omarali50
02-23-2018, 05:37 PM
Extracts from Pakistani military historian Major Agha Humayun Amin's history of the 1947-48 kashmir war (http://www.brownpundits.com/2018/02/18/1947-48-kashmir-war/)between India and Pakistan (from a military history POV, not focused on the political rights and wrongs of the issue) are up at Brownpundits.
http://www.brownpundits.com/2018/02/18/1947-48-kashmir-war/
Extract:
The Pakistan Army’s appearance in Kashmir did not lead to any spectacular results.The fatal state of indecision which had plagued Pakistani political leadership during the period October 1947-May 1948 had ensured that Pakistan Army’s introduction could at best stabilise the frontier and little else at best and still lose some more territory which had been captured by the Gilgit Scouts/Militia/Tribals. From May 1948 till December 1948 two major strategic victories were won by the Indian Army. These were strategic in the sense that although Kashmir was not entirely captured but Indian hold on two major portions of Kashmir i.e. the Ladakh and Poonch areas which was in doubt till November 1948 was at last ensured. On the other hand Pakistani political leadership conducted the war half-heartedly and did not spur or goad Gracey into launching any major offensive.
Today it is fashionable in Pakistan to hold that Indians were in any case superior and Pakistan could not have captured Kashmir.This is merely a distortion of facts.The simple point to be kept in mind is that had the Pakistani political leadership been courageous enough to override Gracey. One Pakistani Brigade supported by a squadron of armoured cars could have accomplished in October 1947, what two Divisions in July 1948 failed to do.
The initial situation was extremely fluid and favoured Pakistan,but the golden opportunities were missed and every minute of inaction on Pakistan’s part enabled India to augment its strength in the valley. The question was not of material or numerical superiority in October 1947, but of greater resolution and “Coup d Oeil” to seize the critical time span by the forelock. Mr Jinnah saw the opportunity but was not supported by his team and what was lost in a moment was lost to eternity. Three Pakistani Divisions were committed to permanent Guard Duty in Kashmir for five more decades and the Indian threat factor was rationalised as an excuse by Messrs Ayub and Co to make Pakistan a beautiful girl which was ready to sell herself to the highest bidder at a very low price during the period 1954-65.
http://www.brownpundits.com/2018/02/18/1947-48-kashmir-war/
Extract:
The Pakistan Army’s appearance in Kashmir did not lead to any spectacular results.The fatal state of indecision which had plagued Pakistani political leadership during the period October 1947-May 1948 had ensured that Pakistan Army’s introduction could at best stabilise the frontier and little else at best and still lose some more territory which had been captured by the Gilgit Scouts/Militia/Tribals. From May 1948 till December 1948 two major strategic victories were won by the Indian Army. These were strategic in the sense that although Kashmir was not entirely captured but Indian hold on two major portions of Kashmir i.e. the Ladakh and Poonch areas which was in doubt till November 1948 was at last ensured. On the other hand Pakistani political leadership conducted the war half-heartedly and did not spur or goad Gracey into launching any major offensive.
Today it is fashionable in Pakistan to hold that Indians were in any case superior and Pakistan could not have captured Kashmir.This is merely a distortion of facts.The simple point to be kept in mind is that had the Pakistani political leadership been courageous enough to override Gracey. One Pakistani Brigade supported by a squadron of armoured cars could have accomplished in October 1947, what two Divisions in July 1948 failed to do.
The initial situation was extremely fluid and favoured Pakistan,but the golden opportunities were missed and every minute of inaction on Pakistan’s part enabled India to augment its strength in the valley. The question was not of material or numerical superiority in October 1947, but of greater resolution and “Coup d Oeil” to seize the critical time span by the forelock. Mr Jinnah saw the opportunity but was not supported by his team and what was lost in a moment was lost to eternity. Three Pakistani Divisions were committed to permanent Guard Duty in Kashmir for five more decades and the Indian threat factor was rationalised as an excuse by Messrs Ayub and Co to make Pakistan a beautiful girl which was ready to sell herself to the highest bidder at a very low price during the period 1954-65.