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Jedburgh
04-20-2007, 01:39 PM
GAO, 19 Apr 07: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary Observations on DODís Approach to Managing Requirements for New Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07596t.pdf)

As operations overseas continue, DOD is experiencing a growing demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide valuable information in support of military operations. While the 2006 Quadrennial Review emphasized the need for the ISR community to improve the integration and management of ISR assets, DOD plans to make significant investments in ISR capabilities for the future. Congress has been interested in DODís approach for managing and integrating existing assets while acquiring new systems.

This testimony addresses preliminary observations based on GAOís ongoing work regarding:

(1) the status of DOD initiatives intended to improve the management and integration of ISR requirements and challenges DOD faces in implementing its initiatives,

(2) DODís approach to managing current ISR assets to support military operations, and

(3) the status of selected ISR programs in development and the potential for synergies between them.

Jedburgh
09-14-2007, 02:08 PM
C4ISR Journal, 3 Sep 07: New Focus on US Air Force ISR (http://www.isrjournal.com/story.php?F=2892613)

In June, the U.S. Air Forceís Air Intelligence Agency became the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency (http://www.afisr.af.mil/), with the goal of consolidating all Air Force ISR functions and improving their effectiveness.

Once focused on signals intelligence, the Lackland Air Force Base, Texas-based organization is now expanding to cover geospatial intelligence, imagery, human intelligence, and measurement and signature intelligence disciplines, along with cryptography.

Presiding over the changes is Maj. Gen. Craig Koziol (http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=6098), a career intelligence officer who serves as commander of the Air Force ISR Agency and the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command.....

wm
06-02-2008, 02:02 PM
An interesting article in the latest JFQ by LTG Odierno and two of his III Corps intel staff is here (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i50/14.pdf). While the discussion of the use/planning of ISR assets is interesting, I find the following quotation even more instructive:

The current environment in Iraq is complex and consists of four interacting conflicts: counteroccupation, terrorism, insurgency, and a communal struggle for power and survival. All are occurring in the context of a fragile state. This situation is further complicated by external influences. Each of these four conflicts is in a different stage, depending on which part of Iraq is being considered, and solving only one of these problems in isolation
tends to make the others worse. Hence, there is no silver bullet solution; instead, solutions are as complex as the problem set.

The lesson that I take from this is that to be successful on the current OIF battleground, operations must not merely focus on a COIN fight.

By the way, the discussion of force HQs levels and allocation of assets still seems a little wide of the mark from where I sit. I suspect that the BCT is not really the locus of operations. It is more likely that the right place to push ISR assets in the current operational setting is to the Battalion Task Force. I think AF liaisons from the CAOC also need to be pushed to that level. Were we to cut Divisions out of the operations loop (using Div HQs as primarily a logistics coordination point instead), more assets and bandwidth might be available for use at the Bn TF level.

Tom Odom
06-02-2008, 02:09 PM
By the way, the discussion of force HQs levels and allocation of assets still seems a little wide of the mark from where I sit. I suspect that the BCT is not really the locus of operations. It is more likely that the right place to push ISR assets in the current operational setting is to the Battalion Task Force. I think AF liaisons from the CAOC also need to be pushed to that level. Were we to cut Divisions out of the operations loop (using Div HQs as primarily a logistics coordination point instead), more assets and bandwidth might be available for use at the Bn TF level.

I would agree that the TF level can see more immediate benefit from ISR support as the battalion frames and supports the company and lower level fight. The problem at the TF level--especially compared to the "beast now known as the BCT staff"--is its small size. If the ISR support came with significant staff support, absolutely. Without that support, it wiuld be another large log on the TF Staff Camel's back.

Tom

wm
06-02-2008, 02:30 PM
I would agree that the TF level can see more immediate benefit from ISR support as the battalion frames and supports the company and lower level fight. The problem at the TF level--especially compared to the "beast now known as the BCT staff"--is its small size. If the ISR support came with significant staff support, absolutely. Without that support, it wiuld be another large log on the TF Staff Camel's back.

Tom
I agree. I support the positon that you need to send a complete force multiplier capability--that includes the people who work as planners and enablers--to the supported HQs. While posting liaision officers at the TF HQ is an option, I suspect in this case, it would be best to attach them to the Bn TF.

The real impact of transformation of the BCT has been to push the scope of operations down at least one level from the days of the Divison-centric operations of the 70's-90's, IMHO. That means that the Bde is the "new" division and the Bn TF is the "new" Bde in terms of planning and executing operations. While the size of combat and combat support elements at the Bn TF may be smaller than during the Cold War-Era US Bde (a DS artillery Battery, e.g, at the TF vs a DS FA Bn at Bde), the capabilities provided are probably comparable. Technology has allowed us in this case to "do more with less" from an equipment perspective. Notwithstanding that, however, certain IT-type human-machine interfaces require that we keep up and /or raise the numbers of planners and integrators at the user level--specifically at Bn TF and Co Team.

Schmedlap
06-02-2008, 02:53 PM
The current environment in Iraq is complex and consists of four interacting conflicts: counteroccupation, terrorism, insurgency, and a communal struggle for power and survival. All are occurring in the context of a fragile state. This situation is further complicated by external influences. Each of these four conflicts is in a different stage, depending on which part of Iraq is being considered, and solving only one of these problems in isolation tends to make the others worse.

I don't see how you solve counteroccupation or insurgency without eliminating the terrorists or the communal fighting first. I think the chaos caused by those two fuels the counteroccupation and insurgent causes. And I think this has been demonstrated. There has been significantly less activity among those two factions as terrorism and communal fighting have been addressed through the steady degradation of AQI and Sadr's militia. So I would assert that the last sentence in that quote is not necessarily true. Solving communal fighting and terrorist activity made the others better.