Meta-Warfare

[AmericanPride]

Hello all,

I'd like to start a discussion on the sophistication of warfare; I don't mean the development of new technologies (essentially the spear and the rifle are the same weapon insofar they occupy the same space and serve the same purpose), but instead the expanding comprehensiveness of what's considered "warfare" - and, as a subset of that, the emergence of legal norms of what defines acceptable and unacceptable forms of warfare. If war is essentially a political act, then the sophistication of warfare follows the sophistication of political systems. War, in essence, reflects the political system from which it emerges.

If that is the case, I think it's important then that theorists also understand the political superstructure underlying the system of warfare in which they're engaged. The levee en masse is perhaps the most defining example of political revolution leading to military revolution. The destruction of the ancien regime and its replacement by a (nominal) people's government resulted in the mass mobilization of the French population. On the battlefield, this resulted in larger armies and decisive victories for France. It was only sustainable by a burgeoning bureaucracy reinforced by a revolutionary zeal. That nation-state system is still largely in place today, although the changing nature of interstate relations, global urbanization, and the growing international bourgeois lends towards smaller, professional, highly technical armies.

So, even as the political nature of warfare remains constant within this context, the actual political objects and variables that drive warfare change fairly often as a historical process. Clausewitz called war a "wrestling match". Wrestling is defined first by its type, separating it in kind from, say, hockey or baseball, but there are also different ways of wrestling.

People who argue that the nature of war doesn't change must then also accept that the political does not change. But the political does change, and so war must change with it. A pro-active military approach should therefore consider (1) how war changes based on the political but also (2) how the military act can also usher in desired or targeted political change.

In this case, instead of only reactively targeting armies, militias, or terrorists, which are essentially temporary and subjective variables controlled by the political object (that is the totality of political conditions that give to their rise), the military should aim to target the permanent, objective, material political relations that bind the enemy structure together. This is less 'nation-building' than it is 'political-destroying', that is destroying the enemy's political strength. This occurred in the aftermath of World War II when the Allies imposed upon a Japan commitment to peace and deprived it of any offensive military capabilities; the security apparatus was reduced in form to less than what exists in other states. Other political objects could be elites, landowners, technical experts, etc. Targeting them does not necessarily have to be lethal (though it could be) nor collective (though it could be that also). They could be targeted by changing the norms around landownership or legal rights, for example, which may deprive one class of strength and empower another. Warfare therefore is not just the engagement of armies, but the totality of compelling actions that can be undertaken against another. The difficult the U.S. faces in places like Afghanistan, in my view, is not because some elusive nature of terrorism or insurgency, but because it is not just an engagement of arms, but also a clash of political systems that the U.S. military finds difficult to navigate. We do it accidentally and haphazardly instead of deliberately. This is in part because our war studies focuses almost exclusively on the tactical and operational, and very rarely on how those things engage with the political. In state warfare, the political decision precedes the military act but in counter-insurgency, every military decision is a political act. But it's also in part because the political system underlying insurgency often is fluid and in disarray, making it difficult for a conventional military apparatus to identify and target an enemy and its political strength to compel it to cease fighting since the conventional military is looking for a target that looks like its own political master (i.e. another state).

This necessarily aims to create an insidious advantage since the adversary tailors their armed forces to defeat the standing forces of another state. We build aircraft carriers, so the Chinese build ship-killer missiles. Asymmetric warfare is akin to one wrestler knowing the weakness of the other wrestler but still aiming to 'wrestle', and therefore adopting a strategy or technique to target that weakness. Meta warfare would be one opponent, recognizing the adversary as a wrestler, deciding to not wrestle at all, and instead disarms their opponent before the match ever starts. This is possible only because of the sophistication of warfare as a means of political engagement where all of society's means - economic, political, cultural, military, technical, etc - can be leveraged as a compelling force by a complex and fairly centralized political system. This simultaneously pushes warfare to the lowest levels (i.e. social media campaigns) and to its most far-reaching. This has consequences for the most junior soldiers and officers, the actions of whom will continue to be more substantial than their predecessors. Accompanying this capability must be an ethic and philosophy that places them within the proper (read: effective) context of their actions.

The military would therefore do well step outside of its own uniform and assess the conditions in which it exists, and ask itself if it is prepared to meet emerging challenges to security. A small, professional, highly technical army works in today's political context (for the most part). But will it work in the next? And what is that next context? And when will it arrive?

[TheCurmudgeon]

I believe you are right, particularly when you say that, while the nature of war may not have change, the nature of politics has. I have been playing with this same concept for some time, and have considered writing on it, although I have not thought through how this actually alters strategy. That would be my interest.

What are you planning on doing with this? How can we help?

[AmericanPride]

I'm not really sure where this train of thought is going yet. I am approaching the dissertation phase of my education, and the closer I get, the less sure I am about which idea/research to pursue. I wonder about the paradigm shift in military-political theory recognized by Clausewitz, and if we are still trapped within that frame of thinking when thinking about warfare. And if we are in the intellectual trap, how do we recognize it and prevent surprise when the paradigm shifts again?

[TheCurmudgeon]

For what it is worth, I believe you are right. I plan to write a short piece on it in the future. But I do believe it deserves a more complete academic review of the topic.

[Bill Moore]

I believe you are right, particularly when you say that, while the nature of war may not have change, the nature of politics has. I have been playing with this same concept for some time, and have considered writing on it, although I have not thought through how this actually alters strategy. That would be my interest.

What are you planning on doing with this? How can we help?

Concur, and this is what I'm struggling with in the Strategy in the 21st Century forum section I'm working on occasionally. Will definitely update it in late April when I have some time based on recent insights gained from a number of readings and discussions, but most prominently the book "Connectography," which I just posted a short review of in the what are you reading section. Globalization is changing governance more than local issues in my view, and that change in governance and priorities has implications for strategy. Our current strategy is inept, we're squandering our wealth via military operations that give us little in return. When they don't work we double down and give it another go. If we're not careful we'll find ourselves in a similar situation that the USSR found itself in at the end of the Cold War.

I realize you and AP are playing it safe, because the dogmatic ones who tend to dominate the military education systems love to promote that the nature of war doesn't change, only its character. However, being a little more iconoclastic, I think the very nature of war is changing. Fortunately there are ongoing studies led by non-U.S. academics (thankfully) to honestly explore this argument.

We have impacted the world little since the end of the Cold War, the world has changed, and we don't know how to wield our power to achieve desired ends anymore. Our political system is in shambles, and we're no longer the shinning light on the hill for much of the world. What does it mean? Will we actually evolve, or relying on blind faith, ride our outdated world view until it spins out of control into its death spiral?

The following article is sad, but true. Our government will not fix itself, and electing populists like Trump may seem appealing because he is from outside the system, this approach never works. He isn't a professional in policy any more than the lawyers in Congress. Even if he was a visionary, our system doesn't allow visionaries to make progress. Our system is flawed by design to ensure we have a relatively weak government, well that worked, but a weak government can't address our challenges domestically or internationally.

https://medium.com/@paragkhanna/5-ways-americas-government-is-much-worse-than-other-countries-dccaa2ce1d0a

5 Ways America’s Government is Much Worse than Other Countries


Donald Trump just won the ultimate reality show: American politics. Since Trump’s shocking election victory, people around the world have been wondering how such a great democracy could so easily come off the rails. Many citizens of foreign countries are even taking pride in how much better their systems are than America’s. Based on my new book Technocracy in America, here are five ways other political systems are more effective than America’s.


(1) Unelected electors indirectly elect our president
(2) The Cabinet is stacked with friends of the president
(3) The government is full of political hacks rather than professional experts
(4) We have two useless chambers of Congress instead of just one
(5) We don’t amend the Constitution even though it is desperately needed

[TheCurmudgeon]

I realize you and AP are playing it safe, because the dogmatic ones who tend to dominate the military education systems love to promote that the nature of war doesn't change, only its character.

I don't believe I am playing it safe. I believe that Clausewitzian "war" is all about politics and the political realm, where natural war is a natural state of human affairs that never changes.

" I define natural war as non-spontaneous, organized, lethal violence committed by one identifiable group of people against another identifiable group of people, executed by warriors and morally sanctioned by the entire group, for some purpose other than the violence itself. There are seven elements to this definition:
1.war is not a spontaneous act of violence like a riot;
2.war is organized—even simple raids by one group against another require planning and preparation;
3.from the onset, the probability of the violence leading to death on either or both sides is understood;
4.the fighting involves two groups that have a distinguishable identity based in anything from familial relationships (hunter-gatherer bands), to ethnic identity, religious identity, national identity, or ideological identity;
5.war is generally executed by a subpart of the group, the warriors;
6.the killing is morally sanctioned by the rest of the group—the warriors are not viewed as criminals; and
7.it is for a purpose other than simply violence, such as to gain resources, eliminate competition for resources, or to retaliate for attacks or territorial incursions."

"There Is Only War, But War Isn’t Always Political (http://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/11/15/there-is-only-war-but-war-isnt-always-political)"

In that same paper I argue that our ideas about what war is and how it should be fought have transitioned in the last five centuries or so from "natural war" to "political war," which has a number of rules about legitimate targets and proportionality. So I truly believe that war has always been the same, but our political frame of reference both expands war into areas that are not lethal (like cyber warfare) and limits war by constricting legitimate targets (surrounding a city and starving out the population is now not war, but a crime).

In today's modern, political society, everything is defined by the frame of reference we surround ourselves with, including war. As that frame of reference changes, so do our ideas about war. What I think AP is saying is that, not everyone agrees with our ideas about what a government should look like. Because of that, their definition of "war" is different from ours. As a result of that, how it is fought and, most important, what it takes to win (or lose) is different than ours. We can fight till we are blue in the face, but we are, in essence, not fighting against each other but fighting past each other. I believe that is the crux of the problem both AP and I are thinking about.

Thanks for clarifying my thoughts, I know what my next paper will be about.

[AmericanPride]

In today's modern, political society, everything is defined by the frame of reference we surround ourselves with, including war. As that frame of reference changes, so do our ideas about war. What I think AP is saying is that, not everyone agrees with our ideas about what a government should look like. Because of that, their definition of "war" is different from ours. As a result of that, how it is fought and, most important, what it takes to win (or lose) is different than ours. We can fight till we are blue in the face, but we are, in essence, not fighting against each other but fighting past each other. I believe that is the crux of the problem both AP and I are thinking about.


I more or less agree with this statement in principle. I would add that I see it in two layers: first, a superficial layer, and second, a core or base layer. In the first, we have different governments like the U.S., Russia, China, et al. Their respective histories, values, and bureaucracies produce different approaches to warfare. But these are all fundamentally similar insofar they are all derived from a similar source: a modern nation-state with a more or less market economy. Each of them have extensive state apparatuses to maintain a large, uniform, more or less highly technical and professional standing army. They arrive at similar conclusions about the conduct and nature of warfare for this reason.

Then you have a base layer; that is the defining political-economic structure underneath all of it. Prior to the modern nation-state, we had feudal political-economic systems. These were defined by personal obligations, small state bureaucracies, small landowning classes, and large dispossessed populations tied to manors. Professional armies, where they existed, were relatively small, and when larger armies were necessary, they were raised and used carefully and temporarily. This perhaps explains why in World War I, when the last of the old era was swept away, that the Austrian-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires failed so spectacularly. The leadership recognized the need for a modern, standing army but their political systems did not allow for it.

