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Jedburgh
04-12-2007, 02:58 PM
IHT, 11 Apr 07: Rio governor requests Brazil army intervention to quell violence (http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/04/11/america/LA-GEN-Brazil-Rio-Violence.php)

Gov. Sergio Cabral Filho has formally requested that the army intervene to contain the violence that has been spiraling out of control in Brazil's most famous city....

...Silva planned to meet with army officials Thursday about the operation. Rio — one of the world's most violent — is scheduled to host the Pan American Games in July....

Jedburgh
11-07-2007, 03:57 PM
Reuters, 6 Nov 07: Brazil Busts Death Squads After Wave of Killings (http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN06386018)

Police in northeastern Brazil arrested 34 people, including policemen, lawyers and merchants, on Tuesday on charges of participating in death squads believed to have killed hundreds of people.

The groups operated in Recife, capital of Pernambuco state and the most violent of Brazil's crime-ridden cities based on per capita homicides.....

bismark17
09-26-2008, 05:34 AM
I recently saw an interesting movie on comcast on demand, possibly called, "Elite Unit" about a law enforcement group known as BOPE in Brazil which is like a self autonomous elite SWAT/SOF L.E. unit. They have a long operational leash to put it mildly.

Its not at the same level as the classic film, Battle of Algiers but its an interesting film. I researched it on the net and the director stated that while filming a torture scene that an actual BOPE member approached him and told him that the technique was all wrong and showed him the proper way to execute it without leaving marks on the victim. The director felt it was their way of showing they didn't care about the film being made. Its worth watching if you can find it.

Bill Moore
01-10-2009, 07:38 AM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/05/AR2009010502741.html


"They probably thought we were going to leave like usual," Cunha said from the school, which has become the headquarters of Rio's latest experiment in urban policing. "But this time we're staying."

The police have regularly launched large operations in Brazil's favelas, or slums, in their battle against drug gangs over the years, but authorities say the occupation of Santa Marta, a relatively small, contained neighborhood, is part of a new approach, a pilot project for the future of crime fighting in this violent city. Brazilian police officers are attempting counterinsurgency tactics similar to those used by U.S. soldiers in Iraq -- setting up small bases occupied around the clock inside violent neighborhoods, developing intelligence by living among their adversaries, and using government funds to rebuild broken areas and generate goodwill.

"Santa Marta is like a laboratory for policing a conflict area," said Antônio Roberto Cesário de Sá, a senior official in the office of the public security secretary of Rio de Janeiro. "The idea is to rescue a territory that until now has belonged to a drug-dealing gang."

davidbfpo
01-10-2009, 07:18 PM
Sorry, this reported experiment in Rio is not an application of "new" COIN war tactics. This is a tried and tested police tactic, which lives under all manner of names: sector policing, neighbourhood policing etc. IIRC this method has appeared in the USA, the snag was keeping the assigned officers living in their patrol base.

davidbfpo

selil
01-10-2009, 07:51 PM
Sorry, this reported experiment in Rio is not an application of "new" COIN war tactics. This is a tried and tested police tactic, which lives under all manner of names: sector policing, neighbourhood policing etc. IIRC this method has appeared in the USA, the snag was keeping the assigned officers living in their patrol base.

davidbfpo


Absolutely correct.

In several western states to this day Deputy Sheriffs officers live in their communities as a requirement of the job. Though that is starting to wane as a technique of controlling crime.

Bill Moore
01-11-2009, 04:33 PM
Dave, I agree it isn't new, but I do think you can make an argument that it is under utilized, and that most "modern" police forces are not equipped or trained to do this. I believe there are still several neighborhoods in the U.S. alone (as compared to globally) that are controlled by gangs, and in these areas the police at most do drive by policing or respond to 911 calls.

The way the article read, it sounds like they established a combat outpost (with the emphasis on combat) in the heart of bad guy turf in order to get control of the turf. They had to fight their way in, then put in sufficient force to hold. Makes you wonder where the bad guys went, and if the next fight will be harder. I'm not a law enforcement expert, but I haven't read about too many cases where police have done this type of operations before. I think the NYC police did some surge operations, and used large buses as their police outposts?

Anyway I thought it was of interest for a few reasons, one you captured, the other is nature and degree of the criminal threat in many places.

William F. Owen
01-11-2009, 04:37 PM
The way the article read, it sounds like they established a combat outpost (with the emphasis on combat) in the heart of bad guy turf in order to get control of the turf. They had to fight their way in, then put in sufficient force to hold. Makes you wonder where the bad guys went, and if the next fight will be harder.

I read something about this... Oh yes. Carl Von Clausewitz. On War. :D

selil
01-11-2009, 04:58 PM
Makes you wonder where the bad guys went, and if the next fight will be harder. I'm not a law enforcement expert, but I haven't read about too many cases where police have done this type of operations before. I think the NYC police did some surge operations, and used large buses as their police outposts?

From different aspects it is a fairly common tactics of United States domestic law enforcement. Often called emphasis patrols or similar catchy titles (my favorite is wolf packs). Emphasis patrols can be sweeps for prostitution, drugs, or juvenile (gang) campaigns. Emphasis patrols usually last a few weeks at most. They usually sweep up some percentage of the criminal target population, and then create dislocation of some percentage, and some percentage hibernates until the sweep is done.

The problems with long term emphasis patrols is that the justice system has a single input, various storage mechanisms, and various outputs. Hundreds of cops arresting hundreds of crooks all process through just a few judges and courts. So anything like a "surge" (ick) in domestic law enforcement won't work for very long. Law enforcement is not a military operation regardless of all those M4 toting SWAT teams who keep trying to "wage war" on crime.

Bill Moore
01-11-2009, 05:54 PM
The problems with long term emphasis patrols is that the justice system has a single input, various storage mechanisms, and various outputs. Hundreds of cops arresting hundreds of crooks all process through just a few judges and courts. So anything like a "surge" (ick) in domestic law enforcement won't work for very long. Law enforcement is not a military operation regardless of all those M4 toting SWAT teams who keep trying to "wage war" on crime.

Selil, I had my doubts about the ink spot for other reasons, but your thoughts just added to my doubts. In many countries (ours included) the court and detention system is overwhelmed, so even if we're successful on the COP, surge, end of the problem, we eventually (sooner rather than later) come a point where this strategy collapses upon itself.

The concept of the ink blot strategy is to pacify one area at a time, and then push out to an adjacent area and pacify it. To enable this to work we need a legal system (and ideally a rehabilitation system) that can handle this surge of detentions, which will probably be the long pole in the tent. If it is only one gang in one area, then this strategy will probably work, but the problem in Brazil is large scale.

It is easier to deal with an insurgency usng this strategy where you can mobilize the nation's resources, employ the military, etc. to deal with what we hope will be a relatively temporary problem.

If there is a lesson here, then it appears to be nipping the problem in the butt before it gets to this level. Goes back to the broken glass theory of law enforcement. It will be interesting to see how this play out over the next few months.

