US Military -v- Internal blogging & Access to WWW

[SWJED]

13 February St. Petersburgh Times - Blogs are CENTCOM's New Target (http://www.sptimes.com/2007/02/12/Tampabay/Blogs_are_CentCom_s_n.shtml) by William Levesque.


It begins almost imperceptibly, one lonely posting on a blog. It says that U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan use candy to lure children so they can be used as human shields.

Patently untrue.

But in an age when the lines between traditional media and the blogosphere are blurred, a dark rumor can spread like a kindergarten virus, unchecked and unchallenged.

U.S. Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa is taking notice.

Since 2005, CentCom officials have jumped into the blogging fray, facing the realities of a new electronic age in hopes of combating misinformation on the Web, or just getting its own news out.

A three-person team monitors blogs - Internet journals with commentary from ordinary citizens and, often, links to news articles - that concentrate on CentCom's area of responsibility, which includes Iraq and Afghanistan...

[selil]

I've been noticing that the peace activists have been hitting places like Digg.com hard with video labeled one thing and showing other things. I won't go so far as to say that the "enenmy" is using digg/slashdot/myspace but it would be interesting to follow some IP's. A place like digg will get a couple hundred thousand page views an hour. If they have three people doing this they aren't taking it very seriously.

[Jedburgh]

....If they have three people doing this they aren't taking it very seriously.
Three people monitoring full-time is plenty serious - if they know what they're doing, if at least one of them is a native Arabic speaker, and if they are supported with effective monitoring software....

[selil]

Three people monitoring full-time is plenty serious - if they know what they're doing, if at least one of them is a native Arabic speaker, and if they are supported with effective monitoring software....


To monitor blogs and forums is going to take eye-balls. Just like you create and bring along a hum-int resource you have to work your way into blogs and forums. I guess it depends on what their actual mission or goals are, but just like the CIA reading news papers it would seem a better bet to spread the task over hundreds of people.

[Jedburgh]

Monitoring blogs bears absolutely no resemblance to any aspect of recruiting and running HUMINT sources. It also does not require the manpower effort of the old FBIS daily translations of hundreds of foreign media sources. Let's not overblow the task.

The key word is monitoring. It doesn't even require reading the entire contents of the blog/journal/forum. Software identifies and highlights new content for you (text, images, video), then all that is required is to gist through to find and follow up on the bits that are of value.

For monitoring and data mining purposes, there is no "working in" required. Even where access requires registration and membership, most of the sites in question do not have levels of restricted access by post count etc. Simply register and you're in. The major difficulty is language - many sites where there is true value to be mined are not in English. And when dealing with the slang and abbreviated terms used in web postings by the indig, success in collection is far more likely when you have a native speaker working for you.

Now, if the idea is to take a step further, along the lines of LE efforts to catch child predators by posing as young'uns in internet chat rooms, then yes, it will take a much larger effort tightly coordinated with other intel elements. That is another discussion entirely....

[goesh]

Three on duty is certainly a good start compared to none but a couple of years ago, a darn good start. I know the Jewish community has some top-notch 'nerds' that are really into and adept at tracking and keeping tabs on any number of radical sites. I wonder if such resources can be tapped as an adjunct? It seems at times as if the military and civilians are cloistered from each other and can only operate in rigid parameters that seem to entail passive flag waving, abject hatred and exploitive contracting on the part of civilians. It shouldn't be that hard to pull in some data bases and other such compilations with non-military sources in this ongoing cyber war. Which ever military element has command status wouldn't have to share with civilian counterparts, simply be recepticles for their data and assessments.

[selil]

Now, if the idea is to take a step further, along the lines of LE efforts to catch child predators by posing as young'uns in internet chat rooms, then yes, it will take a much larger effort tightly coordinated with other intel elements. That is another discussion entirely....

We'll have to agree to disagree then.

From my perspective information warfare occurs on several levels. The political pundits and operational machinery in the last presidential election disseminated information via email to their constituents with daily messages to place in blogs, web forums, to be sent out in emails as a method keeping messages on track.

This last weekend Senator Barak O'bama started an open social network and had thousands of groups set up within hours. His message, his ideas, and the mechanisms for putting that in front of people were well prepared prior to his social network going live. The knowledge, skills and technologies required to promote a particular view point are well developed.

In the last election the machinery prepared by Howard Dean (and then used by John Kerry) utilizing the internet and social software based communities were able to infiltrate and create coordinated messages on everything from hot rod web forums to hunting forums. Realizing the scopes and message directions is not a task for a small group of individuals. Mapping the social network and the ideas being promoted within social networks is not a small task and it does use many of the same social networking mapping techniques that law enforcement has adopted for gang surveillance. The same tools used by anthropologists to map familial and tribal groups in ethnographic studies.

Internal and external (to the United States) adversarial elements are no less coordinated than our own military and law enforcement agencies. To deny the cohesive coordination and technological sophistication of an adversary is a grave error. The scope and content of messages meant to derail or curtail activities (the lever of social will) are well coordinated. Internal debate of topics can be skewed quickly by the rapid movement of a message through the Internet. External sources can use our own technologies to their advantage with little to no cost or personal risk.

The castigating remarks of bloggers irregardless of truth will have traction in the minds of people willing to accept that message. A retraction by the original blogger will have little to no resultant change in message and may be rejected by the readership especially if the military link is exposed. As an example look at the comments by people who see the mere presence of the military as an incursion on freedom of speech in the article and comments section.

From reading the article it looks like the group at CENTCOM simply is looking at refutation of information and providing another view to the blogosphere. This is a Sisyphean task when you consider the number of targeted message organizations already coordinating their story placing their task in the role of stomping out hot spots while ignoring the forest fire.

[Jedburgh]

Selil, please take note of the series of "if's" in my initial response. My second response was a clarification of the nature of the efficacy if my "if's" were met.

As you state, the current CENTCOM structure is not meeting any of that - it is not monitoring - in the intelligence sense of that term - nor does its "mission" seem structured to be anything more than a PR bandaid.

However, if those who plan and decide on such things ever pull their heads out of their fourth points of contact, a small team of professionals will suffice. Once again - a trained intelligence professional, familiar with the types of 'net comms under discussion, will have no problem with effective monitoring - and that ties into the conduct of analysis in support of, and to exploit, that particular mission.

Where a larger group becomes necessary is when the mission has expanded beyond monitoring and simple collection into the construct of false identities that are actively engaged in on-line elicitation - and other activities moving towards the dark side.

[goesh]

Regarding the 'muscle' of a primary blog and its many affiliates and attachments, Obama may have a mighty machine at play but I note he has already developed some serious political baggage with his recent comments about the KIAs in Iraq. One comment in a non-blog environment, transmitted in a non-blog venue and he has taken a serious hit. MSN is already starting to spin that comment. Howard Dean's much vaunted Deaniacs seemed all the rage and an awesome force to be reckoned with until he screamed like a banshee that time in a non-blog venue and it was transmitted in non-blog venues, like the National News and Newspapers and it crippled him. John Dean's campaign just now took a technical hit via Amanda Marcotte resigning. She was the prime blog mover-n'-shaker in his cyber campaign. She got considerable flak and pressure from the people she was attacking in non-blog venues via phone calls and letters and emails. Conversely, look at the PR hit Zaqawri took when he couldn't even handle a machine gun. Rember when some video was recovered showing him fumbling around and his aides burning their hands on the barrel? All it took was a couple of people (Monitors...) who instantly capitalized on it and wham! it spread and he became the laughing stock and his image of being a Saladin was insantly crippled. You bet - his cyber followers got to see al-killer unable to even handle a simple machine gun. Everything starts small and I find it most encouraging that our military is venturing into these uncharted waters.

[sgmgrumpy]

On a little different note, but in the same field, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research is also conducting a study of blogs. It's a collection cell on steroids program in short. I think a few members here may know a little more;)

Sounds like the CENTCOM purpose is to counter disinformation. They go as far as to even "ask websites to put a link to CENTCOM?" :(

http://www.defenselink.mil/transformation/articles/2006-06/ta062906b.html


The Air Force Office of Scientific Research recently began funding a new research area that includes a study of blogs. Blog research may provide information analysts and warfighters with invaluable help in fighting the war on terrorism.

Dr. Brian E. Ulicny, senior scientist, and Dr. Mieczyslaw M. Kokar, president, Versatile Information Systems Inc., Framingham, Mass., will receive approximately $450,000 in funding for the 3-year project entitled “Automated Ontologically-Based Link Analysis of International Web Logs for the Timely Discovery of Relevant and Credible Information.”

[selil]

I've done some work with semantic ontologies (few papers, presentations, boring stuff). Basically it sounds like they're looking at a new variation of machine translation. Might be interesting to see what they come up with.

[120mm]

Regarding the 'muscle' of a primary blog and its many affiliates and attachments, Obama may have a mighty machine at play but I note he has already developed some serious political baggage with his recent comments about the KIAs in Iraq. One comment in a non-blog environment, transmitted in a non-blog venue and he has taken a serious hit. MSN is already starting to spin that comment. Howard Dean's much vaunted Deaniacs seemed all the rage and an awesome force to be reckoned with until he screamed like a banshee that time in a non-blog venue and it was transmitted in non-blog venues, like the National News and Newspapers and it crippled him. John Dean's campaign just now took a technical hit via Amanda Marcotte resigning. She was the prime blog mover-n'-shaker in his cyber campaign. She got considerable flak and pressure from the people she was attacking in non-blog venues via phone calls and letters and emails. Conversely, look at the PR hit Zaqawri took when he couldn't even handle a machine gun. Rember when some video was recovered showing him fumbling around and his aides burning their hands on the barrel? All it took was a couple of people (Monitors...) who instantly capitalized on it and wham! it spread and he became the laughing stock and his image of being a Saladin was insantly crippled. You bet - his cyber followers got to see al-killer unable to even handle a simple machine gun. Everything starts small and I find it most encouraging that our military is venturing into these uncharted waters.

It's amazing how quickly, after that video surfaced, that Zarqawi went from being Al Queda's Right hand man and the leader of the true faith to a buffoon that none of the AQ folks had ever seen before, or even heard of.

The distancing was done faster than the speed of light

[J Wolfsberger]

How will this affect us?

http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/05/army_bloggers

[Jedburgh]

Wow. The new reg is linked in the article: AR 530-1 OPSEC (http://blog.wired.com/defense/files/army_reg_530_1_updated.pdf), dated 19 April 2007

2–1. All Army personnel
Operations security is everyone’s responsibility. Failure to properly implement OPSEC measures can result in serious injury or death to our personnel, damage to weapons systems, equipment and facilities, loss of sensitive technologies and mission failure. OPSEC is a continuous process and an inherent part of military culture and as such, must be fully integrated into the execution of all Army operations and supporting activities. All Department of the Army (DA) personnel (active component, reserve component to include U.S. Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and DA civilians), and DOD contractors will—

(skip to applicable item...)

g. Consult with their immediate supervisor and their OPSEC Officer for an OPSEC review prior to publishing or posting information in a public forum.

(1) This includes, but is not limited to letters, resumes, articles for publication, electronic mail (e-mail), Web site postings, web log (blog) postings, discussion in Internet information forums, discussion in Internet message boards or other forms of dissemination or documentation.

(2) Supervisors will advise personnel to ensure that sensitive and critical information is not to be disclosed. Each unit or organization’s OPSEC Officer will advise supervisors on means to prevent the disclosure of sensitive and critical information....
and then there's:

(15) Because the Internet is a public forum, commanders will ensure that in addition to the OPSEC officer, a public affairs officer (PAO), webmaster/Web site maintainer, and other appropriate designee(s) (for example, command counsel, freedom of information act (FOIA) officer, force protection, intelligence, and so forth.) have properly cleared information posted to the World Wide Web, unclassified intranet, or Army Knowledge Online (AKO) in areas accessible to all account types. (Possible risks must be judged and weighed against potential benefits prior to posting any Army information on the World Wide Web. (See AR 25–1, para 5–10.)

(a) The designated reviewer(s) will conduct routine reviews of Web sites on a quarterly basis to ensure that each Web site is in compliance with the policies of AR 25–1 and that the content remains relevant and appropriate.

(b) The minimum review will include all of the web site management control checklist items in AR 25–1, paragraph C–4e(30) and appendix C. Information contained on publicly accessible Web sites is subject to the policies and clearance procedures prescribed in AR 360–1, chapter 5, for the release of information to the public.
This has the potential to kill everything but official forums (i.e. BCKS, MCCLL) - after a select few have been identified and made an example of to others. Hell, even posting on AKO is now under review.

[J Wolfsberger]

What's really disturbing is that they are shutting down the most effective source of supportive information. Whoever put this out isn't thinking clearly.

[SWCAdmin]

Wow indeed.

This certainly is a new monolith in the e-landscape, and a valiant attempt at getting some toothpaste back in the tube.

I would advise all Army personnel to read and heed as they see fit, within the bounds of sanity and careerism vs. standing for something. I'm not sure if the Army will see its FOUO document posted to the world as further fuel for its righteous fire, clamping down even more aggressively on those pesky information-leaking units known as soldiers and humans. Or, perhaps, it is an indicator of the juggernaut they are trying to spin on a dime, as if by throwing some sacrificial canoes in the path of the supertanker.

I have not had the chance to wade through all 79 pages of the document I'm not supposed to know about, but I hope there is more to the plan than wiping the sticky booger of enforcement and "responsibility" on the shirt of commanders who, having more important things to spend their excruciatingly limited time on but still hoping to pick up MAJ before they retire, will have to just lock up all the key boards and unceremoniously crucify a few "examples." Or perhaps that is the plan.

Here's to the digital Yingling, just waiting to step forward.

And an excerpt from our Privacy Policy (http://smallwarsjournal.com/site/privacy/):



Small Wars Journal and our discussion board, Small Wars Council, are operated by Small Wars Journal, LLC, a private company. We are not a government site. This page outlines our privacy policy and our commitment to you.
We respect your privacy. We will not willingly and knowingly release your personal information to any entity, private or governmental. We do not and will never sell or rent your personal information to third parties.

We are pseudonymous for a reason.

We also remind all that ROE #1 here is no discussion that may disadvantage lawful combatants. We will unceremoniously delete/caution/ban, don't go there. Just be smart.

We trust you. It is better than the alternative.

[Rob Thornton]

I smell apathy brewing whre there was innovation. It would be worth while to put forward a better explanation - else all we'll grow are mushrooms.

[Rob Thornton]

Now that I've had a chance to think about it - I think it brings about a good opportunity to discuss what was at the heart of LTC Yingling's argument - do we understand the fight we are in and are we adapting/innovating/organizing/promoting/assigning/equipping/educating to be successful? When you look at this it sounds allot like the 2 up 1 back, platoon in reserve, pre-planned targets MTC at the NTC / Defense from the BP of the 1990s and while that and information security of sensitive information which may cost success and lives are very important, they are not a sole substitute for developing skills and capabilities needed to prosecute this war and gain and maintain the initiative?

This sounds allot more like a Super FOB IO strategy. We'll build these walls around us and communicate only on approved internal lines of communication with internal approval of approved internal discussions so that we can ensure we are discussing approved questions with approved solutions which we will then dissiminate at approved CTC and publications. The latency will be huge! The timeliness of useful information which can be placed in the correct context so that it can be applied will be largely neutralized. But we will be safe.

OK - this may not have been the intent - but that may not matter if someone does not clarify the directive - remember perceptions are reality.

I'd argue that while the enemy is prosecuting a very effective IO campaign and use of the Internet, we are tightening the chastity belt for fear of misuse. There probably has been some screw ups - but how do you measure the subjective value vs. risk? We are a quantitative bunch at heart facing a foe who is wlling to be subjective. Are we fighting the fight we have or wishing for the one we'd like? Is developinga real information warfare capability vs a better bank vault beyond us? I know people who sit on information for total fear they will be held accountable for its release - they are largely inneffective, but they are safe. They are not concerned about the mission any where near as much as they are self preservation andwill often use it as an excuse for lethargic behavior.

While the risks must be known and mitigated / minimized, don't assume the enemy will operate under any restrictions. How much terrain does a defensive position control - only what it can see and reach - and these days that is very limitied given that the key terrain is Human.

\
Oh - did I mention AKO has retooled its email - again like so many things- form over function.