I would like to also note that large, professional armies are not necessarily a consequence of modern technology (as opposed to state sophistication). The Roman Army is an example of historical, professional standing army. The Roman state was much more sophisticated than its tribal, despotic, or nomadic neighbors.

So I guess we arrive at another question: is there a particular direction or trajectory of this process or is it haphazard? Will the modern nation-state, as presently conceived, continue to refine and better itself? Or will another political-economic system arise that will also give birth to a new form of warfare?

[TheCurmudgeon]

So I guess we arrive at another question: is there a particular direction or trajectory of this process or is it haphazard? Will the modern nation-state, as presently conceived, continue to refine and better itself? Or will another political-economic system arise that will also give birth to a new form of warfare?

Your question goes far beyond what my small brain is capable of answering.

I will say this (if you believe that God created the earth about 5000 years ago you can stop reading now). Humans evolved with a finite set of psychological capacities that were designed to solve the problems of the hunter-gatherer lifestyle. However, our problem solving capacity made the need to constantly hunt and gather food obsolete. We learned to grow crops and domesticate animals. Then we learned how to live that lifestyle. Then our brains solved other problems and we adjusted our lifestyle appropriately. We have learned a lot about how to remove all the problems we used to have. How to ensure we had food and shelter. How to extend our lives with medicine. How to pass on knowledge though the language and writing. But underneath all that, in our motivational and psychological minds, we are still just hunter-gatherers protecting our little space where we hunt and gather and fighting with other little bands to stay alive.

With that as my base assumption, there are only so many ways we can change. We can create new technology, but we can't change what motivates us (although we try like hell to self-medicate ourselves). I would suggest that you look at Professor Schwartz' ideas on universal human values (http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=orpc). After years of study, he determined that there are a limited number of values that motivate people. If he is right, then there are a finite number of things that cause us to chose one social structure (including its political trappings) over another. This means that there are a limited number of political systems (even though you will see recurring themes).

My personal belief is that there are two basic themes: either the political system revers the Group as source of all political power or it revers the Individuals as the source of all political power. Variations of the Group include monarchies, theocracies, various autocracies, and communism. Variations of the Individual are Democracies, Republics, and ultimately anarchy. There are mixes, including Socialism, but these are the basic set of options. That is because these are the limits of what our value systems can support.

Is there something beyond this? Perhaps. Some new mix of values. Some way to balance the reverence with the Individual with the reverence for the group. Maybe something completely different.

Just remember, you asked.

[AmericanPride]

I read an article recently (don't remember the publication) in which the author discussed the consequences of the neural lace, which can potentially transform human thinking (and therefore, I imagine, warfare). I think AI (and human-AI interfacing) will be then next step in political evolution. If scarcity is eliminated, or severely reduced, or if virtually all human labor is made surplus, then the current political-economic system is no longer viable. Automation has been the largest driver of job destruction in the U.S. and that process seems to be quickening. What happens to people if there are no more jobs available? Our values (i.e. "the dignity of work") have not caught up to our technological capabilities.

Automation and AI seems the way forward for capitalism. It eliminates the cost and difficulty of managing human labor and increases profits, efficiencies, and margins. This is already occurring in the financial and industrial sectors. Services, like transportation, are next. The gig economy seems to be the half-way point between old capitalism and AI capitalism. The displaced surplus labor must move somewhere else. The privatization of armies (i.e. Blackwater) and the creation of small, highly capable & technical professional armies seems an accompanying trend to this. Neither of these rely upon a large, loyal population but instead on careerist, technical experts.

[OUTLAW 09]

BTW....it is not globalization that is inherently changing the face of governments and their individual politics...it is simply that we are in the early stages of the "fourth industrialization phase...IE robots" and actually while we write here the world is advancing into the "fifth industrialization phase paralleling the fourth phase...IE AI"...coupled with the 4th....robots......

We see it in the manufacturing and then the repair of say as an example farm machinery where grain harvesters now require a mechanics degree in IT and computer troubling shooting to repair a simple hydraulic leak....as they have five onboard computer systems tied to a central controller computer.

OR in the newest FORD factory that produces cars virtually worker free where the robots do everything and the human watches the control centers...AND where even this position will be replaced next year with AI..as per FORD...BMW has already moved into this new "industrialization battlespace using a combination of robots and AI in building the 3er model here in Germany....

AND BTW....prior wars were all about killing and destruction in order to force your will on your opponent....

SO is a cyber attack and or subtle manipulation of say an election via hacking and an influence ops using fake news...propaganda and disinformation actually forcing your will on an opponent?

So as industrialization changes so does future "wars" of the 21st century...

To argue that "war" has never changed ....flies in the face of 21st century reality....

[davidbfpo]

I do wonder if Western public opinion, which should impact political decision-making, are simply reluctant to consider war - not the almost constant skirmishing in many parts of the world away from them - as being effective for their interests (personal and national) and legitimate.

Long ago our absent member Ken White pointed out when the USA IIRC is engaged in a long war the public gradually start to ask "Is this worth doing?".

We are irregularly told we are in a 'Long War' with jihadist terrorism, reinforced at times by the post-attack media reporting and a good deal of "grandstanding" that builds fear.

Add in our direct involvement in both wars and skirmishing - Small Wars of course - which can hardly be seen as providing meaningful success. No wonder many nations have chosen to reduce military spending and for some a wish to stay out of interventions faraway.

Nor has indirect involvement, primarily "gold", proven to be effective either, unless you consider containment is valid. Somalia being a good example, let alone the Yemen.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I do wonder if Western public opinion, which should impact political decision-making, are simply reluctant to consider war - not the almost constant skirmishing in many parts of the world away from them - as being effective for their interests (personal and national) and legitimate.


Assuming my ideas on 1) the growth of the individual as the center of Western political thought and power, and 2) that war is a group-on-group activity, it follows that 3) war become less likely where outsiders are seen less as groups and more as a collection of individuals. Killing in war (group-on-group) is morally sanctioned. Killing in something less than war (individual-on-individual) is murder. Therefore, those other killings are not seen as legitimate unless they are to either punish those individuals for their past crimes or to stop future crimes.

This is, in my opinion, the foundation of the Democratic Peace Theory - why democracies tend not to go to war with other democracies. Democracies will go to war with autocracies, particularly where it is framed as a war of liberation. The enemy is an oppressive state apparatus. The members of that oppressive state apparatus are seen as criminals. In the minds of the Western Individualist political entities, this is not a war against Iraq or Libya, it is a targeted action against the criminals in the Iraqi or Libyan government. For the liberal individualist, war can never be sanctioned because it goes against their foundational belief in the individual, rather than the group, being the central political figure.

That said, War ain't what it used to be ... so who knows.

[TheCurmudgeon]

AND BTW....prior wars were all about killing and destruction in order to force your will on your opponent....


No, that is a 19th century updated explanation of the purpose of war. It is an explanation founded in the 19th century European Socio-Political framework.

Ten centuries earlier no one would have cared anything about the will of your opponent. Your opponent would either be dead or your slaves.

Similarly, today's 21st century Western definitions of war is restricted by today's Western socio-political and ethical standards. Killing and destruction are secondary to war's ultimate aim, which is political. Where that aim can be achieved by other means, so be it. However, this is really not war. It is coercive demagoguery. There is little or no threat of death or dying.

I don't like referring to "war" in the 21st definition, because I think that psychologically, war still means killing and dying, even if in practice, 21st century war does not require it.

[Azor]

The levee en masse[i] is perhaps the most defining example of political revolution leading to military revolution. The destruction of the [i]ancien regime[i] and its replacement by a (nominal) people's government resulted in the mass mobilization of the French population. On the battlefield, this resulted in larger armies and decisive victories for France. It was only sustainable by a burgeoning bureaucracy reinforced by a revolutionary zeal. That nation-state system is still largely in place today, although the changing nature of interstate relations, global urbanization, and the growing international bourgeois lends towards smaller, professional, highly technical armies.

You may be misattributing to political development, what are consequences of technological development…

The size of professional militaries ebbs and flows. Over the past 75 years, the basic units of advanced militaries have gone from division to brigade to battalion, and quality has eclipsed quantity.

Gradual advancements in farming and weaponry during the Medieval and Early Modern periods enabled large armies to be formed by the 17th Century, albeit these were primarily of mercenaries. By the time of the 18th Century, muskets were relatively inexpensive and easy to use, compared to the advanced arms of prior centuries.

Given their experience of 18th Century warfare and in the context of seeking to avoid absolutist rule or mercenary hosts, the framers of the U.S. Constitution wisely recommended the establishment of a citizen’s militia rather than a professional standing army. Yet only a highly professional military can operate the weapons of today and create the effects that the politicians and generals demand.

Therefore, we are reverting to the Medieval period, when states relied upon relatively small groups of armored heavy cavalry, well-trained bowmen and pikemen or arquebusiers with nerves of steel…


…the military should aim to target the permanent, objective, material political relations that bind the enemy structure together. This is less 'nation-building' than it is 'political-destroying', that is destroying the enemy's political strength. This occurred in the aftermath of World War II when the Allies imposed upon a Japan commitment to peace and deprived it of any offensive military capabilities; the security apparatus was reduced in form to less than what exists in other states.

Agreed. However, you are forgetting that the United States battered and bludgeoned the Confederates, Germans and Japanese into submission. The United States armed forces relied upon the “30% solution” of attrition. In the aftermath, the United States committed itself to reconstructing strong and friendly states, an undertaking that it never really attempted in Indochina, Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya.

When strong states are destroyed, non-state actors or other states fill the vacuum, which is what has happened in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya. But remember when the Taliban were sheltering Al Qaeda and Iraq, Syria and Libya were starting wars and developing WMDs? ;)


…The difficult the U.S. faces in places like Afghanistan, in my view, is not because some elusive nature of terrorism or insurgency, but because it is not [i]just an engagement of arms, but also a clash of political systems that the U.S. military finds difficult to navigate.

Not at all. Look at the reconstruction efforts and engagement in the former Confederacy, Germany, Japan, Italy or American engagement with non-adversaries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Canada, Western Europe and now much of Eastern Europe. Look at the strongmen that the United States depended on in those countries where it wasn’t worth the bother…

Unfortunately, Americans want to have strong and friendly states in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria, with the least amount of effort. It doesn’t work that way.


The military would therefore do well step outside of its own uniform and assess the conditions in which it exists, and ask itself if it is prepared to meet emerging challenges to security. A small, professional, highly technical army works in today's political context (for the most part). But will it work in the next? And what is that next context? And when will it arrive?

It will depend upon technology. Automation and artificial intelligence indicate that we will require smaller militaries, or perhaps have more of the personnel operating unmanned platforms. As these systems are expensive, it is preferable to have as many people working in the private sector and paying taxes to support these developments rather than clinging to old military bureaucracies. Remember in 1968 when Soviet farm trucks were commandeered by the Warsaw Pact for the invasion of Czechoslovakia? That’s not what we want…

[Azor]

I don't believe I am playing it safe. I believe that Clausewitzian "war" is all about politics and the political realm, where natural war is a natural state of human affairs that never changes.

