Plan B? Let’s Give Plan A Some Time First

[SWJED]

6 May NY Times commentary - Plan B? Let’s Give Plan A Some Time First (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/06/opinion/06kagan.html?_r=1&oref=slogin) by Frederick Kagan.


One of the most common criticisms of the current “surge” in Iraq is that its proponents have not developed a Plan B in case it fails. The skeptics liken this lack of a backup strategy to the Bush administration’s failure to plan for various contingencies after the initial invasion in 2003; they see a continuity of errors between previous strategies in Iraq and the new one.

In fact, the debate shows only how little the critics of the war understand about military operations. As one of the initial proponents of the surge, I argue that there is no Plan B because there cannot be one. The idea that there can be a single alternative strategy, developed now, just at the beginning of the surge, is antithetical to the dynamic nature of war. At this early stage, there are only possible general responses to various contingencies, which will become more focused as operations move forward.

The strategy now under way in Iraq — we are providing an increased number of American forces, working closely with Iraqi troops, to establish and maintain security in Baghdad as a precondition for political, economic and social progress — will change the situation in Iraq significantly, whether or not it succeeds in its aims.

In fact, it has already done so, and for the better: the rebel Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr has apparently fled to Iran; American and Iraqi forces have killed or captured more than 700 key leaders and allies of his Mahdi Army, causing the movement to fragment; sectarian killings in Baghdad in April were about one-third of the level in December.

There have been gains outside the capital as well...

[Dr Jack]

From the Sunday talk shows:

http://blog.washingtonpost.com/the-talk/2007/05/may_6_gop_could_seek_plan_b_on.html?hpid=topnews



May 6: GOP could seek "Plan B" on Iraq in Sept.

The leader of House Republicans said today that his members would begin to seek another strategy in Iraq in September, should President Bush's troop "surge" strategy clearly not be working by then. But he pledged that his caucus would stand firm against any Democratic timetable or benchmarks that mandate the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

"We don't even have all of the 30,000 additional troops in Iraq yet. And so we're supporting the president. ... By the time we get to September, October, members are going to want to know how well this is working, and if it isn't,what's Plan B," Minority Leader John Boehner (Ohio) said on "Fox News Sunday."

[SWJED]

19 January SWJ post by Dave Kilcullen - Don't confuse the "Surge" with the Strategy (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/01/dont-confuse-the-surge-with-th/).


Much discussion of the new Iraq strategy centers on the “surge” to increase forces in-theater by 21,500 troops. I offer no comment on administration policy here. But as counterinsurgency professionals, it should be clear to us that focusing on the “surge” misses what is actually new in the strategy – its population-centric approach...

[tequila]

In fact, the debate shows only how little the critics of the war understand about military operations. As one of the initial proponents of the surge, I argue that there is no Plan B because there cannot be one. The idea that there can be a single alternative strategy, developed now, just at the beginning of the surge, is antithetical to the dynamic nature of war. At this early stage, there are only possible general responses to various contingencies, which will become more focused as operations move forward.


Excuse me? So I suppose one can never plan alternative options because your original plan will so irredeemably change the situation? Has Mr. Kagan ever planned anything in his entire life?

[Tom Odom]

Has Mr. Kagan ever planned anything in his entire life?

that would be, assumetric planning. You know, the kind that makes an ass of u and me...

Tom

[SWJED]

11 May Real Clear Politics / Roll Call commentary - Plan B For Iraq: Winning Dirty (http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/05/plan_b_for_iraq_winning_dirty.html) by Mort Kondracke.


Without prejudging whether President Bush's "surge" policy will work, the administration and its critics ought to be seriously thinking about a Plan B, the "80 percent solution" - also known as "winning dirty." Right now, the administration is committed to building a unified, reconciled, multisectarian Iraq - "winning clean." Most Democrats say that's what they want, too. But it may not be possible.

The 80 percent alternative involves accepting rule by Shiites and Kurds, allowing them to violently suppress Sunni resistance and making sure that Shiites friendly to the United States emerge victorious.

No one has publicly advocated this Plan B, and I know of only one Member of Congress who backs it - and he wants to stay anonymous. But he argues persuasively that it's the best alternative available if Bush's surge fails. Winning will be dirty because it will allow the Shiite-dominated Iraqi military and some Shiite militias to decimate the Sunni insurgency. There likely will be ethnic cleansing, atrocities against civilians and massive refugee flows...

[Stu-6]

Is the “surge” really plan A. Four years on we finally get a plan? That maybe part of the problem right there.

If we had started this thing with a well thought out plan, with multiple contingency plans for when thing didn’t go according to the plan (as always happens in war) then, just maybe, we wouldn’t be where we are today. I agree it is a bit early to judge the surge (though I have little faith in it) but to not be considering contingency options seems like the same kind of foolishness that got us here in the first place.

[GPaulus]

19 January SWJ post by Dave Kilcullen - Don't confuse the "Surge" with the Strategy (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/01/dont-confuse-the-surge-with-th/).
The new Iraq strategy centers on the “surge” to increase forces in-theater by 21,500 troops and some would argue that the “surge” misses what is actually new in the strategy – its population-centric approach. Unfortunately, I contend that the Surge continues to focus on an enemy- centric approach (searching out and destroying the enemy) but that strategy never works-- as such it will show little hope of success. History has shown insurgencies cannot be defeated by force alone because they inherently have local ties, promote a local distrust of outsider motives, and carry a level of popular support that is nearly impossible to completely win over.