[Cori]

I've had this conversation with friends who are military before: there are security implications and security violators, I get it. Well, way to throw the baby out with the bathwater. In this war, for the first time, service members have been able to offer virtually real time critique of the press coverage of the war from the combat zone. It is impossible to measure what impact or influence that has had, but the military keeps saying it believes this is an information war, and keeps acting as if information is completely irrelevant to the conduct of the war or to the ability to sustain support for the war.

Here's the reaction from one of the best known and best supported milbloggers: (no, I still haven't figured out how to embed links successfully, you'll need to cut and paste.) http://www.blackfive.net/main/2007/05/new_opsec_regul.html

For those of you near decent university libraries, at the risk of sounding as if I'm self-promoting, there's this cite:

“Life in Wartime: Realtime War, Realtime Critique; Fighting in the New Media Environment,” in Military Culture, vol. 4 of Military Life: The Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat eds. Thomas Britt, Carl Castro, and Amy Adler (Westport, Ct: Praeger Security International, 2006):180-210

I don't know that it's that insightful, it's just the only piece I know of that's out there that traces the importance of the dern things.

I am absolutely gobsmacked that the Army would take this step. And now of all times.

[SWJED]

http://smallwarsjournal.com/images/stooges.JPG


On the Left - We Need to Start Winning this IO 'Stuff' -- On the Right - Shut Up and Toe the Line

[Rob Thornton]

Here is a more vivid description

[Maximus]

This new policy reminds me much of Soviet attempts to keep the truth from the people. It's such a shame with all the good that our Marines/Soldiers/Sailors/Airmen are doing on the ground that we're resorting to something like this. If this policy rules the day, "strategic" corporal will forever be a defensive term only. Instead of going in this direction, I'd like the policy to encourage our warriors to photograph, videotape and transmit their actions to the world on the internet. Train them, teach them about war among the people, why the people are the center of gravity, why the will of the American people is so important, why the American people need to see more than IEDs and firefights and then let them run. We can win the IO component of this fight if we train our warriors and then let them speak. As a very wise Middle East and Terrorism expert said the other day, "We'd better tell our story at the tactical, operational and strategic levels because if we don't our enemy will, and we won't like what he has to say."

[Cori]

Your use of the phrase, "let them see" is important -- this may impact blogs, but it would also impact YouTube and LiveLeak (except that it seems to me that more folks post there anonymously.) The difference is I haven't entirely decided that everything posted to those sites (at least unofficially) will, in the long run, help us in the IO battle. Clips of firefights set to pounding rock n' roll may be creative, but they aren't exactly going to win hearts and minds.

[SWJED]

How will this affect us?

http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/05/army_bloggers

We'll stay as is - should anyone want to 'swap out' their screen name let us know. Our privacy policy is written in stone and we do monitor and moderate to ensure posts do not endanger friendly operations... What in the hell is the Army thinking here?

[SWJED]

Via Google Blog Search (http://blogsearch.google.com/blogsearch?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&tab=wb&q=army+regulations+blogs)...

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Cori


The difference is I haven't entirely decided that everything posted to those sites (at least unofficially) will, in the long run, help us in the IO battle. Clips of firefights set to pounding rock n' roll may be creative, but they aren't exactly going to win hearts and minds.

I think there are at least 3 audiences we have to influence. Enemies, Neutrals and Allies. The effects we want to have on each probably vary depending how we are trying to influence them - ex. "are we trying to deter, repudiate, convince etc?

Since sustaining your own public will is so important, an IO theme (and products) that resonate with them may be an important component of an IO campaign - particualrly when enemies or opponents may be trying to convince the public otherwise. I think as in marketing, you have to know your audience, and what you are trying to convince them to buy.

This is where our bloggers could be highlighted and profiled so they get
location, location, location. Instead we grow sea monkeys - which come off as fake and contrived. This was a problem with CF IO aimed at Iraqis - Products produced by Americans and translated into Arabic don't look, sound or resonate like a product produced by an Iraqi for an Iraqi - what you wind up with the former is a Mentos Advertisement aimed at Americans vs. the Latter which could be compared with a Budweiser ad aired during the game. You could also compare the very successful USMC recruiting ads to the Army's - the former targetded their audience, the latter wound up confused with an Army of One.

In the end it won't matter if all we do say is "Katie bar the door!"

[marct]

Check out the Army's own 1st Information Operations Command posted a briefing on "OPSEC in the Blogosphere," marked For Official Use Only:
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/opsec-blog.pdf


I certainly had no problems accessing it.


Marc
(http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/opsec-blog.pdf)

[selil]

From Secrecy News



"All Department of the Army personnel and DoD contractors
will... consider handling attempts by unauthorized personnel
to solicit critical information or sensitive information as a
Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army
(SAEDA) incident," the regulation states (at section 2-1).

"Sensitive" information is defined here (at section
1-5(c)(3)(e)) to include not just vital details of military
operations and technologies but also documents marked "For
Official Use Only" (FOUO) that may be exempt from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act.

It follows that inquisitive members of the press or the public
who actively pursue such FOUO records may be deemed enemies
of the United States.


Anybody in the army want to tell me what's in their mess kit so I can get named a subversive enemy of America? I can't think of anything more sensitive as a subject than dinner. ROTFLMAO

[marct]

This is nuts! I *hope* that it is a knee-jerk reaction from some careerist dinosaur with delusions of living in a Stalinist state rather than something that has been "studied". Has anyone considered the effects that this will have on recruitment and on younger personelle in addition to its effects on the overall war?

You know, this is sounding a lot like a military version of the Democrat line - "The IO war is lost, so we will just tell everyone to shut up". Oh yes, at the same time, why don't we call everyone who is trying to find out what is going on a "traitor". Does this include members of Congress going on fact finding trips? Does this include journalists? Does this include researchers?

Sorry, I'm fuming over the idiocy entailed in this little piece of Sierra!:mad:

Marc

[slapout9]

As bubba would say that new policy "Is lower than a snakes belly in a wagon rut":(

[Jimbo]

Well,

I will counter the let them blog line of IO with one incident:

ABU GHRAIB

Those pictures hitting the internet were probably the biggest IO defeat we have suffered in Iraq. I am fan of letting soldiers blog, but I will caution that these rules are to mitigate the lowest common denominator. We have all seen service members who are total jackasses, and the will publicly be those jackasses to the widest possible audience. Does anybody remember the goirls of OIF/OEF on "Nowthats####edup.com"?

[selil]

The policy ignores the realities of information and the communication models of people. Maybe the Army is only going to recruit in Appalachia or the Okanogon from now on?

[RTK]

Anyone read it enough to let me know if we're violating any policy? Perhaps this is the juncture where "once-promising-career" turns into "Wal-Mart-Greeter."

"And here's your sticker." :)

[DrSergeant]

Speaking as one who was there when the Abu Ghraib events came to light, I can say that the pictures themselves were not the IO failure. The Iraqis on the streets already knew there were some horrible things going on. In fact, they knew about them, and had seen the pictures well before the soldiers on the street knew. The IO failure was that the Army was NOT open about it, but tried to cover it up. When the Army finally told us we could admit that the events had occurred in the first place, it was received somewhat well, but it would have been received better had we been informed in the first place rather than receiving the Army official line at the time, which was basically "nothing is happening." As every politician knows, it's not the deed that gets you in trouble, it's the cover-up. And this new policy smacks of even more cover-up, not only to the outside world, but to the American people.

I hope this doesn't violate the new policy...

[Rob Thornton]

Its why I love Google

[Merv Benson]

I am curious as to what blog post prompted this reaction. If it was not a dozy then this reaction measure is certainly pretty dizzy to us uninformed who want to support the war effort.

On its face this appears to be a unilateral surrender in the media battle space where our enemy has been kicking our butt for some time. What seems inarguable at this point is the authors of this order have not explained themselves and until they do the lack of apparent wisdom of this idea will be all that is seen.

[Cori]

I don't think it was any one post or event. They do have the Internet even in Appalachia, you know, so even the newest Private comes in completely comfortable with the digital world. That isn't always true of those of us who are, er, older. But you can't unring this bell, all you can do is react to the general information environment by lashing out at the particular manifestations -- like blogs -- you feel you can best control (or control at all). Of course, the pictures from abu Ghraib intially leaked b/c, being digital, they could be emailed -- things this new policy wouldn't have stopped. (Well, they might have made the behavior a violation, but would troops doing that have cared about violating this policy?)

Of course it's correct that while abu Ghraib was an IO disaster, the military's (really OSD's) handling of it made it worse, by giving it legs. Had they released every single picture as soon as the first ones came out, it would have gone much better IMHO.

That said, there have been rumours this was coming, or preemptive versions of this policy, several times before. Which suggests it was not a single post that led to this, but a growing discomfort with the rapid growth of the milblog phenomenon.

You can find links to many of them here:

http://mudvillegazette.com/

[zenpundit]

I have to say, even from my civilian perspective, the genius behind this new regulation is one sorry,out of touch, a-hole.

The primary effect of this idiocy will be to corrupt our own feedback loops by suppressing *truthful* information from guys observing conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan or the Horn of Africa. The sorts of CYA things the brass in any war likes to keep from their superiors, the Congress, the media and the folks back home ( I note the American media is on a PPT diagram with drug kingpins, al Qaida and Warlords - that juxtaposition pretty much says it all in terms of the reigning Army IO philosophy). It is my expectation that such an effect was the primary purpose behind these regs as the international Islamist movement is not going to be inconvenienced in the slightest.

The proper move would have been OPSEC education - milbloggers aren't stupid. Hermetically sealing the military off from the world ( which won't succeed anyway) is the sign of siege mentality in the officer corps and a harbinger of decline.

My two cents

[marct]

Hi Folks,


I have to say, even from my civilian perspective, the genius behind this new regulation is one sorry,out of touch, a-hole.

I suspect he is fully "in touch" with himself - or, possibly, just touching himself.


The primary effect of this idiocy will be to corrupt our own feedback loops by suppressing *truthful* information from guys observing conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan or the Horn of Africa.

Agreed, as a primary effect. I would add in that this type of CS policy will also decrease retention rates, increase the civilian perception that the military is "hiding" things, and be an absolute gold mine for irhabi IO. I also have a strong suspicion that this will cause irreparable damage, if it is implemented, on non-US audiences.


The sorts of CYA things the brass in any war likes to keep from their superiors, the Congress, the media and the folks back home ( I note the American media is on a PPT diagram with drug kingpins, al Qaida and Warlords - that juxtaposition pretty much says it all in terms of the reigning Army IO philosophy). It is my expectation that such an effect was the primary purpose behind these regs as the international Islamist movement is not going to be inconvenienced in the slightest.

Again, I would agree - I suspect that the irhabi are sitting around with huge grins on their faces right now wondering what new piece of blithering idiocy their unwitting allies in the army will come up with. BTW, I';m sticking with my earlier use of the adjective "Stalinist" - this is reminiscent of Lenin's idea of political police stationed inside the military to adjudicate ideological purity.


The proper move would have been OPSEC education - milbloggers aren't stupid. Hermetically sealing the military off from the world ( which won't succeed anyway) is the sign of siege mentality in the officer corps and a harbinger of decline.

"Siege mentality"? Hmmm, maybe, but it could also be a reaction in the form of "do something, do anything".

There is an interesting little hole in their opsec-blog document that I am certain the ACLU will take up. On slide #15, it states:

As an active-duty service member, you have free speech
rights, but these rights are limited. Here are some basic
guidelines to what you can and can’t say and do as a
member of the military. You have the right to …
• Read anything you want
• Write letters to newspapers
• Publish your own newspaper, as long as you don’t
use military supplies or equipment to do so
Am I right in believing that there are "journalists" who are deemed as such by virtue of their blogs and/or web sites? If so, then wouldn't a blog be considered a "newspaper"?

Marc

[slapout9]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-np4Ke4o94E

[zenpundit]

Hi Dr. Marc


"I suspect he is fully "in touch" with himself - or, possibly, just touching himself."
Heh - unfortunately it's the grunts that he's jerking around.


"Am I right in believing that there are "journalists" who are deemed as such by virtue of their blogs and/or web sites? If so, then wouldn't a blog be considered a "newspaper"?"

I believe that is a question before the courts right now. It's hard to legally square the idea that corporations that sell information to make a profit somehow have greater or more first amendment rights than actual, breathing, citizens who intend to express political opinions.

[Merv Benson]

This is buried in a Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/02/AR2007050202253.html?hpid=topnews) story on milbloggers.


...

... Army OPSEC Program Manager Maj. Ray Ceralde, who helped author the revision, said bloggers shouldn't be concerned.

According to Ceralde, the new regulation does not require bloggers to have each post approved by officers, but rather instructs bloggers to alert commanders and OPSEC officers when they initially create a blog. This is similar to the policy already put in place in Iraq, he said. "Soldiers have the right to express themselves as long as they don't reveal information that will subject their unit or personnel to harm," Ceralde said.

...

This is just a small part of a very long article and there still appears to be a great deal of uncertainty caused by the new reg. If Maj. Ceralde is right then the regulation as written is not a model of clarity based on all the educated people who thought it was a big change.

[Dr Jack]

A closer review of the new regulation:


1–5. Definitions
c. Sensitive information.
(1) Sensitive information (formerly known as sensitive but unclassified (SBU) information) is information requiring special protection from disclosure that could cause compromise or threat to our national security, an Army organization, activity, family member, Department of the Army (DA) civilian, or DOD contractor.
----
(3) Examples of sensitive information include, but are not limited to:
----
(e) Unclassified information designated For Official Use Only (FOUO) … Examples include but are not limited to: force protection, movement and readiness data, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), proprietary information and information protected by copyright, pre-decisional documents, draft publications, and information concerning security systems.

As I read this, just about everything that relates to the military can fit in the category of FOUO in this definition -- particularly when it includes the key phrase tactics, techniques, and procedures. In my view, this includes doctrine, lessons learned, and any discussion of current operations.


2–1. All Army personnel
Operations security is everyone’s responsibility. Failure to properly implement OPSEC measures can result in serious injury or death to our personnel, damage to weapons systems, equipment and facilities, loss of sensitive technologies and mission failure. OPSEC is a continuous process and an inherent part of military culture and as such, must be fully integrated into the execution of all Army operations and supporting activities. All Department of the Army (DA) personnel (active component, reserve component to include U.S. Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and DA civilians), and DOD contractors will—
----
b. Protect from disclosure any critical information and sensitive information to which they have personal access.
----
c. Prevent disclosure of critical and sensitive information in any public domain to include but not limited to the World Wide Web, open source publications, and the media.
----
g. Consult with their immediate supervisor and their OPSEC Officer for an OPSEC review prior to publishing or posting information in a public forum.
(1) This includes, but is not limited to letters, resumes, articles for publication, electronic mail (e-mail), Web site postings, web log (blog) postings, discussion in Internet information forums, discussion in Internet message boards or other forms of dissemination or documentation.
(2) Supervisors will advise personnel to ensure that sensitive and critical information is not to be disclosed. Each unit or organization’s OPSEC Officer will advise supervisors on means to prevent the disclosure of sensitive and critical information.

This part of the regulation states that Army personnel (all categories) may not disclose any sensitive data (including the broad definition of FOUO above) in -- letters, resumes, articles for publication, blogs, etc...

The policy is written so broadly that I don't know how anyone in the Army can participate in this forum... or write home... or write for publication. Just about everything I do and write about is included in this regulation.

I don't know how Military Review, Parameters, Armed Forces Journal, or any other publication that is available on the web (or in libraries) will be able to exist under these rules -- unless all of the authors will be those who are completely out of the system.

I'm grateful that LTC Yingling got his article out before this regulation hit the streets...

[Cori]

You cannot imagine the difficulties surrounding that issue as it concerns civilian bloggers, before you even get into the distinctions between military and civilian law. I don't myself buy into the argument that bloggers are de facto journalists, although it is possible that on occasion they may be performing or engaging in a process that is akin to journalism. This has primarily come up as concerns shield laws (do bloggers have the same protections afforded journalists -- to the extent they have them -- when it comes to the right to not reveal sources or give up documents, video tape, etc. to govt. officials.) Here's the problem with that one: if everyone is a potential "journalist," then how does a society enforce some kind of norm that says everyone has an obligation to testify when called upon to do so?

Well, if military members are journalists, what does that do to their obligations to not publish information, footage, photographs, etc? Wouldn't their first amendment protections trump any other obligations?

