Who are the great generals?

[Fred III]

Previous comments have Zinni on peoples' lists. I'd concur and think that if we had him there instead of Franks, it would be a very different ball game now.

All this is a fun parlor game, but the real issue Yingling's article got me thinking about is why, with all our professional education, service Academies, and other "challenges" and "opportunities" do we have so precious few around like these today?


Jayhawker—

I completely agree with your comment about Zinni versus Franks. Just thinking about it is enough to cause “shorter teeth syndrome.”

As for your second point, I think there are a couple of issues. First of all, I believe the system discourages it and the “system” is part of society. For the last 40 years we have been living in a society that revels in constantly lowering the bar—for everything. I think the potentially great generals are present—Petraeus may be one, though I believe it is way too early to tell... and... we may never find out anyway—but the “corporate” mentality of the military tends to keep people in the pack. I suspect, however, that it has always been that way. And it fits with what we want. We boost the underachiever at the expense of those who excel; we always do, even in schools. Instead of spending money to move smarter ones further ahead, we spend the money trying to make the slower ones equal, wondering why they can’t be just as intelligent. All sorts of things fall to the wayside: discipline, manners, dedication. I believe the quality is there; I just do not believe there is sufficient reason for “society” to call on it. Plus, the risks of “labeling” are too great. The Curtis LeMay discussion is a good, early example. You have a WWII genius denigrated and smoked into obscurity because of a remark (that was probably correct, but poorly timed). How about if Ike or MacArthur made such a comment in 1944?

WWII was a catastrophe of a magnitude we will probably never see again. Today’s “war on terror” has become an exercise in face-saving. If it weren’t, we would be winning it. You wouldn’t have generals hauled before congressional idiots who know as much about what should be done—militarily—in Iraq and Afghanistan as my Yorkie. Yet it doesn’t appear to me we have enough backbone to scream to someone about how this thing can be won. It took 3 1/2 years from entry to exit for the U. S. commitment in WWII... and now? Yet you cannot say “draft,” you cannot scream “quadruple the troops!,” you cannot raid Pakistan to clean this modern-day Hammurabi and his bad-haired hash-heads out of their yurts…. No, none of this is the “correct” thing to do. We are entirely too collegial, not only amongst ourselves, but with everyone else. The only problem with that is if we do not take care of ourselves, no one else will chip in to help. Look at the tepid commitment—everywhere. What does Bush call it? The “coalition of the willing” or some such up-chuck. I almost hate to say it, but sometimes I think the only thing that will help will be more 9/11’s, then maybe you will have some leadership step forward that will not care so much about their next star or pip or the “minority” vote or the belly-aching of the great unwashed troglodytes holed-up somewhere in some unpronounceable desert. Waziristan? Sounds like something out of “The Mouse That Roared.” We don’t need great generals today; we’re fighting this so-called war from the shopping malls. How about another hair salon? Anyone for another housing development? Ho-hum! Except, of course, to those who serve; except, of course, to those who bury… but what the hell… that doesn’t affect Americans now, does it? “Quick, Mr.-Man-On-The-Street, point out Iraq on this map! How about Tajikistan!” “Huh?”

Remember, no one knew who the great generals were before WWII. Who was it, Sir Basil Liddell Hart? who proclaimed the German generals of WWII the greatest assemblage of military genius the world has ever known [paraphrased] and then went on to say that America produced a surprising number of very fine generals of its own—at just the right time. Uh-huh!

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Jayhawker]

Fred,

Warning: This post's coherence is threatened due to a long day writing about French communists. ;)

When I think of what people like Ike and U. S. Grant did, before their war came along that gave them their chance to show their stuff, it seems it was all happenstance. Grant even left the Army! Ike was puttin' in his retirement papers or nearly. They'd both been to West Point, and Ike had been to CGSC at Ft Leavenworth, but where did they learn the skills they put in use? Ike only had a command for a brief time, and missed combat in WWI. Grant at least had Mexico. I haven't looked at this closely, but it seems they both enjoyed their time in the Army when working for people who let them use their imagination to think and solve problems and when it went bad, they didn't get fired for their efforts. So perhaps it comes down to practicing how to think on your own. Being pragmatic, practical and understanding the reality in which you find yourself.

Anyway, our post WWII organization men, which I think one would have to included Ike in that mindset, sought to create organizations that would produce leaders. However they underestimated the power of organizations to do what we create them to do, which is create a false situation that only stagnates over time. Nor will they do what the nation needs them to do unless Pearl Harbor happens. I had thought Sept 11th would serve to be another Pearl Harbor, but even Stimson and Knox were nervous about how long the American people could last when they saw Navy war plans running the war out until 1947! (Can you say island hopping? Yeah, that sounds better than 1947!)

We need a Donovan (of OSS fame) coupled with a Wendell Willkie who ran an internationalist foreign policy vs the isolationists in his own party that took the wind out of the sails of the opposition on that issue giving FDR a longer leash. Instead we have Chertoff and Grandma Nancy.

By the way, if the list had gone to 11, I'd put Donovan there.

[Fred III]

Sorry, Jayhawker. I had answered your post, but it appears this darned system "whacked" it. It got lost when I hit the "submit" button. I will try again later.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Fred III]

Jayhawker—

Back for another try!

I started out by complimenting you on your post and wondering how in heaven’s name anyone could survive a day with French communism!

Anyway, while I take some exception to your top-11 list, I totally agree with your contention about Ike and Grant. The problem, I believe, however, is systemic and I think has always existed in this country. It is more societal than endemic to our military and I think it permeates almost every aspect of our lives. While I am not a sociologist or anthropologist, I see it as the “cover-your-butt” syndrome where someone has to be blamed and it damned well better not be me! This is one of the reasons I harp about the “corporate” mentality of our army and not in merely its structure or organization. I often wonder why we need to send officers to Harvard for an MBA or to some other school for some equally un-military education. But “blame” is the game and too often the consequences are too harsh for the wrong, so it always becomes someone else’s fault. “Responsibility” has become a dirty word, despite all the preaching. The problem is, there is always someone in the wings waiting to jump into the void… and often for the wrong reasons and this is most prevalent in the corporate world and in the political arena.

I’ll give you an example. Some time ago there was some sort of muck-up with the airlines. You know, the typical: late planes; no one allowed off; and the rest. The only guy to step forward—and maybe because his was the only airline, I don’t quite remember—was the CEO of Jet Blue. He took full responsibility. I was stunned when I heard him. So the problem was fixed. (And I think he lost his job!) Yet people, rather than applaud the man for his veracity, swore they would never fly Jet Blue again, despite the supposed “fixing.” What if the guy lied and blamed the FAA or the airports or someone else? Would that have kept the sclerotic customers?

Now here is the other side of the coin and the side we seem to be the most comfortable with. There is a real storm brewing about the cholesterol drugs Vytorin and Zetia and their makers, Schering and Merck. It’s already hit the fan because there are accusations about a report being delayed, downplayed, and the drugs largely ineffective if not contributory. The blame game is about to begin and fingers will start pointing at everyone but those really responsible. It’s the American way and enough blame will be disseminated so no one will have to take too big a hit. It’s always the other guy’s fault. Well, this is the same attitude that permeates the military, but I think it always has and so I have to believe the talent is there, it is just hidden. The problem is, will we ever see it? Will anyone ever scream loudly enough? I realize civilian control is paramount, but that is the president, not the hacks in defense. Oh, I know, chain-of-command and all that, but somewhere in there is a constitutional question that is eminently solvable. And if the clowns who protect Bush would do their job properly, we would find out if Bush is the problem (yes!) or he is just keeping his head in the sand (yes, too!)—which I guess is the problem, anyway.

The problem with an event like 9/11 is that the whole thing was too regionalized. I don’t mean that comment to be crude or flippant, but I think it is reality and the now-perceived threat is a zillion miles away. The screaming has died down and what is paramount now is the money and the shunting of responsibility. Also, the perception of success. Take this to the bank: success will be touted from now until inauguration day. That way, when reality hits, someone else can take the blame. And if success turns out to be real (don’t hold your breath!) the credit can be taken by the current incumbent. Ah-h-h, legacy!

I often wonder what it would have been like if Westmoreland had been replaced by DePuy and DePuy had been told, “Win the war.” Or is that unfair? Would the “rules” have been changed?

Maybe it’s just my 67-year old cynicism, but… take heart. The good guys are already there. They are just waiting for the disaster to strike. That’s when they will overcome the system.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Tempest1991]

O.K don't shoot down this addition to the list too quickly but i'd like to make it

David Stirling.

I know he wasn't an actual general by rank but he did command an unit during the Africa campaign of WW2 that chose their own targets and so it was him, with help from his subordinates, that decdied where to take risks.

Also he showed considerable abilty to adapt as after Op Squatter went completely wrong he understood that it was time to change tactics and start to use the LRDG (Long Range desert Group, i think, can't be sure right now) to ferry his men to their targets.

Also the unit he created was credited with disabling more Axis aircraft over a 6 month period than the entire Allied air force in the area. Stirling took his orginial idea and created a unit that is commonally accepted to be the best special forces unit in the world.

oh and Sabutai obviously.

Scott.

P.S if any of these facts are wrong i apoligise.

[LetUsHavePeace]

To appreciate what Ike and Grant accomplished, you have to know how much direct experience they had with logistics. It explains why Eisenhower was chosen to command the largest seaborne invasion of all time and why Grant was able to defeat every Confederate Army that he faced. Eisenhower commanded the first transcontinental truck convoy - what was literally the motorized equivalent of the Lewis and Clark expedition. Grant was a teamster by the time he was 9; by 12 he was making overnight deliveries for the family tannery and being sent alone to do horse buying. (One of Grant's favorite jokes on himself was the story he told about his first negotiation with a man who wanted to sell a horse. "I told the man that my father had said that I was to offer $12 and if he wouldn't take it, I was to pay $14. I paid $14.") In the Mexican War Grant literally had to sneak forward to join the actual fighting because he had been assigned to supply - not as punishment but as an acknowledgement of his ability to get the job done.
An earlier post suggested that Ike and Grant "both enjoyed their time in the Army when working for people who let them use their imagination to think and solve problems and when it went bad, they didn't get fired for their efforts." That was not true about Grant. He had to quit the Army because he was threatened with a court martial if he did not resign - allegedly for being drunk but, in truth, for repeatedly trying to do something about the shabby state of the enlisted men's quarters. Eisenhower did not "get fired" but he spent nearly two decades wishing that he could quit. He found working for MacArthur so maddening that it drove him to develop his 2-pack a day smoking habit. When he was on Staff in D.C., he read all of Zane Grey's novels - TWICE - while waiting for something to do. Ike stayed because he felt he had no choice - he had to support his family. Grant left for the same reason; he could not make enough in the Army to have his family with him.
Both men were constitutionally incapable of taking much crap. That was the key to their eventual success, but it made neither man's career easy.

[Ceaser]

I would say some of the best generals of all time would be
Alexander the Great
Napoleon
Julius Caesar
Hitler
Eisenhower
Robert E. Lee
Sun Tzu
Hannibal

[jmm99]

You might want to introduce yourself - perhaps here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=87218#post87218).

And check your spelling on my fellow lawyer, Julius Caesar (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julius_Caesar).

I'd vote for a person from the Reindeer People, trained as a blacksmith, whose name is variously spelled. Richard Gabriel uses Subotai (good recent 2006 book (http://www.amazon.com/Genghis-Khans-Greatest-General-Subotai/dp/0806137347) on his campaigns); Wiki has him Subutai (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subutai). Best of the best for conventional mobile warfare.

Regards

Mike

[Fuchs]

I would say some of the best generals of all time would be
Alexander the Great
Napoleon
Julius Ceaser
Hitler
Eisenhower
Robert E. Lee
Sun Tzu
Hannibal

I have doubts about Alexander. His methods were rather primitive, he just had the right army to succeed and had a galactic coward as chief opponent.

Napoleon - OK. He's along with Caesar someone who skipped the "the Great" honorific and instead made it to a synonym (although a rather short-lived one).

Hitler? Sorry, but I'm certainly a better general than him. His detail memory was great (no wonder - he was pumped with drugs), that's about it. The genius was Manstein and Manstein had the luck of being part of a competent army that was backed by the No2 industrialized economy and he had people like Guderian who prepared a lot.

Eisenhower? Well, I personally consider his art equal to the managing capabilities of a Rotterdam harbour manager. He was able to move huge quantities of supplies around with an appropriate managing organization.

Lee? It always looked to me as if Lee was at most comparable to Hannibal - great success only as long as the enemy generals were inept.

Sun Tzu?
We don't even know for sure whether he ever lived or ever was in command of more than servants. Maybe "his" work is just a compilation.

Hannibal
Mentioned previously; no great success without inept enemy leadership. His Zama battle order was very unimaginative.


Maybe we should ditch the Western-centric views a bit.

How about some Mongol leaders? One of them rose from a clan leader to master of much of Asia IIRC.

Or Timur the Great anyone?

Manstein?

I'm sure the Indians had many great generals as well. Some Indian military history would be nice. It's a blank spot in my memory.

Pompey? His anti-piracy campaign should embarrass our navies.

Belisarius?

Epaminondas?

[William F. Owen]

I would say some of the best generals of all time would be
Alexander the Great
Napoleon
Julius Ceaser
Hitler
Eisenhower
Robert E. Lee
Sun Tzu
Hannibal

OK, but why?

Napoleon - Really? Won a lot of battles but ensured his own demise by failing to understand to what purpose war was is suppose to serve? Good tactician, very poor strategist.

Hitler - understood little about the use of war a political instrument, and was a very poor strategist. He was also an idiotic tactician.

Robert E. Lee - and compared to Sherman or Grant?

Sun Tzu - if he existed, and if what is said is true.

Hannibal Huh? Hannibal the idiot? This was a man who could not stop Rome generating armies and, like Napoleon, lost because he did not understand the political nature of his endeavour.

[tequila]

Hannibal Huh? Hannibal the idiot? This was a man who could not stop Rome generating armies and, like Napoleon, lost because he did not understand the political nature of his endeavour.

Idiot's a bit strong.

Hannibal had to conduct an economy of force mission inside Italy. He never had enough forces to secure his local Latin allies against Rome's superior manpower. The Latin cities, chiefly Tarentum and Capua, that he did split off could not survive without Hannibal to protect them.

If Carthage had managed to reinforce Hannibal with enough forces (say, if Hasdrubal had won at Metaurus) to either besiege Rome and force a battle or secure enough Latin allies to create a bulwark in Italy against Rome, he very likely could have forced Rome to a peace.

[William F. Owen]

Idiot's a bit strong.
Yes it is, but I get really sick of folks saying how Hannibal was a great general. That belief shows we do no teach strategy. The history channel recently had a whole bunch of old soldiers saying how great Hannibal was... :mad: - and does no one read books anymore?
Yes he could win battles, but he never put those wins to a coherent purpose. He never connected tactical victory with strategic aim.


Hannibal had to conduct an economy of force mission inside Italy. He never had enough forces to secure his local Latin allies against Rome's superior manpower. The Latin cities, chiefly Tarentum and Capua, that he did split off could not survive without Hannibal to protect them.

If Carthage had managed to reinforce Hannibal with enough forces (say, if Hasdrubal had won at Metaurus) to either besiege Rome and force a battle or secure enough Latin allies to create a bulwark in Italy against Rome, he very likely could have forced Rome to a peace.
Rome and the Senate was what allowed the Romans to raise armies. If you don't take Rome, you cannot win. I would further suggest that merely besieging Rome might have got him what he wanted, but he never seems to have even tried.