" I define natural war as non-spontaneous, organized, lethal violence committed by one identifiable group of people against another identifiable group of people, executed by warriors and morally sanctioned by the entire group, for some purpose other than the violence itself. There are seven elements to this definition:
1.war is not a spontaneous act of violence like a riot;
2.war is organized—even simple raids by one group against another require planning and preparation;
3.from the onset, the probability of the violence leading to death on either or both sides is understood;
4.the fighting involves two groups that have a distinguishable identity based in anything from familial relationships (hunter-gatherer bands), to ethnic identity, religious identity, national identity, or ideological identity;
5.war is generally executed by a subpart of the group, the warriors;
6.the killing is morally sanctioned by the rest of the group—the warriors are not viewed as criminals; and
7.it is for a purpose other than simply violence, such as to gain resources, eliminate competition for resources, or to retaliate for attacks or territorial incursions."

"There Is Only War, But War Isn’t Always Political (http://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/11/15/there-is-only-war-but-war-isnt-always-political)"

In that same paper I argue that our ideas about what war is and how it should be fought have transitioned in the last five centuries or so from "natural war" to "political war," which has a number of rules about legitimate targets and proportionality. So I truly believe that war has always been the same, but our political frame of reference both expands war into areas that are not lethal (like cyber warfare) and limits war by constricting legitimate targets (surrounding a city and starving out the population is now not war, but a crime).

In today's modern, political society, everything is defined by the frame of reference we surround ourselves with, including war. As that frame of reference changes, so do our ideas about war. What I think AP is saying is that, not everyone agrees with our ideas about what a government should look like. Because of that, their definition of "war" is different from ours. As a result of that, how it is fought and, most important, what it takes to win (or lose) is different than ours. We can fight till we are blue in the face, but we are, in essence, not fighting against each other but fighting past each other. I believe that is the crux of the problem both AP and I are thinking about.

Thanks for clarifying my thoughts, I know what my next paper will be about.

Lt. Col.,

I mostly agree with your take on “terrorism”. Firstly, I have always been of the opinion that it is unconventional warfare. Secondly, states have always been worse terrorists than non-state actors, and invariably refer to their enemies (usually unarmed civilians and their own citizens) as terrorists. On the one hand, terrorism as a term has been rendered almost meaningless; on the other, it is used so often that it cannot be ignored, and tends to mean indiscriminate violence and/or violence against civilians by non-state actors.

Technology is an issue as well. The types of improvised explosive devices utilized by the NLF/NVA against American forces in Vietnam were not available to the resistance movements of World War II. Quite frankly, the insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq had an abundance of explosive and detonation devices unavailable to prior guerrilla/terrorist forces.

One question, I would have for you is the moral sanctioning of non-state actors. What "entire groups" are specifically sanctioning Al Qaeda, Daesh and their affiliates? The Taliban is very much a Pashtun movement, and Hezbollah is a Shia movement, so I've left them out...

[davidbfpo]

I was struck by more this passage fits here:
The reduction in the numbers of people buying high quality newspapers in Britain in recent decades has led to a diminution in the amount of first-class journalism (https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/VIRTUOUS/CHAPTER4.PDF) available. Together with the digital revolution in accessing information, this has made serious minded media debate on issues like terrorism more difficult.

The author is Professor Richard English, based @ Queens University Belfast and the passage is within a comment on the Westminster attack, so covered in another thread.
Link:https://theconversation.com/the-media-must-respond-more-responsibly-to-terrorist-attacks-heres-how-75490? (https://theconversation.com/the-media-must-respond-more-responsibly-to-terrorist-attacks-heres-how-75490?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20 for%20April%205%202017%20-%2071275378&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20f or%20April%205%202017%20-%2071275378+CID_17705a303dea8ddd66c94e6fd1946564&utm_source=campaign_monitor_uk&utm_term=The%20media%20must%20respond%20more%20res ponsibly%20to%20terrorist%20attacks%20%20heres%20h ow)

[TheCurmudgeon]

Thank you for your kind words. It is nice to know that I am not just crazy.



Technology is an issue as well. The types of improvised explosive devices utilized by the NLF/NVA against American forces in Vietnam were not available to the resistance movements of World War II. Quite frankly, the insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq had an abundance of explosive and detonation devices unavailable to prior guerrilla/terrorist forces. ...

I have always viewed technological advances in warfare the same way I view science fiction. Good science fiction places humans in a world of fantasy or advanced technology, but what actually does is reveal a "truth" about the human condition. That despite all the changes in the world, people are still people. So is the same for warfare and technology. Technology makes new ways of warfare possible, but it does not fundamentally change human nature.


One question, I would have for you is the moral sanctioning of non-state actors. What "entire groups" are specifically sanctioning Al Qaeda, Daesh and their affiliates? The Taliban is very much a Pashtun movement, and Hezbollah is a Shia movement, so I've left them out...

In the case of al Qaeda (and to a lesser extent, Daesh), I would argue that it is the Wahhabists of Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations. I am less sure about their support in Persian cultures. In the early days, that was the source of these groups funding. That is the community where their actions are most often morally sanctioned.

I have read a study that indicated that there was wider support amongst the Muslim community in Morocco and a few other Arab Countries for the activities of al Qaeda. It was from Pew (http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/05/23/where-terrorism-finds-support-in-the-muslim-world/) and it was on the public support for terrorists. I am cautious of this study, but it would provide support for the idea that the activities of al Qaeda are morally sanctioned by a much wider group than simply some Salafists in Saudi Arabia.

[Azor]

In the case of al Qaeda (and to a lesser extent, Daesh), I would argue that it is the Wahhabists of Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations. I am less sure about their support in Persian cultures. In the early days, that was the source of these groups funding. That is the community where their actions are most often morally sanctioned.

I have read a study that indicated that there was wider support amongst the Muslim community in Morocco and a few other Arab Countries for the activities of al Qaeda. It was from Pew (http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/05/23/where-terrorism-finds-support-in-the-muslim-world/) and it was on the public support for terrorists. I am cautious of this study, but it would provide support for the idea that the activities of al Qaeda are morally sanctioned by a much wider group than simply some Salafists in Saudi Arabia.

I'm setting my timer. The Spanish Inquisition of Outlaw, CrowBat, RantCorp and others are coming to explain the nuances of Sunni fundamentalism... ;)

I tried to estimate how many Muslims of the total population were part of armed Islamist formations, and basically arrived at half the proportion of Northern Irish Catholics who were members of the PIRA, INLA, etc. I included parts of the Sudanese and Iranian militaries in my estimates, but it does indicate that Muslim conflicts with non-Muslims tend to be local affairs, and in a number of cases are state-sponsored or led e.g. Darfur. Curiously, only the numbers for Hezbollah and Hamas are in the range of "total war" mobilization, although I suspect much of this strength is dead weight collecting or extorting money, or non-combatants.

With respect to technology, were insurgents denied access to the IEDs used to destroy US vehicles remotely or RPGs, the casualty ratio would be simply eye-watering for them, and about as worth the effort as standing fast in 1991 or 2001...

[TheCurmudgeon]

I'm setting my timer. The Spanish Inquisition of Outlaw, CrowBat, RantCorp and others are coming to explain the nuances of Sunni fundamentalism... ;)... I am fine with that. I don't find the term "Sunni Fundamentalism" helpful. Fundamentalism offers a level of correctness to their thinking that I don't think it deserves, so they can beat me up on that too. :p


I tried to estimate how many Muslims of the total population were part of armed Islamist formations, and basically arrived at half the proportion of Northern Irish Catholics who were members of the PIRA, INLA, etc. I included parts of the Sudanese and Iranian militaries in my estimates, but it does indicate that Muslim conflicts with non-Muslims tend to be local affairs, and in a number of cases are state-sponsored or led e.g. Darfur. Curiously, only the numbers for Hezbollah and Hamas are in the range of "total war" mobilization, although I suspect much of this strength is dead weight collecting or extorting money, or non-combatants....

I like your comparison with the IRA. I believe that, in 1975 you would have found that half the population of Boston would have "morally sanctioned" the actions of the IRA. But they did not hop a plane to Belfast (although some did).

I think it is very hard to equate who morally sanctions the actions of the terrorists with who would actively engage in the fight, although it is far to equate that number with who you have to convince that the terrorists are not worthy of their support.

[Azor]

I wish I’d seen this sooner, but the one man blog known as Outlaw can bury the “Recent Council Posts” list inside of an hour.


I am fine with that. I don't find the term "Sunni Fundamentalism" helpful. Fundamentalism offers a level of correctness to their thinking that I don't think it deserves, so they can beat me up on that too. :p

Well, I used “Sunni fundamentalism” rather deliberately. I do think that those guys do have a good point about distinguishing Salafism from Wahhabism, as the latter involves acquiescing to the authority of church and state, whereas the former involves establishing a revolutionary authority over both the spiritual and the temporal. Neither Bin Laden nor Al Baghdadi recognize(d) any authority higher than themselves, and Al Baghdadi has taken on this role of supreme leader in a way that even Bin Laden never did. Of course, Mohammed and Qutb are both conveniently dead, just as Lenin was in 1929 prior to Russia’s Third Revolution. Certainly, there is a great deal of philosophical overlap between Salafism and Wahhabism as regards asceticism and dismissal of other Muslim sects as heretical, but what should interest us is auctoritas and potestas, and more specifically, who is permitted to do violence to whom and why, as well as who grants permission to do so.


I like your comparison with the IRA. I believe that, in 1975 you would have found that half the population of Boston would have "morally sanctioned" the actions of the IRA. But they did not hop a plane to Belfast (although some did).

I’m a numbers guy. I started out by quantifying insurgency death rates to determine at what point there was acceptance of a problem. The conflict in Northern Ireland was actually the least troublesome of all modern insurgencies in terms of the violence meted out on all sides e.g. the black-on-black homicide rate is actually three times higher than the death rate in Northern Ireland annualized per hundred thousand. My digression helped me to understand racial divides in the United States as some groups were experiencing life in a warzone by any other name, while others had no comprehension of the killing in their own country.

So, suffice it to say, Northern Ireland is my benchmark, or more accurately my floor, against which I compare other episodes of violence, from the Malayan Emergency to Vietnam to America’s occupations in the Middle East. Curiously enough, whether we are talking about Northern Ireland or Irish political violence from 1919 to 1999, the conflict was overwhelmingly one of islanders killing islanders, with under 10% of the fatalities being residents of England, Scotland or Wales.

Throughout the Troubles in Northern Ireland, roughly 0.08% of both the Protestant and Catholic populations were members of paramilitaries. Currently, roughly 0.14% of the Pashtun people are members of the Taliban, so clearly their “hearts and minds” aren’t won over. You probably have more of a feel for Afghanistan than I do, but I am convinced that Pashtun ethno-nationalism was subverted by Pakistan into radical Islam in order to: (a) prevent secession and (b) give Pakistan a hand in Afghan affairs, not unlike what Putin seeks by way of “Novorossiya”. One might suggest giving the Pashtuns a nation carved out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, but the latter could never accept that lest the Balochis fly the coop as well, and it does have nuclear weapons. Therefore, the only sensible solution would be to abandon southern Afghanistan as a no-man’s land, build up the state in the north and keep the Pashtuns out so long as they accept Taliban rule.

