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JD
05-03-2007, 09:12 AM
I recently read with interest the article 'A Failure in Generalship' posted on this website. It expresses the beleif that there is a crisis in the upper levels of the military leadership. It rasies the question who are the great generals, why were they great and why are we not producing their equivalents today?

I would be interested to hear from the wider forum and not just about the most well known but others like the Duke of Marlborough or Alfred the Great who may not be so well know outside Europe.

Comments?

JD

BRUZ_LEE
05-03-2007, 04:06 PM
The "failure in Generalship" is in my opinion related to the process of high level leadership selection, better referred to as "careerism".
In todays' militaries, if you make a mistake, you get a bad evaluation and that spoils your career. So, to become a four-star general, you really are supposed to make no mistake for let's say at least 30 years of service. Which then means, just those who are not innovative and don't dare to do new things (and make mistakes) get into the highest ranks.
That's why one sees so many "bloodless" types of generals there.

Maybe one of the latest -rare- exceptions was USMC General Tony Zinni.

Rifleman
05-03-2007, 08:57 PM
What are the qualities and attributes of a great general? I'm going to assume (dangerous, I know) that a great general needs to be a great strategist, correct?

If that's so, then America has produced many truly brilliant tacticians that were probably never general officer material. Not at all bad officers, just not general officer material. People like Robert Rogers and Nathan Bedford Forrest - in spite of their tactical ability - didn't seem to think on the strategic level.

Am I wrong there?

JD
05-04-2007, 10:19 AM
For what its worth, I think John Monash and Rommel were the great generals of the 20th century but Alexander of Macedon was perhaps the greatest of all time. He proved his tactical genius over and over but it was his ability to create and hold an Empire by adopting and using local customs and institutions that marked him as great. Toward the end of his life the majority of his army was not Greek but Asian and after his death, his Asian conquests remained loyal while the Greek regions rebelled. He must have been a remarkable leader to have instilled such loyalty and formed such diverse regions of sworn enemies into an Empire.

A fundamental issue with western society is that we do not accept error. The Nike founder recently said that the problem with America is not that too many errors are made, but not enough. There is a saying in motor racing that if you aren't crashing once in a while, you're not really trying but society somehow expects senior military leaders to control something as chaotic as war and never make a mistake. Not only that, but they are unfarily held responsible for the actions of personnel over which they have little if any direct influence. Is it any wonder that in such an environment, senior leadership is unwilling to take bold decsions or devolve decsion making to lower levels?

Alexander would not have thrived in such an environment. He attacked a Persian Army at least seven times bigger than his own on a field of their choosing. He took up the customs of his Asian subjects. He defeated enemies in battles and then immediately reinstated them as vassal kings. But, unforgivably, he made mistakes. His army mutinied twice and he nearly destroyed his army in the deserts through his own mistakes in judgment and inadequate logistical planning. Can you imagine such a man keeping his job as a General today? And that's before discussing his relationship with Hephaistion!

jastay3
08-25-2007, 01:45 AM
Actually I would say Alexander was primarily a tactician. To call him a strategist would be to misunderstand his character. He was not like the conventional picture of a strategist, manipulating military circumstance on a large scale to the advantage of his polity. He was a glory-hound, more like a viking going on a raid but on a gigantic scale. If he had been fighting for the interests of the Macedonian Empire then Carthage would have been his target after Persia, not India.

RTK
08-25-2007, 03:32 AM
Some of my favorites:

Chesty Puller
George S. Patton
Omar Bradley
Erwin Rommel
Winfield Scott
Heinz Guederian
Oswald Lutz

Ken White
08-25-2007, 03:54 AM
Belisaurius
Subutai
Anthony Wayne
Colin Campbell
John Buford
Galusha Pennypacker*
Erwin Rommel
Bill Slim
Matthew Ridgeway
Erich Von Manstein
Bruce Palmer

Okay, not a great strategist -- but neither were Puller or Bradley :) but Galusha P. has always been a favorite...

Uboat509
08-25-2007, 10:31 AM
I woudl be remiss not to mention LTG Yarborough. I have also always liked Von Manteuffel.

SFC W

Anthony Hoh
08-25-2007, 11:07 AM
I would have to go with General Mills, because we all know that sugar smacks rock!:D

But to quantify who the great generals of today are by comparing them to the standard of excellence we have known in the past is impossible.

I doubt most of the generals and leaders that you all have mentioned thus far, were held in the same esteem when they were actually in command. History has a way of making us forget faults.

I think we will have to wait another 50 years for someone else to decide who the great generals of our time really were.

RTK
08-25-2007, 11:23 AM
I woudl be remiss not to mention LTG Yarborough.

I feel bad for not mentioning him now. I should have. He had so much to do with making USSF what they are.



I think we will have to wait another 50 years for someone else to decide who the great generals of our time really were.

True, but we can still remember who the douchebags of the past are as well.

Custer, Bragg, Westmoreland

jonSlack
08-25-2007, 11:39 AM
True, but we can still remember who the douchebags of the past are as well.

Custer, Bragg, Westmoreland

lol

Well put.

Mark O'Neill
08-25-2007, 12:54 PM
My five cents:

Napoleon

Monash

Guderian

Zhukov

Giap

slapout9
08-25-2007, 01:08 PM
American Army
James M. Gavin I know that surprises everybody here:) He literally wrote the book on Airborne Warfare....the first FM was done by him and he believed the division to be nothing but an extension of the calvary division, but due to the technical limitations at the time it had to become an Airborne Infantry division. Today the term Air-Mech Division is much closer to what he had in mind. RTK you feeling me man:wry:

USMC
Chesty Puller
Tough and had tremendous common sense.

British Army
J.C. Fuller my definition of a thinking general. He wrote a great book about Generalship it's disease and it's cure. Can not remember the exact title.

German army
Erwin Rommel A professional and a leader of the highest order.

RTK
08-25-2007, 01:49 PM
American Army
James M. Gavin I know that surprises everybody here:) He literally wrote the book on Airborne Warfare....the first FM was done by him and he believed the division to be nothing but an extension of the calvary division, but due to the technical limitations at the time it had to become an Airborne Infantry division. Today the term Air-Mech Division is much closer to what he had in mind. RTK you feeling me man:wry:

USMC
Chesty Puller
Tough and had tremendous common sense.

British Army
J.C. Fuller my definition of a thinking general. He wrote a great book about Generalship it's disease and it's cure. Can not remember the exact title.

German army
Erwin Rommel A professional and a leader of the highest order.

Your list is awesome. I agree with you on Gavin. His vision for the Airborne was that they were a supporting effort for a larger main effort. The 82nd doesn't see themselves that way anymore. :rolleyes:

Mark O'Neill
08-25-2007, 01:52 PM
American Army
James M. Gavin I know that surprises everybody here:) He literally wrote the book on Airborne Warfare....the first FM was done by him and he believed the division to be nothing but an extension of the calvary division, but due to the technical limitations at the time it had to become an Airborne Infantry division. Today the term Air-Mech Division is much closer to what he had in mind. RTK you feeling me man:wry:

USMC
Chesty Puller
Tough and had tremendous common sense.

British Army
J.C. Fuller my definition of a thinking general. He wrote a great book about Generalship it's disease and it's cure. Can not remember the exact title.

German army
Erwin Rommel A professional and a leader of the highest order.

Hey Slapout,

Surely, to be a 'great' general, the general should have been at general rank, and commanded troops on operations at that rank, in a war.

By my reckoning you only have one wartime general on your list.

It is my opinion that distinguished service on operations in the junior ranks , whilst noteworthy, is not the same as exercising the art of successful generalship in war.

Cheers,

Mark

SWJED
08-25-2007, 02:15 PM
Surely, to be a 'great' general, the general should have been at general rank, and commanded troops on operations at that rank, in a war.

... but I'll throw General Anthony Zinni into the frying pan here - in my humble opinion a great general who may not have led CENTCOM in a 'war' (by traditional standards) but contained Saddam while picking up the diplomatic slack (in the Middle East) that the DoS could not or would not provide during his tenure.

Via Wikepedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthony_Zinni), his career as a general officer:


His initial general officer assignment was as the Deputy Director of Operations at the U.S. European Command. In 1991, he served as the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commanding General of Combined Task Force Operation Provide Comfort during the Kurdish relief effort in Turkey and Iraq. He also served as the Military Coordinator for Operation Provide Hope, the relief effort for the former Soviet Union. In 1992-93, he served as the Director for Operations for the Unified Task Force Somalia for Operation Restore Hope. Also in 1993, he served as the Assistant to the U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia during Operation Continued Hope. Zinni was assigned as the Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia, from 1992 to 1994.

From 1994 to 1996, he served as the Commanding General, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. During early 1995, Zinni served as Commander of the Combined Task Force for Operation United Shield, protecting the withdrawal of U.N. forces from Somalia.

From September 1996 until August 1997, Zinni served as the Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Central Command. His final tour was from August 1997 to September 2000 as the Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. He organized Operation Desert Fox, a series of airstrikes against Iraq during December 1998, with the stated purpose of degrading Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction program.

slapout9
08-25-2007, 02:16 PM
Good Morning Mark, I think the list includes two, Gavin and Rommel were both war time generals. Puller was a colonel in war WW2 and Korea I think Fuller was a Lt. Col(not sure) you may know that.

I agree and disagree with you somewhat about having to be a wartime general to be great. I think you should also take a look and how they tried to shape their respective armies when they came into positions of power that allowed them to influence and change future developments. Did he learn his lessons of war and try to improve their organizations so the lessons would not have to be relearned? Or did he just set back and rest on their laurels so to speak.? My opinion anyway.

I almost added Zhukov and he should be on the list:wry:.

Rank amateur
08-25-2007, 02:41 PM
From this amateur:

Powell, though he doesn't seem too popular here.
Rommel, especially since he was involved in the plot to assassinate Hitler
Lee
Hannibal
Sun Tzu wasn't a real person but whoever wrote The Art of War should be on the list.

I think Monty was vastly over rated.


Surely, to be a 'great' general, the general should have been at general rank, and commanded troops on operations at that rank, in a war.

Not if you agree with Sun Tzu that the best outcome is too achieve your objective without fighting.

SWJED
08-25-2007, 02:50 PM
May deserve some slack here - yea Little Big Horn was not his finest moment. That said, there are many who credit Yellow Hair with saving our Union via vs. J.E.B. Stuart at Gettysburg... Food for thouight...

jonSlack
08-25-2007, 02:52 PM
Additions:

Grant, Robert E Lee, Jeb Stuart.

Orde Wingate

And of course, an Engineer, E.D. Swinton.

SWJED
08-25-2007, 02:59 PM
From this amateur:

Powell, though he doesn't seem too popular here.
Rommel, especially since he was involved in the plot to assassinate Hitler
Lee
Hannibal
Sun Tzu wasn't a real person but whoever wrote The Art of War should be on the list.

I think Monty was vastly over rated.



Not if you agree with Sun Tzu that the best outcome is too achieve your objective without fighting.

Time to pay the piper... (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441)

Mark O'Neill
08-26-2007, 11:42 AM
Not if you agree with Sun Tzu that the best outcome is too achieve your objective without fighting.

RA (I hesitate to use either 'Rank' or 'Amateur' alone, as both could sound offensive....)

Sun Tzu meant within the context of war. (the supreme acme being securing the operational objective without battle through superior generalship). In peace time the General cannot achieve the 'objective' - that is for the political leadership.

To my mind the real art of being a General can only be demonstrated in conflict. Successful 'peacetime' generals are demonstrating bureaucratic competence, not generalship. Of course, the best ones can excel in peace and war.

Slap,

My wrong call on Gavin - apologies.

Cheers

Mark

Rob Thornton
08-26-2007, 01:20 PM
Currently reading the memoirs of U.S. Grant. I got interested after the Overland Campaign staff ride. Being from TN, I'd never really given Grant too much thought - most of my time reading Civil War literature focused around over-all accounts, or biographies on Southern leadership. Most of the Civil War prints in my house focused on Lee and Jackson. I had bought into the "Myth of the Great Cause" and did not even know it:o.

To some degree Lee had been painted larger then life. Many of the U.S. Generals in the Eastern theater up to that point had shown hesitation to seize the initiative - for whatever reasons - their posterity had left them faded. They may have achieved some tactical success, but had no real operational art that set it sights on strategic success - or carrying out President Lincoln's policy end of ending the rebellion so political re-integration could occur.

The point is that great generals are not only capable of gaining a tactical victory, but of operational art and securing strategic ends with the means provided them.

Grant's memoirs provide some insight I think into the circumstances that produce great generals. He starts by discussing his father's family, and his own boyhood life and education at USMA. He then talks about the Mexican War, the Army of occupation afterwards and the decision to leave the service for private enterprise, the circumstances which led to succession, and his path back into uniform. I'm now at about 1861-2, where he working with the Navy to seize the Confederate forts on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.

Where I've read some other books by recent Generals, Grant is very humble, and more then willing to point to his mistakes and push credit to his peers or subordinates while he occasionally speaks to a lesson he learned that changed his views. I'm amazed at how large chance played a role in his life and in campaigning, and how Grant was able to make use of that chance. That also is probably a distinguishing factor of a good general, the clarity to perceive an opportunity, and the moral courage to make use of it.

Regardless of your views on Grant of the U.S. Civil War, Grant's memoirs provide some incredible observations and insights.

I think if you consider the definition above, it helps to clarify where generals might stand (at least according to your own rank order). The great generals must be capable of more then delivering a tactical victory. The must be able to take means and employ them in ways to achieve (or at least facilitate) political ends.

As for me, I'm going to hunt down a couple of prints, one is the LOG Base at City Point - there is a great story about foresight and generalship there, and the second is the surrender at Appomattox - there are also lessons there about generalship and foresight in setting the conditions to win the peace.
Regards, Rob

Rob Thornton
08-26-2007, 02:20 PM
Some other things to consider after you establish the initial entry criteria:

- The situation inherited by the general - all factors of METT-TC and lets include domestic and geo-politics to boot:D

- The scope of the task(s)/objectives/ends to be achieved

- The amount of means at hand, and his stewardship o those means in light of the circumstances

- The skill and reputation of the opponent (and the means at the enemy's disposal)

- the courage required to persevere in the face of difficult odds both on the battlefield and on the home front

- the enduringness of the outcome - was this an accomplishment that keeps the state from having to go back in 5-10 years down the road

There are probably many others, but I think these are a few that distinguish "great" from "good".

Regards, Rob

Steve Blair
08-26-2007, 03:16 PM
As an aside, Grant's memoirs are considered one of the best of their kind. It's even more impressive when you consider that he was dying when he wrote them.

Since we seem to be listing again, I'd certainly add Zinni to my list, and I'm beginning to think Mattis should be there as well. Custer was a fine tactical commander in specific circumstances, but he proved unable to adapt to different styles of warfare and in the end paid the price. He wasn't the only cavalry commander at Gettysburg, and Buford made more important decisions during the early stages of the battle.

This raises an interesting point, though: what level of warfare does one consider when evaluating a great general? Stuart had a flair for some operations, though it could be argued that Hampton made better use of cavalry without wearing them down. Rommel also had an operational flair, but his strategic sense has been questioned. Bradley is considered a great general by some, even though his Hurtgen campaign was both unimaginative and (for many) unnecessary.

Rob's list is certainly a nice starting point.

bourbon
08-26-2007, 04:48 PM
Subutai

Sir, I do not claim any pertinent bona fides in this forum, nor do I consider myself particularly astute in military history. But I must agree that Subutai is an excellent selection. I have a fascination with Mongol history and Subutai is certainly a big figure in it.

My understanding is that Subutai is one of the pioneers of maneuver warfare and was the first to employ tactical artillery during the Battle of Mohi. He was adaptive, quick, ran and utilized extensive intelligence operations, and conquered more territory than any General in history. I understand he was not one for the nightly chivalry of the Europeans that valued personal battlefield honor in a commander, but instead viewed battles from afar directing his forces. My Grandfather once said to me: "Machismo and cajones will only get you so far, in the end it comes down to whats between your ears", which is congruent with what I take from reading about Subutai.

I have read that Subutai was on the verge of assaulting the Holy Roman Empire, which would have claimed the rest of Europe for Pax Mongolica, when he was called back. I can only imagine the effect that would have on the history of the world.

Ken White
08-26-2007, 05:25 PM
...

My understanding is that Subutai is one of the pioneers of maneuver warfare and was the first to employ tactical artillery during the Battle of Mohi... My Grandfather once said to me: "Machismo and cajones will only get you so far, in the end it comes down to whats between your ears", which is congruent with what I take from reading about Subutai...

Brilliant man. All those I named were pioneers and, in my opinion, contributed more to the art of warfare than they've been credited.

Your Grandfather was a very wise man.

Rob Thornton
08-26-2007, 10:25 PM
One of the great criticisms of many generals has been their inability to see beyond land. Certainly its a criticism of many German generals. The inability to consider the joint realm as it is named today would indicate an inclination toward personal constraints.

Rare is the flag who can employ air, land and sea-power in a complimentary and synchronous manner to achieve an end.

In today's arena we see COCOMs that are not land generals, but AF generals and Navy admirals. I see no reason why we should limit our list to generals who have employed land forces, rather I propose we expand it to those flags who have commanded land and/or sea and air forces to achieve an end. There is no reason why we should constrain ourselves:D

Regards, Rob

Ken White
08-27-2007, 02:42 AM
Hi Rob;

Flags count, question is, should they?

Generalship has a definition; "Military skill in a high commander"

M-W says about military:
1 a : of or relating to soldiers, arms, or war b : of or relating to armed forces; especially : of or relating to ground or sometimes ground and air forces (*) as opposed to naval forces

Admiralship does not have a definition. While I've known more smart Admirals (my old man was a Squid) than I have smart Generals and I certainly acknowledge that strategic vision and political acumen are the requirements for any good FlagO of any service but mlitary skill and naval warfare skill differ.

I'm not trying to be tedious or petty here; there's a point. That point is the American way of war and peace (problematic at times but I wouldn't change it for another); civilian control of the military (imperative IMO); and Goldwater Nichols.

The American way of war and peace says any FlagO from any service can be a joint commander (or the CJCS) and, we being good guys, tend to rotate these jobs so everyone gets a share of the pie.

In my view that's dumb. The Geograhic commands need a lot of tweaking IMO and which service commands isn't all that critical -- PROVIDED that CinC leaves his subordiantes alone (and I'll give the Navy credit for doing tha better then the other services will). That 'provided' is, though, a critical factor. If that cinC is going to meddle, he should be of the service that is the largest component or the opertational lead in the region.

Since G-N took the Chiefs of Staff out of the advisory loop and that responsibility is now vested solely in the CJCS; Houston, we have a problem.

Look at the workup to Iraq. The Commander in Chief (Note 1 - ex aviator, no land warfare experience), The SecDef (Note 1 again) and the CJCS (Note 1 again) could not spell ground combat. The CincCent was an Artillerist -- good folks but not maneuver oriented and the first pick to pacify Iraq was a Tanker noted for excessive attention to force protection and micromangament.

I submit that the system did not put the best people for the job in the right places. An Admiral in the mix may not have done any more harm -- and at CJCS level might have done some good, particularly if he was a surface guy and not a bubble head or an airedale :D

(No attacks, please; my Father in law was a bubble head and my best friend is an aviator with gold wings -- the objection is practical based on experience and thought patterns in organizing for combat. I wouldn't recommend a balck shoe guy for an air war...)

Which is a long, long way of saying collegiality has its weak points and while I don't really disagree with you on FlagOs, the question asked was Generals and I think there are some differences....

(*) I'd even disagree with Air...(See Myers. R :wry: )

Regards,
Ken

wm
08-27-2007, 11:57 AM
Since Rob and Ken have already argued for an expanded list, my proposal for a very high ranking "fly boy" addition to the list is:

"Smiling" Albert Kesselring

Another German defensive specialist would be:

Gotthard Heinrici from the Russian Front. (Anyone who was unfortunate enough to have to take command of an Army Group previously led by Himmler gets special points. The fact that he was successful in leading it too during the 1945 campaigns gives him many positives strokes in my book.)

And his Russian counterpoint:

Vasili Chuikov, defender of Stalingrad and captor of Berlin.

Many names offered up fit into the category of great captains (I particularly like Ken's list), but I think many of those names are much more tactical hot shots than grand leaders at the operational/strategic level--Rommel being a prime example. BTW, a close reading of his descriptions in Infantry Attacksshows that he was at his best leading from the front in a small group operation.

As requested in the original post, I have added a few "older" leaders for consideration:

Frederick the Great of Prussia
Prince Eugene of Savoy (His co-leader, Marlborough, was already noted.)
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden
Saladin/Salah al-Din from the Crusades/Horns of Hattin/Capture of Jerusalem fame
Zenobia, Queen of Palmyra
Marcus Aurelius
Deborah/Barak (tough to tell from the literature who was really in charge)
Joshua

The fact of the matter is that many "great" generals/leaders are so only because of the great set of advisors and planners that they have/have had working for them. Too bad a lot of those folks get swallowed up in the archives because they do not have good press agents.

goesh
08-27-2007, 12:24 PM
Let's not forget Shaka Zulu, Crazy Horse, Tecumseh, Chief Joseph and Geronimo and I suppose we could throw in Cornstalk, Little Turtle, Red Cloud, Dull Knife and Sitting Bull too.

Stan
08-27-2007, 01:10 PM
Let's not forget Shaka Zulu, Crazy Horse, Tecumseh, Chief Joseph and Geronimo and I suppose we could throw in Cornstalk, Little Turtle, Red Cloud, Dull Knife and Sitting Bull too.
Hey Goesh,

We are still talking about military leaders, correct ? I'll admit, Cornstalk got me searching Dogpile...albeit only briefly :D

Coincidently, a famous E6 known only as GT6 was deep-sixed (once again) ! Years from now, he'll also be in Wiki along with Cornstalk.

Rank amateur
08-27-2007, 01:41 PM
There should probably be some Vietnamese generals on the list.

I think Ike deserves some recognition for being the first to really lead a coalition of nations, while deploying air, land and sea assets.

I read somewhere that Lee was educated with every one of the Union generals he initially confronted (they may've all been classmates at West Point, but I'm not sure about that) and Grant was the first Union general that Lee didn't know personally. An interesting example of "Know your enemy, know your self."

Rob Thornton
08-27-2007, 02:32 PM
Hi RA,
I was under the impression that Lee and Grant did not know each other either, however, Grant states in his memoirs that he had met Lee in Mexico- to paraphrase it goes something like this, "I had met Lee in Mexico and knew that he was human". This plays out in the Wilderness campaign up at Saunder's Field when the Army of Potomac's lead elements make contact with the Army of Northern Virginia and shows some hesitation - they were afraid that Lee was going show up in their rear if they committed. Grant tells his subordinates to quit worrying about Lee somersaulting into their rear and to start worrying about what they were going to do to Lee's army (again a paraphrase). So I think it more along the lines of how well the knew each other (however, your point is well taken;)

After Grant ordered the 2nd attack at Cold Harbor just NE of Richmond, McClellan wrote to his wife and said that he thought Grant now understood that Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia were a higher caliber then those he'd (Grant) faced down in the West. However, I think that while Grant was willing to enter into a war of exhaustion where he lost 2 for every 1 of Lees as long as it provided him an operational advantage, he was not keen on throwing them away for nothing - it was at Cold Harbor (3 Jun 1864) he was labeled as a butcher. Its worth keeping in mind public expectations were high since Grant was near Richmond, and that there was still a political timetable present.

Although the two generals were matching each other closely through out the Wilderness Campaign, and I believe had the sense of how urgent things were and where they were headed, they also fell victim to some mirror imaging. Grant was convinced Lee was near the breaking point after the Army of Northern Virginia had failed to exploit an opportunity while fighting over good ground at the North Anna (23-26 May 1864) - consequently he got in a hurry and it cost him.

In the end he had to slide South and West forcing Lee to extend his lines to match - around Petersburg. When Grant built up the Log base at City Point then seized Five forks and cut the RRs which provided LOCs with the South, it was pretty much over. Soon Lee would send word to Davis that he could no longer be responsible for Richmond - Lee was just over extended. Grant even had the foresight to take steps to prevent Lee from breaking out to go South and link up with the confederate forces in the western theater.

Another thing I think is relevant when discussing "who are the greats" is acknowledging that its rare to have a perfect record. Clausewitz comes in handy here, because fog, friction and chance always play a role and keep it more like a game of cards then a chess match (another shameless paraphrase). I think you have to consider the whole cloth of the General in question.

Rob Thornton
08-27-2007, 03:01 PM
Ken,
I wonder about that as well. Kind of like when does the ground component guy (if organized that way) take over from the Maritime guy in an amphibious operation - generally when enough forces are established ashore as to provide C2 and enough combat power to pursue the LOO toward the objective(s).
But what about a guy like Nimitz? What about when a state is primarily a maritime power - like the contest between Athens and Sparta? Since man lives on land, the bulk of questions decided reference man will be answered there - land power compels - the others really coerce (probably made a few folks nervous with that one, but I think there are more historical examples in favor then against).

That should not mean that an AF general or an admiral could not use land forces to do so - I think its more a question of the means at his disposal, and his ability to understand the nature of the war and its conditions (METT-TC w/ a "P"). Since a person can generally only be truly proficient in so many things, it reasonable to assume somebody versed in land power their entire life is going to understand more of the nuances then say a sea or air guy (and vice-versa). If the flag has a good "joint" staff, and the professional judgment to put it to use, it should be fine. I'll give you though that there are more historical examples of Generals who used sea power to attain operational advantages on land and effect strategic outcomes then admirals - Brassidas, Wellington & Eisenhower to name a few.

You raise a great question, that in my mind raises other relevant questions about how we assign COCOMs - and the whole issue of interdependence. It also raises the issues of definitions and if we should reconsider them- either to reaffirm them, or change them in light of present conditions.

I honestly need to cogitate some more on that one. :D

Rank amateur
08-27-2007, 03:23 PM
Hi RA,
Another thing I think is relevant when discussing "who are the greats" is acknowledging that its rare to have a perfect record. Clausewitz comes in handy here, because fog, friction and chance always play a role and keep it more like a game of cards then a chess match (another shameless paraphrase). I think you have to consider the whole cloth of the General in question.

Very true. Though I could argue that the true greats try to redeal when they get dealt a bad hand. (Captain Kirk is an example if we have any Trekkies out there.;)) Rommel partaking in the plot to kill Hitler is another example, even though that didn't work out, he tried and if successful his country would've benefited greatly.

To give our guys props, I'd suggest that the generals who are saying "Democracy in Iraq may not be possible" are trying to get dealt better cards and I believe that is exactly what is needed.

There was a football coach who said about a colleague, "He can beat you with his team, or take your team, give you his team, and still beat you." (I'm paraphrasing.) To me, that would be the ultimate mark of a great general. That's one reason I mentioned Hannibal. He was dealt a bad hand - smaller force, longer supply lines - and he was still extremely successful.

Ken White
08-27-2007, 03:52 PM
Ken,...
. . .
. . .
You raise a great question, that in my mind raises other relevant questions about how we assign COCOMs - and the whole issue of interdependence. It also raises the issues of definitions and if we should reconsider them- either to reaffirm them, or change them in light of present conditions.

I honestly need to cogitate some more on that one. :D

Good points all and I agree. My sensing, mostly from my father and Navy and Marine friends who were in the Pacific during the war is that much of Nimitz's success was due to good strategic vision, an ability to pick good subordinates (as diametrically opposed to having them forced on him by a personnel system), to delegate and then to let people do their jobs.

I think any good FlagO can do the geographic CinC job. A mediocre or bad one will foul up to one degree or another. The key isn't suit color or community, it's the right guy for the job and generally, that entails not being 'fair.'