[MikeF]

Yes it is, but I get really sick of folks saying how Hannibal was a great general. That belief shows we do no teach strategy. The history channel recently had a whole bunch of old soldiers saying how great Hannibal was... :mad: - and does no one read books anymore?
Yes he could win battles, but he never put those wins to a coherent purpose. He never connected tactical victory with strategic aim.


Rome and the Senate was what allowed the Romans to raise armies. If you don't take Rome, you cannot win. I would further suggest that merely besieging Rome might have got him what he wanted, but he never seems to have even tried.

Wilf,

Your comments on the previous generals is interesting. Rereading through your reasoning, should one expand the definition of a great general to include:

1. Good tactical prowess.
2. Understanding strategy.
3. Understanding the Enemy's Center of Gravity.
4. Political influence to raise the people, guns, and money needed to accomplish one's campaign.

Mike

[tequila]

I would further suggest that merely besieging Rome might have got him what he wanted, but he never seems to have even tried.

He laid siege to Rome in 211 BC as part of an attempt to relieve the Roman attack on Capua. The Romans knew, however, that his forces were not sufficient to launch an assault on the city defenses nor to launch a blockade, and they didn't panic nor did they withdraw from Capua.

[William F. Owen]

He laid siege to Rome in 211 BC as part of an attempt to relieve the Roman attack on Capua. The Romans knew, however, that his forces were not sufficient to launch an assault on the city defenses nor to launch a blockade, and they didn't panic nor did they withdraw from Capua.
OK news to me. I thought he only ever marched towards Rome in a fairly desperate attempt to draw the Romans of Capua - and why didn't he do it before??

[William F. Owen]

1. Good tactical prowess.
2. Understanding strategy.
3. Understanding the Enemy's Center of Gravity.
4. Political influence to raise the people, guns, and money needed to accomplish one's campaign.


Ideally, but it should really be an overall understanding of what he is being asked to do and how he is going to do it.
So some of my favourites are,

Wellington
Bill Slim
William T. Sherman
John Monash
Edmund Allenby

...guys who quietly and methodically did what they were told to do.

[tequila]

Well, it wasn't much of a siege, more like a forlorn hope that the Romans would panic and withdraw from the Capuan siege to offer open battle. The Romans knew that Hannibal didn't have the forces for a genuine siege that would inflict pain on the city, much less an assault, so they just proceeded to take Capua.

Likely the reason he didn't do it before was he knew it wouldn't work, but he had to try something to save his Capuan allies. Depending on blind Roman aggression had worked for him before, after all. But he'd taught these Romans caution too well, which is a lot more than you can say for most Roman enemies.

[Fuchs]

Logistics-wise Hannibal was an invader who turned into an insurgency leader.
He was quite adept at politics, in a tough environment.

I am ready to believe that he didn't have the means to come to a victory.

His campaign costed little if anything to his country, though - so it would have been imprudent to accept defeat and suffer the consequences earlier.

My focus when judging him was that his great battle successes depended on careless enemy leadership, which de-values those successes. Many generals in history would have achieved as much if not more against equally careless opposition.
A similar argument can be made about the German successes in WW2.

[Rifleman]

...guys who quietly and methodically did what they were told to do.

Thomas Jonathan Jackson?

[j earl]

Top five for me:


Marius

Caesar

Puller

Lee

Patraeus

[William F. Owen]

Patraeus
Care to offer evidence? How does Patraeus make a list devoid of Patton and Zukhov - or even Templer?

[Fuchs]

Top five for me:


Marius

Caesar

Puller

Lee

Patraeus

Three Americans (USA: less than a quarter century in existence) in an all-time global top five list? This sounds biased.

In fact I doubt four on your list very much; only G.J. Caesar is a top 20 candidate.

[Rifleman]

(USA: less than a quarter century in existence)

Did you mean to say less than a quarter millenium?

[Fuchs]

Yes, of course. #### happens...

[MikeF]

Lee

Lee lost and his land was turned into a cemetary. What would Giap or Mao think about Lee?

[John T. Fishel]

can't tell a Southroner nuthin bad bout Marse Robert!:rolleyes:

cheers

JohnT

[MikeF]

Y'allcan't tell a Southroner nuthin bad bout Marse Robert!:rolleyes:

cheers

JohnT

I'm very glad that none of my family visits this site. They already think that I was brainwashed from being out in California too long:eek:. Maybe I shouldn't have told them that I disavowed the Republican party, the Southern Baptist Convention, and I no longer like watching cars go around in circles:D. If they find out what I just said about Robert, an intervention will definitely be happening soon.

[Firn]

Wellington
Bill Slim
William T. Sherman
John Monash
Edmund Allenby



Every single one of them spoke English, and three out five from the UK and Ireland. Four out of five served in the last century. This list seems to be rather biased :p

All in all I do rate Hannibal still highly. Knowing well the context and the circumstances it is difficult to lay much blame at his doorstep.


Firn

[marct]

In fact I doubt four on your list very much; only G.J. Caesar is a top 20 candidate.

Oh, I would put Marius as a contender for the top 20 ;).

[j earl]

Defense:

Marius: reformed Roman army, elected Consul 7 times, defeated Teutones and Cimbri, saved Rome.

Lee: I have to mention him or I will be struck by lightning: D. He did happen, with limited resources, to win a series of battles against superior forces and in the end he was smart enough to reconcile. Not sure I understand the reference to Giap. Giap, to my knowledge, never decisively defeated the Americans in a single battle. Dien Bien Phu was a French blunder more so than a brilliant victory by Giap.

Petraeus: Petraeus inherited a lost cause in what has to be one of the most complex civil wars in history and implemented COIN operations that drastically reduced casualties and violence. All this while public support was on the decline and in the face of a hostile government.

[William F. Owen]

Every single one of them spoke English, and three out five from the UK and Ireland. Four out of five served in the last century. This list seems to be rather biased.
Sure it's biased. I make no excuse. You might also note they were all on the winning side!
They are the guys that work for me, in terms of what can be learnt. Comparing Generals is essentially a fashion statement. It says far more about me, than it does the Generals.

The useful element here is finding out WHY folks think certain generals are great, not WHO!

Petraeus: Petraeus inherited a lost cause in what has to be one of the most complex civil wars in history and implemented COIN operations that drastically reduced casualties and violence. All this while public support was on the decline and in the face of a hostile government.
....and I disagree with nearly every single item of that description - as would a few other denizens of this board :wry:

[j earl]

....and I disagree with nearly every single item of that description - as would a few other denizens of this board :wry:

Interesting, I think most of my points can be quantified with statistics, except the complexity part (subjective of course). Is your disagreement with Petraeus' involvement or that the situation has not improved? Certainly I realize the ideas are not unique to him and that many advisors took part in this strategy.

[MikeF]

Defense:
Lee: I have to mention him or I will be struck by lightning: D. He did happen, with limited resources, to win a series of battles against superior forces and in the end he was smart enough to reconcile. Not sure I understand the reference to Giap. Giap, to my knowledge, never decisively defeated the Americans in a single battle. Dien Bien Phu was a French blunder more so than a brilliant victory by Giap.

Dude, I feel you. I respect Robert E. Lee. I wish that I was a bit more like him in some respects. I also respect Dan Marino, but how many SuperBowls did he win? I included Giap for a specific reason. He didn't win many battles, but he won two wars- one of rebellion against a foreign occupation, one against a foreign invader. Dr. Fishel is just gonna shake his head and laugh as he reads this, but I'd suggest that you take some time to read up on the eastern forms of warfare. You'll learn a lot ;).

[John T. Fishel]

Why would I shake my head and laugh? In my Capstone course on War and Conflict from ancient times... this week the class discusses Sun Tzu. I would certainly suggest that in his free time Jamey read the old Chinese dude. I agree with you about Giap.

cheers

JohnT

[MikeF]

Why would I shake my head and laugh? In my Capstone course on War and Conflict from ancient times... this week the class discusses Sun Tzu. I would certainly suggest that in his free time Jamey read the old Chinese dude. I agree with you about Giap.

cheers

JohnT

Sorry John. That just shows the limits of the internet. I thought that you'd laugh from the prospect of Jamey being challenged outside of the regular university instructors. Wilf, Fuchs, and myself already beat him up a bit, and he'll be smarter for it. I did not mean to imply that you had not read the eastern works.

He'll tell his friends about SWJ, and the movement will spread. We'll all be better for it.

[j earl]

No superbowl, but he is still considered a great QB :D . Seriously, yes I should probably study more of the eastern side of warfare, usually I cannot get past the whole proverbial "if your enemy is stronger than you, avoid him" this is common sense stuff. What do you suggest as a good primer?

Maybe I am a bit brainwashed, but I tend to view Vietnam as a matter of failed foreign policy. In regards to strategy, one side operated under restraints, the other did not. Tough one to call.

[j earl]

Actually, I am pretty much snowed in up here in DC. I saw a couple of the guys down in the lobby and they asked what I have been doing for the last couple days. When I told them I have been arguing with people on SWJ, they thought I have finally gone mad. But I told them to check it out, so maybe a few more newbies on the way.

[FlyFisher]

How about some generals who’s main claim to fame (or lack thereof) was not on the battlefield but who played critical parts in their army’s successes? I’d toss out a handful from the past couple hundred years:
• Scharnhorst, or Gneisenau if you prefer, for their involvement in recreating the Prussian Army after the disaster at Jena and the ultimate defeat of the Corsican Ogre.
• Berthier (said Corsican Ogre’s chief of staff)
• John Cowans (Britain’s QMG of the Forces from 1912 through 1919 during their army’s expansion from imperial constabulary to a first-rate continental army)
• Marshall (oversaw an expansion even bigger than Cowans amongst a “few” other things).

Re: Petraeus—it’s way too early to make any call on him. We can still argue the merits of WWII commanders and are still uncovering things in the archives; give it 30 to 50 years until the historians have had a chance to rummage around in the documents and until we’ve got some temporal distance to allow for better assessments of what happened (rather than what’s still happening).

[MikeF]

No superbowl, but he is still considered a great QB :D . Seriously, yes I should probably study more of the eastern side of warfare, usually I cannot get past the whole proverbial "if your enemy is stronger than you, avoid him" this is common sense stuff. What do you suggest as a good primer?

Maybe I am a bit brainwashed, but I tend to view Vietnam as a matter of failed foreign policy. In regards to strategy, one side operated under restraints, the other did not. Tough one to call.

I'd start here (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PKpQRjj_WbU). The Vietnam veterans will give you better advice.

[j earl]

I'd start here (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PKpQRjj_WbU). The Vietnam veterans will give you better advice.

:D haha! I hoping for something with a little more substance. I guess the argument means Jim McMahon was a great QB :p

[Ken White]

Petraeus inherited a lost cause in what has to be one of the most complex civil wars in history...Huh? Basis for that statement?

I thought it was extraordinarily simple compared to half dozen others, not least ours -- or Viet Nam's (45 years worth...). Much less the British; Taiping; Russian...

And speaking of Veet Nam, Don't believe the myth that Giap never won any battles. He may not have been in direct command but his forces won a slew of battles with US forces and even more against the ARVN -- the ones they lost were the larger efforts where the US was able to out number the opposition temporarily. When the bad guy initiates over 75% of your force on force contacts, he is emphatically not a loser. Viet Nam was a failure of foreign policy, no question -- but the US Armed Forces did NOT do it at all well. While some US units did very well, the one year tour (Personnel Policy). our training (Training Policy) and equipment all were problematic (R&D, Procurement and sustainment policies) all meant there was no consistency in US unit performance whreas Clyde and the PAVN / NVA were remarkably consistent. Giap did a better job IMO than any US General from WW II through today.

[MikeF]

:D haha! I hoping for something with a little more substance. I guess the argument means Jim McMahon was a great QB :p

First, as you touched a nerve, the 1985 Bears rocked. McMahon led Steve Dent, Walter Payton, and Refridgerator Perry to victory....As you study this stuff more, you'll realize that it's never about one man.

Second, that song encompasses everything. You just have to learn to listen. No worries brother. When I was your age, my only concern was rugby and women:cool:. So, you have a leg up in that department.

As for serious studies, I honestly don't know where to start....Watch We were Soldiers and read Andrew Kreprenevich's The Army and Vietnam.

[j earl]

Huh? Basis for that statement?

I thought it was extraordinarily simple compared to half dozen others, not least ours -- or Viet Nam's (45 years worth...). Much less the British; Taiping; Russian...

Admittedly, other than Vietnam, I do not know details of the other civil wars, so I will give a few examples of what I consider complex (I just submitted a paper on sort of this same topic, maybe I will post it as well, it compares Tell Me How This Ends by Linda Robinson to Caesar Civil Wars):

An "infidel army" , that created a power vacuum now occupies the country.
The conflct between Shia and Sunni
The conflict amongst tribes and clans.
Support from Iran and Syria
Al Queda
Political mistakes along the way
Clash of cultures etc etc.

How do the others compare? When I say complex, I speak mainly of the social divides in play amongst belligerents.

[j earl]

Giap seems to have a pretty big following here, so I will cede this one. We will just have to agree to disagree. No worries, the great thing about a free country is we can believe what we want :) .

[Rex Brynen]

An "infidel army" , that created a power vacuum now occupies the country.
The conflct between Shia and Sunni
The conflict amongst tribes and clans.
Support from Iran and Syria
Al Queda
Political mistakes along the way
Clash of cultures etc etc.

.

How is that more complex than, say, the Lebanese civil war? DR Congo? Sudan? Somalia? Afghanistan? Indochina (a series of linked civil wars spanning Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia)?

[j earl]

How is that more complex than, say, the Lebanese civil war? DR Congo? Sudan? Somalia? Afghanistan? Indochina (a series of linked civil wars spanning Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia)?

Sorry, the topic is great Generals. I was using the example to make a case for Gen Petraeus, in my misguided attempt to say maybe some great Generals are serving today, premature I know, but still. Not to discount other conflicts, but if the topic is "great" generals then this is my case.

[MikeF]

Giap seems to have a pretty big following here, so I will cede this one. We will just have to agree to disagree. No worries, the great thing about a free country is we can believe what we want :) .

You need to read Mao. He speaks to the People Revolution. The same thing that Dave Matthews Band (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F2UyNQAktSE), Rage against the Machine (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wu67yo-3jfw), and Johnny Cash sing (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mB6P2FFP76I) about. Before you take a stand, I'd suggest that you read my article, "The Break Point (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/50-few.pdf)." It'll introduce you to Mao and an SF guy in Vietnam.

Mike

[Ken White]

but don't let that bother you, seriously, you've got tons of company. There's a tremendous amount of misinformation out there about it and it was a confusing war in a confusing time. You might want to read this (LINK) (http://www.amazon.com/25-Year-War-Americas-Military-Vietnam/dp/0813190363), it's more accurate than many of the oft touted books by Academics.
Admittedly, other than Vietnam, I do not know details of the other civil wars...and if that quote is true, was it not a bit sweeping to say that Iraq was "one of the most complex civil wars in history..." Just asking...
How do the others compare? When I say complex, I speak mainly of the social divides in play amongst belligerents.You're the student so you can study those differences. I'd suggest that social divides are only rarely the most important aspect in the definition of 'complex' with respect to wars... :eek:
Giap seems to have a pretty big following here, so I will cede this one. We will just have to agree to disagree. No worries, the great thing about a free country is we can believe what we want.His following here or elsewhere is not the issue -- what he accomplished should be.