Gringo Malandro
01-11-2009, 08:33 PM
Dave, I agree it isn't new, but I do think you can make an argument that it is under utilized, and that most "modern" police forces are not equipped or trained to do this. I believe there are still several neighborhoods in the U.S. alone (as compared to globally) that are controlled by gangs, and in these areas the police at most do drive by policing or respond to 911 calls.

The way the article read, it sounds like they established a combat outpost (with the emphasis on combat) in the heart of bad guy turf in order to get control of the turf. They had to fight their way in, then put in sufficient force to hold. Makes you wonder where the bad guys went, and if the next fight will be harder. I'm not a law enforcement expert, but I haven't read about too many cases where police have done this type of operations before. I think the NYC police did some surge operations, and used large buses as their police outposts?

Anyway I thought it was of interest for a few reasons, one you captured, the other is nature and degree of the criminal threat in many places.

I'm not a law enforcement expert either, but I would offer that the situation is Rio is a bit different than in the US, even in some of the very bad parts of the US.

Most of the slums in Rio are like de facto independent fiefdoms run by the gangs. It goes beyond being the gang's "turf" where they represent just a physical danger to officers. It most cases they are not only the "government," but they also provide services, administer justice, charge rent, etc... Some members of the police have formed their own extralegal militias that seize territory and administer the favelas in much the same way, but without (official) government support.

I understand there is no fine line, but knowing some folks who are cops in some dangerous areas of the US and having spent some a number of months in Rio I think there are probably some elements of COIN not present in US community policing. Especially if we are talking about the Mexico situation being a small war, which I think probably has more in common here.

jmm99
01-12-2009, 01:42 AM
from the OP article.


from OP link
About 10,000 people live in Santa Marta, a warren of 1,000 to 2,000 shoddy houses threaded with narrow concrete paths and perched on a hillside so steep that many residents ride a tram to get up the slope. About 50 to 60 drug dealers operate here, residents estimate, and the graffiti of the gang in charge -- "CV" for Comando Vermelho, or Red Command -- scar walls. Those are modest numbers, given the scope of the sprawling city -- an advantage for a police operation that employed just 150 men in the initial push. The small favela also has few entrances and is bordered by jungle, rather than blending into other slums.

A bit light on the "insurgent-counterinsurgent ratio", but as David correctly states, this was more of a police than a military operation (with favorable geography, to boot).

More important than the manpower ratio is the question of how long the government is inclined to keep the police presence - 10 months, 10 years, etc. In the long run, will Santa Marta become a pacified colonia ? - after all, even Colchester (http://www.roman-britain.org/places/camulodunum.htm) had its down before its ups, as David can attest better than I.

At least to some inhabitants, the police effort has survived its authoritarian phase, but has yet to win over them - perhaps, a question of valuation of principles in Bob's World terms.


from OP link
Nata Maravilha Nael, 48, a school security guard who grew up in City of God, said even the residents who want the officers in the neighborhood describe such police excesses as speeding through the narrow streets in armored vehicles, screaming at residents and demanding bribes.

"It's an abuse of power," he said. "They're like criminals themselves."

The police have shut down popular dance parties, and several residents said they do not feel comfortable being outside after dark anymore, because of the risk of being accused of criminal activity.

"It's going backward. They're acting aggressively against normal people," Nael said. "When the criminals were here, they didn't mess with normal people."

Nothing new here - we've heard it here so many times in regard to "real" armed conflicts.

It seemed to me to be an illustration of how the counterinsurgent's values (reduction of principles to practice) become the governing criteria for success or failure.

Bill Moore
01-12-2009, 02:08 AM
Gringo Malandro, I wasn't trying to compare the situation in Rio as parallel to a gang controlled neighborhood in Philly or Las Vegas, but simply illustrate there are several neighborhoods in the developing and modern world that are controlled by thugs, not by the police. I agree with all your points, except perhaps downplaying the relevance of this article.

Perhaps it is a school of thought versus a principle, but I believe you have to control the populace to defeat an insurgency, so any articles I find on the government attempting to re-establish control I tend to think they're important. During an insurgeny either the police, military or a combination there of may be employed to control the populace, so I think the tactics being employed by the police are relevant (unfortunately as jmm99 points out, as an example to avoid) to both mlitary and police.

jmm99 points out that legitimacy is the main issue, perhaps the center of gravity, and it is clear that the police are not legitimate to the relevant populace in this case, so it will be interesting to see how this plays out over time.


IIRC this method has appeared in the USA, the snag was keeping the assigned officers living in their patrol base.

David please cite a couple of examples when you have tiime. Also how realistic is it to expect a police officer with a family to actually live in a depressed neighborhood, send his kids to the gang infested schools, etc.?

While I agree in principle, I think there is a limit to what we should expect. Perhaps bringing in a national level law enforcement force for 4 to 6 months at a time (without moving their families) might be acceptable? Thoughts?

If you hire locals, then they are vulnerable to having their families threatened. I think this all ties into how we plan to address long term stability issues in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It may be a different apple, but it is still an apple.

davidbfpo
01-12-2009, 06:41 AM
David please cite a couple of examples when you have tiime. Also how realistic is it to expect a police officer with a family to actually live in a depressed neighborhood, send his kids to the gang infested schools, etc?

While I agree in principle, I think there is a limit to what we should expect. Perhaps bringing in a national level law enforcement force for 4 to 6 months at a time (without moving their families) might be acceptable? Thoughts?

If you hire locals, then they are vulnerable to having their families threatened. I think this all ties into how we plan to address long term stability issues in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It may be a different apple, but it is still an apple.

Bill and others,

I recall when in Washington DC, at least fifteen years ago, that Metro PD had tried deplaying resident officers to a few neighbourhood; it worked well at first, but the officers - often IIRC - were newly recruited and after sometime wanted to buy their own homes. (Bear with me, I will ask two friends closer to the scene).

Deploying a national LE unit for a short period is really a band-aid and few national forces are culturally / organisationally suited.

Hiring locals and related vulnerability issues. Yes, valid. A galaxy of issues and solutions. Difficult and in Afghanistan? I'll not comment.

Possibly an one illustration; locally there have always been Irish-born / descended police officers and throughout 'The Troubles' a large minority in the then Special Branch anecdote indicates were Irish (mainly from the south). Loyalty was not an issue.