Don't think so.

Bloggers, it seems to me, are press critics involved in a larger community conversation.

For all sorts of reasons, the larger military benefited from having its members' voices being heard, even when those voices were critical, in part because those voices were sometimes critical, because it was precisely the fact that those voices were sometimes critical that gave them credibility.

[Cori]

One of the best known "portal" bloggers makes an interesting point -- since this is only an Army reg, other services' milbloggers will continue uninterrupted. If the Marines end up getting more attn for what their troops are doing in the combat zones, again?

http://instapundit.com/archives2/004774.php

[Jimbo]

I know where I am working right now, we have had some huge secuirty problems, at levels above FOUO. so realistically, I can't see every blogger getting fired, but who knows. We have had some big OPSEC issues come to light. Hell, go to the warden thread.

[Ender]

I just caught wind of this thread and must admit I am shocked... I want to read the whole thing and check out all of the links before I say anything more but this is the exact opposite of what I would have expected.

Can someone from USMC higher please smooth my ruffled feathers and assure me we aren't going to see a parallel response from the Corps? This kind of crap is an initiative KILLER.

[selil]

Can someone from USMC higher please smooth my ruffled feathers and assure me we aren't going to see a parallel response from the Corps? This kind of crap is an initiative KILLER.


Initiative? Who issued you that?

[Cori]

With respect, the Warden didn't get into the deserved troublehe's in for blogging.

I don't think anyone's suggesting OPSEC not be taken seriously, only that there had to be a less drastic measure available. Allowing all the bloggers free rain carries the risk that someone will make a mistake or do something stupid, but shutting them all down is not cost free either.

Here's a question -- while I understand there are reasons why the military might not want to advertise particular cases, you'd think we'd of heard at least one story explaining this decision.

So -- who's heard at least the bare bones of a story explaining what someone did to get everyone shut down?

[Rob Thornton]

From Zen Pundit:


It is my expectation that such an effect was the primary purpose behind these regs as the international Islamist movement is not going to be inconvenienced in the slightest.

I think this is a large part of our problem - while the enemy is focused on offensive Info Warfare we are focused on more body armor & damage control . While the enemy is focused on finding ways to connect, share, grown, & leverage in its use of communications- we seem to be investing time and energy in truncation, stove piping and compartmentalization.


Hermetically sealing the military off from the world ( which won't succeed anyway) is the sign of siege mentality in the officer corps and a harbinger of decline.

I'm reading "The Starfish & the Spider" - while I recognize we must have some degree of centralized struture, the decentralized nature of our enemy requires we adapt certain levels of decentralization (arguably beyond what is currently doctrinally acceptable) to compete & win. This not only applies to IO but operations in general.

Zen Pundit had also mention OPSEC education, how about one step further and make an IO course available online that discusses how the enemy uses IO and how Soldier bloggers can combat it by reporting, blogging, etc.? I think if we were to empower and encourage we could leverage service members who want to be part of the solution. No, your not going to be able to micro-manage - just issue some guidance - "What not How" and accept that it will be executed in a decentralized manner. Get the word out through the chain of command about an awesome opportunity and start issuing some rewards for effective IO operations by individuals - could be recognition (AAMs, ARCOMs - depends on the effect believed to have on a target audience) - could be monetary. This way you get a three-fer - you get reporting, you get self-policing and you get massive IO by talented individuals relatively cheap that adpats faster then the enemy.

[milesce]

From Zen Pundit:
Get the word out through the chain of command about an awesome opportunity and start issuing some rewards for effective IO operations by individuals - could be recognition (AAMs, ARCOMs - depends on the effect believed to have on a target audience) - could be monetary. This way you get a three-fer - you get reporting, you get self-policing and you get massive IO by talented individuals relatively cheap that adpats faster then the enemy.

Nice idea. I spend a lot of time reading milbloggers on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with a lot of Iraqi bloggers. It's astonishing sometimes how different the picture is between the folks on the ground and the reporters sitting in the Green Zone.

It'll be a huge loss in the political battle back home if the milbloggers are shut down, given how shaky public support for continuing the venture in Iraq is already. Those guys (and gals) are the best PR the military has ever seen, partly because its much more trusted than anything that comes from a news release. Even reading the really critical ones, I come away with a feeling of confidence that the troops on the ground are doing everything they can to make it a success in Iraq. The credibility level for that is far higher than any political pronouncements I've seen from behind a podium in DC.

[John T. Fishel]

When I was a young officer woking Army current intel, nothing would anger me more that the tendency to overclassify. Things that should never have been classified were, and those that should have been were classified often at levels higher than necessary or desireable. There was also the pernicious tendency (see current rules) to try to use FOUO - an administrative protection designed to protect privacy or FBIS violation of copyright laws :confused: - as a cheap substitute for proper classification. As Dr. Jack's post shows, this is still the case since some of the examples of FOUO he lists fall under the formal definitions of CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and TOP SECRET.
Then there is the ludicrous briefing posted by Marc - FOUO for no good reason other than it is embarrasssing ... often another improper reason for classification - that he, an obvious foreign security risk from that oh so foreign country (is it our ally?) Canada, found openly published on the web in violation of its stupid administrative protection.
Note that classification and administrative protections derive from Presidential Executive Orders and are not (unless things have changed more than I am aware) matters of legislation but only of regulation. Indeed, there is only classified material and unclassified for national security purposes. Sensitive (formerly SBU) is another attempt to get around the rules for clasification. Nevertheless, Article I, Sec 8 of the US Constitution vests Congress with the regulation of the land and naval forces of the US. This seems to me to be one of those moments when we, as individuals who range from liberal to conservative, can call on our elected representatives to do their duty and change, by legislation or its threat, a totally idiotic regulation. Ike Skelton and Carl Levin and our individual Reps and Senators would love to hear from us. I will be writing my Rep, Tom Cole (on the Armed Services Committee) along with his sole Democratic colleague from Oklahoma, Dan Boren (also a committee member).

[marct]

Zen Pundit had also mention OPSEC education, how about one step further and make an IO course available online that discusses how the enemy uses IO and how Soldier bloggers can combat it by reporting, blogging, etc.? ... This way you get a three-fer - you get reporting, you get self-policing and you get massive IO by talented individuals relatively cheap that adpats faster then the enemy.


It'll be a huge loss in the political battle back home if the milbloggers are shut down, given how shaky public support for continuing the venture in Iraq is already. Those guys (and gals) are the best PR the military has ever seen, partly because its much more trusted than anything that comes from a news release. Even reading the really critical ones, I come away with a feeling of confidence that the troops on the ground are doing everything they can to make it a success in Iraq. The credibility level for that is far higher than any political pronouncements I've seen from behind a podium in DC.

That's a really good point, Miles. Credibility is a crucial element and, to be honest, I have a feeling that most politicians have a pretty low credibility when it comes to the war.

I have been trying to figure out why I reacted so strongly to this reg since I'm not really affected by it per se (except as a researcher). My tentative conclusion is that it stems, in part, from being a Canadian. On the whole, while we do tend to get on well with the US, we also tend not to trust the US government that much. Or, to be more accurate, we trust them to be rather short-sighted and throw their weight around while disregarding their own political and philosophical rhetoric in favour of short term political gains. At the same time, we also have an immense reserve of trust in the American people to act as a rein on their government, and freedom of speech, usually via the press but more recently via blogs, boards, etc., is at the core of this.

I have often felt, although I have little concrete proof, that this dichotomous image of the US is one of the crucial components of the "love-hate" relationship many non-Americans feel towards the US. I feel that this reg, if taken to the extremes that are certainly potential within it, will have a very damaging effect on international perceptions.

As John rightly notes

Then there is the ludicrous briefing posted by Marc - FOUO for no good reason other than it is embarrasssing ... often another improper reason for classification - that he, an obvious foreign security risk from that oh so foreign country (is it our ally?) Canada, found openly published on the web in violation of its stupid administrative protection.
If we - aka "obvious foreign security risk[s] from that oh so foreign country (is it our ally?) Canada," - can find and talk about the silliness of this type of "briefing" (:rolleyes:), we can a) help to counter it thereby trying to strengthen US endevours and b) laugh it off as the obvious work of some bureaucratic REMF. If we can't find it, then we will start to wonder. Personally, I think that the fact that it was available so quickly was a good sign; a sign that the American people think that this is bunk.

Marc

[VinceC]

I will counter the let them blog line of IO with one incident:

ABU GHRAIB

Those pictures hitting the internet were probably the biggest IO defeat we have suffered in Iraq.

My recollection is that the Abu Ghraib photographs were leaked to the public by a whistleblower who contacted news organizations. That is somewhat different than posting battlefield gore-porn on blog boards.


The Army regulation strikes me as an unenforceable morale-buster and out of touch with today's information realities. Well-intended people will be reluctant to even email home, while those who disregard or flout regulations will continue to post anonymously and recklessly. All this will be against a background of uncertainty and paranoia at the MWR computer tents.

[sgmgrumpy]

STORYhttp://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-05-02-internet-extremists-report_N.htm




WASHINGTON — Government and community leaders aren't doing enough to counter multimedia-savvy terrorists from using flashy websites, provocative video games, hip-hop music and gruesome images of bloodied Muslim children to recruit young people online, according to a new report that says the Internet may be extremists' most powerful frontier.

"There's only one side on the battlefield, and it isn't us," says Frank Cilluffo, director of George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute, who will testify on the institute's Internet-Facilitated Radicalization report in the Senate today. "We've created this global village — the Internet — without a police department."


"The Internet is a weapon in the hands of our extremist enemies," says Sen. Joe Lieberman, I-Conn., chairman of the Senate Homeland Security Committee, which investigates ways to combat radicalization at prisons, universities and on the Internet.

Among Web-based tactics terrorists use, according to the report:

•Hacking into legitimate websites and posting training manuals deep in subdirectories where no one is likely to notice them.

•Developing video games that spread "a simple but seemingly compelling message: Islam is under attack and young Muslims have a personal duty to fight."

•Using hip-hop and rap musicians "whose catchy, melodic messages contain calls to violence."

The content is typically developed abroad, but it is being placed on U.S. servers and is targeting domestic audiences, Cilluffo says.


Terrorist tactics on the Internet:

•Downloadable video games, such as Quest for Bush, in which players can advance to levels called "Jihad Growing Up" and "Americans' Hell."

•YouTube and MySpace videos, such as underground rapper "Sheikh Terra" singing with a gun in one hand and a Quran in the other, set against images of Iraqis being killed by U.S. troops.

•Graphic images on websites that show injured Muslim women and children, depicted as victims of Western attacks.

[marct]

From the same story...


Homeland Security Department spokesman Russ Knocke says officials are working with intelligence officers, Muslim leaders and police to address the problem. But "it is something that is going to require the vigiliance of local authorities," he says. "They are going to be more likely than the federal government to detect the preliminary signs of radicalization."

For now, the report says, "a nation that gave rise to Silicon Valley, Hollywood and Madison Avenue (has been) outplayed in the realm of ideas, effectively communicated in the new media."

I would argue that the reason why the US/West is getting hammered is contained in the first paragraph - a reliance on "Big Brother" to "solve" the problem. Cyberspace combat is based around "militias" and "hunter-killer teams (aka hackers)", not around Industrial Age conventional armies. Something that many Industrial Age mentalities just don't understand is that the Internet empowers individuals and networks, not organizations.



Marc

[sgmgrumpy]

Among Web-based tactics terrorists use, according to the report:

•Using hip-hop and rap musicians "whose catchy, melodic messages contain calls to violence."

We cannot even control this problem in our western culture so what makes them different? Alot of the rappers referencing killing cops come to mind. I blame the contract holders since they are the ones who controls what song/s gets published or produced? THE RECORD LABELS. It's all about money, nothing else. :rolleyes: For a wakeup call, lets play a few dozen of them at 6:00PM on major NBC/CBS/ABC for 1 hour and let the people decide:D

[ilots]

Here is a copy of the report in question:

http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/reports/NETworked%20Radicalization_A%20Counter%20Strategy. pdf

[Rob Thornton]

Marc,

Something that many Industrial Age mentalities just don't understand is that the Internet empowers individuals and networks, not organizations.

Your quote squarely frames how we place ourselves at a disadvantage. The networked individual has the agility and initiative - he is a "cyber - Geronimo" to steal some from The Starfish and the Spider

[wm]

So -- who's heard at least the bare bones of a story explaining what someone did to get everyone shut down?
You probably need to be aware that the previous Army Chief was raised as a Spec Ops guy and, as a result, was extremely operations security conscious. He probably also motivated the Vice Chief (unless the Vice was already of a similar mind set, which would not surprise me) to take a similar position. I know that security issues related to eelctronic files, computers, email and the internet has been a big issue to Army leadership since at least late 2003. Based on the new policy and other security regulations), however, I am not at liberty to discuss details in this medium, especially without verifying everyone's need to know.:wry:

[SWJED]

Wired's Danger Zone blog - Strategic Minds Debate Milblog Crackdown (http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/05/strategic_minds.html).


There are a whole bunch of interesting discussions about the Army's crackdown on blogs. But the strategic minds at the Small Wars Council have the deepest discussion of the lot...

[Tom Odom]

Oh man I got blocked from seeing it as it is a "blog"

That says it all

Tom

[wm]

Let's look at this as a great opportunity for liberals and conservatives to find some common ground from which to work.:D

To paraphrase the opponents of gun control:

"When blogs are made criminal, only criminals will have blogs."

[Merv Benson]

Reading this discussion today reminded me that my cousin who works in an administrative capacity for the National Guard in another state is not allowed to access any blog from his computer at work. That has been the case for much longer than this new reg.

[dusty]

Oh man I got blocked from seeing it as it is a "blog"

That says it all

Tom

Hmm. I'm on a Army dot mil network and haven't received any blocks on viewing any of the sites listed so far.

[Jimbo]

Well,

It all depends how much enthusiam your DOIM folks have for their job. I actually read this as more of a getting people off of the internet during the duty day. I remember when I was a battalion S-3 air some of the guys spent the enitre duty day daytrading online. Who knows.

[sullygoarmy]

E-mailed a buddy of mine in Iraq and as of now, this hasn't had any impact on computer usage or personal e-mails. We'll have to wait and see.

In Germany, there were a ton of websites restricted during the duty day, everything from sports, to personal e-mail to the usual blocked sites. You could access these semi-blocked sites after the duty day or during lunch, but not during duty hours. Of course in Iraq/Afghanistan, its always a duty day so I'm not sure how that approach would work there.

[Tom Odom]

Hmm. I'm on a Army dot mil network and haven't received any blocks on viewing any of the sites listed so far.

So am I

Depends on where

[marct]

Jimbo, Sully,


I actually read this as more of a getting people off of the internet during the duty day.


In Germany, there were a ton of websites restricted during the duty day, everything from sports, to personal e-mail to the usual blocked sites. You could access these semi-blocked sites after the duty day or during lunch, but not during duty hours. Of course in Iraq/Afghanistan, its always a duty day so I'm not sure how that approach would work there.

Surely there are better means of achieving the goal of people not going to non-duty related web sites? Wouldn't it be better to just treat people like adults, rather than naughty children, and just hold them responsible for what they do rather than telling them what they may do and having everything else cleared by others? This theme of infantalization of military personnel has come up before, and I suspect it is applicable here as well.

Marc

[sullygoarmy]

Ahhh Marc, you hit the nail on the head. Treating people like adults. The problem is, often you have those few who act like morons, hit the porn sites or e-mail home information they shouldn't. The typical military reaction is to overreact, ban all internet and have a formation! If only we could act like adults and treat our soldiers like adults. I guess my advice would to remember that the only difference between the Army and the Boy Scouts is we have automatic weapons.:D

[marct]

Ahhh Marc, you hit the nail on the head. Treating people like adults. The problem is, often you have those few who act like morons, hit the porn sites or e-mail home information they shouldn't. The typical military reaction is to overreact, ban all internet and have a formation! If only we could act like adults and treat our soldiers like adults. I guess my advice would to remember that the only difference between the Army and the Boy Scouts is we have automatic weapons.:D

Not the spiffy uniforms :eek:?????

Honestly, it just makes a lot more sense to me to come down like a ton of bricks on some twit accessing porn than it does on the 99.99999% of folks who don't misuse the 'net. Even what constitutes "misuse" changes by functional area and individual situation (ask 120mm about that one!).