Yes, we can believe what we want -- credibility is gained when one reacts to facts, not beliefs.

You've confused me -- that's easy to do, I'm old -- are you ceding on Giap or are you agreeing to disagree? I'm uneducated but I don't think one can occupy both those positions at once... :confused: ;)

[j earl]

You need to read Mao. He speaks to the People Revolution. The same thing that Dave Matthews Band (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F2UyNQAktSE), Rage against the Machine (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wu67yo-3jfw), and Johnny Cash sing (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mB6P2FFP76I) about. Before you take a stand, I'd suggest that you read my article, "The Break Point (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/50-few.pdf)." It'll introduce you to Mao and an SF guy in Vietnam.

Mike

Thanks, will check it out tonight!

[Rex Brynen]

Sorry, the topic is great Generals. I was using the example to make a case for Gen Petraeus, in my misguided attempt to say maybe some great Generals are serving today, premature I know, but still. Not to discount other conflicts, but if the topic is "great" generals then this is my case.

As I remember, the subissue that you raised was complexity of the civil war, specifically:


[Iraq] has to be one of the most complex civil wars in history

:wry:

Given that, it's not yet clear to me that Petraeus was strikingly more successful, than say, Major-General Ghazi Kanaan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghazi_Kanaan) or Paul Kagame (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Kagame).

[j earl]

but don't let that bother you, seriously, you've got tons of company. There's a tremendous amount of misinformation out there about it and it was a confusing war in a confusing time. You might want to read this (LINK) (http://www.amazon.com/25-Year-War-Americas-Military-Vietnam/dp/0813190363), it's more accurate than many of the oft touted books by Academics.and if that quote is true, was it not a bit sweeping to say that Iraq was "one of the most complex civil wars in history..." Just asking...You're the student so you can study those differences. I'd suggest that social divides are only rarely the most important aspect in the definition of 'complex' with respect to wars... :eek:His following here or elsewhere is not the issue -- what he accomplished should be.

Yes, we can believe what we want -- credibility is gained when one reacts to facts, not beliefs.

You've confused me -- that's easy to do, I'm old -- are you ceding on Giap or are you agreeing to disagree? I'm uneducated but I don't think one can occupy both those positions at once... :confused: ;)

Thanks for the feedback. I say cede meaning I will yeild and not pursue the argument at this point. Since I will probably not have a chance to learn of every conflict, my use of "one of the most" was not an absolute. But in the conversation of great generals, I will stick to my view point that I rank others higher than him.

Good night all!

[Kiwigrunt]

Watch We were Soldiers

I would suggest reading the book as opposed to watching the movie. Much better and only partly because the movie only covers part one of the book. Part two could be an eye opener after the movie and part one.

[William F. Owen]

Interesting, I think most of my points can be quantified with statistics, except the complexity part (subjective of course). Is your disagreement with Petraeus' involvement or that the situation has not improved? Certainly I realize the ideas are not unique to him and that many advisors took part in this strategy.

My current contention is that Patraeus was in charge when things got better. At the moment, there simply is not the evidence to credit him having the degree of personal responsibility some seem to want to attribute to him. Signing off on someone else's a good idea does not make you the man of the moment.

....and as a "war" Iraq is pretty small beans. US casualties never got about 200 a month. Ken White's fought in two wars were US KIA reached over 1,000 in one calender month.

[j earl]

Ken White's fought in two wars were US KIA reached over 1,000 in one calender month.

I am thankful for Ken White and his service. Because of people like him we here in the United States (and many countries around the world) can enjoy spirited discussions of this nature.

[Bob's World]

My current contention is that Patraeus was in charge when things got better. At the moment, there simply is not the evidence to credit him having the degree of personal responsibility some seem to want to attribute to him. Signing off on someone else's a good idea does not make you the man of the moment.

....and as a "war" Iraq is pretty small beans. US casualties never got about 200 a month. Ken White's fought in two wars were US KIA reached over 1,000 in one calender month.

Fame?

Nationality?

The amount of casualties the enemy inflicts upon your force?

The amount of casualties one inflicts on the enemy's force?

Duration?

Complexity?

Strategic Importance?


Sun Tzu would argue that the general who oversaw the war that was never fought at all should top the chart. Not great boxoffice, nothing sells like sex and violence; but good generalship all the same.

So I think there are many ways to make this list; and leaders like Marshall and Powell stand out for good reason, as does General Patraeus. Are they historically great? That is a question for history to answer.

[Fuchs]

Petraeus probably even fell short of what I'd expect a very good general to achieve (and that's much less than "one of the five greatest of all time"!).

I'd rate him on par with MacArthur; great in PR occasionally a very good move, but still dependent on overwhelming resources for success.


Petraeus & MacArthur have their appartments two levels below Manstein and I'm not really sure that Manstein was top 10.


We should also keep in mind that Asia - especially India and China - had thousands of years of organized violence a.k.a. warfare and this military history is a blank sheet to most of us and most likely all else of us know very little about it either.

And then there's Africa. Shaka anyone? He was certainly a great warrior-king, likely a top 50 general of all time (and the exact ranking in the top 50 is a matter of preferences and distorted by uncertainty).

The Incas created a great empire in few generations. That wouldn't have worked without one or two great generals.

There were also some fine generals during the 16th to 18th century in Europe (including Russia); certainly some of them belong into the top 50.


Then again let's recall Sun Tzu's wisdom; a great general may be great for deterring war by his greatness and thus get no entry in history books. Or he may be great because he won wars without battles; again a very poor move if you seek eternal fame.

Generalship is also much about management of resources and leading men; this is generally poorly documented in military history. Generals who achieved much against under-ressourced (or exhausted) enemies who nmade mistakes can get fame quite easily. Generals who fought against seemingly impossible odds, won no battle but "won" the war (the Vietnamese guy, for example; "Giap"?) would likely not be remembered by most, at least not beyond a few generations.

And then there are those who barely lost because their greatness still wasn't able to compensate for the odds. Lee fits into that category, but I discount his qualities because he had rather incompetent and unlucky opponents.


Let's also look at the different meaning of generalship over time. Early Generals lead by example as do platoon leaders today. Beginning probably with Epaminondas the battle order and battle plan became important for generalship.
Early Generals were king-generals; politicians and military leaders at once. Today's Generals need to understand policy/politics, but they do not need to do it. Whenever a General is tasked to do the job of a politician it's a failure of politicians (see McChrystals PR campaign for more auxiliaries from Europe and his meddling in Afghan politics).

Army reform (Scharnhorst/Gneisenau were already mentioned) is another important thing for a General's greatness. Maurice de Saxe (this or another Maurice, not sure), Shaka, von Seeckt, Guderian, Peter the Great, Marius, Scharnhorst and several others were more improtant for their reforms than for their battles (if they commanded in any at all).

How about military theory Generals? Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Maurice de Saxe

[Firn]

Let's also look at the different meaning of generalship over time. Early Generals lead by example as do platoon leaders today. Beginning probably with Epaminondas the battle order and battle plan became important for generalship.


I pretty much agree with the essence of this post. Just some thoughts.

Epaminondas is certainly a very interesting and often overlooked case for an excellent general. He combined many highly esteemed qualities, perhaps even in an exessive amount.

Said that I think that the Battle of Lake Trasimene is bit underestimated. The very hard part there was to pull the Roman into that position, showing that very often many don't view a battle or move in sour isolation. A fact greatly admonished by CvC.


Firn

[John T. Fishel]

the right question, IMO. What criteria are we (you, me, somebody else:p) using? During WWII the two most effective generals on the winning side at the end of the war in terms of military victories and fewest casualties (the criteria I am using in this post, and this post only) were George Patton (an Army commander) in Europe and Douglas MacArthur (a theater commander) in the Pacific. So, Fuchs, by these criteria MacArthur goes to the top 20 list.:wry:

Cheers

JohnT

[Firn]

Just saw several ugly brain fades . It should of course mean:


Said that, I think that the Battle of Lake Trasimene is bit underestimated. The hard part there was to pull the Roman into that position. This shows many view and value a battle or tactical move in isolation. A fact greatly admonished by CvC.


Firn

[Fuchs]

the right question, IMO. What criteria are we (you, me, somebody else:p) using? During WWII the two most effective generals on the winning side at the end of the war in terms of military victories and fewest casualties (the criteria I am using in this post, and this post only) were George Patton (an Army commander) in Europe and Douglas MacArthur (a theater commander) in the Pacific. So, Fuchs, by these criteria MacArthur goes to the top 20 list.:wry:

Cheers

JohnT


Leading (part of) a force that's ridiculously superior in terms of material and also most often in terms of personnel to a hard-fought and slow victory qualifies for an all-time global top 20 position?
I don't think so.

I could fill the top 20 with Germans if the bar was that low.



Keep in mind that WW2 kept only one generation busy. The well-documented human history encompasses about a hundred generations spanning two to six continents.
Two WW2 generals in the top 20 would in itself already be highly suspicious.

[Ken White]

under 60, history was not a subject taken in school. For too many, history covers only those things that occurred in their lifetime or in a movie. The history of anything other than the US is rarely touched upon even in the movies (who get most things totally wrong...).
Keep in mind that WW2 kept only one generation busy. The well-documented human history encompasses about a hundred generations spanning two to six continents.

Two WW2 generals in the top 20 would in itself already be highly suspicious.Quite true. Subotai Bahadur rules!!!

[John T. Fishel]

1. I was comparing only WWII generals on the side that won the war: in Eur my comparison was essentially with Montgomery, Clark, Bradley, etc. In the Pacific, it was with Admiral Nimitz - the other theater commander - and his subordinates as well as those in the CBI. No comparison with comparable level enemy commanders was made. It is, however, worth noting that MacArthur was almost always short on materiel and so was engaged on a more even basis with the Japanese than was Nimitz.
2. My underlying purpose, however, was to illustrate Bob's World's point that the criteria you use determine the outcome of the discussion. If one is comparing generals in terms of their quality of achieving the political-military goals of the war then neither Patton nor MacArthur would make my list (nor would any Axis generals). My candidates would be Marshall/FDR and Churchill supported by Alanbrooke. Eisenhower falls into a critical but subordinate role which he performed superbly. By that standard - from another time and place - perhaps one of the greatest of all time was Genghiz Khan.

What is interesting is that without criteria to set parameters around the problem, we get a fascinating view of the perceptions and biases of those who join the discussion and no real ranking of the "greatest generals."

Cheers

JohnT

[j earl]

What is interesting is that without criteria to set parameters around the problem, we get a fascinating view of the perceptions and biases of those who join the discussion and no real ranking of the "greatest generals."

Cheers

JohnT

It would be interesting to see a discussion of the 20 worst generals of all time, no biases would creep in I'm sure. I think Sun Tzu once said "never join in a discussion titled the greatest ______ of all time, it will end in frustration and nothing will be proven" :p

[jmm99]

from Ken
Quite true. Subotai Bahadur rules!!!

Cheers

Mike

[Dayuhan]

I'm glad Subotai and Genghiz came in for a mention, they'd be near the top of my list.

This raises an important distinction:



2. My underlying purpose, however, was to illustrate Bob's World's point that the criteria you use determine the outcome of the discussion. If one is comparing generals in terms of their quality of achieving the political-military goals of the war then neither Patton nor MacArthur would make my list (nor would any Axis generals). My candidates would be Marshall/FDR and Churchill supported by Alanbrooke.

FDR and Churchill, of course, were not Generals. In the modern era at least, generals may run battles but ultimately it's the statesmen that decide what battles, or at least what wars, will be fought. Napoleon might serve as an example of one who did rather well managing battles as a general but a good deal less well choosing campaigns as a statesman. Generals also take orders, and it's not their fault if they are ordered to undertake campaigns that are ill-advised. Seems to me that if we're ranking generals we should rank them on their performance as generals, doing what generals do: managing battles and campaigns, not choosing them.

Not so sure on MacArthur; I'd defer to the professionals but his "defense" of the Philippines in the early stages of the war hardly seems to qualify for greatness.

I'm also not sure that a general (or a statesman) who typically fought against inferior forces should receive less consideration or rather credit for having avoided the "fair fight" and engaging only from a position of advantage. It's not my profession and again I'd defer to those in the trade, but I'd think in war one would prefer to avoid a fair fight whenever possible.

[Rex Brynen]

FDR and Churchill, of course, were not Generals.

Well, Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty for a period in WWI--but presumably we're not talking the Gallipoli campaign :D

[Bob's World]

I've been reading Stephen Tanner's "Afghanistan - A Military History fro Alexandar the Great to the War Against the Taliban." If one wants a single source of great generals who lived, led, and served long prior to US history, this is a pretty good one. Ghengis Khan accomplished amazing things. As did Alexandar long before him, and Tamarlane after, and dozens in between.

Perhaps having led an army into, and out again, of Afghanistan is a criteria to add to the list. Many did one or the other, not so many both.

[John T. Fishel]

was First Lord of the Admiralty again in 1939 before Chanmberlain was foced to resign after France's defeat. He also served as a Lt Col in France in WWI after he was forced to resign over Gallipoli.

For someone who was caught flat footed by the Japanese bombing his airplanes on the ground the day after Pearl Harbor MacArthur's withdrawal to Bataan and defense of the peninsula was well done against overwhelming odds. My comments about MacArther, Hoever, were focused on his offensive operations in SOWESPAC. His Inchon op in Korea was more of the same although his being surprised by the Chinese in Nov 1950 smacks of the same fallacies as the air attack on the Philippines.

[Ken White]

you mention (of several more...) were pretty egregious and the responsibility for both those (and some of the others) can be laid directly on first COL, later MG Charles Willoughby, his G2...

It's also noteworthy that MacArthur's reputation in WW II post Bataan is very much attributable to LTG Walter Krueger and the Sixth US Army as well as Dan Barbey and the 7th Phib Force. Plus the Australians who pulled our fat out of the old fire a couple of times...

Krueger is an undersung Commander. His Alamo Scouts BTW were probably the premier scouts and raiders of the war for the US, they never failed an op and never had a man KIA.

[j earl]

I've been reading Stephen Tanner's "Afghanistan - A Military History fro Alexandar the Great to the War Against the Taliban." If one wants a single source of great generals who lived, led, and served long prior to US history, this is a pretty good one. Ghengis Khan accomplished amazing things. As did Alexandar long before him, and Tamarlane after, and dozens in between.

Perhaps having led an army into, and out again, of Afghanistan is a criteria to add to the list. Many did one or the other, not so many both.

Excellent book and excellent point. Just curious, I read it in 2006, has it been revised to cover the resurgence of the Taliban?

[Bob's World]

Excellent book and excellent point. Just curious, I read it in 2006, has it been revised to cover the resurgence of the Taliban?

The most recent chapter, at the end of this version covers through 2008. I hesitate to say final chapter, as that will not likely ever be written for this land that sits at the crossroads of so many diverse cultures.

[j earl]

I think they should offer a supplement to the original book every couple years. Maybe we can talk McCrystal in 50 years or so.


The most recent chapter, at the end of this version covers through 2008. I hesitate to say final chapter, as that will not likely ever be written for this land that sits at the crossroads of so many diverse cultures.

