3 Generals Spurn the Position of War "Czar"

[tequila]

Interesting article (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/10/AR2007041001776_pf.html)by Tom Ricks and Peter Baker.


The White House wants to appoint a high-powered czar to oversee the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with authority to issue directions to the Pentagon, the State Department and other agencies, but it has had trouble finding anyone able and willing to take the job, according to people close to the situation.

At least three retired four-star generals approached by the White House in recent weeks have declined to be considered for the position, the sources said, underscoring the administration's difficulty in enlisting its top recruits to join the team after five years of warfare that have taxed the United States and its military.

"The very fundamental issue is, they don't know where the hell they're going," said retired Marine Gen. John J. "Jack" Sheehan, a former top NATO commander who was among those rejecting the job. Sheehan said he believes that Vice President Cheney and his hawkish allies remain more powerful within the administration than pragmatists looking for a way out of Iraq. "So rather than go over there, develop an ulcer and eventually leave, I said, 'No, thanks,' " he said.

[John T. Fishel]

What this article shows is that the administration thinks that the problem is lack of unity of command in Washington. It is not. The problem of a lack of unity of command is in Baghdad and Kabul. In each case, we have a major military operation ongoing and a fully functioning embassy. IAW the ambassadorial appointment letter the ambassador is responsible for all USG actions and agencies in a given country except the military during a major military operation (an ambssador friend argues that even then the ambassador is in charge unless the President has specifically stated otherwise). Clearly, in practice, General Petraeus does not report to Ambassador Crocker or vice versa. That, in a nutshell, is the unity of command problem. It is one that will not be solved by appoining another layer of Washington bureaucracy but would be solved by the simple expedient of the President dseignating one of the two as "in charge" and the other as "working for him."

[Tom Odom]

What this article shows is that the administration thinks that the problem is lack of unity of command in Washington. It is not. The problem of a lack of unity of command is in Baghdad and Kabul. In each case, we have a major military operation ongoing and a fully functioning embassy. IAW the ambassadorial appointment letter the ambassador is responsible for all USG actions and agencies in a given country except the military during a major military operation (an ambssador friend argues that even then the ambassador is in charge unless the President has specifically stated otherwise). Clearly, in practice, General Petraeus does not report to Ambassador Crocker or vice versa. That, in a nutshell, is the unity of command problem. It is one that will not be solved by appoining another layer of Washington bureaucracy but would be solved by the simple expedient of the President dseignating one of the two as "in charge" and the other as "working for him."

You are on target, John T.

I would add that this is also a heavy dose of political window dressing designed to look like a real initiative. Gates started out as a leader; he needs to continue to step up and so does the Chairman. The Nat Security Council has to drive the interagency cooperation and the President with his National Security Advisor whispering in his ear is the CZAR. This latest dodge is bovine excrement.

Tom

[Dr Jack]

This story also made the New York Times this morning...
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/11/washington/11czar.html


White House Mulling War Czar, Report Says
By THE NEW YORK TIMES

WASHINGTON, April 11 — The White House is exploring ways to restructure the National Security Council, including the possible appointment of an official who would oversee the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, The Washington Post reported in its Wednesday issue.

The change could involve elevating the post held by Meghan O’Sullivan, a deputy national security adviser who deals with both conflicts. She has said she plans to step down.

In an interview on Tuesday night, Gordon Johndroe, the spokesman for the National Security Council, said: “A variety of options are being looked at for the structure of the office. It could remain unchanged, but no decisions have been made.”

A White House spokesman did not respond to a request for comment.

The Post article said three retired four-star generals had rebuffed overtures about taking an expanded job that would involved coordinating activities of the State and Defense Departments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

One, John J. Sheehan of the Marines, said he had concluded after discussions with Stephen Hadley, the national security adviser, that the job would be unworkable. He told The Post, “So rather than go over there, develop an ulcer and eventually leave, I said, ‘No, thanks.’ ”

The Post said the others were Gen. Jack Keane of the Army and Gen. Joseph W. Ralston of the Air Force.

[jcustis]

This would play out like Garner and Bremer all over again.

[Jimbo]

As somebody who works north of the river and inside the beltway, there is a HUGE unity of command issue going on currently between the different agencies and organizations of the executive branch. The idea of a czar is the best one I have heard yet. Currently many different orgganizations either don't see themselves having a role in either place, or they see themselves having a role, but they will only particiapte on thier own terms, leaving no room for reaching a consensus. These problems have manifested themselves in the requirement for the Defense Department to resource a majority of the reconstruction effort, and the inability of the government to define roles, missions, scope, and expectations of one another.

The lack of unity of command at the naitonal level exacerbates the the issue sthat arrive on the gorund. At a recent NATO conference, our ISAF partners were frustrated with each other over each partner country executing their own agenda on how to do PRT's and cCOIN. Some were very good, and some only work from 9 to 5. Our NATO partners, stated that theykeep getting different stories from each diofferent agency in the USG. In Iraq, this lead to a disjointed effort between the various entities that the State Department owns. Some do not work for the ambassador, and most use thier informal reporting chain back to the Truman building as opposed to the systems that are supposed to be used on the ground. This problem is maganfied when you add the uniformed services, the defense Department, and other executive agencies. The lack of Unity of Command over this effort in Washington is one of the reasons we have not been able to maximize the D,I,and E parts of DIME in our operations. Bottom line:

When you only execute the "M" in DIME, you do "DIE". It is pathetic that you do this because of squabbling and whining over "rice bowls" in DC.

[Tom Odom]

Jimbo,

I don't disagree with anything you say about a lack of interagency cooperation. But I don't think creating another position--with the inevitable bureacracy to support--will affect anything. I suspect it will only make the resistant burrow in deeper.

We have tried CZARS before and they had no lasting effects. Energy Czars, Drug Czars, Disaster Czars, etc etc etc.

One of the measures I always used as an analyst from afar, a historian looking backwards, or an operator on the ground was whether a country actually fixed things that were broken. This rule applies to bureacracies, militaries, people, and infrastructure. The secondary measure I tied to this was if they did not fix what was broken did they replace it and get rid of the old? Or did they add something new that was supposed to do the same job and end up competing units, agencies, parastatals, or even presidents/prime ministers/dictators (this usually led to civil war)?


A War Czar at this stage seems very 3rd World...

Tom

[John T. Fishel]

Jimbo, there is a War Czar. He is created by Article II of the Constitution of the United States. His title is President. Would reorganizing the NSC staff help him do his job better? Perhaps. But, if you were Bob Gates, would you be willing to take orders from Meghan O'Sullivan? Or Condi Rice from her former DOS subordinate? Remember, these are legally constituted department heads who are answerable to the President, alone in the Executive Branch, and to Congress which confirmed them. I don't recall anybody confirming O'Sullivan or Hadley - the positions are staff, only. Put differently, if the J3 issues an order to a subordinate commander it will only be obeyed if it is perceived as coming from the commander. If there is doubt, the subordinate commander will go directly to his boss, not the J3.

That said, you are correct that the interagency process does not work nearly as well as it should. I just don't believe that this is the best way to fix it.

[Jimbo]

The topic of the NSC came up at a meeting I was at two days ago, and some really smart people pointed out that structurally, the NSC really isn't setup to run the day to day issues that arise in our current fight. These guys also added that the NSC really doesn't have the authorities to what has to happen. Yes, under title II the Prsident is the War Czar, I think he needs an XO or S-3 for what we are currently invovled in. I am currently working on the closest thing to an interagnecy plan, and the friction is enormous. What the President needs is someone who understands what the President wants done, what the principals have bought into, is plugged into what is going on at the execution level (here in DC), and is willing to call Bulls*@# at a principlas/deputies level meeting when the respective agencies brief their stuff with rose colored glasses on. That is what needs to happen.

[Tom Odom]

The topic of the NSC came up at a meeting I was at two days ago, and some really smart people pointed out that structurally, the NSC really isn't setup to run the day to day issues that arise in our current fight. These guys also added that the NSC really doesn't have the authorities to what has to happen. Yes, under title II the Prsident is the War Czar, I think he needs an XO or S-3 for what we are currently invovled in. I am currently working on the closest thing to an interagnecy plan, and the friction is enormous. What the President needs is someone who understands what the President wants done, what the principals have bought into, is plugged into what is going on at the execution level (here in DC), and is willing to call Bulls*@# at a principlas/deputies level meeting when the respective agencies brief their stuff with rose colored glasses on. That is what needs to happen.

Jimbo

You just described the role of the National Security Advisor as it should be performed. Rice did not do it that way and I see no signs that is happening now.

Tom

[jcustis]

For anyone who chooses to read the full text at the link, humor me a bit. I'm pushing up on 38 next month, went to a decent school and studied Pol. Sci. with a concentration in Int. Relations, and yet when I look at the folks profiled in the article, I'm still a little shocked that there are people my age in such positions of influence.