Hope that helps as an early answer over breakfast.

davidbfpo

Having a mixture of local and non-local helps. Alongside moving people on when promoted, at least for a few years before returning.

davidbfpo
01-12-2009, 11:53 PM
Bill & others,

From a recently retired US police colleague, from upstate New York State:
In my experiences, officers living in patrol neighborhoods works if there is a general respect for authority. In neighborhoods where this respect is absent, the officer’s presence (and, in turn, that of his/her family) is seen and acted towards as a threat. In the few cases where officers have ventured to live within their jurisdiction, even fewer have done so with children and less while children attended the public schools. (Note: Rochester PD has offered ownership incentives to officers to do this.) In theory, the idea is sound… in practice, impractical. I lived in my patrol area for the first five years of marriage but moved out at first arrival of offspring

Hope that helps and firsthand knowledge,

davidbfpo

Gringo Malandro
01-13-2009, 02:11 AM
Bill & others,

From a recently retired US police colleague, from upstate New York State:

'In my experiences, officers living in patrol neighborhoods works if there is a general respect for authority. In neighborhoods where this respect is absent, the officer’s presence (and, in turn, that of his/her family) is seen and acted towards as a threat. In the few cases where officers have ventured to live within their jurisdiction, even fewer have done so with children and less while children attended the public schools. (Note: Rochester PD has offered ownership incentives to officers to do this.) In theory, the idea is sound… in practice, impractical. I lived in my patrol area for the first five years of marriage but moved out at first arrival of offspring'.

Hope that helps and firsthand knowledge,

davidbfpo


David, the issue here is not "respect for authority." The cops can't even enter the favelas without being engaged, and they generally go in pretty heavy (armored vehicles, automatic weapons). The idea of renting a room or a house would not be possible, they would be killed. Though the tourist areas are relatively safe, even the police stations there are more like FOBs.

These places are totally off the grid and totally independent from the state. These tactics might not be new everywhere, but they are new here. I suspect that part of that is because it would not have been possible before. A few years ago they had coordinated attacks on bus and police stations, 115 people died in 5 days. (http://travel2.nytimes.com/2006/05/17/world/americas/17brazil.html?pagewanted=print) I'd say the ability to do this showshow much the city has improved, congrats to the Brazilians for that.

On the article, keep in mind that it's from the NYT and thus meant for mass-consumption. This may not be true textbook COIN, but the "big blue arrow" parallels to the US pushing off the FOBs and engaging the populace are a close enough illustration for the casual reader, the NYT could have done worse, and has.

By the way, sorry Bill wasn't discounting the article, I was trying to address a couple posts.

bourbon
01-13-2009, 04:31 PM
I saw the Brazilian film Elite Squad last week after several strong recommendations, The COIN Graduate Seminar (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6491) among them:

Brazil, a hotbed of corruption, crime, and vicious urban warfare between heavily armed special operations police and AK-toting gangsters, is a preview of a possible future for American urban centers. Tropa De Elite (The Elite Squad) is about BOPE, a Brazilian military police special operations unit confronting gangsters and their well-bred sympathizers. The film leaves no one in Brazilian society unscathed, attacking the corrupt municipal government, the fashionably left-leaning university students whose addictions finance the gangs; the horrific gangs themselves, and BOPE itself—depicted as a brutal instrument of repression against the residents of the favelas.

It is an excellent film. If the film is an accurate depiction then, and it is congruent with what I've read and been told by people who have been, then Gringo Malandro's above post sounds accurate.



Letter from São Paulo: City of Fear (http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/04/langewiesche200704), by William Langewiesche. Vanity Fair, April 2007.

Operating by cell phone, a highly organized prison gang launched an attack that shut down Brazil’s largest city last May, with the authorities powerless to stop it. For many in São Paulo, this vast, amorphous criminal network is the only government they have.

Bill Moore
01-13-2009, 05:17 PM
Excellent post Bourbon, the article/letter you attached addresses a lot of topics we surfaced over the years in the SWJ council, and it probably is a prediction of what urbanization throughout the developing world will look like in the very near future.

The attack sounded very familiar to the Mumbai attack in some respects, but involved more of a swarming approach, than an infiltration of one team.

I'll have to read it in depth later, but a couple of quotes caught my eye,

We frequently approach the ideology of insurgent and insurgent like groups with a degree of western naiveity where we assume (population centric approach) that everyone simply wants democracy and our economic system. If we can give them that, they'll turn their guns into plows, etc. That is B.S., many of them are as loyal to their cause as we are to our country.


Prisoners were attracted to the group because it brought order to their lives and gave them purpose, protection, and power. There were obligations. P.C.C. followers lived by its laws under penalty of death. Those who formally joined became “Brothers” for life. They were initiated with a baptism involving water, and had to sign a 16-point manifesto that still serves as the P.C.C.’s constitution.

In this case it is somewhat difficult to attack their strategy. :wry:


“So the Command is a revolutionary movement?”

“Yes.”

“Okay, so jump ahead and tell me what you are fighting toward. Let’s say you win your revolution and take power. What kind of Brazil do you want to build then?”

A smile flickered across his lips. He said, “We do not think about winning. We rebel against the government more to give a response now than with a vision of the future in mind.”

A government official,


The lack of control is much larger than that. It extends to the favelas and, more important, to the office towers where global money flows. People see this, or they should. São Paulo is not alone. Consider all the other Third World cities, consider Moscow, consider L.A. The P.C.C. is just another inhabitant of the growing feral zones. I said, “But isn’t it possible that this is a level of chaos that São Paulo can continue to live with? With all its fortifications and armored cars? Doing business with the world?”

davidbfpo
01-13-2009, 11:18 PM
From an academic friend who has studied policing around the world, who has also read the thread:

This is an interesting debate though, as pointed out, bit chalk and cheese in places. Mike McConville and Dan Shepherd (1992) Watching Police, Watching Communities (http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&id=Qcj34WWoTeEC&dq=watching+Police,+Watching+Communities&printsec=frontcover&source=web&ots=3OXagQQS4_&sig=QbzvO-q4moehUfaL9MoPODZG3bY&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result#PPP1,M1), Routledge was an interesting study that, from memory, drew sharp distinction between 'urban' and 'rural' policing in UK in this respect. In latter, police tend to live in areas they police whereas in former they do not because, even if they come from those areas, they are aspirational, well-paid etc and move to the suburbs.

The other point from history that comes to mind is that the powers-that-be actually don't want cops policing their own area sometimes because of problem that they may have mixed loyalties - the other side of the 'community policing' coin can be 'corruption'!

Re. the broader debate on the blog, we might imagine a spectrum of 'policing' with rural communities in UK forty years ago at one end and the favelas at the other. The point is that in the latter, as made by one contributor, it is not an issue of policing but of governance where gangs provide a whole range of services, one of which is enforcement (just like that state!) Shifting policing in any particular place along this spectrum is an issue on which there has been much work (but not a special issue he has pursued).

Like others I have seen TV documentaries on policing in Brazil, hardly a place to learn from. Others threads have touched upon the issues of policing urban areas where the government's authority is minimal, e.g. Republican areas in Northern Ireland.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
02-04-2009, 08:50 PM
The new policing is now reported on the BBC News website, after a comment by the President: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7870395.stm
Short film clip attached.

davidbfpo

bourbon
02-05-2009, 05:21 PM
Brazil police occupy Sao Paulo slum after clashes (http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2009/02/03/news/LT-Brazil-Violence.php), The Associated Press, February 3, 2009.

Paraisopolis and the PCC - history and symbology (http://samuellogan.blogspot.com/2009/02/paraisopolis-and-pcc-history-and.html), by Samuel Logan. Security in Latin America, February 04, 2009.

Video - The Vice Guide to Travel: The Slums of Rio (http://www.vbs.tv/video.php?id=570589584).
The High City - Shopping in Brazil's favelas. (http://www.vbs.tv/video.php?id=627018097)

Jedburgh
10-07-2009, 07:11 PM
JSOU, Sep 09: Irregular Warfare: Brazil's Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas (https://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU09-8pinheiroBrazil_final.pdf)

In this monograph Major General Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro contributes to the discussion of urban guerrillas, their impact on society, and the role of the armed forces in countering criminal elements. The rise of urban guerrillas is a result of an evolution in command and control capabilities, weapons, and doctrine that has given them strong influence over the daily lives of citizens living in neighborhoods where government support and control is limited or absent. The favelas (ghettos, slums) of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo are ready examples that provide the setting for General Alvaro’s monograph. The urban guerrilla, however, is emblematic of a wider-felt problem, not limited to Brazil. What makes General Alvaro’s monograph compelling is that this Brazilian story has universal application in many locales that are under-governed and under-supported by constituted authorities.

Mike Burgoyne
01-13-2010, 12:26 AM
I will be in Rio shortly looking at the security situation with the favelas.

Any advice, contacts, and/or questions I should ask would be great.

Thanks

Mike

davidbfpo
11-25-2010, 09:39 PM
The BBC has had a couple of reports on a new police "surge" (sorry, could not resist that) into gang territory; link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11838472

There are linked stories and the Marine Corps have provided the police with logistic support and a small number of APCs (M113 in the photos seen).

AdamG
12-01-2010, 03:25 PM
*Shudder*


Justin Bieber has groupies where you'd least expect them. An army of Brazilian cops raided the Rio headquarters of one of the country's most notorious drug gangs.

http://www.1035superx.com/cc-common/news/sections/newsarticle.html?feed=104673&article=7889026

Tom Odom
12-01-2010, 05:26 PM
*Shudder*


http://www.1035superx.com/cc-common/news/sections/newsarticle.html?feed=104673&article=7889026

That is just so...wrong

In too many ways

AdamG
08-15-2011, 04:51 PM
Now *this* is a war on drugs.


(CNN) -- The Brazilian Air Force on Friday dropped eight 500-pound bombs on a clandestine airstrip in the jungle near the Colombian and Venezuelan borders, part of wide military operation that goes beyond targeting drug traffickers.
Video of the scene, released by the air force, showed craters on the destroyed airstrip, which they say was used to move drugs.

http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/08/13/brazil.military.operation/

AdamG
11-14-2011, 03:08 AM
The government of Brazil sent 3,000 troops into Rocinha, the hillside shanty town overlooking Rio de Janeiro, in an effort to drive out crime and violence in advance of the 2014 World Cup.

They encountered little resistance as they moved in at 4 a.m., The New York Times reported, despite the neighborhood's "notorious" reputation. Indeed, the move by the government, blessed with the dissonant formal name "Shock of Peace," is as much public relations as police work. Troops alone won't correct bad infrastructure and endemic poverty.

http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2011/11/brazilian-forces-invade-rios-largest-slum/44921/

bourbon
11-06-2012, 10:41 PM
Rio: the fight for the favelas - Brazil’s most famous city has launched a huge offensive against drug gangs and militias before the next World Cup and Olympics (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/27511af8-23b3-11e2-a46b-00144feabdc0.html), By Misha Glenny. FT Magazine, 2 November 2012.

The integration strategy and efforts by the state and city hall are divided into two stages: UPP Policing and UPP Social.

The first stage sees crack forces storm the favelas in an intentionally intimidating act of urban shock and awe, followed by the establishment of a large civilian police presence inside the favelas for the first time in history.

When occupying Complexo de Alemão, in November 2010, the authorities decided against taking any chances: the army and navy were deployed to secure the perimeter of the entire area as the special forces went in search of the drug kingpins.

Everybody knew that the pacification of two of the city’s largest favelas, Alemão and Rocinha, was of overriding significance. “We chose those territories that were the critical nodes of criminal activity quite specifically, by assessing the fire power of the factions running them,” explains Beltrame. The greater the firepower, the higher up the list for pacification.

Interesting read.

ccmaximus
11-09-2012, 05:35 AM
Another wave of attacks in Sao Paulo has been going on. Bus burned today, with all attacks emanating by one single criminal organization that has some readily identifiable political objectives:

http://noticias.uol.com.br/album/album-do-dia/2012/11/09/imagens-do-dia---9-de-novembro-de-2012.htm?abrefoto=2#fotoNav=2

The leaders of the said organization have been commanding murders of law enforcement agents. 90 so far this year.

A very shocking video of an attack against a police sergeant:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kalcxLjh4ts

These murders were commanded from within prison cells. This was an electoral year, and similar attacks have been constant in every other electoral year.

davidbfpo
03-25-2013, 01:42 PM
A critical comment on 'Pacifying Rio', which has some interesting points I have not seen before. For example the Brazilian foreign policy goals being expressed in their military role in the UN Haiti mission, with the lessons learnt coming home.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/flavie-halais/pacifying-rio-whats-behind-latin-americas-most-talked-about-security-oper

davidbfpo
06-25-2013, 08:27 PM
Amidst the limited reporting here of the protests against bus fare rises and then with a wider theme a report on how Brazilian police can act:
A security force operation in northern Rio de Janeiro has left eight people dead, as the country struggles to contain a popular uprising partly fueled by police brutality.

I suspect this fact may explain a lot:
a Special Operations Battallion (BOPE) sergeant was killed

Not seen these figures before, they are rather sobering:
Police in Rio and Sao Paulo, Brazil's two biggest cities, have killed 11,000 people in the last ten years - in 2008 one person was killed for every 23 arrested, compared to the US police average of one death per 37,000 people arrested.

Link:http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/brazil-police-drug-traffickers-killed-favela-protest

If you're thinking of visiting Brazil for the World Cup in 2014, time to rethink?

davidbfpo
10-26-2013, 01:19 PM
Not unexpected I fear, the opening passage from a NYT report:
A Brazilian police officer who spoke at a technology conference in New York on Tuesday about the potential of a new smartphone app to aid in the “pacification” of Rio de Janeiro’s lawless favelas was indicted the same day by prosecutors back home in connection with a notorious case of torture and murder by her unit in July.

Link:http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/25/rio-police-officer-indicted-for-torture-while-lecturing-on-smart-policing-in-new-york/?_r=0

The lady officer did return home. Yes being a police officer in such places is very hard, torture is not the response.