With regards to “moral sanctioning”, I appreciate Outlaw’s updates on the Russo-Ukrainian War, but I am apprehensive of some of the sentiments expressed in Ukraine, particularly the lionizing of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Zaporizhian Cossacks under Khmelnytsky. I am supportive of Ukraine’s right to self-determination, but unfortunately, the Ukrainians’ two great bids for independence (17th and 20th Centuries) saw Ukrainians spend more time annihilating Jews (vast majority of deaths inflicted) than fighting for an independent state (killing foreign soldiers). Again, the devil is in the numbers.


I think it is very hard to equate who morally sanctions the actions of the terrorists with who would actively engage in the fight, although it is far to equate that number with who you have to convince that the terrorists are not worthy of their support.

Well, unless one is prepared to use Stalinist methods :) , one has to convince the guerrillas/terrorists’ supporters to abandon them. Northern Ireland went through a tragic cycle of Protestant supremacists successfully suppressing Catholic egalitarian integrationists, and then being forced to deal with violent Catholic supremacist separatists. After three decades of conflict, the Catholics finally accepted the terms that they had originally asked for in the early-to-mid-1960s, and supremacists on both sides were forced to more or less go along with it.

[OUTLAW 09]

I am fine with that. I don't find the term "Sunni Fundamentalism" helpful. Fundamentalism offers a level of correctness to their thinking that I don't think it deserves, so they can beat me up on that too. :p



I like your comparison with the IRA. I believe that, in 1975 you would have found that half the population of Boston would have "morally sanctioned" the actions of the IRA. But they did not hop a plane to Belfast (although some did).

I think it is very hard to equate who morally sanctions the actions of the terrorists with who would actively engage in the fight, although it is far to equate that number with who you have to convince that the terrorists are not worthy of their support.

I will not beat anyone up....but think about this....all ideologies and or religious beliefs have a "fundamentalist side to them"...."fundamentalist" meaning "conservative".....AND that since the Romans....actually even earlier than that at least if it was ever physically and verbally recorded....

If one takes say the simple term "terrorism" and places it at the top of a drawn "violence" circle and then moves to the "right" and moves then to the "left" from the starting point....AT some point all "violence" from "left and right" meets in the circle at the 6 oclock point on the "violence circle".......AND then continues onward meeting again at the top of the violence circle so when the violence from "left and right" crosses and merges and runs parallel as both share the same dislikes and enemies what do you call it then???

Violence in some form always has and always will exist even in the 21st century....

What is new is the cyber and info war side of this equation ....using both of these key cornerstones of hybrid warfare...will there ever really be another "war" as we know the term war means?

IMHO...the answer is yes there will be some form of "war violence" accompanying the two cornerstones.....

Where humans interact..is always some form of "violence"....we all are not yet robots driven by AI.....

BTWE...if one really goes back into the history of the US from the 1600s until say VN .....how many true "wars" were there VS....truly how many "small wars" as defined by the SWC/Marine definition of a "small war".....IF we count the US Civil War....then five from 1600s onward....

How many "small wars" tens of tens.......in some ways....the 21st century will be seen as the century of the "small wars" fought using cyber...trade...economics...personal development ...information warfare....religion..........with the new political ideology being "populism"......with a tinge of nationalism....

[Azor]

BTW..this is the most perfect example of just how info warfare is flowing these days....

The first tweets under the hashtag #SyriaHoax came from Russia. Cernovich picked up on it; now it's trending in the U.S via the US alt right sites....Infowars and Breitbart.com and Drudge Reports.....

So is this to be considered "a small war being fought via information warfare"....or is it "political warfare"....or "hybrid warfare"......or just good ole fashioned everyday politics"

In the 21st century these terms are fluid and will constantly change....but there is an underlining term that covers them all..."war short of violence".....

Hey now! Is this meta-warfare or is every thread going to be about the Syrian CW attack and US airstrike?

[OUTLAW 09]

BTW....it is not globalization that is inherently changing the face of governments and their individual politics...it is simply that we are in the early stages of the "fourth industrialization phase...IE robots" and actually while we write here the world is advancing into the "fifth industrialization phase paralleling the fourth phase...IE AI"...coupled with the 4th....robots......

We see it in the manufacturing and then the repair of say as an example farm machinery where grain harvesters now require a mechanics degree in IT and computer troubling shooting to repair a simple hydraulic leak....as they have five onboard computer systems tied to a central controller computer.

OR in the newest FORD factory that produces cars virtually worker free where the robots do everything and the human watches the control centers...AND where even this position will be replaced next year with AI..as per FORD...BMW has already moved into this new "industrialization battlespace using a combination of robots and AI in building the 3er model here in Germany....

AND BTW....prior wars were all about killing and destruction in order to force your will on your opponent....

SO is a cyber attack and or subtle manipulation of say an election via hacking and an influence ops using fake news...propaganda and disinformation actually forcing your will on an opponent?

So as industrialization changes so does future "wars" of the 21st century...

To argue that "war" has never changed ....flies in the face of 21st century reality....

Recently I was into a book by Max Boot on US small wars and then onto the industrialization/globalization driven by all things WW1.

If the thesis is correct that WW1 actually drove the initial beginnings of globalization and say the beginnings of the second industrial revolution of mass assembly lines and the firming of the US financial power going in 1913 from a debtor country to in 1917 the foremost world's banker which did not change until the early 1980's flipping the US back into a debtor country.....the flip in the 80s was the direct financial impact of VN seen long term.....

And actually with each new "war like political engagement" the US financial abilities weakened even more.....Desert Storm....Iraq and AFG and now Syria....but the resulting modernization of the industrial base did in fact advance along with a massive leap in technology....all driven by computerization....

Which actually could be now seen in the generation one of cruise missiles...prior to Libya VS generation two post Libya cruise missiles....

Actually wagging tongues say the US Navy literally fired up all the first generation cruise missiles in order to restock with the new generation...if one compares the number of misfires..."lost missiles" and duds on impact in Libya VS this recent attack with 59 out of 59 hitting there is something to this wagging tongues rumor....

Maybe far more research on wars and how they drive globalization and industrialization is necessary before one moves into a "no war" concept....

Because actually if one takes WW1...then WW2...then the Korean War and finally VN....you will actually see not so subtle shifts in financial power and industrial power .....both keys to understanding the long term effects we are now seeing in 21st century.. where from a cost perspective...major wars are a thing of the past....

Hybrid wars regardless of how they look and feel are actually "a cost saving "war" feature"......

A laptop.....TOR and the darknet is a minor investment that can reap massive "wins" and informational warfare conducted by a group of twitter accounts driving fake news can potentially "win elections" and the costs are nothing really...costs far less than a single tank...and or a cruise missile.

BTW...one cannot discuss meta-war without understanding clearly and concisely what we are now seeing as the two cornerstones of the 21st century;......

1. cyber warfare
2. information warfare

Both are going to be the hallmarks of the 21st century as even the simple common man on the street can drive both and not be connected to any nation state....

[OUTLAW 09]

Hey now! Is this meta-warfare or is every thread going to be about the Syrian CW attack and US airstrike?

BUT in theory...when one questions just how a population supports say the IRA and Boston was a main support center both for manpower and money ......propaganda and fake news drove that narrative....

I know spent a lot of time in Boston and my MA is from Boston University....and I lived in "Southy"....and still have family there...

If you do not thoroughly understand just how information/money drives events and how that information/money can be twisted to support just about anything then you cannot move onto anything else.....

BTW....was I correct or not with Russian election involvement when you gave me grieve about my positions....was I correct on Syria and Ukraine....the current problem is that I do not believe we have in the US any capable leader that can lead the US out of a wet paper bag these days....

And that Steele dossier....largely proven to be correct especially since we are now at four dead Russians mentioned in the dossier later....

[OUTLAW 09]

Azor...here is the critical sentence that triggered this thread......


If war is essentially a political act, then the sophistication of warfare follows the sophistication of political systems. War, in essence, reflects the political system from which it emerges.

My argument is that with the advances in 1) cyber warfare and 2) information warfare that we are literally in the midst of.....until one thoroughly research's the far reaching impacts of both of these.....on the "political system"......Then you are simply spinning empty cycles of time/space ....and going nowhere...

I might have argued that actually the sophistication of warfare ACTUALLY drives the sophistication of industrialization and finance which in turn drives "globalization" WHICH then impacts squarely the "political system"....WHICH then struggles to even try to catch up with the developments going on around it.

Why did I include the term "financial"....check all recent from say 1975 fair trade agreements including the proposed TTP and TTIP....they all have had difficulties in formulation during negotiations in this key area...."Services".......

"Services" meaning banks...hedge funds...investment flows ie money and how it flows and how it will be taxed and or not taxed....etc....

Example......check out the total amount of the current UK yearly budget and how much of that budget is earned in taxes by the financial services industry located in the "City" of London....

[OUTLAW 09]

BTW...perfect example of just how fast this world of ours is turning right now.....

Who would have thought the Iraqi Shia Mullah Sadr would be calling for the removal of an Alewife aligned with Iran....

So in the middle of the Syrian "war" suddenly a "political" voice stands up and makes a far reaching statement....so is the sophistication of war driving the sophistication of politics...OR in this case vice versa?

Sadr issues a statement calling on Assad to resign.
via @alsumariatv
http://www.alsumaria.tv/news/200223/alsumaria-news/ar#

Moqtada al-Sadr calls on all military forces (Russia and the armed factions) to withdraw from #syria

[TheCurmudgeon]

I'm not really sure where this train of thought is going yet. I am approaching the dissertation phase of my education, and the closer I get, the less sure I am about which idea/research to pursue. I wonder about the paradigm shift in military-political theory recognized by Clausewitz, and if we are still trapped within that frame of thinking when thinking about warfare. And if we are in the intellectual trap, how do we recognize it and prevent surprise when the paradigm shifts again?

AP, just letting you know I am going to write something on this. I think our thought patterns are far enough apart for me not to be plagiarizing your idea. I will post an outline when I have one to let you see it.

Good luck on your research.

[AmericanPride]

AP, just letting you know I am going to write something on this. I think our thought patterns are far enough apart for me not to be plagiarizing your idea. I will post an outline when I have one to let you see it.

Good luck on your research.

Sounds good. Looking forward to seeing what you write.

[AmericanPride]

Azor...here is the critical sentence that triggered this thread......



My argument is that with the advances in 1) cyber warfare and 2) information warfare that we are literally in the midst of.....until one thoroughly research's the far reaching impacts of both of these.....on the "political system"......Then you are simply spinning empty cycles of time/space ....and going nowhere...

I might have argued that actually the sophistication of warfare ACTUALLY drives the sophistication of industrialization and finance which in turn drives "globalization" WHICH then impacts squarely the "political system"....WHICH then struggles to even try to catch up with the developments going on around it.

Why did I include the term "financial"....check all recent from say 1975 fair trade agreements including the proposed TTP and TTIP....they all have had difficulties in formulation during negotiations in this key area...."Services".......