He --or she -- selected for that job has to be able to select senior subordinates (hear the Services wail...) and, more importantly, has to be able to trust them and to do just that -- trust them.

We've lost the ability to trust one another (I blame the personnel system but that's another thread another day. :D )

The thing in this thread I have grave reservations about is that 'military advice' to the Prez and SecDef is nominally restricted to the CJCS, that we insist on rotating the services through that and by definition, that is a political appointment...

What's wrong with that picture?

wm
08-27-2007, 05:20 PM
Kind of like when does the ground component guy (if organized that way) take over from the Maritime guy in an amphibious operation - generally when enough forces are established ashore as to provide C2 and enough combat power to pursue the LOO toward the objective(s).

What I think you are really asking goes much deeper than operating across different components. It is connected at a higher level. See if this makes any sense.

Sometimes we are attacking, sometimes defending, delaying, sustaining, etc. I suspect that we have different folks who are better at each of these. I say this because each type of operation represents a different type and amount of risk, and each of us has a different level of risk tolerance. For example, in my list, I named German General Heinrici--a big time defensive specialist--I'd say he was a pretty risk averse guy. I'm not sure I'd want him planning my strategic offensive--give me a Hannibal, who seemed to thrive on risk, for that piece instead. I suspect Eisenhower was a wizard at organizing sustainment, which represents a different form of risk. I don't recall him ever being singled out for his operational or tactical vision.
Lincoln had the vision to put Grant in charge at the right time. I doubt Grant would have had the same type of success in Northern VA in say 1861-62. Fabian delay was right in the Second Punic War until Hannibal left Italy. Fabius Maximus would have been the wrong person to command the legions at Zama.

History is replete with great generals; they just aren't great at doing everything. What I suggest we need at the top are some senior leaders who can see which way the winds are blowing. They then energize their smart folks in the areas towards which those winds are pushing us in enough time to keep us from crashing on rocks, running aground, or getting becalmed.
With reference to Rob's other point quoted below, I apoligize to all the groundpounders out there (and I am one) for ending this post with a naval metaphor, but sometimes we need to remember that life started in the oceans.


What about when a state is primarily a maritime power - like the contest between Athens and Sparta? Since man lives on land, the bulk of questions decided reference man will be answered there - land power compels - the others really coerce (probably made a few folks nervous with that one, but I think there are more historical examples in favor then against).

Granite_State
08-27-2007, 06:02 PM
Very true. Though I could argue that the true greats try to redeal when they get dealt a bad hand. (Captain Kirk is an example if we have any Trekkies out there.;)) Rommel partaking in the plot to kill Hitler is another example, even though that didn't work out, he tried and if successful his country would've benefited greatly.

There was a football coach who said about a colleague, "He can beat you with his team, or take your team, give you his team, and still beat you." (I'm paraphrasing.) To me, that would be the ultimate mark of a great general. That's one reason I mentioned Hannibal. He was dealt a bad hand - smaller force, longer supply lines - and he was still extremely successful.

Rommel refused to participate in the plot against Hitler, but knew about it and did not betray the conspirators. Thus the forced suicide.

Think that coach was Bum Phillips, "He can take his'n and beat your'n, and he can take your'n and beat his'n." Not sure who he was talking about.

Granite_State
08-27-2007, 06:04 PM
American Army
British Army
J.C. Fuller my definition of a thinking general. He wrote a great book about Generalship it's disease and it's cure. Can not remember the exact title.


As others have said, not a real wartime commander, staff officer at the tail end of WWI. Brilliant guy, but I'd call him much more of a military theorist (intellectual father of blitzkrieg) than a great general. Never mind all the fascist sympathizing and occult stuff...

Rob Thornton
08-27-2007, 06:51 PM
Congress receive these days other then the CJCS? With all the Think Tank guys, paid military affairs correspondents on the media and opinions on the blog-sphere that float/filter up through staffers, how much influence does one single guy have these days?

How much influence does a COCOM have given the media, the personality of a president, the experience and comfort zone of a SEC DEF and their bias, the crisis at hand?

I'm not sure there are too many other ways to do it. I mean the President could pick his or her CJCS without worrying about which Joint Flavor of the month it is, but that too has its ills. He/She cold delegate it to the SEC DEF, but again, personal bias may enter in. I'm sure as it is, politics plays a role in the nomination, which at the level is probably some what natural - given the convergence of policy and strategy.

I guess there is also the JFK solution, but we may already have something akin to that with think tanks anyways:(


We've lost the ability to trust one another (I blame the personnel system but that's another thread another day. )

I'd say parochialism spawned by the acquisition system (The "whose rice bowl is it anyways" game show) typified by the debates such as the one on UAS/UAVs, and the professional lobbyers on the Hill- a necessary ill these days for sure in order to justify why we need this or that to fulfill our missions:(.

You know, I don't think I saw Marshall on anybody's list. It may go to our fascination with the tactical - where men die, things are blown up, and celluloid records. I think when you consider the scope of his role, the various personalities involved, and the manner in which he kept himself from becoming politicized, it is humbling. If not one of our greatest generals, he is certainly one of our greatest citizens.

Regards all, Rob

Ken White
08-27-2007, 07:23 PM
"I wonder how much military advice a President and the Congress receive these days other then the CJCS? With all the Think Tank guys, paid military affairs correspondents on the media and opinions on the blog-sphere that float/filter up through staffers, how much influence does one single guy have these days?

Probably way too much from elsewhere and the President with little or no military experience is going to listen to the think tank punditocracy because the military guys either irritate or intimidate him. That, to me is why the choice of SecDef is critical. That's a hard job to fill. Few businessmen have done well as have few of the old guard of governmental high rollers. I think Schlesinger and Laird were probably the best in my lifetime -- and I served under most and knew of all of them to date; I missed only Forrestal up front and Cohen and Rumsfeld (v 2.0) on this end... :rolleyes:


"How much influence does a COCOM have given the media, the personality of a president, the experience and comfort zone of a SEC DEF and their bias, the crisis at hand?"

Probably not much unless he's charismatic and the rather banal news types take a liking to him. That's, IMO, as it should be. I'm more worried about what he does or doesn't do downstream as opposed to media or upward influence.


"I'm not sure there are too many other ways to do it. I mean the President could pick his or her CJCS without worrying about which Joint Flavor of the month it is, but that too has its ills. He/She cold delegate it to the SEC DEF, but again, personal bias may enter in. I'm sure as it is, politics plays a role in the nomination, which at the level is probably some what natural - given the convergence of policy and strategy."

Nah, the system works almost in spite of itself -- the bureaucracy in the building is hard for any one guy to affect -- my issue is that we do not need to have the parochial battles and repeats of Eagle Claw and Urgent Fury where each service has a piece of the action but the combined advice of all the Chiefs is likely to be a better deal for the decision makers than is one guy who may or may not accurately report the group view. Theoretically, the SecDef and the CJCS go in the Tank and a position is reached and the two play honest brokers with the Prez and I'm sure that happens mostly

But do recall, I'm an cynical old Dude...:D
. . .

"You know, I don't think I saw Marshall on anybody's list. It may go to our fascination with the tactical - where men die, things are blown up, and celluloid records. I think when you consider the scope of his role, the various personalities involved, and the manner in which he kept himself from becoming politicized, it is humbling. If not one of our greatest generals, he is certainly one of our greatest citizens."

Regards all, Rob

Agree on that. Awesome personality and a great person. Any General that could manipulate Georgey Patton had to be a great one...

Smitten Eagle
08-28-2007, 05:24 PM
Since we're talking about generalship, why limit ourselves to the actual historical figures? We can learn as much about generalship from history as from fiction, poetry, etc...

So, to the running list of great generals I would add...

Sam Damon (of Once an Eagle fame)

Also,
Epaminondas,
Henry V
The Dead Germans (Rommel, Guderian, von Mellenthin, and Kesselring)
Sherman (the only guy who predicted the nature of the coming Civil War)
MacArthur
Arminius (defeated the Romans at the battle of Teutoburg Forest, holding the Romans at bay for centuries. As opposed to the exalted Boudica, who lost to Rome and left only ruin).

Tom Odom
08-28-2007, 06:56 PM
Taking a page from Smitten Eagle,

I would also suggest we not limit this to land comanders:

Nimitz as the best of the US Naval commanders

George Kenney as one of the most adaptive air generals

Hugh Dowding as the right Air Marshall at the critical time for the RAF

Bomber Harris as the juggernaut behind RAF Bomber Command and really the model for LeMay, especially when the latter went to the Pacific

Doenitz because he was the only German naval commander who really grasped the war at sea and nearly won it despite Hitler

And back to ground commanders, one that will undoubtedly draw screams.....Montgomery at the particular place and time of his emergence as a leading commander in North Africa as an offset to Churchill's near constant involvement in all military affairs (much good, much bad). It took an ego as large as Montgomery's to offset Churchill.

Tom

Uboat509
08-28-2007, 08:39 PM
I am going to throw COLs Aaron Bank and Bull Simmons out there also. We just don't have a lot of Generals in our community but those two are definitely at the top of our hierarchy. They might as well be Generals for the influence that they have had on our community.

SFC W

MattC86
08-28-2007, 09:28 PM
So, to the running list of great generals I would add...

Sam Damon (of Once an Eagle fame)

Also,
Epaminondas,
Henry V


I remember hearing so much about Sam Damon and Once an Eagle, and I thought, "Isn't it a bit dangerous for an entire profession to be trying to base themselves on a character who never existed, and, in many ways, never could?"

Then I read it and realized what the fuss was all about. Heartily agree to put "Sad Sam" up at the top of the list.

As far as Epaminondas, did you read Victor Davis Hanson's Soul of Battle? Marvelous book about Epaminondas, Sherman, and Patton.

I feel like commanders need to be divided into groups. Great tacticians, great strategists, and great cases of leadership. I put the least weight on tacticians, because the other two are far rarer. Also there were many excellent tacticians who were not generals.

Tacticians:
Patton, Lee, Jackson, Rommel, von Manstein, Spruance, Caesar, Scipio, Alexander

Strategists:
George C. Marshall (as Rob mentioned, both an officer and a citizen of the highest caliber. America is lucky to have had him), Nimitz, Sherman, Napoleon, Mahmet (Turk who conquered Constantinople)

Leaders:
Ridgway (Korea and the 8th Army still IMO the best example of the impact one leader can have on a war in history), Farragut, George Thomas, Gustavus Adolphus, Epaminondas

Of course there are many, many others. I feel it will take the judgment of history to categorize today's generals, but Zinni, Mattis, Petraeus, and McKiernan seem the best of the last few years. Many of you would know better than I, however.

Matt

Kreker
08-29-2007, 03:13 AM
von Steuben
Buford
Grant
Pershing
Patton
Marshall
Bradley
Gavin
Abrams
Gavin
Zinni

kit
08-29-2007, 03:33 AM
W.T. Sherman. He understood that war is unrefined brutality and he set out to make Georgia howl, which he did. His objective was to make war so unpalatable to them that they wouldn't resort to it again for 100 years. Well, it's been 140 and they still haven't, so I'd say he succeeded.

Mark O'Neill
08-29-2007, 08:34 AM
von Steuben
Buford
Grant
Pershing
Patton
Marshall
Bradley
Gavin
Abrams
Gavin
Zinni


What an amazingly American (and 20th Century ) centric list, especially after a few millenia of civilisations waging war aginst each other.

I wonder whether people will know these names in a few millenia, like we can cite the generals of antiquity today? Hold on, I think I know the answer to that already....:rolleyes:

I wonder if lists like this are actually representative of the problem that people have conceptualising why things are not working out like they thought that they would.

There is a big world out there, and American hegemony notwithstanding, a lot has happened militarily, and will probably continue to happen, with little or no American input.

I don't mean to offend and I am not offering any value judgement or criticism of American engagement, military prowess or history here - far from it. Just an observation that cultural hubris not only damages perspective, but can also hinder vision and understanding.

Rob Thornton
08-29-2007, 10:05 AM
I don't mean to offend and I am not offering any value judgment or criticism of American engagement, military prowess or history here - far from it. Just an observation that cultural hubris not only damages perspective, but can also hinder vision and understanding.

Mark, you don't offend - as always you make us think - which is good:D

-Let's add another qualifier to the combined lists for separating the world's "greatest" from great generals: they are tied to some event which clearly shaped the world

Can you tie a general/flag to military history which has, or will endure in such away that his legacy will be both enduring and recognizable beyond each of our own lists? I think this will be hard to a certain degree because it asks the question, why do we know more about certain generals (across the world) then others?


I wonder if lists like this are actually representative of the problem that people have conceptualizing why things are not working out like they thought that they would.

There is a big world out there, and American hegemony notwithstanding, a lot has happened militarily, and will probably continue to happen, with little or no American input.

I think this is a keen observation. Mark I think it was the Australian PM who said -and I'm a bad parahraser:D "America's challenge is to carry out the responsibilities of hegemon without acting like one". Does anyone remember the articles a few years back where Zinni and the other COCOMs were the subject of a piece in the Washington Post (or was it the Times) - "Rise of the Proconsuls" I think it was? A very well done article. That is probably a good subject for another thread though.

Best Regards, Rob

Old Eagle
08-29-2007, 12:49 PM
How 'bout General Electric and General Dynamics? General Motors was once great, but is assigned at least temporarily to the trash heap of history due to total mismanagement of the great American automobile cash cow.

The reason for my nominations is simple. Ultimately, it is American indirect power that will determine our posistion in the world. Not just the economic forces I've addressed metaphorically, but all the other DIME elements.

Ski
08-29-2007, 01:35 PM
My 2 quatloos on great generals:

The Ancients
Genghis Khan
Alexander the Great
Scipio Africanus
Fabius Maximus
Cyrus the Great
Hannibal

Belisaurius
Khalid ibn al-Walid
Tamerlane
Saladin

Middle Ages through the 19th Century
Gustavus Adolphus
John Sobieski
Scharnhorst
Clausewitz
Charles Martel
Moltke the Elder
Duke of Wellington
Napoleon

20th Century
Montgomery
Marshall
Patton
Zhukov
Von Seeckt
Chuikov
Eisenhower
Von Manstein
Balck
Puller

Admirality
Jacky Fisher
Ernest King
Nimitz
Nelson
Decatur
Rickover - for his scientific work
Mahan

Air Marshals and the like
Billy Mitchell
Doolittle
Wolfram von Richtofen
Kesselring - was also an Army officer
LeMay - a savage, but since he as on our side it's ok :)
Hans Ulrich Rudel (although he may not have been a General - don't know)
Bomber Harris
Douhet - he's been too influential, and that's why he's on the list

Granite_State
08-29-2007, 01:42 PM
Hugh Dowding as the right Air Marshall at the critical time for the RAF

Bomber Harris as the juggernaut behind RAF Bomber Command and really the model for LeMay, especially when the latter went to the Pacific

Tom

I'm no expert on the RAF, but my understanding is that Harris nearly broke his force in 1943, hurling vulnerable bombers against Germany in daylight raids until Bomber Command was decimated, with marginal effects on German war production. Not to mention the whole question of whether strategic bombing in WWII was an efficient use of resources in the first place.

Agree on Dowding though.

Tom Odom
08-29-2007, 02:08 PM
I'm no expert on the RAF, but my understanding is that Harris nearly broke his force in 1943, hurling vulnerable bombers against Germany in daylight raids until Bomber Command was decimated, with marginal effects on German war production. Not to mention the whole question of whether strategic bombing in WWII was an efficient use of resources in the first place.

Agree on Dowding though.


That would be the USAAF 8th Air force which nearly broke in 1943 in the daylight raids. Bomber Harris was RAF Bomber Command and they went with night bombing very early on, especially as the Halifax and then the Lancaster came on line as the main RAF heavy bombers. Bomber Harris mounted the first 100 plane raid against Cologne in 1942 as a marker of what was to come. It was Harris who pushed to draw the USAAF into the night bombing effort when the 8th had such a rough go in 1943. Churchill nearly pushed for the same thing but liked the idea (and ring) of the phrase bombing around the clock.

As for the debate on whether strategic bombing was a waste of resources, Such bombing did not win the war but it certainly contributed to the victory.

Tom

Granite_State
08-29-2007, 02:38 PM
That would be the USAAF 8th Air force which nearly broke in 1943 in the daylight raids. Bomber Harris was RAF Bomber Command and they went with night bombing very early on, especially as the Halifax and then the Lancaster came on line as the main RAF heavy bombers. Bomber Harris mounted the first 100 plane raid against Cologne in 1942 as a marker of what was to come. It was Harris who pushed to draw the USAAF into the night bombing effort when the 8th had such a rough go in 1943. Churchill nearly pushed for the same thing but liked the idea (and ring) of the phrase bombing around the clock.

As for the debate on whether strategic bombing was a waste of resources, Such bombing did not win the war but it certainly contributed to the victory.

Tom

I was thinking of this:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Berlin_%28air%29

But you're right, night bombing.

I still question whether large-scale strategic bombing was worth it. Obviously Douhet was dead wrong, but Germany also increased its war production almost to the end. Granted that's more a sign of inadequate mobilization of national resources for war, but it still calls into question how much the bombers were really doing.

And I've seen many note that RAF crews were composed of some of the smartest and best-educated men in the British armed forces in WWII. A big chunk of that best and brightest went down over Germany.

Tom Odom
08-29-2007, 02:52 PM
I was thinking of this:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Berlin_%28air%29

But you're right, night bombing.

I still question whether large-scale strategic bombing was worth it. Obviously Douhet was dead wrong, but Germany also increased its war production almost to the end. Granted that's more a sign of inadequate mobilization of national resources for war, but it still calls into question how much the bombers were really doing.

And I've seen many note that RAF crews were composed of some of the smartest and best-educated men in the British armed forces in WWII. A big chunk of that best and brightest went down over Germany.

There is no doubt that the costs were high. My father-in-law was a waist gunner on a B17; he didn't get into the war until the fall of 44. Still he had his own set of memories and many were horrific.

The question I always in response to the fact that Germany increased production under the intensive boming campaign, is simpy do you think Germany's production would have been less without the strategic effort? Without the bomber streams, German warfightiong industries could have concentrated on greater production of Tiger tanks, rockets, etc without any disruption.

As for the talent issue, one of the greatest selection of talent was in the airborne divisions; again one can ask the question was it worth it and many did during and after the war.

On Douhet--he is alive at Maxwell AFB. He comes in quietly and sings with duets with Elvis during Friday Kareoke. I met him one evening in early August 1990 in Checkmate, the AF targeting cell in the Pentagon. He was advocating a strategic bombing offensive against Iraq while ignoring Iraqi forces in Kuwait. :wry:

Best
Tom

Mark O'Neill
08-29-2007, 03:39 PM
I think it was the Australian PM who said -and I'm a bad parahraser:D "America's challenge is to carry out the responsibilities of hegemon without acting like one".


Rob,

man, you are good - I don't know that many Australians who can quote our PM!:D

That said, I think it is a good quote.

I cannot think of any better hegemon on offer (unless I demonstrate ignorance and no sense of the impossible by suggesting Australia....).

I think the qualification you propose on 'world impact' (or something similar) makes us focus more on the true meaning of the term 'great'. Some of the nominees to date seem to fit more into the categories of 'good blokes' or 'people I would like to be' rather than necessarily 'great'.

Cheers

Mark

Ski
08-29-2007, 04:38 PM
Undoubedtly, old chap.

I just finished re-reading "The Generals War" and came to the realization that the entire "effects based operations" that was Checkmate was really the extension of the strategic bombing myth that has been perpetrated on the US military since 1942.

I suspect ol' Douhet is in the witness protection program along with other famous Italians like Jimmy Hoffa!





On Douhet--he is alive at Maxwell AFB. He comes in quietly and sings with duets with Elvis during Friday Kareoke. I met him one evening in early August 1990 in Checkmate, the AF targeting cell in the Pentagon. He was advocating a strategic bombing offensive against Iraq while ignoring Iraqi forces in Kuwait. :wry:

Best
Tom

goesh
08-29-2007, 04:43 PM
-glad to see Ghengis Khan and Saladin added to the list. There is quite a bunch of talented military leaders listed in this thread. I think the group would be hard pressed to list as many great civilian leaders and that is a reflection of reality more so than bias IMO.

kit
08-29-2007, 08:13 PM
There is no doubt that the costs were high. My father-in-law was a waist gunner on a B17; he didn't get into the war until the fall of 44. Still he had his own set of memories and many were horrific.

The question I always in response to the fact that Germany increased production under the intensive boming campaign, is simpy do you think Germany's production would have been less without the strategic effort? Without the bomber streams, German warfightiong industries could have concentrated on greater production of Tiger tanks, rockets, etc without any disruption.

As for the talent issue, one of the greatest selection of talent was in the airborne divisions; again one can ask the question was it worth it and many did during and after the war.

On Douhet--he is alive at Maxwell AFB. He comes in quietly and sings with duets with Elvis during Friday Kareoke. I met him one evening in early August 1990 in Checkmate, the AF targeting cell in the Pentagon. He was advocating a strategic bombing offensive against Iraq while ignoring Iraqi forces in Kuwait. :wry:

Best
Tom


It's my understanding that the effectiveness of the bombing campaign over Germany had more to do with target selection than effort. When we shifted our priorities to ball bearings and fuel production, it really did cripple the German war effort. Concentrating on rail yards, bridges etc, (which could be rapidly repaired) and dispersed industries didn't accomplish a whole lot.

The same could be said of the air campaign over North Vietnam.

Tom Odom
08-29-2007, 08:39 PM
It's my understanding that the effectiveness of the bombing campaign over Germany had more to do with target selection than effort. When we shifted our priorities to ball bearings and fuel production, it really did cripple the German war effort. Concentrating on rail yards, bridges etc, (which could be rapidly repaired) and dispersed industries didn't accomplish a whole lot.

The same could be said of the air campaign over North Vietnam.

On WWII yes and no

The effort to strike the ball bearing manufacturing centers (Schwienfurt) was extremely costly and did have an effect--it got the germans attention about centralized production and lead Speer to spread the industrial effort out. That helped in survivability but also has severe costs in efficiency. Fuel same thing; you hit targets and the bad guys get the message. It does not mean hitting them was a wasted effort. And after the Schwienfurt raids we shifted more toward area targets inside Germany. Changes to that occurred as we built to the invasion, when Ike forced the issue on shifting targets towards isolating France as well as finishing the German air force so it would not threaten the invasion fleet or the beachhead.

As for Vietnam, until we started Linebacker II there simply was no comparison. The air war against Vietnam was a tactical fight executed again and again and again using tactical aircraft in a so called strategic role.

Best

Tom

Granite_State
08-29-2007, 08:56 PM
It's my understanding that the effectiveness of the bombing campaign over Germany had more to do with target selection than effort. When we shifted our priorities to ball bearings and fuel production, it really did cripple the German war effort. Concentrating on rail yards, bridges etc, (which could be rapidly repaired) and dispersed industries didn't accomplish a whole lot.

The same could be said of the air campaign over North Vietnam.

My understanding is that targeting the Ploesti oil fields in Romania, a vital spot, couldn't happen until we had bases closer to the them.

As for Vietnam, actually just read a great paper on the subject today, Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War, by Robert A. Pape, Jr. He argues, persuasively to me, that the problem wasn't really overcentralization (LBJ approving targets), inadequate efforts, or vacillation. The issue, as with the whole war, was the nature of the conflict, pre and post-Tet.

When fighting the VC insurgency, the amount of supplies the guerillas needed to stay in the field was negligible. The 250,000 or so VC in the South needed an estimated 380 tons a day of food, ammunition, medicine, and oil, gas, etc. A single U.S. division at the time needed 750-2,000 tons a day. All the Air Force's bombs couldn't damage the North's economy or infrastructure enough to stop that trickle from getting through. I've heard someone else on here, think it was Sargent, say that the Air Force was actually running out of strategic targets to bomb in the North.

Once the VC was largely defeated and the North switched to a conventional strategy, American airpower could and did do tremendous damage and interdiction to the NVA, in the 1972 Easter Offensive and thereafter.

Rob Thornton
08-29-2007, 09:05 PM
Changes to that occurred as we built to the invasion, when Ike forced the issue on shifting targets towards isolating France as well as finishing the German air force so it would not threaten the invasion fleet or the beachhead.

Whatever else the strategic bombing of German mil/industrial complex did, it brought the Luftwaffe up where it could be destroyed providing an operational advantage for D-Day and throughout the remainder of the war. Ike's tacit understanding of the advantages and limitations of air power, land power and sea power is part of what made him a great operational artist.

His understanding of the primacy of policy in building strategy, his ability to organize well and his ability to work with diverse Coalition and Joint personalities during and after the war is what made him one of our greatest generals - the right man at the right place at the right time. His leadership as the Supreme Allied CDR in the European theater (remember the written statement about where blame would lay if Overlord failed) during WWII, (in my opinion) makes him a candidate for one of History's Great Generals above so many many of his incredible peers.

Best Regards, Rob

slapout9
08-29-2007, 11:38 PM
I would have to add another member of the Airborne Trinity(mafia) that is Maxwell Taylor. Why as far as I can tell he is the one who taught the Army what Strategy is. The expression Ends,Ways and Means belongs to Max Taylor according to Arthur Lykke,Jr from his Army War College article. Except that Max 's original quote was "Objectives,Ways and Means." Some how it was changed to Ends??? Why or how this happened doesn't matter it should be changed back to the original Objectives.


At least for a few years until I get it changed to Motives,Methods and Opportunities:eek::eek::eek:

MattC86
08-30-2007, 01:48 AM
His understanding of the primacy of policy in building strategy, his ability to organize well and his ability to work with diverse Coalition and Joint personalities during and after the war is what made him one of our greatest generals - the right man at the right place at the right time. His leadership as the Supreme Allied CDR in the European theater (remember the written statement about where blame would lay if Overlord failed) during WWII, (in my opinion) makes him a candidate for one of History's Great Generals above so many many of his incredible peers.

Best Regards, Rob

I think in our rush to ordain the "great captains" we forget just how much of a team game it really is.

Consider WWII in Europe, for example. George Marshall was a strategist of the first order, as was Ike, who proved his ability to manage a tenuous coalition, among other things. Under them they had George S. Patton, one of the more remarkable tactical presences of all time.

Without any link in that chain, the Army in Europe has major, major problems. Without Marshall and his peacetime draft policies and remarkable work expanding and creating a citizen army, that Army takes two additional years to get up to snuff. Without Eisenhower, it is not employed in an unbeatable coalition, it is not properly supported logistically, it does not have the right leaders, and has an overall lesser man leading it. Without Patton that Army does not have the personal leadership, determination, and tactical genius to defeat the Wehrmacht at the front.

Any successful military force (the US Navy in World War II would be a similar example: King - Nimitz - Halsey/Spruance/Kinckaid/Mitscher etc.) I believe has to have a similar team of winners at its head.

Matt

Rob Thornton
08-30-2007, 02:18 AM
Another great story and one that ties in with our "why study History" thread - In 1944 Eisenhower told Patton to go to Bastogne, after describing the general situation Patton responded with a Civil War analogy - I think it may have been from the Siege of Petersburg (Battle of Five Forks). What is interesting to me is that because both men had studied the same military history, they shared a common understanding between higher and lower echelons that conveyed intent - no lengthy deliberation, just a simple analogy that sent the message "Hey Ike, I got this one in the bag!" (Again - thanks to DR Mike Matheny for teaching me that!)

Best Regards, Rob

wm
08-30-2007, 11:38 AM
I find the discussion of the "great " leaders of WWII instructive as much for who is left out as for those who are included. In another thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3769), folks are discussing the apparent infatuation with technology that has produced a force woefully understrength for its missions. The names folks are tossing around on this thread happen to be associated with the "technology rich" batttlefields of WWII. Patton and the folks of Bradley's 12st Army Group tended to be loaded with the best in our technical arsenal--upgunned Sherman "Firefly" tanks, CAS support from the latest airframes, cutting edge SP artillery, etc, etc.