[Xenophon67]

Ah...the age old debate. I realize the following suggestions will present further consternation, but I can think of no other definitive way to template this very important activity.

Categories:

1. Tacticians
2. Strategists
3. Masters of the Operational Art

Periods:

1. Antiquity
2. Medieval
3. Early Modern Era to 1792
4. Modern to 1919
5. 20th century
6. OOTW

A GOOD READ:

(Note: "An All-Time Command Team" by Lieutenant Col. George L. Simpson (1937) The Infantry Journal Reader by Col. Joseph I. Greene. Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc. 1943)

[Xenophon67]

In response to "It rasies the question who are the great generals, why were they great and why are we not producing their equivalents today?"

(Apologies for this only being bullet points)

- We may in fact be producing top quality commanders, yet are there the opportunities to be 'great'.
- The emphasis upon scholarship today is profound, more so and at lower levels, therefore Napoleon would be happy "Read the campaigns of the Great Captains..." therefore the potential is there
- The mission(s) are not conducive to grand, sweeping campaigns requiring a dynamic commander (?)
- The political/administrative limitations on a commander are very restrictive, therefore no one commander (in the field) will every have the opportunity to be a Zhukov or even a Patton.

Perhaps we consider - in more depth - the qualities necessary to earn the title great?

[Bob's World]

If it is for the want of opportunity, I raise my glass to "No more great generals!!"

[Firn]

If it is for the want of opportunity, I raise my glass to "No more great generals!!"

It is pretty hard to argue with that. Sadly there will be opportunities, hopefully just not too grand ones, at least in the near future.

Firn

[Bob's World]

I've been a huge fan of U.S. Grant as the greatest general the U.S. has ever produced in my opinion. Others who actually knew him regarded him highly as well:

"When hearing Grant referred to as a "Military Accident," with no distinguishing merit, one who had achieved success through a combination of fortunate circumstances, Lee responded by saying, "Sir, your opinion is a very poor compliment to me. We all thought Richmond protected, as it was, by our splendid fortifications and defended by our army of veterans, and could not be taken. Yet Grant turned his face to our capital and never turned it away until we had surrendered. Now, I have carefully searched the military records of both ancient and modern history, and have never found Grant's superior as a general. I doubt his superior can be found in all history." -- General Robert E. Lee, commander of the Army of Northern Virginia


"I'm a darned sight smarter than Grant; I know a great deal more about war, military histories, strategy and grand tactics than he does; I know more about organization, supply, and administration and about everything else than he does; but I'll tell you where he beats me and where he beats the world. He don't care a damn for what the enemy does out of his sight, but it scares me like hell." -- Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman

[libertariansoldier]

The greatest (because they also ran their empires/republics as an additional duty):
Alexander the Great
Genghis Khan
Napoleon
Caesar (the Leonardo of military leaders--general, statesman, engineer, writer and excelled at all of them)

the best of the rest (chronologically):
Hannibal (tactically, not strategically)
Scipio
Belisarius (another tactical genius)
Gonsalvo de Cordoba
Marlborough
de Saxe
Davout
US Grant
Moltke the Elder
Manstein
Slim
MacArthur (WWI heroics, plus island hopping, plus Inchon)

Plus 1 squid--Nelson

2nd Team All-Stars
Phillip of Macedon (hey he designed the Army that conquered most of the known world, plus Chaeronea)
Gustavus Adolphus
Turenne
Louis II de Conde
Eugene of Savoy
Allenby
Rommel


Honorable Mention
Cornelius Sulla
Alessandro Farnese, Prince of Parma
Cromwell
Charles XII of Sweden (tactically)
R.E Lee
Patton
Zhukov

And having been on the CENTCOM staff at the time, the idea of Zinni being anywhere near this list makes me want to hurl. Generalship is not measured by how smooth you are.

[John T. Fishel]

Like Bob's World, I have long been a fan of Grant. Although he was pilloried as a "butcher" (of his own troops) an examination of his record on casualties shows that his losses were either comparable or less than those of his contemporaries on both sides. So, Grant clearly meets my criteria for greatness.

The Lee and Sherman quotes are fantastic!:cool: Sherman also shows the importance of competence among subordinates that was pointed out by Ken when talking of MacArthur. A Sherman, Sheridan, Krueger, (possibly an Odierno) can make a Grant, MacArthur (or Petraeus). A Willoughby or an Charles Lee can cost his principal - MacArthur or Washington - a battle, campaign, or war.

I like Libertairian soldier's comprehensive list although I might add or subtract a few names.

Cheers

JohnT

[Fuchs]

I've always been astonished by the focus of Americans on their Civil War whenever the topic moves to military history. Even really smart Americans seem to treat that one few-year civil war as a kind of inexhaustible reservoir for military history insights.
I've yet to meet a British, French or Russian who's comparably fixated on the Crimean War, for example.

I understand the the choice of national military history isn't very rich for Americans - but shouldn't that motivate a broader look at military history?


It's certainly unnecessary and kind of rude, but I'd like to remind you all that the U.S.Civil War wasn't nearly as modern as it's often believed to be. Yes, there were telegraphs, railroads and rifles. Mobilization included industrial output and millions of men. The navy had some naval mines and iron-plated/steam-powered ships in use.

Nevertheless, the ground war equipment was quite obsolete in comparison with Europe (Prussia had introduced a breech-loading firing pin rifle in the late 40's and stomped the Minié-rifle equipped Austrians with it at about the same time as the civil war + the U.S. Civil War saw few if any breech-loaded guns and modern shells).

The tactical skill was mostly amateurish - as it was to be expected with such a rapid and extreme army expansion. Corps commanders were comparable in skill to Prussian wartime Majors in my opinion (and Lincoln's issues with officers reflect the competence problem).

The operational skill was marginal except for deep raids. Compare the Battle of Sedan or the (way to the) Battle of Königgratz with any USCW battle for comparison.

The USCW is a war like many others to me, without particularly valuable lessons. In fact, it seems to be have been the beginning of an American habit to simply overcome inadequacies by throwing superior quantities of resources at a problem. That's the opposite of skill (except if you look at logistics only, of course).

The (rare) episodes of U.S. warfare with inferior resources (such as guerrilla warfare on Mindanao, opening weeks of Korean War, Defence of Bastogne) are much more of interest and much more inspiring in my opinion.

Nobody suggested an officer of the 101st at Bastogne so far, but we've had mentions of a long list of USCW characters already.

[JarodParker]

I might catch some flak for this but I’d have George Washington on my Top 10 list. Even though some of his engagements turned out to be disastrous, he also had his share of daring victories which I find that much more impressive when considering the fact that most of his subordinate officers and troops were learning how to soldier on the fly.
He was adept at managing IO and military intelligence. He also had one quality that no great general can go without... luck.

But above all else what I find most admirable about GW is that, as ambitious as he was, he was willing to relinquish power when the time came instead of crowning himself Caesar (or Napoleon).

[John T. Fishel]

a year after the American Civil war ended. As for breechloaders and repeating rifles, they played a role in the Civil War. In one of the great delaying actions of all time, IMO, BG John Buford, commanding a cavalry brigade on 1 July 1863 at Gettysburg PA, using seven shot Henry and Spencer repeating carbines fought a dismounted delay of the Confederate advance from the West (led by Heth's division) until Reynolds brought First Corps up. If you wish to discuss strategy, there was nothing in Europe (other than the invasions of Russia in 1812 and 1941) that was anywhere near so vast as the theaters of the American Civil War. The Western campaigns being fought at the same time as those in the east dwarf anything in Europe in the 19th Century. When both theaters are addressed at the same time the Crimea, the wars of German unification ending with the Franco Prussian War become minor skirmishes. The fighting around Richmond in 1865 very much foreshadows the trench warfare of WWI. One last element of technology was the introduction of the rapid fire gun in the form of the Gatling gun whose principles are still used in modern weapons. Oh, I forgot, the USS Monitor (and her successor monitors) introduced an entirely new principle of naval shipbuilding/gun platform - the rotating turret which reached its epitome with Dreadnought type battleships. but it had not been seen prior to 1862 in Monitor's class with CSS Virginia. Between 1815 and 1914 the only major war between peer competitors was fought in North America between two American militaries - the USA and the CSA.

[Schmedlap]

I've always been astonished by the focus of Americans on their Civil War whenever the topic moves to military history. Even really smart Americans seem to treat that one few-year civil war as a kind of inexhaustible reservoir for military history insights.
I've yet to meet a British, French or Russian who's comparably fixated on the Crimean War, for example.

I think it's due to the social impact, rather than the military prowess. Southerners still identify partly as "rebels" and re-enactments are performed on the grounds that they were fought on, which tend to be on the outskirts of current towns. It is really quite a spectacle to behold, seeing drunken southerners throwing beer bottles at the triumphant union reenacters, shouting, "you cheated!" I'm guessing that most Brits and Frenchmen don't identify strongly with the side that they fought on in the Crimean War.

There is also the fact that the loss of life was crazy at places like Antietam and Gettysburg and there's the dynamic of friends, cousins, and even brothers fighting against one another (rather than nationalities). It is also noteworthy that this war was not about a great game or access to ports or resources. It was about the survival of our nation and it nearly destroyed us. And then there's the whole freeing the slaves thing.

Deep down, we're an idealistic bunch of folks and stuff fought over ideals really resonates with us, which goes a long way in explaining how the recent adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan were sold to us.

Slightly on topic: I would also like to nominate a worst General. My nomination is General Tso. As someone who lived on General Tso's Chicken t-rations for a year, I will curse that name until the day I die.

[marct]

Hi John,


Between 1815 and 1914 the only major war between peer competitors was fought in North America between two American militaries - the USA and the CSA.

I'm not sure I would agree with you on this. First off, calling the USA and CSA "peer competitors" is really pushing it. While they were up until, say, the end of 1861 or early 1862, the manufacturing, population, infrastructure, etc. imbalances were profound. Second, and this is a quibble with the word "major", I would argue that the Crimean war was also "major" with actions from the Pacific to the Baltic as well as the main theatre in the Black Sea. I guess it all depends on how "major" is defined ;).

Cheers,

Marc

[Bob's World]

Come on guys, most Europeans take Fuch's position that there was nothing to learn from the American Civil War;which is why they fought WWI to such a bloody stalemate accomplishing nothing except the demise of a generation. Amercia didn't get there soon enough to help with much of the fighting, but unddoubtedly most of the Europeans who fought in WWII were half American, so we like to think we countributed in a meaningful way regardless.

Once we've had our cities burned, our treasures plundered, or borders erased and redrawn by others and our women violated a few times we too can be as savvy of warriors as the Germans.:)

Oh, but I do find the whole re-enactor thing a bit bizzare. I think 5 minutes on a real Civil War battlefield would cure most re-enactors from a lifetime of marching around on fake ones.

As to Bastogne, the only General there was Anthony McAuliffe; becuase his boss went on leave. The German army wasn't stopped by Generals, they were stopped by Privates.

[John T. Fishel]

Peer competitors: I'm glad we agree that USA and CSA were "peers" in 61 and 62. Agree that the Yankees brought population and industry to bear by 63 and they were no longer "peers" - the Gettysburg campaign in the East and Vicksburg campaign in the West are, I think, indicative of that. My sense of "peer competitor" is really at the beginning of the conflict and to some extent the perception of the combatants but not entirely. For example, in 1845 the US and Mexico perceived each other as peer competitors - they weren't, it was just a misperception. But I do think that, as you said, in 61 and 62 the USA and CSA were.

Crimea as a "major" war: Yes, there were more theaters than just the central one in and around the Black Sea. But the Baltic theater was almost entirely limited naval action as was the Pacific coupled with a few amphibious raids. Nothing really decisive happened outside the Black Sea/Crimea theater. By contrast, the American Civil War had two major land theaters and an extraordinarily difficult supporting sea war - blockading the entire American East and Gulf Coasts (from the MD/VA border to TX). The Western theater involved cutting the Confederacy in two at the Mississippi River depriving the Confederate heartland of its Western food resources and LOC from Mexico. The eastern theater is more well known. But it was from the West that Sherman, with Grant's support and Lincoln's approval, launched his biltzkrieg from Atlanta to Savannah and then north through the Carolinas while Grant drove on Richmond all over the ground of the 62 Peninsula campaign in a giant strategic pincer.

Must be your old Tory ancestors trying to tweak this Yankee Doodle;)

Cheers

JohnT

[Firn]

Come on guys, most Europeans take Fuch's position that there was nothing to learn from the American Civil War;which is why they fought WWI to such a bloody stalemate accomplishing nothing except the demise of a generation. Amercia didn't get there soon enough to help with much of the fighting, but unddoubtedly most of the Europeans who fought in WWII were half American, so we like to think we countributed in a meaningful way regardless.

Once we've had our cities burned, our treasures plundered, or borders erased and redrawn by others and our women violated a few times we too can be as savvy of warriors as the Germans.:)

This is a post with which I have to disagree rather strongly. While the first part is questionable the second is rather offensive, to say the least. The implied connection between individual or tactical performance and ultimate victory can be very easily disputed, but what strikes me a bit is the beginning. Burned cities (with burned human beings in them) and violated womens don't go too well with a smile, at least for me.


Firn

[Schmedlap]

While the first part is questionable the second is rather offensive, to say the least... Burned cities (with burned human beings in them) and violated womens don't go too well with a smile, at least for me.

I think the gist of it was that there is some irony in poo-pooing one country's interest in its civil war when a disregard of the issues underlying the conflict led to a far more uglier war in one's own backyard. Maybe not the most tactful way of putting it, but I think it was made in the spirit of what we Americans refer to as "ball busting (http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=busting%20your%20balls)."

Emoticon etiquette is still in development phase.

[Fuchs]

I think the gist of it was that there is some irony in poo-pooing one country's interest in its civil war when a disregard of the issues underlying the conflict led to a far more uglier war in one's own backyard.

I do strongly doubt that the tactical and operational experiences from 1861-1865 had much value in regard of the problems of 1914-1918.


The machine gun invention, smokeless powder invention (which made the machine gun really useful), widespread introduction of explosive and shrapnel shells, standardization on breech-loaded guns, standardization on quick-firing guns, the rise of technical troops, introduction of automobiles, introduction of spitzer bullets, introduction of open battle order (the version of that period), development of telephones, late industrialization population growth, introduction of railway artillery all came after the USCW.
The development of a general staff, the skilled application of operational and tactical art (such as encircling à la Sedan), fortress networks, central fire cartridges, high population density were pretty much absent and other advances of the time such as standardized arms production were iirc not fully implemented yet as well.
These changes changed the face of modern conventional ground war several times between 1865 and 1914.

The Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars were more highly regarded as lessons before 1914 and that was right. Both were totally inadequate lessons (as were all wars post-'45 in regard to today's state of the art), but still much more relevant than the USCW simply because they were fought with more similarities to the situation of 1900-1913 than the USCW had to offer.

The lessons of 1865 cannot have been too valuable anyway because the U.S. Army quickly turned itself into the apprentice of the French army and learned the "firepower destroys, infantry occupies" attitude.
(The U.S. Navy became apprentice of the Royal Navy, having been late with the Dreadnought and central fire control revolutions).


The USCW (ground) had its interesting facets in regard to telegraphs, railways, marauding and industrial production - but it wasn't interesting in regard to operational art and tactics in general. Napoleon was better - MUCH better.
The use of telegraphs in the Prussian wars +/- 10 years was more professional, while superior operational art offered less time for industrial mobilization (the war was won without throwing huge quantities of newly produced resources at its problems).