I had not realised the pacification effort was partly privately funded:
In August, the embattled Brazilian business tycoon Eike Batista — whose annual contributions of nearly $10 million had paid for U.P.P. equipment, uniforms, weapons, ammunition and training — withdrew his financial support for the project.

davidbfpo
12-29-2013, 11:28 PM
The title comes from the closing line in the linked article, which was headlined:
Gang gunfights loom over Rio de Janeiro's World Cup preparations

It appears that not every favela likes pacification:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/brazil/10541252/Gang-gunfights-loom-over-Rio-de-Janeiros-World-Cup-preparations.html

davidbfpo
02-06-2014, 03:10 PM
Not what one expects, let alone the Brazilian military police:
Brazil's military police have killed six people in response to a gang assault against a Rio de Janeiro Police Pacification Unit, as the city's "pacification" program wavers in the face of regrouping gangs and a lack of progress in resolving social problems.Men in one of the cars opened fire, shooting two police officers, one of which later died.Link:http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/assault-on-upp-base-sign-of-cracks-in-rios-pacification-program


(http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=20687)

flagg
05-19-2014, 11:41 PM
On the topic of Kilcullen/"Out of the Mountains" would Brazil's hosting of both the FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics represent a great opportunity to see how the "conflict entrepreneur" and un/self-governed spaces issues are dealt with?

To me, Brazil's favelas seem like the best laboratories to see how megaslum governance and management solutions play out(or don't).

Such as the Brazil's Pacifying Police Unit(UPP).

If there's one place I'd like to be on the ground to learn and understand in the next two years would be Brazil's favelas.

davidbfpo
05-20-2014, 03:10 PM
This thread is at the suggestion of Flagg. Using David Kilcullen's latest book and theory - what will happen in Brazil's slums / megacities / favelas in the next two years when two international football events take place there?

Can the Kilcullen theory be applied? So watch and comment on Brazil as an example.

There are a number of relevant threads. Notably The David Kilcullen Collection:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=12934 and the Brazil violence in (merged thread), which has a number of news reports on the usually para-military policing of the favelas:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2602

There is the small example of into the slums cited by Kilcullen, the multinational effort to detain a drug lord in Jamaica:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10451

Mexico of course already has an increasingly violent problem:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5370

It is worth reading a recent SWJ article A Proposed Framework for Appreciating Megacities: A US Army perspective:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-proposed-framework-for-appreciating-megacities-a-us-army-perspective-0 One of the authors commented:
We've looked at the recent favela ops, and certainly there is a lot to study there.

Flagg's post will come first after the thread is created.

TheCurmudgeon
05-20-2014, 05:17 PM
Interesting idea. Watching events unravel and testing ideas against reality BEFORE it happens rather than in hindsight.

little information:

Key Facts (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/brazil/8882701/Rio-favelas-key-facts-and-figures.html)



Here is a brief look at some of the facts and figures about the cities' slums:


1,000 – approximate number of favelas in Rio de Janeiro


18 – number of favelas that have seen Police Pacification Units (UPPs) installed to drive out crime since the first was established three years ago


40 – number of UPPs police aim to establish by 2014


20 – percentage of the six million people in the city's metropolitan region who live in favelas

3 – times more people killed on average per year by police in Rio than in the entire United States

37 – murders per 100,000 people in Rio per year compared to 1.9 per 100,000 in London

69,300 – number of inhabitants of Rocinha, South America's biggest favela, according to 2010 census

150,000 – estimated approximate true number of inhabitants of Rocinha


Facts and Figures. (http://soulbrasileiro.com/main/rio-de-janeiro/favelas/facts-and-figures/)


60% of Rio de Janeiro’s new favelas are in the West Zone.

Favelas in the North Zone occupy a greater portion of the city; more than one million people live in communities in this zone.

Large favelas in Rio are prone to real estate speculation. The implementation of services inflated property prices.

Apartments are now common in favelas. Many investors take advantage of irregularities to be able to build apartments and then sell or rent out the units.

Rental price depends on the favela and the property. Monthly rental prices range from R$150 to R$ 500. In Rocinha, people line up to rent a house. Shacks in Pavão-Pavãozinho are sold for R$30.000 to R$40.000.

There is an enormous difference in household income between those who live on the asphalt and those who live in the favela. The average asphalt income is R$1,500, compared to R$352 in the favela. One can see all this inequality in Barra da Tijuca and nearby areas. In Barra, a head of a family earns an average salary of R$ 5,175 while the average income of a family in the Angu Duro community is R$ 382.

Brazilian favelas are considered a consequence of unequal income distribution and the lack of housing across the country. However, according to research by Professor Alba Zaluar, partly funded by the city of Rio de Janeiro, only 15% of favela residents would like to leave their hills. The survey revealed that 97% of these Rio favela homes have a TV, 94% have refrigerators, 59% a DVD player, 55% a mobile telephone, 48% have a washing machine, and 12% own a computer.

Favelas represent 3.5% of the city’s land area.

Between 1999 and 2008, the area of favelas grew by 7%, which corresponds to the entire Ipanema neighborhood.

From 2004 to 2010, 218 new favelas emerged in Rio.

Rio das Pedras favela already has 3,000 apartment buildings.

Favelas have a strong illegal market. Estimates show that irregular businesses generate R$ 3 billion per year.

TheCurmudgeon
05-20-2014, 05:27 PM
An interesting paper, but still in Draft - Please don't quote without permission of the author

Criminal Governance and Insurgency: The Brazilian Experience (http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCkQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bisa.ac.uk%2Findex.php%3Fopti on%3Dcom_bisa%26task%3Ddownload_paper%26no_html%3D 1%26passed_paper_id%3D373&ei=fn97U4GcGcKAqgbqh4DoDw&usg=AFQjCNF54YxUM6ZSa2vPnxmobjSggxVxrw&sig2=HVjy8G_cw9d0Xb9tmaR4Gg&bvm=bv.67229260,d.b2k)


Abstract
The issue of non-state armed groups' governance has recently gained increased attention from various social science disciplines. In my paper I try to look at the territorial governance and authority of armed gangs in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro through the David Kilcullen's notion of insurgency as competition for the support of population through establishing the resilient system of control and subsequently gaining legitimacy from it. Although organized crime groups in favelas are not ideologically motivated to oppose the state as other insurgents are, their engagement in illegal activities and control of population based on „their“ territory make them armed opponents of state and de facto insurgents. In this paper I argue that their authority among favela citizens could be understood by the lack of Brazilian state institutions' capacity to ensure security and social order, which is crucial part of state „output legitimacy“ (and therefore de facto failure. The criminal groups are, on the other hand, viewed by many favela inhabitants as more capable to fulfil at least the most basic community needs. Therefore they are able to „outgovern“ the state and present an effective and in some sense legitimate alternative to its institutions.

flagg
05-21-2014, 02:39 AM
Here's a YouTube link to a decent documentary about a favela in Rio, Brazil:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fP9eYxELA8Y

I particularly like the part from approx 15:00 to approx 21:00 minutes.

It follows the local slumlord(urban warlord meaning of the word) "Spiderman" in his unenviable tasks that seem to include:

Mayor
Police Chief
Judge/Arbitrator
Bank Manager
Public Works CFO
Drug Dealer

He's wearing a lot of hats filling the vacuum left by a failure of legitimate local governance.

To me, after having seen this and then reading Kilcullen's "Out of the Mountains" it really struck home the points of "conflict entrepreneur" and illicit networks where drug revenue is A, or possibly THE revenue stream(of the moment), NOT the purpose of the network.

It also helped better define for me forum member Bob's World's description of self-governed/ungoverned spaces that I've seen in his previous posting.

I've been following the UPP(Brazil's Police Pacifying Unit) project with great interest, and look forward to more in-depth analysis targeting those with a professional interest in the growing megaslum future.

So far, what little has made it into the mainstream has been less than promising:

Rio Police Officer Is Indicted for Torture While Lecturing on ‘Smart Policing’ in New York

http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/25/rio-police-officer-indicted-for-torture-while-lecturing-on-smart-policing-in-new-york/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0

Brazil's favelas are in big trouble, despite the World Cup marketing push

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/18/brazil-favelas-big-trouble-world-cup-marketing-police-abuse-killings-security

As an interested amateur, I'm left thinking that some source material worth researching for future solutions, might include a look into certain directions from the past.

I think if I had the opportunity to visit and understand the Brazilian favela ecosystems or Karachi slum ecosystems I'd want to do some homework in areas such as:

Shanghai Municipal Police(pre WWII) for low-tech historical efforts and innovation to quell organised crime in urban ghettos that has a foreign/colonial component

Northern Ireland 1970's-to present for more modern efforts to counter a capable insurgency with an urban component that covered the gamut of old school manual coal face work up through and including more modern interagency efforts leveraging technology

Political Machines(Tammany Hall as one example) in US urban ghettos from late 1700s to early 1900s for examples of networks leveraging their power to transition from illegal to quasi legal to legitimacy and recognition as one of the political centres of gravity/influence/control.

-----

I sometimes wonder if the life cycles of insects may be an analog to illicit megaslum networks?

embryo
larvae
pupa
imago/maturity/legitimacy

Comparing the favela video above with the Vice series on Karachi found here:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xgIl1vmIchA

It would superficially appear that Karachi's slums/ghettos are well into the transition to political machines

-----

Are developing world megaslums simply echoing our own western history of slum/ghetto development with two adjustments for sheer scale and the catalysing effects of technology?

IF that is the case, and while I am a big fan of David Kilcullen's book and derived great value from it(particularly his conflict entrepreneur and "city as biological system" perspective), I don't see enough emphasis on what I see as the life cycle of illicit networks on the journey from criminality to legitimacy.

Using Kilcullen's own biological system viewpoint, I wonder if the illicit networks can be viewed as a parasitic/symbiotic biological system within a system?

-----

I look forward to seeing how this thread develops in the exciting times ahead!

Bill Moore
05-21-2014, 08:58 AM
I have generally been a fan of Kilcullen's books and articles, although I found this particular book not as well thought out as his previous books. Perhaps because he is still exploring this concept. To be fair Ralph Peters, and many others, did meet him to the punch on this issue, and I recall a number of discussions and papers in the 1990s discussing potential military scenarios in large urban areas and how complex they would be.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/into-the-cities-dark-dense-and-dangerous

Peters' wrote in 1996:
Cities always have been centers of gravity, but they are now more magnetic than ever before. Once the gatherers of wealth, then the processors of wealth, cities and their satellite communities have become the ultimate creators of wealth. They concentrate people and power, communications and control, knowledge and capability, rendering all else peripheral. They are also the post-modern equivalent of jungles and mountains--citadels of the dispossessed and irreconcilable. A military unprepared for urban operations across a broad spectrum is unprepared for tomorrow.

Peters made a lot of interesting points regarding the future of urban warfare in a talk I attended in 2001 (before 9/11), but most of the points focused on the physical aspects of fighting in a city and the difficulty of templating irregulars. Kilcullen adds the socio-political aspects and I found his thoughts on the city as an ecosystem (system of systems) and how competitive control works very helpful in observing and explaining what many of us have experienced and simply labeled it as chaos, yet there was an underlying order that wasn't necessarily visible to us at the time.

On the other hand his book in my opinion is still is missing the so what factor for security planners. He is also focused currently on data analysis to analyze cities which may prove to be valuable, but similar studies in the past have generally led us astray. Ralph Peters on the other hand glances over the socio-political and focuses on the so what at the tactical and doctrine level. Curious about readers' thoughts on his projections made in 1996 as a Major now that we have extensive experience fighting in cities (though done would qualify as a megacity the principles still apply). regardless there is considerable room for further study in this area to inform military doctrine and future capabilities required.

How, or even if, Brazil can secure the games will be interesting to see unfold. We could be overstating the threat by assuming the masses will think and act collectively and actually have an interest in attacking the games. I'm sure some do, but what percentage? Is it enough to be threatening? How good is Brazil's intelligence in identifying the leaders who could provoke a serious security threat? What is their ability to pre-empt it? Will they leverage engineers to create obstacles and channelize potential protesters / trouble makers into zones they can control? What will the impact be if the disenfranchised citizens effectively disrupt (or worse) the games?

TheCurmudgeon
05-21-2014, 01:43 PM
I sometimes wonder if the life cycles of insects may be an analog to illicit megaslum networks?

embryo
larvae
pupa
imago/maturity/legitimacy

Comparing the favela video above with the Vice series on Karachi found here:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xgIl1vmIchA

It would superficially appear that Karachi's slums/ghettos are well into the transition to political machines

-----

Are developing world megaslums simply echoing our own western history of slum/ghetto development with two adjustments for sheer scale and the catalysing effects of technology?

IF that is the case, and while I am a big fan of David Kilcullen's book and derived great value from it(particularly his conflict entrepreneur and "city as biological system" perspective), I don't see enough emphasis on what I see as the life cycle of illicit networks on the journey from criminality to legitimacy.

Using Kilcullen's own biological system viewpoint, I wonder if the illicit networks can be viewed as a parasitic/symbiotic biological system within a system?

I had been hesitating on picking up Kilcullen's book but now you have sparked my interest.

However, I would seriously caution you or anyone else with using biological metaphors for sociological systems. It is true that, like a life form, a social system is a complex adaptive system. However, Life forms evolve to improve the survivability of the species where social systems evolve to improve the desires of the members of the system.

The most common error, and the one that most people still believe is true, is the comparison of “social evolution” to biological evolution. This creates the impression that the more complex, Western societies are more “evolved” and therefore “better” than any other system. It would also imply that the “social system” is the unit that is evolving, that humans are sub-units inside a system in which they have no control. They are simply cells in the social system. The social systems are what are reproducing and it is the social system that is surviving, not the people in it.

That is not true, social systems have adapted to meet the needs of the people in it, the people in it have not evolved to serve the social system.

The rub of this kind of thinking is that it makes Westerners believe that their system is more evolved and therefore “better” than everyone else’s system. That, since we are at the panicle of social evolution it is our responsibility to bring the rest of the world up to our level. It is one of the fundimental components of Modernization theroy. Ideas like this can cause poorly conceived foreign policy.

flagg
05-21-2014, 10:02 PM
I had been hesitating on picking up Kilcullen's book but now you have sparked my interest.

However, I would seriously caution you or anyone else with using biological metaphors for sociological systems. It is true that, like a life form, a social system is a complex adaptive system. However, Life forms evolve to improve the survivability of the species where social systems evolve to improve the desires of the members of the system.

The most common error, and the one that most people still believe is true, is the comparison of “social evolution” to biological evolution. This creates the impression that the more complex, Western societies are more “evolved” and therefore “better” than any other system. It would also imply that the “social system” is the unit that is evolving, that humans are sub-units inside a system in which they have no control. They are simply cells in the social system. The social systems are what are reproducing and it is the social system that is surviving, not the people in it.

That is not true, social systems have adapted to meet the needs of the people in it, the people in it have not evolved to serve the social system.

The rub of this kind of thinking is that it makes Westerners believe that their system is more evolved and therefore “better” than everyone else’s system. That, since we are at the panicle of social evolution it is our responsibility to bring the rest of the world up to our level. It is one of the fundimental components of Modernization theroy. Ideas like this can cause poorly conceived foreign policy.

I would agree with your caution sign.

The analogies can be rough and imperfect....or even potentially hazardous if clung to rigidly.

But I do think there is a place for the use of the terms "evolved" and "better"(maybe more elegant/sophisticated might be a better choice in this case) when used in describing the TTPs and capabilities of networks as some of them attempt to shift from illicit criminal networks to legitimate political networks.

As a political science grad and infanteer I would think governance and light infantry combat both possess best practices that will in some cases have changed little in centuries(as in "it's all about the fundamentals"). But layered on top over the years are more complex capabilities that don't inherently make one better, just potentially more capable if well employed/deployed.

In terms of poorly conceived foreign policy, it's probably easy to imagine near future scenarios where a nation's diplomats are face with the conundrum of dealing directly with both the self-appointed representatives of ungoverned/self-governed megaslums via back channels as well as the government representatives of the sovereign state surrounding the ungoverned/self-governed space.

flagg
05-22-2014, 02:28 AM
I have generally been a fan of Kilcullen's books and articles, although I found this particular book not as well thought out as his previous books. Perhaps because he is still exploring this concept. To be fair Ralph Peters, and many others, did meet him to the punch on this issue, and I recall a number of discussions and papers in the 1990s discussing potential military scenarios in large urban areas and how complex they would be.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/into-the-cities-dark-dense-and-dangerous

Peters' wrote in 1996:

Peters made a lot of interesting points regarding the future of urban warfare in a talk I attended in 2001 (before 9/11), but most of the points focused on the physical aspects of fighting in a city and the difficulty of templating irregulars. Kilcullen adds the socio-political aspects and I found his thoughts on the city as an ecosystem (system of systems) and how competitive control works very helpful in observing and explaining what many of us have experienced and simply labeled it as chaos, yet there was an underlying order that wasn't necessarily visible to us at the time.

On the other hand his book in my opinion is still is missing the so what factor for security planners. He is also focused currently on data analysis to analyze cities which may prove to be valuable, but similar studies in the past have generally led us astray. Ralph Peters on the other hand glances over the socio-political and focuses on the so what at the tactical and doctrine level. Curious about readers' thoughts on his projections made in 1996 as a Major now that we have extensive experience fighting in cities (though done would qualify as a megacity the principles still apply). regardless there is considerable room for further study in this area to inform military doctrine and future capabilities required.

How, or even if, Brazil can secure the games will be interesting to see unfold. We could be overstating the threat by assuming the masses will think and act collectively and actually have an interest in attacking the games. I'm sure some do, but what percentage? Is it enough to be threatening? How good is Brazil's intelligence in identifying the leaders who could provoke a serious security threat? What is their ability to pre-empt it? Will they leverage engineers to create obstacles and channelize potential protesters / trouble makers into zones they can control? What will the impact be if the disenfranchised citizens effectively disrupt (or worse) the games?

Any thoughts on human/social networks developing like an insect life cycle?

When I think of the possibilities of networks in the favelas disrupting(for benefit like conflict entrepreneurs exploiting opportunities) FIFA World Cup and the Olympics, I can't help but recall Air France's pilots union back in 1998 during the French World Cup:

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/fans-grounded-as-french-pilots-strike-kicks-off-1162409.html

I'm thinking what/how can the favela(and Brazil's notorious prison based) networks influence/disrupt logistics essential to FIFA and Olympic events.

And how much does the sophistication of the network and leadership decision making impact on it?

I think I hear what you're your saying both in terms of modern western networks aren't worth emulating in every respect(sometimes far from it) as well as how sometimes guys who live in caves are playing a pretty good game of chess, while folks flying first class are playing a lousy game of checkers.

davidbfpo
06-07-2014, 12:08 PM
Not being interested in football I had missed the first game is due to be played in six days in Sao Paulo. So a mass transit strike is not unexpected and the almost inevitable confrontation with the police:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/brazil/10881363/Sao-Paulo-police-use-tear-gas-on-protesters-six-days-before-World-Cup-opener.html A better report:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-27745401

This week the BBC have shown documentaries on Rio from different angles. One focussed on the sex trade, especially under-age boys and girls. Another on Rio, mostly filmed in one favela, from both sides - the public represented by a former gang leader turned community worker - and the state in the form of the military police. Neither readily found on the BBC website alas.

davidbfpo
01-18-2015, 02:07 PM
A new Governor for the province and a new policy:
If those in charge succeed, the controversial top-down term "pacification" may soon fall into disuse. Instead, police have announced that they are reaching out to civil society to help them do a better, less violent job of keeping Rio safe.
Link:http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/rio-de-janeiro-cops-opt-for-proximity-policing-at-last

davidbfpo
01-18-2015, 02:09 PM
The nine post thread 'Out of the mountains into the slums?' has been merged into the longer running Brazil: violence in (merged thread) today.

davidbfpo
04-13-2015, 09:40 PM
A short article, it starts with:
Outbreaks of violence in one of Rio de Janeiro's major favelas are raising questions about the long-term effectiveness of Brazil (http://www.insightcrime.org/component/tags/tag/10-brazil)'s controversial pacification program, even as plans to expand the program continue.
Link:http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/amid-rising-violence-rio-continues-pacification-program

davidbfpo
07-09-2015, 08:40 PM
Just how Rio copes with the threat of violence is a recurrent theme here, let alone how the 2016 Olympics affects this. Today IISS had an event today 'Urban Warfare in the ‘Marvelous City’: Securing Rio from the Gangs', with two speakers and the podcast is one hour long:http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events-s-calendar/rio-gangs-58a9

The event's chair Nigel Inkster referred to David Kilcullen's book, hence the title.

One speaker didn't make it and her book is due out soon. From an IISS email:
Juliana Barbassa is an award-winning journalist and author. Her book, Dancing with the Devil in the City of God: Rio de Janeiro on the Brink, is based on her years in Brazil as a correspondent for the Associated Press and will be published in July 2015. She was born in Brazil, but has lived in Iraq, Malta, Libya, Spain, France and the United States. She is currently based in Switzerland.

There is thread on Brazil and violence into which this maybe merged:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2602

davidbfpo
07-30-2015, 01:08 PM
Two articles appeared today via Twitter on BOPE, the military police unit, one is a commentary following a death. Its starts with:
The investigation of an elite police unit in Brazil for allegedly trying to cover up the disappearance of a Rio de Janeiro man may represent an opportunity to restore the public’s trust in the rule of law, and perhaps repair the reputation of a controversial program to pacify favelas.
Link:http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/16339/investigation-could-end-impunity-for-brazil-s-elite-police-unit

The second is an interview of a convicted BOPE member:
A former military police officer in Brazil (http://www.insightcrime.org/component/tags/tag/10-brazil) talks about the culture of violence that permeates the force, and how this can dehumanize those who initially joined in order to serve and protect the public.
Link:http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/ex-officerbrazil-military-police-creates-monsters

davidbfpo
03-18-2017, 11:38 AM
A commentary that explains why soldiers are so often on the streets and the refrain "Oh no, not again":
The army has, in effect, become a “parapolice (http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-658-13435-8_13)” force – a substitute for the country’s badly stretched police. Contrary to what some doom-mongering commentators say, this doesn’t signal an impending military coup (http://br.rfi.fr/brasil/20170209-especialista-teme-que-movimento-dos-policiais-do-es-termine-em-golpe-militar), but it does show just how badly the authorities have failed to maintain public security.Link:https://theconversation.com/brazil-is-relying-on-soldiers-instead-of-regular-police-heres-why-73034? (https://theconversation.com/brazil-is-relying-on-soldiers-instead-of-regular-police-heres-why-73034?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=The%20Weekend%20Conversation%20-%2070015247&utm_content=The%20Weekend%20Conversation%20-%2070015247+CID_ec2221b4fdf7a9f8df08092df2767647&utm_source=campaign_monitor_uk&utm_term=Brazil%20is%20relying%20on%20soldiers%20i nstead%20of%20regular%20police%20%20heres%20why)

SWJ Blog
04-25-2017, 08:25 PM
Rio de Janeiro: A War By Any Other Name (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/rio-de-janeiro-a-war-by-any-other-name)

AdamG
04-25-2017, 09:34 PM
Brazilian police near the border with Paraguay have exchanged gunfire with members of a gang who carried out what Paraguayan officials are calling the robbery of the century.
Three gang members were killed and two injured in the clash, police say.
Earlier on Monday about 50 men moved into the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este, blew up the front of a private security firm, and fired on police. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-39700931

davidbfpo
05-05-2017, 07:21 PM
A new report on crime statistics in Brazil (http://www.insightcrime.org/brazil-organized-crime-news)'s state of Rio de Janeiro shows deteriorating violence indicators over a period of several years, raising continued questions about the extent to which the city's public security policies have been effective.Link:http://www.insightcrime.org.linkis.com/iVCl4

A new phrase to me:
homicides resulting from police intervention

davidbfpo
11-08-2017, 01:30 PM
I attended a lecture yesterday in London @ LSE on 'Militarised Response to Transnational Crime', a book now published and one speaker, ex-BBC reporter Misha Glenny, referred to his time living in a Rio favela (Rosina? Rochina) and an interview with a boss (now deposed or dead):
Three factors gave him control: a monopoly of violence in the favela, with just 120 armed men amidst 100k people; corrupting the local police and other state institutions and having community support. Rosina became known as a safe place to visit, for drugs and entertainment, so drug trade profits went up and jobs were created.Finally Misha raised a point IIRC appears here irregularly on other threads; non-state bodies are beating the nation-state in providing stability.

See Journal article:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-5-brazilian-military-stability-and-support-operati

Azor
11-09-2017, 09:24 PM
I attended a lecture yesterday in London @ LSE on 'Militarised Response to Transnational Crime', a book now published and one speaker, ex-BBC reporter Misha Glenny, referred to his time living in a Rio favela (Rosina? Rochina) and an interview with a boss (now deposed or dead):Finally Misha raised a point IIRC appears here irregularly on other threads; non-state bodies are beating the nation-state in providing stability.

See Journal article:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-5-brazilian-military-stability-and-support-operati

Well, to be fair, this is hardly a phenomenon unique to Brazil, and can also be notably found in Colombia (albeit on a much-decreased basis), Mexico, much of Africa, Syria, Iraq, the West Bank, Gaza, and Lebanon.

The first mission of the state is security. The state itself is derived from the army, the first human bureaucracy. The army originated from a group of militants who would conquer, extort and protect a community, which was typically engaged in farming and animal husbandry.

In this respect, the leader of the gang in the Rio favela or the head of the cartel in Juarez imitates the emergence of the very first kings, and his sicarios, the very first warrior aristocracy. We may refer to these organizations as "non-state bodies", but they form in areas of anarchy, chaos and lawlessness, and are as much a historically-accurate attempt at establishing a state, as the black markets of North Korea are at establishing free markets.

davidbfpo
07-26-2018, 08:08 PM
A commentary on Rio and the situation after the federal government took control of security in February 2018. Just whether the agility of the gangs can be overcome by the nation-state is a moot point. Quite a few embedded links to plunder.
Link:https://shoc.rusi.org/informer/duck-and-cover-three-survival-lessons-rio%E2%80%99s-criminals%C2%A0

davidbfpo
11-25-2018, 05:54 PM
Catching up on IISS offerings I found this month old article by Antonio Sampaio, their SME on urban conflict and especially Brazil's cities. He visited Mare, a favela in Rio and reports:
Three years after the withdrawal of military forces, Maré is firmly back in the grasp of criminal factions.
Link:https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/10/urban-security-gangs-militias-streets?_cldee=ZGF2aWRiZnBvQGJsdWV5b25kZXIuY28udWs %3d&recipientid=contact-06dd4cad6980de11b23000237dde6e5c-aa5c606b40104008a17551a33f9a5b25&esid=49b0d815-79ed-e811-80d8-005056be3f90

AdamG
12-23-2018, 01:21 PM
(Bloomberg) -- Teams of marksmen next year will patrol swaths of Rio de Janeiro with high-powered weapons and a license to kill, said a security adviser to Governor-elect Wilson Witzel.

As many as 120 sharpshooters will accompany police incursions into the slums of Brazil’s postcard city to exterminate gun-toting criminals, according to Flavio Pacca, a longtime associate of Witzel who the governor-elect’s press office said will join the administration. The shooters will work in pairs -- one to pull the trigger, one to monitor conditions and videotape deaths.
https://www.bloombergquint.com/law-and-policy/license-to-kill-policing-to-get-a-trial-run-in-rio-de-janeiro#gs.nFZUJ7s