The biggest danger with Industrial Age organizations is that they historically set themselves up as the font of all knowledge and wisdom. Basically, they operate on a social contract of "be loyal to the organization and you will get security", and part of that loyalty involves giving large amounts of control over your life to the organization. What started the perception shift towards a more Information Age mindset was the failure of that social contract back in the late '60's early '70's. Nowadays, the "social" contract is more along the lines of "be loyal to your personal network and don't trust any organization - they are all liars even when hey try not to be".

Marc

[carl]

But not from the standpoint of someone who wants to win the war.

It makes perfect sense from the standpoint of a mid to upper mid-level bureaucrat in the State or Defense Dept., somebody who is going to survive the upcoming change in administrations. This somebody has made the judgement that the change in administration will result in a precipitate bug out of Iraq that will not reflect honorably (to put it mildly) upon the US.

By shutting down the soldier bloggers, they prevent the most credible and direct observers of the disaster to come from reporting what they see as they see it. This reduces embarrassment to the bureaucrats and the politicos they serve.

There won't be enough mainstream media on the spot to make any difference and nobody in the US pays attention to Al-Jazeera. So figure the whole thing as an exercise in damage control before the fact.

I firmly believe this is true and it greatly saddens me.

[selil]

Information operations whether the task be military or civilian hinges on the willingness of the participants and the acquisition of intelligence. In the process of recruiting willing participants an adversary in years gone by would actively seek the physical resting spot of soldiers and marines to listen to table talk. Finding family members suddenly on a picnic or tearfully saying good bye on the ship wharf was a sure sign of imminent deployment. In the past a spy could watch deployment patterns and discern the likelihood of a ship or MEU showing up onsite within a few days. This type of spying for first world countries became less important as satellites became more easily available, but the pattern of world conflict switched from first and second world countries to third world countries and regional based conflicts. Enter the necessity of the spy and information gathering arm for countries without sophisticated satellites and the blind eyes of information containment teams to that threat.

There is a direct and substantial relationship between cyber-warfare and information operations. In a world of instantaneous digital transmission the information operations arm moves from classifying data and providing analysis to acquisition and recruitment of human operational resources. The information operations arm of the military becomes metaphorically the long range reconnaissance and patrol arm of cyber-conflict and integral to the entirety of security. This role is not completely understood as the on the one hand those involved in information operations are busy in an acquisition mode they are also charged with guarding the garrison. This is a conflict in roles and strategy. The tools of the patrol do not meet the needed tools of the garrison.

Conflict is sure to erupt as those using normal tools of the technology culture to accomplish enculturated communication expectations are stopped. One the one hand you have a culture who is technologically sophisticated and has used technology as a primary weapon of restricted warfare. On the other hand you have a highly adaptable adversary who is willing to use the infrastructure of their enemy against them and loath to build that infrastructure. A sincere and well-trained guerrilla force with information operations skill and technical sophistication in non-state warfare has no need of building a vast array of technical tools they will literally use their enemy’s resources. Into this battle space the technology society wades with email, blogs, web-pages, satellite phones, digital cable channels, and iPods.

The fact a society knows how to use technology does not mean they are sophisticated in the building blocks of that technology. Few people could create a watch based simply on their use of that technology. Similarly in information operations few if any people will truly understand the capacity and realistic risks of information operations based on their use of email and the Internet. Principles such as meta-data are lost on the normal user of technology. For example something as simple as a picture carries with it a substantial amount of meta data besides the content of the picture. Embedded within the picture can be the camera make, model, type, software revision of the operating system, the user name, the type of computer used to connect to the camera, the date of the picture, the date of any manipulations of the picture, and even in some geographic coordinates. From one simple picture a lot of deeper information elements can be found.


In the past the commander within a battle space could count on soldiers letters home providing time displacement from when operation would occur. Should a censor not find a risky piece of information the commander could count on mail embargo's to keep possible data out of unfriendly hands for some period of time. Within the cyber-society that time displacement can and likely does vanish. How many soldiers sitting in computer tents (imagine that concept during world war 2!) have cut a conversation short because they had to go to briefing or out on patrol? What phrases did the participants use to end the conversation? Into this tiny void of feeling of loss and home front a wedge of information leakage erupts. While nobody is the wiser and none are of evil intent the simple acts can create issues. More on this in a moment.

A commander in the field could also count on geographic displacement as a method of insuring that his soldiers could not leak information willingly or even without malice. A hundred miles of desolate lifeless land is a good deterrent to soldiers carousing with locals. The technology society community no longer reflects borders or geographic displacement. A simple post to a blog or webpage stating a simple item is in fact information leakage by the soldier. Simplistic adjustments in tone, opinion, word choice, and time of posting are in fact information leakage. The search function allows for statistical analysis of the habits and opinions of a battle field asset. An active blogger intending to abide by stringent controls on content will leak through their posting habits their current state of mind, feelings about home (and associate operational tempo), opinions on operations, success and failure, and morale. To a world wide audience.
Human capital in this case is simply a matter of understanding the medium and analyzing the resultant information flows.

Operational security and planning jeopardizes the freedom of soldiers and the associated family relations. Soldiers have abided by email embargo and telephone embargo in the past as an understood response to operational security. In an environment where the tempo of conflict increases and wanes in a cycle counted over years and resolution is not likely possible in any near time the soldier will endeavor to maintain those associated ties to family and home with the tools they understand. The boon to enemy operational and information strategists is the rapid availability of information on operational strategy posted not by the soldiers but by the loved ones of those soldiers.

As I’ve been alluding to and as promised lets talk about information leakage. The principles of information leakage are not fully understood outside of a very small circle of information operations specialists. The principles of analysis and k-anonymity are fairly straightforward. With k-anonymity we can look at data that has been scrubbed to protect individuals rights to privacy and then use secondary and tertiary sources of data that have also been scrubbed of identifying information to build the identity of an individual. This same analysis technique can be used within information operations to build dossier data on military members and their familial relationships. Since there is also leakage of data on marriages, children, previous employers, and more a fundamental picture of each military member can be built. Specific unit members can be targeted based on their location and simple analysis used to find more information. In many cases members have posted full résumé’s when looking for jobs that are easily found using free or inexpensive account data. They do this because they are looking for jobs when they return of were looking for jobs when they were activated from the reserves. Normal behavior causes substantial leakage of personal information. In the commercial world we have seen similar disclosures like the Choice Point exposure done for criminal purposes using fully legal means.

An active blogger or poster may not realize just how much information they leak simply by visiting a website. The location of the connection, the operating system of the machine, the browser, the IP, the visited pages history, and so much more is available. Back track attacks are when the URL is stored in the history and poorly designed websites cache the authentication mechanism in the URL address. A dedicated adversary can look for that and use it as a method to access associated pages a user has been visiting or even the account of the user on other web pages.

The furor of military bloggers has me of two minds. I like to know what I can do to help the current members of the military and ease the hardships of service. At the same time I understand the risks and attempt to balance the fear, uncertainty and doubt with a skepticism. The mental gymnastics of ethnocentrism required to pander mental pudding portraying adversaries as cognitive midgets with luddite tendencies is a common failing. The adversaries are well trained likely in United States universities and higher-level technology curriculum's with all of the associated understanding of the technology and the politics. To ignore the aspects of guerrilla warfare where the enemy uses your own technology and resources against you in a war where information is the only force multiplier is to fail.



http://www.danasoft.com/vipersig.jpg

[Rob Thornton]

Sam,
Thanks for managing to provide some education on the risks in a manner that was both sufficiently informative yet staying in the realm of common tongue.:D
I think this is the kind of education we should be providing - although where (in terms of a service members timeline is a tough call) - maybe, through a portal - you want ISP access while deployed, you take the class - yes there are Information Assurance and OPSEC classes, but they focus on do's and dont's vs why's and how's. It might not even be a bad idea to offer up some further classes on how the enemy is using IO and how we can too - It is often useful to visit the enemy's sites - it provided me allot of insight into how they operate, how they see themselves etc - think of it as a recon.

It is a balancing act, but it is not going to get better solely by establishing barriers and penalties - there has to be some recognition of where the WWW /Info-spere fits.

[Ender]

http://www.politico.com/multimedia/?pageref=Photo_Video-516617

This could probably fit in other threads as well but this one seems to be hot and this is relevant. I was particularly intrigued by the "dead drops" and am confounded as to how one would combat something like that...

The point at the end about the criminality of us being beat at this game is salient as well.

[Uboat509]

This reminds me very much of gun legislation. It will do very little to stop the jack-assery but it will impact law abiding people. Furthermore, I can't help but suspect that there will be some fairly significant I/O blowback from this along the lines of "You see, the Army is trying to hide its misdeeds." There is at least one person on this very site who seems to be convinced that there is some kind of huge conspiracy to conceal untold amounts of military wrong doing. There have been a few publicized incidents of wrong doing by military members ergo there must many many more that have been concealed. This will be taken as additional evidence to "prove" that.

[selil]

Dead drops or hidden channel communications can only be detected through traffic analysis.

If you watch the habits of a group of people and you see eroneous traffic (visit the baker but don't buy any bread, etc..) then you can pick it out and examine it.

Eroneous traffic might be an on-line email website (e.g. hotmail) that has somebody log in from Montanna and a few minutes later somebody log in from Dubai. That would by an interesting bit of traffic. The analysis could also be automated with heuristics for a low false positive rate. Two people in the same building though are going to require differnent tools and techniques.

[Cori]

or walk-back, but either way, it looks as if there's been a change here (although Captain Ed, who's a blogger with an excellent track record, doesn't seem to have a link for the clarification, unless I'm misreading this):

http://www.captainsquartersblog.com/mt/archives/009872.php

[marct]

Great post, Sam!

Similar traffic analysis techniques have been used to bust child porn trading rings, and there is actually quite a bit of information on the techniques involved. There are also a whole host of technique that Sam, quite rightly, doesn't mention - so neither will I ;).

I think that the important "lesson" to take from this is one that humans have had to learn time and time again - the world can be a dangerous place. Trite, I know, but something that everyone wants to disbelieve. I remember he press talking about how 9/11 changed the world - no, it didn't, it just changed how some people viewed the world; their basic metaphysical stance as it were.

The same thing is happening, to a lessor degree, to the perception of the Internet. But, while "discretion may be the better part of valour", going out into "the dark" to protect those you love is also valorous; sticking your head in the sand isn't.

Marc

[Cori]

Let me go back to where I started: doctrinally IO is responsible for electronic OPSEC as well as for the types of concerns we have generally lumped together under "information operations" (writ large), which is to say, the ability to influence audiences, hostile neutral and friendly. Now, I understand all the concern with OPSEC, we all understand the concern with OPSEC, we get it.

The problem is that in today's war (writ large) actions taken with only OPSEC concerns in mind are no longer cost free. In fact the cost might well be quite large -- which is why it is well worth while to look for ways to accomplish the same goal at lower cost. If those other means don't do the job as well, but the cost is less, well, then you have a judgment to make. The reason we've all been discussing this policy, at least as Wired initially represented it, is that it seemed not to consider the costs, or to try and find a way to seek a balance. That's why I asked earlier whether anyone knew if there were stories out there about serious security violations associated with blogs (again -- abu Ghraib, not a blog, and, again -- I'm guessing the people engaged in what those guys were doing wouldn't have been too worried about checking the regs on emailing,) because you have to know exactly how serious an OPSEC problem you've got before you can know how large a cost you should be willing to swallow.

I guess given the discussions on security (and, again, I understand the importance of that) I thought it worthwhile to put a certain frame on things.

[Eddie Beaver]

Upon reporting to my new aircraft carrier command, I noticed that a lot of blogs and forums were blocked 24/7. After about two months, all the few blogs and forums (including SWC) I could view previously were now blocked (certainly why I quit visiting SWC). After checking with the IT's about this, they pulled out a battle group regulation about no blogs, no forums and no "social networking" sites (i.e. the book site Shelfari or the PPT site SlideShare). Yet people at my old aircraft carrier can still (as I did) blog, visit blogs and interact on (SOME) forums. None of the regs match up in the Navy.

My fun now consists of pointing out hypocrisy with the blocked list, i.e. why can I visit FHM or Maxim sites but not DNI or Small Wars Journal? Or embarrassing them and pointing out that I can't visit Obama's site or read news on PBS but I can visit Rudy G's site and watch streaming video on Fox News?

The most offensive thing to me is the sheer idiocy of it all... I have a subordinate who is taking a physics college course and his professor posts assignment hints and further resource ideas on his university blog, but even with myself and the department master chief pushing the IT's to "unblock" just this one professor's blog, they refuse to do it.

Oh well.. Six months.....

[Eddie Beaver]

How could I forget? And this is the ship (The Abe Lincoln) that did tsunami relief in 2004-2005 and had several sailors who participated in the relief efforts and blogged about it on a regular basis at the time, often to the point where local hometown newspapers would highlight what Seaman Johnny was doing for his country and the world based on his blog posts (approved by his chain of command with their encouragement) and pictures (that were official Navy released photos).
Yet 2 years later, the positive experience of encouraging enterprising sailors who wanted to show a good side of a 10 month deployment at sea is easily forgotten.....

(commenting tonight from the freedom-soaked internet at my apartment)

[goesh]

- so I wondered to myself when I read the lead post on this thread, is this in anyway a reflection of any conflict and antagonism against the COIN philosophy? I wondered to myself given the open-house approach COIN has to the more closed-house approach traditionalists have. COIN sees civilian input and interfacing as a potential resource, traditionalists see it otherwise and more in the negative. I'm probably wrong, but if the troops are rubbing shoulders too much with civilians that means they are getting too many civilian ideas, which I don't think sits real well with some traditionalists.

[SWJED]

How could I forget? And this is the ship (The Abe Lincoln) that did tsunami relief in 2004-2005 and had several sailors who participated in the relief efforts and blogged about it on a regular basis at the time, often to the point where local hometown newspapers would highlight what Seaman Johnny was doing for his country and the world based on his blog posts (approved by his chain of command with their encouragement) and pictures (that were official Navy released photos).
Yet 2 years later, the positive experience of encouraging enterprising sailors who wanted to show a good side of a 10 month deployment at sea is easily forgotten.....

(commenting tonight from the freedom-soaked internet at my apartment)

EB,

Good example of what the majority of milblogs are attempting to do. The SWJ Blog has been quoted several times by the mainstream media and got across points of view and / or insights that otherwise would have been lost or printed below the fold on page Z-148 two weeks after the fact. This information rich high-speed environment is not going away and the military needs to embrace it - adding such things as milblogs to their IO toolbox or otherwise enabling milbloggers. Living in denial is not an option. The gun-analogy (posted earlier on this thread) is spot-on. The malcontents in our midst will still continue to post to the Internet and the well-meaning blogger will ride off into the sunset.

BTW - I sure do miss your blogging.

Fair Winds and Following Seas,

Dave

[Cori]

How could I forget? And this is the ship (The Abe Lincoln) that did tsunami relief in 2004-2005 and had several sailors who participated in the relief efforts and blogged about it on a regular basis at the time, often to the point where local hometown newspapers would highlight what Seaman Johnny was doing for his country and the world based on his blog posts (approved by his chain of command with their encouragement) and pictures (that were official Navy released photos).
Yet 2 years later, the positive experience of encouraging enterprising sailors who wanted to show a good side of a 10 month deployment at sea is easily forgotten.....

(commenting tonight from the freedom-soaked internet at my apartment)

What a perfect example of what I was referring to when I said there's a price to be paid in today's warfare when taking steps to ensure electronic OPSEC. This is the type of thing that has to be considered in the balance, something that just wasn't relevant ten, or even five, years ago. But it's why it would be worthwhile to accept some degree of risk on electronic OPSEC today -- unless there's hard evidence that the price we're paying there has just been exhorbitant.

Again, doctrinally electronic OPSEC has always fallen under IO's rubric. Those things we now think of as "IO" are, if not relatively new, relatively new in their importance. But the new policy (prior to yesterday's walk-back) was disturbing because it suggested a return to prior emphases without an understanding of the way this war demands, at a minimum, that IO take into account a delicate balance between all the concerns that fall under its purview.