Accordingly, I have a rather low opinion of the generals involved and suspect a tunnel vision whenever an American expresses his admiration of a USCW general.

[Schmedlap]

I do strongly doubt that the tactical and operational experiences from 1861-1865 had much value in regard of the problems of 1914-1918.

Agree. I think the real lessons are political, strategic, economic, et cetera. I, too, never had much interest in the minor details of how some General executed a wagon wheel left or integrated artillery in support of a bunch of guys standing up shoulder-to-shoulder in the open.

[Firn]

I think the gist of it was that there is some irony in poo-pooing one country's interest in its civil war when a disregard of the issues underlying the conflict led to a far more uglier war in one's own backyard. Maybe not the most tactful way of putting it, but I think it was made in the spirit of what we Americans refer to as "ball busting (http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=busting%20your%20balls)."

Emoticon etiquette is still in development phase.

I'm pretty sure that Bob's World wanted to bust those balls big time. ;)

There is also a saying here in parts of Europe, which I regard as being pretty elegant. When the cards are badly stacked against you, a friendly "With full trousers it is easy to stink" can be bit liberating. In this sense in war one should always make sure that one has an easy time to make things stink for the other side :D


Firn

[Rifleman]

.....introduction of open battle order (the version of that period).....came after the USCW.


I will disagree with this one part of your post, Fuchs.

Open battle order with firearms started to appear on the North American Continent during the colonial era. Admittedly, at that time it was practiced by scouts and skirmishers, not the line infantry.

The German Jagers made contributions to the evolution of open order tactics in the American Revolution, credit given where due.

The green coated US Rifle Regiment was very active on the frontier and in the War of 1812.

The famous Baker rifle armed British rifle units of the Napoleonic era were refinements of the 60th Regiment of Foot, aka The Royal Americans, who learned their trade on the North American frontier.

The USA fielded two green coated sharpshooter regiments during the Civil War. The CSA fielded many sharpshooter battalions. Both units continued to develop open order light infantry tactics.

And finally, the true sniper did not emerge in the trenches of WWI as an outgrowth of the earlier skirmisher. Nor can the Boers take credit. The true sniper emerged on the Civil War battlefield as an independent Confederate sharpshooter (the word sniper was not known and used) with a British Whitworth target rifle brought in by blockade runners.

[John T. Fishel]

that true open order fighting with large units really did not take place until late in WWI with the introduction by the Germans of infiltration tactics as a means around trench warfare. The reason this did not ake place sooner, IMO, was the inability to control troops who were dispersed all over the battlefield. The problem was field comms. Even in WWI, a commander had no way of tactically controlling his troops that did not exist at the time when Alexander the Great was a corporal!:rolleyes:. Yes, there was the field telephone but it was pretty useless when the troops went over the top or if its wire was cut by an artillery barrage during a defense. So, massed troops were needed because of C2 requirements. The German infitration tactics innovation worked because the German infantryman was rather well educated compared to his 19th century predecessors and was trusted to think on his feet. WWII made it all easier with tactical radios coupled with the German WWI innovation.

[Bob's World]

To Fuchs, and alll, I assure you, no animosity toward anyone was intended by my comments, to paraphrase a classic line from a classic move, I may be guilty "of bringing a gun to a knife fight."

I stand on my points, but definitely intended it as a friendly, if a bit darkly, humorous retort. All humor in warfare has a dark side to it that I believe it best we don't forget as we debate the topic.

The point I think most poignantly overlooked by Europeans about the Amercian Civil War is also the point about the American Civil War overlooked by most Americans as well. I don't think it's about tactics, god knows the tactics were criminally outdated. It is not about the many technologies that served to outdate the tactics. For me, the main point is about Strategy. and it goes back to one of the many reasons I am such a fan of General Grant.

The relationship between Western Governments and their populaces were significantly altered by the American and French revolutions. (Ok, ours was actually a separatist insurgency, but I quibble). Napoleon understood and maximized this new merging of populace and governent as one to mobilize the entire French populace to wage warfare on all around him. The strength of a nation was no longer measured by the size of its army or navy, or even its King's treasury. It was measured by the will of the populace to resist invaders or to assert itself against others as well.

General Grant understood this. He shifted the focus from the destruction of the other's Army, or the capture of his capital (though he understood both were still essential supporting tasks that he supervised personally as he shadowed General Meade's campaign (Meade really should get more credit) to achieve those two tasks; but sent his two most trusted Lieutenants on missions to break the will of the Southern populace and to destroy their ability to support the military. The birth of "the American Way of War" as it has been tagged, but Grant grasped this, and sent Sherman and Sheridan out to make it happen.

Everyone focuses on tactics and toys and flags. Grant shifted the focus, he understood you had to crush the populace's will to continue, and that killing soldiers is a damn poor way to do that. I think the European military went into WWI still fully bent on killing soldiers and capturing flags to win the day. I think that day had passed, and they arrogantly missed the lesson that could have spared a generation of soldiers, but would have made WWI much harder on the popualces of Europe. It could well have prevented WWII though.

Sorry Fuchs, I am guilty of being an American. Bomb my harbor, destroy my buildings; and I come back with bigger response. It;s in the DNA I guess.

[Dayuhan]

it seems to be have been the beginning of an American habit to simply overcome inadequacies by throwing superior quantities of resources at a problem. That's the opposite of skill (except if you look at logistics only, of course).


Americans use superior resources for the same reason that dogs lick their own genitals: because they can. I don't see why knowing your advantage and exploiting it to the fullest should be regarded as a sign of inferior skill.

[Firn]

To Fuchs, and alll, I assure you, no animosity toward anyone was intended by my comments, to paraphrase a classic line from a classic move, I may be guilty "of bringing a gun to a knife fight."

I stand on my points, but definitely intended it as a friendly, if a bit darkly, humorous retort. All humor in warfare has a dark side to it that I believe it best we don't forget as we debate the topic.

Perfectly fine. I'm pretty sure that every any living human being has near or (very) distant ancestors or relatives who suffered from violence in warfare. Dark humour is also part of our nature.


The point I think most poignantly overlooked by Europeans about the Amercian Civil War is also the point about the American Civil War overlooked by most Americans as well. I don't think it's about tactics, god knows the tactics were criminally outdated. It is not about the many technologies that served to outdate the tactics. For me, the main point is about Strategy. and it goes back to one of the many reasons I am such a fan of General Grant.

The relationship between Western Governments and their populaces were significantly altered by the American and French revolutions. (Ok, ours was actually a separatist insurgency, but I quibble). Napoleon understood and maximized this new merging of populace and governent as one to mobilize the entire French populace to wage warfare on all around him. The strength of a nation was no longer measured by the size of its army or navy, or even its King's treasury. It was measured by the will of the populace to resist invaders or to assert itself against others as well.

This reasoning seems to be a bit idealistic in parts, so to speak. The populance of Vanatu (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vanuatu) or a tribe (http://www.survivalinternational.org/news/5509) from the Andaman islands might have a titanic will to resist invasion, but good luck with that considering their numbers and their navy and army.



General Grant understood this. He shifted the focus from the destruction of the other's Army, or the capture of his capital (though he understood both were still essential supporting tasks that he supervised personally as he shadowed General Meade's campaign (Meade really should get more credit) to achieve those two tasks; but sent his two most trusted Lieutenants on missions to break the will of the Southern populace and to destroy their ability to support the military. The birth of "the American Way of War" as it has been tagged, but Grant grasped this, and sent Sherman and Sheridan out to make it happen.

Once again a key argument is that he had the ressources, time and space to send those two Lieutenants burning and looting on a grand scale. In this specific instance it did work, but this aspect of the American way of war, the burning part to be precise, failed also quite some times to achieve the aspired goals. Or

I also fail to understand how this burning and looting thing or strategy, aimed at the populance and the own belly is somehow a new invention. It has certainly been around quite some time in the evolution of mankind. To stay in the same century, it was certainly a staple procedure in the Napoleonic wars.



Everyone focuses on tactics and toys and flags. Grant shifted the focus, he understood you had to crush the populace's will to continue, and that killing soldiers is a damn poor way to do that. I think the European military went into WWI still fully bent on killing soldiers and capturing flags to win the day. I think that day had passed, and they arrogantly missed the lesson that could have spared a generation of soldiers, but would have made WWI much harder on the popualces of Europe. It could well have prevented WWII though.

Once again the intent alone is not enough, and arguably very few even intended WWI as a war of annihilation. Anyway, how could the Italian army for example crush the will of the Austro-Hungarian Empire's populace? How could the British empire make the German populace suffer? How could the German empire target the fighting will of the Russian empire?

The military actions did certainly their part through death and destruction, but they were limited due the specific circumstances. Grant would have found it pretty difficult to initiate a pillaging raid through Central Germany as he did in the South, because the pesky circumstances made such an attempt during the duration of the war impossible.

I will answer my questions myself. While Italy could do very little in this regard other than throwing paper on Vienna, the British fleet blockaded the Central powers and the Germans tried to cut the British lifelines at sea and send Lenin to Russia, from Germany with love.



Sorry Fuchs, I am guilty of being an American. Bomb my harbor, destroy my buildings; and I come back with bigger response. It;s in the DNA I guess.

And in the full trousers, to paraphrase our saying, which make stinking a lot easier. :D


Firn

[Bob's World]

To say the Sherman and Sheridan went "looting and burning" is to apply an unprofessional eye to their mission. Their acts were not random or wanton, or uncontrolled; and their purpose was not to enrich the Union, the Leaders, or the soldiers.

They were on a specified mission to designed and executed to crush the spirit of the South and to destroy their ability to resource their army and themselves. It was to ensure that the Populace of the South understood on no uncertain terms that they had been defeated when the army surrendured and the capital capitulated. Otherwise they would have likely slid into a long drawn out insurgency with the possiblity of follow-on warfare.

Which leads to the other great strategic lesson from the ACW that was ignored by the Friench and British, even though Wilson was there to remind them: The importance of being gracious in victory in order to secure the peace that your military has worked so hard to produce.

I believe strongly that Hitler is far less to blame for WWII than the French and British delegations at Versaille were.

So:

The importance of the will of the populace in wars between nations (vice Kingdoms); and
The importance of being gracious in victory in order to secure the peace.

Two great strategic lessons from the Amerian Civil War. Grant led the way on both counts; and his President understood and backed his play.

[Fuchs]

Open battle order:

There was a vivid discussion during the 1900's about open battle order tactics for a reason. It was not yet standard for line troops in battle (just as it wasn't standard at Gettysburg to advance with several metres spacing between every soldier).
The Boer Wars inspired the discussion as much as did the new technologies despite the smokeless powder innovation that made closed order + quick firing rifles at least practical in regard to visibility.
An open battle order existed for skirmishers since warfare began and was institutionalized in Velites, Peltasts and other forms of warriors thousands of years ago.
I wrote "(the version of that period)" for a reason.


Strategy and throwing resources at a problem:

Throwing resources at a problem may lead to some kind of victory, but it's not high art.
Strategy is among others about efficiency: How to do the best with given resources (maximization of effect up to the given goal).
To excel with (relatively) few resources is a high art while to come to a painful conclusion after struggling for years is not.

I can build you a home with a billion dollar, but that doesn't make me a great construction project manager and certainly doesn't help me to become a top 100 construction manager of all time. Keep in mind I might take years for what really good construction managers would achieve in months.

To answer a question: What's wrong with spending much resources for victory?
Wrong is that really great generals would have won in months, barely after the federal budget office would have noticed the war. Moltke the Elder would have advanced for a few hundred miles, encircled and annihilated an enemy field army and would have pursued/hunted for the enemy till its surrender in 1862. He would have done so by coordinating several corps from a line setup an encirclement by offering the corps enough freedom of action while coordinating on the operational level instead of failing to copy Napoleon as did Lee, Grant and others.

In other words (taking high cost for granted and pointing at the ability to stay afloat with relatively few resources):
Does anyone believe that grant would have survived the Seven Years War as Prussian leader as did Frederick the Great?

[Bob's World]

Open battle order:

There was a vivid discussion during the 1900's about open battle order tactics for a reason. It was not yet standard for line troops in battle (just as it wasn't standard at Gettysburg to advance with several metres spacing between every soldier).
The Boer Wars inspired the discussion as much as did the new technologies despite the smokeless powder innovation that made closed order + quick firing rifles at least practical in regard to visibility.
An open battle order existed for skirmishers since warfare began and was institutionalized in Velites, Peltasts and other forms of warriors thousands of years ago.
I wrote "(the version of that period)" for a reason.


Strategy and throwing resources at a problem:

Throwing resources at a problem may lead to some kind of victory, but it's not high art.
Strategy is among others about efficiency: How to do the best with given resources (maximization of effect up to the given goal).
To excel with (relatively) few resources is a high art while to come to a painful conclusion after struggling for years is not.

I can build you a home with a billion dollar, but that doesn't make me a great construction project manager and certainly doesn't help me to become a top 100 construction manager of all time. Keep in mind I might take years for what really good construction managers would achieve in months.

To answer a question: What's wrong with spending much resources for victory?
Wrong is that really great generals would have won in months, barely after the federal budget office would have noticed the war. Moltke the Elder would have advanced for a few hundred miles, encircled and annihilated an enemy field army and would have pursued/hunted for the enemy till its surrender in 1862. He would have done so by coordinating several corps from a line setup an encirclement by offering the corps enough freedom of action while coordinating on the operational level instead of failing to copy Napoleon as did Lee, Grant and others.

In other words (taking high cost for granted and pointing at the ability to stay afloat with relatively few resources):
Does anyone believe that grant would have survived the Seven Years War as Prussian leader as did Frederick the Great?

George Washington wanted nothing more (other than perhaps to be a regular in the King's Army) than to be like Frederick. His pursuit of building and fighting a regular army ala Frederick against the British nearly cost us the Revolution. We simply lacked the training, experience and resources to fight that type of warfare.

By Grant's era, strategies that drove Frederick's operations were obsolete. I suspect he may well of recgnized that had he been in Grant's shoes, but probably not. He probably would have stuck to the old strategem's like everyone else. Could Grant have gone back in time and applied the lessons he was taught at West Point on how to fight like Frederick? I see nothing to indicate why not. Any good cook can follow the directions in a recipe book. It takes a genius to create something bold and new.

[Fuchs]

You misunderstood me.
I didn't mean tactics; I meant the odds. Frederick fought against overwhelming odds and prevailed for seven years without much ground to trade.

Grant succeeded with overwhelming odds on his side and I think he didn't show anything that could convince me that he had the quality to stand a test at odds as experienced by Frederick.

[Shek]

And finally, the true sniper did not emerge in the trenches of WWI as an outgrowth of the earlier skirmisher. Nor can the Boers take credit. The true sniper emerged on the Civil War battlefield as an independent Confederate sharpshooter (the word sniper was not known and used) with a British Whitworth target rifle brought in by blockade runners.

General John "They couldn't hit an elephant at this distance" Sedgwick would grudgingly agree with you.

[Shek]

I do strongly doubt that the tactical and operational experiences from 1861-1865 had much value in regard of the problems of 1914-1918.