The WWII names that haven't gotten a mention happened to be doing yeoman service in the southern part of France, with the more traditional weapons of war--the largely all infrantry forces in Jacob Devers' 6th Army Group. like Patch's 7th Army and Lucian Truscott, Jr's VI Corps divisions (3rd ID, 36th ID, 45th ID), as well as the justly famous 442 RCT. These guys did something no other army in history had ever done before--mounted a successful offensive through the Vosges. I will only note the lack of discussion of actions on the Italian Peninsula by admitting that we had some really poor leadership in that theater that more than overbalanced the good guys like Truscott.

Maybe if we chose a different set of icons for our WWII heroes, we might find a better set of solutions for the current morass in which we find ourselves enmired.

kit
08-30-2007, 11:47 AM
I find the discussion of the "great " leaaders of WWII instructive as much for who is left out as for those who are included. In another thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3769), folks are discussing the apparent infatuation with technology that has produced a force woefully understrength for its missions. The names folks are tossing around on this thread happen to be associated with the "technology rich" batttlefields of WWII. Patton and the folks of Bradley's 12st Army Group tended to be loaded with the best in our technical arsenal--upgunned Sherman "Firefly" tanks, CAS support from the latest airframes, cutting edge SP artillery, etc, etc.

The WWII names that haven't gotten a mention happened to be doing yeoman service in the southern part of France, with the more traditional weapons of war--the largely all infrantry forces in Jacob Devers' 6th Army Group. like Patch's 7th Army and Lucian Truscott, Jr's VI Corps divisions (3rd ID, 36th ID, 45th ID), as well as the justly famous 442 RCT. These guys did something no other army in history had ever done before--mounted a successful offensive through the Vosges. I will only note the lack of discussion of actions on the Italian Peninsula by admitting that we had some really poor leadership in that theater that more than overbalanced the good guys like Truscott.

Maybe if we chose a different set of icons for our WWII heroes, we might find a better set of solutions for the current morass in which we find ourselves enmired.


Good point.

And, nobody has mentioned Troy Middleton who's almost universally accepted as the best US division commander in WWII. And he commanded the 45th Infantry (OKNG), which was a pure foot Infantry unit!

marct
08-30-2007, 12:11 PM
In no particular order and trying not to duplicate

GEN Arthur Currie
Heraclius
Basil II
George Maniaches
Alp Arslan
Alexios I Komnenos
Khosrau I
Phillip of Macedon
Vo Nguyen Giap

wm
08-30-2007, 12:19 PM
As an addendum to my earlier point, those who live by technology also die by it. Remember what happened to John Frost's British paras at Arnhem when the technology heavy armored relief force from Horrocks' XXX Corps couldn't get through because of such "low tech" things as the blowing of the Son Bridge and a delay in delivery of the assault boats (which showed up without paddles) needed to capture the Grave Bridge.

"Vertical" envelopment operations, like Market Garden, are a by-product of technology. I cannot think of one truly successful operation of this type.
(And, yes, I am a "leg.")

Mark O'Neill
08-30-2007, 12:45 PM
"Vertical" envelopment operations, like Market Garden, are a by-product of technology. I cannot think of one truly successful operation of this type.
(And, yes, I am a "leg.")

I can think of a few successful ones off the top of my head:

1. Fort Eban Emael, Belgium , 1940 (Germans).
2. Markham Valley / Lae / Nazab, New Guinea, 1943 (US 503rd Inf Regt, Aust Artillery and Engineers).
3. Normandy , 1944, (vertical envelopment of the English Channel); and
4. Cassinga, Angola, 1978 (South African Airborne Brigade and Recces).

Interesting point that all have in common (apart from audacity) is that the tactical objectives once the troops were on the ground were not excessively unrealistic / ambitious (unlike Market Garden).

Cheers,

Mark

Tom Odom
08-30-2007, 12:59 PM
"Vertical" envelopment operations, like Market Garden, are a by-product of technology. I cannot think of one truly successful operation of this type. (And, yes, I am a "leg.")

Despite the tragedy of drops like Sicily and again Normandy, airborne operations did work-and worked in those cases. Market Garden airborne operations worked to a point; they failed because senior leaders--airborne and heavy--ignored avaliable intelligence on what was at Arnhem and the surrounding area. They also failed because the tail wagged the dog--the worst air general of the war, Brereton had Peter Principled himself to command the airlift and airlift concerns set the DZs for 1st Para. Urqhart--himself a leg--did not truly grasp the implications of having DZs six miles from the objective. Gavin and Taylor did and listened with crossed fingers. Johnny Frost and 2d Battalion paid the price along with the rest of 1st Para.

The Soviets also employed airborne operations successfully. As did the Germans. Airborne operations in the Congo in 1964 succeded and again in 1978. Grenada despite hiccups succeeded. Panama succeeded. All of this of course does not even touch the issue of air assault using rotary wing aircraft which of course is vertical envelopment.

Best

Tom

slapout9
08-30-2007, 02:01 PM
Let's see:

1-The rescue of Mussolini from a hilltop in Italy by the German Airborne. This was truly incredible if you have ever read the story.

2-The Raid on the Los Banos prison camp in the pacific campaign. Rod Serling of "The Twilight Zone" was part of this. A Book about this was released shortly after the Iranian Hostage incident. Rescue raids were done several times in WW2 and one suggestion of the book was that we have forgotten how to do them.

3-Although not a battle when the USMC was retreating from Chosin their escape route was cut off when a critical bridge was blown up. An entire bridge!! was parachuted in to them, so they could finish their withdrawal.

4-The second Normandy invasion in the south of France often called "The Champagne Campaign" had successful drops. General Gavin himself suggested that the exploits of the little known 17th Airborne division were text book models of how to do it right.

There is a similar situation in LE that I have written about in other posts, in that the more successful a technique is the more likely it is that it will "not" become well known. It appears this also happens in military history as well. If there are not a lot of causalities and blunders it doesn't get much press. So success often remains hidden.

Steve Blair
08-30-2007, 02:08 PM
I tend to consider airborne operations as a more tactical/operational device, due more to limitations in what can be delivered and realistically supplied. In this role it can be outstanding and at times decisive. However, it does require a strong follow-on force if it's intended to have more than a tactical impact (unless of course it's a special or limited operation like some of those slapout mentioned).

And as an aside to WM's post, the Firefly was a British modification to the Sherman. It didn't feature in Patton's units.

wm
08-30-2007, 02:14 PM
Mark, Tom, and Slapout:

There are airborne operations and then there are AIRBORNE operations. As noted, Mark's successes are not at all like Market Garden. They had limited objectives and were generally susceptible to quick link up with ground forces. BTW, had the Germans stopped the amphibous landings on the Normandy beaches, the Normandy airborne operation would have had results more disastrous than Market Garden. Crete is the only operation that I know of comparable to Market Garden. Its success was largely a Pyrhhic victory and was due to quick reinforcement with airlanded conventional forces. The Soviet airlandings in Afghanistan were largely unopposed and were made in support of an ostensible ally. Grenada and Panama operations were similarly largely unopposed--air landings rather than air assualts--against a grossly inferior opposing force. Slapout's listed successes are also very limited scope events.

I acknowledge that tactical vertical envelopment has a place in our bag of tricks. I do not hold the same belief for such events at the operational and strategic level. My belief is based on my doubt of an the ability to sustain such a force long enough and well enough to keep it from turning into a "speed bump" to a determined counterattack.

Regarding my point about technical infatuation and vertical envelopment, here's an interesting quotation to ponder:

In view of the present state of technical development, I place a considerably higher estimate on the opportunities for airborne operations in a war between military powers than does the principal author. The latter considers that the essential conditions for the successful use of airborne operations-even on a large scale-exist only in close cooperation with the operations of ground troops.

Assuming that there are sufficiently strong air forces and air transport facilities, I believe that in the future airborne landings by large bodies of troops (several divisions under unified command) can also be used for independent missions, that is, for such military operations as are not closely related in place and time with other ground actions, but are only bound to the latter by the general connections existing between all military operations in the theater of war. It is precisely along these lines that I envisage the future development of airborne warfare. I am convinced that with the proper preparation and present-day technical facilities it is possible to form new military bases by means of large-scale airborne landings far in the enemy's hinterland, in areas where he expects no threat from ground troops and from which independent military operations of large scope can be undertaken. To supply by air such large-scale airheads for the necessary time is essentially a technical problem which can be solved. The independent commitment of large airborne forces seems to offer a present-day high command an effective means for suddenly and decisively confusing the enemy's system of warfare.
It was made by Gen. Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the German Army, 1938-42 in a foreward to "Airborne Operations, A German Appraisal," a study that was written for the Historical Division, EUCOM, by a committee of former German officers. You can read it here (http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/104-13/104-13.HTM)

Tom Odom
08-30-2007, 02:28 PM
There are airborne operations and then there are AIRBORNE operations. As noted, Mark's successes are not at all like Market Garden. They had limited objectives and were generally susceptible to quick link up with ground forces. BTW, had the Germans stopped the amphibous landings on the Normandy beaches, the Normandy airborne operation would have had results more disastrous than Market Garden. Crete is the only operation that I know of comparable to Market Garden. Its success was largely a Pyrhhic victory and was due to quick reinforcement with airlanded conventional forces. The Soviet airlandings in Afghanistan were largely unopposed and were made in support of an ostensible ally. Grenada and Panama operations were similarly largely unopposed--air landings rather than air assualts--against a grossly inferior opposing force. Slapout's listed successes are also very limited scope events.

You are redefining as you go along. Your comparison with Normany says that if the Germans had won the war, our losses would have been real disasters. The Soviets used airborne operations well before Afghanistan. Grenada was not pure airland and neither was Panama. And in the latter I had friends taking rounds. Crete was Pyrhhic no doubt; it still achieved the objective.

As for the speed bump analogy and counterattacks, Normandy was in that regard a success. No one in the airborne community then or now advocates use of airborne operations at the operational level of war without a link up. In any case, the parachute or the helicopter are delivery means, not means of fighting. Once the force is in, it does not matter how it got there. Bastogne was by truck and it was a defensive deployment to retain a crossroads using light infantry. The speed bump held.

Best

Tom

wm
08-30-2007, 04:22 PM
You are redefining as you go along. Your comparison with Normany says that if the Germans had won the war, our losses would have been real disasters. The Soviets used airborne operations well before Afghanistan. Grenada was not pure airland and neither was Panama. And in the latter I had friends taking rounds. Crete was Pyrhhic no doubt; it still achieved the objective.

As for the speed bump analogy and counterattacks, Normandy was in that regard a success. No one in the airborne community then or now advocates use of airborne operations at the operational level of war without a link up. In any case, the parachute or the helicopter are delivery means, not means of fighting. Once the force is in, it does not matter how it got there. Bastogne was by truck and it was a defensive deployment to retain a crossroads using light infantry. The speed bump held.

Best

Tom

Tom,
Regarding redefining,let me say "Tu quoque." My original post indicated I was discussing large scale operations.
"Vertical" envelopment operations, like Market Garden, are a by-product of technology. I cannot think of one truly successful operation of this type. (emphasis added)

The 101st at Bastogne was not a vertical envelopment. How you get there does matter--part of the Market Garden problem had to do with failure of aerial resupply. Think how differently things might have gone had 1st Para and the Polish Bde been able to truck in and carry a lot of antitank weaponry with them.

I also didn't say anything about the Germans winning the war. When I said
had the Germans stopped the amphibous landings on the Normandy beachesI had visions of Anzio in mind.



Regarding the Normandy speed bump, the last time I checked, the only real adversary for the US airborne forces at Normandy was the recently formed 91st Air Landing Division and maybe some rear area elements of the 352d Infantry Division. Any fighting was a battle of near equals, except the Allies had massive air superiority, which was pretty much the case throughout operations in the West. The Germans have much to say about their hatred of the Allied "JaBos" (CAS aircraft) in personal memoirs and such. On 6 June, the German's counter attacked with 2 bns of their 6th Airborne Regiment. Significant German armor was only encountered 7 days later (June 13th) and then the paratroopers were quickly reinforced with CCA, 2nd AD.

Regarding Bastogne, I suspect that had the Germans flung their panzers at the defense in a single coordinated attack rather than in piecemeal efforts, we would have had a different result. BTW, Bastogne was not defended by a pure light infantry force. The 101st was reinforced with remnants of the 9th AD retreating from its initial drubbing along the Ourthe River and by CCA, 10th AD as well. The real battle was the delaying action against 2d Pz Div by 1/506 Inf and 10th AD tanks on 19/20 Dec near Foy. The Bastogne encirclement only lasted for about 3 days. Air support was available on the 23rd and relief from Creighton Abrams' 37th Armor came on the 26th of December.

I had friends taking rounds in Panama too. But, by their description, it was not much worse than the shootout at Waco, TX with David Koresh's folks.

I seem to remember that Soviet airborne ops (if you want to call sliding off the wings of planes into snowbanks airborne ops) against the Finns were a resounding failure. I know of no other efforts by them in the Great Patriotic War.

Steve Blair
08-30-2007, 04:27 PM
If memory serves, the Soviets did some battalion+ drops during the 1942 offensive around Kharkov. They did cause some confusion, but failed in the end due to poor planning and the Red Army's general lack of offensive maturity at that phase in the war. They did smaller-scale drops both before and after that campaign as well.

Tom Odom
08-30-2007, 05:00 PM
WM,

You changed the reference to Market Garden in your second post to large operations with your disclaimer about airborne operations and AIRBORNE operations. Like others here I saw the reference to Market Garden as a type of operation to mean vertical envelopment .

If you are only talking about an airborne operation involving the lift of three divisions and a brigade in daylight, then there is no comparison because Market Garden is the only one.

The reference to if the Germans won the war takes your what if the Normandy invasion failed to its logical extension. The invasion did not fail and the airborne operations were part of the reasons it succeeded. That the paras had air support was part of the plan.

As for Bastogne, again if you want to get into what if the Germans had operated differently, then things might have gone differently for the 101st. That is more supposition like postulating about a German victory at Normandy.

Dave Glantz wrote an excellent study on the Sovier Airborne Experience (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/glantz.pdf)you might find enlightening.

Finally the most recent operational level vertical envelopment was again the 101st in Desert Storm. As was the case in WWII, that maneuver assumed link up and worked quite well.

Best

Tom

slapout9
08-30-2007, 05:18 PM
I am at my day job so I can not respond properly, I will posts later on tonight. Tom...All The Way Sir.:)

wm
08-30-2007, 05:24 PM
WM,

You changed the reference to Market Garden in your second post to large operations with your disclaimer about airborne operations and AIRBORNE operations. Like others here I saw the reference to Market Garden as a type of operation to mean vertical envelopment .

If you are only talking about an airborne operation involving the lift of three divisions and a brigade in daylight, then there is no comparison because Market Garden is the only one.

The reference to if the Germans won the war takes your what if the Normandy invasion failed to its logical extension. The invasion did not fail and the airborne operations were part of the reasons it succeeded. That the paras had air support was part of the plan.

As for Bastogne, again if you want to get into what if the Germans had operated differently, then things might have gone differently for the 101st. That is more supposition like postulating about a German victory at Normandy.

Dave Glantz wrote an excellent study on the Sovier Airborne Experience (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/glantz.pdf)you might find enlightening.



Best

Tom

Tom,
The lower case/upper case distinction (airborne vs AIRBORNE) was meant to point out a difference in scope and size. As I noted, in agreement with Mark, small scale, limited objective vertical envelopments (whether using parachutes (airborne), helicopters (airmobile), or fixed wing assets(air landing) as the deliver mechanism, have a place in our bag of tricks. I submit that operations like Market Garden and Crete do not.

Back to Bastogne, you seemed to miss my main point--it was not simply a light infantry versus tanks battle. The 4th AD relief column that Patton pushed north engaged in such a infantry Vs, Tanks battle with the German 5 Parachute Div. It sliced through the Germans like a hot knife through butter.

Thanks for the reference to the Soviet Airborne Experience title.

Thanks also for the healthy debate.

Ken White
08-30-2007, 05:59 PM
Tom,...

Back to Bastogne, you seemed to miss my main point--it was not simply a light infantry versus tanks battle. The 4th AD relief column that Patton pushed north engaged in such a infantry Vs, Tanks battle with the German 5 Parachute Div. It sliced through the Germans like a hot knife through butter.
. . .


Just as a matter of record, the German 3d through the 7th FJD were Parachute in name only for prestige purposes; the troops were not parachutists, training was abbreviated and the divisions were not light infantry, they were effectively normal or heavy infantry divisions with a different TOE from the true FJD -- including more artillery, heavy weapons and vehicles -- and they were poorly trained Divisions at that.

The more experienced US 82d and 101st held their own against the dispersed attacks including Armor , the 5th FJD could not against a precisely focussed attack.

wm
08-30-2007, 06:39 PM
Just as a matter of record, the German 3d through the 7th FJD were Parachute in name only for prestige purposes; the troops were not parachutists, training was abbreviated and the divisions were not light infantry, they were effectively normal or heavy infantry divisions with a different TOE from the true FJD -- including more artillery, heavy weapons and vehicles -- and they were poorly trained Divisions at that.

The more experienced US 82d and 101st held their own against the dispersed attacks including Armor , the 5th FJD could not against a precisely focussed attack.

Given the casualties and reorganization of the Wehrmacht, I doubt that I would call any late 1944 regular German division (I am not including Waffen SS in this discussion, but I would include the Luftwaffe's gound forces--Fallschirmjaeger, and Luft Divisions), other than some few of the Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions, a match for any American division in troop strength or equipment. Volks Grenadier divisions ostensibly had greater armor defeating capabilities in terms of their weapons mix, but the troops manning them tended not to be quite up to the task of using them effectively.
In late 1944, many US divisions had trained and operated together for almost 3 years before being commited in France. German forces on the other hand had devolved into rag tag bands thrown together with only a few months collective training. And, as in later WWI, the Germans had lost almost all of their veteran, effective small unit leadership.

Rob Thornton
08-30-2007, 07:11 PM
Its an interesting point about technology, but all formations to a varying degree employ the technology they have available based on the conditions at hand. The available means and how the general employed them to a tactical, operational or strategic advantage might be a better indication of his quality, vs turning it into a handicap.

Henry at Agincourt (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Agincourt) is a good example of dueling technologies (the Long Bow & French Armor) that were employed to good or bad effect given the conditions.

Even Orde Wingate (http://www.kcl.ac.uk/lhcma/locreg/WINGATE.shtml) & the Chindits made use of technology where practicable given METT-TC


I like Mark's ref. to Normandy and the Airborne Operations required to facilitate the landing by isolating German forces on the Normandy beachheads. I think it reinforces many of the things I admire about Eisenhower - He knew the risks, weighed them and committed. As was pointed out there is a great deal of chance in such a risk - weather, time to build combat power, etc - but they made it work. How many military operations can we point to of that scope, and difficulty where multiple forms of maneuver were coordinated and executed by Joint and Allied forces?

I think there are certainly some that come close - The invasions of Italy and Southern France certainly have their place; but I'd argue they were not the LOO we committed to in our advance to Germany.

Ref. Airborne operations overall - I hope we retain the ability to seize airheads (could be Air Assualt or retired MG Grange's Air/Mech) in conjunction with follow on forces - we have the ability to attain surprise on an operational level, and with the increasing lethality in small packages, improved C4ISR to maintain comms, provide, near precision-all weather-long range fires, project sustainment with near pinpoint accuracy, the ability to have good map data combined with BFT/FBCB2, better mobility and the host of other things good technology have made possible - we have at least a little less to chance then Eisenhower did. However, without good leadership that sees the problem as it is vs. what they would like it to be, its all for naught (good people/leadership first - enabled by tech).

Best regards, Rob

Ken White
08-30-2007, 07:12 PM
10 characters...

slapout9
08-30-2007, 11:45 PM
Ref. Airborne Operations: As for US Airborne operations they are better understood in the framework of Cavalry Operations, which is exactly how General Gavin meant them to be used. Since he wrote the book on them(He wrote the 1st Airborne FM and how they should be used) they have a different perspective than Vertical Envelopment but some strong similarities.

The Normandy Invasion was a giant "Cavalry Screen" as were many Airborne ops and they were meant to and planned to link up with the heavier main force effort right from the start. It is when they were used for something else that they got into trouble, such as Market Garden. I don't remember Gavin's exact quote but it something like"Somebody just dreamed up a real nightmare"

Because of the Cavalry Mobility advantage Gavin thought they would be idea in the traditional role of the screen,the guard or pursuit roles. It is when they are used for something different that they can get into trouble.

The concept of the Air-Mech Division is nothing but the Cavalry concept of the "Flying Column" mad concrete. Gavin believed that these "Flying Columns" could play a critical role in what he referred to as "Brush Fire Wars" or as the Marines say Small Wars (the concept of flying columns is in the USMC Small Wars manual) his concept was different from standpoint that he meant a small light armored vehicle force that would have Strategic mobility to anywhere in the world but also maintain tactical mobility and survivability. Again similar to some of the advanced V-22 USMC concepts of Operational Maneuver.

Bodhi
08-31-2007, 01:36 AM
Well, this is a Small Wars site, so here goes:
-Nathaniel Greene
-Simon Bolivar
-Spartacus
-William Wallace & Robert the Bruce
-Jose Francisco de San Martin
-Duke of Wellington (in Iberian Peninsula)
-Bohdan Chmielnicki (revolted and created separate Cossack state)
-Huang Chao (rose up & established Qi Dynasty)
-Zhu Yuanzang (revolted against Mongols and established Ming Dynasty)
-Mao Tse Tung
-Vo Nguyen Giap
-US Grant and WT Sherman
-Harold Briggs & Gerald Templer
-Chesty Puller
-Anthony Zinni
-John Pershing
-William Joseph Donovan (Wild Bill Donovan)
-Many, many others...

Rob Thornton
09-01-2007, 02:37 PM
TT made a great connection on this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3478&page=3)and I wanted to link the two and share his observation because of its bearing on this thread:


Rob,

What was most annoying about my keyboard is that it did not share

(I have been trying to get the 'blue quote' thing to work but I give up)



from a question Rob asked TT and Marc - 'The last event, if dramatic enough, seems to shape the rest of an individual experience and becomes sort of Rosetta Stone or lens through which all lesser experiences are viewed until some other experience of equal weight is encountered. Its a natural bias which must be guarded against in order to look forward (at future problems) with objectivity.

I think your observation is spot on. To take this point onwards....

A very solid argument can be made, I think, that WWII, the ‘Good War’, provides the foundation for how the modern US military (well, not so much the USAF, ‘cause it did not exist during that conflict) sees itself and what it does. To grossly oversimplify, as each US service sees itself in a different way, WWII is in essence the last war that the ‘generals’ want to fight better (as opposed to the last battle). This form of warfare, state vs state, division vs division, has been, and to a degree remains today, the focus of the US military in spite of the many small wars it has engaged in since 1945, with the US military steadily refining and becoming ever more proficient in the form of warfare they fought in WWII.

This emphasis is partly reinforced and indeed propagated by the icons of each service. In the ‘Who are the Great Generals’ thread, I was struck by the fact that most – but certainly not all -- of the Generals named were those who commanded ‘conventional’ style wars (from Alexander to the present). I understand that the intent – particularly by the members of the SWB – is to identify Generals who exemplify the many leadership skills and attributes that are required of a good officer whatever the form of warfare. These men – and the few women mentioned – certainly do serve as role models. As such, however, the connection between their iconic status and the form of warfare on which their status is based carries a strong connotation or meaning about what is 'proper war', about what is the form of warfare that should be aspired to. Or to put it another way, such role models, consciously or unconsciously, reinforce ‘who we are’ and ‘what we do’, and the 'what we do' in many of the examples put forward is ‘conventional warfare’.

wm in his post on the ‘Generals’ thread titled ‘The "Greats" & America's Infatuation with Technology’, made what I think is a very astute observation. His observation was, ‘Maybe if we chose a different set of icons for our WWII heroes, we might find a better set of solutions for the current morass in which we find ourselves enmired.’ This is, wm, excellent advice.

Certainly the great Generals should be iconic symbols, but it seems to me that there is real need develop a new set of ‘iconic’ leaders, to elevate the many US military personnel from through out US history who demonstrated the same leadership skills and attributes as the ‘great generals’ but in small wars. A hard reality is that such potential ‘iconic’ officers would not make a Great Generals list, for many if not most of the officers you would be looking for would not have been Generals at the time and many, if not most, very likely never made it up the ladder to ‘General’ (or Admiral). So one way to try to forestall the ‘stagnation you raise, the US military should (to contribute to changing the ‘narrative’) is pillage through its history (and as small wars are largely on land, this means mostly the history of Army and Marine Corps) to find and rehabilitate those officers, whatever their rank, who engaged in small wars to provide modern day role models of leaderships to sit alongside .

Just as a brief example Chesty Puller was mentioned several times as a great general Even in the Marine Corps (where Puller is as Jon Hoffman has said, ‘is the mythological hero of the Marine Corps – the very icon of the entire establishment’) he is most well known for his actions and exploits in the Pacific Campaign and Korea – conventional wars. Yet Puller cut his teeth as a junior officer in the small wars of the USMC in the 1920s and 1930s, and from what I have read, he was very effective in these small wars (and yes, most Marines do know this, more or less, but the emphasis is on WWII and Korea).

Finding other officers such as Puller who were very good or excellent in small wars, who, while not great ‘generals’, were as more junior officers still great leaders in and practitioners of small wars. These men (and women) can serve as role models to exemplify what is required of the officers of today and tomorrow, while that same time indicating that small wars/COIN/irregular warfare is an important part of what the US military does, rather than being, as they sometimes appear to be, terms that are best not used in polite company.

TT

Steve Blair
09-01-2007, 02:47 PM
Actually I think you have to include the Air Force (in its Army Air Force/Corps versions) in that statement, since so much of their mythology and corporate identity came from the strategic bombing campaigns in Europe and the Pacific. SAC was the creation in many ways of Curtis LeMay, who made his bones in WW 2. Many of the changes that have since come to the AF were in reaction to LeMay's organizational template, but they still draw much of their inspiration and identity from the AAC/AAF days. Most lineage for the major commands goes back to WW 2. It's as much a part of them as other services...perhaps more so because they trace their birth straight back to the changes that took place immediately after the war.

TT
09-01-2007, 03:27 PM
Steve,


Actually I think you have to include the Air Force (in its Army Air Force/Corps versions) in that statement,

You are absolutely correct, of course. What was I thinking....oh, I apparently wasn't :wry:.

TT

Steve Blair
09-01-2007, 03:42 PM
Steve,



You are absolutely correct, of course. What was I thinking....oh, I apparently wasn't :wry:.

TT

No worries....:)

Actually, I think this bedrock link to WW 2 really hurts the AF when it comes to any sort of irregular war situation. So much of their being is tied up in total war and the like that any change to a limited situation is very wrenching for them...perhaps more so than any other service. If you look at the published reaction to wars like Korea and Vietnam, you see a service that tends to reject the results because they weren't allowed to do what they wished without restriction. Also, both conflicts tended to produce few 'inside' heroes or role models aside from individual pilots within the system. In Vietnam, Chappie and Olds are remembered for their kills, not their planning. In fact, the commander who pushed for revisions in the Linebacker II strike planning after the first few days has been more or less removed from most internal historical discussions of that campaign.