All media are now in effect global media. So having those involved in the tsunami relief effort (something which helped our image among a Muslim population) tell their stories in an immediate and personal way was of tremendous use. Was it enough to in and of itself win over the hearts and minds of the Islamic world? No, no more than any single broadcast earned the credibility of the old Voice of America with its audiences behind the Iron Curtain. But this is a marathon, not a sprint. Looking at any single effort and judging it individually will allow any single effort to be judged less than necessary. Which is completely aside from the impact these efforts might have on the domestic population.

[VinceC]

Originally post by Carl,
It makes perfect sense from the standpoint of a mid to upper mid-level bureaucrat in the State or Defense Dept., somebody who is going to survive the upcoming change in administrations. This somebody has made the judgement that the change in administration will result in a precipitate bug out of Iraq that will not reflect honorably (to put it mildly) upon the US.

By shutting down the soldier bloggers, they prevent the most credible and direct observers of the disaster to come from reporting what they see as they see it. This reduces embarrassment to the bureaucrats and the politicos they serve.

There won't be enough mainstream media on the spot to make any difference and nobody in the US pays attention to Al-Jazeera. So figure the whole thing as an exercise in damage control before the fact.

I firmly believe this is true and it greatly saddens me.



This is an intriguing idea. But it implies someone with a deep understanding and strategic sense of Information Operations. Someone with that kind of insight would also know that the blogs ultimately can't be stopped and that cutting off e-commo would have its own negative public impact. At best, you'd be delaying the personal reports by a few weeks or months until the troops depart and start spilling their stories and photos from their home computers.

[wm]

The high level answer is risk management.

Risk management is tied very much to the personality of the risk managers and their levels of risk aversion. Folks tend to have varying levels of risk aversion—the guy who routinely trades on E-trade is probably much more financially risk tolerant than the guy (having lived through the Great Depression and lost a fortune in the stock market crash) who socks away his dollars into a 10-year certificate of deposit. The college freshman who use Face Book and IM every day to communicate with friends and family is much less risk averse to the threats of the World Wide Web than the child of the
1950’s who learned how to add and subtract without the benefit of a Texas Instruments pocket calculator. Likewise, some commanders are much less likely to accept certain kinds of unmitigated risks than others. The Cav officer who is used to running economy of force operations probably has much more risk tolerance than the Mech Infantry guy who was always part of operations that had a 3:1 force ratio against the bad guys.

The critical factor that I think that needs emphasizing is that we cannot really decide which risks to accept, which to avoid, and which to mitigate unless we fully understand what those risks are. We tend to fear (that is be risk averse to) that about which we know the least. (Am I right here, MarcT?) As an aside, I also think that we tend to try to regulate away the risks about which we know the least.

I suspect the latest effort to control the electronic environment , AKA AR 530-1, is really a well-meaning, but poorly informed, effort to manage risk by some very risk averse (because of their poor understanding of the true nature of the risk) senior leaders.

A couple of metaphors for the "problem" of the ubiquity of electronic communications come to mind. The first is Pandora's box. Another is the apple in the Garden of Eden. But one I really like is, in the words of the old song, "How you gonna keep them down on the farm now that they've see Paree?" Rather than compaining about folks who stick their heads in the sand, I'd like to know how we get those ostrich-like decision makers on the tour bus to France?

[marct]

Hi Vince,


This is an intriguing idea. But it implies someone with a deep understanding and strategic sense of Information Operations.

Why would you make that assumption? An a**-covering bureaucrat doesn't have to be intelligent when they are merely applying bureaucratic scripts that have worked in the past and are in "the book". Personally, I find it far more likely that the "philosophy" behind this action is a knee-jerk reaction.

WM notes that:


The critical factor that I think that needs emphasizing is that we cannot really decide which risks to accept, which to avoid, and which to mitigate unless we fully understand what those risks are. We tend to fear (that is be risk averse to) that about which we know the least. (Am I right here, MarcT?) As an aside, I also think that we tend to try to regulate away the risks about which we know the least.

and I think the key, in this case, is the level of institutional "fear" of that which cannot be controlled couple with the occupational fear of those who are responsible for controlling it (based on old technologies). I think we should be guided by the words of that great sage Anonymous:


Never ascribe to malice what can be ascribed to stupidity

Marc

[marct]

Hi WM,


The high level answer is risk management.

Yupper; especially when it is coupled in with a very strong organizational culture of bureaucracy.


Risk management is tied very much to the personality of the risk managers and their levels of risk aversion.....

The critical factor that I think that needs emphasizing is that we cannot really decide which risks to accept, which to avoid, and which to mitigate unless we fully understand what those risks are. We tend to fear (that is be risk averse to) that about which we know the least. (Am I right here, MarcT?) As an aside, I also think that we tend to try to regulate away the risks about which we know the least.

The hallmark of redistributive organizations, and the military is a classic example, is that they have an organizational culture meme that says "the organization knows best". Good (i.e. adaptive) redistributive organizations actually have organizational sub-units who are charged with producing updated pictures of the operational environment of the organization that will allow that organization to adapt (CALL is a good example of this). Poor organizations of this type reject any picture of the operational environment that disagrees with their internal picture.

This internal picture of the environment includes definitions of what is "known" and what is "unknown". That which is "unknown" is often treated as "dangerous", "taboo", or "polluted" (Mary Douglas has some great work on this see Purity and Danger (http://www.amazon.com/Purity-Danger-Pelican-Mary-Douglas/dp/0140211500/ref=sr_1_1/103-6031495-5193427?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1178284713&sr=1-1) and How Institutions Think (http://www.amazon.com/Institutions-Think-Frank-Abrams-Lectures/dp/0815602065/ref=sr_1_1/103-6031495-5193427?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1178284665&sr=8-1), as does my colleague Aaron Doyle (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/103-6031495-5193427?%5Fencoding=UTF8&search-type=ss&index=books&field-author=Aaron%20Doyle)). This "unknown" zone is often viewed as the province of people who are "set apart" from the mainstream of he organization - the "ritual specialists", whether they be called witches, magicians, insurance adjusters or futurists. The "unknown" zone is the province of "magic", while the "known" zone is the province of "science" (at least for Malinowski (http://www.amazon.com/Magic-Science-Religion-Other-Essays/dp/B000GSNZG2/ref=sr_1_4/103-6031495-5193427?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1178285060&sr=1-4)).


I suspect the latest effort to control the electronic environment , AKA AR 530-1, is really a well-meaning, but poorly informed, effort to manage risk by some very risk averse (because of their poor understanding of the true nature of the risk) senior leaders.

Well, I'm more inclined to view it as an attempt to impose an internal image on an organizational operational environment (the Beltway). By showing how stringently they are trying to control the "unknown", the bureaucrat authors of this order have assigned priority to organizational "survival" (including their own personal careers) while downgrading operational survival, in terms of winning any particular conflict.


A couple of metaphors for the "problem" of the ubiquity of electronic communications come to mind. The first is Pandora's box. Another is the apple in the Garden of Eden. But one I really like is, in the words of the old song, "How you gonna keep them down on the farm now that they've see Paree?" Rather than compaining about folks who stick their heads in the sand, I'd like to know how we get those ostrich-like decision makers on the tour bus to France?

A TDY to examine the recruitment potential of "disaffected French 'youth'" :D? Well, one old saw deserves another - you can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him drink.

Marc

[Rob Thornton]

From Marc,

A TDY to examine the recruitment potential of "disaffected French 'youth'" ? Well, one old saw deserves another - you can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him drink.

Marc, why does some of this remind me of the "we are French and so to preserve frenchiness, we must disdain all things non-french (or was that Montreal?).

The inability to predict /anticipate change and shape events as such to obtain an advantage vs. recalcitrant attitudes towards the global information environment that result in strategic inertia seems to be our recurring problem.

Why? For all the lip service paid to Transformation the emphasis has been on development of technology as a cure, vs. the application of technology by people (transformative thinking). This is why even with so many C4ISR assitance type tools, so many leaders still fail to recognize decision points in a timely matter (if at all) that allow them to put the enemy at a disadvantage. This seems to be the hallmark of centralized, bureacratic organizations vs. flat, decentralized ones - while both have values, there is a need to adapt/become flexible enough in the face of change to meet the needs of the problem at hand - I think this illustrates the need for more debate about how we prosecute this and future wars, and what type of organizations and leadership will be required to win them.

[wm]

For all the lip service paid to Transformation the emphasis has been on development of technology as a cure, vs. the application of technology by people (transformative thinking). This is why even with so many C4ISR assitance type tools, so many leaders still fail to recognize decision points in a timely matter (if at all) that allow them to put the enemy at a disadvantage. This seems to be the hallmark of centralized, bureacratic organizations vs. flat, decentralized ones - while both have values, there is a need to adapt/become flexible enough in the face of change to meet the needs of the problem at hand - I think this illustrates the need for more debate about how we prosecute this and future wars, and what type of organizations and leadership will be required to win them.

We will continue to have "horse and buggy thinking" until all the old horse and buggy thinkers are no more. Even then, we will have folks (many of whom who pass themselves off as academic historians) who reinvent the wheel by appealing to past successes of those who used what are now passe
methods.

The funny thing about change is that once you do so, you can't go back and undo it. As a result, many fear it because it produces something they can neither know with certainty (the future) nor control.

[marct]

Marc, why does some of this remind me of the "we are French and so to preserve frenchiness, we must disdain all things non-french (or was that Montreal?).

Je crois que c'est les Parisienne, mais, c'est possible, c'est les Quebecois aussi.

Yeah - it's a general inability of people to accept that their perceptions were (and will always be) not absolute "truth".


The inability to predict /anticipate change and shape events as such to obtain an advantage vs. recalcitrant attitudes towards the global information environment that result in strategic inertia seems to be our recurring problem.

Why? For all the lip service paid to Transformation the emphasis has been on development of technology as a cure, vs. the application of technology by people (transformative thinking). This is why even with so many C4ISR assitance type tools, so many leaders still fail to recognize decision points in a timely matter (if at all) that allow them to put the enemy at a disadvantage. This seems to be the hallmark of centralized, bureacratic organizations vs. flat, decentralized ones - while both have values, there is a need to adapt/become flexible enough in the face of change to meet the needs of the problem at hand - I think this illustrates the need for more debate about how we prosecute this and future wars, and what type of organizations and leadership will be required to win them.

This has been a big debate inside business and management for decades now. The one "advantage" that business has over the military, in terms of learning to adapt, is that it is constantly in its operational environment so you can usually get pretty quick feedback on what works and what doesn't.

I think that it is important to make a distinction between the prosecution of wars and the organizational body that allows for wars to be prosecuted - think of it along the Line and Staff division. Organizationally, Line units have to be increasingly flexible, technologically savvy, culturally aware etc. while Staff units have to be predictable. Since both types are needed within the military, then the overall organization has to be able to support both without destroying one or the other.

At the same time, changes in the operational environment are going to require that functional areas sometimes be shifted from Line t Staff and vice versa. In this particular case, we are seeing a certain type of IO function being grabbed by Staff when it should be a Line function.

Marc

[Merv Benson]

I was general counsel to an investment banking company back when personal computers were making their way onto the brokers' desks. The Compliance Department was concerned that it would lose control of communications with customers and unauthorized data might be used to induce a trade.

As it turned out the opposite happened. The computers and email enhanced communication with the customer and it enhanced the supervisors ability to monitor that communication as required by securities regulations.

Today, I arbitrate a lot of disputes involving the securities business and these electronic business records are a routine part of the evidence submitted usually by the brokerage firm to prove the customer was aware of things he now claims he was not.

The point is that commanders can deal with their concerns without inhibiting communications. They can control the inappropriate communication without shutting down legitimate communications that enhance the war effort. As others here have pointed out, the communication is still going to take place. If someone is making an inappropriate communication they will also have a record of that too.

[Merv Benson]

Three Republican senators have written (http://www.thekidalog.com/seejanemom/2007/05/text_three_sena.html) Secretary Gates asking him to take a took at the new regulation and weigh the need for individual expression.

[carl]

At best, you'd be delaying the personal reports by a few weeks or months until the troops depart and start spilling their stories and photos from their home computers.

Those few weeks or months are very important to our bureaucrat. The time lessens the emotional impact of the stories; it is easier to get upset about those being killed than those who are dead. And it gives our man time to create a defense and muddy the waters.

These things won't eliminate the ensueing embarrassment. But they might reduce it just enough to allow our man to keep his job and get his promotion on time.

[SWJED]

Hat Tip to Blackfive (http://www.blackfive.net/main/2007/05/new_opsec_regul.html) and Danger Room (http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/05/army_bloggers) for posting a link to Muddy Boots IO: The Rise of Soldier Blogs (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/Staff/g7/InformationOperations-RobbinsMuddyBoots.pdf) by Major Elizabeth Robins.


... be sure to read Major Elizabeth Robbins award winning paper about military blogs "Muddy Boots" - which General Petraeus praised. It is pure genius and I'm glad Noah linked to it. I believe that Major Robbins is or is on the way to somewhere dangerous.

[VinceC]

Those few weeks or months are very important to our bureaucrat. The time lessens the emotional impact of the stories

The hamlet-clearing action in the My Lai villages of Vietnam took place in March 1968. Army photographer Ronald Haeberle waited until he had come home from Vietnam and been discharged before making his photographs known (he shot a personal camera alongside his Army-issue camera). His photographs were published 18 months later, in November 1969, in LIFE magazine. They led to investigations, courts-martial trials and, inthe I/O realm, an image of the American soldier -- correct or not -- that echoes down to this day.

The bulk of the Abu Ghraib photographs were taken half a year before they reached the public. I would argue that their impact would have been lessened if they had immediately reached the public, while the events were taking place. Bad news delayed implies cover-up and apathy toward wrong-doing.

These days, every solder carries a camera. We live in an interactive Web 2.0 world. When mistakes are made, they will be documented, by people close to us, whether we like it or not.

[John T. Fishel]

The most problematic part of the new regulation - as I noted earlier, it isn't a new problem - is the specific inclusion of FOUO as if it were CLASSIFIED information. Please note that the briefing posted by Marc early in the threat is "protectively" marked FOUO with absolutely no good reason for doing so. Zealous military and civilian bureaucrats freely use the FOUO stamp (and classified stamps as well) on the (to be charitable) presumption of better safe than sorry. In reality, such stamps are too often used - as it apparently was in this case - to avoid the embarassment of public scrutiny of an ill considered policy.

As Sam so dramatically pointed out and explained so well, there is a real danger to OPSEC posed by the technology we are using. But my impression of the policy and regulation and my concern is with its focus on content. If content must be protected then we have three levels of classification and numerous compartments to keep information within need to know channels. We also have policies in place that provide relatively good ground rules for determining the appropriate level of classification. Using FOUO as a cheap and unthinking substitute for properly classifying information is, as this forum has pointed out, counterproductive and hamstringing to the war effort, in violation of the real First Amendment rights of both service personnel and government civilians, and just plain bad policy.

[carl]

VinceC:

I agree completely with all the things you said. But, just because something might not work doesn't mean people won't try it. After all, might not work also means it might.

In the My Lai case during those 18 months a lot of people got promoted or were able to retire. Ultimately only one person went to jail. The main stream media had turned against the war by that time and seized upon the story to beat on the military and the administration. If they, for arguments sake, had still supported the war maybe the time interval would have an effect on their coverage.

There is another example from Vietnam, the bomb shortage. We were sending two man jets up north with 2 250 lb. bombs apiece. They did it to keep up sortie counts. The brass denied it of course and by the time the pilots got back in great enough numbers to be believed, the shortage was over and the dead crews had been dead for weeks or months. Nothing much came of it; careers were preserved.

If a similar thing happened now, bloggers would report and people would know right now. That would be good for the country and the crews, but it would be bad for somebody's career. If the blogger were silenced, a career would remain unthreatened, at least for awhile and maybe for longer.

My basic point is inside the bureaucracies of which we speak, what is good for the country and the war effort is not the first imperative; what seems to be good for the organization and the career within it is.

Another good recent example is Pat Tillman's death. Talk about blatant and should have known better. But, I'll bet there are people inside the beltway who lay awake at night thinking to themselves "If only we could have shut those guys up. Wouldn't things have been fine."

[SWJED]

If a similar thing happened now, bloggers would report and people would know right now. That would be good for the country and the crews, but it would be bad for somebody's career. If the blogger were silenced, a career would remain unthreatened, at least for awhile and maybe for longer.