Infiltration tactics

1. Upton's successful but unexploited assault at the Mule Shoe.

2. Burnside's failed attempt at the Crater (the decision to remove the assigned USCT unit that had rehearsed for days/weeks for the mission accompanied by Burnside's lackluster performance doomed the mission).

3. Mahone's failed attempt at Fort Stedman (simply not enough force to accomplish the mission, as evidenced by only a four hour delay of the Presidential review scheduled in the same sector).

All three episodes foreshadow the principles of the infiltration tactics referred to by John T. Fishel that emerged in WWI from the Germans that eventually helped to break the stalemate.

Surprise (short to no prep of the point of penetration). Concentrate on a specific point (rather than a general offensive). Exploit the breakthrough with follow on waves.

Operational art

You can look to Grant's operational art in coordinating attacks through time and space towards specific objectives as opposed to ineffective, uncoordinated attacks that allowed the enemy to use operational movements to move troops from areas of inaction to areas of action. You could look at his use of the joint force and leveraging joint capabilities to make other services more effective. You could also look at how under him and Sherman, the cavalry became not just a screening/reconnaissance force, but also an arm of attack, just as armor was to become WWI (of course, it took the emergence of the attack, but the use of horse cavalry by the AOP in 1864/5 presents some lessons).

These foreshadow the modern operational art that would emerge as the stalemate in the trenches was broken at the end of the war.

Why the stalemate came about

You could look to the AOP's centralization of artillery as a means to mass artillery fire and make large scale infantry attacks more likely to be a losing proposition (I suspect that this isn't unique in history, but it nonetheless demonstrates a problem that was faced during WWI).

I would quibble with marct's remark that the Federals and Confederates were not peer competitors (and we may simply be using the term in a slightly different context). While the North did possess an industrial base that gave it an advantage, the Confederates were able to tap into Britain to offset much of the advantage (and if they hadn't chosen to embargo cotton to Britain for a year probably could have taken advantage even more of this), and combined with Union decisions not to adopt exploit some available technologies until later in the war (some units in the Union army still had smoothbores at Gettysburg), this Northern advantage is not as great as it's sometimes made out to be.

How this translated to the battlefield is that you didn't see large tactical mobility differences, and when combined with the scale of the fighting and finally the emergence of continuous fighting during the Overland Campaign, you saw the spontaneous rise of field fortifications (trenches) that would eventually result in the stalemate around Petersburg when Smith and Hancock failed to turn the key that they held for Petersburg around June 15, 1864.

You saw the same in World War I, as a lack in large mobility differences combined with the scale of the fighting resulted in the trench stalemate. Some of the exact same type of tactics and the use of the operational art seen at the end of the ACW, adapted to the context of the technology, scale, and situation of WWI would be the solutions to the ending of the trench stalemate.

[Shek]

You misunderstood me.
I didn't mean tactics; I meant the odds. Frederick fought against overwhelming odds and prevailed for seven years without much ground to trade.

Grant succeeded with overwhelming odds on his side and I think he didn't show anything that could convince me that he had the quality to stand a test at odds as experienced by Frederick.

Your comparison is a bit fallacious IMO. Grant had to fight an offensive war completely on enemy territory (and then leave forces behind to administer the occupation) to succeed, and had to do so against a Washington clock. Frederick didn't have to fight on enemy territory and didn't have conduct operations in the context of a domestic political election (which constrained potential options). Also, the scale of the fighting meant that you didn't see the near continuous fighting during the Seven Years' War vice the ACW, which also made strategic approaches different. Given two very different situations, I find it hard to make a valid comparison.

However, I've only done a cursory read on the Seven Years War, and so I'd ask you to go in the opposite direction to help me out, since maybe the two situations are more similar than I believe. Can you argue why Frederick would have been successful in Grant's shoes in the river campaigns in 1862, at Vicksburg in 1863, and finally during the Overland and Petersburg campaigns of 1864-5? Thanks.

[marct]

Hi John,


Peer competitors: I'm glad we agree that USA and CSA were "peers" in 61 and 62. Agree that the Yankees brought population and industry to bear by 63 and they were no longer "peers" - the Gettysburg campaign in the East and Vicksburg campaign in the West are, I think, indicative of that.

I'm shooting from my hip, here, since I'm not by any stretch of the imagination an expert on the US civil war, but I would argue that Gettysburg was the last campaign were you could see the USA and CSA as anything close to "peers" in the straight military realm.


My sense of "peer competitor" is really at the beginning of the conflict and to some extent the perception of the combatants but not entirely. For example, in 1845 the US and Mexico perceived each other as peer competitors - they weren't, it was just a misperception. But I do think that, as you said, in 61 and 62 the USA and CSA were.

This is where we part company in some ways. I've never liked the idea of looking at a comparison along a single dimension and at a single point in time, which is what I see the term being used for a lot. If we take 1861 - 62 as the "peer" time, at least at an overall gloss level, then it would probably be safe to say that in military experience, leadership, overall elan, general but not specific logistics (i.e. what was actually brought to bear vs. what might have been brought to bear), they were "peers" in the sense that the results were a +/- 15% either way. By the Gettysburg campaign, I would argue that the logistics and population recruitment base, plus infrastructure differences, had reduced the "peerness" to a dangerous point; basically, the leadership, experience and elan were still "peer", but the rest was rapidly dropping off. I have a suspicion that we would have seen a similar change in the Franco-Prussian War if it had lasted longer.


Crimea as a "major" war: Yes, there were more theaters than just the central one in and around the Black Sea. But the Baltic theater was almost entirely limited naval action as was the Pacific coupled with a few amphibious raids. Nothing really decisive happened outside the Black Sea/Crimea theater.

Agreed, but I think that that just highlights / foreshadows if you will, a lot of the characteristics of a peer / near-peer competition. The fact that the stalemated theatres were naval does have a major baring, IMO, as does the counterpart in the US Civil War were you had a massive common land border. Even in the US Civil War, you have a funneling effect into two main theatres, as you noted while, given the points of contact in the Crimean War, you really only had one major theatre - although the Caucus campaign was intersting :wry:.


Must be your old Tory ancestors trying to tweak this Yankee Doodle;)

But of course :D. Actually, if you wanted a better analog for what we are dealing with in the current operations, you should be looking at the War of 1812 - at least as far as the accidental guerrilla factor is concerned. Check out General Hull's invasion of July 13th, 1812 :p.

Cheers,

Marc

[Fuchs]

Infiltration tactics
...
All three episodes foreshadow the principles of the infiltration tactics referred to by John T. Fishel that emerged in WWI from the Germans that eventually helped to break the stalemate.

Infiltration attacks had happened for thousands of years, with mixed results. The challenges of the Western front and Gallipolli were probably marginally similar to challenges as experienced in some previous sieges (especially Port Arthur), but nevertheless very different than the challenges possible with 1865 technology.

Surprise (short to no prep of the point of penetration). Concentrate on a specific point (rather than a general offensive). Exploit the breakthrough with follow on waves.

The German Michael offensive wasn't focused on one point at all. The experiences of 1915-1917 told both sides that the breakthrough must not be narrow for else the defender's railway advantage would produce a successful counteroffensive or sealing.

Operational art

You can look to Grant's operational art in coordinating attacks through time and space towards specific objectives as opposed to ineffective, uncoordinated attacks that allowed the enemy to use operational movements to move troops from areas of inaction to areas of action.

You think that's special?

You could look at his use of the joint force and leveraging joint capabilities to make other services more effective. You could also look at how under him and Sherman, the cavalry became not just a screening/reconnaissance force, but also an arm of attack, just as armor was to become WWI (of course, it took the emergence of the attack, but the use of horse cavalry by the AOP in 1864/5 presents some lessons).

The U.S. Horse cavalry was anyway comparable to European dragoons - not counted as cavalry in Europe. There was never a Cuirassier or other shock cavalry force in the U.S.. In other words; such a transformation from screening to attack was less than what had been done 2,500 years earlier by Philipp II. Incidentally, the age of horse cavalry attack against infantry had declined for hundreds of years in Europe, previous to the USCW. Reforming towards a concept that had already lost most of its utility with the standardization of rifles as line infantry weapons was hardly a positive indicator for a general's quality.


These foreshadow the modern operational art that would emerge as the stalemate in the trenches was broken at the end of the war.

Sorry, but there was no real operational art involved in 1918 - on neither side. There was more operational art involved in 1914 than in 1918.
And I don't see any connection of relevance between the interwar years armor theories to the USCW. In fact, I doubt that any of the European thinkers on armour had much interest in the USCW.
The dysfunctional state of the U.S.Army's armoured units during teh interwar years furthermore suggests that even those with the best knowledge about the USCW had no clue about modern armoured warfare.

Why the stalemate came about

You could look to the AOP's centralization of artillery as a means to mass artillery fire and make large scale infantry attacks more likely to be a losing proposition (I suspect that this isn't unique in history, but it nonetheless demonstrates a problem that was faced during WWI).

Actually, this is regularly attributed to Napoleon.
Didn't I mention before that tactically the USCW was pretty much Napoleonic? That's what i think, for sure.

...
You saw the same in World War I, as a lack in large mobility differences combined with the scale of the fighting resulted in the trench stalemate. Some of the exact same type of tactics and the use of the operational art seen at the end of the ACW, adapted to the context of the technology, scale, and situation of WWI would be the solutions to the ending of the trench stalemate.

Interesting. So why exactly did the U.S.Army begin to translate and issue as their own French field manuals during WWI and didn't stop doing so until the early 1930's?
Why exactly did the USMC almost wipe itself out once it joined the fighting in Europe?



It's easy to find predecessors of the problems and solutions of the 20th century in earlier warfare. That's why military history is valuable.

I'm quite sure that there's no unusual concentration of such lessons to be found in the U.S. civil war once you've learned about global military history of different ages, though.

Likewise, there are no really exceptional generals to be found in that war. Not in the context of a global all-time top 5, 10, 20 or 50 list. I'd even doubt a top 200 entry.

--------

@Shek:

Again; it was about the odds.
Frederick failed in his first battle, but he also had battles like Leuthen (well done, though not completely original).
He proved his ability to operate against two opposing armies at once, to beat superior armies, to conserve his power instead of relying on a powerful stream of reinforcements - and he proved his ability to snatch a large province and still defeat its much larger owner in war.
He was weakened by the need to leave garrisons behind not so much because he was advancing as because he fought against two most of the time numerically superior enemies at once.

By the way; I don't consider a marauding and blockade strategy as high strategic art. It's rather what military forces tend to resort to once they realize that they aren't superior or successful in a more acceptable form of ground warfare.

[Shek]

Interesting. So why exactly did the U.S.Army begin to translate and issue as their own French field manuals during WWI and didn't stop doing so until the early 1930's?
Why exactly did the USMC almost wipe itself out once it joined the fighting in Europe?

These are red herrings. Why did the US not use COIN lessons it had experienced from its history in 2003-4/5? A valid question, but it doesn't negate the fact that there were lessons to be gathered from earlier history (whether from American experience or other counterinsurgent experience).


It's easy to find predecessors of the problems and solutions of the 20th century in earlier warfare. That's why military history is valuable.

I'm quite sure that there's no unusual concentration of such lessons to be found in the U.S. civil war once you've learned about global military history of different ages, though.

Once again, an entirely different statement than your earlier proposition that you doubted that there were any lessons to be carried forward.


Likewise, there are no really exceptional generals to be found in that war. Not in the context of a global all-time top 5, 10, 20 or 50 list. I'd even doubt a top 200 entry.

--------

@Shek:

Again; it was about the odds.
Frederick failed in his first battle, but he also had battles like Leuthen (well done, though not completely original).
He proved his ability to operate against two opposing armies at once, to beat superior armies, to conserve his power instead of relying on a powerful stream of reinforcements - and he proved his ability to snatch a large province and still defeat its much larger owner in war.
He was weakened by the need to leave garrisons behind not so much because he was advancing as because he fought against two most of the time numerically superior enemies at once.

By the way; I don't consider a marauding and blockade strategy as high strategic art. It's rather what military forces tend to resort to once they realize that they aren't superior or successful in a more acceptable form of ground warfare.

Given that you've made a strong comparative statement, I was expecting some comparative analysis. Yet, you haven't offered any. As I stated earlier, I've read on Frederick the Great and Prussian history, but only superficially, so a comparative analysis as to why Frederick would have performed as well or better than Grant during his 1862, 1863, 1864, and 1864-5 campaigns would be very beneficial for me.

[Bob's World]

My biggest question on WWI is; that in a war where technological advances rendered neither side powerful enough to reinitiate maneuver warfare by going forward; why no one on either side thought to do so by falling rapidly rearward, and then launching powerful assaults through the flanks of the salient they had created, and into the enemy rear (while closing the bag on the then cut off attacking force in their own rear.

I think its because both sides were far too commited to protecting every inch of the hard earned ground they had, so that they could only think about how to go forward.

One thing that the Civil War and WWI had in common is both were dominated by tragic tactics, executed by generals fighting the war they were trained to fight rather than the war they were in.

There's actually a lot of that going around in the history of warfare. Recent history as well.

[William F. Owen]

My biggest question on WWI is; that in a war where technological advances rendered neither side powerful enough to reinitiate maneuver warfare by going forward; why no one on either side thought to do so by falling rapidly rearward, and then launching powerful assaults through the flanks of the salient they had created, and into the enemy rear (while closing the bag on the then cut off attacking force in their own rear.

Because no one would fall for such an obvious trick! WW1 Generals were not stupid. Some where but only some. The western front was a unique perfect storm, not seen before and never seen since. Most Generals knew the problem and knew the solutions, based on experience, which cost a lot of lives to get, but there simply was no alternative.

WW1 cannot be understated in the importance of creating the modern armies we see today, and the various modern tactical systems. The problem is that very poor emotionally based on poetry, novels, and popular fallacies has obscured key operational lessons for nearly 90 years!

I submit, that WW1 Generals learnt much faster than a lot Generals since, as to what worked and what did not.

[Bob's World]

I don't think it is all that difficult to convince one desparate for success that they are being successful. In fact, that is probably the easiest military deception of them all.

Clearly you couldn't just abandon your trenchs and then all hide behind farm houses and yell "surprise!" It would requires an assessment of where the enemy wants to succeed, creating impressions of weakness and small successes over time to set the stage, while covertly developing one's own counterattacking force.

It works in martial arts and small level tactics (god knows how many mounted and dismounted patrols have chased a small group into a large ambush over the annals of time).

This is an "obvious trick" that the human mind is susceptible to fall for. Kind of like telling a woman she's beautiful, listening to her prattle on, and buying her drinks. Some things work because they work.

[Fuchs]

Because no one would fall for such an obvious trick! ...

The 'backward offensive' thing was actually proposed by Manstein as part of an accusation directed at WW1 generals in his memoirs.
The greatest problem with it was likely that even such an offensive would have bogged down eventually jsut as it happened in 1914 and 1918 when offensives came to a halt.

[Bob's World]

The 'backward offensive' thing was actually proposed by Manstein as part of an accusation directed at WW1 generals in his memoirs.
The greatest problem with it was likely that even such an offensive would have bogged down eventually jsut as it happened in 1914 and 1918 when offensives came to a halt.

But I am comfortable with the company!

I was just always taught that the frontal assault was the least favored form of maneuver (though that also, for the lead sqaud, every form of maneuver is a frontal assault).

So if you can go around, over, or under; I guess that leaves the "rearward envelopment" prior to resorting to just putting your shoulder down and pushing.

You'd be absolutely crucified if you tried it and failed though; but if you try a frontal assault for the umpteenth time and fail you get a promotion. Same kind of reward system we use at our training centers. Follow doctrine to the letter, use the "two up, one back" and get thrashed by the OPFOR and you are a "go." Get creative and win, and you "got lucky." Get creative and lose, and you "get fired." Just one more way, along with the senior rater profile, to breed the creative genius out of the officer corps.

[William F. Owen]

The 'backward offensive' thing was actually proposed by Manstein as part of an accusation directed at WW1 generals in his memoirs.
The greatest problem with it was likely that even such an offensive would have bogged down eventually jsut as it happened in 1914 and 1918 when offensives came to a halt.

I think Von Manstein was missing a trick. The Germans held very few troops in the forward defensive zone, at least by 1916 - about a 1/4 of what the Allies did. The whole point was to have reserves massed for counter attack. - a backwards offensive is just that, without the screen in the place.

I just do not see any competent general walking into what is obviously a well laid ambush - and I think history supports that contention.

[William F. Owen]

You'd be absolutely crucified if you tried it and failed though; but if you try a frontal assault for the umpteenth time and fail you get a promotion. Same kind of reward system we use at our training centers. Follow doctrine to the letter, use the "two up, one back" and get thrashed by the OPFOR and you are a "go." Get creative and win, and you "got lucky." Get creative and lose, and you "get fired." Just one more way, along with the senior rater profile, to breed the creative genius out of the officer corps.

Well this is conundrum of military practice versus theory. The problem is that very few armies capture best practice and teach it. Simple works better than anything else in war, yet "risk is the coin of war." What often adds to the confusion is folks doing stupid things badly, being seen as "What armies taught." Simple does not mean stupid. Simple plans work best. Simple required deep understanding.

All my great generals were not very imaginative men (a bit like me!). They just didn't do stupid stuff (unlike me!). They did what obviously worked and skewed the odds in their favour using better logistics, intelligence and staff work.

[Fuchs]

The battles of WW1 were rarely deeper than the technical range of artillery.
Artillery had to relocate its batteries to stay in range (or to survive), but there were few offensives that left the known and fully registered battlefield to really unhinge the stalemate.

That's one difference among others between a tactical elastic defence and an operational mobile defence.

The German Generals of WW1 were right to postpone most offensives in the West in 1915-1917 (Verdun being an experimental exception) in order to win on less problematic fronts first, though. The attacks with limited objectives of that period helped to understand the battlefield as much as did large offensives.


It's remarkable how Luddendorff won Tannenberg with good operational art against the odds, but had no better offensive idea than an almost full width advance in 1918.

[Firn]

But I am comfortable with the company!

I was just always taught that the frontal assault was the least favored form of maneuver (though that also, for the lead sqaud, every form of maneuver is a frontal assault).

I guess there is a reason why you were taught that way. ;)


A general observation leaning a bit on CvC. If the only intrinsic advantage of the attack is surprise it seems logical that the defender wants to lessen it's impact. From using the high ground and building wallls like the citiziens of old to mines&IED, wire, ditches and multiple lines and covert and silent points for an effective defense in depth, it all has to do with reducing the effects of surprise, lenghtening the available reaction time and increasing the defensive redundancy.

This also seems to be one of the reasons why ambushes tend to work very well on a small scale and hardly on a large scale. Small ambushes are far easier to prepare and hide and the action is strongly compressed in time and space. If pulled of well the enemy has no to little time to respond and may lack the redundancy offered by units which aren't pinned down or annihilated. If you and practically all of your men are down or helpless after the first seconds the idea of a counter-attack becomes a moot point.



The battles of WW1 were rarely deeper than the technical range of artillery.

If I remember correctely there were considerable efforts to make it possible to push firepower on all levels forward. The tank was part of the range of solutions, just like the submachinegun and tasked grenadiers for the infantry.


Firn

[Bob's World]

What we are talking is not the ability to spring a large ambush, but rather the ability to convince an arrogant and over-confident foe that he has you on the run, prompting him to drop his own caution and charge into your trap to exploit his "success."

Certainly a favorite trick of the Souix indians that Crazy Horse used many times on small patrols; and then there is Custer's little mis-judgement...

Or Leftenant Colonel Tarleton at Cowpens in 1781 at the hands of Brigadier Daniel Morgan.

I suspect the real historians out there can come up with dozen larger examples over the ages of recorded military history.

[marct]

I suspect the real historians out there can come up with dozen larger examples over the ages of recorded military history.

Hastings in 1066 springs to mind :cool:.

[Firn]

What we are talking is not the ability to spring a large ambush, but rather the ability to convince an arrogant and over-confident foe that he has you on the run, prompting him to drop his own caution and charge into your trap to exploit his "success."

Certainly a favorite trick of the Souix indians that Crazy Horse used many times on small patrols; and then there is Custer's little mis-judgement...

Or Leftenant Colonel Tarleton at Cowpens in 1781 at the hands of Brigadier Daniel Morgan.

I suspect the real historians out there can come up with dozen larger examples over the ages of recorded military history.

One can find examples of some very neat ambushes here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=92978&postcount=307), there (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=92390#post92390) and once again there (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=92923&postcount=33) (the famous COIN operation gone wrong).

In this cases the very difficult terrain was the key to success. In the first two cases the action was very concentrated in time and space. The last one was a more protracted affair, with ever present harassing and frequent ambushes. All of them necessitated the kind cooperation of the enemy.

While I confess that I'm not that well informed about Eastern Warfare, Subotai and his forces certainly rank very high when it comes to mobile warfare and almost effortless shifts between feigned flights and dispersion and rapid concentration of force and fierce counter-attacks. They made the galloping ambush into a high form of (brutal) art.

Manstein's famous counter-attack against Kharkov comes to my mind , as well as his plan for the French campaign, although I'm not sure how far-reaching his intent was. The major difficulty with such actions is always that the enemy must oblige your operational or strategic intent to quite some extent.

Firn

[marct]

You can also see excellent examples of the same type of pseudo-ambush tactics by Belisarius and other Byzantine generals.

[William F. Owen]

What we are talking is not the ability to spring a large ambush, but rather the ability to convince an arrogant and over-confident foe that he has you on the run, prompting him to drop his own caution and charge into your trap to exploit his "success."

Sure, something you could do in a "battle", but not something you could do in huge continuous multi-army engagement! Why one army falls back, while the others remain in place, - and re-position their reserves - would have been a very tough bluff to pull, without actually hanging your neck out.

[Rifleman]

Or Leftenant Colonel Tarleton at Cowpens in 1781 at the hands of Brigadier Daniel Morgan.


Cowpens was the tactical masterpiece of the American Revolution.

I don't know if Morgan should be considered a great general or not because I don't know if he was a great strategist. But he was certainly a master tactician.

[Bob's World]

Cowpens was the tactical masterpiece of the American Revolution.

I don't know if Morgan should be considered a great general or not because I don't know if he was a great strategist. But he was certainly a master tactician.

Morgan was a fighter who sought to match his strength against the enemy's weakness, and didn't care a damn what the enemy thought of his "professionalism."

Washington, with his chip on his shoulder over being rejected by the British Regular Army, coupled with his constant pursuit of striving to be like his idol Frederick, was constantly matching our weakness against enemy strengths. I think in large part he wanted to prove to the British that he was indeed worthy of being an officer in there Army by defeating them "correctly."

This is the strength of the American warfighting Army historically. The Regulars are small in number, steeped in doctrine, and set out the fight the last war. The volunteers and draftees come in in large numbers knowing little of doctrine and fight the war they're in. The large standing army required for the Cold War has in large part nullified what I see as one of our greatest historic strengths. This is why I think Generals like Casey will never be discussed in forums like this, because they are products of a system crippled by the Cold War necessities, and are dedicated to preserving the Army they needed for the last war, rather than pragmatically reducing the standing army to what is really needed (and when we stop using the Army to force a failed family of policy to work, we will be able to bring 2-300,000 guys home); and designing a flexible, adaptive force and doctrine for wars that are likely to emerge. Quit being jealous of and seeing the Guard as a competitor for scarce resources you need to fulfill your obsolete vision of "correctness," and instead embrace the Guard for what it is: America's historic warfighting, war-winning, force. Just an observation.

Add "blinded by Cold War experience" to "senior rater profile" and "CTC evaluation focus" for why we are limited today in our ability to produce great generals, but produce a hell of a lot of great, dull, efficient, managers.

[Culpeper]

Lots of good generals. As for American:


Longstreet
Bradley
Patton
Erskine
O.P. Smith
Mattis, James

Just to name a few, of course.

[Schmedlap]

Add "blinded by Cold War experience" to "senior rater profile" and "CTC evaluation focus" for why we are limited today in our ability to produce great generals, but produce a hell of a lot of great, dull, efficient, managers.

Oh man. CTC evaluation focus. No ####, there I was. In Bosnia, prior to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we had one large operation during our deployment (the rest of the deployment was just squad/platoon patrols). The operation was incredibly dicked up, largely because my CO couldn't make a decision, give clear guidance, or do anything without his commander telling him every move to make. Realizing that things were dicked up, he remarked, in all seriousness, "this isn't unfolding very well, but I think it's a good rehearsal for our training exercise next week." He was referring to a multinational training exercise that we were slotted to participate in, largely as a dog and pony show.

I am so glad that I did not need to follow that man into combat when the real wars kicked off. Even on a real-world operation, he was stuck in the mindset of training for a CTC evaluation. Funny thing is, even with his inexplicable focus on training evals, he performed horribly at CTC prior to deployment. By "horribly" I mean that our unit was slotted to take on the most sensitive mission, farthest from headquarters, but after that CTC rotation the BN CO lost so much confidence in him that the mission shifted to another unit and we spent the first month doing base camp security.:mad:

[Xenophon67]

Sure Hannibal had forgone the besieging of Rome, yet for three years in a row (218-216 BCE) Hannibal earned his rank as one of the Great Captains of History (T.A. Dodge).

218 November - Battle of Ticinus River - Brilliant cavalry engagement which gave Scipio his bloody nose and allowed Hannibal to gain the initiative despite having emerged from the Alps, basically in tatters.

218 December - Battle of Trebia River - After recruiting thousands of Gauls he managed to lure Sempronius across the freezing Trebia in a ill-conceived hasty crossing only to emerge being surprised in his flank and rear losing around 30,000 men.

217 April - Battle of Lake Trasimene - Absolutely brilliant ambush anticipating Sun Tzu's maxim "know your enemy and know yourself.." - Hot-tempered Flaminius threw caution to the wind driving his men forward into a narrow defile under steep cliffs. Hannibal took advantage of the terrain, climate, and his opponent's disposition to deliver a devastating blow. The resulting (needless) slaughter saw some 30,000 Roman dead as well as Flaminius.

216 August - The Battle of Cannae - Tactical Perfection - the epitome of shaping the battlespace - and the blueprint for every battle thereafter.

"A nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its laws made by cowards and its wars fought by fools."
— Thucydides

[Ken White]

This is the strength of the American warfighting Army historically. The Regulars are small in number, steeped in doctrine, and set out the fight the last war.Not always, though I acknowledge it's true as often as not. There are a lot of things that can be said of all components. Saying them often does more harm than good.
... dedicated to preserving the Army they needed for the last war, rather than pragmatically reducing the standing army to what is really needed (and when we stop using the Army to force a failed family of policy to work, we will be able to bring 2-300,000 guys home)Those are both your opinions and you're entitled to them and to state them in an open forum. I'm just as entitled to say you need to stop smoking that stuff.. ;)

Those 'failed policies' are your opinion -- and I suspect I'd agree on some, probably not on others. In any event, that's not going to happen.
...designing a flexible, adaptive force and doctrine for wars that are likely to emerge.Couldn't agree more; you're absolutely correct. That's not gonna happen either due to politics and a fear of a truly effective Army; Congress does not want that. Pretty effective or effective enough, yes -- but not truly effective. They'd be dangerous. :wry:
Quit being jealous of and seeing the Guard as a competitor for scarce resources you need to fulfill your obsolete vision of "correctness," and instead embrace the Guard for what it is: America's historic warfighting, war-winning, force. Just an observation.As one who had a Guard serial number before you were born, one that was used in three States, allow me to point out that the Army Reserve also was a part of that war winning force until you guys got their combat units dissolved with your superior Congressional clout. So was the Regular Army, so were the Marines. What did not help in any of those wars was parochial B.S. Nor does it help today.

I'll also point out that the Guard, as a war winning force in two World wars got so diluted with Regulars and Reservists during those wars due to senior officer lack of competence plus reservists and draftees added for the duration that they were not really Guard units, they were AUS units. The Guard also was for various dumb political reasons not a big factor in either Korea or Viet Nam. It has been used lately to good effect and the ARMY has benefited from that. So has SOCOM. There have also been some downsides. To both...
Add "blinded by Cold War experience" to "senior rater profile" and "CTC evaluation focus" for why we are limited today in our ability to produce great generals, but produce a hell of a lot of great, dull, efficient, managers.You can also add political correctness, diversity, 'One Army' and several other things to the limits. Do not forget the Congress that protects programs that are of marginal total benefit to the defense of the nation but are politically popular. I can think of several such programs...

DOPMA and its followers being beautiful examples.

Parochial B.S. is not beneficial to any component. That Congress which protects the Guard (and to a lesser extent, the USAR) as a counterpoint to the AC is not truly beneficial to any of those components. We're supposed to all be in this thing together...

[Entropy]

Ken,

I've been in the Guard for a couple of years now after serving in the Reserve and on Active duty. I think you're totally correct about the Guard. Hounding me to join NGAUS and the state organization has gotten pretty old along with the "good old boys" network which does negatively affect operations IMO.

[Bob's World]

Oh, no question the Guard is perhaps the most powerful political lobby in America. My point being that is the Regulars would recognize that clout and work with it to the common advantage, the common defense, we would be far better off than with the adversarial model of today.

I've seen the Good, the Bad and the Ugly in the Guard, but in the end walked away with a keen appreciation that it is, with all of its flaws, one of America's national treasures and greatest institutions. Just as the rights of Free Press and to bear arms keeps the three branches of government in check (what I like to think of as "Home"plate); the Guard is a great check of the military ever getting out of line as well. Seems far feteched today, but looking around the world and through history, and these things can change. We have a lot of warts and problems, but their is a genius of balance in our sytem that runs far deeper than what we were taught in 8th grade civics class.

(And yes Ken, absolutely as to every aspect of draftee, reservist and guardsman that combines to create the great american "citizen soldier." Also yes, when one is a one man band, sometimes you have to abuse the playlist until the tunes catch on!)

Finally, for the sake of historical accuracy, while Morgan gets all of the credit for the battleplan at Cowpens, I have it on good authority he actually discovered it scratched out in the dirt where a young drummer boy by the name of Ken White had been sitting during a rest break on a road march. (All rumors that this same Kenius Whitius was the S-3 for Hanibal are purely speculative)!

[Schmedlap]

... it is, with all of its flaws, one of America's national treasures and greatest institutions.

In addition to what you cite, I would add that the ARNG was about the only gov't entity during the Katrina flood that did not have its collective heads tucked up its collective ass.

