The Strategic Corporal vs. The Strategic Cameraman

[SWJED]

From the SWJ Blog - The Strategic Corporal vs. The Strategic Cameraman (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/05/the-strategic-corporal-vs-the/) by Josh Manchester.


Consider for a moment the differences in informational-warfare responsbilities of junior leaders in the Marine Corps -- corporals -- and the propagandists in insurgent and terror cells -- cameramen.

Infantry squad leaders -- often, corporals -- know (or should) that the behavior of their Marines sends signals to those always watching them in an insurgency: the people and the insurgents. When the Marines are comfortable with their weapons; seemingly unafraid to interact with the locals; understanding of native customs and mores; and treat the populace with dignity and respect, then the sum of all of these attitudes conveys a certain perception to both the people and terrorists who watch them: it hastens cooperation from the populace and hard-targets them from insurgent attacks. This is the basic informational component of a strategic corporal in Iraq.

Consider now a strategic cameraman. Numerous attacks in Iraq and elsewhere are filmed for propaganda purposes. The classic case is that of the IED or VBIED. Numerous IED videos circulate throughout cyberspace for recruiting or fundraising purposes.

From an informational standpoint, the area immediately affected by a corporal with a squad of Marines is local and physically located. The area immediately affected by a cameraman posting attack videos online is global and virtual.

If our enemies can manage to squeeze virtual and global effects out of tactical and local actions, why can't we?...

[Cori]

This is a terrific piece, and could as easily (perhaps more appropriately) have been filed under Media and Info Ops as Triggerpuller. The recognition that the vision of the "Strategic Cpl" is a negative one, ie, make a mistake even at the squad level and you can have a strategic impact given today's media, is, I think, an accurate one. But so too is the recognition that it doesn't have to be only a negative impact.

Other folks have noted here the idea (captured in the piece) that it makes sense for troops to make sure that even down to the platoon level there are always cameras present, but that the change in thinking that needs to take place is that those cameras need to be used to document all the things that the troops accuse the media of not documenting -- school openings, wells being dug, hospitals being rebuilt, and just simple day-to-day interactions between people and troops.

That essentially inverts the way the enemy uses his "strategic cameraman," producing footage that is of propaganda value for us because it is positive, not negative. What it does, in effect, is to turn our Strategic Cpl. into a Strategic Cameraman -- for our side.

And the architecture, as the piece mentions, with outlets such as YouTube (and now the MNF-I channel there), and Liveleak, is already in place. Good video goes viral very quickly. This is all besides the fact that once the troops are in the habit of filming everything, the footage will also be available, as a natural side benefit, to counter false propaganda claims. Nothing answers a claim better than visual evidence, and nothing answers visual claims better than other visual evidence.

There have been several instances in which propaganda claims have lingered, have not been dealt with in such a way that all doubts were removed, because there was, for whatever reason, a reluctance to release official visual product. (For example, in one case because it was believed that it was more important to protect the security of Predator video, to preserve doubts regarding how good those cameras were, than it was to end debate over whether we had killed innocent Afghans without cause.) But if the cameras were privately held off-the-shelf videocameras owned by individual soldiers, it will be far easier to release the footage immediately, as soon as false claims are released to the press.

The irony is that during the combat phase, while certainly the entire battlefield was not being visually documented, more of it was being filmed than any in history (proportionally, I'd bet.) If this challenge is taken up, between our cameras and theirs, the same may be true again, except that since none of the cameras will be operated by professional (ostensibly "objective") photojournalists, there will be questions about the authenticity and trustworthiness of every bit of footage.

More irony: I bet the very networks which have been seamlessly integrating insurgent-provided footage for four years will only take soldier/marine provided footage with every possible visual and verbal cue imaginable.

[goesh]

I think its about impossible to squeeze global and virtual affects from the local and tactical actions for several reasons: first is the fact that many civilians don't easily identify with COIN. There is a serious civilian disconnect between the need of understanding enemies and their culture and killing them. We are a task and goal driven people and there should be some limited blood trails and dead jihadis shown to Mom and Pop back home. Civilians are not immune to violent death nor unable to deal with it and come to grips with it. Surely to God the Pentagon doesn't think civilians would be shocked and traumatized by the sight of dead bodies, do they? they need to get out on the interstate more and stroll the tough neighborhoods from time to time and visit some of the many thousands of funeral homes in full operation. From the over-kill exposure of Viet Nam, it's gone to the other extreme of no-kill exposure in Iraq. Remember that picture of the soldier carrying that wounded little girl in his arms? Who do you think that picture resonnated the most with - the military or civilians? Point specific on the picture is that everyone can identify with rescuing a hurt child but many can't identify with killing the enemies that had no compunction about having that child in the line of fire. Your job, from the civilian perspective, is to kill the extremists that were willing to sacrifice that child. Bloodshed is one dimensional because the other side blames us for having put that child in danger in the first place and their take on that picture is one of guilt and shame on the part of the trooper carrying her out of the fire fight, not heroism and compassion. Maybe your focus should not be so much on selling COIN to Mom and Pop back home but rather exposing the forces for what they are that oppose COIN. Your extreme sacrifice is expected and demanded but at least you are accorded trust and full faith that no elected politician can ever have.

[goesh]

Hamas is even reaching out via Mickey Mouse:

http://video.msn.com/v/us/v.htm?g=47AC6B09-766D-4C2E-B8B9-A7A5BC4C0697&t=c150&f=06/64&p=hotvideo_m_edpicks&fg=&GT1=9951

[Cori]

Uh, what?

I'm sorry, but I can't tell if you're arguing that attempts at persuasion are intrinsically besides the pt with the American public (and if that is your argument I would point you to any of a half dozen recent opinion polls by way of answering that someone needs to start making some damn arguments here) or is it you're position that the types of videos I'm suggesting won't work. If the latter, please be specific: is it your position that what's needed at home is a visual record of American forces killing jihadis? or is it your position that we need to stop shying away from such images? In either case, I'm not sure that we need to be producing material that would work to support the propaganda positions of the enemy (that this is a war on Islam, for ex.) and much of such material would come very, very close to crossing that line -- it might be far too easy for the other side to coopt it for their own message. Indeed, I'm already a little uneasy about some of what shows up on Liveleak, given the way that it's edited, the music that gets chosen, etc.

[goesh]

I think some visual record of enemy KIAs is needed, proof of the pudding so to speak. I've heard more than one person ask, " are they even fighting over there?" That's a valid question coming from civilians given our war history.Sad to say, there is the perception, though not by far prevailing, that our forces are just crusing around getting hit. You gave us Dresden and Hiroshima and 50K of our own killed at home in a couple of days at Gettysburg, never forget that. Shying away, as you phrase it, is nothing but a political trend, best theory practice currently in vogue since Viet Nam. COIN footage as I call it is not going to find an overly receptive audience on the homefront because for every clip of chatting it up with the locals all it takes is one media report of an IED or market bomb taking out X number of civians and the issue of a failed mission rears its ugly head again. Secondly, there are significant elements within our society that do not want to understand Iraqi culture and see no need for it and that feeling projects and transfers to a certain extent onto our military forces. It's the classic damned if you do, damned if you don't dilemma but as far as IO goes, if from the Gulf War on and amidst the hundreds of attacks against Western interests there has been no major step forward on the IO front, there simply isn't going to be. Best minds have been at it for how many years now? I further contend that the best IO possible is not going to diminish the prevalent American aggressor image in the Muslim world and the real need lies in convincing the homefront and the politicians of the worthiness of the war. You have to ask yourself, do the likes of Obama, Reid, Pelosi, H. Clinton, Murtha, etc. care one iota about COIN? I think not. A reasonably stable Iraq in 7-9 years is the only IO option there is for this war. Stand your ground and let the politicians know where you stand.