A government and population-centric approach is necessary to establish peace. In July, I have been asked to present a strategy to "Create a Sustainable Iraq" to an international conference at the University of Massachusetts. In my strategy, is a plan to Create a Cause to Live For that is greater than the Insurgents' preceived Cause to Die For. This paper provides key steps necessary to establish peace and create a sustainable Iraq. It is based on the belief that human behavior is motivated by self-interest; that democracy cannot take root unless the basic human needs are provided; and that nations from around the world will openly participate to stop the violence and social decline. Working through the government of Iraq, the plan offers a strategy to increase employment, revitalize the economy, reduce the insurgency, and to provide regional stability.

The intent is to energize the working economy in Iraq and in doing so restore peace to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which freedom and democracy can take hold. This plan is based on the simple and workable concept — put people to work rebuilding their own neighborhoods, cities and country; provide them an opportunity to support their families; rally them toward a vision for a better future and you will divert energy away from self-destructive behaviors. In essence, the plan provides the people of Iraq with “A Cause to Live For”.

It is clear that we need only look to history for examples of how government work programs and reconstruction encampments mitigated social decline. After WWII, Germany hired millions of men to rebuild their nation on loans from other countries. In United States history, when economic engines had stalled during the great depression, President Roosevelt created the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and the Worker Progress Administration (WPA). The philosophy is to put the unemployed back to work in jobs that would serve the public good and improve the skills and the self-esteem of workers. Simply stated, we must borrow these chapters in history to create the conditions for peace in Iraq.

The plan is based on meeting basic needs for food, water, shelter, security, and income: jobs first and quality of life second, followed by self-confidence, esteem, freedom, and justice on the path to democracy. Aristotle said, “Poverty is the father of Crime, Revolution and Corruption” and it is clear that the cities in Iraq are no stranger to poverty. “The most striking thing in Iraq is the extreme poverty. I’ve been to the Philippines and saw poverty. But at least they could eat. Here there is sewage and trash on the ground. Shepherds take their sheep to eat from the trash.”

It must be financed, implemented and managed by Iraqis for Iraqis. The new government in Iraq must take the leading role and they must articulate and deliver an Iraqi Initiative for peace, economic recovery and hope. Government legitimacy comes with the first payday paid to the Iraqi workers--population-centric--winning the hearts and minds while organizing society toward a unifying, tangible vision based on government action and not rhetoric. Within this plan are powerful principles of government leadership, economic self-help, ethnic and regional cooperation, technical training, education and jobs which are all fundamental to rebuilding Iraq today.

The result of this plan will be a revitalization of Iraqi agriculture, utilities, energy infrastructure, roads, governance, communities and industrial capability. In the end, thousands of development projects will take place to help create jobs, stimulate economic growth...rebuild infrastructure…promote trade...restore peace and create a sustainable Iraq.

The plan provides an opportunity for the Iraqi people to volunteer for a one-year commitment, with compensation, to be enrolled and to live on employment camps within their tribal area. An incentive of two months wages will be paid to individuals, upon enrollment on the camp. Living on the camp is a key counterinsurgency strategy to take enrollees out of their usual surroundings, and negative distractions, provide income producing jobs, develop trust in government, offer on-camp academic and skills training, and push cash into the local economy via the "velocity of money." The camps will be expanded or contracted in size depending on the reconstruction work in the local area. Camps clusters will be established on an "Ink" Blot basis. Each camp will serve a highly localized area, in other words, workers will perform work near their own communities, usually within 10 km of the camp. Enrollees will perform many different jobs, from the most basic to skilled duties, and tasks; and at the same time will receive pay, training and education. On-camp education and training will be used to prepare men for future jobs. This group of Iraq citizens will enter this government employment program on a purely voluntary basis and they will rebuild local communities in Iraq brick by brick, and block by block. The world will see the Broken Window Theory at work.

The camps will provide Iraqi men billeting, food and water, work uniforms, training, and localized reconstruction projects while providing the communities hope. It is a core goal of the program to assist these young men, so that by the end of their commitment, they are prepared and have found private sector employment.

The military role "surge" and Iraq security forces will continue to be security, stability and overwatch for the communities, the camps and the workers. U.S. and Iraqi military and security forces must continue to focus on establishing a safe and secure environment under the rule of law, stability and area security for the Iraqi people. They must continue to attack and destroy insurgents and they must provide a stable security platform for democracy to take hold. Furthermore, it must be clear that insurgents, political parties, or other groups whose aim is to perpetuate human misery in order to profit politically or otherwise will encounter violent and decisive actions from coalition military forces.

Iraq will pay for the program with foreign exchange credits of oil nondeliverable today but sold as oil futures in the ground to all participating countries. The creation of jobs is a government to the people program implemented and financed by Iraqis for Iraqis. It cannot be over emphasized that the program cannot be American run or contractor run or private sector managed, or it will not work. This plan is about building trust, confidence and legitmacy in the new government of Iraq.

[SWJED]

I contend that the "surge" is but one tool (tactic) in a new population-centric strategy. Unfortunately, the new strategy was introduced late in the game and after several years of either living in denial that an insurgency even existed and, once acknowledged, adopting the enemy-centric approach to COIN. Also in the minus column is the time factor – our domestic political situation is pointing to a September “blow-up” that may seal the fate of the surge tactic. Still, in order for a population-centric approach to COIN to succeed there has to be at least a semblance of security for the population and other non-military actors. Using the old maxim that COIN is 80% political and 20% military – the surge is part of the 20% that is intended to enable the 80% to begin in earnest.

Initiatives such as the one you posit – and there are many good and well-meaning proposals out there – do not even have a fighting chance until there is some degree of normalcy and security in Iraq. Moreover, successful execution of any COIN strategy will take years, not months. The surge is but the pointy-end beginning and should not be scrapped simply because it is misinterpreted as a long-term strategy.

