-coverage.)

But let me also just point out that there are reporters covering this war who are very professional, well informed, and fair, and whose stuff is always well worth reading. I haven't quite figured out how to embed links yet, but it should be a fairly easy matter to Google the reports filed by UPI's Pamela Hess during the recent nine weeks or so she spent reporting out of Iraq -- note particularly the stories she filed out of Anbar. (Since this started with a discussion of IO, look esp. for the story she filed about the Major who tried all measure of media to get his unit's IO messages across, leaflets, radio, TV -- nothing worked. Then one day he was listening to the call to prayer when it finally hit him -- LOUDSPEAKERS.)

Ender
04-06-2007, 10:16 PM
Cori,
I hear you on your post above and sincerely welcome your perspective on this matter. I agree that there isn't a group out there who can report as well as us and that this far removed from a draft the broadcast media is, (NO QUESTIONS, NO DEBATES) the single most effective method for bridging the gap between here and there. The theory is sound but the application is where we find our rub. I "think" I could safely say that most commanders, if loosely given the choice and no other strings were attached, would consistently pick not having reporters along for the ride over having them. (I am clearly no commander so I could be wrong :) ) There is no doubt that the benefits from a good report COULD be helpful to the armed forces but it is assured that a negative one WOULD and WILL hurt them BADLY every time.

I think the perception (from the lower enlisted side) is that the broadcast media is a large, double-edged sword with one side that is MUCH sharper than the other because only one sees any real use. With all due respect Cori, I don't care how good the press is at their job, until they become as proficient at building us up as they are ripping us apart the stigma is going to be tough to shake, especially in the ranks where it counts the most.

We had "embeds" that had zero clue about what the Marine Corps in general or Recon specifically were about and it was very frustrating for me to have an attachment from Reuters who had his own agenda or angle he wanted to pursue in his story and a mission that was developing in a different direction.

I was on a patrol in Zaidon during the elections in early 2005. On top of my team I had a large number of attachments on this one, to include the dude from Reuters, 8 or so Iraqi "special forces," some Army engineers, our own combat engineers, some Civil Affairs, and a few others...

Long story short, very short, one of the ISF was run over in the road by an attacker in what we suspected was an SVBIED that did not go off. In the ensuing very limited engagement to stop the vehicle, our interpreter (one of the most amazing men I have ever met) was shot in the back by one of the Showani’s (hmmm), the perp took off and had to be hunted down a few blocks away, my patrol was split and no one knew what was hell was going, at least until we killed the bad guy and regrouped. I had an injury and a gaggle of POGs and we needed to bounce in a major way. We had just dodged a major bullet and needed to NOT BE THERE RIGHT THEN. I had to physically make this clown stop taking pictures of the dead guy, drag him all the way back to his truck and make him get in the back. He had no clue that while there may have been officers and SNCO's on the patrol, I HAD TACTICAL control. It was explained in the brief (he was there) and everyone with a uniform had the billet hierarchy down. All this guy saw was an E-4 who may or may not have known what was going on and his foot dragging at the very least was unprofessional and at worst could have gotten him or any of us killed.

I concede this guy could have been an anomaly, that maybe this was a bad example but seriously if I have to think about what some guy is going to write when the rounds are NOT flying, and also worry about what he’s doing when they are, then the potential returns are not worth the probable risk for me.

I can be persuaded though and can analytically see the benefits to a mutualistic relationship between “us and them.” But until some of my questions are answered in regards to what has changed since 2003-2005, specifically in preparing the reporters better for life with (every other embed I saw focused on an outside in, or Marines under a magnifying glass approach) the military as opposed to life “just outside” the military I am going to be skeptical. I know about the mini boot camps and the entire reporter military crash course idea but that doesn’t cut it….it can’t just be a stint, or an adventure; in war it has to be as real for the person reporting as it is for the person being reported on and if my reality is different than Reuters when the rounds start flying then something is seriously wrong with one of us.

Sorry I know I am venting a little here… there is a point in here somewhere and if you can tease it out I would appreciate it because I really can see benefits to getting along and would like to help in some small way so that we can all fix this, move on and go back to the business of being effective, warfighting Americans!

Joel

Maximus
04-07-2007, 03:32 AM
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1607603,00.html

Thought this article would add a nice touch to this thread, particularly the part about how Al Qaeda in Iraq's overstepped its bounds all being listed one-by-one, with text from the Koran to support.

Cori
04-07-2007, 03:47 AM
Ender:

Listen, I don't disagree with anything you write, and I absolutely understand the frustration you express here. Again, I'm far more a critic than a defender of the press. The story you tell is, I think, a function of what happens when you've got folks embedding who don't have a great deal of experience with the military. One response to that is to embed more, not less, another is to be very careful to know the reporters coming out to a unit in advance, by googling their prior work so that you know what kind of stories they've been covering up to that point: it would let you know at what level to pitch a briefing.

The concern that the press can hurt more than they can help may or may not be accurate, but either way the pt is the same: precisely b/c the power of the press is so great, it's that important that the military work to make sure the relationship works. Decisions that in prior wars were cost free (avoiding press coverage) today come with a price, that's my larger point. That doesn't mean in any given instance you have to choose one way as opposed to another, but it does mean you need to recognize that there's a price to be paid in avoiding press coverage. Keep in mind, too, if you think the press can burn you, then you should certainly want to encourage embeds, because the press is going to cover this war with or without your help -- better to have a shot at telling them your side of the story.

Like I say, I don't, in the end, disagree: the question is, what can military units do to make the relationship a more productive one? I thought it was important to point out that not every reporter covering the war should be assumed on face unprepared or hostile, but I'm well aware that there are plenty of problems. Given the importance of coverage, I just think it's important for the military to think about what can be done from their side to work to resolve those problems.

best,

Cori

Ender
04-07-2007, 04:05 AM
Cori,
You make very strong points and in no way have I viewed anything you have said as being against what I said. I may have not artiuculated as clearly as I would have liked; it is difficult to objectively communicate concepts when so much it attached. You have given me reason to pause and consider just what can be done, because I will have to admit, as frustrating as the press can be, I would much rather have them working for us than against us.

Thank you for your insight.

Joel