I like some of your observations on the adaptability thread, TT. Carlson and Edson certainly deserve to be mentioned as great commanders, and Edson certainly for what he did after the war. Within the US Army (and going back to one of my main periods of study), I really wish commanders like Mackenzie got more attention than folks like Custer or Crook. Thomas Devin is another commander who deserves more notice than he's gotten for his actions after the Civil War. Both Mackenzie and Devin were among the few officers who successfully made the transition from the big unit Civil War to the Indian Wars. In fact, a fair amount of Crook's later success could be traced to the aftermath of Devin's campaigning around Prescott. But I digress.....:o

Rob Thornton
09-01-2007, 03:47 PM
Steve,
You know - I'll bet that could be a book (along the one done on the inter-war years between WWI & WWII) that focused on adaptive leadership between the Civil War and the Indian War - at the very least it'd make a hell of a fine article.

Best Regards, Rob

Steve Blair
09-01-2007, 04:01 PM
Steve,
You know - I'll bet that could be a book (along the one done on the inter-war years between WWI & WWII) that focused on adaptive leadership between the Civil War and the Indian War - at the very least it'd make a hell of a fine article.

Best Regards, Rob

Yeah...I've been kicking around an idea like that for some time now. Best get started...though I still owe Marc a bit of stuff on AF history....:eek:

I've always considered most examinations of Indian Wars Army leadership to be too focused on the CCM effect (Custer-Crook-Miles), with little attention paid to many other fine officers who managed to transition between two very different types of warfare. Personally, I don't think either Crook or Custer did a very good job (Crook had served on the Frontier before the war, so he just continued what he'd been doing before) of making that transition. Mackenzie and Miles had no pre-war Frontier experience, and they proved to be two of the best. Devin also did a fine job, along with Carr and Hatch. Interesting bunch, to be sure.

TT
09-01-2007, 04:38 PM
Steve,


I really wish commanders like Mackenzie got more attention than folks like Custer or Crook. Thomas Devin is another commander who deserves more notice than he's gotten for his actions after the Civil War. Both Mackenzie and Devin were among the few officers who successfully made the transition from the big unit Civil War to the Indian Wars. In fact, a fair amount of Crook's later success could be traced to the aftermath of Devin's campaigning around Prescott. But I digress....

Actually, you are not digressing. My knowledge of Army history is worse than woeful, but it is probably officers such a Mackenzie and Devin who are the type of officers who need to resurrected.


You know - I'll bet that could be a book (along the one done on the inter-war years between WWI & WWII) that focused on adaptive leadership between the Civil War and the Indian War - at the very least it'd make a hell of a fine article.



Yeah...I've been kicking around an idea like that for some time now.

Writing such articles is definitely part of the process, for it exposes officers to predecessors of whom they likely know little. I would look forward to reading such an article! But really to accomplish the sort of shift we have been discussing will require, to my mind, a more wide ranging effort -- such as having the Army historians start producing 'critical' studies of past small wars Army officers.

The 'critical' approach is crucial. Far too often such histories tend to be very descriptive and/or hagiographical in bent (and I am thinking mostly of Marine Corps history, as I have read much Army history). The hagiographical bent is part of creating and reinforcing 'self identity' (plus is good PR to the general public and Congress), yet it is this narrative that needs to altered -- perhaps 'added to' is the better way to phrase this.

TT

Armchairguy
09-02-2007, 06:48 AM
I saw most of the generals I'd pick in one list or another.

Don't know if I saw the following though.

Alfred von Schlieffen for his great invasion plan and it's modified version used successfully the very next war on the western front.

Haile Selassie troops armed with spears, arrows, and some antiquated guns against the Italians in WWII did a pretty good job considering the Italians had Tanks, Airplanes, Poison gas and machine guns. Haile wasn't a general but he told his commander how to fight the Italians. They lost, but even losing generals can be great.

Leonidas was another non-general loser who did pretty well.

I won't even try to talk about vertical envelopment :rolleyes:

stanleywinthrop
10-04-2007, 01:58 PM
Rare is the flag who can employ air, land and sea-power in a complimentary and synchronous manner to achieve an end.



I'm going to go out on a limb here--when I read this sentence one name came to mind-Douglas MacArthur.

When you look at his breadth of his Pacific Campaign, I see a general who fills the above description to a T. After the slugfest at Buna, MacArthur embarked on a campaign that minimized direct engagements all the way up the New Guinea coast and on to the Phillipines, when taken in the whole his entire 3 year campaign had fewer casualties than the Battle of the Buldge.

However, many (perhaps rightly) will not be able to see past MacArthur's extreme egotism. He was, according to one biographer, a "thundering paradox" of a man. He often refered to the Air Force and Navy under his command as "his Air Force, and his Navy" all the while skillfully employing each. The one real blight on his military career was his despondance at the inital Japanese invasion of the Phillipines, once he got engaged, we was able to skillfully maneuver his army intact to Bataan, but his delay to order this withdrawl ensured that not enough supplies would be transported as well, therefore dooming his command.

Tom Odom
10-04-2007, 02:06 PM
I'm going to go out on a limb here--when I read this sentence one name came to mind-Douglas MacArthur.

When you look at his breadth of his Pacific Campaign, I see a general who fills the above description to a T. After the slugfest at Buna, MacArthur embarked on a campaign that minimized direct engagements all the way up the New Guinea coast and on to the Phillipines, when taken in the whole his entire 3 year campaign had fewer casualties than the Battle of the Buldge.



True but when you look at his actions in the PI after Pearl Harbor, the contrast is stunning. The same yin and yang applies to Korea. He ignored any signs the war would start because he said it would not. He exhibited genius in the Inchon operation. And then he again returned to the pre-war mold and ignored the Chinese threat.

I will take a middle of the road, plodder anyday over a guy like Macarthur.

Tom

Steve Blair
10-04-2007, 02:08 PM
Don't forget, either, that one of MacArthur's tactics was to declare regions "secure" and haul out US troops, replacing them with Australian and New Zealand forces. Of course in most Pacific campaigns there were many pockets of resistance that remained after an island was "secure," so losses continued even though press coverage and command attention slipped away. It also held down the number of casualties reported during the initial operation...keeping his totals low.

MacArthur could also have the success he did thanks to the parallel campaign in the Central Pacific conducted by Nimitz and the massive US submarine campaign that practically destroyed the Japanese ability to move troops and supplies. Nimitz' moves kept the Japanese high command constantly guessing as to where a blow might fall, and the submarine campaign crippled their ability to respond to any shift on the part of the allies.

Steve Blair
10-04-2007, 02:09 PM
True but when you look at his actions in the PI after Pearl Harbor, the contrast is stunning. The same yin and yang applies to Korea. He ignored any signs the war would start because he said it would not. He exhibited genius in the Inchon operation. And then he again returned to the pre-war mold and ignored the Chinese threat.

I will take a middle of the road, plodder anyday over a guy like Macarthur.

Tom

..........

Gian P Gentile
10-04-2007, 02:36 PM
Levels of war (if there are such things) matter and affect choices for top generals but here is a stab:

Grant
Ike
G Washington
Frederick the Great
Napoleon
Patton
LeMay
Davout (was "DaMan at Austerlitz)
Nathaniel Greene

And yes LeMay, at the operational level during World War II he was one of the best.

Why don't we have these sorts now? Please dont attack me for saying this but we dont have big battles to fight anymore or major coalition warfare that allows generals to succeed brilliantly or fail.

Tom Odom
10-04-2007, 03:09 PM
Why don't we have these sorts now? Please dont attack me for saying this but we dont have big battles to fight anymore or major coalition warfare that allows generals to succeed brilliantly or fail.

No disagreement at all. Last time was Desert Storm and as a member of the research and wrtiting team for Certain Victory, that was very much a minefield. At the operational level on Arny forces, I would put forth then LTG Fred Franks and the left hook into the RGFC. At the division level, it was 1st Armor MG Griffith and then 2ACR. Some would and I see their point would add the 101st under MG Peay because of the aiir assault. And of course, the 24th has its lobby; but neither the 101st nor the 24th ran into what the 1st Tanks and 2nd ACR did.

But above VII Corps, it got really dismal, especially when it came to the issue of synchronizing air and land power. Stormin Norman routinely changed the targeting at the 24 hour brief and then roasted folks because target lists were not perfect. Coalition was spotty and by default; we put the Arabs together into Kuwait. We kept the Brits close (but not too close). And we stuck the French way out on the flank after their first commander was sent home.

Best

Tom

stanleywinthrop
10-04-2007, 04:25 PM
Don't forget, either, that one of MacArthur's tactics was to declare regions "secure" and haul out US troops, replacing them with Australian and New Zealand forces. Of course in most Pacific campaigns there were many pockets of resistance that remained after an island was "secure," so losses continued even though press coverage and command attention slipped away. It also held down the number of casualties reported during the initial operation...keeping his totals low. Yet the casualtiy comparison I made above applies for post-war figures as well. All casualties in his theatre would have been considered under his command, beacause he was the southwest pacific's "supreme" commander, whether those casualties occured on Austrailian or American troops.


MacArthur could also have the success he did thanks to the parallel campaign in the Central Pacific conducted by Nimitz and the massive US submarine campaign that practically destroyed the Japanese ability to move troops and supplies. Nimitz' moves kept the Japanese high command constantly guessing as to where a blow might fall, and the submarine campaign crippled their ability to respond to any shift on the part of the allies.

One could also make the same argument in reverse, that Nimitz was given freedom because of MacArthur's moves in New Guinea and further north. A more balanced review would conclude that the two drives were complimentary (which they were designed to be, by the way) and each derived benefits from the other.

Steve Blair
10-04-2007, 04:31 PM
MacArthur still has more downsides than he does upsides. You could use the same combined operations yardstick to rank many of Nimitz' planners (Spruance, Kelly, and so on) in the same league as MacArthur, and they had fewer liabilities (as did Nimitz himself).

stanleywinthrop
10-04-2007, 04:55 PM
MacArthur still has more downsides than he does upsides. You could use the same combined operations yardstick to rank many of Nimitz' planners (Spruance, Kelly, and so on) in the same league as MacArthur, and they had fewer liabilities (as did Nimitz himself).

For me, the casualties taken compared to the effect upon the enemy is an important way to examine a commander, and in that category MacAurther outweighed the Central Pacific commanders. I absolutly do not blame you for not overlooking MacArthur's extreme egotism, and his political aspirations were most definatly his fatal achilles heel.

wm
10-04-2007, 06:21 PM
For me, the casualties taken compared to the effect upon the enemy is an important way to examine a commander, and in that category MacAurther outweighed the Central Pacific commanders. I absolutly do not blame you for not overlooking MacArthur's extreme egotism, and his political aspirations were most definatly his fatal achilles heel.

Caualties sustained need to be looked at in the context of the stiffness of the defense. I'd be interested in hearing opinions about how the Japanese defense compared in the two parts of the Pacific under discussion. (I have my own opinion on the matter, but it is not as well informed as others in this forum expect.)

Steve Blair
10-04-2007, 06:26 PM
MacArthur was attacking targets that were less fortified on average than those targeted by Nimitz and his staff. This is especially true when considering the island battles. The nature of the campaign in the Central Pacific, and the need for airbases to launch attacks against Japan (without the vulnerability that the bases in China faced), called for some (but not all) of those assaults. I don't think forces under MacArthur's command ever assaulted a target with the defenses of Iwo Jima, Peleliu, or Saipan.

stanleywinthrop
10-04-2007, 06:31 PM
Caualties sustained need to be looked at in the context of the stiffness of the defense. I'd be interested in hearing opinions about how the Japanese defense compared in the two parts of the Pacific under discussion. (I have my own opinion on the matter, but it is not as well informed as others in this forum expect.)

The boyd school of thought (of which I am unabashadly a fan) tells us that the "stiffness of the enemies defense" depends, in large part, on the actions of friendly forces, and I'm talking about all levels of warfare.

Rob Thornton
10-04-2007, 06:34 PM
"Bob, I want you to go out there and take Buna, or don't come back alive" to Eichelberger during WWII, but at the same time had the self confidence and courage to push hard for Inchon in Korea. Tom' point about Yin and Yang may not have a better example.
Best regards, Rob

stanleywinthrop
10-04-2007, 06:47 PM
"Bob, I want you to go out there and take Buna, or don't come back alive" to Eichelberger during WWII, but at the same time had the self confidence and courage to push hard for Inchon in Korea. Tom' point about Yin and Yang may not have a better example.
Best regards, Rob

MacArthur was desperate to take Buna to serve as a foothold on the north coast of New Guinea for further operations. He was unsatisfied with the performance of U.S. troops up to that point, and in his vanity this is how he chose to express that unsatisfaction. From that point forward MacArthur leapfrogged northwest up the Guinea coast, avoiding other Japanese strongholds.

Unfortunatly I have to disagree with you on this being a prime example of MacArthur's "yin and yang", Mr. Odom's examples of his ignorance of chinese intentions and indecision in the first few days after pearl harbor are much better examples.

wm
10-04-2007, 06:49 PM
The boyd school of thought (of which I am unabashadly a fan) tells us that the "stiffness of the enemies defense" depends, in large part, on the actions of friendly forces, and I'm talking about all levels of warfare.

The "actions of friendly forces" needs further discussion. I believe that the Boyd school of thought presupposes that the stiffness of the defense is directly related to how much pre-attack prep (AKA aerial bombardment) has occurred. I suspect that the same amount of prep against, for example, the 1940 French Maginot Line and the 1942 British Gazala-Bir Hacheim Line in the Western Desert would have produced extremely different results in reducing the stiffness of those two defensive systems.

Rob Thornton
10-04-2007, 06:53 PM
we've been known to do that here. For me it goes deeper then how things play out (although that is a good way to measure things), but it also goes to personality, character and will. I had two relatives who served in the Pacific theater - both had incredibly contrasting opinions about MacArthur and both were based on different reasons based on what they valued in a general. To me, that is very interesting- it brings it alive, and makes for good thinking about leadership.

Best regards, Rob

stanleywinthrop
10-04-2007, 07:06 PM
The "actions of friendly forces" needs further discussion. I believe that the Boyd school of thought presupposes that the stiffness of the defense is directly related to how much pre-attack prep (AKA aerial bombardment) has occurred. I suspect that the same amount of prep against, for example, the 1940 French Maginot Line and the 1942 British Gazala-Bir Hacheim Line in the Western Desert would have produced extremely different results in reducing the stiffness of those two defensive systems.

I'm afraid I'm speaking much broader terms than your example (although I'm not sure how you can boil Boyd down simply to prepatory fires).

Here's a quote from Boyd that better illustrates the point I'm driving at:


Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as shape and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s) that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere.

stanleywinthrop
10-04-2007, 07:14 PM
we've been known to do that here. For me it goes deeper then how things play out (although that is a good way to measure things), but it also goes to personality, character and will. I had two relatives who served in the Pacific theater - both had incredibly contrasting opinions about MacArthur and both were based on different reasons based on what they valued in a general. To me, that is very interesting- it brings it alive, and makes for good thinking about leadership.

Best regards, Rob

Most of, if not all, the troops on Bataan disliked MacArthur because he remained reclusive on corregidor--they called him "dugout Doug". This starkly contrasts with latter battles in the war and even in Korea where he repeatedly exposed himself to enemy fire. One anectdote from New Guinea, I beleive, is that shortly after a landing MacArthur landed to inspect the front lines. One soldier urged the general to take cover because they had killed a Japanese sniper a short time ago, and he repsonded "good, that's the best thing to do to them" and continued walking down the path.

This is more evidence of the "yin and yang" previously referred to and I suspect that his vanity was the reason MacArthur remained hidden on Corrigedor--he was ashamed that he had been bested and could not face the troops he had failed.

wm
10-04-2007, 10:57 PM
I'm afraid I'm speaking much broader terms than your example (although I'm not sure how you can boil Boyd down simply to prepatory fires).

Here's a quote from Boyd that better illustrates the point I'm driving at:
Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as shape and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s) that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere.

Prep fires are merely one way to cause confusion in your opponents and thereby get inside their decision loops. Executing Boyd's OODA loop is not a panacea. Being able to achieve the unbalancing of an oppponent at the tactical level does not guarantee sucesses at the operational and strategic levels. A good example of this is to be found in the German operations in the Ardennes in 1944 as well as the follow on operation (Nordwind) in the Vosges in 1945. Similalry, consider what happened to the Germans in North Africa during WWII and the Western Front throughout WWI. They routinely did a much better job of executing the steps of Boyd's loop yet still came up on the short end of victory.

Lest you think this is just a 20th Century phenomemon, I point you to Hannibal's similar inability to defeat Rome in the Punic Wars despite his significant tactical successes at Lake Trasimene and Cannae. He won those battles using methods to achieve just what Boyd specifies in you quotation above.

Fabian delaying tactics throw a monkey wrench into Boyd's theory, as Hannibal discovered. This realization also came to Napoleon's forces in the attack of Russia in 1812. I think the lesson applies (but was not learned) to the US in Viet Nam and the Japanese in China during WWII as well.

Here's an interesting twist to what most post about how to succed in SWA. Most say we need to get better at getting inside the insurgent/terrorist decision loop in our operations in SWA. They argue we will succeed by getting better intel to operators faster. This is the the OODA loop paradigm par excellance. What I think we need to do is figure out how we get our oppponents to lose their willngness to wait us out. Sometimes the Bionic Man/Women solution (be "better, stronger, faster") is not the right one. And applying it in COIN is just such a place, IMHO.

stanleywinthrop
10-05-2007, 04:30 AM
Prep fires are merely one way to cause confusion in your opponents and thereby get inside their decision loops. You are thinking in one dimension here. Trust me, Boyd can be accused of many things, but not thinking in one dimension is not one of them.

Executing Boyd's OODA loop is not a panacea. Being able to achieve the unbalancing of an oppponent at the tactical level does not guarantee sucesses at the operational and strategic levels. You are falling into the same trap that many who make a precursory study of Boyd do--you boil him down to the OODA loop, and can't get past the tactical level in its application.

A good example of this is to be found in the German operations in the Ardennes in 1944 as well as the follow on operation (Nordwind) in the Vosges in 1945. Who was more unbalanced in the Ardennes? Was the quick deployment of the Airborne in Bastogne or Patton's 90 degree turn indicitive of a "tactically unbalanced force"? Boyd points to the complete siezure of the French command and control system in 1940 as an example of true success. The Germans never came close to replicating this success in the operational or strategic level in North Africa or post Normandy.
We could go on forever about this tactical stuff, but as I've already pointed out Boyd's theories were meant for and should be applied to all levels of war, including the political spectrum.


Lest you think this is just a 20th Century phenomemon, I point you to Hannibal's similar inability to defeat Rome in the Punic Wars despite his significant tactical successes at Lake Trasimene and Cannae. He won those battles using methods to achieve just what Boyd specifies in you quotation above. Again at the risk of overly repeating myself Boyd would be the first to point out that the application of his theories at the tactical level would be meaningless if not weaved into a "grand strategy". Here is another quote from Boyd:

"The art of success
•Appear to be an unsolvable cryptogram while operating in a directed way to penetrate adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses in order to isolate him from his allies, pull him apart, and collapse his will to resist.
yet
•Shape or influence events so that we not only magnify our spiritand strength but also influence potential adversaries as well asthe uncommitted so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success."

Do you really think that Hannibal was thinking in those terms?




What I think we need to do is figure out how we get our oppponents to lose their willngness to wait us out.

Another Boyd statement:

"Amplify our spirit and strength, drain-away adversaries’and attract the uncommitted."

Ken White
10-05-2007, 05:21 AM
implement them and finds that one has a large unwieldy bureaucracy (that's reality) to fight with and that everyone involved is not a John Boyd (that's also reality), that other government agencies who must be involved have a vastly different worldview and approach than does DoD (reality again) and that a helpful Congress will intrude to show the American voter they're on top of things and that the Executive Branch cannot push them around (yet another reality).

Then things really get messy because one finds that one has to deal with other people and organizations who have different ideas, not necessarily wrong ideas, just different...

On top of that, there's the pesky enemy, bad guys or whatever one wants to call them who do not always cooperate as they should. Why, sometimes, the enemy du jour doesn't even have an OODA loop; they can be so crass as to simply have a DA loop. Occasionally, they do include the first 'O' and the second is omitted because they Oriented on AND Decided what they wanted to do months or years before they even started observing. Thus one is occasionally confronted with only an 'A unless one catches them at that first 'O.'.

That on tactical, operational and strategic levels...


"Amplify our spirit and strength, drain-away adversaries’ and attract the uncommitted."

I particularly like that one; given the divisions in the nation's body politic today, I'm not at all sure on the spirit angle; our strength is technology based destruction which is not always germane; our adversaries have no infrastructure and little strength yet a great deal of 'spirit' and surprising staying power and the uncommitted apparently really don't want to play with either side.

What do you suppose Ol' John would recommend?

Not being snarky or derisory, it's a very serious question.

wm
10-05-2007, 12:08 PM
Ken's post about the need to get everyone reading and playing from the same sheet of music is key I suspect. I, too, wonder how one could use Boyd's paradigm to make that happen.

stanleywinthrop
10-05-2007, 01:22 PM
implement them and finds that one has a large unwieldy bureaucracy (that's reality) Boyd was a theoritician he was giving us a pedestel to strive for; indeed he spent most of his later years fighting these realities. This does not mean that we should give up and accept the status quo in perpetuitity.

to fight with and that everyone involved is not a John Boyd (that's also reality), that other government agencies who must be involved have a vastly different worldview and approach than does DoD (reality again) and that a helpful Congress will intrude to show the American voter they're on top of things and that the Executive Branch cannot push them around (yet another reality).
Believe it or not, Boyd spent almost 2 decades inside these bureaucracies, and he understood them probably better than most of us. But his successes in the fights for the F-16 and F-15 are examples that the occasionally the system can be bucked. Boyd would argue that the necessary changes would need to take place at the leadership levels first (from CINC to Fire Team leader.) Can everyone understand the full breadth and depth of Boyd? Of course not. Does it give us an ideal to strive for? I believe so. mcdp 1incorporates many of Boyd's ideas. Boyd argued time and time again that we must focus on the enemy, not his weapons and not the terrain. This lesson was painfully learned again in Iraq as we only recently began focusing on entire IED networks and not the IED itself (at least if the Washington Post is to be believed). Merely complaining about the realities of the system does not give us the right to accept them as is without the efforts to change it. I am being hypocritical here, as I have done very little to change things.



On top of that, there's the pesky enemy, bad guys or whatever one wants to call them who do not always cooperate as they should. Why, sometimes, the enemy du jour doesn't even have an OODA loop; they can be so crass as to simply have a DA loop. Occasionally, they do include the first 'O' and the second is omitted because they Oriented on AND Decided what they wanted to do months or years before they even started observing. Thus one is occasionally confronted with only an 'A unless one catches them at that first 'O.'.
I do not wish to give offense but your lack of complete understanding of Boyd is apparent here. You are still thinking in reactive terms--Boyd argued that we must make the enemy reactive, not us. In your example above, in the case where an enemy "decided" years ago, our job would be to change the reality today to something different than what the enemy was expecting when he 'decided'. If the enemy (as in your example) is not activly observing the current situation, our job is to exploit that oppurtunity to continue to change the reality beyond what his mind expects. The lynch pin is to have the ability to do it quicker than our enemy can react. I am not saying (nor was Boyd) that the current DoD is set up to run this system with panecea, but again, Boyd was arguing for change, not that the current system could incorporate his theories writ large. I am puzzled about how you and others somehow think Boyd didn't realize that the enemy gets a vote. Quite the contrary, Boyd is counting on the enemies vote. The key for us is to ensure that the enemy makes the wrong vote, and to have the adapdability to flex as the situation changes.






I particularly like that one; given the divisions in the nation's body politic today, I'm not at all sure on the spirit angle; our strength is technology based destruction which is not always germane; our adversaries have no infrastructure and little strength yet a great deal of 'spirit' and surprising staying power and the uncommitted apparently really don't want to play with either side.

What do you suppose Ol' John would recommend?

This is a question I have been struggling to answer these days. Boyd recognized that in COIN (or counter guerilla warfare as he called it) the most important spectrum was Political in nature. This of course is not a new concept and has been repeated many times before and after Boyd.

Another Boyd quote:

"Break guerrillas’ moral-mental-physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort."

Boyd recognized that the most important element in COIN is to seperate the insurgency from the poplulation, and make them distinguishable as such, and that the political spectrum was the only way to do this. None of these are novel ideas and offer no further insight than current COIN doctrine. Boyd would tell us thatwe cannot treat an insurgency's mental and physical OODA loops as a single rational actor, however the moral is the critical dimension in an insurgency and to a certain degree different actors in an insurgency do have a cohesive moral OODA loop, and that is where we must concentrate our efforts. This is as far as my thinking has taken me, and is not very helpful to current conflicts.

I apologize to the members as we have strayed far from the intent of this thread and suggest that we carry on ths conversation in another place or form.

Ken White
10-05-2007, 03:40 PM
Boyd has merit. No one has all the answers -- which was my only point.

As you say we're off thread; another time and place.

Take care,
Ken

Norfolk
10-06-2007, 05:29 AM
I recently read with interest the article 'A Failure in Generalship' posted on this website. It expresses the beleif that there is a crisis in the upper levels of the military leadership. It rasies the question who are the great generals, why were they great and why are we not producing their equivalents today?

I would be interested to hear from the wider forum and not just about the most well known but others like the Duke of Marlborough or Alfred the Great who may not be so well know outside Europe.

Comments?

JD

1. The Great Generals:

First Tier: Tiglath-Pileser III, Cyrus the Great, Qin Shi Huangdi, Sala' al-Din, Ghenghis Khan, Subutai, Tamerlane, Wellington, von Moltke, Slim.

- Second Tier: Hattusili, Darius the Great, Alexander the Great, Scipio Africanus, Pompey, Julius Caesar, Arminius, Diocletian, Belisarius, Charles Martel, Charlemagne, Basil II, Henry V, Mehmet II, Ivan the Terrible, Gustavus Adolphus, Marlborough, Napoleon, Davout, Sherman, Kirby-Smith, von Manstein, Kesselring, Liu Bocheng, Templar, Dayan.

-Third Tier: Sargon the Great, Thothmoses III, Hannibal, Attila, Kutusov, Toussant L'Ouverture, Lee, Stonewall Jackson, Grant, Nathan Bedford Forest, Byng, Monash, Currie, Wavell, Freyberg, any number of WWII German generals, Patton, Ridgeway, Giap, Sharon.

- The Great Enablers: Sunzi, Marius, Emperor Maurice, Berthier, Clausewitz, von Schlieffen, von Seekt, Tuckachevsky, Guderian, Marshall, Morgan, Eisenhower, Zhu De, DePuy.

This is somewhat subjective, but the first tier is composed of generals who were more or less undefeated and achieved victories with long-term historic consequences, and often with a relative paucity of resources compared to their opponents. The second tier is composed of those who also achieved great victories with long-term historic consequences, or achieved stunning successes in the face of overwhelming odds; in either case, either they achieved their victories only to lose in the end, or those successes either did not long outlast them or were confined in their consequences (at least so far). The third tier is composed of those who achieved great battlefield victories, but with only very temporary or local historical consequences, or not enough time has elapsed for those consequences to be made fully felt.

Finally, the Great Enablers is a list of those who may have performed little or nothing in the way of battlefield command in the great victories for which they worked, but without whose organizational skills or strategic grasp, victory would have been much less likely.