I'm also a tad bit alarmed, because I wonder what life experiences these folks have (outside of a semester abroad as an undergrad) that gives them a grasp of what is going on out there.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/10/AR2006031002003.html

The NSC's Sesame Street Generation


By Dafna Linzer
Sunday, March 12, 2006; Page B03

They headed off to college as the Berlin Wall was coming down, were inspired by globalization and came of age with international terrorism. Freed from a constant nuclear standoff as a dominant fact of international life, members of Generation X no longer fear war or upheaval in the global status quo.

Understand them -- and where they came from -- and suddenly President Bush's Middle East forays, grand democratic experiments and go-it-alone strategies take on a different look.

That's because nearly a dozen thirtysomething aides, breastfed on "Sesame Street" and babysat by "The Brady Bunch," are now shaping those strategies in unexpected ways as senior advisers at the National Security Council, the White House's powerful inner chamber of foreign policy aides with routine access to Bush. This small group of conservative Gen Xers -- members of an age cohort once all but written off as stand-for-nothing underachievers -- is the first set of American policymakers truly at home in a unipolar world.

-----
One quote in particular alarms me, and that comes from O'Sullivan herself:

"If your frame of reference is the Soviet invasion and how they got bogged down, then I think you'd be very modest about what could be achieved in Afghanistan," O'Sullivan said. "That's not how I see it. I see an end of Taliban rule and a nascent democracy."

Coming straight out of the mouth of someone who has a role in whether servicemembers go there to fight and potentially die. This isn't some capital venture gig where you are targetting those areas ready to explode, given the right investment. WTFO?

I would not even come close to pretending that I know squat about steering a course for governance of an entire country, and I consider myself a reasonably smart mofo.

[tequila]

She's gone (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/02/AR2007040201745.html)now, undoubtedly to a well-paid sinecure before returning for the next go-around. Next year in Tehran?

[jcustis]

I'm slogging through Imperial Life in the Emerald City, and now I remember her name, and the Garner/Cheney issue. I haven't gotten beyond the point where the stock exchange is being addressed, so I hope to learn more about her involvement.

[Jimbo]

There are people younger than O'Sullivan making a bigger impact in DC. Most of your staffers, who do the real work, are only in their late 20's, early 30's at best. Most have M.A.'s and some have Ph.D.'s. It can be quite disconcerting at times. Sometimes we are really lucky that tasking X lands on staffer X's desk and not staffer Y. Soemthing to think about.

[Jimbo]

Tom,

I agree with what you stated about the National Security Advisor. I thinbk what is needed currently is someone to function as the chief of current operations, and someone to function as the chief of plans. What I am picking up in DC is that there is too much going on for the Rice, Hadley, or anyone else to truly do both currently.

[jcustis]

There are people younger than O'Sullivan making a bigger impact in DC. Most of your staffers, who do the real work, are only in their late 20's, early 30's at best. Most have M.A.'s and some have Ph.D.'s. It can be quite disconcerting at times. Sometimes we are really lucky that tasking X lands on staffer X's desk and not staffer Y. Soemthing to think about.

Ah yes, and they are thoroughly couched in theory as opposed to having developed the expertise at recognizing the patterns, currents, and even the occasional eddy or two. Crikeys!

[Tom Odom]

Ah yes, and they are thoroughly couched in theory as opposed to having developed the expertise at recognizing the patterns, currents, and even the occasional eddy or two. Crikeys!

And they exist in every administration. For me in Zaire and Rwanda they were the Clintonistas. That group was somewhat older but not necessarily so.

You can't change this pattern, guys. It is part and parcel of what makes our world so different from theirs. We treasure knowledge tempered with experience. They treasure knowledge unfettered with reality but constructed through a prism of political loyalty. By that I mean knowledge is only valuable if it can be bent to the message of the day.

To O'Sullivan's credit, she at least talked to folks in the State Department and that nearly got her canned early on. Have no doubt, she will be back.

Best

Tom

[John T. Fishel]

Jimbo

Perhaps, some reorganization of the NSC staff would help do this if the NS advisor will not play it as Tom suggests he/she should. Nevertheless, the success of the staffer in riding herd will depend on the President's willingness to come down hard on a Cabinet officer who is not treating the staffer as speaking for the Pres.

On interagency planning: The first such plan was for Haiti in 1994. Read Walt Kretchik's superb chapter on planning in our CSI book, Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion." PDD 56 issued by the Clinton Administration sought to address the problem and was one of the few PDDs continued by the Bush Admin. It never went far but NDU's ITEA program contin ues to work the issue and its head, Erik Kjonnerud might have some helpful thoughts.

Cheers

John

[Dr Jack]

PDD 56 issued by the Clinton Administration sought to address the problem and was one of the few PDDs continued by the Bush Admin.

When NSPD-44 (Mananagement of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization) was issued on December 7, 2005, it superceded the Clinton-era PDD 56:

http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.pdf

The press statement that accompanied NSPD-44 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051214.html) stated:


The directive establishes that the Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. Depending on the situation, these operations can be conducted with or without U.S. military engagement. When the U.S. military is involved, the Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.

A new "War Czar" would require a complete re-look at this process...

[Jimbo]

NSPD-44 is a poorly worded document that is causing some of the squabbling within state. In theory it should work, but the problem is multifaceted.

Since the establishment of S/CRS in that document S/CRS hasn't really delivered much. They have alienated many parts of state by planning in a vacuum, and then coming in and trying to tell regional bureaus what to do based on thier plan. The have this so-called NSPD-44 process: which is a process of triggers that would force the inter-agency to come to the table and do "something/planning" they are till trying to get this process built then they have to figure out how to implement it. they have consistently had their budget not be met because they haven't quite figured out how to engage with OMB (this issue is bigger than S/CRS), they are responsible for the Civilian Reserve Corps (it happened yet), they aren't sure hwta is meant by stability so the get inot frictional issues with "State" and USAID. So S/CRS has been around for almost 3 years and hasn't presented anydeliverables beyond the Hati plan, and they aren't being resourced. NSPD-44 was written as an inside state document to prevent Lugar and Biden from pushing legisltion from the Hill for structural reform inside State. There is a alot of potntial with the NSPD-44 document, but nobody has sat the different parts of the stae department down and explained how they play in the process ( A DoS "come to Jesus meeting"). Until that happens the NSPD-44 construct is going to be slow coming.

[Stratiotes]

I am somewhat amazed, knowing a little about this country's history, that the idea of a "war czar" does not make more people scream about civilian control. I am just cynical enough to believe that politicians generally do not make decisions in order to improve results so much as they make decisisons to cover their own butts. I think this could be one such occasion - "it isn't my fault, I left that up to the war czar...." When things go well, they could take credit and when they go poorly, they'd have somebody else to blame. It isn't republican vs democrat - its politics as usual - the one thing that permeates evenly across party lines.

[BScully]

As someone who works on interagency issues daily and is trying to get my organization to play a larger role in supporting U.S. National Security, I have to agree with Jimbo. I also agree that the NSC should play a larger role in making things happen. From my perspective, I've seen several factors that have prevented Departments and agencies from getting more involved.

First, and most importantly, the resources just are not there. You can task all you want, but if there is no money and no staff, nothing is going to get done. This leads to my second observation, most Departments and Agencies do not believe they have a role in National Security issues...they are domestic agencies and therefore do not fund national security activities. Third, as with most interagency activities, parochialism runs rampant and Department and Agency agendas take priority.

Personally, I think a War "Czar" would be very useful in pulling the interagency together. While I wouldn't call the position a War "Czar," somebody who has a direct line to the President and his full support, can move resources, can ride Cabinet officials without fear of being fired, would be a tremendous benefit. Until a more effective national security system is put in place, interagency cooperation is only going to be effective if a strong personality/leader with direct access to the President is driving the train.

Could the National Security Advisor play this role? Sure. But if the National Security Advisor was 100% focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, which they'd have to be to be successful, what will the impact be on the rest of U.S. policy?

Take care,
Brian

[Old Eagle]

As many of you know, the catch phrase for interagency coordination is a "Goldwater-Nichols" for the IA. If the administration can't reform itself, it needs to be reformed from the outside. I don't believe in catch phrases, and I don't believe that there will be reform.

I think that one of the points that we tend to overlook is that the Founding Fathers created an inefficient government structure (and an inefficient military) in order to preserve the greater concept of democracy. It would be impossible for any of the major subordinate departments to amass the power necessary to overwhelm the rest of the government. The billpayer for this attitude is the fumble bumble in the IA. Yes, it costs money. Yes, unfortunately, it costs lives. It occassionally leads to failure. Price of doing business. Sorry.

