Counterinsurgency Expert Argues U.S. Must Stay in Iraq

[SWJED]

4 April Times Argus - Counterinsurgency Expert Argues U.S. Must Stay in Iraq (http://www.timesargus.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070404/NEWS01/704040349/1002) by Peter Hirschfeld.


A lieutenant colonel who had a key role in America's new counter-insurgency doctrine says Americans must accept greater risks and greater losses in Iraq in order to win the war.

Lt. Col. John Nagl also says the war has to be won more with political than military action, and leaving early would cause "horrific" consequences.

"We have not, in my eyes, done as good a job as we should of explaining to the American people this war we're fighting, our strategy for winning, the nature of the enemy we face, the benefits of victory or the costs of defeat," he said.

Nagl is managing editor of the approximately 300-page counter-insurgency doctrine, published in December and copy edited by David Petraeus, the four-star general who recently took command of U.S. military operations in Iraq.

Nagl, in Northfield this week for the Norwich University Military Writers' Symposium, said in an on-campus interview Tuesday that the doctrine challenges the precepts of conventional warfare...
Much more at the link.

[Menning]

I wrote a piece on FM 3-24 for the local paper where I work. I visited with the people at Ft. Leavenworth's Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate and the Joint Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center also at Ft. Leavenworth. I never heard anything mentioned about Nagl playing a central role in the creation of the new manual. Dr. Conrad Crane was the principle author, with many other small groups writing the individual chapters. I know Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife was influential. According to the CADD guys Petraeus reviewed each chapter personally. “He put forth suggestions, but it wasn’t in the form of ‘this is what I want.’ It was ‘have you thought about this.’” Hirschfeld seems to have some of his facts a bit skewed. Or maybe I do.

[Shek]

I wrote a piece on FM 3-24 for the local paper where I work. I visited with the people at Ft. Leavenworth's Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate and the Joint Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center also at Ft. Leavenworth. I never heard anything mentioned about Nagl playing a central role in the creation of the new manual. Dr. Conrad Crane was the principle author, with many other small groups writing the individual chapters. I know Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife was influential. According to the CADD guys Petraeus reviewed each chapter personally. “He put forth suggestions, but it wasn’t in the form of ‘this is what I want.’ It was ‘have you thought about this.’” Hirschfeld seems to have some of his facts a bit skewed. Or maybe I do.

Here's an older article excerpt from the NYT.


http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/05/washington/05doctrine.html?ei=5088&en=c8d8ad7db4c5de56&ex=1317700800&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&pagewanted=print

The effort to develop the new program began a year ago under Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of the Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, former commander of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and the current chief of the First Marine Expeditionary Force. Colonel Crane, Lt. Col. John A. Nagl and Col. Douglas King of the Marines were among the major drafters.

Academics and experts from private groups were asked for input. A draft was completed in June and was circulated for comment. Almost 800 responses were received, but military officials said they would not alter the substance of the new doctrine.

“We are codifying the best practices of previous counterinsurgency campaigns and the lessons we have learned from Iraq and Afghanistan to help our forces succeed in the current fight and prepare for the future,” Colonel Nagl said.

In drafting the doctrine, the military drew upon some of the classic texts on counterinsurgency by the likes of T. E. Lawrence of Arabia, and David Galula, whose ideas were partly informed by his experience in Algeria.

Colonel Crane said that many of the ideas adopted for the manual had been percolating throughout the military. “In many ways, this is a bottom-up change, “ he said. “The young soldiers who had been through Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Iraq and Afghanistan, understood why we need to do this.”

[Menning]

I sit in my chair corrected. I'm not sure why nobody at Ft. Leavenworth mentioned Nagl. I reviewed my notes before I posted and there was no mention of him being a principle drafter of the FM. Thanks for the correction.

[Old Eagle]

We're not big on crediting individuals in any team effort. That's just us.