Moreover, any strategy that is dependant on the Iraqi government for success has a long and difficult road ahead. The national government seems to be “broke” and this may force us into a bottom-up approach to transforming Iraq into a stable and responsible state. I have always been a proponent of a bottom-up approach but that is not how our elements of national power seem to like to do business. The early tactics of the surge will most likely serve as the first step in that bottom-up approach. Please see Bing West’s latest SWJ trip report (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/05/iraq-trip-report-2-29-april-20/) and blog articles at Westhawk (http://westhawk.blogspot.com/2007/05/bing-west-and-bottom-up-approach.html) and The Belmont Club (http://fallbackbelmont.blogspot.com/2007/05/ear-to-ground.html) for more on this.

[SWJED]

15 May Washington Post commentary - Running Out of Time in Iraq (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/14/AR2007051401215.html) by David Ignatius.


... With a September deadline looming for U.S. commanders to report on the progress of the surge of U.S. troops into Baghdad, the core issue remains the need for a political reconciliation between the country's warring sects. The difficulty of achieving that goal was on display here last weekend during a visit by Adm. William Fallon, who, as head of U.S. Central Command, has overall responsibility for the war.

The top Shiite and Sunni leaders each insisted that the other side is to blame for the violence that torments the country. Each demanded that the other side make the first concessions. Each voiced support for the surge of American troops while at the same time complaining that his own neighborhoods aren't much safer...

[SWJED]

15 May Wall Street Journal commentary - Surging Ahead in Iraq (http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110010077) by Max Boot.


There is a serious and widening disconnect between the timetables that commanders are using to guide their actions in Iraq and those being demanded by politicians in Washington. Gen. David Petraeus and Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, the senior U.S. commanders in Iraq, are quite properly planning for the troop "surge" to extend well into next year. That's why the Pentagon has alerted 10 combat brigades with some 40,000 soldiers to get ready to deploy in August. They will be needed to replace troops rotating home.

Back home, however, politicians are demanding results in the next few months--or else. And not just Democrats. House Minority Leader John Boehner has said that if they don't see progress by the fall, even House Republicans will start demanding a Plan B for Iraq, which would presumably involve pulling troops out, not sending more. That message was reinforced by the group of 11 House Republicans who visited the White House last week...

[SWJED]

18 May Washington Times commentary - Petraeus and PC-policy-making (http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20070517-100742-5372r.htm) by Dinah West.


"This fight depends on securing the population, which must understand that we — not our enemies — occupy the moral high ground."

—Gen. David Petraeus, May 10

Oh, they must, must they?

With his single sentence, Gen. David Petraeus reveals what's wrong with our Iraq policy. Success depends not on our own actions, but on a politically correct expectation of how Iraqis will react to those actions. It seems that victory depends on something over which we have no control — the point of view and behavior of people in Iraq.

Consider the "surge." Even if our troops achieve the goal of "securing the population" by securing Baghdad, success still rides on subsequent Iraqi behavior: whether murderously competing Iraqi sects decide to come together and sing "Kumbayah" — what you might call a big "whether."

Somehow, I'm practically alone among conservatives in believing this to be a dangerously ill-conceived policy (Surrender-crats aren't worth discussing here), and I think I know why. The Iraq policy itself is an outgrowth of another dangerously ill-conceived policy of our leaders to avoid any rational assessment of the Islamic culture that informs the point of view and behavior of people across the Fertile Crescent in the first place...

[marct]

There's a quote running in the back of my mind after reading this "article":

“It is as useless to argue with those who have abandoned the use of reason as it is to administer medicine to the dead.”
Thomas Paine, Common Sense.
Marc

[Tom Odom]

Marc

the commentator would again be one of those pigs with a wristwatch...

Tom

[Stu-6]

While completely ignorant on the subject of counter-insurgency, and pretty much everything else, Diana West almost stumbled upon a gem in that steaming pile: what if they just don’t want us or what we are selling? Now Ms West doesn’t come right out and say that or have any idea of what to do about that (except some idiotic notion of being less PC) but we maybe there. Frankly I think it probably has less to do with being “infidels” and more to do with good old fashion you don’t belong here, but it doesn’t matter why. The fact of the matter is they may just not want us there . . . and then what?

[Tom Odom]

While completely ignorant on the subject of counter-insurgency, and pretty much everything else, Diana West almost stumbled upon a gem in that steaming pile: what if they just don’t want us or what we are selling? Now Ms West doesn’t come right out and say that or have any idea of what to do about that (except some idiotic notion of being less PC) but we maybe there. Frankly I think it probably has less to do with being “infidels” and more to do with good old fashion you don’t belong here, but it doesn’t matter why. The fact of the matter is they may just not want us there . . . and then what?

Slap,

That in a nutshell is why we did not do this in 1991.

Best
Tom

[slapout9]

Slap,

That in a nutshell is why we did not do this in 1991.

Best
Tom
OK Tom I give up. I haven"t even posted on this thread. :confused:

[Tom Odom]

OK Tom I give up. I haven"t even posted on this thread. :confused:
Slap,


Mea Culpa, Mate.:eek:

I should have said "Stu"

Tom:

[slapout9]

Hi Tom, that Mea Culpa guy gets around a lot.

[Tom Odom]

Yep me and Culpa like to hang out together, don't you know?:)

[Stu-6]

Slap, Stu, Whatever, as my old squad leader use to say “I get paid the same no matter what”. Seriously though your point about ’91 reminds me of what Col. Hackworth use to say about C.R.S. Can’t Remember ####

[SWJED]

20 May Washington Post commentary - An Army Against the Clock (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/18/AR2007051802159.html) by David Ignatius.


America set a long clock ticking when it decided to spend $300 million to rebuild the sprawling military base here as a logistical center for the new Iraqi army. This was to be the soldier's version of nation-building -- maintenance depots, orderly barracks and professional schools for Iraqi officers and NCOs.

But the political clock in Washington is running on a different speed. Congress is impatient with the slow work of building a modern army -- especially in a country where sectarian violence is destroying any semblance of normal life outside the confines of well-guarded compounds such as this one...

This U.S. training mission in Iraq was the heart of the Baker-Hamilton report's recommendation last December. And it still seems to me the right way forward. American troops cannot stop a civil war in Iraq, but they can teach soldiers how to fix drive shafts, maintain engines and order spare parts. That's a basic mission that Congress should reaffirm, even as it questions the surge of more U.S. troops into Baghdad. Time is the strategic resource now; Congress and the administration need to agree on ways to add some minutes to the clock.

[SWJED]

27 May Washington Post - White House Considers Next Steps in Iraq (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/26/AR2007052601027.html) by Michael Abramowitz and Peter Baker.


President Bush and his top aides have signaled in recent days that they are beginning to look more closely at a "post-surge" strategy that would involve a smaller U.S. troop presence in Iraq and a mission focused on fighting al-Qaeda and training the Iraqi army.

Even as the final installment of the nearly 30,000 additional U.S. troops has yet to arrive in Iraq, the officials are talking publicly and privately about how U.S. strategy might change if the additional forces are able to stem sectarian violence in Baghdad.

"I would like to see us in a different configuration at some point in time in Iraq," Bush said at a news conference Thursday. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Peter Pace offered similar comments that day, telling reporters that military leaders would be reviewing a new approach as they await a September report by Gen. David H. Petraeus on the progress made by the additional troops...

[SWJED]

31 May Washington Post commentary - Time for 'Plan B-H' in Iraq? (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/30/AR2007053002020.html) By David Ignatius.


President Bush said publicly last Thursday what his top aides have been discussing privately for weeks. He talked about a transition to "a different configuration" in Iraq after the surge of U.S. troops is completed this summer. When pressed on whether he was talking about a post-surge Plan B, Bush answered: "Actually, I would call that a plan recommended by Baker-Hamilton, so that would be a Plan B-H."

Let's make sure we've got that right: This would be the same Baker-Hamilton plan whose authors were lampooned by the conservative New York Post in December as "surrender monkeys"? The same Baker-Hamilton report that seemed to be all but buried by Bush's January embrace of a surge of 30,000 U.S. troops into Iraq?

Yes, that same Baker-Hamilton plan now seems to be official White House policy. Administration officials insist that the president supported it all along, though you could have fooled me. Now it's back -- six months later than it should have been, with six extra months of political poison to corrode its bipartisan spirit. But better late than never...

[Abu Buckwheat]

I'd like to contribute to this discussion ... As far as I can tell Plan "A" started in March 2003 ... we have had very similar force levels in Iraq since that time, approx 150,000 men. We plussed up in Late 2004 to defend the elections, then rotated troops out without replacements and went down to 130,000 ... now in Jan 2007 we go back to the 2004-2005 force figures but with a stronger, smarter and more skilled threat force. So in essence we are calling everything we have been doing since OEF-1 ended ... what? Plan Zeta?

This is not Plan "A" ... the surge is a one in a long series of quarterly chances to let MNF commanders do something to stop the AIF daily combat increases and sectarian violence ... to let General Petraeus have a chance at stabilizing Baghdad and key areas according to his plan. To do that he needed troops back at the previous force level at a minimum. In fact, he needs 50,000 more, and when that news hits the public response will be awesome... and not in a good way.

There has to be an alternate plan. Especially an active strategy which can stop the growing "Hizballah-ization" of the Mahdi Militia and use of the Iraqi Army to secure/confront them in the south. Thus far Plan A only does what we've been doing for four years ... in a cleverly focused way... we'd better have a Plan B (for the third Mahdi Army uprising), a Plan C (full Iranian resupply to said Militia) and a Plan D (MM and AIFs join forces to push us out in a combined March 2004-like uprising).

Here is the problem right here ... Denial from Policy makers ... "It's bad policy to speculate on what you'll do if a plan fails when you're trying to make a plan work."- Condoleezza Rice, 11 Jan 2007 :rolleyes:

[SWJED]

31 May Wall Street Journal - Can the Iraq 'Surge' Be Salvaged? (http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB118056694765119209-_Ob9W9Zuak9ratIbzw_LYtyIiVE_20070630.html?mod=tff_ main_tff_top) by Greg Jaffe (SWC member) and Yochi Dreazen.


When the Bush administration decided to send tens of thousands of additional troops to Iraq, the strategy rested on an unspoken trade-off: U.S. troops would risk greater casualties to tamp down violence and buy the Baghdad government time to make the political compromises needed to reconcile the country's warring factions.

But a resurgence of sectarian violence and attacks on U.S. troops, coupled with little to no progress on crucial Iraqi political goals, is already spurring discussion about whether the current strategy can succeed.

In the near term, senior American military officials in Baghdad are wrestling with how to increase the effectiveness of the "surge" strategy between now and September, when Gen. David Petraeus, the top commander in Iraq, is supposed to give Washington a progress report. U.S. officials here and in Baghdad are also waging a parallel debate over how long the "surge" should last -- and whether the U.S. needs to begin planning for an alternative approach that would scale back both U.S. troop levels and American ambitions in Iraq...

Much more at the link.

[jcustis]

Looks like a coordinated review (maybe led by a new war czar) is in order to determine if the terms of "victory" remain what they were 1, 6, or 12 months ago.