[wm]

I am somewhat amazed, knowing a little about this country's history, that the idea of a "war czar" does not make more people scream about civilian control. I am just cynical enough to believe that politicians generally do not make decisions in order to improve results so much as they make decisisons to cover their own butts. I think this could be one such occasion - "it isn't my fault, I left that up to the war czar...." When things go well, they could take credit and when they go poorly, they'd have somebody else to blame. It isn't republican vs democrat - its politics as usual - the one thing that permeates evenly across party lines.

I too may be jaded, but I think that this is really what is operational here--politics as normal and a need to have a fall guy in case things go south.

We might consider the choice of title here. Wasn't the Czar the failed Russian autocrat who once epitomized totalitarian (i.e, non-democratic) rule and was supplanted as the bete noir of the West by the Communists?

[SSG Rock]

Gentlemen, I'm just a retired NCO who got his graduate degree at night school. I don't have any experience, just common sense. As an NCO, when my troops aren't performing to the standard, I knocked their heads.

President Bush, at this juncture doesn't have to worry about making or keeping friends. Why doesn't he knock some heads? Can he? Has he tried that approach?

Wouldn't the creation of a "Czar" require hammering out new laws? Creating support staff, in short, wouldn't it take a lot of time? And wouldn't the position inevitably be tainted by partisanship anyway? Why go through the trouble to create another position that ultimately will not help?

I think I'd hold a "come to Jesus meeting" and I'd lay it on the line, demand interagency cooperation on a scale never seen before, and I would tell them if this doesn't happen I'll fire you, and if I can't fire you I'll spend the rest of my term making your life as miserable as I possibly can.

[BScully]

Why doesn't he knock some heads? Can he? Has he tried that approach?

Wouldn't the creation of a "Czar" require hammering out new laws? Creating support staff, in short, wouldn't it take a lot of time? And wouldn't the position inevitably be tainted by partisanship anyway? Why go through the trouble to create another position that ultimately will not help?

I think I'd hold a "come to Jesus meeting" and I'd lay it on the line, demand interagency cooperation on a scale never seen before, and I would tell them if this doesn't happen I'll fire you, and if I can't fire you I'll spend the rest of my term making your life as miserable as I possibly can.

SSG Rock,

The problem isn't the "come to Jesus meeting," which the President can easily pull together, it's the lack of ability to followup that causes the problem. That's why a "Czar" would be helpful. He has the full authority and support of the President along with the time necessary to make sure folks are getting their jobs done. My agency gets many tasks from the NSC and White House. Despite the fact they are Presidential/NSC initiatives, they don't always get the support you would think. We often fight for funding just to meet the minimum requirements (and we're not always successful).

If things worked as they should, each Department and Agency would review the National Security Strategy, figure out how they can support it, and put resources to the task. This simply doesn't happen in most (any?) departments or agencies.

Until the entire system is fixed, you need somebody who can crack skulls with the President's approval.

That's my view anyway.

Brian

[selil]

The Mongolian horde effect...

Adding bodies to a problem of coordination is adding another variable, another barrier, another point of failure, another blame point, another... you get the idea.

When something is going wrong the commander gets on the phone, gets in the trench, figures out where things went wrong and fixes it.

Putting somebody else in charge of a sinking ship doesn't do the baling.

Pedantic and simplistic makes the obvious simpler. A Czar is a pseudo solution to a real problem that only a real leader can truly solve. The president can not abdicate the responsibilities of running a war to a political appointee.

But, what would I know I'm a Gen X'er and irresponsible in my enthusiasm for abject hero worship.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi all,
Good to be back. Trying to get my house in order, go on vacation and then start the PCS and enroute schools - sums up my last couple of three weeks.
I was thinking about this morning when I read it on the earlybird. Aside from possibly inserting a layer of command that would further delay needed decisions and possibly installing a personality whose situational perspective is far away from ground truth (time and space), yet whose inter-perspective is one of being validated by both his military experience and obligation to try and get it right; how about the idea of opening yourself (those asked to take the job) to becoming a magnet (or shield) for criticism from both sides- what was the term one perspective candidate used "ulcer?
I think this is important in the context of some of the other things coming to light. Anybody read what retired General Scales wrote recently about ground truth? One of the things he mentioned in addition to the status of equipment & time needed to refit and train was in ref. to the data quoted by DoD ref. retention of experienced, innovative, creative talent that the private sector is competing for. A buddy of mine just called to say he got word his TT tour was going to be 15 months. He is close to 20, I predict he will leave when he gets back. There seems to be a couple break points for most - those under the point with good opportunities are apt to leave prior to a delayed captain's course, those at 20 are not really considering 30 (although I know some 06s who are looking at high 3, etc.) These are good people. Those of us in the middle are playing the wait and see, but it doesn't look good - why, because we see the mill continuing to turn with less compensation ( ex. we lose money when we PCS because we try and make it easy on the family )while we try and balance obligations to family with obligations to our service and nation.
Here is the part that I think military service members are really starting to look hard at, and I think the response to the "War Czar" is indicative of.

1) Those who serve or served ( I think its reasonable to include LE and FDP types) understand that they are a minority, most American citizens don't understand the word sacrifice in the sense that we do.
2) They also don't understand what they inherit by virtue of birth, they have not really faced adversity, get their news in sound bytes, prescribe to the T.V and Internet for morals and values and in general don't understand us a minority - many I've run into are glad we do what we do, but many of those are only glad that someone else does a job that they would never want to.
3) So why should less then 1% take up the burden for so many for so little in return? Sure when there is no war, its a pretty good life, but most of are aware that the world is fundamentally changed, and war will be with us for a long time to come.

So why when Congress and the administration play politics with the money we need for training, equipping, etc; when although there are bonuses for retention of some and recruitment of others, but no real fundamental shift in investing in people (a significant raise that competes with Industry/Private Sector), performance bonuses, etc that place people above cash cows should that 1% obligate themselves to the point of exhaustion (anybody seen the new #s on how many 04s and 05s the Army is short - anybody want to guess how we'll fix that?) Retired General Scales is 100% correct on the value he places on people - good equipment is good and part of investing in people, but to do both we'll need a larger % of the GDP.

I think those who serve love serving, but you have to compensate them better if you are going to ask more of them. I'll bet the Czar candidates thought of Sherman's words when asked - can you blame them? I love the all volunteer military, but I think unless we start looking hard at compensation (not one shot bonuses, but the kind of compensation that people see they are in an organization that invests in them for the long term - yes people are expensive - good ones more so - but you have to have them), I think we'll be forced to consider selective obligatory service. This war is not over in 2008. I think we'll be at war in this populated and competing world and committed to fighting those who would come here and kill us for decades, if we are going to ask a small percentage to shoulder the burden, then we better ante up.

We have a long term strategic human resource problem that we are addressing with tactical foresight - its a cultural problem.

[Jimbo]

Guys,

If I were not in the belly of this beast and directly working the clsoest thing to an interagency way ahead for the war we are currently in, I would entertain many of the views that some have expressed. If the voters knew how broke the interagency was, there would be 536 recall elections. Like BScully said, the interagency needs someone to come in and knock heads, somebody to tell secretary's that they and their organization aren't cutting the mustard. You can't really make the additional level of friction arguement when the current alternative is chaos. Thank god, I am out of thye ebltway in the next few months.

Jimbo

[Tom Odom]

Per Jimbo's last:You can't really make the additional level of friction arguement when the current alternative is chaos.


New York Times
April 12, 2007

News Analysis

4 Years On, The Gap Between Iraq Policy And Practice Is Wide (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/12/world/middleeast/12policy.html?_r=1&ref=washington&oref=slogin)

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, April 11 — Four years after the fall of Baghdad, the White House is once again struggling to solve an old problem: Who is in charge of carrying out policy in Iraq?

Once again President Bush and his top aides are searching for a high-level coordinator capable of cutting through military, political and reconstruction strategies that have never operated in sync, in Washington or in Baghdad.

Once again Mr. Bush is publicly declaring that his administration has settled on a strategy for victory — this time, a troop increase that is supposed to open political space for Sunnis and Shiites to live and govern together — even while his top aides acknowledge that the White House has never gotten the execution right.

“We’re trying to learn from our experience,” Stephen J. Hadley, the national security adviser, said in an interview on Wednesday. Confirming a report that first appeared in The Washington Post, Mr. Hadley said he had been sounding out retired military commanders to assess their interest in a job where they would report directly to President Bush.

“One of the things that we’ve heard from Republicans and Democrats is that we need to go a step further in Washington and have a single point of focus, someone who can work 24/7 on the Washington end of executing the strategy we’ve put in place for the next 22 months,” to the end of Mr. Bush’s term.

Mr. Hadley came to his job in the beginning of 2005, after four years as deputy national security adviser, and said from the outset that the Achilles’ heel of the administration had been its failure to execute its policies.