"Services" meaning banks...hedge funds...investment flows ie money and how it flows and how it will be taxed and or not taxed....etc....

Example......check out the total amount of the current UK yearly budget and how much of that budget is earned in taxes by the financial services industry located in the "City" of London....

So to sum up our differences, we see the direction of the relationship as different. I think this is a chicken vs egg question: what emerged first, war or the state? Most material historical explanations generally start with the creation of economic relations which in turn produce a political system to sustain it, and a security apparatus to protect it. In the 20th century, many of the military technological advances were produced by states intent on maximizing their chances of victory in an environment of total war. The great powers entered World War I with the old world sense of horse trading territories before recognizing that revolutionary nature of the war that imperialism had created. In this sense, the political system pushed states to the logical extremes of total state destruction, to be repeated again in WW2.

But I also recognize that this process is a negotiation between political sophistication and military sophistication. Many things today, such as cyber warfare, would not be possible without technological advancement.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Sounds good. Looking forward to seeing what you write.

Here is the introduction. It lays out the paper

Intro

The purpose of this paper is to explore how defining an enemy’s political center of gravity can help build a strategy to defeat the enemy. The point it to identify primary and supporting elements of our enemy’s political power in order to allow us to better target those power centers. If war is truly an extension of politics by other means, then the source of our enemy’s political power is a valid, if not critical, target. Therefore, accurately identifying that target, and understanding how to eliminate, preempt, or co-opt its power, is a critical part of any strategy.

The paper is laid out in four sections. The first is assumptions and definitions. Terms like “political warfare” and “hybrid warfare” may not have the same meaning to everyone, and it is always useful to explain any assumptions. Second is the idea of a political center of gravity. I explore three primary centers as well as several supporting elements that can reinforce the political center. Next is a short section on the strengths and weaknesses of each political center of gravity. Finally, I will conclude with some thoughts on the offensive and defensive applications of the ideas presented here.

[Bill Moore]

C,

I'm confident you realize this isn't new ground, political warfare is quite old, but like war itself it's character changes based on changes in political, economic, social systems, and technology. It needs to be explored more as a topic, but the CIA, State, USIS, and to a lesser extent special operations have experience in this realm. Victories in this area were generally short lived when applied offensively, but I think it offers a lot of promise employed defensively.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Open for criticism - my draft list of definitions

Definitions
1. Political War. The employment of all the means at a Political Entity’s command, short of organized lethal force, to compel an enemy to do its will.

2. Kinetic War. The employment of organized, legally recognized lethal force by a Political Entity to compel an enemy to do its will.

3. Terrorism. The employment of illegal lethal force by a political actor or Political Entity to compel an enemy to do its will.

4. Hybrid War. The employment of a combination of Political War, Kinetic War, and/or Terrorism by a Political Entity to compel an enemy to do its will. Hybrid War usually involves low-intensity conflict and the true antagonist pressing the conflict may be obscured.

5. Political. The “political” is a principal around which a people identify, organize, and bind themselves separate from other peoples. As used here, it is an abstract, values based ideal separate from politics, which are the day-to-day operations of a political entity. The easiest way to think of it is as the term “political legitimacy” shortened to leave out the term “legitimacy.”

6. Political Entity. A group of people organized around a political ideal. They could be anything from a State to a terrorist organization. They are distinguished from other groups, like criminal or religious organizations, by their intent to control the traditional aspects of political power, like the creation, operation and application of civil and criminal laws; collection of revenue and the distribution of goods and services for the general welfare; the uncontested application of legitimate force; and provisions for the common defense.

7. Political Center of Gravity (PCoG). The PCoG is the source of the Political System’s power. It is what binds the people together as a group and gives them their motivation to act in concert towards a specific political or military goal.

8. Political System. Political systems are typologies of the various ideals people use to bind themselves into a political element with the purpose of controlling the traditional aspects of political power.

9. Autocratic System. A political system where political power emanates from a central authority. The governing authority has absolute, or near absolute power and is not answerable to the general population.

10. Democratic System. A political system where political power emanates from the general population. The governing authority is answerable to the general population, who are the true source of political power.

11. Ideological System. A political system where political power emanates from a guiding Ideology. The governing authority draws it power from the population’s belief in the ideology.

In a footnote I will probably add that Political War may involve the application of covert lethal force on a targeted basis (assassinations, elimination of spies, etc.)

[Bill Moore]

Responses will come in bits and pieces starting with this.

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/a-curators-pocket-history-of-the-cia/Curator-Pocket-History-CIA.pdf


The US Government had to learn how to conduct secret operations in the Cold War. Few precedents existed. The primary mission was relatively straightforward: predict if/how/when the Cold War could become a hot war—to prevent another Pearl Harbor. Paramilitary initiatives also followed from World War II experience.

But what about political warfare, that is, influencing political outcomes without
showing the hand of the US Government? The threat was relatively easy to
grasp, but the possible American responses took some time to develop. As the
eminent diplomat George Kennan put it, “We were alarmed at the inroads of…
Russian influence in Western Europe…particularly over the situation in France
and Italy. We felt that the communists were using…very extensive funds…to gain control of key elements of [political] life in France and Italy, particularly the…press, the labor unions, [and] student organizations.” To counter the threat, in 1948 the Truman Administration decided to use the CIA to provide secret campaign funds to Italy’s pro-western Christian Democratic Party. The Christian Democrats won the election, averting a possible communist takeover and establishing a precedent. The CIA proceeded with operations in Iran—in concert with the British—and in Guatemala to install pro-Western governments.

[TheCurmudgeon]

C,

I'm confident you realize this isn't new ground, political warfare is quite old, but like war itself it's character changes based on changes in political, economic, social systems, and technology. It needs to be explored more as a topic, but the CIA, State, USIS, and to a lesser extent special operations have experience in this realm. Victories in this area were generally short lived when applied offensively, but I think it offers a lot of promise employed defensively.

I do, but I think that distinguishing the nature of the target makes a difference.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/resources/ndu/pwpor.pdf

On page 77


Politics is the marshaling of human beings to support or oppose causes. Political warfare is the marshaling of human support, or opposition, in order to achieve victory in war or in unbloody conflicts as serious as war.

We have new terms now, and we don't agree on the boundaries of what war is, but I think you tweak this one to your view. Foremost I think it is important to concisely describe what politics are as the above definition does, and then apply that to what you mean by political warfare.

In the next piece Max Boot uses Kenan's definition of political warfare. Personally, I find this too broad of description and not overly useful. Statecraft yes, but not all Statecraft is political warfare.

http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/political-warfare/p30894


This concept was defined in a May 4, 1948, memorandum produced by the State Department's policy planning staff under George Kennan:

The bold highlights are mine, because I don't believe political warfare necessarily comes to an end in times of armed conflict, in fact it should intensify.


Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP—the Marshall Plan), and "white" propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.

During WWII the British principally defined political warfare as propaganda, but were careful not to limit it to propaganda.

https://www.psywar.org/psywar/reproductions/MeanTechMethod.pdf


Political Warfare employs both publicity and propaganda. That is to say, it can and must be as objective as possible in its projection of the British or Allied case. It, too, has to seek the good will of those in enemy and enemy-occupied countries who are already sympathetic to that case. It has to demonstrate and not merely claim the certainty of victory. It has to show by force of example that we have something better to offer than the Nazis. It has to establish the veracity of the news in order to win confidence for its propaganda and to build an audience through which it can achieve its eventual purpose.

(xi) There is, however, no intrinsic virtue in news; news is a device of Political Warfare; it is a necessity which we can make a virtue, since, as stated above, news is the most potent means of attracting and building up an audience.

Fake news has a long history, but the scale and sophistication of it in the 21st Century is a perfect example of political warfare. Our election results, our political bedrock is the legitimacy of our democracy, remain questionable by some. Fake News and exaggerations of actual events have pushed Europe further to the right, and the EU is a risk of fracturing further, clearly a Russian objective.

Finally the following piece, while focused on domestic U.S. politics and be applied to the larger picture.

http://libertypoint.org/?page_id=156

The Six Principles of Political Warfare

Three of the principles follow:


In political wars, the aggressor usually prevails.

Aggression is advantageous because politics is a war of position. In attacking your opponent, take care to do it right. Going negative … can be counterproductive. Ruling out the negative … can incur an even greater risk.


Position is defined by fear and hope.

The twin emotions of politics are fear and hope… hope is the better choice.


The weapons of politics are symbols that evoke fear and hope.

I found these interesting, because I attended an interagency working group discussing political warfare, and a government member present partly responsible for countering the use of adversary propaganda, said he or she didn't feel compelled to counter Russia's maligned propaganda because no one believes it. He or she may feel differently now, but we tend to view the world through our own eyes naturally. People in some government agencies are well educated (not the same as street smart), so they assume everyone is aware of what is propaganda and what isn't. As the principle clearly states, the aggressor usually wins.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Bill,

Thanks. I have the Kennan Memo as well as some other documents. My definition is a mix of Kennan and Clausewitz. I am trying to stick with a "bright line" distinction of 1) Political - Less than organized Lethal Violence, 2) Kinetic - Organized Legal Lethal Violence, and 3) Terrorism - Organized Illegal Lethal Violence. Hybrid is a mix, usually on a Low Intensity level.

I don't expect to spend a lot of time on them. I just want it clear (as it can be) what I am talking about so that definitional arguments do not get in the way.

I do agree with the second part, about who wins (although I disagree in general with the Liberty Point article, which seems to be designed for domestic, not international conflicts). I think this is because we rarely recognize we are at war, or we misinterpret what is war for simple propaganda or terrorism. I also believe that Democracies are particularly vulnerable to this kind of attack, particularly at election time. Part of the reason for my taking up the subject.

[TheCurmudgeon]

More grist for the mill ...

"II. The Political Center of Gravity
The idea of an enemy’s center of gravity (CoG) originates with Clausewitz. He did not use the term consistently, and whether is it truly useful to military commanders is a matter of some dispute. As used here, it is the source of a Political Entity’s power. It that respect, it represents the prime target for Influence Campaigns. If our aim is to bend the enemy’s political will, then the PCoG represents the metaphorical point that we want to concentrate our major efforts.

The problem is that the PCoG is not a piece of armament or a physical location on the battlefield. It is a value laden ideal. It is, in a manner of speaking, an idea about how and why a people bind them together into a Political Entity. But more importantly, it is the source of political decision-making. Any attack on an enemy is designed to affect the enemy’s political will. Even in Kinetic War, it is so. You attack and destroy the enemy’s armies to cause the enemy to lose their will to fight. The destruction of the enemy is the act, but the goal is to cause the enemy to lose their will. The ultimate aim of the physical attack is to affect in the ethereal world of the PCoG.

I identify three types of PCoG: Autocratic, Democratic, and Ideological. These are pure types in the Weberian sense. No real Political Entity exists in these pure forms. But by using pure forms it makes them easier to recognize in the real world. It also makes their advantages and disadvantages clearer.