I think that a few things stand out about the great generals:

1. Most of them are fine long-term thinkers and planners (who spend a great deal of time in detailed study, contemplation (even meditation might be a better word here), and testing and planning), yet they conversely are able to make clear and instaneous judgements and decisions on the spot (improvisional genius), which on the surface at least, would appear to be contrdictory traits, but in the great generals, they are completely complementary;

2. They tend to be either self-contained, even loners on the one hand, or brooding, even unstable personalities on the other, or both, and they usually experinced great or exceptional adversity in their lives, especially before achieving greatness. Sargon the Great was a foundling abandoned in a floating basket on a river, and rescued by an old peasant who raised him as his own. Diolcetian went from Illyrian peasant to Roman Emperor (and restored it with his own generalship after it collapsed in 284 AD). Wellington, unlike Diocletian, was born into aristocracy, but like Diocletian, he had to learn to build and army almost from scratch himself, and then beat all comers, regardless of the odds against him. Grant and Sherman are classic examples of personal hardship before greatness. Sherman, in addition, was a classic dual personality, and so probably was Aleander the Great. Alexander the Great may have been born to greatness, but his life was no picnic - a lot of suffering and anguish; Ivan the Terrible could have related perfectly to him. A Marshall and a Patton are not so different as they might appear on the surface - they probably understood each other very well, in a way that other, more stable persons might not have. Some, like Marius and DePuy, were men on a mission, to reform broken Armies, and to re-invigorate and to excell at the profession of arms, and forging anew implements of "Imperial" power.

3. Hand-in-glove with 2., perseverance in adversity and the indomitable will-to-win.

Why Aren't We Producing Great Generals Today?

1. Our culture: We don't want them, so we in one way or other divert those would-be great generals from the profession of arms early in life and prejudice their minds against it. We live in a selfish culture that is about Me, Myselk, and I.

2. The service culture, in large degree doesn't want them, because that culture is about careers first, and the rest second. Incidently, the least selfish of the great generals tend to be the most successful, while the most egotistical of them tend to be the ones who meet the most tragic ends, even if they won in the end (and most didn't).

3. Those would-be great generals who do enter the profession of arms are often driven out by the careerists, as many of them realize that the service culture, the higher you go, will not, cannot, change enough to make sufficient room for both careerists and professionals, without the former almost always dominating the latter.

4. The lack of adversity in our culture, both in our civilization and in the armed forces. The profession of arms is all about facing moral, intellectual and physical stress and challenge and overcoming it. Almost everything about the way we live tries to do away with such challenges, so we are raised to abhor them.

My best guess.

marct
10-06-2007, 01:59 PM
Hi Gian,


Why don't we have these sorts now? Please dont attack me for saying this but we dont have big battles to fight anymore or major coalition warfare that allows generals to succeed brilliantly or fail.

This isn't meant as an attack but, rather, an observation. I suspect the answer to your question of "why don't we have these sorts now?" is much simpler and inherent in how we actually judge a "great general". If we use the criteria of "big battles" and "major coalition warfare" as the criteria for defining great generals, then you are right. But what if we don't?

I would suggest that we should base our criteria for "greatness" solely at he strategic and grand strategic levels, and leave out the tactical and grand tactical (operational) levels - basically something that Norfolk does with his list. Within those constraints, I would argue that we need to further differentiate between functional areas: organization, operations and innovation. Admittedly, they are all inextricably linked, but I think that it is important to analytically separate them since it is quite possible for an individual to be "brilliant" in only one functional area.

Marc

Ken White
10-06-2007, 03:58 PM
I believe your four conclusions are, regrettably, totally correct. :mad:

And I didn't say your post was great because you hit most all my picks in about the same order I'd have used had i not gone chronological. You did miss my boy, Galusha Pennypacker, MH, BG, USV... :D

skiguy
10-06-2007, 04:44 PM
This opinion is not based on professionalism or experience, it's just based on what I'm seeing and hearing, and the fact that what he's doing now just blows my mind every day. Even though it's very recent history or current history, I hope he's given enough time to show his greatness even more than he already has. He deserves a nod in this thread: Gen. David Petraeus.

Norfolk
10-06-2007, 06:29 PM
I believe your four conclusions are, regrettably, totally correct. :mad:

And I didn't say your post was great because you hit most all my picks in about the same order I'd have used had i not gone chronological. You did miss my boy, Galusha Pennypacker, MH, BG, USV... :D

Sorry about Galusha Pennypacker, but the closest figure I could come up with to that was Ivan III Moneybags (for all I know, thay may be the same person), and I agree that Ivan Moneybags was a great general, certainly strategist, maybe even greater than his son. Likewise, I hadn't realized Subutai's import in history (I had ascribed much of that to Genmghis himself) until I saw you mention him, so I did some quick research. I will be sure to educate myself on the subject of Galusha Pennypacker's generalship!:D

Ken - P.S. - Ah! Galusha Pennypacker - Second Battle of Fort Fisher - youngest general in US Army (age 20).

skiguy: Yeah, I hope they give Petraeus a real chance after Iraq; he may be the closest thing to an Abrams or at least a DePuy that we're likely going to get for the foreseeable future.

Culpeper
10-06-2007, 10:39 PM
The truth will be known in time, and I leave that to show how much of the responsibility of Gettysburg rests on my shoulders.
- General James Longstreet


http://i.pbase.com/g6/53/538353/2/74225863.tw0Hdrz1.jpg

Rob Thornton
10-06-2007, 11:32 PM
Hey Marc,


I would suggest that we should base our criteria for "greatness" solely at he strategic and grand strategic levels, and leave out the tactical and grand tactical (operational) levels - basically something that Norfolk does with his list. Within those constraints, I would argue that we need to further differentiate between functional areas: organization, operations and innovation. Admittedly, they are all inextricably linked, but I think that it is important to analytically separate them since it is quite possible for an individual to be "brilliant" in only one functional area.

Good food for thought - but with us asking the question about what makes a good general - we may wind up having to qualify that by rank, position and responsibility if we only only consider the strategic level of war. Would we wind up excluding DIV and Corps CDRs if we did that? Would we be ignoring anyone below the 4 star flag? I don't know - if we say general, do we distinguish between a 1 and a 4 star. I don't have a good answer - but I am intensely interested in leadership in terms of how and where it manifests itself, where there are leadership failures and how we can best identify & cultivate it. Leaving the list open beginning when an officer becomes a generalist gives us a broader bunch to consider - some who for various reasons never rose above 1 or 2 stars.

I do like the idea of qualifying in terms of function for about the same reasons. If somebody can articulate what qualities may have made that general great, we might be able to consider the context of the action and learn something like- is the attribute or skill set applicable, or on a personal level - where do I stand?

There is something to Gian's comment:


Why don't we have these sorts now? Please don't attack me for saying this but we don't have big battles to fight anymore or major coalition warfare that allows generals to succeed brilliantly or fail.

I'm not sure we don't have these incredible folks, but the actions which will define them currently are different. I think them still capable of succeeding (or failing) in a marked and distinctive fashion if the occasion arises (and it probably one day will, God forbid). One cannot help but marvel at the manner in which incredible leaders stood against towering odds to deliver a victory where there often should not have been one without searching for an answer to how such a victory could come to pass.

When the time spans are shorter, and seemingly more violent, when lady luck shows her harshest or sweetest favor and all seems to be gained or lost with one throw of the dice, we are agape at the temerity of leaders who stand fast or push forward. Its hard to tell how much can be attributed to the force of personality and how much to circumstances which surround it - in history we often find those things for which we look hardest. This may not be all bad though - it is often from the past where we find an example to do the hard things we know ought to be done, examples of courage and excellence are of great value, and you often have to know where you have been before you can chart an appropriate course forward.

I recently went to SWC member ZenPundit's website (you can get there from the SWJ blogrole). He has a book review on Roman generals that I decided to order - I simply can't help it - when I read about war time leaders overcoming fantastic odds to accomplish the incredible I stand in awe. It may be why so many have a hard time imagining themselves in any other profession.

Best Regards, Rob

Norfolk
10-07-2007, 01:07 AM
I am intensely interested in leadership in terms of how and where it manifests itself, where there are leadership failures and how we can best identify & cultivate it. Leaving the list open beginning when an officer becomes a generalist gives us a broader bunch to consider - some who for various reasons never rose above 1 or 2 stars.

I do like the idea of qualifying in terms of function for about the same reasons. If somebody can articulate what qualities may have made that general great, we might be able to consider the context of the action and learn something like- is the attribute or skill set applicable, or on a personal level - where do I stand?

One cannot help but marvel at the manner in which incredible leaders stood against towering odds to deliver a victory where there often should not have been one without searching for an answer to how such a victory could come to pass.

When the time spans are shorter, and seemingly more violent, when lady luck shows her harshest or sweetest favor and all seems to be gained or lost with one throw of the dice, we are agape at the temerity of leaders who stand fast or push forward. Its hard to tell how much can be attributed to the force of personality and how much to circumstances which surround it - in history we often find those things for which we look hardest. This may not be all bad though - it is often from the past where we find an example to do the hard things we know ought to be done, examples of courage and excellence are of great value, and you often have to know where you have been before you can chart an appropriate course forward.

I simply can't help it - when I read about war time leaders overcoming fantastic odds to accomplish the incredible I stand in awe. It may be why so many have a hard time imagining themselves in any other profession.

Best Regards, Rob

This raises a crucial, and double-sided point in considering who qualifies as a Great General. Leadership is just one of several, if not many qualities a great general would universally be thought to have. But this is also where the two sides to that point come in. A general either on the battlefield or back in a headquarters may exert leadership through dominance of will or force of personality compelling or inspiring subordinates to great efforts in the face of what appears to be long odds or hopeless adversity. Whatever its origins in the personality, leadership is as real force in war as physical violence is. The list of Great Generals should include the great tactical and operational masters.

But is it leadership when an innovative thinker or superb administrator opens the minds of leaders or organizes the institutions and armies for war? Is the same real force of personality involved here as on the battlefield? Tuchachevsky may have been a leading innovator, but was he a leader, or an innovator, by formulating and teaching his doctrines (and which still inform us today). Guderian was probably no more gifted than Tukhachevsky, but he had his day on the battlefield, Tukhachevsky did not. Was Guderian there fore a Great General, and not Tukhachevsky? Eisenhower was no tactical or operational genius, or even particularly talented in either area, but he is no less a Great General for lack of such talent; Rommel was no strategic genius, and felt uncomfortable in the presence of General Staff officers, but his tactical and operational leadership and talents in the face of long odds are unquestioned, albeit not perfect. Eisenhower's gifts were strategic - political, diplomatic, administrative - a superb Supreme Commander who was as great for his recognition of the limitations of the Allied forces as for his use of their strengths. Eisenhower's armies (led initially by Montgomery) decisively defeated Rommel in Normandy, but Eisenhower was no great battlefield leader as Rommel was.

At this point, either the definition of leadership as Rob defines (if I am reading him correctly) as dominance of will or force of personality, combined with professional talent, and exerted upon subordinates to achieve great victories in the face of supreme adversity must be abandoned here, in order to retain such Great Generals who apparently lacked (or were not required to exert) such leadership ability; or leadership must be redefined (and I am not only uncomfortable with redefining/de-defining words and thus corrupting the language), I am in fact reasonably comfortable with Rob's definition of leadership to begin with. If that definition of leadership stands, and I am inclined to think that it should, then leadership by that definition should not necessarily be a crucial factor in determining who makes the list of the Great Generals, and who does not.

What I am getting at here is, is generalship (and therefore a Great General) inseparable from leadership defined as dominance of will or force of personality, such as is exerted tactically on a battlefield or operationally from campaign headquarters, especially under conditions of supreme adversity, a necessary component of generalship to the extent that it is one of the definitive marks of the Great Generals? Or is some quality other than leadership so defined, exerted especially in the field of military education or organization at the strategic level in the absence of such adversity and without the exertion of dominance of will or force of personality also sufficient to qualify one as one of the Great Generals? And what might that quality(ies) be named?

I think that Rob is right that it perhaps does less than justice to great tactical and operational commanders (ie. Pat Cleburne and Ken's fav gen Galusha Pennypacker the former, Lee and Patton the latter), but when leadership is defined as dominance of will or force of personality in the face of adversity, it may also rule out great strategic thinkers and performers who may not have had to exert nearly as much dominance of will and force of personality under conditions of great adversity such as faced by tactical and operational commanders.

For the purposes of deternmining who are the Great Generals, I think that it may be best to recognize that generalship, to begin with may consist of, amongst other things, either leadership defined as a force of will exerted in the face of staggering adversity to achieve victory, or, alternatively, some unnamed quality in the absence of such leadership yet still qualifying its possessor for generalship. I do however, agree with marct that the Great Generals should be, where possible classified by tactical, operational, and strategic achievements.

Culpeper
10-07-2007, 01:37 AM
Why don't you start a poll?

Rob Thornton
10-07-2007, 02:17 AM
Norfolk,
Superb Post. It raises the right points and provides many good points for further consideration.


For the purposes of determining who are the Great Generals, I think that it may be best to recognize that generalship, to begin with may consist of, amongst other things, either leadership defined as a force of will exerted in the face of staggering adversity to achieve victory, or, alternatively, some unnamed quality in the absence of such leadership yet still qualifying its possessor for generalship. I do however, agree with marct that the Great Generals should be, where possible classified by tactical, operational, and strategic achievements.

I don't know that we'll ever get to a point where all (and we have some pretty good lists on the thread already - and I'll bet this thread still has allot of life in it) our generals line up - but that is probably a good thing:D What I think is of most value here is the discussion of "why" for all the reasons you mention above. Its truly a fascinating thread that by virtue of its subject discusses a great many characteristics and traits of successful generals who in their own rights overcame significant obstacles to secure a place at the table.

This rates as one of the most interesting threads I think we've had, with a great deal of timeless substance to return to time and again.

Best to all, Rob

davidbfpo
10-07-2007, 11:37 AM
The confrontation between Indonesia, then led by a nationalist populist Sukarno, and Malaysia - in the 1960's has disappeared from view. The struggle took many forms, with a low intensity war in Borneo, maritime and areial incursions - with major units deployed, e.g. arircraft carriers. Malaysia had the support of the UK, New Zealand and Australia. A very short scene setting.

In the jungles of Borneo the confrontation was at it's highest and the UK appointed General Walter Walker as CinC, whose career had been in the Ghurkas earlier. With very few reources (compared to Vietnam a few miles to the north), he out-fought the Indonesians - with tactics now familiar. There are several books on this war.

He was a controversial soldier when serving and after retirement.

Not forgotten here.

davidbfpo

Ken White
10-07-2007, 04:23 PM
May not be much about in the public realm but I know some folks looking at future stuff in the Armed forces and both the Confrontation in general and Operation Claret in particular are studied.

marct
10-07-2007, 04:56 PM
Hi Rob,


Good food for thought - but with us asking the question about what makes a good general - we may wind up having to qualify that by rank, position and responsibility if we only only consider the strategic level of war. Would we wind up excluding DIV and Corps CDRs if we did that? Would we be ignoring anyone below the 4 star flag? I don't know - if we say general, do we distinguish between a 1 and a 4 star. I don't have a good answer - but I am intensely interested in leadership in terms of how and where it manifests itself, where there are leadership failures and how we can best identify & cultivate it. Leaving the list open beginning when an officer becomes a generalist gives us a broader bunch to consider - some who for various reasons never rose above 1 or 2 stars.

Good point, Rob. Maybe the solution would be to use some type of a 3D matrix by functional type, operational level (tactical to grand strategic) and operational type (HIC, LIC, assault, defense, training, budgetary lobbying, etc.).

I think in some ways one question that we haven't asked is why we want to be able to classify generals as "Great". I doubt that it is solely for reasons of putting up statues :D. If we are looking at this then there will, inevitably, be repercussions for careers and promotion tracks.

Marc

Rob Thornton
10-07-2007, 06:10 PM
Hey Marc,


I think in some ways one question that we haven't asked is why we want to be able to classify generals as "Great". I doubt that it is solely for reasons of putting up statues . If we are looking at this then there will, inevitably, be repercussions for careers and promotion tracks.

There is much to that - maybe its a sub-category of the great or indispensable man idea. One thing I think considering it provides, is rationale that great men are needed in all aspects of military endeavors where skill, acumen and courage to succeed are required.

I had only started to think about what the thread might mean in terms of repercussions - or how it might influence perceptions and expectations. I guess what I'd hope is that it would highlight how leadership in a number of areas can make a difference when applied at the right time, to the right problems with the right measure. We should not limit ourselves to only considering our opportunities in light of the conditions we'd like to find ourselves in, but rather to those we find ourselves responsible for.

We will not all be general officers (indeed many of us would have a hard time imagining ourselves as one), many will never attend their service war college equivalent, or even assume something approaching the branch qualifying job of BDE / Regt. command in their service or career field equivalent. However, that should not inhibit or dissuade us from attempting to be the very best leader we can be - we owe no less then that to those we lead.

COL (P) Robert Brown once told me he found himself surprised that he'd been selected to command a BDE (this was during his intro to all of his CO CDRs at 1/25th) - he'd approached his career as solely trying to do the right thing at the right time to fulfill his obligations to those he led. His thoughts were that any rank or command he rose to above the one he was already charged with was just gravy - each job for him was already the best he'd ever have. He managed to strike a good balance between those he was responsible for and those he was responsible to. He had a passion for leadership and soldiering and fostered that in his entire command.

Not every general or flag we've listed probably has the same approach as COL Brown, but I think they all had the passion, courage, drive and tenacity that provided self confidence to lead under adversity. As long as we keep those requirements alive, we will produce great generals who can prevail.

Best Regards, Rob

SWJED
10-08-2007, 10:00 AM
Wayne Mastin sent us a blog entry concerning this thead - Great Generalship (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/10/great-generalship/).


An interesting discussion thread entitled "Who are the great generals?" has been running for quite a while on the Small Wars Council. I suspect that most of those reading the posts on this thread are looking for a list, preferably very short, of the qualities that justify one in assigning the adjective “great” to senior military officers. In other words, what the readers and posters are seeking are the characteristics that are jointly necessary and sufficient to identify outstanding generals. I further suspect that we can probably agree on a few necessary conditions. However, the truly elusive piece will be gaining agreement on the sufficient condition or conditions. In fact, I doubt that we can propound such a list of traits upon which we can all agree. However, I think that this should not cause us to despair. The discussion is not just an academic exercise in military history. It is, instead, an effort, to identify the sorts of things our officer selection, evaluation, and promotion processes ought to key on and our training institutions ought to emphasize in officer professional development activities...

charter6
10-08-2007, 12:16 PM
Ahmad Shah Massoud, anyone?

Sorry for being a latecomer to this threat.

Steve Blair
10-08-2007, 01:38 PM
I tend not to get too wrapped up in the "great generals" considerations because there are so many variables, and to a great extent a "great general" requires at least competent subordinates to carry out his vision. Would Grant, for example, have been considered as great if he had been forced to rely on Pope and Burnside to carry out his plans? And would Sheridan have risen to prominence under, say, Meade?

I tend to look more at the "great leader" question, and that at any level of command. From that standpoint I do believe there are some common traits that can be found in great leaders at all levels of command, but for some reason or another (vision, personal inclination, ability to "grasp" war...I don't know) not every officer rises to higher command levels...or even should. The Union Army in the Civil War was rife with men who were excellent regimental or corps commanders, but floundered when promoted to higher levels of authority. There were also others who were not stellar at lower levels (Sherman was one) but excelled when placed in charge of larger formations.

Sorry for derailing the discussion...I'll sign off now.:)

Rob Thornton
10-08-2007, 04:19 PM
Sorry for derailing the discussion...I'll sign off now.
Steve,
Would not call it a derailing at all - just a variation, or perhaps a new direction - keeps the discussion alive and healthy - gets us thinking from a different angle:)
Best , Rob

Fred III
10-11-2007, 01:36 AM
I am new to this site so I beg your forgiveness for the intrusion and hope I can contribute even one small thing that might set minds working.

I find this topic fascinating and I admire your guts for exploring it, for I think it has to be one of the great exercises in brain-wracking futility. I am sorry to say that I have not even heard of some of the names you have put up here but I would like to add a few for thought. I would ask you, as well, to understand that I find flag rank officers of the 20th century (and 21st) a different lot than earlier generals, simply because I feel war and the military is considerably more "corporate" than it was prior to 1900. There were a number of German WWII officers who have merely been lost to history who may deserve a higher place (you have already brought up the names of several: v. Manstein, who I consider the most brilliant general of the 20th century; Rommel, an exceptionally dynamic man; and 1 or 2 others), among them men like Gerd v. Rundstedt; Erich Marcks; Walther Model; Hans Guenther v. Kluge; Hans Valentin Hube; Hermann Geyer; and Erich Brandenberger.

WWI produced some of the finest tacticians of the past 150 years, men like Fritz v. Lossberg (who may not have risen above colonel) and Wilhelm Balck. I also believe Erich v. Ludendorff should be considered in any list of "great." Obviously some of these men were specialists and may not fit the overall parameters, but they were all formidable in their own right.

As for Americans, I hold a very strong belief that the finest of our generals-- post-WWII-- was William E. DePuy, and to me no list of 20th-century American soldiers is complete without him.

Now for a little fun. I saw George Custer's name brought up here. While I don't consider him as a great general, per se, I do feel he was one of our most dynamic. It is also extremely hard for me to condemn him based on his final foray or the tactics he employed. I believe a careful study of those tactics, especially in light of the surrounding circumstances, might reveal some surprises. Of course any study of Custer's tactics has to be couched within the parameters of the campaign's strategy. Therein lies the Custer conundrum.

My thanks for your indulgence and best wishes,
Fred.

Culpeper
10-11-2007, 02:28 AM
Welcome to the SWC. I happen to like Custer because he was fond of his dogs. I think he was a General during the Civil War and was a Lt. Colonel when he rode down into that valley of history. Only someone with an ego as big as Custer's would end up in eternal bliss at a place beautifully named, Little Big Horn. "It was a good day to die".

tequila
10-11-2007, 08:15 AM
Welcome to the SWC. I happen to like Custer because he was fond of his dogs. I think he was a General during the Civil War and was a Lt. Colonel when he rode down into that valley of history. Only someone with an ego as big as Custer's would end up in eternal bliss at a place beautifully named, Little Big Horn. "It was a good day to die".

I wonder if Custer's troopers thought the same as their bodies were being stripped?

I myself am not a big believer in the glory of last stands. I have a feeling that most of the cinematic moments are provided by the imagination of folks in the rear, blowing trumpets and banging drums to avoid asking difficult questions.

Steve Blair
10-11-2007, 12:43 PM
Custer was not overly popular with his troops, either. The 7th had one of the highest desertion rates when he was the field commander, and he faced charges at least twice for excessive discipline (and that took some doing in the Old Army). And as for the twaddle about it being the best regiment on the Frontier....the less said the better about that one.

Custer's tactics at the Little Big Horn were the same tactics he'd always used on the Frontier. He divided his command at the Wa####a in '68 and ended up with an element cut off and destroyed (Elliott's detachment...granted there are some questions about Elliott's competence, but there is little real debate that this incident did a great deal to solidify the cliques within the 7th's officer corps...and they were among the worst in the Frontier Army). For all his romanticized scribbling about the Indians, I don't think Custer ever really understood the reality of war on the Frontier.

And in an unrelated aside...when you're looking at the tactics of Custer's detachment I don't think you're looking at Custer's tactics. I tend to believe that Custer was either killed or incapacitated very early in the battle (he always led from the front and his first instinct was to charge). His brother would have carried him (dead or alive) to the "last stand" sight, and the Indians weren't even aware that they were fighting Custer until after the fact. His command was really quite "green," and the loss of their commander would go far toward explaining why his detachment "came apart" like it did. Clearly the Sioux and Cheyenne played a major role in that (don't get me wrong), but the assumption that Custer "fought until the very end" has always struck me as much more white man's myth than plausible reality.

Fred III
10-11-2007, 12:55 PM
I myself am not a big believer in the glory of last stands.


You will never get an argument from me on that point! Remember the words of George Patton: let the other guy die. Enough human mistakes in judgment were made that day-- and the days before-- to negate the finest tactics of God.

Steve--

I agree with you on a couple of points: your first paragraph is absolutely correct and you are generally correct about Custer's tactics on the frontier. Division of force was an acceptable doctrine because of the way the Indians fought. Custer's understanding of the Indians led him to employ those tactics more than once. His rigidity in the employment of those tactics and that supposed understanding-- his refusal to accept any other behavior or pattern-- were his downfall.

I do not agree with you, however, about his early demise or his brother carrying the body hither and yon. That particular scenario has brought more consternation to the study of the battle than almost any other and does not fit with either the troop dispositions or the timing involved in the battle. It also leads to-- and this is not a criticism of your ideas, so please, don't take it the wrong way-- something of a denigration of the abilities of Custer's officers, namely Keogh, Yates, Smith, and Custer's own brother.

Also, in my estimation, the idea that the command was "green," has been overplayed. While I completely agree with you about the regiment's reputation, the unit was staffed with many fine officers and NCOs and the command that crossed the Rosebud-Little Big Horn divide on June 25, 1876, had precisely 9 men with less than 6 months service, none of whom rode with the two battalions wiped out with Custer. 51.7% of the Seventh Cavalry had between 1 and 5 years service and 30.1% more than 5 years. More than 1/3 of the men left behind at a supply depot had less than 6 months service, so in that regard, you are correct. Those men, however, never saw battle.

The "myth" of "last stands" tends to swing into hyperbole and I believe the "They Died With Their Boots On" last stands are fiction. While this might smack our army in the face, I think there was probably more panic than "glory" as the day wore on.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Culpeper
10-11-2007, 01:02 PM
I was only speaking for Custer. The Battle of Little Big Horn was not a Last Stand. It was a rout for Custer and his men.

tequila
10-11-2007, 01:38 PM
I was only speaking for Custer. The Battle of Little Big Horn was not a Last Stand. It was a rout for Custer and his men.

Culpeper - Apologies if my post looked like a slam on you - it was not meant as such, as I think you meant that sentiment for Custer himself. I only intended to add that many troopers died quite unnecessary deaths because of his failings. IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.

Fred III
10-11-2007, 02:07 PM
IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.

That is about as correct as anyone could possibly state it.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Ken White
10-11-2007, 03:13 PM
... IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.

Mostly unforgivable incompetence... :mad:

Tom Odom
10-11-2007, 03:23 PM
Originally Posted by tequila
... IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.

Mostly unforgivable incompetence... :mad:

Here is another one--and as a native Texan I will have to remain in hiding in the swamps of Acadia--William Barrett Travis and his decision to "hold" the Alamo.

best

Tom

wm
10-11-2007, 03:32 PM
IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.

It is even better if you have a successful defense at Rorke's Drift to hold up as cover for your Isandlwana; have a Baden-Powell holding out in the "seige" of Mafeking to offset your Buller at Colenso; have, as with Gordon at Khartoum, some "infidel" Fuzzy Wuzzies to blame for your "fair-haired boy" leader's failure to face facts and get himself decapitated; or, as with Elphinstone at Kabul, some duplicitous Afghans who break their word after your command's very poor choice of garrison locations causes you dismay (being able to point to a well-organized withdrawal to Jellalabad by another commander like Sale also helped in this last case). Sorry to focus on British examples, but they have had many more small war disasters to cover over than America has.

Information ops are pretty pervasive and not just for winning the hearts and minds of your opponents or those who you are trying to stabilize and support.

I suspect that many of history's "great" generals are so simply because of a good PR campaign by someone with a vested interest.

marct
10-11-2007, 03:35 PM
Hi Tequila,


IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.

Agreed totally on the Custer scenario. On Tom's Alamo analog, I'm not as sure, and on something such as Leonidas I would totally disagree. All had roughly the same immediate outcome, but fairly different long term effects and (possibly) motivations. It strikes me that in some (by no means all!) instances, the annihilation of an entire unit can have effects totally out of proportion to the combat; Thermopylae being the classic example.

I certainly agree that romanticizing a blunder, and the idiot who made it happen, is a critical mistake, but I have to wonder if it isn't a fairly "normal" reaction to any such type of a loss?

tequila
10-11-2007, 03:54 PM
Hi Tequila,
Agreed totally on the Custer scenario. On Tom's Alamo analog, I'm not as sure, and on something such as Leonidas I would totally disagree. All had roughly the same immediate outcome, but fairly different long term effects and (possibly) motivations. It strikes me that in some (by no means all!) instances, the annihilation of an entire unit can have effects totally out of proportion to the combat; Thermopylae being the classic example.

I certainly agree that romanticizing a blunder, and the idiot who made it happen, is a critical mistake, but I have to wonder if it isn't a fairly "normal" reaction to any such type of a loss?

Thermopylae is so far back in history and so shrouded in mythmaking that we have little real data to go on. Certainly it made no difference strategically - the Persians avenged the burning of Sardis when they occupied and burned Athens, saw their supply line sink at Salamis (the critical battle), and then withdrew their main force which could not have remained deployed in Greece proper for long anyway. The rearguard meant to create a Persian-friendly permanent base in the north beat a retreat to friendlier ground that turned into a rout when their native allies turned on them (see Elphinstone) and the local tribes united and caught up to them at Plataea.

Thermopylae ranks as an outstanding information operation in that it held enormous propaganda value, especially for Sparta in maintaining its place at the head of the anti-Persian alliance in the face of a determined Athenian challenge.

Norfolk
10-11-2007, 04:23 PM
There were a number of German WWII officers who have merely been lost to history who may deserve a higher place (you have already brought up the names of several: v. Manstein, who I consider the most brilliant general of the 20th century; Rommel, an exceptionally dynamic man; and 1 or 2 others), among them men like Gerd v. Rundstedt; Erich Marcks; Walther Model; Hans Guenther v. Kluge; Hans Valentin Hube; Hermann Geyer; and Erich Brandenberger.

WWI produced some of the finest tacticians of the past 150 years, men like Fritz v. Lossberg (who may not have risen above colonel) and Wilhelm Balck. I also believe Erich v. Ludendorff should be considered in any list of "great." Obviously some of these men were specialists and may not fit the overall parameters, but they were all formidable in their own right.

As for Americans, I hold a very strong belief that the finest of our generals-- post-WWII-- was William E. DePuy, and to me no list of 20th-century American soldiers is complete without him.

Very much agreed Fred, on both the Germans and General DePuy.:) DePuy's papers should be recommended reading at all army staff colleges (I don't know if they are at CGSC, but I would expect that they are).

marct
10-11-2007, 04:29 PM
Hi Teqila,


Thermopylae is so far back in history and so shrouded in mythmaking that we have little real data to go on.....

Thermopylae ranks as an outstanding information operation in that it held enormous propaganda value, especially for Sparta in maintaining its place at the head of the anti-Persian alliance in the face of a determined Athenian challenge.

Agreed, but hat was the point I was trying to make: you can construct a "loss" as a major symbol for motivation. There are a number of others that I could have chosen, but Thermopylae is rather outstanding (Pearl Harbour would work as well).

tequila
10-11-2007, 04:42 PM
Hi Teqila,



Agreed, but hat was the point I was trying to make: you can construct a "loss" as a major symbol for motivation. There are a number of others that I could have chosen, but Thermopylae is rather outstanding (Pearl Harbour would work as well).

Except I would argue that Thermopylae's principal value was as IO for Sparta in intra-Greek politics, rather than as a sort of rallying cry against Persia --- the anti-Persian alliance was already largely committed to the struggle, and Salamis proved to be a mostly Athenian affair anyways, mooting the necessity of allied Greek motivation in ultimate victory.

wm
10-11-2007, 05:01 PM
you can construct a "loss" as a major symbol for motivation. There are a number of others that I could have chosen, but Thermopylae is rather outstanding (Pearl Harbour would work as well).
MarcT,
I suspect that this really only works when you end up being the big winner.
Some examples: Thermopylae--Greeks won in the end
Alamo--Texans finished as winners after San Jacinto
Pearl Harbor, Bataan/Corregidor, Kasserine Pass, Little Big
Horn, 1st and 2nd Manasas--US ended up winning the
whole shooting match every time.
Crimean War and Charge of the Light Brigade--Brits
victorious
Consider the other side: French in Russia, 1812--big disaster, big final loss.
Germans at Verdun in WWI
Russians in every battle in the Russo-Japanese War.
And then there are some where the final outcome is neither a clear cut victory nor defeat and we get mixed reviews about individual actions within them--like Task Force Smith or Frozen Chosin in Korea.

Tom Odom
10-11-2007, 05:04 PM
Very much agreed Fred, on both the Germans and General DePuy.:) DePuy's papers should be recommended reading at all army staff colleges (I don't know if they are at CGSC, but I would expect that they are).

Good LP on Depuy here (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Herbert/Herbert.asp) and another good work here (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/gorman/gorman.asp) as well as his papers here. (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#select)

Best

Tom

marct
10-11-2007, 05:08 PM
Hi WM,


MarcT,
I suspect that this really only works when you end up being the big winner.

Hmmm, could well be. Off the top of my head, I can only think of two (possibly) counter examples: Masada and Wounded Knee. Then again, it could be argued that both of them were "re-constructed" as part of revitalization movements.

Marc

Merv Benson
10-11-2007, 05:16 PM
I think Santa Anna decision was the much bigger mistake and it wound up costing him the war, since the Texas Army under Sam Houston was able to get into a position to ultimately defeat him while he was pummeling a fortress he could have easily by passed. Patton would not have made that mistake. Travis' effort bought time that Santa Anna could not afford.

Norfolk
10-11-2007, 05:19 PM
Good LP on Depuy here (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Herbert/Herbert.asp) and another good work here (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/gorman/gorman.asp) as well as his papers here. (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#select)

Best

Tom

Thanks Tom. I've got all three of them already, and I practically burn the print off the pages so to speak. I also have the article you co-authored "Transformation: Victory Rests With Small Units":cool:, and I posted a link to it a few months ago on another board (I hope that's all right with you!). Between those and an article posted in the Infantry journal about ten years ago (I recently found it again on Free Republic) written by a Canadian officer in Rwanda who witnessed a Tutsi 3-team squad attack on a Hutu squad of the same size, my understanding of infantry tactics has been completely transformed.

General DePuy should not have been largely forgotten, or even ignored, outside of the US.:mad: The greatest Combined-Arms thinker of the last generation at least IMO. Funny, it seems the USMC has taken DePuy's teachings on infantry (especially PARFOX) closer to heart than the US Army.

Tom Odom
10-11-2007, 05:30 PM
Between those and an article posted in the Infantry journal about ten years ago (I recently found it again on Free Republic) written by a Canadian officer in Rwanda who witnessed a Tutsi 3-team squad attack on a Hutu squad of the same size, my understanding of infantry tactics has been completely transformed.

Hey send me that! Or post a link. Good stuff on RPA tactics is hard to find. It should not surprise anyone on here that it is often quite difficult to break through sterotypes of military incompetence (which are appropriate in many cases) when exceptions like the RPA emerge. I can only say as I did in my book that when Stan and I first crossed into Rwanda from Zaire and ran into RPA checkpoints, the differences with the FAZ were startling in a refreshing way.

Best

Tom

PS

email address sent via PM

Fred III
10-11-2007, 05:39 PM
General DePuy should not have been largely forgotten, or even ignored, outside of the US.:mad: The greatest Combined-Arms thinker of the last generation at least IMO. Funny, it seems the USMC has taken DePuy's teachings on infantry (especially PARFOX) closer to heart than the US Army.

On a personal note, I am delighted to see your reply. I was a bit taken aback by not having seen his name mentioned earlier; rather surprised. One of the great satisfactions of my life will always be the fact I had the good fortune to serve under him, not once, but twice. The first time as a brand-spanking new infantry 2LT when he was the CO of the 1/30 BG in Germany and he stopped an entire excercise to show me the proper way to assault an enemy position-- his way (... and quite different from what I had just been taught at Fort Benning!!!). The second time was when he placed me in charge of a company in Vietnam. When he was the CG of the 1st Infantry Division, the whole atmosphere was like a re-union. It seemed every officer and senior NCO I ran into there, I had served with in the 30th, from George Joulwan down to squad leaders.

God!, he was a hell-bringer!

Best wishes and thanks for the agreement,
Fred.

PS-- Tom Odom: if you have not read his work, you are in for some enjoyment when you do. I read the stuff even today, and his small unit movements and formations worked brilliantly. I do not know what's taught today at Benning, but if DePuy's stuff is not, that is a big mistake to me.
FCW

tequila
10-11-2007, 05:39 PM
I think Santa Anna decision was the much bigger mistake and it wound up costing him the war, since the Texas Army under Sam Houston was able to get into a position to ultimately defeat him while he was pummeling a fortress he could have easily by passed. Patton would not have made that mistake. Travis' effort bought time that Santa Anna could not afford.

Arguably Patton did make a similar error with his fixation with taking Metz in 1944.

Norfolk
10-11-2007, 05:53 PM
Hey send me that! Or post a link. Good stuff on RPA tactics is hard to find. It should not surprise anyone on here that it is often quite difficult to break through sterotypes of military incompetence (which are appropriate in many cases) when exceptions like the RPA emerge. I can only say as I did in my book that when Stan and I first crossed into Rwanda from Zaire and ran into RPA checkpoints, the differences with the FAZ were startling in a refreshing way.

Best

Tom

PS

email address sent via PM

Tom and all, here's the link (but the original illustrations are missing on Free Republic, and the Infantry School took the Infantry Journal off-line (except on DIN, and I don't have DIN access) years ago:

http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a397a16354784.htm

The Tutsi's still used a '2 up, 1 back' fomration, but that was on an isolated Hutu squad, so it made perfect tactical sense in that situation.

Norfolk
10-11-2007, 06:02 PM
On a personal note, I am delighted to see your reply. I was a bit taken aback by not having seen his name mentioned earlier; rather surprised. One of the great satisfactions of my life will always be the fact I had the good fortune to serve under him, not once, but twice. The first time as a brand-spanking new infantry 2LT when he was the CO of the 1/30 BG in Germany and he stopped an entire excercise to show me the proper way to assault an enemy position-- his way (... and quite different from what I had just been taught at Fort Benning!!!). The second time was when he placed me in charge of a company in Vietnam. When he was the CG of the 1st Infantry Division, the whole atmosphere was like a re-union. It seemed every officer and senior NCO I ran into there, I had served with in the 30th, from George Joulwan down to squad leaders.

Best wishes and thanks for the agreement,
Fred.

PS-- Tom Odom: if you have not read his work, you are in for some enjoyment when you do. I read the stuff even today, and his small unit movements and formations worked brilliantly. I do not know what's taught today at Benning, but if DePuy's stuff is not, that is a big mistake to me.
FCW

Fred, once I saw both von Manstein and DePuy mentioned together, I just knew we scored the jackpot with a new member! (I'm a new member too, but I didn't exactly come with a pot of gold under my arm, and I couldn't find the end of a rainbow even if I were an Irish leprechaun, but I'm not; I'm English, but I am a Catholic).

It's great that's another person here who actually worked with DePuy himself; I think Tom did at one time or other, I know he's certainly written a lot on DePuy. There may be a few others. I've just read about him. Glad you're here Fred!:cool:

wm
10-11-2007, 06:10 PM
Arguably Patton did make a similar error with his fixation with taking Metz in 1944.

I suspect Patton and Metz is very different than Santa Ana at the Alamo. I think Patton's sense of history got the best of his tactical /operational judgment. He was following in both French and German footsteps from 1870 and 1914 by viewing Metz as key to Germany/Alsace-Lorraine. I think Santa Ana viewed the reduction of the Alamo as a way of striking a winning blow in the IO war--it would demonstrate his willingness and ability to overcome any rebellious force in his path and seem, thereby, invincible to the people under his rule. Both of these actions seem to reflect a form of megalomania I suppose, but the two men were megalomaniacs with different agendas.

Fred III
10-11-2007, 06:50 PM
Norfolk--

Thank you. Those are kind words and very much appreciated. I find this site a bit humbling for I see names I should know something about, but have never even heard of. It really does allow one to re-set his compass. I am also impressed with and pleased by the lack of acrimony. That says a lot about your membership and your moderator. I have friends who have been driven from interesting discussions because of the distasteful repartee and the name-calling.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Culpeper
10-11-2007, 07:19 PM
Culpeper - Apologies if my post looked like a slam on you - it was not meant as such, as I think you meant that sentiment for Custer himself. I only intended to add that many troopers died quite unnecessary deaths because of his failings. IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.

Agreed. I once watched a documentary using battlefield forensics at Little Big Horn. The more I watched the angrier I became when it became evident the slaughter that took place there and the only person to blame would be Custer himself. He even got members of his own family killed. I wasn't offended by your post so need for an apology. I thought about adding more to that post using the same light you shed but opted out.

Culpeper
10-11-2007, 07:23 PM
Here is another one--and as a native Texan I will have to remain in hiding in the swamps of Acadia--William Barrett Travis and his decision to "hold" the Alamo.

best

Tom

Yeah, I'm a native Texan as well. It never occurred to me to blame Travis for holding the Alamo. :eek: :eek:

You should be ashamed of yourself!:eek:

http://politicsoffthegrid.files.wordpress.com/2007/05/cometakeit.jpg

Tom Odom
10-11-2007, 07:34 PM
Yeah, I'm a native Texan as well. It never occurred to me to blame Travis for holding the Alamo. :eek: :eek:

You should be ashamed of yourself!:eek:

http://politicsoffthegrid.files.wordpress.com/2007/05/cometakeit.jpg

Did so against orders at that...

Fred III
10-11-2007, 10:13 PM
I once watched a documentary using battlefield forensics at Little Big Horn. The more I watched the angrier I became when it became evident the slaughter that took place there and the only person to blame would be Custer himself.


Culpeper-- Be careful here. Your conclusion is correct, Custer bears the blame, but this event is not the most widely studied, most hotly debated, most widely written about military battle in American history without reason. There are more sides to the blame issue than fingers on your hands. There is more controversy and dissension about more issues in that 5- or 6- hour event than any other event I can think of. And to make it even worse, the controversy extends back to days before the battle and involves people who were not even there. If I am not mistaken, there is or was an instructor at C&GS or the War College who conducts or conducted yearly or programmed treks-- on horseback just to get the proper feel-- to the battlefield, constantly going over the tactics and issues involved. What Custer did that day must be studied-- not for condemnation or approval-- but for the psychological and physiological actions of so many individuals.

Television programs are great for general knowledge, but they are sort of like driving along the access road in the battlefield park. Cursory. Even the placement of the markers there are wrong and overstated and anyone interested in military battles could be led to incorrect conclusions just by looking at them. I would venture to say we know with more certainly what the Romans did at Masada than we know about Custer's last 2 hours at the Little Big Horn.

All I ask of you is please do not draw conclusions based on what you see on TV. For every "fact" you are handed I could probably give you 2 that head to different conclusions. It is a fascinating study.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Culpeper
10-11-2007, 11:43 PM
Culpeper-- Be careful here.
All I ask of you is please do not draw conclusions based on what you see on TV. For every "fact" you are handed I could probably give you 2 that head to different conclusions. It is a fascinating study.

Best wishes,
Fred.

You can ask all the questions you want here. I think I read everything I could on Little Big Horn many years ago. The documentary (Discovery Channel 2002) was counting bullets and casings and documenting where they were found. It was a forensic and scientific experiment that came to certain conclusions but didn't tell the whole story. For example, they used ballistics to track where a weapon was during the battle. They found some casings and bullets that were in several places and what direction the weapon traveled and so forth. It was based soley on what was found and where it was found as well as documented history. One skirmish line for example tells a story. The bottom line: Custer made the decision to attack the village. Other factors were involved. But he was ranking commander. It's his fault. It was a rout. The Indians had repeating rifles bearing down on overwhelmed troops with single shot carbines to state the least. The evidence lies on the battlefield.

I had almost forgot that I liked the documentary so much that I purchased the video. I still have it. Now, I want to watch it again.:)


Custer's Last Stand. Battlefield archaeologists use crime-scene forensics to discover the real story (Discovery Channel's Unsolved History).

http://www.veriscopepictures.com/

Culpeper
10-11-2007, 11:46 PM
Did so against orders at that...

I was taught in my Texas history class that Houston gave some sort of order but it wasn't approved by the Governor so Travis may have not been ordered to raze the garrison and leave. Unless, you're referring to something else.

Fred III
10-12-2007, 12:20 AM
Culpeper--

Well, I'll tell you this: you bought the right one. That is the Scott-Fox archaeological dig. And you are correct: it was Custer's fault, but if we felt that Waterloo was merely Napoleon's fault and never studied "why," we would be the worse off for it.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Culpeper
10-12-2007, 02:40 AM
Culpeper--

Well, I'll tell you this: you bought the right one. That is the Scott-Fox archaeological dig. And you are correct: it was Custer's fault, but if we felt that Waterloo was merely Napoleon's fault and never studied "why," we would be the worse off for it.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Waterloo was Napoleon's fault?:wry:

Steve Blair
10-12-2007, 12:41 PM
The main reason, IMO, the LBH is so studied (and restudied) is Custer (both George and Libbie). Fetterman lost 80 men in 1866 in what was probably the only real victory the plains tribes had against the government (it resulted in the closing of the Bozeman Trail), but it draws nowhere near as much attention. Why? Because Fetterman didn't have a beautiful, articulate wife who both wrote well and outlived most of the other participants in the engagement. There were a number of officers in the Seventh who had decided not to really talk about the battle until Libbie died...the problem is that she outlived them all.

And I'm still convinced that one of the reasons the Seventh came apart was the death or incapacitation of Custer early in the fight.

Tom Odom
10-12-2007, 12:45 PM
I was taught in my Texas history class that Houston gave some sort of order but it wasn't approved by the Governor so Travis may have not been ordered to raze the garrison and leave. Unless, you're referring to something else.

It was Houston and he was in command of Texian military forces, not the governor.

Tom

Culpeper
10-12-2007, 01:03 PM
It was Houston and he was in command of Texian military forces, not the governor.

Tom

Uh, you might want to check that out.

Tom Odom
10-12-2007, 01:08 PM
Uh, you might want to check that out.

This is going no where. You have your opinions and that's fine.

My source A Time to Stand, The Epic of the Alamo, by Walter Lord,
PP 200-201.

Best

Tom

Fred III
10-12-2007, 01:32 PM
And I'm still convinced that one of the reasons the Seventh came apart was the death or incapacitation of Custer early in the fight.


Steve--

I certainly respect your opinion, but the problem with that argument is multifold. First of all, if Custer was incapacitated early in the fight, then why didn't the very experienced senior officers-- Myles Keogh and George Yates-- take the command back the way it had come? There was no pressure from that direction and that was where the remainder of the regiment was. Second, the battle lasted-- probably-- an hour and a half to 2 hours after the place Custer would have most likely been hit. Third, there is plenty of historical, anecdotal, and archaeological evidence that the command continued on in an offensive mode for quite a bit longer and quite a distance farther. Despite Custer's bravado, reputation, and domineering aura, Keogh and Yates were highly competent officers, fully capable of carrying on the mission.

I would, however, like to return to the discussion of the generals, the original intention of this thread.

I would also like to know your opinions on this business about Congress and the resolution regarding Turkish genocide against the Armenians. Would that have to be another thread? If so, where and who would start it?

Best wishes,
Fred.

Culpeper
10-12-2007, 01:40 PM
This is going no where. You have your opinions and that's fine.

My source A Time to Stand, The Epic of the Alamo, by Walter Lord,
PP 200-201.

Best

Tom

Don't get mad. Governor Smith didn't approve Houston's order and Travis didn't receive it. It was the order to abandon the garrison and have it razed. Again, unless you are referring to something else.

It's easy to find on the Internet:


"I have ordered the fortifications in the town of Bexar to be demolished, and, if you should think well of it, I will remove all the cannon and other munitions of war to Gonzales and Copano, blow up the Alamo and abandon the place, as it will be impossible to keep up the Station with volunteers, the sooner I can be authorized the better it will be for the country."

Houston may have wanted to raze the Alamo, but he was clearly requesting Smith's consent. Smith did not "think well of it" and refused to authorize Houston' s proposal.

Tom Odom
10-12-2007, 01:52 PM
Again, Lord's use of diaries and notes tells a different story. This is a matter of disagreement not anger.

best

Tom

Steve Blair
10-12-2007, 01:54 PM
Steve--

I certainly respect your opinion, but the problem with that argument is multifold. First of all, if Custer was incapacitated early in the fight, then why didn't the very experienced senior officers-- Myles Keogh and George Yates-- take the command back the way it had come? There was no pressure from that direction and that was where the remainder of the regiment was. Second, the battle lasted-- probably-- an hour and a half to 2 hours after the place Custer would have most likely been hit. Third, there is plenty of historical, anecdotal, and archaeological evidence that the command continued on in an offensive mode for quite a bit longer and quite a distance farther. Despite Custer's bravado, reputation, and domineering aura, Keogh and Yates were highly competent officers, fully capable of carrying on the mission.
Best wishes,
Fred.

Keogh was experienced, as was Yates, but they were also both very combat-oriented officers. And given the momentum of a cavalry charge, I really doubt if either of them could have turned the command around. Also, you have to factor in the presence of Tom Custer, who was cut from very much the same cloth as his brother (and if anything was the bolder of the two).

Custer launched a number of charges during the Civil War (starting at Gettysburg) that he was unable to finish...yet the charges continued. There's also a great deal of evidence that the battle broke into a series of skirmishes, with some units resisting more effectively than others. Had Custer been alive, wouldn't it make sense for him to have sounded recall and rallied his forces?

While I respect the urge that many have to assume that Custer lived and fought to the very end, I also do not discount that something very different might have taken place. Keogh and Yates were both very much "Custer men," and it stands to reason that they would have attempted to continue the charge their commander had ordered. Also, Keogh's body was one of the few that was not mutilated (a sign of respect on the part of the Sioux and Cheyenne). Does it not stand to reason that Custer's would also have been spared had he fought to the end (especially since by all Civil War accounts he was not afraid of single combat in the least)? The Sioux were not aware of the identity of the commander until after the fight (well after in most accounts), so they wouldn't have been "singling out Yellow Hair" in any sense. Most accounts from journals taken right after Terry's command found the battlefield indicate that Custer had been mutilated (although this was not often mentioned later out of respect for Libbie).

As for the Armenian question...I'd suggest a new thread either in "Historians" or possibly one of the current affairs forums...depending on the thrust of the discussion.

wm
10-12-2007, 02:11 PM
I would also like to know your opinions on this business about Congress and the resolution regarding Turkish genocide against the Armenians. Would that have to be another thread? If so, where and who would start it?



Fred,
I started that thread here. (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4106) We have another somewhat related thread on Turkey and cross border action in Iraq here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4106).

Enjoy.

Fred III
10-12-2007, 02:53 PM
... given the momentum of a cavalry charge, I really doubt if either of them [Keogh/Yates] could have turned the command around. Also, you have to factor in the presence of Tom Custer, who was cut from very much the same cloth as his brother (and if anything was the bolder of the two).

... There's also a great deal of evidence that the battle broke into a series of skirmishes, with some units resisting more effectively than others. Had Custer been alive, wouldn't it make sense for him to have sounded recall and rallied his forces?

While I respect the urge that many have to assume that Custer lived and fought to the very end, I also do not discount that something very different might have taken place. Keogh and Yates were both very much "Custer men," and it stands to reason that they would have attempted to continue the charge their commander had ordered. Also, Keogh's body was one of the few that was not mutilated (a sign of respect on the part of the Sioux and Cheyenne).... Most accounts from journals taken right after Terry's command found the battlefield indicate that Custer had been mutilated (although this was not often mentioned later out of respect for Libbie).


Steve--

At the risk of early alienation, I beg to differ with you. It seems to me you are making too many assumptions, especially when you mention the momentum of a cavalry charge. There is no evidence any cavalry charge was ever made. Quite the contrary, there is overwhelming evidence-- again, anecdotal and archaeological-- that precludes such an event. I agree with you about the battle breaking into a series of skirmishes, but this occurred because of the disposition of forces. Within those individual skirmishes, you have the breakdown of discipline and the theories of panic (much of which I subscribe to, though I believe the extremes may be overstated). By the time Custer realized his dilemma, it was too late and "recall" was no longer an option.

As for Keogh being a "Custer man," that has been proven to be very much an exaggeration. Keogh was considerably closer to Benteen than to Custer. You are absolutely correct, however, regarding Yates. Keogh was the senior officer at that phase of the fight and if Custer had been incapcitated as early as you are suggesting, I might think Keogh would have chosen the "recall" option and made his way back to regroup. While I do not believe there was great pressure on the command at or near the place generally thought of being where Custer may have been mortally wounded, I think his plans were still tenuous at that point and not fully communicated to his officers. But that's a guess. Also, while Keogh was an experienced fighter-- and no one could question his bravery-- he was still a more experienced staff officer than an actual combat commander like his boss. He was also-- and this may shock some-- not nearly as rash as many think.

As to the Custer mutilation, there were several reports stated by command members long before Libbie's demise. Keogh's lack of disfigurement has generally been described as being because of the "Medaglia di Pro Petri Sede" or the "Ordine di San Gregorio" medal he wore (I forget which), that the Indians thought were "big medicine," or some such Hollywood-driven bromide.

I do agree with you about this "last stand" phenomenom and that it is highly overblown. I would also agree with you if you said Custer was incapacitated at or near where they found his body and that it occurred early in that phase of the battle. I cannot, however, agree that the command would have carried on to the extent it did if Custer was killed too early in the fight, especially if the corollary of the command's disintegration were to follow.

Again, Steve, I don't mean to be snippy here, and I would just as soon drop this topic as pursue it further. I think I am beginning to bore people and I am much more interested in reading some of these opinions than typing. So please, my apologies before and after.

Very best wishes,
Fred.

Steve Blair
10-12-2007, 03:00 PM
No problem. We shall agree to disagree.:)

Fred III
10-12-2007, 03:45 PM
We shall agree to disagree.:)

Steve--

And in that, we agree! Spoken like the gentleman I believe you are. And thank you for allowing me to air my views.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Culpeper
10-12-2007, 07:28 PM
Again, Lord's use of diaries and notes tells a different story. This is a matter of disagreement not anger.

best

Tom

From University of Texas

http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/AA/qea2.html


By January 17, Houston had begun to question the wisdom of maintaining Neill' s garrison at Bexar. On that date he informed Governor Henry Smithqv that Col. James Bowie and a company of volunteers had left for San Antonio. Many have cited this letter as proof that Houston ordered the Alamo abandoned. Yet, Houston's words reveal the truth of the matter:

"I have ordered the fortifications in the town of Bexar to be demolished, and, if you should think well of it, I will remove all the cannon and other munitions of war to Gonzales and Copano, blow up the Alamo and abandon the place, as it will be impossible to keep up the Station with volunteers, the sooner I can be authorized the better it will be for the country [italics added]."

Houston may have wanted to raze the Alamo, but he was clearly requesting Smith's consent. Ultimately, Smith did not "think well of it" and refused to authorize Houston' s proposal.

Also, Texas A&M University

http://tamu.edu/ccbn/dewitt/adp/archives/feature/neill/neill.html


How curious this is. Most of the "authorities" based their conclusions upon their reading of character and personality, always an inexact methodology. In addition, most view Bowie as the key player and relegate Neill's role to that of a minor figure. Others, relying on inaccurate interpretations, fall into lock step and simply repeat earlier errors. Although it obviously is at times, history at its best is not determined by preconceived assumption nor "gut feelings." It is time to reexamine the source materials...


The Texas A&M paper examines Lord's work.

Tom Odom
10-13-2007, 12:11 AM
The first quote that you have is from Lord's book, the pages I cited. It discusses razing versus not defending.

The second is interesting. Funny that you quote him and then use another source to dispute him.

But in the end, the fight for the Alamo while a great motivator was a tactical mistake which Houston was against. The loss of the Goliad garrison was a parallel--all related to Houston's warning against fixed positions against a larger army with a commander who did not care about casualties.

You have your opinion, I have mine.

Best

Tom

Culpeper
10-13-2007, 02:34 AM
The first quote that you have is from Lord's book, the pages I cited. It discusses razing versus not defending.

The second is interesting. Funny that you quote him and then use another source to dispute him.

But in the end, the fight for the Alamo while a great motivator was a tactical mistake which Houston was against. The loss of the Goliad garrison was a parallel--all related to Houston's warning against fixed positions against a larger army with a commander who did not care about casualties.

You have your opinion, I have mine.

Best

Tom

Don't cop out just yet, Tom. I'm no monument to justice or reading anything I dispute out of context. I didn't take it from Lord's book. I took from the link I posted. The first quote may have originated from your book but why does it state the governor apparently did not approve the order? Was that in Lord's book as well? The second quote wasn't to dispute or disagree. Just merely showing that the subject you brought up is contested as well as your source. I'll read Lord's book. I won't go so far as to have contempt prior to investigation. But I don't think the Historian forum is the place for the, lets agree to disagree bug-a-boo. We might give some kid the wrong idea about what history is supposed to be about. Which, is the truth.

Like you stated earlier. This will go no where. But please don't talk out loud about the subject while in the Alamo and for God's sake, remember to take your hat off before you go inside.;)

Check out the "(Across Houston)" on the plaque. Probably someone's idea of sick joke or something.:eek:
http://www.burger.com/alapix14.jpg

Norfolk
10-13-2007, 03:39 AM
1. The Great Generals:

First Tier: Tiglath-Pileser III, Cyrus the Great, Qin Shi Huangdi, Sala' al-Din, Ghenghis Khan, Subutai, Tamerlane, Wellington, von Moltke, Slim.

- Second Tier: Hattusili, Darius the Great, Alexander the Great, Scipio Africanus, Pompey, Julius Caesar, Arminius, Diocletian, Belisarius, Charles Martel, Charlemagne, Basil II, Henry V, Mehmet II, Ivan the Terrible, Gustavus Adolphus, Marlborough, Napoleon, Davout, Sherman, Kirby-Smith, von Manstein, Kesselring, Liu Bocheng, Templar, Dayan.

-Third Tier: Sargon the Great, Thothmoses III, Hannibal, Attila, Kutusov, Toussant L'Ouverture, Lee, Stonewall Jackson, Grant, Nathan Bedford Forest, Byng, Monash, Currie, Wavell, Freyberg, any number of WWII German generals, Patton, Ridgeway, Giap, Sharon.

Looking back at my list of Great Generals, at least 3 of the 10 First Tier Great Generals were cavalrymen, and arguably Sala'el-Din was a fourth. Of the Second Tier, Belisarius, Charles Martel and Charlemagne, and Mehmet II led armies that were either based upon the cavalry, or cavalry formed at least half or more of their armies; Gustavus Adolphus in fact integrated much of his infantry, cavalry, and artillery units into what we might call "All-Arms" Brigades. Of the Third Tier, Attila, Nathan Bedford Forest, and Patton were cavalrymen; Alexander the Great led a mainly infantry army, but led his own Companion Cavalry into battle.

It seems to me that the Great Generals who came from the Cavalry likely shared the trait of improvisational genius perhaps more than anything else. They had a feel for the direction of the battle, were able to size up a situation in an instant, and synchronize their forces seemingly while on the fly. The latter was often made possible by careful preparation and planning beforehand, but the great cavalry generals seemed able to quickly and efficiently change their plans or simply make news ones practically on the spot, and then make it happen right away. For an arm whose outstanding characteristic was speed, improvisational genius was essential for Cavalry Generals to stay ahead of events, and failing that, to regain control of the situation and adapt to the change of conditions on the battlefield.

Fred III
10-13-2007, 05:14 AM
It seems to me that the Great Generals who came from the Cavalry likely shared the trait of improvisational genius perhaps more than anything else. They had a feel for the direction of the battle, were able to size up a situation in an instant, and synchronize their forces seemingly while on the fly. The latter was often made possible by careful preparation and planning beforehand, but the great cavalry generals seemed able to quickly and efficiently change their plans or simply make news ones practically on the spot, and then make it happen right away. For an arm whose outstanding characteristic was speed, improvisational genius was essential for Cavalry Generals to stay ahead of events, and failing that, to regain control of the situation and adapt to the change of conditions on the battlefield.

Norfolk--

While I don't necessarily agree with your rankings (probably because I never heard of many of the names you posted), that last paragraph-- above-- is as cogent a piece of analysis as I have ever read. Beautifully done.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Norfolk
10-13-2007, 12:41 PM
Norfolk--

While I don't necessarily agree with your rankings (probably because I never heard of many of the names you posted), that last paragraph-- above-- is as cogent a piece of analysis as I have ever read. Beautifully done.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Thanks Fred.:) Now you actually walked, talked, and worked with a Great General, DePuy. What, according to your observations, were the outstanding traits of Great Generalship that DePuy himself had?

Fred III
10-13-2007, 08:00 PM
Thanks Fred.:) Now you actually walked, talked, and worked with a Great General, DePuy. What, according to your observations, were the outstanding traits of Great Generalship that DePuy himself had?

Norfolk--

DePuy was the most remarkable soldier I ever served with, and that includes George Joulwan, who was my CO when I was a young 1LT with the 1/30, 3rd Inf. Div., in Schweinfurt, Germany. Whatever I am today, I owe to my parents, my school, and George Joulwan, so you can see how high I hold DePuy. (Joulwan, incidentally, was NATO CG and led the forces into Bosnia.) Joulwan was also with me in Vietnam, same division (1st) when we served together under DePuy for the second time.

As a teacher-- BG CO in Germany-- he was a patient man with young LTs, teaching them his methods, teaching them-- us-- how to be good officers. At the same time, he brooked no excuses and forced you to take responsibility for what you did. If you erred, you always had the opportunity to explain, and either he or his well-taught officers always took the time to show you how to get it right. He was a strict disciplinarian and enforced his ideas and his methods, his formations, his timing, etc. We used the "traveling," the "traveling overwatch," and the "bounding overwatch," techniques until we could taste them, and woe betide he who wouldn't learn! We also used his fire-and-maneuver techniques until they became second nature and even the lowest private was so embued with DePuy's tactics, that they scoffed at anything else. As you can imagine, we were probably the only unit in USAREUR to use this stuff and the morale in the battle group was sky-high because we felt we were something different and because DePuy always emphasized the necessity of saving lives.

When we went on field exercises, there was a constant emphasis on the use of assets. On a small unit level, it was our introduction to "combined arms." Again, God help the man who moved his men to the "attack" without first exploring the availability and use of mortars, artillery, air, and any other mechanism that would save a single life.

This translated into the same atmosphere in Vietnam. I was RA, but had bad eyes so I couldn't remain in the infantry. I lucked out after my 2-year obligation to a combat branch, and was transferred in TC, and got an interview job at NATO as a 1LT. You talk about cloud nine... ! When my tour was up, I went to Ft. (Useless) Eustis, school, a battalion S-3 job, company CO, then Vietnam. In Vietnam I took over the truck company in the S&T Battalion (the only one a division has). That's when I ran into Joulwan again, several NCOs I knew in the 1/30 and a couple of the officers from there, as well. It almost seemed DepUy had orchestrated the whole thing: could he have? All his own boys? I don't know, but it certainly seemed that way.

I wrote a manual for the division on convoy operations when I was there and I ran the first so-called infiltration convoy of the war, from Lai Khe to the old French Michelin rubber plantation at An Loc, a 7-day affair, if memory serves me correctly. And Depuy was his old smoke-bringing self. He was aided by another hell-raiser, his ADC 2-3, Jim Hollingsworth (there's a great blurb about Hollingsworth in Cornelius Ryan's The Last Battle). The main difference was that the teaching-gloves were now off and guys who couldn't cut it or who screwed up real bad were quickly gone. This was no longer CPXs and FTXs. This was "Charlie," the NVA, and dirty pool. DePuy wanted no excuses, no nonsense, none of the "corporate" charts showing casualties and captured rifles, none of that stuff. He wanted results. Operations were brilliantly planned and he used massive air assets, heliborne operations for everything, speed, stealth, surprise, and massive firepower. He had so many attachments I think the division at one time numbered more than 25,000 troops. Again: mortars instead of men. Then send in the troops. I would be given convoy instructions by the DTO. (They only used us as decoys to flush Charlie out; virtually everything was re-supplied by air.) I would always ask who was providing road security. The inevitable answer was, ARVN. My reply was always the same. "Negative, sir." It would then immediately go back to Hollingsworth or DePuy and I got US troops (most of the time George Joulwan; he musta loved that!).

DePuy was also very big on base-camp perimeter patrols and in the year I was there, our huge camp was not hit once, rather remarkable for 1966-1967. Once in a while I was allowed to attend a division staff meeting during an operation. Maps were used; the charts disappeared. He hated them. And the division was the most professional organization I have ever served in, again, with extremely high morale. The man was indefatiguable, all over the place, and I must say, many careers were ruined by him, Hollingsworth, and the ADC 1-4, Deane (or Dean, I can't remember which any more). And I will say this, with all deference to other units: we were always pulling guys out of hot water: Tropic Lightning, the Old Reliables, a couple of those LIBs. I constantly ran convoys to other divisions, yet no one ever ran them to us.

I don't ever remember us taking severe casualties and our operations were always kept reasonably quiet despite the ARVN "support." DePuy was an attrition general, but he defined it in a way that was different from what most think: "... we continued to hope that we could inflict such losses on the VC or the NVA that it would be more than they would be able to take. That's the alternative to cutting the trail. That's an attrition war." Many think it's the other way around. He was also the innovator of the "search and destroy" operation and never believed in letting the enemy off the hook. He always had something going on. I think if I had to pick one thing, however, about his tactics, it would be surprise. The enemy that faced the 1st Inf. Div. when Bill DePuy commanded it, was never given a breather, was always looking around him, was always off balance, never knowing where the next battalion was going to land, where the next attack was coming from. DePuy was a master at it.

Another thing I really liked about him was he was not afraid to admit his mistakes. That's a very rare quality, even in the "duty-honor-country" society of the military.

So that's it. You will love the C&GS stuff on his papers, especially chapters 24-28. The first ones are good, as well. They're the ones that give you his squad and platoon tactics. Great stuff. I wonder if we use them today. Boy, oh boy! did they make sense. Try moving a platoon that way instead of the old, 1962 Ft. Benning madness.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Tom Odom
10-13-2007, 11:55 PM
Don't cop out just yet, Tom. I'm no monument to justice or reading anything I dispute out of context. I didn't take it from Lord's book. I took from the link I posted. The first quote may have originated from your book but why does it state the governor apparently did not approve the order? Was that in Lord's book as well?

Enough with the tone. No one is copping out and I certainly don't have to explain myself to you. Yes The governor's dispute is in Lords's book. And the quote did come from the book. I would not have stated so otherwise.


Like you stated earlier. This will go no where. But please don't talk out loud about the subject while in the Alamo and for God's sake, remember to take your hat off before you go inside.

Over the top again. I revere the defenders of the Alamo and took my wife there this year. Drop it.

Tom

Culpeper
10-14-2007, 12:31 AM
Enough with the tone. No one is copping out and I certainly don't have to explain myself to you. Yes The governor's dispute is in Lords's book. And the quote did come from the book. I would not have stated so otherwise.



Over the top again. I revere the defenders of the Alamo and took my wife there this year. Drop it.

Tom

Excuse me? My tone has been no different than yours. You just like to bug out. All I did was grab you by the tail and pulled you back. Like you stated earlier. This is more about disagreement than anger. I took your advice and used your own company language. It is not my fault you took offense. Lets do this. Lets just ignore each other in the future starting now.

MattC86
10-15-2007, 03:44 PM
Having just finished Cray's biography of George C. Marshall (and thus now an unimpeachable authority ;) ) I'm surprised to see few mentions of him on this thread.

I also noticed this about MacArthur, who people were arguing about a page or so ago. While other controversial generals get some positive mentions in other people's biographies (Patton being the one that comes to mind most readily), I have never seen a biography of another WWII-era figure that puts MacArthur in a good light. He was trashed in the Marshall biography, same with McCullogh's "Truman," not especially well regarded in the few Patton biographies I've read (along with Patton himself sometimes), and pretty well lambasted in E.B. Potter's "Nimitz," if memory serves.

I know the man had his moments of brilliance (Inchon), but his combat record doesn't seem to compare to Patton's, who had some of the similar negative characteristics.

Thoughts?

Matt

Steve Blair
10-15-2007, 03:48 PM
I think two of the biggest differences between the two is that Patton understood and paid attention to the chain of command (even though he might have complained about it) and could admit when he made a mistake. MacArthur didn't deal well with either. IMO, anyhow.

wm
10-15-2007, 04:52 PM
While other controversial generals get some positive mentions in other people's biographies (Patton being the one that comes to mind most readily), I have never seen a biography of another WWII-era figure that puts MacArthur in a good light. He was trashed in the Marshall biography, same with McCullogh's "Truman," not especially well regarded in the few Patton biographies I've read (along with Patton himself sometimes), and pretty well lambasted in E.B. Potter's "Nimitz," if memory serves.

I know the man had his moments of brilliance (Inchon), but his combat record doesn't seem to compare to Patton's, who had some of the similar negative characteristics.

Thoughts?

Here are just a few reasons for folks not being a MacArthur Fan
1. He got jumped 2 grades before the start of WWI --Major to Colonel--probably watered off a few folks he jumpeed over (Remember General Alexander M. Haig anyone?)
2. Critical of how Pershing fought WWI
3. As Superintendent, USMA, he was responsible for major changes in how the place ran and what it taught--Anmyone who knoews anything about USMA knows that change is not well-loerated by its past graduates, nor is the person who makes the changes happen. (An old saying is "The Corps has . . .")
4. He was politically connected to Teddy Roosevelt
5. He was not politically connected to FDR
6. He was a general's kid (his father was a 3 star)
7. He served on the Bily Mitchell court martial panel
8. Medal of honor for service on Bataan (I have no idea what the citation
says).
9. He spent a lot of his career in the Pacific theater.
10. He is the only American military officer ever to be appointed Field Marshall (even if it was in the Philippine Army.)
11. CSA during the Depression, disbanded the "Reserve" Army of Vets

How are those for starters?

Fred III
10-15-2007, 10:02 PM
I have always been led to believe that the two greatest American field or fighting generals of WWII were MacArthur (and subsequently into Korea) and Patton. MacArthur for his island-hopping strategy that drove the Japanese crazy and Patton for obvious reasons, not the least of which was his turn toward Bastogne, considered by some I had read to have been the greatest maneuver of any major American field force of the war. (I often wonder if any of those writers had studied the German panzer generals before being so awed.)

I am aware of the monumental egos involved, but I have never known that shortcoming as counting when considering a man's generalship. I am not sure charming personalities matter when one looks for a warrior who can lead his men to victory. Attila and Genghis come to mind. Of course that begs the question, did they win strictly out of numbers, reputation, and fear, or was it generalship? Probably a combination of both. I would guess we wouldn't have gotten too het-up if MacArthur had chopped his way through a few Japanese civilians to get at his enemy, and Dresden, 1945, speaks for itself. What would we be saying about Patton if that particular gem was his brainchild?

I don't know; I think for my money, I will stick with what I learned a long time ago: MacArthur and Patton wear the medals of great generalship for America during WWII. I will maintain that Bill DePuy assumed their mantle when the American people had done with them, and now we thirst for the new love-hate relationship. Maybe David Patraeus will be fortunate/unfortunate enough to step into that role. He seems to be just clever enough-- by half-- to "write the book," "assume the role," and keep just enough of his political powder dry to figure out what to do next.

It seems odd though. Much of that "book" I seem to recall having read in Special Forces school back in the early 60's. Déjà vu all over again.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Norfolk
10-15-2007, 11:58 PM
Agrred Fred. Patton and MacArthur were certainly the most brilliant of the US Army's operational-level commanders during the Second World War, and while MacArthur may not have been a popular man (or even Patton for that matter), a fair number of people at least did recognize MacArthur's brilliance. I think perhaps the major difference in generalship between MacArthur and Patton was Patton's more or less consitent brilliance, while MacArthur had moments of brilliance between rather more pedestrian performances. Granted, even Patton had difficulty fighting through the hedgrows in Normandy, but so did everyone else. Patton's consistent performance left much less room for critics to denigrate his generalship than MacArthur's; but MacArthur remains a great general.

Brilliance aside, while I think Patton was also perhaps the most consistently competent of the US Army operational-level (rather than tactical-level) commanders, I think that Kruger and Simpson rate not too far behind. Especially given that Kruger had to deal with MacArthur's personality, and Simpson had to deal with Montgomery's (almost remarkable accomplishments in themselves); nevertheless, Kruger helped pulled off the Phillipines, and Simpson handled two rather difficult situations with great skill: holding the north shoulder of the "Bulge", and crossing the Rhine with almost (and relative) ease, given the circumstances. What Kruger and Simpson may have lacked in sheer brilliance, they made up for in consistent competency and few if any mistakes in particular.

wm
10-16-2007, 12:35 AM
Agrred Fred. Patton and MacArthur were certainly the most brilliant of the US Army's operational-level commanders during the Second World War, and while MacArthur may not have been a popular man (or even Patton for that matter), a fair number of people at least did recognize MacArthur's brilliance. I think perhaps the major difference in generalship between MacArthur and Patton was Patton's more or less consitent brilliance, while MacArthur had moments of brilliance between rather more pedestrian performances. Granted, even Patton had difficulty fighting through the hedgrows in Normandy, but so did everyone else. Patton's consistent performance left much less room for critics to denigrate his generalship than MacArthur's; but MacArthur remains a great general.

Brilliance aside, while I think Patton was also perhaps the most consistently competent of the US Army operational-level (rather than tactical-level) commanders, I think that Kruger and Simpson rate not too far behind. Especially given that Kruger had to deal with MacArthur's personality, and Simpson had to deal with Montgomery's (almost remarkable accomplishments in themselves); nevertheless, Kruger helped pulled off the Phillipines, and Simpson handled two rather difficult situations with great skill: holding the north shoulder of the "Bulge", and crossing the Rhine with almost (and relative) ease, given the circumstances. What Kruger and Simpson may have lacked in sheer brilliance, they made up for in consistent competency and few if any mistakes in particular.

If you want to tout WWII Allied Generals with "consistent competency," I suspect you need to include Patch and Lucian Truscott Jr.. The old 7th Army is the only force to successfully cross the Vosges in an opposed offensive operation. Even though they faced some of the dregs of the Wehrmacht, they also faced some fairly competent Panzer units and a crack Mountain Division as well during that campaign. The use of tailoring to achieve effective force mixes for the various terrrain in the Vosges area was masterful, IMO. This is the kind of thing I would expect from a great general--build and maintain cohesive units, train subordinates well on combined arms operations, give them the resources they need to win, then stand back and let them succeed.
Patch was also a significant leader in the Pacific (Formed the Americal Divison, later the overall commander on Guadalcanal) before moving to the European Theater. I cannot recall any other Allied General who has a similar claim to fame, but I look forward to being corrected if I am wrong.

Ken White
10-16-2007, 01:06 AM
if you mean command in the Pacific and then in Europe. Of Course, Wavell and Auchinlek went the opposite way... :)

Norfolk
10-16-2007, 02:36 AM
If you want to tout WWII Allied Generals with "consistent competency," I suspect you need to include Patch and Lucian Truscott Jr.. Patch was also a significant leader in the Pacific (Formed the Americal Divison, later the overall commander on Guadalcanal) before moving to the European Theater. I cannot recall any other Allied General who has a similar claim to fame, but I look forward to being corrected if I am wrong.

You're correct on all counts wm, and I apologize for my negligence. And contrary to some accounts, the advance from the Riviera up the Rhone was rather less of a walk in the park as many histories might lead some to believe (principally out of negligence, again). After all, our man Audey Murphy won his MH in the wake of Anvil. Devens and Patch made remarkable time, even if the German retreat could have been better handled. Except for the outstanding Alpine Corps, the great majority of 1st French Army was a dead-weight on logistics, not to mention a political nuisance.

I believe Truscott, in addition to his superlative training and handling of his men and his formations, was the only subordinate general to ever go eyeball -to-eyeball with Patton, and come out of it (professionally) intact. One of the gutsiest moves any US General ever made beyond the direct observation and fire of the enemy during WWII.

Norfolk
10-16-2007, 02:39 AM
if you mean command in the Pacific and then in Europe. Of Course, Wavell and Auchinlek went the opposite way... :)

Setting aside the above mentioned (Wavell was a Great enabler, and Auchinleck a much better general than given credit for), Ken is also correct about Collins...did Middleton commanded V Corps after coming up from divisional command, didn't he/

Fred III
10-16-2007, 10:04 AM
... Auchinleck a much better general than given credit for...

I completely agree, completely!

Incidentally, has anyone ever read the late Russell F. Weigley's book, Eisenhower's Lieutenants? (Or am I a day late and a dollar short, as usual?) If you haven't, it is worth every dime you spend on it. For my 10 cents, the best book ever written about D-Day on.

Best wishes,
Fred.

wm
10-16-2007, 11:27 AM
Setting aside the above mentioned (Wavell was a Great enabler, and Auchinleck a much better general than given credit for), Ken is also correct about Collins...did Middleton commanded V Corps after coming up from divisional command, didn't he/

Hard to believe I forgot about him. Maybe it has to do with my thinking that Middleton's VIII Corps (not V Corps) was the big noise during the breakout. (Or maybe it has to do with a personal defensive reaction against all things "VII Corps" after being assigned to a tenant unit in the Corps area while Patton the younger was the deputy Corps Cdr :D)

charter6
10-21-2007, 02:46 PM
Figured I'd try to revive this thread a bit.

How about Hjalmar Sillasvuo? Granted, he was only a colonel at the time of Suomussalmi, but he did kick the stuffing out of two Soviet divisions with a scratch force of territorials.

wm
10-22-2007, 03:27 PM
Figured I'd try to revive this thread a bit.

How about Hjalmar Sillasvuo? Granted, he was only a colonel at the time of Suomussalmi, but he did kick the stuffing out of two Soviet divisions with a scratch force of territorials.

Tactical stuff. And one wonders whether he was that good or his opponents were that bad. Russian performance during the Winter War was almost as bad as it was in the Russo-Japanese War IMO. Based on what I've read about his subsequent career, there is not much to write home about. As a corps commander in the Continuation War he did not seem to have had much success.

charter6
10-23-2007, 04:34 AM
WM, I obviously wouldn't put him on the same level as a lot of the people we're talking about, but I think he does deserve more credit that you're giving him.

His success at Suomussalmi wasn't so much a tactical thing as it was reliant on his developing on the fly a fairly advanced operational concept -- akin to Daniel Morgan's "two volleys" at Cowpens, which completely changed the face of the American revolution. He understood the limitations of his troops, and employed them against a superior opponent in a manner in which those limitations were irrelevant. He also understood the psychological level of the battle in a way a lot of more conventional commanders don't.

I think he gets a bum rap for the 1944 Karelian Isthmus thing. He was facing an absurd concentration of Soviet artillery and armor. I don't think any commander could have done much better. I think (could be wrong) that he's one of the few, if not the only, non-Germans to lead an SS division during the war. Not really relevant but a fun tidbit.

wm
10-23-2007, 11:59 AM
WM, I obviously wouldn't put him on the same level as a lot of the people we're talking about, but I think he does deserve more credit that you're giving him.

His success at Suomussalmi wasn't so much a tactical thing as it was reliant on his developing on the fly a fairly advanced operational concept -- akin to Daniel Morgan's "two volleys" at Cowpens, which completely changed the face of the American revolution. He understood the limitations of his troops, and employed them against a superior opponent in a manner in which those limitations were irrelevant. He also understood the psychological level of the battle in a way a lot of more conventional commanders don't.

I think he gets a bum rap for the 1944 Karelian Isthmus thing. He was facing an absurd concentration of Soviet artillery and armor. I don't think any commander could have done much better. I think (could be wrong) that he's one of the few, if not the only, non-Germans to lead an SS division during the war. Not really relevant but a fun tidbit.
My comment about tactical dealt with the level of action. I suspect that the Finns' actions were directed by Mannerheim who probably recognized the threat of having his country split in half

My comments about the Continuation War are from far earlier than 1944. In 1941, his Third Corps basically tried, in reverse, what the Russians failed to do during the Winter War, ending up with their defeat in detail at the extended battles around Suomussalmi. Just as the Russians never made it to the sea, the Finns never seized the Murmansk railroad.

Regarding tactics that make the best use of what you have--if that's the marker for a great general , then I guess we could include the character played by Patrick Swayze in "Red Dawn" in our list. :D

You are right about his command of the 6th SS Division "Nord" (which had been upgraded to a division only the previous month), but his command only lasted for about 3 months, probably a stopgap measure to reform and refit the unit after it had been routed during Operation Silverfox.

charter6
10-23-2007, 05:50 PM
Regarding tactics that make the best use of what you have--if that's the marker for a great general , then I guess we could include the character played by Patrick Swayze in "Red Dawn" in our list. :D


except... he's fictional ;)

You're probably right here, I'm just a huge fan of Suomussalmi. Can't get the image of Finnish territorials on skis cutting up the Red Army out of my head.

Rifleman
10-24-2007, 06:07 PM
You know, of course, that if we're down to listing fictional characters and tactical operations then we can just say Maximus Decimus Meridius and forget about the rest. ;)

I'm thinking this thread has pretty much run it's course. :rolleyes:

Fred III
10-28-2007, 04:45 PM
I'm thinking this thread has pretty much run it's course.

Unfortunately, I tend to agree. I would, however, like to get one last opinion. The Germans had a field marshal during WWII by the name of Ferdinand Schörner. I am reasonably sure Schörner made his rank by virtue of the fact he was supposed to have been a Nazi stalwart, though I am not positive of that. He rose up in rank with much of the old guard of the Prussian general corps (he was born in 1892, making him a few years younger than some), so he probably wasn't incompetent, but I just wonder how good he really was. Despite his closeness with Hitler, the man ran his own show and on more than one occasion, defied the "great" general/politician/idiot/madman. With v. Manstein's departure, Schörner seemed to be the superstar of the Eastern Front (such as anyone could be in 1944-1945).

So... with that in mind, I wonder how good a general this guy really was. Any opinions... ?

Best wishes,
Fred.

Distiller
12-13-2007, 05:34 PM
Since #1 post in this thread called for generals, I'm not sure about including state leaders, like Alexander the Great, Darius the Great, or Frederick the Great. Ceasar is a border case, as at the time of his conquests he was in a triumvirate with Crassus and Pompeius.

Going strictly for generales, a number of WW2 Germans sure do qualify.
And Islam produced a whole range of incredible successful generals like Khalid ibn al-Walid (I think he was mentioned), Timur (also a border case, as he was not a state leader, but acted as one, and founded an empire), and also not yet mentioned I think Robert Guiscard.

Also I think the Spanish conqistadores were not yet mentioned, even though their rate of utilized assets vs gains (or whatever you might call it) is absolutely unique, winning a whole continent with only a handful of men.

I personally like Wallenstein, even though his impact was rather regional.

And on this U.S.-heavy forum Douglas MacArthur was not yet mentioned?

Gian P Gentile
12-13-2007, 07:15 PM
I personally like Wallenstein, even though his impact was rather regional.


How about the generalship of Osama bin Laden? His impact is certainly way beyond regional, and, like Wallenstein and the effects of the Thirty Years War, many see him and his war of terror as evil.

slapout9
12-13-2007, 07:34 PM
You are right Colonel but People don't like to admit that. He understands EBO and he understands Targeting. His failure for us fortunately was he could not continue to press the attack or we would have been in deep trouble.

Jayhawker
12-31-2007, 04:54 AM
Well if the criteria are understanding the war you're in, and implementing a strategy to win it, then my list is below.

Gen Washington has my vote for best in American history. Consider what he had to work with, where he had to go, and what he accomplished. Yes, I know, he only won three battles, if you don't count the successful evacuations, but the man understood the nature of his war and kept that always in mind. He also coordinated with Allies (French and various Indian tribes) to include the French Navy. Now that, for 1783, was a grand accomplishment.

I think old George gets completely ignored. My list is American only as I don't feel competent to go abroad.
1. Washington
2. Grant
3. Marshall
4. Pershing
5. Eisenhower
6. Winfield Scott
7. Sherman
8. LeMay (both during WWII and Cold War)
9. Jimmy Doolittle
10. Vinegar Joe Stillwell

All these guys showed imagination, innovation, took risks and understood the nature of the war they were in. And, all except Grant, Scott, and Sherman had to handle Allies.... which is truly an art form. Previous comments have Zinni on peoples' lists. I'd concur and think that if we had him there instead of Franks, it would be a very different ball game now.

All this is a fun parlor game, but the real issue Yingling's article got me thinking about is why, with all our professional education, service Academies, and other "challenges" and "opportunities" do we have so precious few around like these today?

Perhaps its because they, had careers filled with innovation and risk, just showing up for normal duties in their peace time army? I don't know but I wish someone would figure it out.

Rifleman
12-31-2007, 09:07 PM
10. Vinegar Joe Stillwell

Did Vinegar Joe misuse or have unrealistic expectations of Galahad? Or were his orders just the nature of the war in Burma and what had to be done?

Scott R. McMichael in comes down pretty hard on Stilwell in his work A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry.

Charles Ogburn states in The Marauders that Stilwell had to assume deputy duties from Mountbatten once for 22 days and "it was said the senior staff, American as well as British, were dismayed to find him (Stilwell) at sea in high-level administration and to be incapable of taking charge or giving any useful directions."

The general feeling seems to have been that Stilwell was fine at division level, maybe in a little over his head at corps level, and that "the requirements of an army command were entirely beyond Stilwell's scope."

Jayhawker
01-01-2008, 08:21 PM
I had not seen those comments about him before, and they could very well be justified. The joke was that CBI did not stand so much for China-Burma-India theater, but rather Confusion Beyond Imagination! "Working" with Chaing Kai-Shek and the British provided a level of complexity that I think most do not recognize. You know the Brits, often repeat the old Montomgery/Alanbrooke saw that Ike was no battlefield commander, but rather an "Allied administrator...." Which demonstrates their lack of understanding of the complexities and challenges of being a Supreme Allied Commander, in any theater of war.

No rocks thrown at my Air Force generals? All you army guys....where are you?

Umar Al-Mokhtār
01-03-2008, 07:56 PM
I’ll bite. :D

"Bombs Away” LeMay’s belligerence threatened to escalate tense Cold War situations, especially during the Cuban Missile Crisis, into open war (and possible nuclear exchange). I think his mantra of “bomb them back into the Stone Age” still pervades in some Air Force circles (which is not a good thing). While he was an important Air Force general with many kudos (the box formation; low-altitude, nighttime incendiary attacks; Berlin Airlift) he couldn’t see the proper application of strategic air assets and concentrated on strategic bombing as the premier strategic weapon of the US.

Doolittle was only a GO from August of 42 to May of 46 so his impact, other than the fame of leading the Doolittle Raid, was not exceptionally noteworthy.

I think if you’re adding US Air Force generals to the list then Vandenberg, Spaatz, or Arnold would be better choices rather than either LeMay and Doolittle. Or better yet General Buck Turgidson and Brigadier General Jack D. Ripper!

Overall, I think it’s tough to have a blanket list of “great generals” that stretches across 3000+ years. A change to the sight picture, sight alignment might help, i.e. of the US; of WWII; 17th Century; etc.

Jayhawker
01-03-2008, 09:04 PM
Glad to get a rise out of someone. Yes, LeMay's time as Chief of Staff was near to a disaster when it comes to the Cuban missile crises. But his organization and leadership was key in Europe and Asia during WWII and his re-org of SAC into a premier organization (that never would have allowed the recent mess up with nukes from ND to LA with ....what? They were here a moment ago!!... to happen) was fundamentally sound and ahead. And for Doolittle, the raid is impressive, but not the best thing he did. When he got to England in early '44 he refocused the effort on bombing German fighter factories, which depleted their number, allowing for command of the skies by June of 44. Had he not done that, well, who knows?

I like Hap Arnold a lot, but his focus on strat bombing over other things diminishes him in my eyes somewhat. Furthermore, he seemed to be impressed with the British area bombing and by '45 want the USAAF to do more of that?! Le May and even more, Doolittle, modulated to what worked, not maintained the strat bombing party line.

I've a friend whose working title for his diss is "10 or 20 million dead,....depending on the breaks" That should win an award for best titled PhD don't you think? Homage to old Buck....

wm
01-04-2008, 12:17 PM
I think if you’re adding US Air Force generals to the list then Vandenberg, Spaatz, or Arnold would be better choices rather than either LeMay and Doolittle. Or better yet General Buck Turgidson and Brigadier General Jack D. Ripper!

No list of great AF generals would be complete without General Dreedle!
:D

Gian P Gentile
01-04-2008, 01:11 PM
No list of great AF generals would be complete without General Dreedle!
:D

WM; to be honest I actually forgot who Dreedle was, then I googled the name and realized of course the classic character in "Catch 22." Good call although for movie generals my vote still goes to old Buck. You know, when you mentioned Dreedle my first silly thought was one of Frank Zappa's kids; Moon Unit, Dweezil, and "General Dreedle."

Seriously I do think LeMay was one of the greatest operational Generals the American military has produced, at the level of a Patton or even Sherman. I think you can make the tentative comparison of LeMay's brilliant decision to shift from high-altitude precision bombing of the Japanese home islands in early 45 to low level fire bombing to General Patraeus's very recent decision to co-opt and arm our former enemy the non-alqueda sunni insurgents; although this comparison is still immature and tentative without the insights and wisdom of history on our side for the latter.

gian

tequila
01-04-2008, 01:17 PM
COL Gentile, can you be more specific about this? I'm not a huge student of the air war in the Pacific, but I find it hard to characterize any change in '45 as constituting anything near the strategic shift that occurred with the embracing of the Sunni tribal/insurgent alliance, which has truly altered the dynamics on the ground. Japan's naval power had already been gutted by then and it had no hope of strategic victory on any level.

Gian P Gentile
01-04-2008, 01:34 PM
COL Gentile, can you be more specific about this? I'm not a huge student of the air war in the Pacific, but I find it hard to characterize any change in '45 as constituting anything near the strategic shift that occurred with the embracing of the Sunni tribal/insurgent alliance, which has truly altered the dynamics on the ground. Japan's naval power had already been gutted by then and it had no hope of strategic victory on any level.

Hey Tequila:

Sure, a good book to read on American strategic bombing in the Pacific in World War II is Con Crane's classic "Bombs, Cities and Civilians." Crane highlights the operational shift that LeMay brought about. Prior to his taking command the Army Air Forces had stuck with their method of daylight, high-altitude precision bombing that had worked pretty well in the European theater. MG Haywood Hansell had tried in late 44 and early 45 to apply that same method against the Japanese home islands. For many reasons and conditions it was not having the desired effect. LeMay enters the picture and takes command, assesses the situation, and decides to change the operational method from high altitude precision bombing to low level fire bombing of Japanese cities. This was not an easy decision for LeMay to make; to so quickly discard an operational method that the army air force had based its existence on; it was dangerous institutionally for the airmen and tactically for the airmen flying the missions. But LeMay made it and at least operationally in terms of effects on Japanese war production it worked. I am leaving aside here many issues of course. So it is in this regard that I make the comparison to General Patraeus and his bold decision to arm and co-opt our former enemy the non-alqueda sunni insurgent. It is the decision and vision of the operational commander in which I make this comparison albeit tempered with the qualification that we still do not have the temporal distance and wisdom of history on our side for the latter.

Hope this clarifies.

gian

tequila
01-04-2008, 01:53 PM
Hope this clarifies.

It certainly did, and thanks for the book recommendation. I've always had the cartoon image of LeMay the Mad Bomber in my mind whenever I thought of him, so it'll be good to see another side.

Gian P Gentile
01-04-2008, 02:14 PM
It certainly did, and thanks for the book recommendation. I've always had the cartoon image of LeMay the Mad Bomber in my mind whenever I thought of him, so it'll be good to see another side.

Right; LeMay has become known from his later years as AF Chief of Staff during the early years of Vietnam when he made the notorious statement "Bomb them back into the Stoneage" and for his run as VP candidate under Wallace in 68. LeMay's later years obscure the reality that he was a superb tactical and operational air general in World War II.

thanks

gian

Jayhawker
01-04-2008, 04:37 PM
I could not have explained it any better. LeMay is an interesting guy, what with the WWII innovation contrasted with his 1960s complete inability to understand the nature of the conflict in SE Asia.

The US Air Force Academy has a program that each class will chose its "Exemplar." Someone from the Air Force or Army Air Force history that is an example for that class to follow. Rumor has it that LeMay is not an allowed choice, due to his campaign platform and his statements about race and segregation.

On another related note discussed above, Catch-22 is still widely assigned for the cadets to read--glad to say.

wm
01-04-2008, 04:50 PM
Hey Tequila:

Sure, a good book to read on American strategic bombing in the Pacific in World War II is Con Crane's classic "Bombs, Cities and Civilians." Crane highlights the operational shift that LeMay brought about. Prior to his taking command the Army Air Forces had stuck with their method of daylight, high-altitude precision bombing that had worked pretty well in the European theater. MG Haywood Hansell had tried in late 44 and early 45 to apply that same method against the Japanese home islands. For many reasons and conditions it was not having the desired effect. LeMay enters the picture and takes command, assesses the situation, and decides to change the operational method from high altitude precision bombing to low level fire bombing of Japanese cities. This was not an easy decision for LeMay to make; to so quickly discard an operational method that the army air force had based its existence on; it was dangerous institutionally for the airmen and tactically for the airmen flying the missions. But LeMay made it and at least operationally in terms of effects on Japanese war production it worked. I am leaving aside here many issues of course. So it is in this regard that I make the comparison to General Patraeus and his bold decision to arm and co-opt our former enemy the non-alqueda sunni insurgent. It is the decision and vision of the operational commander in which I make this comparison albeit tempered with the qualification that we still do not have the temporal distance and wisdom of history on our side for the latter.

Hope this clarifies.

gian

I may be misspeaking since I haven't looked at much on conventional bombing campaigns in the Pacific in over 30 years, but perhaps you are giving LeMay a little too much credit for the innovation. I think that earlier in the Pacific War, using the low-level tactics would have been well nigh impossible due to range restrictions on the availalble aircraft. The B-24, which was designed as a high altitude bomber and which was a notably difficult aircraft to fly had a range of 2100NM, the B-17's was about 1700. The medium, low altitiude bombers like the B25 came in around 1200NM or less. The B-29, with its 2800NM range, was the first aircraft to attack the Japanese "mainland" after the Doolittle raid and that did not happen until mid 1944 IIRC. The attack was staged from China.

Just to give you some distance references, Tokyo to Guam is about 1450 NM and Tokyo to Iwo Jima is about 700 NM.

Gian P Gentile
01-04-2008, 05:21 PM
WM:

I thought you would have jumped on my Catch 22-General Dreedle, Frank Zappa thing from a previous and recent post on this thread.

But back to LeMay the innovation was his in early 1945 shortly after he took command from Hawyood Hansell of the 21st Bomber Command based out of the Marianas. Hansell (and a great air power thinker and innovator in his own right) had pushed the method of daylight, high altitude precision bombing from from the Marianas but in Arnold's and other high ranking airmen's eyes did not produce results and effects against the Japanese. When LeMay took command in early January 1945 from Hansell he did innovate and substantially altered method by shifting to low level attacks by B29s using fire-bombs against Japanese cities. It is in this conext that i refer to LeMay as innovative.

gian

wm
01-04-2008, 06:07 PM
WM:

I thought you would have jumped on my Catch 22-General Dreedle, Frank Zappa thing from a previous and recent post on this thread.

But back to LeMay the innovation was his in early 1945 shortly after he took command from Hawyood Hansell of the 21st Bomber Command based out of the Marianas. Hansell (and a great air power thinker and innovator in his own right) had pushed the method of daylight, high altitude precision bombing from from the Marianas but in Arnold's and other high ranking airmen's eyes did not produce results and effects against the Japanese. When LeMay took command in early January 1945 from Hansell he did innovate and substantially altered method by shifting to low level attacks by B29s using fire-bombs against Japanese cities. It is in this conext that i refer to LeMay as innovative.

gian

Gian,

I passed on the Dreedle /Zappa commentary initially because I had a bad case of "deflicted eyes" from having an eskimo named Nanook rub some deadly yellow snow crystals into them. I was also sidetracked by a sudden desire to hear Captain Beefheart crooning on Zappa's Hot Rats song "Willy the Pimp."

We've agreed as to the oustanding quality of "Strangelove" in the movie genre. I submit that Catch-22 occupies a similar place in writing. Too bad that Mike Nichols and Buck Henry destroyed it in the screen version. However, casting Orson Wells as Dreedle was a good choice--the only other persons I might have chosen would have been Ernest Borgnine, based on his performance as General Worden in The Dirty Dozen or Carol O'Connor based on his performance as MG Colt in Kelly's Heroes.

selil
01-04-2008, 07:02 PM
This thread reminds me of the discussion I've had in classes: "What can we learn about homeland security from bad science fiction"?

1) The problem at hand was either created by a nuclear bomb or can be fixed by one.

2) You can always go faster if you yell at the engineers.

3) Only one pretty girl will survive (usually a blonde).

4) Tampering with nature will only end up bad.

5) Wait for the bad guy to monologue then attack.

Gian P Gentile
01-04-2008, 07:03 PM
Gian,

I passed on the Dreedle /Zappa commentary initially because I had a bad case of "deflicted eyes" from having an eskimo named Nanook rub some deadly yellow snow crystals into them. I was also sidetracked by a sudden desire to hear Captain Beefheart crooning on Zappa's Hot Rats song "Willy the Pimp."

We've agreed as to the oustanding quality of "Strangelove" in the movie genre. I submit that Catch-22 occupies a similar place in writing. Too bad that Mike Nichols and Buck Henry destroyed it in the screen version. However, casting Orson Wells as Dreedle was a good choice--the only other persons I might have chosen would have been Ernest Borgnine, based on his performance as General Worden in The Dirty Dozen or Carol O'Connor based on his performance as MG Colt in Kelly's Heroes.

WM:

The breadth and depth of your pop-cultural knowledge are indeed striking. How many of us "old" (with respectful deference of course to Ken White) Cold Warriors know who "Nanook of the north" is? When was the last time you had a urinalysis done?

Agree and defer to your knowledge on literary classics to which Catch 22 is certainly one of them.

too much fun

gian

Ken White
01-04-2008, 07:54 PM
What's a urinalysis? Is it something in FM 3-24 which I've only skimmed and don't propose to read? You guys keep inventing new stuff, hard for an old guy to keep up... :D

Ron Humphrey
01-04-2008, 08:09 PM
What's a urinalysis? Is it something in FM 3-24 which I've only skimmed and don't propose to read? You guys keep inventing new stuff, hard for an old guy to keep up... :D

We'll fill you in on all the details when you have the NEED TO KNOW:eek:

wm
01-04-2008, 08:55 PM
This thread reminds me of the discussion I've had in classes: "What can we learn about homeland security from bad science fiction"?

1) The problem at hand was either created by a nuclear bomb or can be fixed by one.

2) You can always go faster if you yell at the engineers.

3) Only one pretty girl will survive (usually a blonde).

4) Tampering with nature will only end up bad.

5) Wait for the bad guy to monologue then attack.

And don't forget, the always popular,

6) The new security guy in the red shirt is always the first to die. (Death is usually prounounced by Leonard "Bones" McCoy: "He's dead, Jim.")

wm
01-04-2008, 09:04 PM
WM:

How many of us "old" (with respectful deference of course to Ken White) Cold Warriors know who "Nanook of the north" is? When was the last time you had a urinalysis done?


Gian,

Actually, I had one right after finishing my pancake breakfast at Saint Alphonso's. I was concerned about social diseases after visiting Zappa's "200 Motels."

BTW, I thought that kind of test was a weekly mandatory for guys who had attended UC-Berkeley. :D

Norfolk
01-05-2008, 12:20 AM
Unfortunately, I tend to agree. I would, however, like to get one last opinion. The Germans had a field marshal during WWII by the name of Ferdinand Schörner. I am reasonably sure Schörner made his rank by virtue of the fact he was supposed to have been a Nazi stalwart, though I am not positive of that. He rose up in rank with much of the old guard of the Prussian general corps (he was born in 1892, making him a few years younger than some), so he probably wasn't incompetent, but I just wonder how good he really was. Despite his closeness with Hitler, the man ran his own show and on more than one occasion, defied the "great" general/politician/idiot/madman. With v. Manstein's departure, Schörner seemed to be the superstar of the Eastern Front (such as anyone could be in 1944-1945).

So... with that in mind, I wonder how good a general this guy really was. Any opinions... ?

Best wishes,
Fred.

Fred, what I know about Shoerner is scant, although he did have a terrible task to perform when he commanded German and Finnish Mountain troops on the Murmansk Front, and it is not clear that anyone could have done much better. I remember reading about German and Finnish operations on the Kola Pensinsula, and it is almost impossible to think of a worse place to have to fight - countless giant boulders blocking the passage of almost any vehicle without road-construction, which itself bordered on the impossible under the prevailing climatic conditions; no vegetation or natural cover aside from said boulders; inadequate clothing, shelter, and rations, and of course, inability to adapt to the conditions of life in a Polar region, until the Germans learned from the Finns how to wage Arctic Warfare; and finally, being at the wrong end of a grossly overlong supply "route", made Operational-level action effectively impossible. Even Tactical action was difficult in the extreme.

He and Rommel were competitors, and both were old Gebirgsjaegars; and both won the Pour le Merite in WWI. Schoerner must have had something truly exceptional about him to share in that very rare honour.

But it was under his command on the Eastern Front that the Battle of Targul Frumos was fought by German and Rumanian troops, and the actions of the GD in particular have been studied by NATO for decades now. Whether such studies focusing on Targul Frumos to the detriment of what else was going on on the Eastern Front in the months just before Operation Bagration are useful is admittedly arguable.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

As for great Air Force generals, Lord Dowding for his innovations in Strategic Air Defence (the "Dowding System"), and his performance leading up to and during the Battle of Britain.

wm
01-05-2008, 02:17 AM
Fred, what I know about Shoerner is scant, although he did have a terrible task to perform when he commanded German and Finnish Mountain troops on the Murmansk Front, and it is not clear that anyone could have done much better. I remember reading about German and Finnish operations on the Kola Pensinsula, and it is almost impossible to think of a worse place to have to fight - countless giant boulders blocking the passage of almost any vehicle without road-construction, which itself bordered on the impossible under the prevailing climatic conditions; no vegetation or natural cover aside from said boulders; inadequate clothing, shelter, and rations, and of course, inability to adapt to the conditions of life in a Polar region, until the Germans learned from the Finns how to wage Arctic Warfare; and finally, being at the wrong end of a grossly overlong supply "route", made Operational-level action effectively impossible. Even Tactical action was difficult in the extreme.

He and Rommel were competitors, and both were old Gebirgsjaegars; and both won the Pour le Merite in WWI. Schoerner must have had something truly exceptional about him to share in that very rare honour.

But it was under his command on the Eastern Front that the Battle of Targul Frumos was fought by German and Rumanian troops, and the actions of the GD in particular have been studied by NATO for decades now. Whether such studies focusing on Targul Frumos to the detriment of what else was going on on the Eastern Front in the months just before Operation Bagration are useful is admittedly arguable.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------



Shoerner commanded Army Group Center in the end days. I believe his failure to commit the AG reserves allowed the Russian to force a penetration south of Heinrici's Army Group Vistula at the Seelow Heights, which in turn force Heinrici to abandon a set of positions from which he had stopped Zhukov cold. Shoerner also had something to do with the Courland defense IIRC, but my memory is very sketchy here. I think he reached his Peter Principle level of comptence at the Regimental or division commander level in Finland. BTW, regarding Targul Frumos--having Hasso von Manteuffel as a division commander could probably have made even George McClellan or Ambrose Burnside look like an operational genius.
Regarding the Blue Max--from my read of Rommel's Infantry Attacks and other WWI German memoir materials, receiving that award would have no correlation with one's ability to perform well as a general officer. The German mountain troops had a "death-defying" aura or charisma about them similar to German aviators, the main winners of the medal. Perhaps that explains the medals more than anything else.

Gian P Gentile
01-05-2008, 02:33 AM
What's a urinalysis? Is it something in FM 3-24 which I've only skimmed and don't propose to read? You guys keep inventing new stuff, hard for an old guy to keep up... :D

Ken:

I heard a rumor ("in the air" hey WM how about that Night Ranger riff; Ken, that is a 80s rock group) that in an earlier draft of FM 3-24 (the one that Ralph Peters read and freaked-out about) there was a 10th Paradox that didnt make the final cut. Rumor has it that it read:

"[Grasshopper] Sometimes the more soup that you eat, the less likely you will come up hot on a urinalysis and the more secure you will be," or something to that effect. Dont really know the underlying meaning to it but i guess if i meditate on it for a while i can figure it out. I did go to UC Berkeley you know; "Not that there is anything wrong with that!"

Pun actually intended here.

gian

Norfolk
01-05-2008, 02:50 AM
BTW, regarding Targul Frumos--having Hasso von Manteuffel as a division commander could probably have made even George McClellan or Ambrose Burnside look like an operational genius.

At the very least, it is quite the Ace to have up one's sleeve. Not to mention having certain Formations of the quality of the GD...

Ken White
01-05-2008, 03:05 AM
work but what the heck. :D

All this time I thought being secure entailed firepower and a tight perimeter or rapid movement and battlefield agility...

Uh, well, meditating is okay and I know all you US-B folks are into it but I met a RAND analyst at a conference long ago who had an MS from there and she could meditate over more bourbon than most. Far more. As she said, her meditation enhancement potion of second choice avoided problems on tests.

(I didn't ask what the first choice was :wry: )

How, in the 80s with teenagers did I miss the Night Rangers? Though it took me years after those days to appreciate Dire Straits, come to think of it. I'll have to research that with my Music and Pop Culture Advisory Committee who have obviously let me down...

Gian P Gentile
01-05-2008, 04:07 AM
...All this time I thought being secure entailed firepower and a tight perimeter or rapid movement and battlefield agility...
How, in the 80s with teenagers did I miss the Night Rangers?

Agree about security although some would argue that you need to become one with the people and protect yourself less and that is how to become secure; you are an old knuckle-dragging fuddy-duddy if you think you need firepower and maneuver to secure yourself. AGAIN, PUN INTENDED HERE.

Dont worry about missing Night Ranger in the 80s. I had teenagers in the early years of the new millennium and i missed the Deftones.

gian

ps; Ken, it is actually Night Ranger (singular); I guess the old infantryman in you just wont die!!

Ken White
01-05-2008, 04:36 AM
Smart enough to know when people do not want and have no intention of allowing me to become one with them but willing to take advantage of their inherent politeness when offered? Check.

Follower of the 21st Marine Rule of Combat ("Be courteous to everyone, friendly to no one. Be polite. Be professional. But have a plan to kill everyone you meet")? Check.

Calluses on knuckles from dragging on ground? Check.

Re: the p.s. -- as Martha Stewart usedta say; "... and this is a good thing..." :D

Gian P Gentile
01-05-2008, 12:40 PM
Smart enough to know when people do not want and have no intention of allowing me to become one with them but willing to take advantage of their inherent politeness when offered? Check.

Follower of the 21st Marine Rule of Combat ("Be courteous to everyone, friendly to no one. Be polite. Be professional. But have a plan to kill everyone you meet")? Check.

Calluses on knuckles from dragging on ground? Check.

Re: the p.s. -- as Martha Stewart usedta say; "... and this is a good thing..." :D

Ken:

Right to all and thanks. As always, enjoyed the discussion with you.

v/r

gian

wm
01-06-2008, 02:52 AM
How, in the 80s with teenagers did I miss the Night Rangers? Though it took me years after those days to appreciate Dire Straits, come to think of it. I'll have to research that with my Music and Pop Culture Advisory Committee who have obviously let me down...

Ken,
Gian knows his Night Ranger 'cause he's a Bay Area boy. Night Ranger was a SF hard rock band with some national appeal. If you want to double dip on your early "Big 80s" nostalgia, you could watch the movie Sixteen Candles and hear Night Ranger's "Rumours in the Air" on the soundtrack.
(I hope you have strong control of your gag reflex--pardon the offense to any Molly Ringwald and Anthony Michael Hall fans out there) If I were you, I'd stick with Mark Knopfler and Dire Straits.

Ken White
01-06-2008, 04:40 AM
Ken,
Gian knows his Night Ranger 'cause he's a Bay Area boy. Night Ranger was a SF hard rock band with some national appeal. If you want to double dip on your early "Big 80s" nostalgia, you could watch the movie Sixteen Candles and hear Night Ranger's "Rumours in the Air" on the soundtrack.
(I hope you have strong control of your gag reflex--pardon the offense to any Molly Ringwald and Anthony Michael Hall fans out there) If I were you, I'd stick with Mark Knopfler and Dire Straits.

Pop Culture and Music Advisory Committee -- I do recall watching bits of Sixteen Candles back in the day, on TV. The PCMAC were too cheap to spend $$ on movies and thus monopolized the tube for their cinema...

Hmmm. That may be why I almost never watch TV. :D

Norfolk
01-06-2008, 05:35 PM
Well, if we're still in the eighties time warp here (admittedly a decade I rather preferred to the two since, and don't even get me started on the seventies:eek:), how 'bout the Greatest Generals of the 1980's?

For non-fictional generals, I propose Major-General Sir Julian Thompson for his leadership (as a Brigadier of course) of 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands. Especially after the loss of most of his helicopter lift, forcing his Brigade to campaign almost entirely on foot and in the midst of a rather difficult supply situation.

I'll leave the fictional ones to the Pop Culture Pros.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
01-08-2008, 06:27 PM
I'm going to break out some Duran Duran just for a dose of nostalgia.

I think Norfolk has a stumper category. :eek:

Gian P Gentile
01-08-2008, 07:08 PM
....how 'bout the Greatest Generals of the 1980's?

For non-fictional generals, I propose Major-General Sir Julian Thompson for his leadership (as a Brigadier of course) of 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands. Especially after the loss of most of his helicopter lift, forcing his Brigade to campaign almost entirely on foot and in the midst of a rather difficult supply situation.

I'll leave the fictional ones to the Pop Culture Pros.

I hadn't thought about generalship in the 80s; I like Norfolk's nomination of Thompson in the Falklands; tough fight requiring sound leaders. I also thought perhaps of the American General Don Staary for his role in the development of FM3-0, Airland Battle.

For pop-fictional generals of the 80s how about General Barnicke from the cult classic movie "Stripes?" I think he owes me money.

gg

Umar Al-Mokhtār
01-09-2008, 01:55 PM
That's a fact, Jack!

Then there's the unflappable General Jack Beringer from Wargames: "Flush the bombers, get the subs in launch mode. We are at DEFCON 1." :eek: