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jcustis
04-13-2007, 12:36 PM
I've been grinding through the guide with a certain fervor of late - not just hitting the highlights or flipping back and forth, but reading front to back. That's a bit of a challenge when you're talking doctrine or TTPs, but that's sort of besides the point.

As I read, I see plenty of references to charts, network diagrams, and miscellaneous tracking/collection tools to help a company commander and his staff organize and prosecute the COIN mission.

Does anyone know of a package of digital COIN tools out there that can be easily manipulated to suit the situation, sort of like a "COIN ops in a box"? From my experience as a TF battle captain, I realize that some information capture tools need to be built from the ground up, but given the already critical time crunch commander's face in training for the deploy, why not give them pre-formatted templates and tools right out of the gate? The first direction to take may be to go to the S-2, but even then he doesn't have it all, so it often comes down to the Marine with the quickest Powerpoint and Excel skills. Not to mention, there are a number of TTP sections that rate their own smartcard for reproduction and issue as required.

Any MCCDC guys on here who think attaching a CD-ROM to the back dust jacket makes any sense?

RTK
04-13-2007, 12:53 PM
Seems that a standardization of tracking sheets and databases would make it easier to share information. What better place to begin standardization than at the tactical level? The CD you speak of could do that.

jcustis
04-13-2007, 12:59 PM
...but you are on point with the standardization piece RTK. If a unit commander and his staff roll in for the RIP and the turnover consists of a review of the details in standardized form, it could make the RIP more efficient. Staffs would be working with intel and information in roughly the same format that they used during the work-up.

I'll admit that on the Marine side, we are terrible at that degree of standardization, even though the doctrine and TTps are right in our face.

Has the USA made any strides in that direction?

Tom Odom
04-13-2007, 01:24 PM
If someone will get it to me I will see about getting it done.

best

Tom

marct
04-13-2007, 01:35 PM
Is the guide generally available or is it FAUO?

Marc

jcustis
04-13-2007, 01:38 PM
I've not seen it posted electronically Marc, although I know electronic versions are moving between .mil accounts. Distro appears to be limited to US Govt agencies and theire contractors.

marct
04-13-2007, 01:55 PM
I've found a link to it, but it appears to be in a restricted access area. It appears that there is a copy of MCIP 3-33 02 available in the non-restricted area. Too bad, I was hoping to read it :)

Marc

slapout9
04-13-2007, 02:29 PM
Marc, it used to be in the SWJ library. However try a thread search for COIN manuals and it should come up there. I tried to copy for you but no luck. It is listed as small unit leaders guide. You will like it!

marct
04-13-2007, 02:37 PM
Thanks Slapout! I got it from http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/coin.pdf

Marc

marct
04-13-2007, 03:32 PM
I don't know if people are aware of this tool or not, but the CDC has an open source tool called EPI INFO developed to rack epidemiological outbreaks that could prove useful here. It is free, and information on it is available at

http://www.cdc.gov/EpiInfo/

Marc

PS. It's already used in at least one anti-terrorism project - see http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/8city.htm

Jedburgh
04-13-2007, 03:52 PM
Thanks Slapout! I got it from http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/coin.pdf
....that link didn't work for me - but there is an alternate:

Small Unit Leader's Guide to COIN - Jun 06 (http://www.expose-the-war-profiteers.org/archive/government/2006-1/20060600.pdf)

...and here's a link to resources to go along with it provided by the USMC Warfighting Laboratory:

Small Unit Leader's Guide to Counterinsurgency (Charts & Graphs) (http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil/concepts/SULG_Charts.cfm)

marct
04-13-2007, 04:08 PM
Since they deal with kinship, here are a few links to way too much information on kinship types and charts.

Kinship and Social Organization: an interactive tutorial (http://www.umanitoba.ca/anthropology/kintitle.html) - Produced by an old acquaintance of mine, Brian Schwimmer at the University of Manitoba, this is probably the best online resource for learning about kinship networks and types of families. It's basically the equivalent of an Introduction to kinship course.

Essential Information & explanations, latest texts & monographs on Family. (http://essential-facts.com/primary/ethics/Family.html)

David's Relationship Chart (http://www.feliixplace.com/genealogy/relationship.html) - There's a downloadable program and a massive number of links.

Marc

marct
04-13-2007, 04:58 PM
I'm about half way through it at the moment and I just came to a comment that really bothered me:


Regardless of the agencies involved, this is your AO and you must stay involved with all upcoming and ongoing efforts. Remember, you are the one that will have to live with whatever happens in your AO, everyone else is just a tourist. (page 64-65)

While I can understand the issue of "owning an AO", it strikes me that the "everyone else is just a tourist" comment really strikes against the entire heart of COIN ops. Let's face it, the troops are, really, just tourists on extended visas (to carry on with the analogy). Maybe I'm being overly picky, but it strikes me that this is a somewhat skewed attitude to take.

Marc

Tom Odom
04-13-2007, 05:39 PM
Marc,

You are misinterpreting the "you" and "everyone else". These remarks are toward the COIN forces, NGOs, etc. not the locals.

I try to teach the very same point: that the pointy end of the COIN spear is also the point of greatest knowledge when it comes to situational awareness and its growth into situational understanding. That happens of course if the small unit leaders take that objective to heart: that SU is their goal and that waiting for headquarters to explain what is happening outside the wire is a certain formula for disaster.

best

Tom

marct
04-13-2007, 05:49 PM
Hi Tom,


You are misinterpreting the "you" and "everyone else". These remarks are toward the COIN forces, NGOs, etc. not the locals.

I figured I was :). The reason I posted about it was that I had a specific emotional reaction to the comment - i.e. it really bothered me (I'm still trying to nail down the exact whys of it) and I was wondering if it bothered anyone else.


I try to teach the very same point: that the pointy end of the COIN spear is also the point of greatest knowledge when it comes to situational awareness and its growth into situational understanding. That happens of course if the small unit leaders take that objective to heart: that SU is their goal and that waiting for headquarters to explain what is happening outside the wire is a certain formula for disaster.

You know, I'm wondering if "the pointy end of the COIN spear" is the best metaphor. It's certainly accurate in most of the current situations, but I'm wondering if a "shield" metaphor or an "interface" metaphor mightn't be better.:confused: I think it's time for me to go back and reread Ginzburg on metaphor and analogy...

Marc

RTK
04-13-2007, 08:18 PM
Marc,

You are misinterpreting the "you" and "everyone else". These remarks are toward the COIN forces, NGOs, etc. not the locals.

I try to teach the very same point: that the pointy end of the COIN spear is also the point of greatest knowledge when it comes to situational awareness and its growth into situational understanding. That happens of course if the small unit leaders take that objective to heart: that SU is their goal and that waiting for headquarters to explain what is happening outside the wire is a certain formula for disaster.

best

Tom


To add to that point for Marc, many times you'll have a major road network through your AO. Many will use that road network but none will have to deal with the 2nd and 3rd order effects like the "owner" of the AO if those outside agencies come into contact, return fire, inflict collateral damage, or any other contingency that occurs. They come and go. The owner stays and deals with it.

marct
04-13-2007, 08:23 PM
Hi RTK,


To add to that point for Marc, many times you'll have a major road network through your AO. Many will use that road network but none will have to deal with the 2nd and 3rd order effects like the "owner" of the AO if those outside agencies come into contact, return fire, inflict collateral damage, or any other contingency that occurs. They come and go. The owner stays and deals with it.

You know, that's an excellent point. I don't remember reading about dealing with that in the handbook (admittedly, I was skimming it). Is there a particular way for a local company to "report" (?) something like this? I'm thinking back to some of the video's posted on youtube last year (kids "attacking" convoys).

Marc

jcustis
04-13-2007, 09:50 PM
Marc, to answer your question, we would try to call them on the carpet when we could. That usually meant dragging them into the COC when their convoy eventually came to our FOB. On other stretches of road near Ramadi, we went to great lenghts to address the issue, educate other units, and inform them of what was going on, but we still had to duck from their fires on more than one occasion. All because they saw something go bump in the night and they had absolutely no fire discipline.

Other times the only thing we could do was pass a report up to the movement control center embedded in the higher HQ, and hope they would address it appropriately.

marct
04-13-2007, 09:59 PM
Hi JC,


Marc, to answer your question, we would try to call them on the carpet when we could. That usually meant dragging them into the COC when their convoy eventually came to our FOB. On other stretches of road near Ramadi, we went to great lenghts to address the issue, educate other units, and inform them of what was going on, but we still had to duck from their fires on more than one occasion. All because they saw something go bump in the night and they had absolutely no fire discipline.

Thanks. You know, that is a rather scary situation in terms of being able to control the local AO.


Other times the only thing we could do was pass a report up to the movement control center embedded in the higher HQ, and hope they would address it appropriately.

Again, truly scary. I hate to say it, but if a bunch of yahoos showed up on one of our highways and started shooting, we would have their butts in slings. From a "law and order" perspective (and I really HATE that term - "perspective"), I have to wonder what the value to a local IO op would be to actually prosecute, in the AO, some yahoo who shoots up "stuff" on an MSR.

Marc

jcustis
04-13-2007, 10:31 PM
I have to wonder what the value to a local IO op would be to actually prosecute, in the AO, some yahoo who shoots up "stuff" on an MSR.

In some sense, that appears to have been the point that someone tried to make in Afghanistan with regard to that MARSOC unit. Sadly, we will never know the full story, and just like the Duke lacrosse players, the incident has played out in full view through the helpful hands of the media.:mad:

Maximus
04-15-2007, 04:05 AM
As always, great ideas and observations.

WRT the CD, something like this was discussed when creating the handbook and is currently being worked on. About this time last year though, the guidance from higher (specifically LtGen Mattis) was to get an 80% solution (the link at this thread is an initial draft; the mass-produced version is roughly 230 pages) on how to operate in a COIN environment into our small-unit leaders' hands ASAP.

Lots of lessons learned WRT how/why a military does/does not learn and adapt throughout the process of writing and ultimately getting the COIN handbook into our warriors' hands. Suffice it to say, if it weren't for a few high level officers demanding the Small Unit Leader's Guide to COIN regardless of normal, peacetime protocol on USMC doctrine, the COIN handbook wouldn't exist today (interesting story concerning why it's an MCIP vs. MCWP for anyone interested).

Please share ideas on what you think should be on the CD. A few things that immediately come to mind are: how to run an intel cell at the company and even platoon level; tactical questioning techniques and recommendations; patrol log templates; QRF templates both internal and external; standardized census database formats; detention facility SOP template; a "how to" guide on info ops; how to use the internet in your fight...

If anyone has specific inputs that you don't feel appropriate to send in an open forum, please send to me via e-mail (.mil) and I will pass on (I'll be sure to include the "Fundamentals of the Battle Captain" thread http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2126).

Changing subjects a bit...

Marc, I understand your concern with: "Regardless of the agencies involved, this is your AO and you must stay involved with all upcoming and ongoing efforts. Remember, you are the one that will have to live with whatever happens in your AO, everyone else is just a tourist. (page 64-65)".

To offer some reinforcing fires for Tom, Ryan, and JCustis though...

Unless I'm mistaken the Blackwater Contractors that were ambushed in Fallujah in Mar 2004 never cleared their mission with the unit that owned the AO. This tragedy had an enormous impact on "strategic" level decisions and as "Bing" West discussed in No True Glory really put our senior military leaders in a tough position.

On a more tactical level though, I'll never forget my first few months of patrols into a very unwelcoming village in Najaf. Although we didn't get attacked with mass IEDs or RPGs, my Marines were routinely hit with rocks, flipped off and occassionally even spit on. For my Marines, such actions proved often more frustrating and in some ways more difficult to deal with than say an RPG attack because throwing rocks back at kids and spitting back at teenagers just isn't an option. Anyway, after months of challenging work and some incredible patience from my Marines, we were eventually able to turn the tide in this village through winning over the majority of the people with mini-MEDCAPS, school projects, helping the police and, in general, simply treating people like human beings. Well, about 2 months into operating in this area, and a month after "winning" over the village, the Iraqis once again resorted to routine rock throwing, demanding we leave their village, spitting, Sadr pictures everywhere, etc. Needless to say, I was confused about why until one of the village elders explained that "we" had come into the village one of the previous nights, set an explosive charge on a door, raided a house, took a whole bunch of stuff from a family, without explaining anything. I had no clue what he was talking about, and was not the least bit happy when informed later that a "specialized" unit had received intel of an IED cell in the village and acted on it, ultimately finding nothing. As the quote says, this was my "AO", my Marines' problems, my Marines' having to dodge rocks and come up with creative ways to catch 100 lbs kids throwing rocks while my Marines weighed on average, 225-250 lbs with all of their gear, etc. The "specialized" unit fit the tourist description in this case.

And a last brief note on how this might relate to NGOs... I remember operating in a village 20 miles or so S-SE of Baghdad. Initially the village wasn't overjoyed with our presence, but eventually welcomed us, in many cases with feasts, invitations to ceremonies, frequent soccer games, etc.
The Marines enjoyed patrolling in this area and actually looked forward to doing so (after a few weeks). Well, one day when trying to coordinate a CA project with an NGO for this particular village, the NGO told me the village was hostile. I asked why is it hostile. The response was we (the NGO) think we were shot at as we convoyed by (in our armored SUVs with black tinted windows), were definitely hit with rocks, and the people weren't the least bit happy to see us. I remember my Marines asking, "are they talking about the same village that we're in every day?" I thought the same. Again though, I was surprised to learn that an NGO was moving through the AO without coordinating with anyone, and probably more troubling was this NGO's making judgments based on sketchy info/intel at best and without ever contacting the military unit responsible for the area. It scares me to think how this village was painted up the chain of command.

I'll stop here because I'm drifting into a whole new discussion that I think will lead into the importance of unity of effort in COIN.

Please share ideas and input/products for the CD.

Semper Fi!

jcustis
04-15-2007, 12:21 PM
Well, about 2 months into operating in this area, and a month after "winning" over the village, the Iraqis once again resorted to routine rock throwing, demanding we leave their village, spitting, Sadr pictures everywhere, etc. Needless to say, I was confused about why until one of the village elders explained that "we" had come into the village one of the previous nights, set an explosive charge on a door, raided a house, took a whole bunch of stuff from a family, without explaining anything. I had no clue what he was talking about, and was not the least bit happy when informed later that a "specialized" unit had received intel of an IED cell in the village and acted on it, ultimately finding nothing. As the quote says, this was my "AO", my Marines' problems, my Marines' having to dodge rocks and come up with creative ways to catch 100 lbs kids throwing rocks while my Marines weighed on average, 225-250 lbs with all of their gear, etc. The "specialized" unit fit the tourist description in this case.

You just hit a homerun with that one Maximus. I had to endure those specialized tourists at least three times in our Ramadi AO. It's funny when you look at the expenditure of assets involved, and realize that one of your squad-sized dismounted patrols could sneak in there at night and accomplish the same thing.

marct
04-15-2007, 01:00 PM
Hi Maximus,


WRT the CD, something like this was discussed when creating the handbook and is currently being worked on. About this time last year though, the guidance from higher (specifically LtGen Mattis) was to get an 80% solution (the link at this thread is an initial draft; the mass-produced version is roughly 230 pages) on how to operate in a COIN environment into our small-unit leaders' hands ASAP.

That does make a lot of sense. I would also expect that the learning curve would be that much steeper and likely to generate negative reactions if there was too much in the handbook; at least that's the reaction I see in some f my students when I shift the talk from "in the field" to "theory and methods" :).


Please share ideas on what you think should be on the CD. A few things that immediately come to mind are: how to run an intel cell at the company and even platoon level; tactical questioning techniques and recommendations; patrol log templates; QRF templates both internal and external; standardized census database formats; detention facility SOP template; a "how to" guide on info ops; how to use the internet in your fight...

If anyone has specific inputs that you don't feel appropriate to send in an open forum, please send to me via e-mail (.mil) and I will pass on (I'll be sure to include the "Fundamentals of the Battle Captain" thread http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2126) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2126%29).

I do have a few ideas that I don't won't to post in the open. However, I don't have a .mil account. If I PM you with my account name, can you accept that?


Marc, I understand your concern with: "Regardless of the agencies involved, this is your AO and you must stay involved with all upcoming and ongoing efforts. Remember, you are the one that will have to live with whatever happens in your AO, everyone else is just a tourist. (page 64-65)".

To offer some reinforcing fires for Tom, Ryan, and JCustis though...