Autocratic Systems are the easiest to define. Except for some forays into Democratic governance in Ancient Greece and Rome, this this has been the dominant system of governance throughout the world’s history. These are the Monarchies, Empires, Principalities, and other political entities where political power vests in the central leader and their vassals. Historically power transferred down family lines. In the modern age the transition to power is rarely a matter of birthright. Power is seized by the dictator, with or without force, and legitimized by an election where there is only one viable candidate. This is often done with the backing of the majority of the population. As used here, the true autocratic system is not one where the population is enslaved. The majority of the population supports the dictator and is willing to fight and die for them. Think of Hitler or Kim Jong Un. The main point is that, in the eyes of the majority of the population, political power rightly vests in the person of the central leader, making the central leader the appropriate target of any Influence Campaign.

Democratic Systems are relatively new on the world stage. Once seen as the end of history, democracies have been in the decline in the last few years. Democracies are built on the ideal that political power vests in the individual and is granted to the government by the individual. The government acts on behalf of the people to advance the general welfare. Unlike an Autocratic System, the government is answerable to the general population, usually through elections. This means that the true source of political power is the general population and the appropriate target of an Influence Campaign is the general population.

Ideological Systems see a deeply held belief system as the source of political authority. These systems are rare. In most cases an ideology plays a supporting role in either a Democratic or an Autocratic system. For example, the ideal of human rights is a foundational belief in a Democracy, but political power still resides in the people. Three examples are Communism, Fascism, and Political Islam. In each the tenants of the ideology subsume the traditional aspects of political authority listed above. People follow these systems because they believe the core tenants of the Ideology represent revealed truth. Following the Ideology is not just the right path for the adherents, but the true path for all mankind. In that sense Ideological Systems are the most dangerous. All Ideological Systems require human actors to administer the system. There will be a Party Chair or a Caliph, but they are only worldly vessels. The real power lies in the Ideology. Which means the primary target of an Influence Campaign designed against an Ideological System is the Ideology itself."

I also had to add a definition:

12. Influence Campaign. A suite of operations that may include activities that fall into any, or all, of the forms of War (including Terrorism), designed to bend the will of, or destroy, the PCoG.

[Bill Moore]

A PCOG can be control over a nation's security forces. If there is chaos in the street, and the government in power loses control of its ability to impose control, then it will likely fall. We saw this play out during the Arab Spring, and the different outcomes between those who did and didn't. Kilcullen describes how terrorists wage political warfare through competitive control. They create chaos and a great deal of uncertainty, and then establish a new form of governance that reduces uncertainty. The communists did a form of this. Not all forms of political warfare are non-violent. What makes it political warfare is the objective.

[TheCurmudgeon]

A PCOG can be control over a nation's security forces. If there is chaos in the street, and the government in power loses control of its ability to impose control, then it will likely fall. We saw this play out during the Arab Spring, and the different outcomes between those who did and didn't. Kilcullen describes how terrorists wage political warfare through competitive control. They create chaos and a great deal of uncertainty, and then establish a new form of governance that reduces uncertainty. The communists did a form of this. Not all forms of political warfare are non-violent. What makes it political warfare is the objective.

But if there is chaos in the streets, something else has failed. That failure could be the result of strictly internal factors, or it could be the result of external Influence Operations. Destruction of the existing PCoG may be acceptable, but not if it creates a worse situation than the one that existed before.

[Bill Moore]

I'm looking at political warfare as practiced by other actors, not just the U.S. If part of PW is defense, perhaps counter UW in this case, then we need to understand the different strategies that may be employed against us. Sounds like you are focused on how the U.S. can employ it?

[TheCurmudgeon]

I'm looking at political warfare as practiced by other actors, not just the U.S. If part of PW is defense, perhaps counter UW in this case, then we need to understand the different strategies that may be employed against us. Sounds like you are focused on how the U.S. can employ it?

I am not looking at it as practiced by anyone. I am looking at it from a generic point of view. How does what I have said makes it U.S. unique?

[TheCurmudgeon]

I'm looking at political warfare as practiced by other actors, not just the U.S. If part of PW is defense, perhaps counter UW in this case, then we need to understand the different strategies that may be employed against us. Sounds like you are focused on how the U.S. can employ it?

I am pretty sure no one in the U.S.A. believes that Autocratic Systems are anything but oppressive governments where the population are downtrodden slaves who have no choice but to obey their overlords. In their minds there is no such thing as a popularly supported Dictator.

[Bill Moore]

I am pretty sure no one in the U.S.A. believes that Autocratic Systems are anything but oppressive governments where the population are downtrodden slaves who have no choice but to obey their overlords. In their minds there is no such thing as a popularly supported Dictator.

True in many cases, not all. However, that gets to my point about security forces being the COG versus a competitive idea or ideology. If the autocratic government is unpopular, then its center of gravity is arguably their control of their security forces. Severing the relationship is not sufficient, the opponent of the autocrat (whether internal or external to the country) still needs to generate a mass movement.

KJU in DPRK is an extreme case, where many people seemly believe the rest of the world lives in the same condition and KJU is truly the anointed one. However, more information getting in via business contacts, balloons, DVDs, etc. may develop cracks that can be exploited. If messaging from outside via the U.S., China, or South Korea promises a degree of economic and safety status quo to the security forces then a regime change is possible, but it will still be an autocratic government, but maybe one willing to work with the rest of the world?

Just throwing ideas out, the topic of PW fascinates me, and the Russians actually think we're quite good at it, even if we don't agree :D

[Azor]

Lt. Col.,

A couple of questions:

Firstly, are you conflating the terms "war" and "conflict"? The Cold War was a conflict that involved a series of violent wars and non-violent soft power, as well as violent and non-violent criminal activities.

Secondly, what does victory over or defeat of an adversary look like? For instance, if Putin is overthrown, would a civil war be considered a victory? Was victory achieved in Iraq or Libya? Can containment or deterrent of a threat be considered a victory? Basically defeat can range from behavior modification to incarceration to physical destruction...

[TheCurmudgeon]

Lt. Col.,

A couple of questions:

Firstly, are you conflating the terms "war" and "conflict"? The Cold War was a conflict that involved a series of violent wars and non-violent soft power, as well as violent and non-violent criminal activities.

Secondly, what does victory over or defeat of an adversary look like? For instance, if Putin is overthrown, would a civil war be considered a victory? Was victory achieved in Iraq or Libya? Can containment or deterrent of a threat be considered a victory? Basically defeat can range from behavior modification to incarceration to physical destruction...

To your first point, yes I am conflating the two. I will have to clarify that later.

To your second, I haven't gotten there yet. However, victory would look different in every situation. Take the Spanish Elections. Al Qaeda used violence (train bombings) for the political purpose of persuading Spain to remove its troops from Iraq. The government that was elected did so. That was victory. Since the point is to influence your adversary to do you will, victory could be as little as getting them to sign a favorable trade deal, or it could be as great as regime change.

[TheCurmudgeon]

True in many cases, not all. However, that gets to my point about security forces being the COG versus a competitive idea or ideology. If the autocratic government is unpopular, then its center of gravity is arguably their control of their security forces. Severing the relationship is not sufficient, the opponent of the autocrat (whether internal or external to the country) still needs to generate a mass movement.

KJU in DPRK is an extreme case, where many people seemly believe the rest of the world lives in the same condition and KJU is truly the anointed one. However, more information getting in via business contacts, balloons, DVDs, etc. may develop cracks that can be exploited. If messaging from outside via the U.S., China, or South Korea promises a degree of economic and safety status quo to the security forces then a regime change is possible, but it will still be an autocratic government, but maybe one willing to work with the rest of the world?

Just throwing ideas out, the topic of PW fascinates me, and the Russians actually think we're quite good at it, even if we don't agree :D

I see your point, and will have to address it later. I am hesitant to use the security forces as a singular entity. Think about Turkey, or even Thailand. In both cases the military have been actively involved in supporting or attacking regimes. But also it was not necessarily the security force that had the last word. The general population either supported the military or attacked them. So I am not sure it is as simple as we like.

I will throw out the next section, which covers supporting PCoG, and will definitely include security forces.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Rough draft - second part of PCoG discussion.

"Secondary Types. All Political Entities exist within a socio-cultural system. They are a part of that system, but not the only part. Other elements of that system interact with the Political Entity and can either support it or oppose it. The oft cited elements of national power – Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) -- are just such elements and represent tools that one nation can use to influence another. But, like tracers, they go both ways.

There are a myriad of supporting, or secondary types. The easiest way to think of these secondary types is through the metaphor of a man standing on a stool. The man is the primary PCoG. If I can influence him directly, I win. If I can’t, then I must look for another way. The secondary types are the legs of the stool. If I can cut deeply enough into one or more of those legs, I might be able to make the man unsteady, thus influencing the man just as if I had done it directly. Although there are probably dozens of secondary types, this paper only addresses a few.

Economic System/Support. Humans are economic animals. The complex social systems we build depend on economic activity. The people who make up every polity depend on the economic system to provide them with the opportunity to obtain the goods and services they need to survive and thrive. Even in the most independent of systems, the people still look to the political entity to provide the framework for a dependable economic system.

Security Forces. Security forces provide the basis of power for all political entities. In the case of a State, these are often the military and/or other security and intelligence agencies. In States, and lessor polities, these can also include private contractors or mercenaries, or militias made up of irregular forces.

Vassals or Key Supporters. These are individuals who provide the political leadership critical financial, military, or political support. In an Ideological System, these will include the actual leadership.

Ethnicity. Outside of family, ethnicity is probably the strongest physiological bond humans experience. It is often a critical part of how one defines themselves. It most likely defines what language a person speaks, what type of food the person grew-up eating, what region of the world the person lives, and potentially what religion they believe in as well as a plethora of cultural icons, common myths and fables, and historical stories. It provides an instant connection with others of the same ethnicity.

Religion. Religions provide not just a set of guiding moral principals, but also a sense of purpose. Religious leaders often are well respected in the community and are looked upon to provide guidance in difficult times.

Political Ideology. There are many political ideologies. Sometimes these are pure political theories, like Democracy or Anarchy. Sometimes they are a combination of political and economic theory, like Communism, Monarchy, and Socialism. On occasion, the political ideology and the Political System align, as in Democracy, but this is usually not the case. In most cases, the political ideology acts as a framework that bolsters and justifies the Political System. As such, while attacks against a political ideology will be useful, they are unlikely to be dispositive.

Individual Human Rights. Historically speaking, this is a new concept that is primarily a 17th Century Western invention. This is the idea that each person is a coequal with all other people when it comes to certain aspects of human life. These aspects are usually referred to as rights or freedoms, and include freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom to choose one’s own path in life.

National myths and Icons. Although often overlooked, a people are also bound by their common myths and Icons. In America, the Icon of Uncle Sam looms large in patriotic symbolism, as do stories of the founding fathers. These icons and stories can be used to support a political leader, or to attack them."

[AmericanPride]

Did political warfare exist before the modern nation-state? During feudalism, tribalism, or the ancient Roman/Greek era(s), were there forms of warfare that existed that don't now, or vice versa?

Realism obviously has a major influence in today's political-military thinking. Even self-professed true believers, whether communist or Islamist or fascist, are met with cynicism about their motives and their actions re-framed in the realist prism, which is a framework for nation-state conflict. But even fascism at its ideological core believed in warfare (and violence generally) as more than just diplomacy by other means- it was a purifying force for the individual and the nation. The state was the tool for war, not war a tool for the state.

A related question: when machines drive supply convoys, refuel unmanned aircraft, and perform increasingly more complex combat tasks, what happens to warfare? And when there are vast social changes - such as the displacement of factory workers, truck drivers, servers, and warehousing people - what happens to the political system? In some countries, the military forms a portion of the state's social welfare program, keeping the restless employed and off the street. Is that our future?

[davidbfpo]

Following a review and with the agreement of the original RFI author I have moved twelve posts - which do not sit here well - to the thread devoted to Russian Disinformation plus.

So if the exchange seems to stop and start check that thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=25056&page=23

[TheCurmudgeon]

Did political warfare exist before the modern nation-state? During feudalism, tribalism, or the ancient Roman/Greek era(s), were there forms of warfare that existed that don't now, or vice versa?

Realism obviously has a major influence in today's political-military thinking. Even self-professed true believers, whether communist or Islamist or fascist, are met with cynicism about their motives and their actions re-framed in the realist prism, which is a framework for nation-state conflict. But even fascism at its ideological core believed in warfare (and violence generally) as more than just diplomacy by other means- it was a purifying force for the individual and the nation. The state was the tool for war, not war a tool for the state.

Realism is useful as far as it goes. But as Clausewitz points out, you must have the passion of the people to complete the Triad of the Government, the Military, and the People. Realism would discount the passion of the people. Besides, the average person does not fight and die for realism.

Realism cannot explain humanitarian interventions, which date back at least as far as Oliver Cromwell and his military expedition to help the Huguenots in France. Only emotion, and the belief in a ideology (Protestantism) can cause people to go to a foriegn country, in which they have no rational interest, and fight a war.

In as far as I describe the Ideological Systems, it is to identify a COG. I believe that we have failed to identify the proper COG in groups like ISIS. We fight ISIS like it was any other Autocratic System, but it is not. It's true power does not emanate from al Baghdadi. It emanates from the dream of the Caliphate. At least that is my theory.


A related question: when machines drive supply convoys, refuel unmanned aircraft, and perform increasingly more complex combat tasks, what happens to warfare? And when there are vast social changes - such as the displacement of factory workers, truck drivers, servers, and warehousing people - what happens to the political system? In some countries, the military forms a portion of the state's social welfare program, keeping the restless employed and off the street. Is that our future?

This is a very interesting question, and well beyond me. I have seen strings of it in various places, including Rosa Brooks "How everything became war and the Military became everything." Somewhere out there is a paper (or book) that theorized that the middle class was created to fight wars (not far from the truth, at least in the case of Germany), and that, once robots take over the fighting, there will be no need for the middle class and they will be eliminated by the rich/elite.

In any case, I am not really in a good position to answer at this time.

[Azor]

To your first point, yes I am conflating the two. I will have to clarify that later.

To your second, I haven't gotten there yet. However, victory would look different in every situation. Take the Spanish Elections. Al Qaeda used violence (train bombings) for the political purpose of persuading Spain to remove its troops from Iraq. The government that was elected did so. That was victory. Since the point is to influence your adversary to do you will, victory could be as little as getting them to sign a favorable trade deal, or it could be as great as regime change.

I prefer the term "conflict" to "war", in this case. When I'm enjoying a UFC match and it turns into a bloody slugfest, I refer to it as a "war" and not a "conflict". Terms such as "economic warfare" and "lawfare" make sense, but for instance, the "Arab-Israeli Conflict" encompasses a number of wars, terrorist acts, police actions and non-violent struggles.

Indeed, the Spanish response to the Al Qaeda attack was absolutely craven, and contrasted to the French reaction to Daesh's attacks.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Indeed, the Spanish response to the Al Qaeda attack was absolutely craven, and contrasted to the French reaction to Daesh's attacks.

But the point is, they got what they wanted. They wanted the Spanish out of Iraq and they got it. They did not have to invade Spain. They did not have to do anything other than the bombing. It is one of the best examples of Terrorism succeeding. Plus, it would only work in a Democratic System. It was the population who capitulated and voted for the party who promised to get Spain out of Iraq. It is a perfect example of what I am talking about.

[Bill Moore]

Pardon the interruption, but I posted this link many moons ago, but it is worth resurfacing. I highly recommend watching Occupied on Netflix if you have not done so already. It is germane to the topic on this thread.

https://www.netflix.com/title/80092654

Then there was this article in SWJ a couple years back.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-inauguration-of-21st-century-political-warfare-a-strategy-for-countering-russian-non-li

[TheCurmudgeon]

Pardon the interruption, but I posted this link many moons ago, but it is worth resurfacing. I highly recommend watching Occupied on Netflix if you have not done so already. It is germane to the topic on this thread.

https://www.netflix.com/title/80092654

Then there was this article in SWJ a couple years back.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-inauguration-of-21st-century-political-warfare-a-strategy-for-countering-russian-non-li

Thanks for the article. I disagree with parts, especially the belief that these campaigns should be run by State, but it is very relevant.

[OUTLAW 09]

Following a review and with the agreement of the original RFI author I have moved twelve posts - which do not sit here well - to the thread devoted to Russian Disinformation plus.

So if the exchange seems to stop and start check that thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=25056&page=23

Then this is an interesting comment simply because if I read the RFI and the resulting comments on "political warfare"...then the current Russian cyber and info warfare BEING used to both support and drive "political warfare" is suddenly what "not political warfare" AS it has "emerged out of a political system which has it's on belief system that is driving that "political war"....

Makes no sense does it not to totally ignore a major component?

If in fact we together with Mirco Trend have actually been able to track this Russian state sponsored hacking group and it is a group and it is state sponsored then in fact this element is definitely "political warfare"....

Read the full report and then tell me seriously this is not a central element of "political warfare" by any definition that one wants to give "political warfare"...even by SWC standards.

https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-two-years-of-pawn-storm.pdf

Taken from the very first paragraph of the RFI if I am correct.....

I'd like to start a discussion on the sophistication of warfare; I don't mean the development of new technologies (essentially the spear and the rifle are the same weapon insofar they occupy the same space and serve the same purpose), but instead the expanding comprehensiveness of what's considered "warfare" - and, as a subset of that, the emergence of legal norms of what defines acceptable and unacceptable forms of warfare. If war is essentially a political act, then the sophistication of warfare follows the sophistication of political systems. War, in essence, reflects the political system from which it emerges.

THEN when we are actually confronted as a political system ie "the West" by a true form of "political warfare" that we can see....feel..touch and observe in real time......we do again exactly what...ignore it?

I could go back and link to a "political warfare article from "War on the Rocks" written in 2014 and the USA SOF White Paper on the same topic titled "Support to Political Warfare" which surprisingly while listed in Google is not available...which now Google cannot find the quoted page.


Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP—the Marshall Plan), and "white" propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.

If we are actually honest then "political warfare" has been with us since the first time humans formed any form of a "government"....what has changed are the abilities to employ it.

So when we have a living breathing actual form of it being shoved into our faces every day by Russia then suddenly those elements of "political warfare" are suddenly not part and parcel of political warfare?

BTW the way ...in this discussion I would like to see an accepted common definition that varies from the standard form...if it in fact varies from the above posted definition....which I do not think it has.

[OUTLAW 09]

If one noticed yesterday the large number of links went to hacked Russian emails of main/key political players actually practicing political warfare you would have been able to "see and understand" the mindset of those using political warfare...now one can see the "political system" in action employing political warfare...AND or one of the first solid articles on the use of Russian transnational gangs a true key element in Russian political warfare...

We have never really had that opportunity until years later when someone dies and we get access to their achieves.....

Recently we are being flooded with countless articles on this topic and other topics...deeply researched...well mostly researched...talking and writing but absolutely no research on the how to stop it.

Heck we cannot even get the current US WH to honestly admit they profited by active Russian influence operations and now we are going to stand up and stop it....

Until we can get away from nothing, but research articles and not to more ...this is way forward or this is one way of doing it...it is a waste of time..effort..and paper...

[OUTLAW 09]

If I go back to the list of RFI subsets....money is missing....why do I include that...the core Russian soft power lays within their use of money both legal and illegal in obtaining their political warfare goals....

While it is not such a major issue in the West...other than trying to figure out how to launder it....it is not used really as a "weaponized system" used in political warfare.

The West tends to use money in the form of financial based organizations...IMF...WorldBank....WTO etc.....to achieve it's goals...

The Russian Laundromat Exposed

https://www.occrp.org/en/laundromat/


Three years ago, OCCRP exposed the “Russian Laundromat” - an immense financial fraud scheme that enabled vast sums to be pumped out of Russia. The money was laundered and moved into Europe and beyond through bribery and a clever exploitation of the Moldovan legal system.
Recently, OCCRP and Novaya Gazeta obtained detailed banking records for more than 120 accounts that made up the Laundromat. We shared the data with dozens of reporters from around the world who tracked down the money locally. The results are "The Russian Laundromat Exposed" - a new project which reveals far more about how the scheme worked and where the money went. The stories below explain how more than $20.8 billion was taken out of Russia and laundered, who got the money, and why some of the world’s largest banks failed to shut the scheme down.

We have seen that Russian money flow being used to finance their info and cyber warfare globally...as it cannot be traced back to Russia and or a single Russian bank.....

[OUTLAW 09]

This is exactly why the US cannot and is not capable of responding to Russian political warfare and countering Russian cyber and information warfare....

"The world is moving too fast for the institutions we created in the 20th century." - General Jones

That is why social media and IT security companies are in fact leading the pushback...not the US government or it's agencies...and that includes DoD/DoS...as they are not tied to the 20th century structures....

[TheCurmudgeon]

Outlaw, when I get to a real computer and can type I want to respond to some comments you made earlier on Kirkullen.

Right now I want to go back to a point I believe Bill C made, that using the term "Political Warfare" is imprecise and confusing. The obvious alternative is "Political Conflict" but that seems too weak. Does anyone have another suggestion.

[Bill Moore]

I wouldn't worry about the confusion, don't define it, but describe it. The description will morph over time as its character changes. Army SF did more harm than good when it narrowly "defined" UW along organizational lines (underground, auxiliary, guerrilla force), which is basically nothing more than another weapon system to coerce. Political warfare is complex and many facets, that is just the way it is. If you do define it you'll have to limit your discussion to the narrow definition you applied to it. I know that is the army way, but then again the army is still trying to figure out how to use military force to achieve political objectives (different than political warfare) in the 21st Century.

[OUTLAW 09]

I wouldn't worry about the confusion, don't define it, but describe it. The description will morph over time as its character changes. Army SF did more harm than good when it narrowly "defined" UW along organizational lines (underground, auxiliary, guerrilla force), which is basically nothing more than another weapon system to coerce. Political warfare is complex and many facets, that is just the way it is. If you do define it you'll have to limit your discussion to the narrow definition you applied to it. I know that is the army way, but then again the army is still trying to figure out how to use military force to achieve political objectives (different than political warfare) in the 21st Century.

Actually a very good thought as it then allows the description to morph as does the environment....

IMHO I am far more concerned about "how that political warfare looks....feels....thinks....acts"....as they are the elements that a country being "attacked" will see and need to counter......

I know I am on a soap box but we are in fact "losing" the "war" and in my daily world it is a "grind it out war" against cyber and information warfare which both drives and supports "political warfare"....

This confirms a lot of what I have been saying when I say the US is losing...on both fronts...cyber and info warfare...

The US Takes On the World in NATO’s Cyber War Games in Tallinn
https://www.wired.com/2017/04/us-takes-world-natos-cyber-war-games/?mbid=social_twitter_onsiteshare#… via @WIRED

In this cyber war game, the Czechs won. The US came in 12th—a step up from last year's dead last.

Many readers here wonder why I keep repeating over and over..we are in fact losing to the Russian cyber and information war directed straight at the US..the above article answers that question in a very clear and concise way.

While we might have the greatest movers and shakers in Silicon Valley we have lost our tech edge and advantages in the cyber era long ago...as we do not focus on the younger generation and drive their tech learning/training/education opportunities as do a lot of other countries...who clearly recognize that value...

[davidbfpo]

Citing Outlaw09's last post in part:
While we (USA) might have the greatest movers and shakers in Silicon Valley we have lost our tech edge and advantages in the cyber era long ago...as we do not focus on the younger generation and drive their tech learning/training/education opportunities as do a lot of other countries...who clearly recognize that value...In the UK there has been an attempt to recruit young "techies" into government-run cyber roles in the last six years, which is reportedly hard to achieve. One explanation is the private sector pays better, shocking.:D Then there is the cultural aspect, are government, let alone military institutions in peacetime (as seen by them) places they would fit happily into.

A few years ago I attended a mainly British Army attendee conference on information operations; the vast majority of army attendees were either over-fifty or retirees on contracts. Hardly encouraging IMHO.

GCHQ and the Cabinet Office both have schemes, or are they plots underway to attract and educate talent. We shall see if they work.:wry:

[TheCurmudgeon]

Many readers here wonder why I keep repeating over and over..we are in fact losing to the Russian cyber and information war directed straight at the US..the above article answers that question in a very clear and concise way.

While we might have the greatest movers and shakers in Silicon Valley we have lost our tech edge and advantages in the cyber era long ago...as we do not focus on the younger generation and drive their tech learning/training/education opportunities as do a lot of other countries...who clearly recognize that value...

I would argue that we will never win an information war with Russia because any attack on Russian information is futile. The government power is not based in popular support, so information given to the general population will be of no effect. As long as we think that information will beat a dictator, we will be on the losing end of the war.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I am going to shift to "Political Hostilities." I want to be clear that what is happening does not include organized lethal violence. Discussions in the area are muddied enough. I would prefer some clear lines drawn in defining terms.

A political entity can engage in War Overtly, as in a declared war like Russia in Syria; Covertly, as in undeclared wars like Russia in the Ukraine; or via surrogates or proxies, like Russian support of the Taliban in Afghanistan. They can engage in Political Hostilities either independent of war or in conjunction with any of the three types of war.

The point of these terms are to identify WHAT is being conducted, not HOW it is being conducted. Terms like Irregular Warfare defines a HOW; a set of tactics used by the combatants.

This creates a quandary for me, as I see Terrorism as a HOW and not a WHAT. I my have to compromise on this one.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Next Section:

III. Strengths and Weaknesses.

As an opponent in a battle of political wills, each of the three Political Systems has strengths and weaknesses.

Autocratic Systems.

Strengths. An Autocratic System’s greatest strength is that all of the elements of national power are concentrated in a limited group of key players, including the entity's leader. This means that attacks on, or attempts to influence, other sources of power, like the population, are likely to be ineffectual. Depending on how repressive the regime is willing to be, even attempting to exploit cleavages in ethnic or religious segments of society may have little effect.

Weaknesses. In any medium to large size political entity, control cannot be effectively wielded by one person. This means that there will be a groups of close confidants or even family members, -- the Vassals -- who will have direct influence on the autocrat and some level of control. Some may even have aspirations to be the autocrat someday. Also, the autocrat’s ability to project power, both internally and externally, will be based on their security services, including their military. Finally, the autocrat needs to control the economy to be able to keep their Vassals happy and fund their military/security services. All of these are appropriate targets.

Democratic Systems.

Strengths. A Democratic System’s strength lies in its ability to distribute authority over a large number of people, who will act independently, but with a common purpose. Democracies tend to be wealthier, and because the population are not constrained by a centrally controlled market system, their economies will tend to be more diverse, which means that the economy itself is less likely to be effectively targeted.

Weaknesses. A Democratic System’s greatest weakness is its population, who can be fickle and easily influenced by demagogues. This makes coordinated action difficult to maintain over the long term except in times of direct threat (real or perceived). Also, ethnic or religious cleavages are easily exploited, as well as any other method that divides the unity of the group.

Ideological Systems.

Strengths. An Ideological System’s strength lies in its adherent’s dedication to the ideology. This devotion is individualized, which means that, unlike the Autocratic System, no single leader or group of leaders is likely to be critical to the group’s survival. This individualized devotion means that, like a Democratic System, authority to act can be distributed. It is also not dependent on a military or a security service to survive or even expand. A dedicated follower can always find a weapon to use against the enemy of the ideology.

Weaknesses. A purely Ideological System is a one-trick-pony. It is belief that the ideology is inevitably correct that keeps it alive. This presents an ideological group with two problems. First, if it wants to grow, it must gain (or conquer) new converts. Second, if it fails to meet the expectations of the followers, the ideology may lose its control over the population. This means that the two primary ways to defeat an ideology is either through discrediting the ideology or through exhaustion.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Next Section. Not complete by any stretch,

IV. Strategy

Initial Questions. The PCoG can assist in designing a strategy to achieve your political goals. To do this, a few preliminary factors must be identified.

1. What is the political end-state you are trying to achieve?
2. How far are you willing to go to achieve this end-state (offensive and defensive)?
3. What is the primary type of political entity you are engaged with?
4. What are the secondary elements that support your adversary?
5. Other than the adversary, what other entities (friend or foe) will be involved?

First, we must know the political end-state we are seeking to achieve. Without that clearly identified, everything that follows will be the noise before the defeat. Second, is this something you are willing to go to Kinetic War over or are you just considering Political Hostilities?

The first two are standard questions. Next comes the question of identifying your adversary’s PCoG. In certain cases, like ISIS or North Korea, the answer is simple; ISIS is ideological and North Korea is autocratic. In others, like Iran, the answer is more nuanced, being a combination of ideology and autocracy. Still, Iran is primarily an autocracy, even though it is built on an ideological base. Iran also demonstrates why secondary elements are important. There are at least three that either offer targets to attack or serve as obstacles that should be neutralized as best as possible. First, there is the military, and in particular, the Revolutionary Guard. Second, there is the economy, dominated by oil production. Third, there is the Religion, which is a strong uniting factor in the country.

The fifth question deals with others who must be taken into consideration. Looking at Iran again, foes that must be addressed are Russia, who provides military support as well as state supported terrorist groups. Friends would be Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as other Sunni Arab countries.

Aligning Strategy with the PCoG. Every situation is unique. Therefore, there is no cookie cutter answer. However, there are some general principles that might prove helpful with at least identifying where one’s efforts might be the most productive.

In offensive operations, identify and exploit weaknesses in your adversary’s PCoG. In an Autocratic System, determine which is the weakest of the Vassals, the economy, or the military. A specific attack less than Kinetic War may be sanctions on the economy, as were used against Iran to get them to negotiate on nuclear weapons. In a Democratic System you want to directly influence the population, as in the al Qaeda terrorist bombings in Spain prior to their elections. In an Ideological System you could wear it down until it collapses from exhaustion and is discredited, as in the case of communism. In defensive operations, your adversary will seek to exploit your weaknesses, so you must prepare to defend against such actions.

Strategic Mismatch. Until now, most of this probably seems intuitive. This next part may sound like heresy. If you do not align your operations with the appropriate PCoG, you will either spend far more time than necessary to achieve your objectives, or you will fail. For example, in Iraq American Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine stated that the people were the Center of Gravity. That would be true if Iraq was a Democratic System. It was not. We had toppled one large autocracy, which was eventually replaced with a multitude of smaller autocracies operated by local leaders. Intuitively, we realized this, and worked with Key Leaders to influence events. But our overall strategy of holding elections to legitimize a system that, in reality, was not the PCoG, was doomed to failure. We wasted a lot of time trying to influence the wrong PCoG, and left our mission unfulfilled.

[AmericanPride]

Hello all,

After several months of deliberation, I think I've settled on a dissertation subject. I'm still working out the particular question(s) to address. I've jotted down notes here and there but this my first time really flushing out the idea, so bear with me. I definitely appreciate any further conversation on this matter.

As many of you are aware, I'm primarily interested in the relationship between the political system and military practice. The long-accepted paradigm, especially in the West, is the Clausewitzian paradigm where "war is diplomacy by other means"; in other words, the goal of military operations is to achieve some politically defined objective on behalf of the state. "Military revolutions" or "transformations" occur within this paradigm, which raises the question of whether they are revolutions or transformations at all. Scale and conduct may change but the principle remains the same. Linking a state's politics to its military practice therefore becomes an exercise in country studies. The Clausewitz paradigm defines the acceptable norms, practice, infrastructure, language, and architecture of the military apparatus in a way specific to it.

My research focus will therefore be on military paradigms - not 'revolutions' or 'transformations' or 'reform' or 'modernization', all of which mean different things. As I see it, there are four kinds of war:

The First Kind: intra-paradigmal conflict. This is conflict between actors of the same military paradigm; i.e. two nation-states.

The Second Kind: transitional paradigmal conflict. This is conflict between actors of the same military paradigm with transition to a new paradigm as a consequence of the war itself. The 'total war' nature of the world wars probably fit in this category, since in my reading, total war is when the object of the war itself subjugates the political object sought, and thus is a different paradigm than Clausewitz.

The Third Kind: cross-paradigmal conflict. This is when actors of different paradigms come into conflict. The Mongol invasion of Japan is a good example, when the large hordes of the Mongols met a Japanese practice focused on single combat. The European wars against the native Americans is another example.

The Fourth Kind: meta-paradigmal conflict. This could be called 'thinking about thinking about warfare'. That is, when an actor deliberately integrates components of other military paradigms into its own practice and is able to fight across paradigms. Good examples of this are probably limited to localized adaptations of practice.

Some other terms:

'military revolution' - sudden change from one paradigm to another

'military transformation' - change from one paradigm to another

'military reform' - deliberate change from one paradigm to another

'modernization' - improving one's capabilities, not paradigm specific, and usually limited to making one's forces more capable within the established practice

'domain' - land, sea, subsurface, air, sub-orbital, space, cyber (and, depending on the paradigm, cultural, political, social, economic, environmental)

Thoughts on identifiable paradigms:

Clausewitz - limited war to achieve political ends established by the state

Total war - conflict in which victory supersedes all other considerations

Revolutionary - overthrow of the current political system

Marxist - seizure of a political system's means of production

Humanitarian - conflict to protect, uphold, or establish human rights

Genocidal - war to eliminate in whole or in part another people

Eschatological - war to bring about the 'end of the world' or 'judgment' according to religious belief

Commercial - war for profit

Honor - war to defend or improve reputation, honor, etc