[William F. Owen]

Sure Hannibal had forgone the besieging of Rome, yet for three years in a row (218-216 BCE) Hannibal earned his rank as one of the Great Captains of History (T.A. Dodge).
I submit that while he could win battles, he did so with a flawed strategic aim - or even no strategy at all. Today people agonise over "strategy" pointing out how the US "can win battles" but "looses wars." Vietnam? - Well welcome to the cult of Hannibal!!

4 big victories never hurt Rome's ability to force generate.

Yes, Hannibal was better on the day, but he constantly failed to exploit his victories. He just "mowed the lawn." It may well be that 75% of tactical action in Afghanistan is irrelevant for the same reasons.

Napoleon falls into the same bucket, - as not only a tactician, but also a strategist.

[Ken White]

Entropy: The boys can go a little overboard... :D

Bob's World: Was never a drummer, no sense of rhythm a-tall. And that was J3, not S3... ;)

SdhmedlapWrong. I was there shortly afterward. Everyone in DoD did well, the Navy Airedales from Corpus and Pensacola, the Air Farce from Hurlburt and Eglin and the Coast Guard all did well. Coasties did great, in fact. The Navy moved the USS Bataan up the river on the tail of the hurricane. The Guard did do a good job but most of the government aside from FEMA did well also -- and much Federal Aid was delayed due to Governor Blanco initially wanting to do it with no Federal assistance (just as had FL governor Chiles during Hurricane Andrew. Politics can screw up anything...).

Interesting thing about the Guard was that there were more Guardsmen from other States than from LA -- due to the LA Bde being in Iraq and in process of returning when the storm hit, IIRC

[Fuchs]

I submit that while he could win battles, he did so with a flawed strategic aim - or even no strategy at all. Today people agonise over "strategy" pointing out how the US "can win battles" but "looses wars." Vietnam? - Well welcome to the cult of Hannibal!!

4 big victories never hurt Rome's ability to force generate.

Yes, Hannibal was better on the day, but he constantly failed to exploit his victories. He just "mowed the lawn." It may well be that 75% of tactical action in Afghanistan is irrelevant for the same reasons.

Napoleon falls into the same bucket, - as not only a tactician, but also a strategist.

Another example is Rommel, who bled white OP Barbarossa with his log truck & fast troops demands for Lybia.


I still think that you judge Hannibal too harshly. He never got significant reinforcements from Carthago. Instead, he managed to keep a war effort going against the great power Rome in its backyard with the little resources that some allies (former Roman allies) were able to offer.
That required a great strategic and political effort. It didn't suffice for besieging & taking Rome, the odds (especially the robustness of Rome's Republic and alliance system) were too tough.
It's furthermore questionable whether he ever had the resources for besieging Rome. The logistical problems of such an undertaking were certainly huge - and he had little reason to be confident about a success after a breach of the walls. Even a small relief army would have been able to mess the whole siege up.

I wouldn't be able to name a single general who would have done better in the specific situation other than maybe Alexander the Great.

[marct]

It's furthermore questionable whether he ever had the resources for besieging Rome. The logistical problems of such an undertaking were certainly huge - and he had little reason to be confident about a success after a breach of the walls. Even a small relief army would have been able to mess the whole siege up.

I wouldn't be able to name a single general who would have done better in the specific situation other than maybe Alexander the Great.

Good points, Fuchs. I'm not sure Alexander could have done it, either, without his engineers, and Hannibal just didn't have an engineer corps equal to Alexanders.

The other thing to remember about Hannibal and the 2nd Punic War is that the Carthaginians had a real problem with their fleet, especially after the initial naval encounter at Lilybaeum when they were defeated by a smaller Roman fleet! Without having control of the seas, which they didn't have, Hannibals' logistics were quite problematic. Trying to besiege Rome in, say, 217 or 216, would have been strategically insane since


the city could have held out easily for at least a year if not longer;
Rome had fairly large forces, including naval transport, outside the city, and
Fabius would have pushed for and "insurgent crunch" with the fortifications acting as the anvil and the interrupted logistics and sniping raids acting as the hammer.

[William F. Owen]

Trying to besiege Rome in, say, 217 or 216, would have been strategically insane since


the city could have held out easily for at least a year if not longer;
Rome had fairly large forces, including naval transport, outside the city, and
Fabius would have pushed for and "insurgent crunch" with the fortifications acting as the anvil and the interrupted logistics and sniping raids acting as the hammer.

I do not want to play, "what if history" but why not use force to set the conditions where besieging Rome might have worked?

I'm only harsh on Hannibal to demonstrate the futility of a strategy based on something which was not tactically feasible. - that - relegates him from "great general" to "good general." Yes he did incredibly well with very little. He gets an "A" for good effort, but he died and Rome went on.

[William F. Owen]

I wouldn't be able to name a single general who would have done better in the specific situation other than maybe Alexander the Great.
....any General that won the war he set out to win? Setting out to to do well with little is not the acme of skill if it doesn't get you what you want!

[Firn]

I'm only harsh on Hannibal to demonstrate the futility of a strategy based on something which was not tactically feasible. - that - relegates him from "great general" to "good general." Yes he did incredibly well with very little. He gets an "A" for good effort, but he died and Rome went on.

I personally think that his effort was strategically and tactically feasible, perhaps even very much so. We must consider that the Italian peninsular was inhabitated by a many distinct cultures and ethnics. The Greek, Samnite, Latins, Umbrians, Etruscans, Celts, Illyrians, Raetians were just some of those. Many of them had strongly opposed Rome in the remote and recent past, often by forging large and powerful alliances.

Shattering the Roman system of alliances and strong recruiting among those unhappy with Roman dominance could bring Rome on it's knees, especially with a steady flow of reinforcements by the dominions in Spain and by Carthage over the sea. All those calculations and hopes were not pulled out of thin air.



Firn

[Xenophon67]

An outstanding discussion all around and well worth further debate.

All great commanders are expert problem solvers. The military genius does so under great risk, uncertainty and time-pressure and may not develop the 'perfect' solution, but will produce the 'best' for that situation.

I have read a great deal about J.Boyd's OODA loop and Recognition Primed decision making (G. Klein) yet have not been able to find a definitive explanation or model for a commander's decision making cycle - other than what I have pieced together myself.

Does anyone have any guidance in this area?

Thanks

[Entropy]

Since everyone is focused on Generals, I'll put forth an Admiral - specifically Nelson.

[William F. Owen]

I have read a great deal about J.Boyd's OODA loop and Recognition Primed decision making (G. Klein) yet have not been able to find a definitive explanation or model for a commander's decision making cycle - other than what I have pieced together myself.


Well no secret I'm a Boyd sceptic, and an OODA sceptic as well. The only good example I have seen of OODA application is a method of updating TTP's for operational "learning." Basically, if you do the Core Functions, I cannot see how the OODA loop helps.

Never heard of "Primed Decision making" but the language in terms of description sounds about right. Pattern Recognition is certainly useful.

[slapout9]

An outstanding discussion all around and well worth further debate.

All great commanders are expert problem solvers. The military genius does so under great risk, uncertainty and time-pressure and may not develop the 'perfect' solution, but will produce the 'best' for that situation.

I have read a great deal about J.Boyd's OODA loop and Recognition Primed decision making (G. Klein) yet have not been able to find a definitive explanation or model for a commander's decision making cycle - other than what I have pieced together myself.

Does anyone have any guidance in this area?

Thanks


Based upon my communications with Colonel Walters and The writings of Colonel Wyly-"Fundamentals Of Tactics"- I would suggest this.

1-Observe-The Area of Operations(as a system) based upon your Mission, searching for Surfaces and Gaps. In conventional Warfare use METT-TC in unconventional Warfare use ASCOPE/5 Rings analysis.

2-Orient-Focus on the Enemy's Gaps(Vulnerabilities) that can help you accomplish your Mission.

3-Decide-On the best unit with the best means to exploit the Enemies Gaps(vulnerabilities).

4-Act-Execute your decision with the greatest speed possible.


Which will lead you back to Observing again to see if you are moving closer to or further from accomplishing your mission. Adapt your COA as needed. The faster you can move through this decision cycle the more you will maintain the initiative over the enemy which MAY give you a decisive advantage.


Be careful about Recognition Primed Decision Making as your Enemy could use it against you. Be original as far as that is possible.

[Firn]

Be careful about Recognition Primed Decision Making as your Enemy could use it against you. Be original as far as that is possible.

Like baiting through an ambush the helicopters of the rapid airmobile infantry on mined and covered landing zones. Worked very well on fresh Soviet troops who had just rotated in.

Basically avoid doing b when the enemy says a. Although b might be the best and simplest response. But then again in war the simplest things become very difficult. It is the pesky human element in it. ;)


Firn

[William F. Owen]

Be careful about Recognition Primed Decision Making as your Enemy could use it against you. Be original as far as that is possible.
Doing stupid things is always stupid? Thanks for the tip Slap! That was a close shave....

"OK boys... it's plan B. Get out the Penguin suits and put the fish in your mouth.... Do not say ready, or else the fish will fall out.... OK?"

[Rex Brynen]

"OK boys... it's plan B. Get out the Penguin suits and put the fish in your mouth.... Do not say ready, or else the fish will fall out.... OK?"

I don't know, wasn't something like that used during Operation Paraquet? :D

[Xenophon67]

Slapout9 thanks for the OODA/Decision Cycle and further reading

John Keegan's Mask of Command (315-38) that a commander is a man of his society and acts accordingly - therefore I am wondering how the decision making cycle of different commanders would be influenced by the following 'imperatives' that Keegan describes:

1. Kinship - the creation of a bond between a commander and men.
2. Prescriptions - the need for a commander to speak directly to his men.
3. Sanctions - the issuing of rewards and punishments.
4. Action - intelligence gathering and the formulation of plans.
5. Example - the most important imperative, the need for a commander to be seen to share dangers with his men.

Surely, each nation/time period would have a different emphasis on each one of the above. This being the case would the OODA cycle be influenced by these factors?

This is where Sun Tzu comes in...."if you know yourself and your enemy..."

(not just dribble....diligently trying to create a composite/template of a commander's decision making cycle)

[Pete]

I've always been astonished by the focus of Americans on their Civil War whenever the topic moves to military history. Even really smart Americans seem to treat that one few-year civil war as a kind of inexhaustible reservoir for military history insights. I've yet to meet a British, French or Russian who's comparably fixated on the Crimean War, for example.
For a discussion of the influence of the American Civil War on European military officers I recommend the book The Military Legacy of the American Civil War: The European Inheritance, 1959 and reprinted in 1988, by the late Jay Luvaas. The career of Dr. Luvaas included being an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy and a professor at the U.S. Army War College. His book contains a chapter on German observations and analyses of the the war. The author concedes that the war had a negligible impact on German military thinking because of the preoccupation of Bismarck and the German states on unification during the 1860s. However, British army officers studied the campaigns of "Stonewall" Jackson at staff college during the first half of the last century.

Colonel G.F.R. Henderson (1854-1903), a York and Lancaster veteran of Tel el-Kebir, wrote the book The Fredericksburg Campaign in 1886, which brought him to the attention of then-General Garnet Wolseley and led to his appointment as an instructor at Sandhurst in 1890. In 1898 he published Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, the book for which he is best known. Henderson was appointed chief of intelligence in South Africa in 1900 but he caught malaria and was invalided home, where he died in 1903. Regular British officers serving in the First and Second World Wars would have studied Lee and Jackson's campaigns at staff college, which became part of the curriculum when Colonel Henderson was a staff college instructor.

[Fuchs]

For a discussion of the influence of the American Civil War on European military officers I recommend the book The Military Legacy of the American Civil War: The European Inheritance, 1959 and reprinted in 1988, by the late Jay Luvaas. The career of Dr. Luvaas included being an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy and a professor at the U.S. Army War College. His book contains a chapter on German observations and analyses of the the war. The author concedes that the war had a negligible impact on German military thinking because of the preoccupation of Bismarck and the German states on unification during the 1860s.

Bismarck was no officer, but a statesman.

Moltke the Elder was the military leader of Prussia at that time and probably busy with the railroad logistics, telegraph, artillery & general staff innovations, three wars in short succession and his own Cannae fixation. Later on he had the reorganize the army for a united empire, but that was after '71.

[Pete]

I'm quite aware that Bismarck was not a military officer. Two books by the German officer Justis Scheibert are discussed in detail by Luvaas: Sieben Monate in den rebellen Staaten wabrend des nordamerikanischen Krieges (Stettin, 1868) and Des Burgerkrieg in den nordamerikanischen Staaten: Militairsch beleuchtet fur den Deutschen Offizier (Berlin, 1874).

[Fuchs]

It was said at the end of the 19th century that the majority of military texts were published in German.

Two texts (one -judged by the title- a report of someone who has been in America for seven months and the other apparently being a kind of CV summary) mean very little if anything.
It's difficult to estimate their influence (in part because many relevant historic archived burned down in '45 or were looted towards Moscow) among the thousands of publications of that time.

[Pete]

Scheibert was a Prussian captain of engineers. In February 1863 he was summoned to Berlin by Prince von Radziwill, chief of engineers, and told he was being sent to America as an observer. His instructions were to determine "the effect of rifled artillery on earth, masonry and iron." Prior to his departure for America he also met with von Roon, the war minister, and von Prittwitz, the deputy inspector general of fortifications. I'd recommend that you find a copy of the Luvaas book--he appears to have consulted many German-language sources from the 19th century.

[Schmedlap]

..."if you know yourself and your enemy..."

(not just dribble....diligently trying to create a composite/template of a commander's decision making cycle)

Good point. I would add to understanding his decision making cycle, also knowing how his organization acts upon his decisions (enthusiastically implement, grudgingly comply, passively ignore, undermine, etc). Not all leaders are transformational or even effective. I suspect that is why al-Masri is still alive and why the reward on his head is so low. He definitely doesn't make this list.

[William F. Owen]

Regular British officers serving in the First and Second World Wars would have studied Lee and Jackson's campaigns at staff college, which became part of the curriculum when Colonel Henderson was a staff college instructor.
Pre- WW1 Regular Officers alone would have studied Lee and Jackson because Hamley's Operations of War (6 editions between 1867-1909) was the required Staff Collage text prior to 1898.I strongly suspect Henderson would have taught using Hamley's text.

BTW, I have the 1909 edition. It makes current US/UK writing on campaign planning and operations, look like a child's finger painting in comparison.

[AdamG]

Another tempest in a teapot -


JACKSON, Miss. (AP) - A fight is brewing in Mississippi over a proposal to issue specialty license plates honoring Confederate Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest, who was an early leader of the Ku Klux Klan.
The Mississippi Division of Sons of Confederate Veterans wants to sponsor a series of state-issued license plates to mark the 150th anniversary of the Civil War, which it calls the "War Between the States." The group proposes a different design each year between now and 2015, with Forrest slated for 2014.

Specifically,


Johnson, with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, said he's not bothered by Civil War commemorative license plates generally. But he said Mississippi shouldn't honor Forrest, who was an early leader of what he calls "a terrorist group."

http://apnews.myway.com/article/20110210/D9L9TRQG0.html

[Pete]

That bit about Forrest is old and has been well-known for a long time. Twenty or so years ago some in Memphis wanted to have a statue of Forrest in a park in the city removed. At around the same time there was a push to remove the Confederate statue on Washington Street in Alexandria, Virginia after a drunk driver knocked it off its pedestal. A Virginia law from about 1900 states it shall remain there forever and that was the end of that. The war happened and rooting out its visible reminders won't do anything to alter that fact.