[SWJED]

4 June NY Times - Commanders Say Push in Baghdad Is Short of Goal (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/world/middleeast/04surge.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin) by David Cloud and Damien Cave.


Three months after the start of the Baghdad security plan that has added thousands of American and Iraqi troops to the capital, they control fewer than one-third of the city’s neighborhoods, far short of the initial goal for the operation, according to some commanders and an internal military assessment.

The American assessment, completed in late May, found that American and Iraqi forces were able to “protect the population” and “maintain physical influence over” only 146 of the 457 Baghdad neighborhoods.

In the remaining 311 neighborhoods, troops have either not begun operations aimed at rooting out insurgents or still face “resistance,” according to the one-page assessment, which was provided to The New York Times and summarized reports from brigade and battalion commanders in Baghdad...

[Strategic LT]

I have read the threads on the troop surge and how it is not the strategy, but only part of the bigger strategy of engaging the population. With KIA per day averaging 3.52, which is the highest it has been since the beginning of the war according to icasualties.org, I have to ask this question. Is the surge really helping us reach the goal of engaging the population? I think one could argue that there has been successes in Anbar and Baghdad which is great news, however it appears that all that what we have essentially done is push the enemy into a different area. With the recent presidential debates it is obvious to me that the enemy has succeeded in breaking the American with most of the candidates (our elected representatives) speaking out against the war. I don't know....Just lost another friend the other day and it has got me thinking. Please enlighten me. I would like to hear some professional opinions on how affective we are right now in Iraq. If not what do we (both strategically and at the unit level) need to do differentially. Thanks

[FascistLibertarian]

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/05/plan-b-in-iraq/
Plan B in Iraq
Beyond the Surge: Keeping the Military Relevant in an Asymmetric World
Fernando Martinez Luján


The Surge: Mission Impossible?

While public opinion is still radically divided regarding the ongoing plan to “surge” 21,500 additional American troops into Iraq, there can be little argument that the next 12 months will be decisive to America’s future. Despite attempts by the administration to portray the new plan as only one option out of many remaining, most media outlets are now describing the troop increase as a “last chance” for American and Iraqi forces to “secure the country.” As a result, insurgents and death squads can win by not losing. They understand that in a war that is being fought largely in the news, any major attack conducted during the surge discredits the US and helps mark this “last chance” as a failure. Even if the attacks occur in less defended areas outside of Baghdad and Anbar—away from where the surge is targeted—the insurgents know that the resulting 10-second news sound bites will make no distinction.

[Stu-6]

I think it is a bit early to determine if the surge is really working, stabilizing a mess like Iraq will take time (20 years?). This being said I’ve always seen the idea of a stable democratic Iraq as unlikely surge or no surge.

[SteveMetz]

At 10 AM EST. Should be webcast (http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/index.asp?subnav=close).

Witnesses are Tony Cordesman, Fred Kagan, and MG Batiste.

[SteveMetz]

(I seem to get about an equal amount of email from Tony and from Nigerians wanting to help make me rich. In other words, a LOT).

Iraq: Is Escalation Working”

Anthony H. Cordesman

Mr. Chairman, let me begin by thanking you, the ranking member, and the Committee for the opportunity to testify today. I have prepared a formal review of the Department of Defense’s latest report on the surge and overall progress in Iraq to date, and I request that it be included in the record.

More broadly, there are many elements of the current US campaign in Iraq that are impressive. The US military has steadily shifted from a force oriented towards conventional war to one that can also fight counterinsurgency campaigns. It has greatly improved its tactical, intelligence, and targeting skills to attacked dispersed networks of insurgents like the Sunni Islamist extremists that include Al Qa’ida’s various affiliates. It has shown it can win tactical battles with a surprisingly low ratio of forces to opponents.

Yet, it is all too clear that the US, its Coalition allies, and the Iraqi government cannot win any form of security and stability if insurgent movements can keep large areas of Iraq unstable and constantly provoke Iraq’s civil conflicts. Tactical success is an important element of victory.

Tactical Victory or Stretching Too Thin and a New Form of “Whack a Mole?”

The present campaign in Iraq may be a tactical success, but there are serious serious issues regarding its strategic value. One key problem was raised during the debate over the surge strategy before President Bush adopted it and announced it in January 2007. It was always clear that an operation in Baghdad would simply lead many insurgents to leave the city and operate elsewhere and that most Sunni militias might simply stand down, let the US-led forces defeat the insurgents, watch a Shi’ite dominated government gain power, and resurface once the US was gone. Baghdad was important. It never made sense to see it as a decisive battlefield or center of gravity.

This is now all too clear even in a narrow military sense. The US is having to expand its counterinsurgency operations broadly outside Baghdad in ways that can steadily disperse limited US and combat-capable Iraqi military forces. Baghdad is still only 30-40% secured, but the fighting not only is dispersing limited US forces into the Baghdad ring cities, but into a troubled zone of provinces ranging from Anbar to Diyala. The US has learned it cannot ignore growing Shi’ite tensions and Iranian pressure in the south, and still faces serious potential problems with Arab-Kurdish tensions in the north.

(cont'd next post)

[SteveMetz]

It is too early to judge what is happening in Baquba, and the use of far more intense combat tactics coupled to broader efforts to seal and secure urban areas after tactical victories may have a more lasting effect. There is, however, an obvious risk that the US will simply end up playing “Whack a mole” on a steadily rising scale.

So far, the claims of success have often been tenuous to meaningless. As of June 23rd, MNF-I claimed that, “at least 55 al-Qa’ida operatives have been killed, 23 have been detained, 16 weapons caches have been discovered, 28 improvised explosive devices have been destroyed and 12 booby-trapped structures have been destroyed.” These figures are far too low to matter.