I think these are really good examples, Maximus. I would certainly be interested in finding out if anything has been done to mitigate these as a result of the new command team in Iraq. And, BTW, these really do fit the classic stereotype of the "ugly American tourist" :wry:.

My real concern was with the semantic reactions the statement might evoke and, now, I'm starting to get a touch worried about cognitive dissonance :wry:. On the first point, North Americans tend to have a trinary categorization of "tourist", "ex-pat/long term resident" and "local / native" (at least this is what shows up in the business and tourism literature and in the research I've done in those areas). That middle category is a real pain - caught in between the real binary opposition of "foreigner (tourist)" and "local". In some ways, "you" are responsible for the actions of "other foreigners" on the "local" turf and, since you are partially "local", there is usually he expectation that "you" will deal with them. I do have some ideas on how it can be mitigated, but I'll toss those in an email.

The cognitive dissonance observation comes out of the examples you (and JC) tossed up and from the nasty position of being caught "betwixt and between" (to use Victor Turner's words). If you are claiming to be responsible for security in an area and you can't even control the "tourists" what use are you? One way to resolve that type of dissonance is the Catch-22 reaction - probably not the best in the current situation :). Another, and to my mind infinitely more useful, way to resolve it is to institute two procedures:

A traffic control plan that requires all traffic, including contractors and NGOs, to log in their routes which would then automatically alert "local" units that they are coming through their AO.
A clear and visible system of "local justice".
I'll stop here because I'm drifting into a whole new discussion that I think will lead into the importance of unity of effort in COIN.

I agree absolutely with that! Although, to be honest, I'm not sure if that is a "new discussion" so much as a discussion surrounding the context of the handbook itself <shrug>.

Marc

slapout9
04-15-2007, 01:53 PM
Hi Maximus, I think a good place to start is with FM3-19.50 it has samples of standard products like network diagrams,tactical questioning guidelines,checklist,etc. It would also have the added benifit of intergrating with local police departments if??? they also used the same manual as their SOP. Bismarck17 and Jedburgh would be 2 sources I would have PM'd yesterday! on this subject. They be Jamming up on this stuff:wry:

Maximus
04-15-2007, 03:00 PM
Marc/Slapout/JC,

Thanks for the feedback. I agree with all that you say.

JC: I often felt the same WRT why have someone else come into a unit's AO IOT execute a mission that 10-15 Marines assigned to the AO can easily accomplish--and often with better results. Goes back to the whole unity of effort discussion.

Marc: Look fwd to reading and pursuing your ideas. WRT to the new command team addressing "tourists" interfering in AOs unannounced, to be honest, I don't know what's been done on this front, nor do I think there's an easy fix, especially with all the contractors operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Front page of the Washington Post today has a story on this issue.

Slapout: FM 3-19.50 looks good. I will review later today and also contact the other members as you recommended. Also, thanks for the background on the LE thread. Makes perfect sense now.

jcustis
04-15-2007, 05:37 PM
Please share ideas on what you think should be on the CD. A few things that immediately come to mind are: how to run an intel cell at the company and even platoon level; tactical questioning techniques and recommendations; patrol log templates; QRF templates both internal and external; standardized census database formats; detention facility SOP template; a "how to" guide on info ops; how to use the internet in your fight...

Afew "nice-to-haves":

-A template script for COC watch changeover briefs b/n the off-going and on-coming rotations.
-A mission card template that provides a format for passing info to the battle captain/watch officer before departing the FOB.
-A table for tracking convoys that move through the unit AO. Would need to be able to blow this up on a plotter
-A sigevents tracking chart. I have the format from the one 3d LAR used, which we laminated, filled in with information from sigevents that were represented by thumbtacks on the AO map, and then cleared off after 24-48 hours had passed and the events had been archived on the electronic journal
-A pre-formatted set of electronic folders with a standardized naming convention. This one would be tricky, b/c each unit would have its own flavor, but better to give them everything and allow them to a la carte what they need.
-A list of possible coordinating instructions appropriate to the COIN environment, for incorporation into matrix orders.

RTK
09-10-2007, 02:52 AM
I've been looking at past subjects a lot this weekend. I gotta ask what follow up to this has been done (not that any of you haven't been busy)....:wry: