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Jedburgh
12-08-2005, 05:21 PM
RAND just published another good product:

State and Local Intelligence in the War on Terrorism (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG394.pdf)

Most discussion of information sharing in the war on terrorism has concentrated on the federal government. Yet, state and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) may be uniquely positioned to augment federal intelligence capabilities by virtue of their presence in nearly every American community, their knowledge of local individuals and groups, and their use of intelligence to combat crime. How widespread is counterterrorism intelligence activity among state and local LEAs, and how is this activity managed? What are those state and local authorities doing differently since 9/11 in collecting and processing information? How are courts and other oversight bodies guiding that process? And what might an “ideal” division of labor among the various levels of government look like?

sgmgrumpy
01-25-2007, 08:24 PM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/30/AR2006123000238.html



Frustrated by poor federal cooperation, U.S. states and cities are building their own network of intelligence centers led by police to help detect and disrupt terrorist plots.

The new "fusion centers" are now operating in 37 states, including Virginia and Maryland, and another covers the Washington area, according to the Department of Homeland Security. The centers, which have received $380 million in federal support since the 2001 terrorist attacks, pool and analyze information from local, state and federal law enforcement officials.

The emerging "network of networks" marks a new era of opportunity for law enforcement, according to U.S. officials and homeland security experts. Police are hungry for federal intelligence in an age of homegrown terrorism and more sophisticated crime. For their part, federal law enforcement officials could benefit from a potential army of tipsters -- the 700,000 local and state police officers across the country, as well as private security guards and others being courted by the centers.
But the emerging model of "intelligence-led policing" faces risks on all sides. The centers are popping up with little federal leadership and training, raising fears of overzealousness such as that associated with police "red squads" that spied on civil rights and peace activists decades ago. The centers also face practical obstacles that could limit their effectiveness, including a shortage of money, skilled analysts, and proven relationships with the FBI and Homeland Security.

Still, the centers are emerging as a key element in a sometimes chaotic new domestic intelligence infrastructure, which also includes homeland security units in local police forces and 103 FBI-led terrorism task forces, triple the number that existed before the Sept. 11 attacks.
Fusion centers are becoming "part of the landscape for local government," said the incoming D.C. police chief, Cathy Lanier. But she warned that police are navigating a new patchwork of state and federal privacy laws that govern the sharing, collection and storage of information. "We're in a very precarious position right now," she said. "If we lose community support, that is going to be a big deal for local law enforcement."

Jedburgh
01-25-2007, 09:01 PM
...the centers are emerging as a key element in a sometimes chaotic new domestic intelligence infrastructure, which also includes homeland security units in local police forces and 103 FBI-led terrorism task forces, triple the number that existed before the Sept. 11 attacks...
Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Fusion Centers at the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Level (http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/ise/guidelines.pdf)

FY 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program Supplemental Resource: Fusion Capability Planning Tool (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/fy07_hsgp_resource_fusion.pdf)

mikemac64
01-27-2007, 04:56 PM
We have a Fusion Ctr. here in MA, though no one can tell this street cop how to access or contribute to it. It is quite frustrating as at the street level, we get very little intel or tips.

davidbfpo
01-27-2007, 09:18 PM
All too easy from this side of the Atlantic to say - the 'Need to Know' prevails, rather than the 'Need to Share'. No wonder the cop on the ground has been given little guidance on what to look for.

Dispite our experience of the 'Irish Troubles' for over thirty years, we too are struggling to find satisfactory guidance for the cop on the ground.

Davidbfpo
U.K.

Jedburgh
01-28-2007, 04:22 PM
Info-sharing within the broad LE community has come a long way since 9/11 - but there are still significant obstacles to overcome before emerging capabilities can be leveraged and exploited by the average cop.

When I first began working with a county-level "joint" gang task force, it was very frustrating to realize that none of the individual city jurisdictions could communicate with each other - no 'net connectivity at all, and extremely limited comms otherwise. "Info sharing" was conducted the old-fashioned way - by physically going over to the other guy's office and comparing notes. Given the size of the county and the tempo of ops, this was a long way from being even minimally effective.

Now, any LEO can obtain access to systems like CyberCop, FPS Link Portal, LEO and their respective part of the RISS system. Each is a very useful resource in its own context, and provides information that your average city cop would have had an extremely hard time getting his hands in a timely fashion pre-9/11. However, none of these even begin to address the problem of rapid dissemination of tactical intelligence across jurisdictions.

The real point is that the bad guys stay abreast of LE capabilities and they exploit these comms gaps and manning issues. (Manning issues - in CA the cost of living has resulted in many jurisdictions being significantly understrength, and attempts to concentrate manpower in hotspots and during critical time periods only results in constant catch-up as the bad guys displace)

slapout9
01-28-2007, 07:17 PM
Without going onto a long rant and rave about all this, I could not agree more with all the above posts. I have done the meet me at the local coffee shop so many times just to find out what is going on routine it is ridiculous. This is a serious problem and needs to be fixed. Yes improvements have been made but we still have a long ways to go.

sgmgrumpy
01-29-2007, 11:18 PM
WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?
"Common sense is not so common" (Voltaire)

Intelligence is different from information-processing. It's not the sort of brain intelligence, or small-letter i intelligence that psychologists study. Intelligence can be defined as "secret knowledge of an enemy, the kind of knowledge which stands independently of the means by which it is obtained and the process by which it is distilled" (Troy 1991). Intelligence is the same as "foreknowledge, a kind of prophecy-like craft, which is always on alert, in every part of the world, toward friend and foe alike" (Dulles 1963). Intelligence is never an end in itself, but is always directed toward other ends, such as winning a war, coming out ahead of the competition, or aiding with the investigation of crime, in which case the title "intelligence analyst" is synonymous with "crime analyst." Intelligence is also like social science, since it tries to analyze and predict political, economic, and social behavior. However, social science is value-free, and intelligence is inherently partisan. Shulsky and Schmitt (2002) define intelligence as "the collection and analysis of intelligence information relevant to a government's formulation and implementation of policy to further its national security interests and to deal with threats from actual or potential adversaries." Intelligence can be thought of as a PROCESS (the means by which secret information is collected, analyzed, and disseminated), as a PRODUCT (the analyses, reports, and briefings that are useful or "actionable"), and an ORGANIZATION (a collection of units or agencies that carry out intelligence work).



ONLINE LECTURES ON INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/427/427lects.htm



Lessons Learned Information Sharing


Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) is the national network of Lessons Learned and Best Practices for emergency response providers and homeland security officials. LLIS.gov's secure, restricted-access information is designed to facilitate efforts to prevent, prepare for and respond to acts of terrorism and other incidents across all disciplines and communities throughout the US.

Secure: LLIS.gov is an encrypted system and all users are verified emergency response providers and homeland security officials.

Peer-validated content: All Lessons Learned and Best Practices are peer-validated by homeland security professionals.

After Action Reports and Information clearinghouse: LLIS houses an extensive catalog of AARs as well as an updated list of homeland security documents from DHS, and other Federal, State, and local organizations.


DHS LLIS
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/index.cfm

Jedburgh
02-24-2007, 01:46 PM
Interesting article on the Terrorism Liaison Officer concept and its implementation from a FD perspective in the current (Feb 07) Fire Chief magazine: The Best Defense (http://firechief.com/mag/firefighting_best_defense/)

...Firefighters are instinctual and often recognize when something isn't right, but without some basic awareness training, they likely are unable to verbalize these instincts. However, a program recently launched in Arizona could provide a solution.

The Arizona Terrorism Liaison Officers program features weekly briefings on the newest terrorism techniques, trends, tactics and procedures. The program is operated out of the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center, or ACTIC, and includes participants from 21 law enforcement, four military, five federal and 13 fire service agencies throughout the state....

Jedburgh
04-04-2007, 02:25 PM
N-DEx: Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/ndex/ndex_home.htm)

Create an electronic catalog of criminal information from around the country, give it some powerful search and analytical tools, push relevant information to users through subscription alerts, and enable new levels of communication and collaboration between those with similar interests. That’s our vision for N-DEx, the Law Enforcement National Data Exchange initiative. N-DEx is currently under development by the FBI and its partners, and the first stage will be launched early next year. Learn more here about how it works and how it will improve law enforcement’s ability to fight crime and terrorism.

sgmgrumpy
06-12-2007, 03:20 PM
Jedburgh,

You aware of this new NGIC? Interesting how this has come about.


FBI seeks vendor for NGIC gang intelligence (http://www.washingtontechnology.com/online/1_1/30795-1.html?topic=state)



The FBI is seeking proposals to develop and integrate gang intelligence analysis and workflow capability for its National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) to support law enforcement.



Currently, NGIC does not possess a centralized information system that can receive, store, manipulate or exchange gang information, including photographs and other identifiers, from federal, state and local law enforcement. In addition, the center does not connect to either the Regional Information Sharing System Network or GangNet, two major gang intelligence systems that law enforcement agencies nationwide use. NGIC participants agree that equal and equitable information sharing is a key to the center’s success.



The NGIC information technology support system will be a sensitive-but-unclassified system.

The contract would have a one-year base period and four option years. The base period will start one year from the award date. Proposals are due July 9.

AZACTIC
07-05-2007, 05:52 PM
I was glad to see that the article in the Fire Chief magazine was quoted in this forum. I have worked in the AcTIC (Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center) since it's inception, and can tell you that we are very proud of what we have built out here. With all of the AZ links to 9-11, we had to get much better at communicating between all agencies, and we had to do it fast. (AZ is cited 59 separate times in the 9-11 Commission report)

We have been operational since 2004, and continue to make improvements to our system. I am saddened to see some of the other posts about the lack of information getting out to the line level officers, from other centers around the country. With the federal agencies and all the state and local agencies all in one building it makes information sharing very simple and easy. Sometimes we in law enforcement make information sharing too difficult a task than what it has to be... we put up barriers where they don't need to be between levels of government and other agencies.

As mentioned in the Fire Chief magazine, our Center also includes a very close knit partnership with the states Fire Agencies. I ask the states that don't have close ties with their fire agencies, is where is all your information coming from then? Partnering with the Fire agencies and Private Security increases your "eyes & ears" out in the State and builds your protective lines and levels of security around your state.

I can't think of too many things that other states come to AZ for to learn how to do things right... and we aren't saying that we have all the correct answers, but we know we have a great program out here, and we continue to evaluate what is working and what doesn't and we change from there. Our citizens in AZ expect it from us, and we are doing everything we can to keep AZ Safe.

Jedburgh
07-10-2007, 01:35 PM
CRS, 6 Jul 07: Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34070.pdf)

...Fusion centers are state-created entities largely financed and staffed by the states, and there is no one “model” for how a center should be structured. State and local law enforcement and criminal intelligence seem to be at the core of many of the centers. Although many of the centers initially had purely counterterrorism goals, for numerous reasons, they have increasingly gravitated toward an all-crimes and even broader all-hazards approach. While many of the centers have prevention of attacks as a high priority, little “true fusion,” or analysis of disparate data sources, identification of intelligence gaps, and pro-active collection of intelligence against those gaps which could contribute to prevention is occurring. Some centers are collocated with local offices of federal entities, yet in the absence of a functioning intelligence cycle process, collocation alone does not constitute fusion.

The federal role in supporting fusion centers consists largely of providing financial assistance, the majority of which has flowed through the Homeland Security Grant Program; sponsoring security clearances; providing human resources; producing some fusion center guidance and training; and providing congressional authorization and appropriation of national foreign intelligence program resources, as well as oversight hearings. This report includes over 30 options for congressional consideration to clarify and potentially enhance the federal government’s relationship with fusion centers. One of the central options is the potential drafting of a formal national fusion center strategy that would outline, among other elements, the federal government’s clear expectations of fusion centers, its position on sustainment funding, metrics for assessing fusion center performance, and definition of what constitutes a “mature” fusion center. This report will be updated....

ntstlkr
07-11-2007, 03:47 PM
Cheers All,
Having stumbled upon this site a little while back I've been reading the threads with great interest, but this one in particular stood out as I reflect upon my own experience and observations.

A little background on yours truly. I currently work in ICE, within DHS, as part of a multi-agency "Task Force", for want of a better term, primarily in the counternarcotics/human trafficking/CT fields, doing case coordination/deconfliction between agencies and analysis of TIII information. I've only been working in the LE field since 1998 (back when ICE was US Customs), previous to that I was in the Army since the mid-80s (with all the appropriate campaign ribbons and deployments etc). Although it's going on nearly a decade, I find my mindset still revolves around military terms and methodology (for better or worse).

This is the context that I place the title of my post in. For all that the LE community has a large number (not absolute and no numbers on specific ratios) of current/prior service personnel, I find that at least one thing has not been carried over from our collective time in uniform. Purple. In military terms, purple is more than a color, it's a mindset, backed by doctrine and continuous review of practices. Surely Joint Operations has come along way since the Goldwaters-Nochols Act of '86. It's execution is not perfect by any means, and there remains, even at this date two decades later, plenty of inter-service rivalries/redundencies which need to be addressed. But the US Military of the 21st Century is far and above a more cohesive fighting machine than the one I was a part of when my unit moved out to the GDP in West Germany (when there was a West Germany). Or even when, a few years later, we hit the big sandbox in Saudi Arabia and crossed into Iraq the first time. By the time I made it to Sarajevo with IFOR, Joint Operations had probably gone from a grudging exception to something a little more approaching the norm. And it continues to this day.

Faced with a glaring inability to operate together and several operational failures/almost failures (Desert One, Grenada, etc), some members of Congress, at least (one of the few times that political body has done anything worthwhile some would say), recognized the fact that confronted with an enemy that numerically outmatches us, and in some cases technologically as well, our only recourse in order to win when fighting against such a foe would be to fight harder, faster, and smarter than what the enemy was capable of responding to. We could no longer afford to allow the interservice rivalries and self hindering practices we indulged ourselves with to get in the way of the most fundamental aspect of military operations: finding and destroying the enemy.

Sure, as I've said, there always remains room for improvement. But noone even questions the existance of Joint Operations nor the basic principles involved in it's Doctrine, even if debate occurs regarding it's execution.

In a few short monthes it will be 6 years since 9/11. That one day provided the impetus for the LE community to undergo the same shift in focus and practice that the Military underwent after Desert One and Grenada. Yes, the Department of Homeland Security was created to bring all the disparate LE agencies which should have been working together beforehand under one roof and central direction. But creating a new department and org charts alone does not create "jointness". In the military context at least, which is the lens through which I still judge effectiveness.

We still wrangle over enforcement jurisdiction and keep investigative information from each other. There is constant in-fighting over case information disclosure and operational details that should be shared between impacted departments, determining who is going to "lead" the investigation, and so on. And this is in a unit that, I have to admit, is actually one that's better than most at "sharing" information. If anything it's exactly what the unit was created to address.

So the question is why, after all this time, is the concept of Joint Operations still foreign to LE? I have my own ideas about that and what to do about it but I'd ask the readers of the forum what they think about the idea/issue.

For all that Intelligence needed a reform after the events of 9/11, I would forward that Intelligence Reform will be ineffective without basic LE Reform. That LE Intelligence Operations will never reach their full potential for effectiveness until LE itself has undergone a sea change.

Sorry for the long and drawn out rant but any thoughts?

sgmgrumpy
07-11-2007, 07:18 PM
Crime info trumps terror data at fusion centers :confused:


http://www.washingtontechnology.com/online/1_1/31005-1.html?topic=homeland



Anti-terrorism information-sharing and analysis is taking a back seat to criminal intelligence at the more than 40 state intelligence fusion centers, according to a new report from the Congressional Research Service.

State governors created the centers, and the Homeland Security Department provides part of the funding. Their purpose is to fuse federal, state and local intelligence against terrorism, but CRS found the fusion centers have gravitated more toward collecting and analyzing criminal intelligence and all-hazards intelligence. The service found few indications that the centers have been making efforts to become aware of terrorist plans and foil attacks.

ntstlkr
07-16-2007, 02:26 PM
Crime info trumps terror data at fusion centers :confused

Cheers SGM,

This is an interesting article but, in itself, not very suprising nor, when you think about it, should be.

For all that terrorism and terrorism related activity is ongoing 24/7, when compared to the more common concerns of drug and human trafficking it becomes obvious where the ratio of effort will slide. This isn't to say that the CT function gets shelved, but that to be perfectly honest, terrorism isn't the only game in town nor is it the only thing that threatens national security. For every terrorist (home grown or import) there's a thousand drug dealers, traffickers, and those who trade humans as commodities. And that's just here in the good 'ol US of A.

The number of CT related investigations being pursued by an individual state or even a group of states could probably be counted in one hand. Two at most. The number of narcotics, money laundering, and human trafficking (the red headed step child of the bunch) can number in the hundreds easily within one state alone.

Other factors include the limited resources a state or group of states may have to bring in collecting intelligence on any potential terrorist group and, if such a group gets noticed, whether the matter automatically brings federal attention (and usurption) in the process. It would be hard to imagine the FBI, upon being notified of a possible terrorist cell operating in Nashville say, not wanting to become a part of the investigation. Much less taking the lead should the presence and activities of the cell become confirmed.

The fusion centers, at least from the federal perspective, are little more than middle men. They coordinate info sharing and leads during the initial phases of an investigation, but they would subsequently be subsumed should the case actually trip to something substantive.

In the mean time, they are rather expensive (and knowing that no government program, whether state or federal, is beyond the bureaucratic intertia to keep growing, expand services, increase funding etc) to keep around to JUST work CT issues. Especially when there is so much else that can use the effort. As a FC manager, I'd probably be selling my programs ability to coordinate investigations, case information, etc for all it's worth to the drug enforcment community. Likewise, those "FCs" like EPIC and NDIC and so on have done the same in reverse.

The question should be can CT inspired fusion centers retain their focus while working these other adjunct areas? Will they forget their primary purpose for being?

sgmgrumpy
07-25-2007, 06:23 PM
usurption:confused: Forgive me; I had to look that one up:D


Personally I think they should be used in such a manner. Nothing wrong with a METL for a fusion center;). I would assume priorities are controlled and changed on a 24/7 basis.

Article does not cover exactly how they are operated in-depth, as they should not, but to the average civilian, it looks as if Uncle Sam is again throwing money towards something it was not intended for. Drugs, Gangs, Org Crime as far as I am concerned are all just as important to NS as terrorism.

The benefits of those fusion centers are just too great not to have them covering the entire spectrum of insuring homeland is secure.

A former police chief recently described it best. "Traditional Police methods do not work anymore, we have to find different methods/tactics in fighting crime."

ntstlkr
07-30-2007, 03:58 PM
Aye SGM,

I had a discussion awhile back w/one of our agents, about the time when we had just undergone the "big marriage" into DHS. I had basically taken the viewpoint that, for a large part (and from a more military midset) the DoJ can be subsumed under DHS as in the end, crime has (always been tbh) emerged as another factor that effects National Security concerns. Not everyone agrees with that assertion but there it is. Crime facilitates terrorist activities. From providing methodologies/TTPs to funding streams for operations, crime is intimately related to terrorism in ways beyond falling under a lump legal classification of "illegal activities".

Case in point is meth production and trafficking. My group was involved in a number of cases where individuals and groups were importing the precursor chemicals, manufacturing, then distributing meth. The procedes from these operations were then plugged back into the cycle to purchase additional quantities of precursors to continue the operation. A significant portion of the money was also remitted to charity organizations known to be associated with terrorist groups and/or the terrorist groups themselves. Time and competition from traditional criminal organizations has caused their share of the meth market to go down but it hasn't stopped them from continuing to find other traditionally criminal enterprises to enter in order to continue raising money. The secondary benefit, from the terrorist leadership standpoint, is that the "enemy" is having to deal with the problems of narcotics. it adds up to another way to wage war, in effect, another front in the fight.

Evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, the intimate relationship traditional criminal activity has with terrorism, and therefore National Security, is still something some folks (both in and out of LE) have a time getting their heads around.

Does it mean we should federalize all LE and just plop the DoJ under the DHS? No. But we really have no over-arching plan, no joint concept of operations that ties ALL the disparate agencies and operations together.

I had proposed that something along the lines of the combatant commands, with unified and specified commands throughout conus. The reason behind this is twofold. First, none of our organizational structures coincide with each other. For example, the DEA has it's SACs and Field Offices as do we (ICE), but our organizations are not structured to support each other. Much less the FBI or anyone else. We each just tend to our own backyards and address our own particular priorities of the moment (read administration) but beyond that nada. Secondly, as we have seen with 9/11, but has really been apparent to anyone who's been paying attention for the last few decades, when we have noone who is in charge, noone who is in a position to make decisions that cut across organizational boundries and assign priorities that affect conditions right there at the ground, all the notions of inter-agency cooperation goes out the window.

We need someone to be in charge of the California AOR, for instance, who can keep tabs on what all the little indians are doing and direct them to accomplish certain objectives. Of course, not many, if at all, of the agencies are going to like that kind of setup because it relegates them to second tier status like the service heads.

I didn't mean to go so far afield with the rant but the point is that the fusion centers are just a small part of what needs to be put into operation. And without the overriding structure and organization to go along with it, their effectiveness will be about as good as our success in the "War on Drugs", pretty minimal. They are great ideas and should have been up along time ago. But as it stands, they still won't add up to much beyond just what they are, individual parts of a system that should be acting as just that: a system.

sgmgrumpy
07-31-2007, 06:38 PM
I find it odd that this type intermixing from muslim youths would only be unique to Nashville area. Detroit I would say has to be #1 based on population.


NASHVILLE, TN (http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/K/KURDISH_GANG?SITE=FLTAM&SECTION=US)


But now the Kurdish immigrant community has been shaken to see its young people joining a street gang that blends old-world customs and new-world thuggery. Police blame the gang for a string of rapes, assaults and home invasions.

The gang calls itself Kurdish Pride and is made up of 20 to 30 teenagers and young adults.



They also put Kurdish flags on their cars, and use yellow - from the Kurdish Democratic Party banner - as their gang color. On their Web sites, they talk about Kurdish music and culture.

Unlike other gang members, most Kurdish Pride followers grew up in stable, working-class, two-parent homes, and many of their parents own successful businesses or work at universities, Nashville Detective Mark Anderson said.

The Kurds, most of whom are Sunni Muslim, come mainly from Turkey, Iraq and Iran but have their own language and culture. Kurdish immigrants have sought refuge in Nashville since the 1970s, creating the largest community of Kurds in an American city, with about 10,000 members, Karadaghi said. More Kurds fleeing persecution came to Nashville in the late '90s, and many attend the city's public schools.

Gang members say they formed Kurdish Pride in response to threats and harassment after the Sept. 11 attacks, Anderson said. But Anderson, who works their neighborhood, said he has never heard of any violence against the Kurds.

slapout9
08-03-2007, 12:16 PM
Fantastic article from newest issue JFQ on how the Chicago CLEAR system was used in Iraq. Link to article
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i46/7.pdf

sgmgrumpy
08-03-2007, 01:28 PM
We each just tend to our own backyards and address our own particular priorities of the moment (read administration) but beyond that nada.

And that IS still occuring from what I have observed, herd of or read about. To many agencies from local to the federal level that have no clue as to Team Player rule. Sometimes it makes we wonder who picked the name :JTTF:rolleyes: When are they going to get it?

Here is another example of my that type mentality.


FBI Wants Its Own Stasi (http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/fbi_informant_network_fbi_wants_its_own_stasi.htm)
Proposes building network of US informants
In a move startlingly similar to that of the East German government during the Cold war, the FBI wants to recruit thousands of covert informants in the US and work with the CIA to train them in an effort to expand and adopt more aggressive intelligence capabilities.

The next headline will be
"CIA at odds with FBI to adapt intelligence cells in US"
:cool:

I can see that one being added to the ACLUs list.

slapout9
08-03-2007, 01:43 PM
sgmgrumpy this sounds like a rehash of old COINTELPRO (http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/cointel.htm) program of the 60's. This exploded in their face in the 70's during the Sen. Frank Church hearings on domestic spying.

sgmgrumpy
08-03-2007, 03:01 PM
FYI


IS-701 Multiagency Coordination System (MACS) - New
IS-800.A National Response Plan (NRP), An Introduction - Revised
IS-860 Introduction to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) - New


Courses here are intended for emergency management personnel, fire service personnel, first responders, Department of Homeland Security personnel, and the general public.

http://emilms.fema.gov/

ntstlkr
08-07-2007, 05:38 PM
And that IS still occuring from what I have observed, herd of or read about. To many agencies from local to the federal level that have no clue as to Team Player rule. Sometimes it makes we wonder who picked the name :JTTF:rolleyes: When are they going to get it? .

Aye. Rest assured we continue to endeavor to remain our own worst enemies. One of the hardest things to get my head around, and remains although I've grown pretty cynical since, is this idea of "ownership" of a case/case information. It's institutionalized. Yeah, sure, when it comes to deployments, especially rw ones, the military can get as comptetative as organizations go. But, in that instance, it's about getting in on the action (and yes I realize funding is a big part of that too). But the endgame, so to speak, is putting the bad guys where they belong, in the ground.

Law Enforcement works on an entirely different set of perspectives. The funding issue rules the nest, which only reinforces the "doesn't play well with others" mentality which they ALL share. Even within departments there is a reluctance to share case information at times.

Again, I'm not saying the uniformed mindset is completely without it's problems, it's taken us along time to get "Joint" to where it is today, and there's always room for improvement. And while not every LE department is headed by a info sharing-averse director or head, but the fact remains, the concept/habit/institution of case "ownership" is a big minus whether in the criminal or terrorism fields.

In the counter-narcotics game, which is my TF's bread and butter, we are getting eaten alive not just because the adversary, the traffickers/dealers/manufacturers/etc outnumber us by such a wide degree, but because we continue to plan/act incoherently. We don't organize to play together, we don't plan to play together (except in those "break glass only in emergencies" circumstances, even then they're only just that "plans"), and where the rubber hits the road, we don't actually play together all that well (being polite here).

In the 70's, the big wigs up in TRADOC and so on recognized that we just couldn't plan on playing the attrition game if we had to fight the Pact rolling across the IGB and into the FRG. AirLand changed our way of thinking to a more aggressive and tactically flexible way of fighting. It also, little known, began the incorporation of "jointness" into our doctrine, plans, and operations. Deep Strike was every bit as important as the Close Battle, and the Commander absolutely HAD to coordinate attacks on follow-on enemy echelons with the AF.

It was the only way then, and probably the only way now (another discussion lol).

9/11 should have given the Law Enforcement community at large the same wake-up call. Guess they never answered the phone on that one.


The next headline will be
"CIA at odds with FBI to adapt intelligence cells in US"
:cool:
I can see that one being added to the ACLUs list.

Yeah, I hear ya SGM lol.

sgmgrumpy
08-10-2007, 11:39 AM
Well it's not the headline we expected, but it is similar.:rolleyes:
The ole Us and Them concept:D

States Feel Left Out Of Disaster Planning (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/07/AR2007080702115.html?nav%3Dhcmodule&sub=AR)


A decision by the Bush administration to rewrite in secret the nation's emergency response blueprint has angered state and local emergency officials, who worry that Washington is repeating a series of mistakes that contributed to its bungled response to Hurricane Katrina nearly two years ago.

State and local officials in charge of responding to disasters say that their input in shaping the National Response Plan was ignored in recent months by senior White House and Department of Homeland Security officials, despite calls by congressional investigators for a shared overhaul of disaster planning in the United States.

ntstlkr
08-10-2007, 05:53 PM
Well it's not the headline we expected, but it is similar.:rolleyes:
The ole Us and Them concept:D

States Feel Left Out Of Disaster Planning (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/07/AR2007080702115.html?nav%3Dhcmodule&sub=AR)


sgmgrumpy,this sounds just like Iraqi government planning session:)

Too right.

Here's an example.

A few monthes into the the initial phase of cobbling together DHS I had the dubious honor of being drafted to do a rotation up at Nebraska Ave (the Ops Center) as the Customs Rep. Practically all the federal LE agencies were represented, as well as DoD and each of the services. I was immediately struck by the fact that our primary work area was clearly seperated into the two camps. Military on the one hand, and Law Enforcement on the other. In literary terms I think this is referred to as "foreshadowing". The attitude in those days went the same way. The LE mindset was to guard information, and in the case of investigative info, find any way to make sure it wasn't released. Part of this was/is because of the institutionalized "case ownership" mentality, partly because of real legal requirements to not compromise ongoing investigations.

Or as one INS rep told me "Don't they get that you can't just give this information out?" when he turned down a request for information for the upteenth time. He was right, and wrong too. The military requests (which, now that I think of it, a majority of info requests did seem to come from the military and not the other way around) were driven by operational needs. Yes, depending on the individual rep, there was give and take from one side to the other, but nowhere near what it should have been, much less given we were still so close in time to the traumatic events that forced the OP Center to be put together in the first place. There was little desire or initiative exercised to find ways of sharing investigative information without compromising a case.

In addition, the Reps from LE were just that, Reps and no more. They weren't given any authority (legal or otherwise) to release information without authorization from their respective HQs (an obviously tedious and time consuming affair). I think this was done purposely. As well as knowing their innate reluctance to release case info, the LE agencies counted on this to ensure that the guys at the OC wouldn't be tempted to give away the farm while in the process of "cooperating". But the consequences were a divided "team" and an abject unwillingness to share pertinent information in a timely manner. Again, the whole reason why we were there in the first place.

Operational needs on the one hand, the mandate to protect investigative information on the other.

slapout9
08-10-2007, 06:46 PM
Nightstalker, that is so true about LE. I was told way back when if you are the Case Agent your job is to get information not give it:eek:. I have had friends pull the silent treatment on me when they became the Case Agent but yet they wanted info from me to solve "their" case.:confused:

ntstlkr
08-10-2007, 08:33 PM
Nightstalker, that is so true about LE. I was told way back when if you are the Case Agent your job is to get information not give it:eek:. I have had friends pull the silent treatment on me when they became the Case Agent but yet they wanted info from me to solve "their" case.:confused:

Yeah well you know that's nothing when you start doing case hour reporting. Relatively "simple" things like reporting the number of hours spent supporting which cases can easily be used to justify an increase in funds going to a department or section. The rule then is to watch your back.

But aye. Fusion Centers (just a fancy name for Ops Center, which is itself another fancy name for TOC/BICC, etc etc.....ad nauseum) will have to find a way to get past this at the state and regional level as much s the federal. Whether it's the Department of Homeland Security vs the Department of Justice or Metro Nashville PD vs the Nashville Sheriffs Department vs the Nashville Fire Department. You're asking organizations and agencies to go against institutional inertia on the one hand and to act against "perceived" self interest on the other.

Yes, the fact that the long term self interest (of the organization much less the society) may be entirely irrelevant to this thought process and poses a real danger as real as any terrorist cell is as maddening as it is perplexing but there it is.

selil
11-10-2007, 10:40 PM
I just sat through a discussion of fusion centers and a utter lack of analysts. At the state level I heard a lot of grumbling that the FBI says analysis is done "THIS" way, and the CIA says it is done "THIS" way, and the states looking for training and standards are left going... Railroad tracks never meet except in the distance and that is an illusion. Interesting stuff coming out of DHS with no dog in the hunt they are creating standardized analyst training.

relative autonomy
11-16-2007, 03:43 PM
Here is a good article about the DSH Intelligence Fusion Centers, which the FBI is actively involved in. i know in some states the FBI office physically houses the fusion center and it is principally staffed by the FBI.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/30/AR2006123000238.html

i think this is where a lot of good intelligence comes from.

Erick
11-20-2007, 02:37 AM
i think this is where a lot of good intelligence comes from.

It may be disseminated from these, the RTTACs, and others. However, good intel comes from the guys & gals out on the ground, talking to the people. That applies a lot in a whole bunch of places.

JeffC
12-01-2007, 05:10 PM
You've probably seen the recent NY Times article (http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/us/AP-Intelligence-Centers.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin) about the lack of terrorism focus by Fusion Centers. I think that's taking far too narrow a view at how these centers should be doing their work, or even what the scope of that work should be.

The CRS report on Fusion Centers (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34070.pdf) issued this past summer suggests that a broad, all-hazards approach may be best. This seems like a no-brainer to me. What, do you imagine, are the disadvantages to a broader focus that encompasses fighting terrorism and crime?

selil
12-01-2007, 05:48 PM
With the new National Response Framework they are going to have to adopt it. The days of terrorism only being a mission is gone. (sorry for the drive by but there are some interesting things in the NRF).

JeffC
12-01-2007, 06:01 PM
With the new National Response Framework they are going to have to adopt it. The days of terrorism only being a mission is gone. (sorry for the drive by but there are some interesting things in the NRF).

Is the NRF going back for revisions after the public draft was so ill-received?

slapout9
12-01-2007, 06:32 PM
What, do you imagine, are the disadvantages to a broader focus that encompasses fighting terrorism and crime?

None. It is how it should be and how it was really meant to be. The concept of NCIC (National Crime Information Center) which was the first attempt to computerize and share all information across state lines could have been upgraded and expanded for a lot less money. It is like COIN the best stuff is the old stuff. But if you call it new you get better funding. IMHO

Jedburgh
12-01-2007, 08:55 PM
You've probably seen the recent NY Times article (http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/us/AP-Intelligence-Centers.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin) about the lack of terrorism focus by Fusion Centers. I think that's taking far too narrow a view at how these centers should be doing their work, or even what the scope of that work should be.
That article spun the GAO report in manner consciously chosen to grab readers for the paper. That's what they do. That's also why I tend to ignore news articles about such reports and actually read the damn thing myself.

Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0835.pdf)

Why GAO Did This Study

In general, a fusion center is a collaborative effort to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. Recognizing that fusion centers are a mechanism for information sharing, the federal government—including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), which has primary responsibility for governmentwide information sharing and is located in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence—is taking steps to partner with fusion centers.

In response to your request, GAO examined (1) the status and characteristics of fusion centers and (2) to what extent federal efforts help alleviate challenges the centers identified. GAO reviewed center-related documents and conducted interviews with officials from DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE, and conducted semistructured interviews with 58 state and local fusion centers. The results are not generalizable to the universe of fusion centers. Data are not available on the total number of local fusion centers.

selil
12-01-2007, 09:31 PM
Is the NRF going back for revisions after the public draft was so ill-received?

My understanding is that they have already started the revisions, but it is really fait acompli. I was kind of disheartened at the lack of detail. I'm worried to that the NRF and NIMS don't really match up so you have a incident command system that doesn't meet up with the strategic coordination system. My understanding is that the military doesn't do joint coordination any better either and yet they are held up as the great model. There is a lot of distance between bullets and boots and the Fusion centers have never done the firefighters that much good. The can but they haven't.

Jedburgh
12-24-2007, 03:26 PM
sgmgrumpy this sounds like a rehash of old COINTELPRO (http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/cointel.htm) program of the 60's. This exploded in their face in the 70's during the Sen. Frank Church hearings on domestic spying.
The ACLU has siezed on this aspect - among other issues - in a recent paper attacking Fusion Centers:

What's Wrong with Fusion Centers? (http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf)

The Problems With Fusion Centers
I. Ambiguous lines of authority allow for “policy shopping.”
II. Private sector participation in fusion centers risks privacy and security.
III. Military participation in fusion centers violates fundamental tenets of liberty.
IV. Data fusion = Data mining, which is bad for privacy and bad for security.
V. Excessive secrecy undermines the mission of fusion centers.

JeffC
12-24-2007, 05:35 PM
The ACLU has siezed on this aspect - among other issues - in a recent paper attacking Fusion Centers:

What's Wrong with Fusion Centers? (http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf)

Not a very impressive paper. I don't think the authors have much of a grip on the technology hurdles that these centers still have to overcome, and their frequent use of generalizations "data mining is bad" is almost comical.

Jedburgh
09-03-2008, 06:17 PM
NDIC, Jun 07: Improving the Law-Enforcement-Intelligence Community Relationship (http://www.ndic.edu/press/5463.htm#)

....Much has been said about Law Enforcement not “getting” intelligence and about the Intelligence Community not “getting” law enforcement operations. Those of us who have had the privilege of serving in both communities know from experience that neither assertion is true and have urged a thoughtful analysis of facts to tamp down the emotion that surrounds this debate. This work succeeds in moving us beyond surface judgments and emotions, exploring law enforcement intelligence tools and techniques in some depth and pointing to their utility in fi ghting and prevailing over today’s adversaries. Just as importantly, it points to extant Intelligence Community practices that if applied broadly will help Law Enforcement make the transition from prosecution to prevention.....
CONTENTS

Best Practices in Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community

Developments in Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysis

Unmasking Networks: Drug Enforcement Administration Tradecraft for the Intelligence Community

Improving Tactical Military Intelligence with Anti-Gang Techniques

“Home-Grown” Islamic Extremists in U.S. Prisons

Predictive Intelligence: What the Drug Enforcement Administration Can Glean From the Intelligence Community

Obstacles to Integration

British Military Intelligence-Law Enforcement Integration in the Irish War of Independence, 1919-1921

The Wall Between National Security and Law Enforcement

Problems and Progress in Information Sharing

Addressing the Difficulties

Perceptions of Law Enforcement-Intelligence Community Information Sharing

Challenges and Opportunities of Intelligence Community Membership

Intelligence Fusion in the Field: Translating National Strategy into Practice

Semantic Web: Technology for Integration

davidbfpo
09-03-2008, 08:20 PM
On a quick glimpse some unusual items here and will take time to read - probably when in a warmer climate than rain-swept England. Will report back then.

davidbfpo

Jedburgh
01-14-2009, 03:06 PM
DHS-OIG, Dec 08: DHS' Role in State and Local Fusion Centers is Evolving (http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_09-12_Dec08.pdf)

.....At the request of Representative Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security (http://homeland.house.gov/), we assessed whether the Department of Homeland Security is providing adequate oversight and guidance for fusion centers, and what problems and challenges are being encountered as fusion centers develop. Specifically, we determined:

(1) the extent to which the department’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1220886590914.shtm) has been working to coordinate and develop its relationship and role with fusion centers; (2) whether fusion center funding and activities are aligned to further the department’s mission; (3) the merits of detailing Office of Intelligence and Analysis staff to fusion centers; and (4) whether the Office of Intelligence and Analysis is successful in backfilling positions used to staff fusion centers.

Office of Intelligence and Analysis coordination efforts with fusion centers are improving and evolving, and its intelligence officers assigned to fusion centers have added value. However, challenges remain with internal Department of Homeland Security coordination, aligning fusion center activities and funding with the department’s mission, and deploying personnel to state and local fusion centers in a timely manner......

Juan Rico
02-03-2009, 01:35 AM
www.washingtonpost.com (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/29/AR2009012903568.html)


http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51yIGzFTgpL._SL500_AA240_.jpg


New York City's Police Department is among the largest and most recognizable police forces on earth. Thanks to the global reach of syndicated television programs, audiences in cities as diverse as Paris, Tel Aviv, Amman, Abu Dhabi, Singapore and Santo Domingo share a cursory familiarity with the comings and goings at One Police Plaza in Manhattan. But what viewers in those exotic locales don't realize is that the NYPD has now come to them for real, posting officers in potential hot spots around the world.