Now, Mr. Hadley said, he had decided that “while we’ve had plans and due dates and stoplight charts, what we need is someone with a lot of stature within the government who can make things happen.” That official, Mr. Hadley said, would deal daily with the new American ambassador in Iraq, Ryan C. Crocker, and the new commander, Gen. David H. Petraeus, and then “call any cabinet secretary and get problems resolved, fast.”

Given all that, Jimbo's comment on chaos suggests we have been discussing draining the swamp while the alligators feast on his ass. I think I understand Jimbo's frustration much better after reading this piece in which the Nat Sec Advisor seemed to repeatedly admit difficulty in learning.

Tom

[tequila]

So ... is this Hadley basically declaiming, after 4 years as assistant to Rice and 2 years as NSA that he still does not know how to run the job? That we need someone of "of stature" that apparently he does not have? That there are so many pressing priorities that take precedence over the two wars we are fighting at the moment that he just cannot spare the time? :mad: Am I venting here?

Given the difficulties they are encountering finding someone "of stature", I'm feeling that Jimbo is not going to be getting the help he needs when the Admin's 4th or 5th choice finally assents to the post.

[Tom Odom]

So ... is this Hadley basically declaiming, after 4 years as assistant to Rice and 2 years as NSA that he still does not know how to run the job? That we need someone of "of stature" that apparently he does not have? That there are so many pressing priorities that take precedence over the two wars we are fighting at the moment that he just cannot spare the time? :mad: Am I venting here?

Given the difficulties they are encountering finding someone "of stature", I'm feeling that Jimbo is not going to be getting the help he needs when the Admin's 4th or 5th choice finally assents to the post.

That was exactly my reaction when I read it...:(

[jcustis]

“One of the things that we’ve heard from Republicans and Democrats is that we need to go a step further in Washington and have a single point of focus, someone who can work 24/7 on the Washington end of executing the strategy we’ve put in place for the next 22 months,” to the end of Mr. Bush’s term.

And my frustration grows Tom, as I read this and wonder aloud, "Why the hell aren't we worried about executing the strategy until it has successfully run it's course?" Screw being concerned about election timelines.

Someone, regardless of party, is going to get a nice squishy ball of wax to play hot potato with.

I nominate Odom for czar!!! :D

[BScully]

Gentleman,

I'm a relatively young, federal civil servant with no combat experience, so I typically lay low and learn from the conversations that take place here rather than contribute. However, I think the wrong lessons are being drawn from the articles you've read and discussions to date.

The issue that needs to be addressed is that the interagency system is seriously broken. There needs to be serious reform before any administration will be able to count on the entire federal government working together in an effective manner. There are any number of different reforms and directives that have tried to solve this problem since 9/11 (and before for that matter). They just haven't worked. The system needs to be fixed. And until its fixed, future Administration's will continue to have the same issues.

Operating under the reality that the system is broke, but we cannot succeed without effective interagency cooperation, what are the options available? Obviously someone needs to figure out how to fix the system. But that is a longer term solution and will not take effect for years (Look at how long jointness under Goldwater-Nichols took). In the short term, there is only one effective answer that I'm aware of and that is what Hadley suggests. Have one person, with staff, entirely focused on making sure the interagency supports the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan 24/7...that's all they work on.

Several of you have said that Hadley should be focused on Iraq and Afghanistan. That is just unrealistic. There are numerous National Security issues that the National Security Advisor and his staff must pay attention to...Iran, North Korea, China, Sudan just to name a few. I personally think it would be extremely irresponsible for the National Security Advisor to focus all of his time on Iraq and Afghanistan at the expense of the many other issues/crisis facing the U.S..

In many ways, I give Hadley credit for giving up some of his turf on one of the most critical issues facing the nation to someone else and admitting it's just too much for him to handle. How often does that happen in Washington? Normally I'd go on a long diatribe about how we expect our leaders to be perfect and then criticize them when they admit mistakes or changes in policy/tactics based on lessons learned...but I've already written too much. :)

While I certainly don't have any answers to the problem, I do know a few things. First, many administrations have tried to address the lack of interagency cooperation over the years and all have been unsuccessful. Second, even after Bush and Hadley are long gone, National Security Advisors will continue to deal with poor interagency cooperation until the entire system is blown up and rebuilt.

Take care,
Brian

[jcustis]

I'm a relatively young, federal civil servant with no combat experience, so I typically lay low and learn from the conversations that take place here rather than contribute. However, I think the wrong lessons are being drawn from the articles you've read and discussions to date.

Scully,

In a subtle way, you validate the expansion of the board. I'm glad you are here, regardless of the capacity in which you participate. Keep up the good fight.

[Tom Odom]

Scully,

You will get no argument from me that the interagency process needs fixing.

You will get an argument when you tell me I am missing the point by not seeing that the process needs work. I have seen it and I have worked it inside the beltway and outside downrange where it is very personal.

Mssrs Hadley and company have for the past several years worsened the interagency process by turf fighting in the extreme. DOD was the lead culprit--especially when it came to the issue of going to war in OIF and then failing to plan for the aftermath. True enough that Hadley has many things on his plate; he sat down at the table and top two items of the menu read, Iraq and Afghanistan. If it takes 2 years to understand that he could not handle the meal, that is too long, especially after serving as Rice's deputy for the previous 4.

Best

Tom

PS

What really makes all of this even more frustrating is that the very subject--the need to focus on Iraq--was covered extensively in Bob Woodard's book, State of Denial, concerning 2003-2005. And Hadley played a large role in pushing for greater focus from the key players, including his boss at the time National Security Advisor Rice.

[wm]

Rather than just note the failure of inter-agency cooperation with regard to the efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq, perhaps we ought to try to understand why this failure has occurred. If one looks at the basic structure of American government, I believe that understanding should be fairly easy to attain.

(Sorry for the Pol. Sci. 101 rehash, but we often seem to forget the basics.) The fundamental principle that underlies our government is a separation of powers to provide a system of checks and balances for the whole structure. The separation is not just limited to the three main branches of government. It also exists within each branch. As an example, consider the Federal budget process. Three different Congressional groups are involved in deciding how to spend the taxpayers' dollars--the budget committees, the authorization committees, and the appropriations committees (and they need the approval of the two houses of Congress to boot). The history of the United States is a history of the struggle of the nation to work through these checks and balances to achieve results. The process is the reason that governmental reform efforts achieved results very slowly and in very small increments.

Before we look for a solution to the current lack of interagency cooperation, we might do well to ask what we would give up were we able to resolve the problem. In Democracy in America, De Tocqueville prognosticated that the United States would not survive for long because of the many small interests competing in the country. As it turns out, America has probably survived for as long as it has because of those many conflicting special interests. They have prevented the nation's being overwhelmed by a tyranny of the majority. Contrast our country’s relatively peaceful internal disagreements with the struggle in Iraq between Shia (empowered majority) and Sunni (largely disempowered minority). Attribution of the conflict to religious differences is, I believe, largely a misapprehension of the social dynamic--conflict is almost always about power.

When American special interest groups have disputes, talk show hosts are suspended. When Iraqi special interest groups have disputes, Parliament’s cafeteria is bombed.

Fixing the interagency process may well be possible. However, to do so may run contrary to the very spirit of the American political process as expressed in the Federalist papers and other places, like the Constitution.

[BScully]

Hi Tom,

I understand what you're saying and don't disagree. The point I was trying to make was that regardless of the mistakes Hadley, Rice, Bush, and all the others may have made, they were set up for failure by a system that is broken. Did Hadley make it worse? I don't know from personal experience and will take your word that he has. What I worry about and what drove me to post was the focus on Hadley as the problem. It's typical Washington and often masks the real nature of what needs to be fixed.

Until we fix the entire system, folks on the ground are going to needlessly suffer. And that is going to occur whether Hadley is the National Security Advisor or it is a future National Security Advisor. All of the interagency issues I've faced have been at a lower level than the NSC and most have been the result of Department vs. Department parochialism, limited resources, and/or lack of proper authority.

It could also be argued that the Administration has been trying to fix the problem, unsuccessfully, for several years (eg: NSPD-44 and other similar initiatives). Clinton tried to do the same thing under significantly less difficult circumstances and it failed.

I've made improving interagency coordination something of a personal mission despite my lowly stature in the world. I've attended numerous courses, conferences, symposium and done a lot of reading. The simple fact is, as you know all too well, this problem has been going on for a long time. And while it may be worse under Hadley, it's been bad under everyone.

The point of this thread was basically to discuss the administration's plan to have a War "Czar." My opinion is that until the interagency system is fixed, a War "Czar" is required (though I'd call it something else). I believe the longer we focus on Hadley and his colleagues in the Administration, the longer it will take for us to actually solve the real problem -- both short term and long term.

Maybe I simply read too much into the posts on here and am concerned for no reason...it has happened before. I just don't want folks to believe that once Hadley (and Bush) are gone things will be better.