Limited tactical successes really dosn’t matter unless such casualties include substantial cadres of leaders and experts that cannot be easily and rapidly replaced. The insurgents can simply disperse, stand down, and regroup. The domestic political realities in the US also make it clear that unless the US is successfully taking out cadres and structure, the US is now so sensitive to US casualties that tactical victories can be the same kind of political and strategic defeat that occurred in Vietnam.

This risk is all too clear from the recent statements of Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the second-ranking American commander in Iraq. If, as the general said on June 22nd, some 80 percent of the top Qa'ida leaders in the city fled before the American-led offensive began, it is not clear that it matters if “80 percent” of the recruits who were there when the offensive remained in the western half of the city. It also is pointless to call the leaders and cadres who leave “cowards.” Iraqis are not foolish and they understand that such actions are an inevitable insurgent reaction to US military superiority and a key element of asymmetric warfare.

Not only have such estimates of “stay behinds” been badly exaggerated in past fighting, along with the capacity to keep them from infiltrating out or hiding, it is all too easy to move on to the next area and city and recruit more, and exploit the hostility following urban combat operations and large-scale detainments. Moreover, no major US-led or Iraqi operation will ever take place without enough signs, leaks, and infiltration to provide leaders and cadres with advanced warning.

The Critical Importance of Political Conciliation

The tactical problem, and stretching a limited pool of US forces too thin, is also only part of the problem. As both General Petraeus and Secretary Gates have made clear, none of this matters unless the Iraqis can move towards political conciliation – or at least a relatively stable form of coexistence. So far, there is only a limited promise of potential legal action by the government.

If anything, the use of Sunni tribes in the West has created new forms of Sunni vs. Shi’ite polarization, Shi’ite on Shi’ite fighting and feuding has gotten much worse in the south and central government, and the uncertainties over oil and a regional referendum on federalism in the north are increasing Kurdish, Arab, and Turcoman tensions.

Creating an Effective Bridge between Tactical Victory and Lasting Strategic Impact

There also is the problem of creating an effective bridge between tactical victory and lasting strategic impact even if political conciliation does move forward, and so far the Coalition has been virtually silent on progress in Baghdad, much less how such progress can be made in the new fighting outside it. Giving tactical victories lasting meaning requires the following additional elements:

1. Iraqi Army forces must begin to take over meaning operations without US embeds and US partner units, and dependence on US reinforcement and support. There does seem to be increasing Iraqi Army capability here, but Coalition reporting does not provide a meaningful picture of progress – merely grossly inflated figures on areas of responsibility and total numbers of battalions in the lead.

2. Iraqi police and local security forces must establishing a lasting security presence in the areas where tactical victories are won, and do so credibly in ways that give ordinary Iraqis security. There can be no “win” without “hold.” So far, the US has made claim after claim to have secured cities after winning tactical battles to control them, and has never actually established lasting security in even one of them. The most critical problem has been the lack of active, combat-capable police, without corruption and sectarian and ethnic ties. Falluja and Samara are only the most obvious cases of such failures.

Coalition reporting so far talks about the number of police posts established or with US embeds. It has not said a word about the ability provide lasting security using Iraqi police in parts of Baghdad or anywhere else. It also has not talked about the ability to support police efforts with an effective local criminal justice and court system or to screen detainees in ways that do not breed local hostility.

The Coalition also needs to start talking about who actually does provide local security, and stop treating militias, local security forces, and police hired locally without Coalition training, as if it was always hostile or did not exist. In the real world, these forces and not the “trained and equipped” police are the real local security force in most of Iraq. There has to be a credible plan to use, absorb, or contain them.

[SteveMetz]

3. The Iraqi government must follow-up security with a meaningful presence and by providing steady improvements in services. “Winning hearts and minds” doesn’t come from public information campaigns and propaganda. It comes from providing real security for ordinary Iraqis, and showing the government cares, is present, and can steadily improve services. Once again, promise after promise has been made in past campaigns, and the central government has not yet shown it can follow up in even a single case. If this is happening even in the “secured” areas of Baghdad, no one has yet said so. How it can happen in Diyala or other high threat areas is even unclear.

4. There must also be effective local government. The liberation of various areas often has seen the emergence of local leaders willing to work with the Coalition – although often with little faith in, or ties to, the central government. In most cases, however, they have become targets, and the effort has broken down in local faction disputes or because of a lack of effective government support and problems in Coalition civil affairs efforts. Once again, if there is progress in creating stable, survivable, effective local government; none of the details are clear.

5. There has to be economic aid and progress. Iraqis have to give priority to physical security and key services, but unemployment , underemployment, and shut or failed businesses affect some 60% or more of Iraqis nationally and the figures are even higher in high threat and combat areas. The strategy President Bush advanced in January 2007 advanced proposals for accomplishing such an effort in Baghdad. Once again, there has been no meaningful Coalition reporting on broad progress in such efforts in the secured areas of Baghdad, and past promises such aid would be provided in “liberated” cities like Samara and Falluja were not kept.

6. There must be an end to sectarian and ethnic cleansing and displacement. There is no near and perhaps midterm answer to suicide bombings and atrocities, to attacks on sacred shrines and critical facilities. No mix of security forces can stop even small cadres of extremists from occasional successes. No tactical victory has meaning, however, unless Iraqis can be secure in neighborhoods and areas where they are in the minority, and can reach across ethnic and sectarian lines and barriers in ordinary life.

One of the greatest single failures of the current approach to fighting in Iraq is that it does not track sectarian and ethnic separation and displacement and make ending this on a local and national level at least as important as halting major attacks and killings. It may take years to make Iraqis secure from Islamist extremists and the worst elements of Shi’ite gangs and militias. There can be no meaningful tactical success, however, unless Iraqis can be safe from their own neighbors and begin to lead ordinary lives in their own neighborhoods.

Metrics, Benchmarks, and Real Victory

The late Colonel Harry Sommers summed up the US defeat in Vietnam in a brief exchange he had with a North Vietnamese officer after the war. Sommers pointed out that the US had won virtually every tactical encounter with both the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces. The Vietnamese officer replied, “Yes, but this was irrelevant.”

The new US Army manual on counterinsurgency, which is the result of an effort led by General Petraeus recognizes this reality, and virtually all of the points made above. It also m ay well be unfair to judge progress in Baghdad even in September, much less now. Historically, any campaign that has had to begin with as weak a foundation as the surge strategy began with took at least a year to seriously take hold and often several years. An Iraq in political turmoil, in local economic collapse, and without security even for senior officials and members of parliament, will not move quickly – especially in a Baghdad summer.

The fact remains, however, that tactical success will remain largely meaningless in Baghdad, Baquba, the other areas cover by Operation Ripper, and in Iraq as a whole unless it can be linked to political conciliation and progress in the other six critical elements of victory listed above. The US team in Iraq and Bush Administration need to show the American people and the Congress that they understand this, are acting on the basis of these realities, have sound plans, and are making real progress. “Spinning” the importance of tactical success does not do this.

At the same time, both the media and outside analysts need to focus far more on the full range of actions it takes to win, and do so with patience and objectivity. No strategy or campaign could possibly achieve significant success in all of these elements by this fall, or even ensure a successful start. It is reasonable to demand credible plans and transparent and meaningful reporting – something that the Administration has not yet provided in a single critical area.

It is not reasonable to demand instant progress or focus solely on the level of US troops in Iraq or casualties in the fighting. It should also be clear from the above list that US military tactical victories are almost certain to be meaningless if the US political system cannot adapt to the reality that broad success – albeit with what may be much lower US troop levels – will require an effort that extends at least several years in to the next Administration and which cannot take place without bipartisan support. The odds are bad enough given the problems in Iraq; they are hopeless if the political environment in the US offers no hope of the necessary time and bipartisanship.

[goesh]

We civilians don't know how much in-house disagreement there is within our defense forces over Iraq and war in general against insurgents and militants. I think it is a well kept secret. The general Public sense of it is one of assumed unanamity. Yet on the other hand, if Americans spend 15 billion a year on cosmetic procedures and potions: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19445564/site/newsweek/page/2/
perhaps the appearance of progress and everyone being on the same page is all we need for the time being. I don't see these hearing addressing in any substantive way the issues and problems of in-house turf wars and bickering and philosophical differences and how this impacts our strategic well being and real-time, in-the-field progress in Iraq and Afghanistan. Heroic warriors can become handy scapegoats about as fast as you can say "botox" you know. My sense is that the COIN camp is somewhat in the minority and I sincerely hope that is not an understatement.

[Jedburgh]

transcripts from the 27 Jun 07 hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Iraq: Is the Escalation Working?

MG (R) John Batiste (http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov:80/110/bas062707.htm)

Our national strategy for the global war on terror lacks strategic focus; our Army and Marine Corps are at a breaking point with little to show for it; the current “surge” in Iraq is too little, too late; the Government of Iraq is incapable of stepping up to their responsibilities; our nation has yet to mobilize to defeat a very serious threat which has little to do with Iraq; and it is past time to refocus our national strategy and begin the deliberate withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Indeed, it is time to place America’s vital interests first. Our troops are mired in the complexity of a brutal civil war and we have lost sight of the broader objective of defeating world-wide Islamic extremism. The following testimony will address the current situation and recommend a way-ahead. Iraq and Afghanistan are the first two chapters in a very long book and we are off to a terrible start....
Anthony Cordesman, CSIS (http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov:80/110/cor062707.htm)

...The present campaign in Iraq may be a tactical success, but there are serious serious issues regarding its strategic value. One key problem was raised during the debate over the surge strategy before President Bush adopted it and announced it in January 2007. It was always clear that an operation in Baghdad would simply lead many insurgents to leave the city and operate elsewhere and that most Sunni militias might simply stand down, let the US-led forces defeat the insurgents, watch a Shi’ite dominated government gain power, and resurface once the US was gone. Baghdad was important. It never made sense to see it as a decisive battlefield or center of gravity.

This is now all too clear even in a narrow military sense. The US is having to expand its counterinsurgency operations broadly outside Baghdad in ways that can steadily disperse limited US and combat-capable Iraqi military forces. Baghdad is still only 30-40% secured, but the fighting not only is dispersing limited US forces into the Baghdad ring cities, but into a troubled zone of provinces ranging from Anbar to Diyala. The US has learned it cannot ignore growing Shi’ite tensions and Iranian pressure in the south, and still faces serious potential problems with Arab-Kurdish tensions in the north....
Frederick Kagan, AEI (http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov:80/110/kag062707.htm)

...To say that the current plan has failed is simply incorrect. It might fail, of course, as any military/political plan might fail. Indications on the military side strongly suggest that success—in the form of dramatically reduced violence by the end of this year—is quite likely. Indications on the political side are more mixed, but are also less meaningful at this early stage before security has been established....

[SteveMetz]

6 May NY Times commentary - Plan B? Let’s Give Plan A Some Time First (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/06/opinion/06kagan.html?_r=1&oref=slogin) by Frederick Kagan.

Even though I disagree with him, I thought Fred did an outstanding job defending his position before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs yesterday. His prepared statement may be on the American Enterprise Institute's home page. I can't confirm that because I'm currently at work and the U.S. Army, in its infinite wisdom, blocks access to the AEI site (long story--this is one instance where my personal life strategy, which I call the "power of positive whining"--has not paid off).

[SteveMetz]

Even though I disagree with him, I thought Fred did an outstanding job defending his position before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs yesterday. His prepared statement may be on the American Enterprise Institute's home page. I can't confirm that because I'm currently at work and the U.S. Army, in its infinite wisdom, blocks access to the AEI site (long story--this is one instance where my personal life strategy, which I call the "power of positive whining"--has not paid off).


Well, fudge!! Disregard this post. I see that Jedburgh scooped me.

[Jedburgh]

Military Review, Jul-Aug 07: The Surge Can Succeed (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug07/ClarkINSIGHTS.pdf)

....Protecting the population in Baghdad neighborhoods
is a top priority, and it can be achieved by increasing security forces in the city’s neighborhoods and conducting aggressive patrols from joint security stations and combat outposts. Deployed en masse in Baghdad, the combined combat power of U.S. and Iraqi security forces can limit the enemy’s influence and, by so doing, set the necessary security conditions for political reconciliation and economic progress. Plans with these elements have already worked in Mosul, Samarra, and Ramadi. If we can do the same in the capital, the heart and soul of Iraq, we could significantly weaken the insurgency and set the stage for an Iraqi recovery.

[Jedburgh]

USIP, 11 Sep 07: Seven Months Into the Surge: What Does it Mean for Iraqis? (http://www.usip.org/pubs/working_papers/wp2_iraq.pdf)

The military surge underway since February 2007 was prompted by the rationale that reducing sectarian violence in and around Baghdad and curtailing insurgency and terrorist attacks would, together, create a breathing space for political and social groups to engage in national reconciliation and agree on common principles and policies. In other words, there is the anticipation of a direct relationship between military achievement and political achievement, and of building a positive synergy that would lead to stable conditions and permit U.S. troop reduction. Does this relationship hold true? Has the expanded military presence and its new operating strategies increased security, reduced sectarian killing and sectarian purges, and controlled insurgent and terrorist attacks? If violence has decreased, has this provided a respite to government and political forces, and have they, as a result, engaged in the necessary trustbuilding measures and dialogue towards reconciliation?

This report shows that the security and political situations in Iraq in the summer of 2007 were tentatively and marginally improved in Baghdad but in a state of flux, and that the political process was far behind the military effort. The report is based on conversations held in July 2007 with a large number of Iraqi political leaders and senior government officials, members of parliament from the major parliamentary groups, as well as a wide range of Iraqi citizens from Baghdad and the provinces. Its principal policy recommendations are that: a) international mediation is required to help Iraqi leaders build a new national compact; b) Iraqi leaders need to be encouraged to develop national political agendas and policies, and reduce reliance upon identity politics and narrow factional patronage; and c) that the central and provincial governments each require assistance to improve their capacity for constitutional governance.....

[Tom Odom]

The Shi’a accuse the Sunnis of being intransigent and of deliberately hampering political progress, and they blame Iraq’s neighbors and the U.S. for aiding and abetting the Sunnis. In ranking the causes of problems in Iraq, the Shi’a place the meddling of Arab states at the top. The prime culprits are Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Syria, and Jordan. They believe that these countries are relentlessly hostile to Shi’a rule in Iraq and will go a long way to thwart it.

Given our focus on Iranian interference in Iraq, this is an interesting counterpart from the Iraqi Shia. It is not surprising and I dare say, the Shia are correct about the Arab states. It is also interesting that the Shia include Syria--under a Shia minority rule via Asad--in the meddler camp with the Saudis and the Jordanians.

Best

Tom

[Jedburgh]

Given our focus on Iranian interference in Iraq, this is an interesting counterpart from the Iraqi Shia. It is not surprising and I dare say, the Shia are correct about the Arab states. It is also interesting that the Shia include Syria--under a Shia minority rule via Asad--in the meddler camp with the Saudis and the Jordanians....
Its important to remember that the Alawi ruling elite in Syria are not considered true Shi'a by the Shi'a in Iraq or in Iran. Many, especially Sunnis, do not even regard Alawis as being Muslim. And although the ruling elites in Syria are certainly from the Alawite clans, the regime is a secular dictatorship. The Alawi faith actually tends to foster a secular outlook.

[Tom Odom]

Its important to remember that the Alawi ruling elite in Syria are not considered true Shi'a by the Shi'a in Iraq or in Iran. Many, especially Sunnis, do not even regard Alawis as being Muslim. And although the ruling elites in Syria are certainly from the Alawite clans, the regime is a secular dictatorship. The Alawi faith actually tends to foster a secular outlook.

Correct in its past secular focus but that has been changing over the past decade. The Islamist "camel's nose" is well under the Syrian regime's tent. Daddy Asad leveled Hama over the Sunni Muslim Brethren uprising. Son Bashir has been much more inclusive of Islamist themes. Alawite domination inside Syria's power structure continues regardless of its secularist tendencies.

Alawis are indeed looked on as less than mainstream; however, recent Syrian regime rapprochement with Iran, especially when it comes to Lebanon, have certainly been cultivated by the Shia to Shia connection. In the past Amal was Syria's Shia mpovement in Lebanon and it was defintely more secular than the later devloping Hisballah as a client of Iran. Syria has since shifted much of its support to Hizballah, or at least made it easier for Iran to maintain its support.

All of that aside, the pint remains that Iraqi Shia see the surrounding Arab states as meddlers in Iraq against Shia interests when Syria has of late been more in synch with Iranian interests in the region, albeiit with a greater focus on the Arab-Israeli dispute than the sectarian struggle inside Iraq.

Best

Tom