The role of these agents, part of an elite and controversial counter-intelligence unit within the NYPD, is the subject of Christopher Dickey's illuminating Securing the City (http://www.amazon.com/Securing-City-Americas-Counterterror-Force/dp/1416552405/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1233623864&sr=8-1). Dickey is an old hand on the terrorist beat, having spent decades covering the Middle East and Europe for Newsweek and The Washington Post, and he's eminently well positioned to examine New York City's effort to start its own mini CIA.

davidbfpo
02-14-2009, 09:34 PM
Catching up, this is a review of the Dickey book in The Economist: http://www.economist.com/books/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13097608&source=hptextfeature

Some points there to ponder, is the NYPD model one others can follow?

davidbfpo

Jedburgh
11-13-2009, 09:48 PM
NIJ, Oct 09: Learning From 9/11: Organizational Change in the New York City and Arlington County, VA Police Departments (http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/227346.pdf)

On Sept. 11, 2001, local first responders in two jurisdictions — New York City and Arlington County, VA — were forced to deal with attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that were unprecedented in scope and loss of life. Following 9/11, the National Institute of Justice awarded a grant to the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) to conduct case studies of the two law enforcement agencies most directly involved to learn what they could teach about best practices for responding to future incidents....

bourbon
09-21-2010, 05:23 PM
The Terror Translators (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/nyregion/19intel.html), by Alan Feuer. The New York Times, September 17, 2010.

Formally known as the Analytic Unit of the department’s Intelligence Division, the team was created in 2002 as part of the city’s response to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. It stands as a unique experiment in breaking traditional law-enforcement boundaries, comprising two dozen civilian experts — lawyers, academics, corporate consultants, investment bankers, alumni of the World Bank and the Council on Foreign Relations and even a former employee of the Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan.

The team serves as the Police Department’s terrorism reference arm: available on demand to explain Islamic law or Pakistani politics to detectives in the field.
Good article.

slapout9
09-21-2010, 07:56 PM
The Terror Translators (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/nyregion/19intel.html), by Alan Feuer. The New York Times, September 17, 2010.

Good article.

Ditto: it is a good article

bourbon
09-22-2010, 02:11 PM
Ditto: it is a good article
Slap,

The NYPD Intel Division gets glowing press, which naturally makes me suspicious; but through the various accounts it adds up to something pretty impressive. Their linguistic capability is strong; they have guy’s overseas working at desks in foreign police departments while FBI Legat’s are stuck in embassies, good relationships with the national intelligence community, and they can draw talent. The facts line up.

The line about finding civilian analysts with a “low jerk quotient” who can work with detectives is a good one. The idea of blending street guys with academic types is a good one, but you can tell from the outset that success would hinge on interpersonal dynamics.

I don’t know if other cities in the US can recreate the scope of NYPD Intel, or even if they need to. But it sure is something to see come together.

slapout9
09-22-2010, 03:24 PM
Slap,

The NYPD Intel Division gets glowing press, which naturally makes me suspicious; but through the various accounts it adds up to something pretty impressive. Their linguistic capability is strong; they have guy’s overseas working at desks in foreign police departments while FBI Legat’s are stuck in embassies, good relationships with the national intelligence community, and they can draw talent. The facts line up.

The line about finding civilian analysts with a “low jerk quotient” who can work with detectives is a good one. The idea of blending street guys with academic types is a good one, but you can tell from the outset that success would hinge on interpersonal dynamics.

I don’t know if other cities in the US can recreate the scope of NYPD Intel, or even if they need to. But it sure is something to see come together.


Yep, you want to know who predicted the current financial crisis long before anybody else.....the FBI!!! In 2004 they reported that one of the most massive mortgage frauds in history was underway. That is why I say we don't have an Economic problem we have a Criminal problem and until that is dealt with nothing will change,there is no economic policy that can fix what is essentially a Criminal problem. But don't hold your breath because to many senior politicos new exactly what was happening, so no effective prosecutions were allowed to proceed. If Cops ran the country we would all be better off:)

Ken White
09-22-2010, 05:13 PM
but when I hear tales of the political scuffles that go on in both my Sons' fairly big departments... :wry:

Spot on with that mortgage prob and the political malfeasance (both Parties) that sat on it. :mad:

mikemac64
12-26-2010, 05:57 PM
but when I hear tales of the political scuffles that go on in both my Sons' fairly big departments... :wry:

Spot on with that mortgage prob and the political malfeasance (both Parties) that sat on it. :mad:

I have grown to have little use for the major political parties. Many good ideas never see the light of day because one party won't let the other get credit. It is a shame really that so many of our politicians, at all levels, see themselves first as Donkeys or Elephants, and Americans second.

There appears to be a renewed push for local Police, under the auspices of Intelligence Led Policing, to develop Intelligence capabilities. In my city, three gas station which were owned by persons of middle eastern descent, closed within days of the last NY city car bomb attempt. Coincidence? Maybe, maybe not.

There may not be overt terror planning in your average municipality, but there may be supporters (philosophical and material) and sympathizers in many municipalities across the US! This is where local criminal intelligence operations with will come in handy.

FYI I am attending the FLETC Intel Analyst Training Program in January.

davidbfpo
08-29-2011, 11:26 AM
Moderators Note

This thread considers one strand of the US response to terrorism, intelligence and it's handling and of late another thread has taken a wider view, including intelligence 'Terrorism in the USA:threat & response (merged thread)' :http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8828&page=9

AdamG
10-03-2012, 05:14 AM
The Department of Homeland Security has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on a network of 77 so-called “fusion” intelligence centers that have collected personal information on some U.S. citizens — including detailing the “reading habits” of American Muslims — while producing “shoddy” reports and making no contribution to thwarting any terrorist plots, a new Senate report states.

http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/10/02/14187433-homeland-security-fusion-centers-spy-on-citizens-produce-shoddy-work-report-says?lite