Take care,
Brian

[Tom Odom]

Wm,

Your points are valid and part of the US culture. That is why the Army has no General Staff and why about three or four decades ago Congress made it known that the Army was not to adopt the beret like other militaries, because it looked "too professional."

But the position of National Security Advisor and the National Security Council was created to better inter-agency cooperation in the first place. Fixing it in my mind means making it work, not kicking the can down the road with "Czars" and late blooming realizations that a war that has cost so much in lives and money is indeed important.

I would further submit to you that we fought a much harder war, fielding millions of Soldiers, Airmen, Marines, and Sailors, created almost from scratch the most technologically advanced functional military forces of the day, and we won WWII in less time than has elaspsed since 9-11. All of that was done before we reorganized the national security structure, a redesign that added levels of bureacracy.

I guess I would say to you fundamentally that culturally and constitutionally mandated separation of powers is not a defense for sluggish, amateurish floundering.

Now I am stepping off my soap box...

Best

Tom

[Tom Odom]

The point of this thread was basically to discuss the administration's plan to have a War "Czar." My opinion is that until the interagency system is fixed, a War "Czar" is required (though I'd call it something else). I believe the longer we focus on Hadley and his colleagues in the Administration, the longer it will take for us to actually solve the real problem -- both short term and long term.

Brian,

Agree and understand. I too believe that the system must be reworked.

Keep trying to fix it! Or at least keep shooting the damn alligators until someone drains the swamp :wry:

best

Tom

[Stan]

And my frustration grows Tom, as I read this and wonder aloud, "Why the hell aren't we worried about executing the strategy until it has successfully run it's course?" Screw being concerned about election timelines.

Someone, regardless of party, is going to get a nice squishy ball of wax to play hot potato with.

I nominate Odom for czar!!! :D

I second that recommendation, Tom :eek:

You should get a sneaky NCO for this :cool:

[wm]

Wm,

Your points are valid and part of the US culture. That is why the Army has no General Staff and why about three or four decades ago Congress made it known that the Army was not to adopt the beret like other militaries, because it looked "too professional."

But the position of National Security Advisor and the National Security Council was created to better inter-agency cooperation in the first place. Fixing it in my mind means making it work, not kicking the can down the road with "Czars" and late blooming realizations that a war that has cost so much in lives and money is indeed important.

I would further submit to you that we fought a much harder war, fielding millions of Soldiers, Airmen, Marines, and Sailors, created almost from scratch the most technologically advanced functional military forces of the day, and we won WWII in less time than has elaspsed since 9-11. All of that was done before we reorganized the national security structure, a redesign that added levels of bureacracy.

I guess I would say to you fundamentally that culturally and constitutionally mandated separation of powers is not a defense for sluggish, amateurish floundering.

Now I am stepping off my soap box...

Best

Tom

Tom,
I'm glad you brought up WWII as an example of how to make things work. I suggest that we were successful because the folks who did the coordinating were good at it and had the charisma to make it happen.
The NSC leadership role requires some like a George Marshall or a Dwight Eisenhower to make it work. When someone like Brent Scowcroft sat in that chair, the organization did the things it was supposed to do. I know little about the incumbent, but it seems like we do not the right guy running the show.
I agree that there is no excuse for floundering and half-stepping by the holder of position that was created to beat down the roadblocks. My point was that we might not get much else these days because our rising leadership generation does not have the background and experience to force compliance on a playground where all the kids think they get to make their own rules and no one has to play the same game.
Back in the early days of the Roman Empire, they ruled the known world with about 400 civil servants. By the time of Constantine (about 300 years) that number had swelled to over 40,000. iI about 100 more years, the city of Rome was sacked by the Goths.

[Rob Thornton]

Originally Posted by Tom Odom

I would further submit to you that we fought a much harder war, fielding millions of Soldiers, Airmen, Marines, and Sailors, created almost from scratch the most technologically advanced functional military forces of the day, and we won WWII in less time than has elaspsed since 9-11. All of that was done before we reorganized the national security structure, a redesign that added levels of bureacracy.

I agree with Tom - The nation was at war during WWII - the whole nation. Driven by a sense of purpose that allowed political leadership to focus national will and resources, and the system worked because of it. Given that most of the nation is currently at the mall, and more worried about why Sinjia has not been voted off then if we prevail in Iraq and Afganistan (or for that matter anywhere) I don't think it would matter if you make a czar or not. If people are unwilling to work together and find solutions they will wait you out, or expend vast ammounts of energy to circumvent the best of efforts. Thre are too many people who don't want to be uncomfortable.

Until our political leadership can harness the full will and resources available, the position of czar is an empty hat. No wonder its been declined by some very talented retired generals.

[jcustis]

Because I finally saw Flags of Our Fathers on DVD, it gives me reason to offer up that though the nation was at war in WWII, the folks grew tired then as well, over time.

[tequila]

Gotta say, this has been one of the better threads I've read anywhere.


In Democracy in America, De Tocqueville prognosticated that the United States would not survive for long because of the many small interests competing in the country. As it turns out, America has probably survived for as long as it has because of those many conflicting special interests. They have prevented the nation's being overwhelmed by a tyranny of the majority. Contrast our country’s relatively peaceful internal disagreements with the struggle in Iraq between Shia (empowered majority) and Sunni (largely disempowered minority). Attribution of the conflict to religious differences is, I believe, largely a misapprehension of the social dynamic--conflict is almost always about power.

Note that we cannot forget our own history here. A mere 25 years after de Tocqueville published, the U.S. fought a rather massive civil war that was, so far, much bloodier than what has gone on in Iraq (assuming you do not subscribe to the Lancet). The aftermath of this featured decades of racial terrorism against African-Americans throughout the South. I trust that the history of Native Americans does not have to be rehashed here as well - let us just note that Phil Sheridan would not have had many quibbles with Ali Hassan al-Majid in his methods in crushing uppity natives.

[Rob Thornton]

Originally posted by JC,

Because I finally saw Flags of Our Fathers on DVD, it gives me reason to offer up that though the nation was at war in WWII, the folks grew tired then as well, over time.

JC, makes you wonder if we should poll the average guy on what his suspense "might " be prior to taking policy to the next level. I once took part in a discussion about the letters between Jefferson and Madison where the former advocated the value of 1 man 1 vote and the I believe the latter took the position of why the "common" man might not be the best to put policy in the hands of, since he might have more pressing issues

Anybody read what Sen Kerry said yesterday - something to the effect of "the reason nobody wants the job is because the White House strategy has little chance of success" - paraphrased from the early bird - but fairly close. Another example of how politicians will twist reactions, etc to further their personal agendas.

[tequila]

That sounds like a pretty reasonable paraphrase of Gen Jack Sheehan's response.


"The very fundamental issue is, they don't know where the hell they're going," said retired Marine Gen. John J. "Jack" Sheehan, a former top NATO commander who was among those rejecting the job. Sheehan said he believes that Vice President Cheney and his hawkish allies remain more powerful within the administration than pragmatists looking for a way out of Iraq. "So rather than go over there, develop an ulcer and eventually leave, I said, 'No, thanks,' " he said.

[Dr Jack]

This morning it appears that there have now been at least 5 generals who have turned down the "War Czar" job:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/12/AR2007041202147.html?hpid=topnews


Retired Marine Gen. John J. "Jack" Sheehan, retired Army Gen. Jack Keane, retired Air Force Gen. Joseph W. Ralston and retired Air Force Gen. John P. Jumper have said they are not interested, according to sources or the generals themselves, and CBS News said retired Marine Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm also demurred.

The article also gives some additional insight into the new job:


According to the proposal, the execution manager would develop "clearly assigned responsibility, deadlines, performance metrics (as appropriate) and a system of accountability to ensure progress" in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and other key Cabinet officers would assign a "trusted agent" to work with the new White House official.

Hadley said the idea is to "fix problems in Washington that are in the way," not to rewrite the chain of command or take over operational decisions. The official would work through Cabinet secretaries to solve problems, but would have enough clout to ensure follow-through.

"My goal is to make the person really work for and be seen to work for the president, and be able to speak in his name," Hadley said. "I can do it, and I do do it, but I can't do it and North Korea and Iran and all the other things I've got to do." (He said he will jettison the title "execution manager" to avoid unintended double meaning.)

This job gets better and better...

[jcustis]

Better to find more qualified to staff the PRTs we so desperately need, me thinks.

This makes me think of a sig line I've seen on another board, where a Czech officer is quoted as saying, "I am an officer, where is my office?"

Interagency coordination is great, but what do we do when one of the agencies can't (or won't) shoulder its share of the burden? Are we any closer to staffing those critical DoS slots for the PRTs?

Is anyone more keen to head to the Green Zone now that they've seen the BGs bring the fight to us within a damn cafeteria?

[Tom Odom]

Tom,
I'm glad you brought up WWII as an example of how to make things work. I suggest that we were successful because the folks who did the coordinating were good at it and had the charisma to make it happen.
The NSC leadership role requires some like a George Marshall or a Dwight Eisenhower to make it work. When someone like Brent Scowcroft sat in that chair, the organization did the things it was supposed to do. I know little about the incumbent, but it seems like we do not the right guy running the show.
I agree that there is no excuse for floundering and half-stepping by the holder of position that was created to beat down the roadblocks. My point was that we might not get much else these days because our rising leadership generation does not have the background and experience to force compliance on a playground where all the kids think they get to make their own rules and no one has to play the same game.
Back in the early days of the Roman Empire, they ruled the known world with about 400 civil servants. By the time of Constantine (about 300 years) that number had swelled to over 40,000. iI about 100 more years, the city of Rome was sacked by the Goths.

Maybe if the French Canadians sack DC, we can start over :D

Your point on leadership is EXTREMELY well taken (forgive the caps). Forgive the slight off topic shift but I think it applies here as well. I watched Wolfowitz (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/13/world/13wolfowitz.html?ex=1177128000&en=886834f92fc6665e&ei=5070&emc=eta1) apologize (and get boo'ed) for giving his Iraqi--correction Tunisian--girl friend a 60,000 dollar raise in the World Bank after he took over.


Mr. Wolfowitz apologized at a morning news conference and at the atrium meeting after the staff association disclosed that it had found a dated memorandum from Mr. Wolfowitz to a vice president for human resources at the bank, apparently instructing him to agree to the terms of a raise and reassignment for Ms. Riza.

The transfer and a subsequent raise eventually took her to a pay of $193,590 from $132,660, tax-free because of her status as a diplomat, and exceeding the salaries of cabinet members. “In hindsight, I wish I had trusted my original instincts and kept myself out of the negotiations,” Mr. Wolfowitz said.

“I made a mistake, for which I am sorry,” he added, pleading for “some understanding” of the “painful personal dilemma” he faced when he left the Pentagon to become bank president. Mr. Wolfowitz said he had been seeking to avoid a conflict of interest by having Ms. Riza, with whom he had a personal relationship, transferred from his supervision.

What drove the anger at the bank was not that Mr. Wolfowitz had denied earlier that he had sought Ms. Riza’s transfer, but that he had been less than fully candid in discussing it until documents surfaced showing his direct role. His earlier insistence that he had consulted with ethics officials was disputed by some of them, who say they were not involved in the salary aspect of discussions.

Mr. Wolfowitz, who is divorced, has been close to Ms. Riza for several years, according to people who have worked with them. She was a communications officer in the Middle East and North Africa bureau of the bank when Mr. Wolfowitz arrived in 2005, and was transferred that September to the Middle East and North Africa bureau to help set up a semi-independent foundation to promote democracy in that region.

Her initial supervisor at the State Department was Elizabeth Cheney, whose father, Vice President Dick Cheney, has been a longtime associate of Mr. Wolfowitz. Ms. Riza now serves as a consultant to the foundation, the Foundation for the Future, while drawing her World Bank salary, the State Department said.


I can't wait for my next mandatory ethics class....:cool:

Tom

[marct]

Back in the early days of the Roman Empire, they ruled the known world with about 400 civil servants. By the time of Constantine (about 300 years) that number had swelled to over 40,000. iI about 100 more years, the city of Rome was sacked by the Goths.

And let us not forget that the vast majority of "civil servants" in the Roman Empire were either slaves or eunuchs. I will leave any current analogies to the thoughts of the individual reader :cool:. That's why the Goths had to come in and protect the Western Empire from the depredations of the real barbarians, like the Vandals whose group excursion tour of Rome in 412 caused such damage.


Maybe if the French Canadians sack DC, we can start over :D

Now, Tom, you know that we did that in 1814. I'll admit, we should have had more troops from la Belle Province along on that little excursion, but, what can I say, space was limited ;).

On a (slightly) more serious note, the job description is both revealing and disturbing:


According to the proposal, the execution manager would develop "clearly assigned responsibility, deadlines, performance metrics (as appropriate) and a system of accountability to ensure progress" in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Didn't the US fight in a little "dust up" called Vietnam with that mindset? One has to wonder if the person responsible for the proposal hasn't been staring at MS Project screens for to long!

Marc

[Tom Odom]

Hadley said he is seeking a retired general or diplomat but will also consider active-duty military or foreign service officers before presenting a choice to Bush. Retired Marine Gen. John J. "Jack" Sheehan, retired Army Gen. Jack Keane, retired Air Force Gen. Joseph W. Ralston and retired Air Force Gen. John P. Jumper have said they are not interested, according to sources or the generals themselves, and CBS News said retired Marine Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm also demurred.

"Why would we do it now?" Hadley said. "We try to learn."

There is a point in all endeavors that trying is no longer good enough--you either do it or you fail. Period.

There is similarly a point in all endeavors when learning from mistakes ceases to be learning because you can't be learning if you simply make the same mistakes over and over again.

Tom

[wm]

Your point on leadership is EXTREMELY well taken (forgive the caps). Forgive the slight off topic shift but I think it applies here as well. I watched Wolfowitz (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/13/world/13wolfowitz.html?ex=1177128000&en=886834f92fc6665e&ei=5070&emc=eta1) apologize (and get boo'ed) for giving his Iraqi--correction Tunisian--girl friend a 60,000 dollar raise in the World Bank after he took over.




I can't wait for my next mandatory ethics class....:cool:

Tom

When I read the BBC story on Wolfowitz and his "associate", I was so frosted I could barely see straight.
Re your next mandatory ethics class: why is it that ethics in the US government only has to do with fiscal propriety?

[Tom Odom]

Re your next mandatory ethics class: why is it that ethics in the US government only has to do with fiscal propriety?

Actually that is not true; it deals with overall ethics including--drum roll here--the appearance of impropriety. In the case under discussion, that line was not merely crossed. They apparently played hop-scotch with it.

tom

[Tom Odom]

Parallel piece to our discussions here:



war stories: Military analysis.
General Knowledge
Why no one wants to be Bush's war czar. (http://www.slate.com/id/2164058/)
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Thursday, April 12, 2007, at 6:13 PM ET

...The fact that Bush has found no takers suggests one of three possibilities: The generals don't have any great ideas; they don't believe they'd really be given carte blanche; or, most likely, to some degree, both.

There's a history of American policy czars—grey eminences solemnly appointed by presidents to untangle the day's knottiest problems (drug czar, energy czar, inflation czar, etc.)—and each chapter has been a tale of frustration and woe.

The reasons for failure have been the same in each instance.

First, the sources of the problem are beyond any one person's grasp.

Second, the president names a czar because the normal government agencies have failed or don't know what to do.

Third, czars may be given a mandate to knock heads together, but they're not given the power to set policy. If the president doesn't have a sound policy, the most efficient coordinator can't solve anything important.

Fourth, an outsider, no matter how smart and respected, probably doesn't have a better grasp of the problem than the responsible government agencies do—or if he does, he doesn't really control the levers to force those agencies to follow his directives.

Fifth, everyone (except maybe the appointed czar) understands all this from the outset—understands that the whole enterprise is a PR stunt to make the president look like he's trying to do something and to absolve him from blame after it's clear that even the wise outsider couldn't work miracles.

[SteveO]

OK, I'll wade in...

Yes, the interagency is broken. Iraq is a symptom. Maybe Rumsfield, the Alpha Secretary, was the precipitating cause this time. Maybe Cheney perverted the tenuous IA power matrix. But where was/is the President? Where is the leadership? Is this a war or a management exercise?

Unless the Federal bureaucracy, along with other substantive players (multilaterals, NGOs, transnationals), have become too much for one executive, we don't need Congress to legislate an interagency Goldwater Nichols. The NSC reflects the President's preferred management style and follows his lead. We need an effective Commander in Chief.

A real fix will take longer than we have in Iraq.

So, in the meantime, McCain for War Tsar. He's a strong advocate and a credible political/military/civilian leader. And he's kind of old. Old enough to know which heads to knock. Maybe too old for President in 2010, but just right for Deputy President in 2007.

Where's the Churchill for our generation?

SteveO

[Tom Odom]

SteveO,

Good wade in!

I read this this morning and had the thought maybe the new CENTCOM Commander might "git 'er done."

Tom



Inside The Pentagon
April 12, 2007
Pg. 1

Fallon To Push For Better Mideast Intelligence, Particularly On Iran (http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20070413505800.html)


Adm. William Fallon, the new U.S. commander in the Middle East, is expected to immediately drive the intelligence community to develop a greater understanding of nations and actors in the region, with a particular focus on demystifying Iran, according to officials familiar with his approach.

The career naval aviator is said to be unusually aggressive in tracking down reliable information to help decipher foreign actions and intent.....

But to Fallon, talking remains only a first, if crucial, step.

Advancing security and stability in the region means “acting the junkyard dog in holding people accountable to produce results,” he told ITP. “This is what we need.”

Who, in particular, must be held to account?

“Most importantly, it is about holding myself [accountable], as well as those we can influence; subordinates; associates; [and] anyone who has an interest in the issue,” Fallon said. “And that’s a lot of people.”

[BScully]

So, in the meantime, McCain for War Tsar. He's a strong advocate and a credible political/military/civilian leader. And he's kind of old. Old enough to know which heads to knock. Maybe too old for President in 2010, but just right for Deputy President in 2007.

McCain '07...I like it! Not so sure his campaign staff would support this decision though.

I do like the idea of a civilian rather than a general. I think you need somebody that understands the cesspool that is Washington bureaucracy. Of course, they carted out the tried and true James Baker the III already and that didn't work out so well.

Take care,
Brian

[Jimbo]

I am for McCain, but in the meantime, I nominate myself. I have learned first hand where these landmines are, and which ones need the "pop and drop" placed besides them in order to effect a breach. Seriously, I think that Barry McCaffrey should be the guy. He was the first "Drug Czar", and he fully understands the pitfalls and ankle-biters that are out there for this job. He is one of the better read in retired G.O.'s on what has been happening over in Iraq. I think he would be the best possible choice based on his military experience, and his experience as the first "Drug Czar".

[sullygoarmy]

I'm slogging through Imperial Life in the Emerald City, and now I remember her name, and the Garner/Cheney issue. I haven't gotten beyond the point where the stock exchange is being addressed, so I hope to learn more about her involvement.


Great book, especially if you were at the Palace during that time period. I still remember when the stabbing took place in the CPA trailer park! Thought there was a crazed insurgent in our midst for days.

How about this crazy suggestion for "War Czar". I recommend the Commander in Chief, ie The President. Seems like he's in the right spot for the job.

Honestly though, isn't that his role/responsibility? Not that Jimbo wouldn't be a good candidate, but I think the Constitution already picked someone for the job back in 1787 and ratified in 1789!

[slapout9]

Sully, you are exactly right!! This War Czar stuff is nothing but a nationwide search to provide a scapegoat for the 08 elections. Don't blame me blame the War Czar. Lets try the constitutional path for while, what a concept!!

[selil]

Heck I need something to do this summer on my Holiday I'll take the Job as War Czar...

I have a very short list of people I'll be hiring to help me out. Tom, Marct, you know the crew... Anybody working for me will have poll dancers as their secretary.

I figure in three months I'll get as much done as anybody else.

[marct]

Heck I need something to do this summer on my Holiday I'll take the Job as War Czar...

I have a very short list of people I'll be hiring to help me out. Tom, Marct, you know the crew... Anybody working for me will have poll dancers as their secretary.

I figure in three months I'll get as much done as anybody else.

Damn! Count me in - after June 9th, Ive got a European concert tour - but after that, I'm on Selil!

Marc

[tequila]

Selil, are they offering pole dancers now?

Damn. I turned down the offer before dinner and they only offered me two secretaries. I asked if I could pick from this thread (http://www.f-16.net/f-16_forum_viewtopic-t-5241.html)and they told me no. Damned Wolfowitz scandal.

[Rob Thornton]

I want to see Marc with the "Sinjia" doo (maybe I should break out the Adobe photo shop for his "Google Talk" photo:D - Marc, you guys get American Idol up there? Its probably one of the top two most important things going on in the States right now - your avreage citizen may not know who GEN Petreus is, but by God they know Sinjia:mad: .

[marct]

Hi Rob,


I want to see Marc with the "Sinjia" doo (maybe I should break out the Adobe photo shop for his "Google Talk" photo:D - Marc, you guys get American Idol up there? Its probably one of the top two most important things going on in the States right now - your avreage citizen may not know who GEN Petreus is, but by God they know Sinjia.

Long time no chat :D. Yeah, we get American Idol up here along with its bastard child - Canadian Idol :rolleyes:. On the "doo" - I don't do Mohawks! Puhleses! Something with a touch more class! Even a Gepid double braid greased with butter has more style than that! Besides that, I'm a 2nd Bass.

On the popular culture point, how about a "Sanjaya Goes To War" option? Given his obvious talents, wouldn't it be so much better to get him out in the field? Oh, wait, sorry... I forgot, torture's not allowed by the Geneva Convention :eek:.

Marc

[Tom Odom]

Marc

I had you pegged more as a "rasta mon" with a Canadian "oot and aboot" accent.

I have to admit the idea of a "Czar Search" --especially on a commercial basis--takes PMCs to even greater heights. One has to wonder if "winning" Czar search is indeed a victory.

Tom

[marct]

Tom,


I had you pegged more as a "rasta mon" with a Canadian "oot and aboot" accent.

LOLOL Well, I 'spose I could do the accent :D.


I have to admit the idea of a "Czar Search" --especially on a commercial basis--takes PMCs to even greater heights. One has to wonder if "winning" Czar search is indeed a victory.

You know, I think that they are going about the search in completely the wrong manner. In order to capture America's popular opinion, what they really need to do is run a reality TV show!!!!! - "So you want to be a War Czar!" If nothing else, the advertising revenue might make up for what the Dems are threatening to claw back :eek:.

Marc

[tequila]

Marine General Jack Sheehan on why he turned down (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/15/AR2007041500564_pf.html)the job.


Based on my experience, I knew that a White House position of this nature would require interagency acceptance. Cabinet-level agencies, organizations and their leadership must buy in to the position's roles and responsibilities. Most important, Cabinet-level personalities must develop and accept a clear definition of the strategic approach to policy.

What I found in discussions with current and former members of this administration is that there is no agreed-upon strategic view of the Iraq problem or the region. In my view, there are essentially three strategies in play simultaneously.

The first I call "the Woody Hayes basic ground attack," which is basically gaining one yard -- or one city block -- at a time. Given unconstrained time and resources, one could control the outcome in Iraq and provide the necessary security to move on to the next stage of development.

The second strategy starts with security but adds benchmarks for both the U.S. and Iraqi participants and applies time constraints that should guide them toward a desired outcome. The value of this strategy is that everyone knows the quantifiable and measurable objectives that fit within an overall strategic framework.

The third strategy takes a larger view of the region and the desired end state. Simply put, where does Iraq fit in a larger regional context? The United States has and will continue to have strategic interests in the greater Middle East well after the Iraq crisis is resolved and, as a matter of national interest, will maintain forces in the region in some form. The Iraq invasion has created a real and existential crisis for nearly all Middle Eastern countries and created divisions among our traditional European allies, making cooperation on other issues more difficult. In the case of Iran, we have allowed Tehran to develop more policy options and tools than it had a few years ago. Iran is an ideological and destabilizing threat to its neighbors and, more important, to U.S. interests.

Of the three strategies in play, the third is the most important but, unfortunately, is the least developed and articulated by this administration.

...

There has to be linkage between short-term operations and strategic objectives that represent long-term U.S. and regional interests, such as assured access to energy resources and support for stable, Western-oriented countries. These interests will require a serious dialogue and partnership with countries that live in an increasingly dangerous neighborhood. We cannot "shorthand" this issue with concepts such as the "democratization of the region" or the constant refrain by a small but powerful group that we are going to "win," even as "victory" is not defined or is frequently redefined ...

[Tom Odom]

So apparently--at least according to this--this is actually the second (somewhat delayed)season for "Czar Search."



Washington Examiner
April 19, 2007

White House Having Trouble Creating Top War Post (http://www.examiner.com/a-682637~White_House_having_trouble_creating_top_war _post.html)

By Rowan Scarborough, National Security Correspondent

WASHINGTON - The Bush administration once again is trying to create a super-policy post inside the White House to coordinate a war, but it is having about as much success as it did in 2001 when a similar job never got filled.

In the first instance, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld saw the plan for a new senior staffer as a potential rival and snuffed it out.

This time, Rumsfeld’s successor, Robert Gates, endorses the idea of National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley. He wants to find someone with the oomph of a retired four-star officer who would strong-arm the federal bureaucracy to meet the demands of commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan.

[BScully]

I think they need to stop looking for retired generals who know better than to take the position.

[Mondor]

Is this an attempt to formalize a role similar to the one that Col. House filled for Wilson? I guess that Marshall provided the same service for Roosevelt. Otherwise I would think that between them the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the President's Cabinet could give enough background and options for the President to fulfill his duties as Commander and Chief.

[Tom Odom]

Well American Idol is headed toward its seasonal conclusiion so we could get a panel of experienced judges right there. Simon would most certainly ask the hard questions...:wry:

Mondor,

The cynic in me says, no, it is not a "COL House" or a "Marshall" role being sought. It is a buffer or barrier to deflect heat from getting unbearable.

Tom

[tequila]

The whole thing's become a farce now, anyway. How exactly is the 16th choice going to get respect from the bureaucracy now?

[wm]

Actually, if the goal was to find a heat shield or fall guy, the ploy has worked by getting no takers. Now the rejoinder to the critics can be, "Don't blame us for this failure. We asked for help from the experts. None of the folks who could have helped us steer our way through this maelstrom answered the call of their country in its hour of need."

[Tom Odom]

Actually, if the goal was to find a heat shield or fall guy, the ploy has worked by getting no takers. Now the rejoinder to the critics can be, "Don't blame us for this failure. We asked for help from the experts. None of the folks who could have helped us steer our way through this maelstrom answered the call of their country in its hour of need."

good point!

[SWJED]

23 April Washington Times commentary - Generals Dodge a Bullet on Iraq War (http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20070422-110538-9555r.htm) by Stefan Halper.


That at least three four-star generals, according to The Washington Post, have rejected a White House offer to assume the new post of "war czar," to coordinate the Iraq and Afghan wars, is an extraordinary and unprecedented vote of no confidence. One of them, Marine Gen. Jack Sheehan, summarized, "The very fundamental issue is, they don't know where the hell they're going," adding that Vice President Dick Cheney's hawkish views still dominated over the pragmatists looking for a way out of Iraq.

Gen. Sheehan's remark underscores the debilitating dispute between "hawks," who were once convinced that democracy was achievable in Iraq and would now settle for stability, and "realists" who believe the expanding civil war between Sunni and Shia insurgents demands a decisive change of course. The gulf in perceptions of the challenge before us could not be greater, nor could it portend greater consequences for American credibility and security.

The gap originated with the neoconservative belief that "regime-change" meant the United States could eliminate Saddam's mass weapons and replace his strong-man government with some form of democracy. Conditions on the ground have tempered this early idealism: Now the view is if democracy cannot be achieved, simple stability will do. Today, two elections, a constitution, and four declared strategies later, we see that having provided the structure for democratic governance, we can not establish the security needed for it to function -- a point underscored by the bombing of the Iraqi legislature inside the "Green Zone" when 30 were wounded and three killed earlier this month...

[SWJED]

30 April NY Times - Quiet Bush Aide Seeks Iraq Czar, Creating a Stir (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/30/washington/30hadley.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin) by Sheryl Gay Stolberg.


Stephen J. Hadley would be the first to tell you he does not have star power. But Mr. Hadley, the bespectacled, gray-haired, exceedingly precise Washington lawyer who is President Bush’s national security adviser, is in the market for someone who does — with the hope of saving Iraq.

Mr. Hadley is interviewing candidates, including military generals, for a new high-profile job that people in Washington are calling the war czar. The official (Mr. Hadley, ever cautious, prefers “implementation and execution manager”) would brief Mr. Bush every morning on Iraq and Afghanistan, then prod cabinet secretaries into carrying out White House orders.

It is the kind of task — a little bit of internal diplomacy and a lot of head-knocking, fortified by direct access to the president — that would ordinarily fall to Mr. Hadley himself. After all, he oversaw the review that produced Mr. Bush’s troop buildup in Iraq. But his responsibilities encompass issues around the globe, and he has concluded that he needs someone “up close to the president” to work “full time, 24/7” to put the policy into effect. He hopes to fill the job soon...

[BScully]

I know some of you guys are very skeptical about the usefulness of this position, but I really wish they'd find someone to fill it soon. While I can't blame folks for not wanting the job, we will not be successful in Iraq without it.

Brian

[tequila]

And the winner is ... LTGEN Douglas Lute (http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=3176644&page=1), former operations officer for CENTCOM under retired GEN Abizaid.

[Ski]

How in God's name is a "war czar" going to make operations in Iraq successful?

[tequila]

Updated NYTIMES article with more info (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/washington/15cnd-warczar.html?hp=&pagewanted=print)on Lt Gen Lute.

[Jimbo]

Lute could potentially make a ton of difference. Bscully and I have spoken written on this, and we could enumerate in painful detail about how DC doesn't work like it should for this. I think this is a good step forward.

[SWJED]

16 May Washington Post - Bush Taps Skeptic of Buildup as 'War Czar' (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/15/AR2007051501612.html?hpid=topnews) by Peter Baker and Robin Wright


President Bush tapped Army Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute yesterday to serve as a new White House "war czar" overseeing the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, choosing a low-key soldier who privately expressed skepticism about sending more troops to Iraq during last winter's strategy review.

In the newly created position, Lute will coordinate often disjointed military and civilian operations and manage the Washington side of the same troop increase he resisted before Bush announced the plan in January. Bush hopes an empowered aide working in the White House and answering directly to him will be able to cut through bureaucracy that has hindered efforts in Iraq...

[Ski]

How does creating another layer of bureaucracy add to our efforts?

I've read through this thread and seen a need to improve interagency efforts towards Iraq and the WoT in general. Hate to say this, but the bureaucracies of Washington DC are not the issue here. Improving interagency integration isn't going to do much when the Iraqi people don't have jobs, electricity, security or much of anything to be frank.

Now - if you told me this was being done to improve things for the future, I might buy off on that theory, but all of this is doing nothing in the short terms is building more bureaucracy and layers of "command" when we are fighting a most decentralized war.

[Jimbo]

Read back through the posts on this thread, and you will see your question has been answered already.

[goesh]

It appears he can't do much policy-wise or with the budget(s) but I suppose he can by symbolically put against the wall like Czar Nicholas was if all doesn't go well....He will need a good game face when dealing with Pelosi and Reid

[Jimbo]

What the position is supposedly going to do is hold the different departments and agencies accountable for what they have "signed up" to do. A bunch of agencies have said things at the secretary level, and then they don't follow through at the bureaucratic level. Based on where I currently sit, a bunch of these agencies have not adequately addressed their capacity issues at the NSC/president level (a kind of emporer has no clothes thing). The Czar is supposed to follow up with access to the President. when you talk budgeting and such, some of these agencies and departments need somebody from the outside to tell them that they need to expand to meet mission requirements. If you think that the current structures are doing that, then you are mistaken.

[Old Eagle]

Today is a great day to be someone other than Doug Lute.

[Tom Odom]

Today is a great day to be someone other than Doug Lute.

Oh man I started laughing so hard my NCO looked at me like I was mental--then again that's me and I often get those looks. Just ask Stan.

But Eagle you are correct and the spin in the media game is already on with articles on how is more acceptable to department heads because he has less rank.

Tom

[wm]

For what it is worth. He is a Cav guy from way back--may be a good fit with the current leadership in country given that another cav unit (the 3rd ACR) and 101 ABN (on the Army side) seem to have really figured out how to fix the problems in their AOs.

He and Petraeus also overlapped at USMA in the Social Sciences Department.

[sullygoarmy]

Oh man I started laughing so hard my NCO looked at me like I was mental--then again that's me and I often get those looks. Just ask Stan.

But Eagle you are correct and the spin in the media game is already on with articles on how is more acceptable to department heads because he has less rank.

Tom

I think you are dead on Tom. When Rumsfeld first took over, he had a one star working as his assistant. Even though the one-star kept protesting saying he was waaaaaay to junior to handle the higher ups, Rumsfeld kept him for months until he realized the one-star was right. For Lute to have better credibility with the serving four stars, he'll need to bump up a star. I think this was the primary reason the President was initially looking for a retired four-star, kind of a senior mentor, or graybeard, who has "been there, done that" and can relate to the four stars.

Like Old Eagle Said, I'm glad I'm not LTG Lute!

[BScully]

I think the main role of LTG Lute is going to be working with the civilian agencies...not the military. From my perch, what needs to happen is that the civilian agencies need to follow through on their promises of support to the military. Gen. Lute will need to be busting heads to make that happen. I don't think he'll be directing the military at all or really getting too heavily involved in military activities except to fully understand what the military needs from the civilian departments to win in Iraq.

Brian

[SWJED]

17 May Washington Post - To 'War Czar,' Solution to Iraq Conflict Won't Be Purely Military (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/16/AR2007051602876.html) by Peter Baker and Robin Wright.


In selecting Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute to manage the war in Iraq, President Bush has chosen a soldier who believes there is no purely military solution to the conflict and wants to forge a political accommodation among Iraqi factions that may fall short of full reconciliation but could lead to an exit strategy, according to friends and colleagues.

Lute's appointment shifts the balance within Bush's war council by adding a powerful voice who resisted sending more U.S. troops to Iraq and plans to pressure civilian agencies to take on a greater role. Lute promised Bush that he will do everything he can to make the buildup succeed despite his reservations, but he may be more open to arguments for a withdrawal should it fail, the colleagues said...

[Old Eagle]

For such an unassuming guy, Lute sure seems to be drawing fire. Another good reason not to be him again today.

For the academics among you, I would point out that Tom Leney would have had a terrible time building a more complex sentence than that in his quote.