Bingo - Spot-On Carl...

[Rob Thornton]

You know there is another aspect to this that ties in with the discussion on where we are, where we are going and where we need to go . Often the people who author a reg, or issue a command do so in ignorance of the secondary and tertiary effects.

What I mean is, consider the author of the reg was issued guidance to issue a policy which safeguards information that might be harmful - and he did so with gusto- but he did so from the perspective of his branch solely. The review was also performed in branch or institution bias and so it was published.

I'm not buying too much into the conspiracy piece - although I have seen people take advantage of regs to support their lethargy, or cover their fear of risk. Its a concern that so important of a reg seems to have escaped a thorugh review of its impacts in any other area except for how well it "protects" information and operations. With any decisions there are pros and cons, and things to be gained and things that will be lost - nothing is free.

From T.X. Hammes recent MILREVIEW article on 4GW/5GW

Strategic shift. Strategically, insurgent campaigns have shifted from military campaigns supported by information operations to strategic communications campaigns supported by guerrilla and terrorist operations. (italics added) While there is no generally agreed upon definition of 4GW, according to the definition I wrote in 2003, “Fourth generation warfare uses all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency.”

Our current regulation writters and reviewers may not be versed in how 4GW/5GW are evolving, and thus may not be considering all the aspects of decisions to truncate access, positive and negative side effects, etc. LTC Yingling speaks to this quite well in his argument.

[Cori]

Whether that's because the Army walked it back when they saw the response or because Wired got it wrong is hard to know.

In any event, the milblogger's conference was this weekend, and it started with a videotaped greeting from -- the President.

http://gatewaypundit.blogspot.com/2007/05/liveblogging-2007-milblog-conference.html

Kind of hard to shut people down, or proceed with shutting them down, after you've got the Prez on record commending them for what they've been doing.

For a "liveblog" of the conference, including some discussion of these regs (and the participation of the author of the Wired article) go here:

http://redstate.com/stories/technology/liveblogging_the_milbloggers_conference

I'm sure there will be multiple posts up tomorrow reviewing what was said in more detail. The best central locale to find those links would be www.mudvillegazette.com, which is a great "clearinghouse" for all the milblogs of all categories (active duty, veterans, family members, etc.)

[marct]

It also gets interesting when we take this press release into consideration.


No. 537-07
May 04, 2007
New DoD Strategy Outlined For Information Sharing

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration and DoD Chief Information Officer John G. Grimes signed the “DoD Information Sharing Strategy” today and established a new information sharing vision for the Department of Defense: “Delivering the power of information to ensure mission success through an agile enterprise with freedom of maneuverability across the information environment.”
....

According to the DoD Information Sharing Strategy, the vision describes a future state where “transparent, open, agile, timely, and relevant information sharing occurs to promote freedom of maneuverability across a trusted information environment.” To achieve this vision, the strategy describes four goals that form the necessary environment across the department. These include: (1) promote, encourage, and incentivize sharing; (2) achieve an extended enterprise; (3) strengthen agility in order to accommodate unanticipated partners and events; and (4) ensure trust across organizations.

Developed through the combined efforts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the strategy was published in response to the President’s information sharing imperatives and as outlined in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review. It seeks to guide the Department’s exchange of information within the DoD and with domestic and international partners; for example, federal, state, local, tribal, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, foreign nations, and international organizations. It provides an approach to information sharing activities and operations for the Office of the Secretary of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commands, the military departments, the Office of the Inspector General of the DoD, the defense agencies, the DoD field activities, and all other organizational entities in the DoD.

“To realize these objectives, the strategy addresses necessary changes to information mobility and associated alignment of incentives, policies, processes and systems, while identifying the critical cultural shift required to support collaboration and improved knowledge sharing,” said Grimes.

More... (http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10831)

Has anyone got a copy of this "Strategy"? I can only find a couple of pdf brochures for presentations and one PowerPoint slides set that is pretty useless. Of course, I suppose that it could be FOUO and, hence, my asking about it now makes me an "enemy":eek:.

Marc

[SWJED]

D. J. Elliott at The Fourth Rail Blog - OPSEC, the OOBs and the Myopic Mis-Focus of Security Personnel (http://billroggio.com/archives/2007/05/opsec_the_oobs_and_t.php).


Most people do not realize that Chris and I were bouncing Order of Battle [OOB] data between each other for a year before the OOBs were finally published. I started my collection of data as a hobby to see just what the real status of the Iraqi Security Forces was since the published press reports were far off base and contradictory in their own stories. My principle motivations for my involvement in publishing these OOBs are somewhat contradictory. First, I wanted to get the principle operational security [OPSEC] violators to tighten their OPSEC. Second, I want to further an understanding of the development of the Iraqi Security Forces and the Baghdad Security Plan. As a retired intelligence analyst, I could not believe that the Public Affairs Officers [PAOs] and Commanders were releasing this much operational data in a time of war...

[Cannoneer No. 4]

between the AF MSgt Combat Camera Videographer and IS1 (SW), Elliott, USN (Ret).

Now maybe I'm not seeing the big picture, but it looks to me like the OPSEC-side of the IO house's attempt to shut down the only effective counter propaganda the domestic target audience gets (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/Staff/g7/InformationOperations-RobbinsMuddyBoots.pdf) has turned into a major exercise in small ruminant breeding, calling into question the whole idea of lumping the disparate components of IO together in the first place. (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=14894)

[Culpeper]

Most employers won't put up with employees writing negative anything on the Internet about the company. Also, people get fired everyday for violating company Internet usage as well. In the civilian world people get fired at the drop of the hat for either violating company policy concerning Internet usage on the job, revealing company secrets on such things as blogs and message boards, criticizing the boss on a blog or message board, and so forth. I read today that the Pentagon was going to starting blocking access to youtube and so forth. I was like, "We've been blocked from such sites for years in the workplace". Its just the military catching up with corporate America concerning usage of the Internet and the workplace. Whether it be in an office or on the front lines in some hostile land. Now, if military personnel want to write a blog on their own time using their own equipment than that is a different story. But so is the UCMJ. Welcome to the real world, your job, and the Internet. User beware.

[milesce]

True, but at the same, a lot of smart companies (Microsoft is a good example) are encouraging their employees to blog and do it openly. In the case of MS its made a 180 turnaround in attitudes of developers and other folks who have to implement their products. I'm sure they've got guidelines in place -- i.e. no bashing the company. On the other hand, I recently read a long justification from one of their programmers explaining why he'd switched to mac, and as far as I can tell he's still employed.

The question is, can you keep enough of that information flow to provide the genuine positive PR impact back home, and prevent leaks of information that can hurt people?

I mostly manage websites now to pay the bills, and I've seen at least one major nonprofit which had a very wide open forum for its members try to clamp down on controlling the message. Traffic dropped, followed by donations, because people no longer felt invested in the mission. I realize the case isn't necessarily analogous, but there's a strong argument for the internet as a real positive tool in communicating with the audience back at home which is rapidly losing patience with the unending stream of bad news from Iraq.

[Culpeper]

The question is, can you keep enough of that information flow to provide the genuine positive PR impact back home, and prevent leaks of information that can hurt people?

I don't know the answer to that. The Internet has grown so much in the last ten years. Once upon a time the Internet was just a group of universities connected together. I agree that I would prefer the military allow blogging like what you described with Microsoft. Frankly, the only reason I can see the military blocking this sort of medium is because of a few that abuse the privilege. One person screws up and everyone has to suffer. Or on a larger scale maybe it is more about security than freedom of expression. Or maybe it is just the military putting a lid on it because they can and they don't know the answer anymore than I do. What I can't stand are headlines like, "Al Queda tells U.S. to stop looking for missing soldiers". With that in mind, its seems ridiculous to stop a tool like blogging to counter the media acting as a conduit for the enemy.

[120mm]

Most employers won't put up with employees writing negative anything on the Internet about the company. Also, people get fired everyday for violating company Internet usage as well. In the civilian world people get fired at the drop of the hat for either violating company policy concerning Internet usage on the job, revealing company secrets on such things as blogs and message boards, criticizing the boss on a blog or message board, and so forth. I read today that the Pentagon was going to starting blocking access to youtube and so forth. I was like, "We've been blocked from such sites for years in the workplace". Its just the military catching up with corporate America concerning usage of the Internet and the workplace. Whether it be in an office or on the front lines in some hostile land. Now, if military personnel want to write a blog on their own time using their own equipment than that is a different story. But so is the UCMJ. Welcome to the real world, your job, and the Internet. User beware.

Yeah, but most employers don't routinely send their employees to God-forsaken places to die.

[Culpeper]

I agree. But what does that have to do with Internet usage? Really. BTW, there has been plenty of U.S. citizens killed in this war.

[120mm]

Actually, it has everything to do with it. When the Army sends Joe Schmoe to Iraq, they effectively remove his/her communication network. It's not like he can plug his laptop into his personally purchased T1 cable.

Us old-timers need to realize that if we want quality soldiers in an all-volunteer army, we need to realize that things aren't the same as they used to be. As my old Gunny used to say: "There are three things you can't f*ck with; Pay, Chow and Mail." Well, the US Army is f*cking with the soldiers' "mail". OPSEC, I get. Treating the internet like it's a luxury, I do not.

And your point about businesses restricting internet access is good, up to a point. Your business doesn't tell you that you can't go home and surf on your own computer; effectively, that's what the Army is doing to deployed soldiers.

I have doubts as to how much effort the Army is really putting into internet service to deployed areas. Four years into the war, and umpteen Trillion dollars later, we shouldn't be having bandwidth problems, imo.

[Jedburgh]

Military Review, Sep-Oct 07 (1st Place CAC IO Writing Contest):

Muddy Boots IO: The Rise of Soldier Blogs (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct07/robbinsengseptoct07.pdf)

Military web logs, known as blogs or milblogs, are small websites that Soldiers maintain as informal journals for personal comments, images, and links to other websites. Blogs emerged concurrently with the War on Terrorism and have become an increasingly influential and controversial phenomenon. This form of communication gives a Soldier the potential to reach a global audience.

In fall 2005, in recognition of the potential effects of blogs on information operations (IO), the Army began educating deploying units about this aspect of the evolving information domain. This article explores the milblog phenomenon, its benefits to the Army, current challenges, and the way ahead. It concludes that qualified support of Soldier blogs is good policy when coupled with clearly defined boundaries and aggressive Soldier education.

[SWJED]

Air Force Blocks Access to Many Blogs (http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/02/air-force-banni.html) by Noah Shachtman, Wired Magazine's Danger Room blog.


The Air Force is tightening restrictions on which blogs its troops can read, cutting off access to just about any independent site with the word "blog" in its web address. It's the latest move in a larger struggle within the military over the value -- and hazards -- of the sites. At least one senior Air Force official calls the squeeze so "utterly stupid, it makes me want to scream."...

Not sure what to say, hopefully this is not exactly true. In the meantime, would not mind knowing if those from an US Air Force cotrolled netwrk can reach our SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/). The url contains the word "blog".

[Cliff]

Let's just say there have been some serious OPSEC issues of late involving blogs, and the AF is responding to that. Might be an overreaction, but if you saw some of the stuff some folks had posted, you might agree (pretty blatant attempts to elicit information). Anyone who looks at the SWC members list can see some folks that are probably reading everything we say here, and while this is an international forum, are probably not friends of NATO/the west in general and the US specifically. That is what they are worried about.

The key I think is to be extremely careful to keep things to strategy/operational art and avoid discussing systems/tactics specifics, for that exact reason. Kinda is a bummer because you can learn a lot from sites like SWJ.

Is there a push in the US Army/NAVY/USMC to put up FOUO or SIPR level discussion boards? Just wondering...

Anyway that's the background.

V/R,

Cliff


Air Force Blocks Access to Many Blogs (http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/02/air-force-banni.html) by Noah Shachtman, Wired Magazine's Danger Room blog.



Not sure what to say, hopefully this is not exactly true. In the meantime, would not mind knowing if those from an US Air Force cotrolled netwrk can reach our SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/). The url contains the word "blog".

[Cavguy]

The key I think is to be extremely careful to keep things to strategy/operational art and avoid discussing systems/tactics specifics, for that exact reason. Kinda is a bummer because you can learn a lot from sites like SWJ.

Is there a push in the US Army/NAVY/USMC to put up FOUO or SIPR level discussion boards? Just wondering...



The Army has BCKS, where discussions up to FOUO happen. Sites like companycommand.mil are the examples of the best of that community where TTP's and the like happen. But you lose what SWJ brings to the table, the non military community of academics, government officials, and those just interested in the topic.

I've never seen anything in SWJ that isn't already available, and the admins (and the self policing community) quickly remove or caution any discussion that risks OPSEC problems, like the recent topic on running sources at the

The need for OPSEC is balanced by the need to communicate what is happening to the world, which is LTG Caldwell's point, and recent order to his subordinate leaders to participate in blogs as well as traditional media, with the same ROE.

[Cliff]

training for your folks is the answer (what is the threat, what is appropriate and what isn't). To paraphrase LTG Caldwell, if every soldier is a sensor, why can't every soldier be a reporter too? 'Course this multiplies "the strategic corporal" effect too...

I don't think SWJ is at all what the AF is worried about, luckily!

I am currently doing some PME by correspondence (no seminar available where I'm at!), and so SWJ is one of the few ways I can discuss the readings with anyone, so I would for sure loose if I weren't allowed to read here.

Thanks for the answers, Cavguy!

V/R,

Cliff


The Army has BCKS, where discussions up to FOUO happen. Sites like companycommand.mil are the examples of the best of that community where TTP's and the like happen. But you lose what SWJ brings to the table, the non military community of academics, government officials, and those just interested in the topic.

I've never seen anything in SWJ that isn't already available, and the admins (and the self policing community) quickly remove or caution any discussion that risks OPSEC problems, like the recent topic on running sources at the

The need for OPSEC is balanced by the need to communicate what is happening to the world, which is LTG Caldwell's point, and recent order to his subordinate leaders to participate in blogs as well as traditional media, with the same ROE.

[SteveMetz]

As I may have mentioned here, the Army blocks blogger and blogspot. In an act of monumental idiocy, Army PAO promotes sites on them while Army IT blocks them. It is possible, though, to use pkblogs.com, a mirror site designed to get around government censorship in Iran and China, to access blogs I need for professional use.

Have no trouble with SWJ, though.

Of course, I've contended for years that the Air Force is not a service, it's a cult. And, while I'm at it, I need to point out that I was really tempted to look into adopting a Marine as mentioned in another post in here. But then someone told me they're really hard to house break.

[selil]

It sounds like Airforce IT is trying to be a policing entity rather than a customer service entity. Never a good situation. If OPsec was broken by somebody on a BLOG than that is betweeen the commander and the individual IT is the "telephone" not the police.

[slapout9]

Cavguy, FOUO....that's southern for "for you" but they want let me in.:eek: Who do I need to splain this to bout how 2 talk rite?

[SteveMetz]

It sounds like Airforce IT is trying to be a policing entity rather than a customer service entity. Never a good situation. If OPsec was broken by somebody on a BLOG than that is betweeen the commander and the individual IT is the "telephone" not the police.


That's not the way "they" see it. We had a CIO here (LTC) who defined his mission as keeping the network running and uncompromised. He used to come right and say that if all of us poor stiffs out here would just stop using the network, he'd have 100% mission success.

The way I see IT security is that no one in a position of authority is ever willing to say that we're secure enough. It can tube someone's career if something bad happens, but it doesn't harm them if they simply erode the effectiveness of hundreds or thousands of people by adding ridiculous security requirements (like having to log back on after 5 minutes of inactivity, even if I'm sitting at the keyboard thinking. I average 10-20 logons a day. Multiply that by the hundreds of thousands of people who are in the same boat). This situation contrasts with the private sector where people in authority actually weigh security against mission effectiveness.

[jcustis]

And, while I'm at it, I need to point out that I was really tempted to look into adopting a Marine as mentioned in another post in here. But then someone told me they're really hard to house break.

C'mon...we only piss on the floor on the odd occasion when we feel compelled to mark territory. :D

[SteveMetz]

C'mon...we only piss on the floor on the odd occasion when we feel compelled to mark territory. :D

In that case, I guess I could just hit him on the nose with a rolled up copy of the Gazette.


I'm doing some serious ranting today. I feel like SWJ's answer to Lewis Black.

[Tom Odom]

In that case, I guess I could just hit him on the nose with a rolled up copy of the Gazette.


I'm doing some serious ranting today. I feel like SWJ's answer to Lewis Black.

With the price of oil this AM, we should all be ranting...

[selil]

The way I see IT security is that no one in a position of authority is ever willing to say that we're secure enough. It can tube someone's career if something bad happens, but it doesn't harm them if they simply erode the effectiveness of hundreds or thousands of people by adding ridiculous security requirements (like having to log back on after 5 minutes of inactivity, even if I'm sitting at the keyboard thinking. I average 10-20 logons a day. Multiply that by the hundreds of thousands of people who are in the same boat). This situation contrasts with the private sector where people in authority actually weigh security against mission effectiveness.

Higher Education is going through some of these same issues.

What you described by having to log in many times is called a denial of service attack against the user.

Highly punitive information technology policies have a tendency to cause users to circumvent the technology, stifle creativity, support dietism of the admins, and actually create substantial insecurity in the network systems.

I'm going to say something and you all are going to say "NO FREAKING WAY!", but give me a chance.... Information assurance and security is a solved issue.

The support:

1) There is no such thing as a totally secure network you only have levels and must accept some risk at whatever mitigation/price you're willing to accept/pay.

2) True security requires education of the user, good administrative practices, but most importantly agreement by the users. Hostile or punitive policies create fear and loathing in the users and support insecurity of the network.

3) A communications network is only as secure as the weakest link and should be considered as such. The user is an integral part of the network, is highly mobile, go's home at night, has access through other networks, and as such degrades through the "sneaker net" any and all other security factors.

4) Security that is obvious and blatant is a form of force and can be used against the network (think Judo analogy). The harsher the security mechanism the more information provided to violate the network perimeter.

In essence most security of networks is the equivalent of "CYA". To date most enterprises have single factor authentication, they publish the userid as the email address (the first factor) and the second factor (password) is defined as a symbol, 7 characters, etc.. (thereby giving pattern recognition password breakers a better chance). To date most enterprises use the "block it all" method versus contextual analysis which causes users to circumvent the security either through tools at work or when they get home (thus removing them from their role and creating other issues).

Totalitarian network administration never works. There are always break ins, violations, and in general firings of administrators. The reality is that you have to manage, assist, and support users if you want assistance in securing the network. Anything else is guaranteed to fail. The kicker is if you take the totalitarian approach the users will be to afraid to tell you and you won't know when it fails.

Information assurance and security is solved. The fact is that it will never be perfect and it must be sized/priced/created in such a way that it supports rather than degrades the network. Until the information technology professionals accept that the user is integral to the network, security will always be less than is possible.

[Cavguy]

Cavguy, FOUO....that's southern for "for you" but they want let me in.:eek: Who do I need to splain this to bout how 2 talk rite?


I hear you, I was born outside of Auburn, and my family hails from Monroe county. However, I was transplanted to Virginia at a young age to escape the vicious cycles of LA .... Lower Alabama that is ......

:D

I'll have to add that to the appendix to Doctrinal Terms and Symbols.

[Tom Odom]

I hear you, I was born outside of Auburn, and my family hails from Monroe county. However, I was transplanted to Virginia at a young age to escape the vicious cycles of LA .... Lower Alabama that is ......

:D

I'll have to add that to the appendix to Doctrinal Terms and Symbols.

He's right,,FOO YOO is related to WHUFFO a term in the parachuting and skydiving circles for spectators with origins in George and Alabama..comes from "WHUH FOA YOU jump outta dem planes?"


Sam,

I completely agree and the remarkable thing is I know influential guys who also agree and cannot get the rational points across.

The IT community inside the military has become very much like the old stove-piped Army Security Agency; reason and rationale thought does not necessarily apply. In fact attempting rational and reasoning thought tends to prompt a knee-jerk, irrational reaction with no thought applied.

Best

Tom

[SteveMetz]

The IT community inside the military has become very much like the old stove-piped Army Security Agency; reason and rationale thought does not necessarily apply. In fact attempting rational and reasoning thought tends to prompt a knee-jerk, irrational reaction with no thought applied.

Best

Tom

What I find both amusing and idiotic is that when you ask who has the authority to fix a specific item of stupidity, the answer is "Huachucua." In other words, there is no human decision-maker, just this mysterious and all powerful entity known as Huachucua. Case in point--the American Enterprise Institute and the Stanley Foundation are blocked. We've tried for years to fix that, but can't identify the actual organic unit who made the decision or can overrule it.

[Tom Odom]

What I find both amusing and idiotic is that when you ask who has the authority to fix a specific item of stupidity, the answer is "Huachucua." In other words, there is no human decision-maker, just this mysterious and all powerful entity known as Huachucua. Case in point--the American Enterprise Institute and the Stanley Foundation are blocked. We've tried for years to fix that, but can't identify the actual organic unit who made the decision or can overrule it.

I am the great and powerful Oz... :eek:

Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain...;)

[slapout9]

I hear you, I was born outside of Auburn, and my family hails from Monroe county. However, I was transplanted to Virginia at a young age to escape the vicious cycles of LA .... Lower Alabama that is ......

:D

I'll have to add that to the appendix to Doctrinal Terms and Symbols.


Cavguy, I can understand that, if I lived outside Auburn I would move to.

[MountainRunner]

Maybe the Air Force might want to pay attention to more than just blogs. From the the UK's Telegraph: (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2008/02/29/nmildenhall129.xml)


A tourist information website promoting a small Suffolk town has had to shut down after it received a barrage of thousands of classified US military emails.
Sensitive information including future flight paths for US Presidential aircraft Air Force One, military strategy and passwords swamped Gary Sinnott's email inbox after he established www.mildenhall.com (http://www.mildenhall.com), a site promoting the tiny town of Mildenhall where he lives, the Anglia Press Agency reports.
As well as Mr Sinnott and his neighbours, Mildenhall is home to a huge US Air Force base and its 2,500 servicemen and women, and the similarity in domain names has led to thousands of misdirected emails from Air Force personnel. Any mail sent to addresses ending @mildenhall.com would have ended up in Mr Sinnott's mailbox.
Now military bosses have blocked all military email to the address, and persuaded him to close down his site to end the confusion. He is giving up ownership of the address next month.
Mr Sinnott said: "You wouldn't believe some of the stuff that I have been receiving - I wonder if they ever had any security training. When I told the Americans they went mental.
I got mis-sent e-mails right from the start in 2000 but even after I warned the base they just kept on coming. At one stage I was getting thousands of spam messages a week. I was getting jokes and videos and some of the material was not very nice - people were sending stuff without checking the address.
"But then I began to receive military communications from all over the world - a lot containing very sensitive information."

[Norfolk]

A few months ago I sent an E-mail to Carlisle asking them to take down a FOUO document released to them by a friendly foreign government that the War College had in turn posted on one of its public sites; it still took them about 2 months to finally install a login for access to that document. This sort of thing is a persistent problem; the IT Security types need to ensure they have a solid handle on all classified stuff before they even think about about restricting access to documents specifically cleared for public access - especially when that access is required by other Services.

As for blogs, I have to at least partially side with Selil here, though there is certainly a place for regulation. That said, maybe each unit should possess its own censor with whom each unit member should register their blog(s), and allow the unit censor to monitor each for OPSEC. This notion is probably repugnant to many, but if the troops themselves do a good job of self-policing, then the censor amounts to nothing more than a safeguard, "just in case."

[SteveMetz]

Maybe the Air Force might want to pay attention to more than just blogs. From the the UK's Telegraph: (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2008/02/29/nmildenhall129.xml)

That story smells fishy. I don't think you can send classified email to an unclassified network.

[SteveMetz]

A few months ago I sent an E-mail to Carlisle asking them to take down a FOUO document released to them by a friendly foreign government that the War College had in turn posted on one of its public sites; it still took them about 2 months to finally install a login for access to that document.

I hope that wasn't *us*. Our webmaster is right around the corner so I can usually get stuff changed on our web site in a matter of minutes.

We had to get presidential approval and provide the broomstick of the Wicked Witch of the West before we were allowed to put the phone numbers for our subject matter experts on our page.

[Norfolk]

I hope that wasn't *us*. Our webmaster is right around the corner so I can usually get stuff changed on our web site in a matter of minutes.

We had to get presidential approval and provide the broomstick of the Wicked Witch of the West before we were allowed to put the phone numbers for our subject matter experts on our page.

No Steve, it was PKSOI.

[selil]

That said, maybe each unit should possess its own censor with whom each unit member should register their blog(s), and allow the unit censor to monitor each for OPSEC. This notion is probably repugnant to many, but if the troops themselves do a good job of self-policing, then the censor amounts to nothing more than a safeguard, "just in case."


This might help with information seepage. You say the sky is blue, I say the sky is cloudy, soldier x mentions the wind is blowing, and somebody with ill intent figures out we're going operational in three hours. That kind of strange linkage and seepage of information (like k-anonymity) is almost impossible for an individual to realize and rarely covered by IO experts. A "censor" might see the pattern.

[120mm]

We had a very good discussion on BCKS about this very issue, until the web-nazis shut it down. (Insert heavy irony, here.)

There is a blog by a Navy-type who shows how the military is "alarmed" by relatively minor OPSEC violations, while PAO officers and O-6 and above types publicly "sell out the farm" in their idiotic press releases and public statements.

1AD's Division Commander advertised a public call in show that talked about specifics regarding the 5 Ws of their deployment. He revealed IN THE ADVERTISEMENTS the When and Where portions of DIV HQs and HHC's deployment. He also discussed what I would consider sensitive information during the call-in show.

PAO routinely releases photographs and articles which include units, locations, individual names and home towns of soldiers in combat zones, to include the names of operations, etc..

I'm thinking maybe the military needs to "heal themselves" prior to coming down hard on individual servicemembers.

[Rockbridge]

That story smells fishy. I don't think you can send classified email to an unclassified network.
Agreed. Some folks still don't understand the difference between "classified" and "sensitive." There's a lot of stuff floating around out there that the average Joe might think should be classified (and maybe some of it should be), but it's only sensitive.

[selil]

Oh I don't know. I have not held a security clearance since 1986. Nor do I want one it would hamper my creativity. I in the last ten years have though had things that I write or have created stamped secret. Or, in other words, stuff that I created I shouldn't know. Which is a bit strange, but has at one job resulted in my computer being confiscated (understanding that all materials used came from inside my head)... I'd have asked if they were going to confiscate my brain but I'm afraid of an answer I don't know.

I like all the classifying agencies and authorities all duking it out. I really think all the Bell-Lapadula scheming and scoping of information is hillarious. It makes me feel much better about the peer review process in science. I can always say that at least science isn't that screwed up.

[Surferbeetle]

An example of a blog (http://kaboomwarjournal.blogspot.com/) that does a good job of capturing the feel of Iraq.


Biggie Smalls: “Why are they all fat-bodies?”
(My crew breaks out into hysterics.)
SGT Cheech: “Too much FOB food, Biggie. They don’t sweat out the pounds all day and night like we do.”
PFC Boomhauer: “Yeah, and I bet even in the rear, they never did PT (physical training.) It sure don’t look like it.”
Biggie Smalls: “That is not fair! They must work hard like us and become slim like us!”
LT G: “Biggie, where did you learn the word ‘fat-body?’
Biggie Smalls: “One of the Big Sergeant’s (SFC Big Country) tough talks with platoon. He say ‘don’t be a fat-body!’ He is very good at yelling.”


The landowning Captain’s plan wasn’t bad. More complex than mine, certainly, but it had more moving parts, and was involving units that had never worked together before. Whereas my plan was like crashing lightning, in and out of there just long enough to nab JAM-Master Flex, this was like rolling thunder, a methodical cordon steeped more in book tactics than situational intelligence. His brief was better than mine, though. Very fluid, no crutch words. And his maps were in color, and had all kinds of cool demographical breakdowns. Shiny is fun, and keeps those of us with the attention span of gerbils entertained.


One of those infinitely delicate and ever-malleable terms in combat is “close call.” For a phrase that is sure to be used in every Iraq War yarn spun in bars across America, it certainly leaves a lot to be desired in terms of exactitude. The Gravediggers certainly have had our fair share of close calls – some of which I’ve written about, some not – and our definition of that elusive axiom obviously carries more legitimacy than some pogues’ close calls with an unexploded mortar round that landed on the other side of the FOB. Conversely however, the killing experts in the Other Units operate on levels of precision and death-defiance that I can barely comprehend, let alone compete with. In the Army, there's always someone else more high speed and more badass. We’ve seen more than most, but some have seen more. Like I said. It’s all relative.

[Spud]

PAO routinely releases photographs and articles which include units, locations, individual names and home towns of soldiers in combat zones, to include the names of operations, etc..

I'm thinking maybe the military needs to "heal themselves" prior to coming down hard on individual servicemembers.

It's an interesting argument and also (unfortunately) one that leaves me so frustrated that I want to punch something (or more often someone).

OPSEC is a measure to protect EEFI from enemy ISR (in simple generic terms). The correct application of OPSEC means taking measures to protect those EEFI from enemy ISR knowing the various forms of collection they will/are likely to/or possibly could undertake (stay with me here I know I'm probably preaching to the converted).

Yet how much time do we put into actually developing our EEFIs? Everyone has seen a published and approved EEFI along the lines of "weapons systems employed by XXX" ... how in the hell are you meant to protect an EEFI that has been dreamed up by some 2 shop guy on a sugar and caffeine hit that is so generic that simply walking outside the armoury breaches it.

EEFIs must be specific ... generic just don't cut it as it leaves too much open to interpretation (although I will admit it makes the staff work a hell of a lot easier). The 2 guys need to provide the threat, the IO/PA guys need to provide the info IPB as to just what is out there officially and what isn't and the 3 guys and the commander need to make a call about what they want to protect (and the associated impacts of applying that EEFI). More importantly the EEFIs need to be reviewed and not just staffed at the beginning of a operations and 6 years later soldiers are still trying to use the same info.

Of course this doesn't just apply to weapons, personal ID is another great one. If we want to protect the identities of our soldiers for OPSEC reasons why do we all wear name tags, unit identifiers and rank on our uniforms when deployed? And then we complain when PA guys use that detail? (Admittedly I've seen so many examples of the PA guys going above and beyond in working out the names of a soldier's first born there is some issues on their behalf as well.) Good OPSEC is more than just what appears in the papers and on the web … it’s a completely cultural thing.

We've been through the mill on this and in reality unless an OPINST has an extremely comprehensive EEFI list (that is based on reality i.e. what can be easily found on official/authorative sites in the public domain already) that is signed by the operational commander it can't hold water. Importantly though to be comprehensive the EEFI list must be highly classified as it essentially details all of those specifics you are trying to protect. In our case the PA guys actually have something to work to in support of the operation and actively seek to be part of the EEFI development process. I would go so far as to say make the PA guys responsible for the staff work to develop the EEFIs (with the J3 as the immediate approving authority). Nothing makes you apply a policy like having some ownership over it.

However my greatest frustration stems from the belief of some of our Coalition partners that our EEFIs are perishable (usually after an operation concludes and everyone wants to pat themselves on the back). If it is an EEFI it remains an EEFI until such point that a commander deems that information no longer requires protection! Thankfully I don't operate in an environment where "the first amendment" seems to be the trump card over good information environment policy.

[Cliff]

Of course this doesn't just apply to weapons, personal ID is another great one. If we want to protect the identities of our soldiers for OPSEC reasons why do we all wear name tags, unit identifiers and rank on our uniforms when deployed? And then we complain when PA guys use that detail?

I've wondered what the Army did about this... pretty much SOP in the AF to "sanitize" and remove all identifying information/patches/nametages prior to flying in combat... most folks have a nametag with just their nickname/callsign on it and that's it... Seems a little silly but I guess we learned the hard way back in Vietnam.

-Cliff

[Culpeper]

The high priests of the Church of the Air Force find anything that requires free thinking and stomps it into the ground. The high priests of the Church of the Air Force take anything they find as a threat to themselves and the future of the Church that they have tasked themselves to protect and create a regulation for it. Going by the regulation is not thinking. It is complying. For some, sadly, if there is not a rule or regulation that has been shoved down their throats for a certain situation than....[fill in the blank].

Example: The Air Force is stilling feeling its way around SOF ever since Reagan's Rapid Deployment Force. Most have not realized that allowing an airman to break certain rules and substitute them with something else in certain situations is actually a good thing and not a threat to the organization but instead a means to an end. This story about blocking blogs is just the tip of the ice berg.

[Schmedlap]

There is a blog by a Navy-type who shows how the military is "alarmed" by relatively minor OPSEC violations, while PAO officers and O-6 and above types publicly "sell out the farm" in their idiotic press releases and public statements.

In OIF V, we had an incident where a PAO issued a press release, giving a very accurate battle damage assessment of a mortar attack. He more or less stated, "on d day at h hour, x mortars were fired from y location and hit such and such location, resulting in xyz damage." Coincidentally, two days later, we saw a video of the attack on an insurgent website and saw a video of the insurgents reciting the battle damage put out by the PAO. That part of that particular FOB got hammered with mortars at that same location numerous times for several weeks. Many wounded, lots of damage, thank you very much, may I have another?

However, I would add that the average rank-and-file servicemember (and possibly civilian) commits plenty of OPSEC SNAFUs that often go unnoticed by many of us. I have seen some of the stuff intercepted by the CI folks and it is amazing to behold what information people think is okay to email to everyone on their personal distro ("check out these photos of the latest rocket attack - good thing they didn't fire this 2 hours later or 200 meters to the east"), or post on their blogs ("here are detailed photos of our patrol base and its vulnerabilities"), or on Google Earth ("this map is outdated - here is where we're really at!")

[Spud]

In OIF V, we had an incident where a PAO issued a press release, giving a very accurate battle damage assessment of a mortar attack. He more or less stated, "on d day at h hour, x mortars were fired from y location and hit such and such location, resulting in xyz damage." Coincidentally, two days later, we saw a video of the attack on an insurgent website and saw a video of the insurgents reciting the battle damage put out by the PAO. That part of that particular FOB got hammered with mortars at that same location numerous times for several weeks. Many wounded, lots of damage, thank you very much, may I have another?


A perfect example of why the artificial firewall that the US places between its uniformed PA staff and the people that actually conduct operations in the global information environment can only result in information fratricide. The sooner PA moves away from being a command support function and becomes and ops function the better. In simple terms the US military's PA capability performs the same function during ops as it does during peacetime ... that is look at us we're good neighbours. You can't criticise the PA guys when your own doctrine and leadership keeps them off to one side, completely silo'd and tells them all day every day that they're losing the information war ... do something to get on the front foot. in 04 when MNF-I STRATCOM was formed and the PA, IO and PD guys all worked in the same room it was completely undercut by cap badge rivalry and politics ... the information lessons learned in Al FAJR continue to to be ignored.

[davidbfpo]

Following the theme and from a different viewpoint. There has been much concern, including public comments by the Director-General of the (UK) Security Service (MI5), on the apparent leaking of information to the media in relation to counter-terrorism operations.

Within the "Whitehall village", akin to within the Beltway, RUSI had a session at a CT conference on the subject of the press and CT (will have to check if now published in their journal).

To illustrate a TV camera crew were in situ for a live CT arrest operation, in which a police SWAT team was involved. Under UK convention, the D Notice system, SF activity is covered, but not the police.

Some suspect "leaks" come from within the "Whitehall village" and have more to do with "spin".

davidbfpo

[Culpeper]

This is the Air Force. This has less to do with OPSEC and more to do with deniability. The latter would be just fine if it pertains strictly to small war doctrine but it doesn't. Shameful opportunists don't want anything with an exchange of ideas on solving problems that are outside of the Air Force box. "Meet the new boss. Same as the old boss". Read "Flying though Midnight". That is the Air Force. Nothing has changed. The Air Force is not like other branches. The Marines train and fight with ability to improvise as necessary right down to a private knowing he may find himself squad leader. The Air Force has no such doctrine. Each position is compartmentalized due to its mission and structure. There are those that do the work and those whose only motivation is self preservation and protection of the Church as an entity. Personally, the Air Force should have remained the Army Air Corps. Ever since then the adage is to get out as soon as you can or you might find yourself doing all the work or even worse become one of the high priests that get the workers killed. You can't apply typical small wars doctrine to what the Air Force makes up as it goes along.

[120mm]

A perfect example of why the artificial firewall that the US places between its uniformed PA staff and the people that actually conduct operations in the global information environment can only result in information fratricide. The sooner PA moves away from being a command support function and becomes and ops function the better. In simple terms the US military's PA capability performs the same function during ops as it does during peacetime ... that is look at us we're good neighbours. You can't criticise the PA guys when your own doctrine and leadership keeps them off to one side, completely silo'd and tells them all day every day that they're losing the information war ... do something to get on the front foot. in 04 when MNF-I STRATCOM was formed and the PA, IO and PD guys all worked in the same room it was completely undercut by cap badge rivalry and politics ... the information lessons learned in Al FAJR continue to to be ignored.

I have to agree, wholeheartedly, with you on this one. PA functions share a lot of similarity with the G6 functions as well....

Too much being done "in a vacuum" or in a parallel system, which leads to the "fratricide" I mention.

[Cliff]

This is the Air Force. This has less to do with OPSEC and more to do with deniability.

What does a Comm Squadron guy blocking certain addresses have to do with deniability? Pretty sure that was not an Air Staff level decision...



The latter would be just fine if it pertains strictly to small war doctrine but it doesn't. Shameful opportunists don't want anything with an exchange of ideas on solving problems that are outside of the Air Force box. "Meet the new boss. Same as the old boss". Read "Flying though Midnight". That is the Air Force. Nothing has changed.

Haven't read that, who is it by?



The Air Force is not like other branches. The Marines train and fight with ability to improvise as necessary right down to a private knowing he may find himself squad leader.

I would strongly disagree with this. Our doctrine and tactics emphasize the fact that at any moment the wingman may have the tac lead or the flight lead, and it can (and does) often change rapidly. Improvisation occurs all the time. Even with the technology becoming closer to the CAOC being able to fly your jet, you are still typically out there on your own with you and three other guys, trying to not get you/them/the grunts killed... Not a very good environment for ironclad "do as I say" doctrine. As a famous man once said, "Flexibility is the key to airpower".

I have been on very few flights where in the debrief we came up with only one right way to skin the cat - it's an art form, not a science. Has been this way since the late 70s when we canned the "welded wingman" tactics... Are you referring to USAF doctrine as a whole, or USAF Small Wars doctrine?


The Air Force has no such doctrine. Each position is compartmentalized due to its mission and structure. There are those that do the work and those whose only motivation is self preservation and protection of the Church as an entity.

I think you can make an arguement that the AF has/is stovepiped/tribalized, but the current Chief is doing a lot to fix that - part of why anyone who isn't deployable is getting cut, and small unit tactics are being added into Basic. Most folks in the Air Force know more about working with the other services and other aircraft than say, a typical Army aviator. My point is that so much of our job is working with the other services, we have no choice but to think outside the "AF Box" as you refer to it. Every major event I have flown in I have worked with USN and USMC folks, and several of them with Army, USCG, and even "other" government agencies.


Personally, the Air Force should have remained the Army Air Corps. Ever since then the adage is to get out as soon as you can or you might find yourself doing all the work or even worse become one of the high priests that get the workers killed. You can't apply typical small wars doctrine to what the Air Force makes up as it goes along.

Sounds like you have had some bad experiences. I don't agree that that is the adage though. While not everyone wants to be a general (thank goodness!), that doesn't mean that folks don't want to serve.

And just what is "small wars doctrine" in the context of airpower?

I have to ask, why is there such rampant Air Force bashing every time it comes up? The AF has changed a lot since Vietnam... informed criticism is helpful and what makes us good, name calling doesn't help you build a better joint team.

V/R,

Cliff

[Culpeper]

I can appreciate your response but I didn't have any bad experience with the Air Force other than Desktops getting in the way of learning how to survive. I just know how the organization operates using its own brand of company language. I can tell you one thing. I was glad my job required being out in the field with the Army and away from desktop officers that make stupid decisions like trying to figure out why web logs are a bad thing. And I did take the advice of the more experienced and got out as soon as I could. My friends that stayed in and retired were like deer in headlights when they came into the world. So much for the 9 to 5 recruitment poster.

Listen, there has always been a lot of criticism about other branches in this current conflict; i.e. mistakes et al. But very little about the Air Force in general. Why should [they] be any different? Like I intimated earlier, this story about blogs is just a symptom of the overall ineffective decision making on the part of the Air Force. The Air Force has made its share of mistakes since 911 and gets a bye because of what? The Air Force even gets a bye for their culpability on losing the Vietnam Conflict. Desktop officers in the Air Force make sure of that by keeping all their dirty little secrets in the box. Thinking or communicating outside the box under any circumstance is heresy. Trust me, no small part of the USAF decided that blogs were bad for airmen. That is is a fairy tale and just an example of the compartmentalization of the organization as a whole. It has been structured since its inception to protect itself and a select few, which it does an excellent job. Thus, it is probably the most dysfunctional branch of the military. Why do you think so many Air Force people that do the work believe the Air Force eats its young?

Next time you are replying to someone that is criticizing the Army or the Marines for mistakes or policy try to avoid assuming that a "bad experience" or resentment is the motivator. That is not part of the company language of the forums.

EDIT:

I forgot the book. I used to think I was the only one that thought something just wasn't right about he USAF until I read this book. This guy is super cool and responds to messages.

http://flyingthroughmidnight.com/

...

[Spud]

Interesting though ... the guy that oversaw the STRATCOM revolution in MNF-I wore blue. Even more intersting was the bloke who wore white who preceded him and the one in green who came after him were active in the downfall of the whole experiment.

[Cliff]

I can appreciate your response but I didn't have any bad experience with the Air Force other than Desktops getting in the way of learning how to survive. I just know how the organization operates using its own brand of company language.

It's hard for me to understand what you are saying here... who are Desktops (is it like a REMF?), and how did they get in the way of learning how to survive? What did you do in the Air Force (sounds like TACP or JTAC but I don't want to assume...)



Listen, there has always been a lot of criticism about other branches in this current conflict; i.e. mistakes et al. But very little about the Air Force in general. Why should [they] be any different?


I think there's been plenty on the AFs mistakes... which is good. I'd note that the AF has pretty much been in a supporting role since the end of OIF I, so it stands to reason that they're not the focus of this particular forum, which focuses on the supported Small Wars fight.



Like I intimated earlier, this story about blogs is just a symptom of the overall ineffective decision making on the part of the Air Force. The Air Force has made its share of mistakes since 911 and gets a bye because of what? The Air Force even gets a bye for their culpability on losing the Vietnam Conflict. Desktop officers in the Air Force make sure of that by keeping all their dirty little secrets in the box. Thinking or communicating outside the box under any circumstance is heresy.

What examples do you have? I don't think the AF has a bye at all since 9-11, or for Vietnam... in fact, the PME course I'm in right now just had an entire lesson about how we screwed up Vietnam by drifting away from our doctrine... doesn't seem like hiding it to me if you put it in the class that everyone has to take.

Do you have examples other than this blocking of the blogs?



Trust me, no small part of the USAF decided that blogs were bad for airmen. That is is a fairy tale and just an example of the compartmentalization of the organization as a whole. It has been structured since its inception to protect itself and a select few, which it does an excellent job. Thus, it is probably the most dysfunctional branch of the military. Why do you think so many Air Force people that do the work believe the Air Force eats its young?


I personally haven't heard of/seen/talked to many people who think the AF eats its young... if anything, the opposite - the AF is too soft is a common complaint.



Next time you are replying to someone that is criticizing the Army or the Marines for mistakes or policy try to avoid assuming that a "bad experience" or resentment is the motivator. That is not part of the company language of the forums.


Your tone was what made me ask about bad experiences... please provide examples of what you're referring to so I can understand your arguement. Otherwise I'm simply left with the emotion you're conveying, which make it hard for me to learn much! I don't think the AF is perfect at all, but I am curious as to what specific mistakes/problems need fixing.

Again, my point is simply that a Comm Squadron or even the AF NOSC deciding to block "blogs" doesn't neccessarily indicate that the AF is trying to hide mistakes or supress dissent...

I know plenty of folks who have come up with bright new ideas and had them turned into TTPs, doctrine, or actual hardware... happens more than you would think. A buddy of mine was an ALO that came up with a lot of cool stuff, and he has more generals asking him what he thinks than you would believe.

Looking forward to your reply.

V/R,

Cliff

[Steve Blair]

What examples do you have? I don't think the AF has a bye at all since 9-11, or for Vietnam... in fact, the PME course I'm in right now just had an entire lesson about how we screwed up Vietnam by drifting away from our doctrine... doesn't seem like hiding it to me if you put it in the class that everyone has to take.

Cliff

I'd be interested in seeing their spin here. Given the structure of the NVN effort, AF doctrine as it existed in the 1960s couldn't have worked. But then again if the Marines have Stalin's PR team (to paraphrase Truman), I've always felt that the AF has his command historians....:)

Which of course is semi-hijacking this thread. Apologies to all.

[Cliff]

Although I guess I am talking about Info War - the AF's info war on it's own folks thru PME? Just kidding.


I'd be interested in seeing their spin here. Given the structure of the NVN effort, AF doctrine as it existed in the 1960s couldn't have worked. But then again if the Marines have Stalin's PR team (to paraphrase Truman), I've always felt that the AF has his command historians....:)

Which of course is semi-hijacking this thread. Apologies to all.

Quick summary: The gist of it was that the doctrine in Vietnam was so far skewed towards strategic bombing - which had morphed into meaning solely a general nuclear war. It ignored the more balanced traditional air doctrine in conventional war in favor of SAC and the SIOP. That got us away from interdiction, CAS, etc. They also talked a lot about the focus on nukes meaning we spent too little money on the tech for conventional war - true when you consider that the first guided bombs were used in WWII, but then it took us till the 70's to make them useable...

Anyway, my point in bringing it up is that the AF does indeed acknowledge and air its mistakes... blocking blogs, agree with it or not, is for security reasons and not for managing dissent.

The art/culture of the debrief has been taken to a high level by the USAF Weapons School, and it is routine for a young LT to openly point out and critique a superior's mistakes in the debrief... even if the superior is the General or Colonel. Not something that could happen a lot if the culture was to repress dissent or critique... and it is definitely why in spite of not having the edge in machines we used to have we still have the best Air Force in the world (not that I am biased!).

V/R,

Cliff

[Steve Blair]

But all that does is indicate that they were following their doctrine at the time. And as I pointed out, the general consensus is that their 1960s doctrine could not really work in that setting. Granted, is a big step for the AF to look back and admit that something didn't work, but it is a touch disingenuous to look at it through current doctrine.

USAF Weapons School debriefs are one thing...moving forward with doctrine is another. And I would tend to put blocking blogs down to some sort of routine cluster**** on the part of some sysadmin. We see more than a few of those out here.

[Cliff]

But all that does is indicate that they were following their doctrine at the time. And as I pointed out, the general consensus is that their 1960s doctrine could not really work in that setting. Granted, is a big step for the AF to look back and admit that something didn't work, but it is a touch disingenuous to look at it through current doctrine.

USAF Weapons School debriefs are one thing...moving forward with doctrine is another. And I would tend to put blocking blogs down to some sort of routine cluster**** on the part of some sysadmin. We see more than a few of those out here.

They were comparing it to the ACTS, doctrine during WWII, etc. The point was that between the end of WWII and 1986 or so (GW-N) the AF drifted away from its founding doctrine to become a "strategic-nuclear" focused force... the lesson talked about how the Army did a better job articulating AF doctrine in AirLand battle than the AF did.

As for the USAFWS debriefs, they set the culture of the combat air forces, and are starting to do so for the mobility folks as well. Culture begets doctrine, IMHO - if your culture is one of a no-holds-barred, no-rank debrief, then that's what your doctrine will come to support in time. In spite of what the folks at CADRE and Maxwell would have you believe, the operators do get a say, not just the folks at Air University!

V/R,

Cliff

[Culpeper]

Cliff

We can go back and forth. But the debate ended when I thought we would continue to disagree. I've learned the hard way to avoid that. I do appreciate you responses and will leave you with the last word.

[wrongful1212]

I never know about wars related council.thanks for sharing anyway


wrongful death
lawyer (wrongful-deathlawyers.com)