[jcustis]

Cori,

I think anything put out there by our side can and will be co-opted by the other side. This is because we are already so far behind in this endeavour, there will be mis-steps, fumbles, and the single message that just comes out dead wrong or misinterpreted.

I look at the furor over OPSEC and blogging, and cringe to think that the business of pushing video could turn into a smothering blanket. When troops pull into the COC for a debrief in the future, I can predict the reply when the IO officer (who is continuously pressed for good "message" material) takes the PL to task for a lack of digital media..."Well sir, I was kind of busy with that whole firefight thing. The camera went down anyway..."

[marct]

Hi JC,


I think anything put out there by our side can and will be co-opted by the other side. This is because we are already so far behind in this endeavour, there will be mis-steps, fumbles, and the single message that just comes out dead wrong or misinterpreted.

It probably will but, honestly, I have have to recast this logic in another form: anything we do will be made to look bad therefore we should do nothing. Um, is that really a position that you would want to take? I think it's far better to start in on this type of strategic cameraman operation, live out the learning curve, and then beat them. If they can use our stuff, we can use theirs as well.


I look at the furor over OPSEC and blogging, and cringe to think that the business of pushing video could turn into a smothering blanket. When troops pull into the COC for a debrief in the future, I can predict the reply when the IO officer (who is continuously pressed for good "message" material) takes the PL to task for a lack of digital media..."Well sir, I was kind of busy with that whole firefight thing. The camera went down anyway..."

That is certainly a possibility but again, I think it has to be put in a larger perspective.

Marc

[tequila]

Slightly on topic: an interesting off-the-cuff interview (http://bloggingheads.tv/video.php?id=268)of an embedded repoter and MAJ Chris Norrie, a MITT team leader in Baghdad. A story (http://www.nysun.com/article/54062?page_no=1)written by said reporter.

Regarding videos recorded by troops - to be serious, I doubt these really have much impact. Online video is still a very nascent media form and only breaks through to widespread distro in the American public when it shows something really out of the ordinary. Ordinary on-the-street positive interactions between Iraqis and Americans is not "newsworthy." Interesting combat footage, on the other hand, will get broadcast and watched on both the internet and wider media - a soldier playing with a kid will not.

[Cori]

Sorry, still haven't figured out how to make that "quote" function do what I want it to do. I want to reply to the issue you raise that there is a concern or a perception, "are we even fighting?" I couldn't agree more, and in work I've done over the last few years I've made the exact same argument: the nature of the press coverage gives the impression that our troops are in a completely passive posture, at best that they spend their time driving from one end of Iraq to the other, waiting to be blown up by IEDs.

I argue that what causes that is in large part the narrative-free presentation of casualty figures, night after night after night, this sense that there's just this drip, drip, drip of casualties, (particularly since on nights where the networks don't focus on Iraq -- and there are many such nights -- they feel the one thing they must report is the casualties), where all that gets reported is, number of deaths, Army or Marines, perhaps the province where the troops died, and sometimes the type of weapon that caused their deaths ("roadside bomb," "IED attack," "RPG attack," and almost never, "firefight.")

Now, to be clear, this is not entirely the fault of the press. The military has made two choices that contribute to this. The first is to avoid, almost always, reporting on enemy casualties. That, to be sure, is to avoid a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" phenomena -- the desire to avoid all the heat that comes along with the perception that they are using "body counts" as the metric for success. Fair enough, but the result is that there's also a perception created that it's only our side that's taking the hits, and only their side that's taking an active stance. The second choice is to release as little information regarding battlefield casualties as possible.

As I understand it, one reason for this is because information provided immediately afterwards also provides the enemy something they can't get otherwise: BDA. Fair enough, but as I've argued here in other contexts, understand that isn't a cost-free choice. Perhaps there's a way to balance that, to reduce the risk of providing useful information while giving something, something that suggests what it was our troops were doing when they fell. It is a myth, the research makes clear, that the American public will not accept battlefield casualties, but what they will not accept is casualties they do not believe were justified. (See the work of my colleagues at the tri-university research consortium down here on this point:
http://www.amazon.com/Choosing-Your-Battles-Civil-Military-Relations/dp/0691115842/ref=sr_1_3/002-5344435-6495215?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1178753977&sr=8-3

But if there is no narrative, no explanation, then by definition there is no justification, yes?

The other reason the military hesitates in giving out information is because, given the high risk early reports will be incorrect, there is a fear that later corrections will be misinterpreted or misunderstood. I understand that but, again, withholding all information is not a cost-free choice. Surely there is a middle road, such as waiting several days and then releasing some information.

Now, Goesh's suggestion is that one possible answer to all this is to simply show the proof that our troops are active, in the form of visual evidence. I respectfully disagree. That, I believe, would backfire. Think about how rarely you see images of dead bodies on the news (you see foreign dead more often than American dead, but even those are not a regular occurance.) This is a particularly American phenomenon -- the Canadians show a bit more than we do, the Brits a bit more than the Canadians, (I don't know anything about the Aussies), but the rest of the world just doesn't have this sense that viewing the dead is in some way being disrespectful of the dead.

Without babbling on too much longer and boring you any more than I probably already have, some have argued that this is a "sanitization" of war coverage, done for ideological reasons. That's just wrong. Watch the local news in any market in the United States: a staple item will be car accidents, and you just will not see dead bodies, period. You see images that are proxies of death -- shoes by the side of the road, teddy bears by the side of the road, maybe the crumpled car. The thing is, the news outlets make this judgment partially out of their own belief, but partly because they know what reaction they get from their audiences when they cross particular lines. They'll do it for images they think are particularly newsworthy (the Mogadishu pictures, for ex) but they'd better be damn newsworthy.

The kind of images you're talking about will not be well received, at all. In fact most people will have a violent negative reaction to them, and given that you're talking about a work-around to the mainstream media, a la YouTube, I just don't think it will work.

Let me apologize for the long-windedness of this post, but you raise an important and complicated point. I don't have a good answer (yet), but it's something I've been fussing over (like a loose tooth) for some time. In point of fact it's been annoying the crap out of me that I don't have a good answer to all this, so if anyone has any suggestions, I'd be very grateful.
Cori

[jcustis]

It probably will but, honestly, I have have to recast this logic in another form: anything we do will be made to look bad therefore we should do nothing. Um, is that really a position that you would want to take? I think it's far better to start in on this type of strategic cameraman operation, live out the learning curve, and then beat them. If they can use our stuff, we can use theirs as well.

Excellent point! I nominate marct for IO czar!:D

[Maximus]

Great discussion, as always.

I've posted in earlier threads about why I think it's important that we get in the IO fight and very much agree with Josh's thoughts.

How much Americans will watch internet videos or read stories containing pictures that generally present a more positive image of what goes on in Iraq remains to be seen. We haven't tried it, so I'm not convinced just yet that it won't have an impact. What troubles me about this whole discussion is that those who have served in Iraq/Afghanistan will tell you that 99% of the time nothing that could be perceived as "negative" happens. In fact, very often just the opposite occurs. Problem is that these stories rarely get out. Is it the "strategic" corporal's job to transmit these stories, or at least to pass them to a platoon, company or battalion IO officer to transmit (part of our problem is that we don't have IO officers at these levels)? I say it depends. If the "strategic" corporal is in the middle of clearing a building or a trench, of course not. On the other hand, if the "strategic" corporal is eating a meal at an Iraqi's house, conducting a patrol with the Iraqi Police, playing in a soccer game, etc. why not participate? After all most Marines will take pictures/video of these types of events anyway and tuck them away for photo albums when they get home. For me, whether Marines use digital or videocameras when on patrol is a non-issue. They've done so for the past 4 years. Further, the new Distributed Ops package has in excess of 180 digital cameras designated for every infantry battalion. For me then, the question is really how do we teach Marines to use the pictures and videos that they take when on patrol to help not only in the intel battle but probably more important is in the IO battle.

Can pictures or videos from the tactical level have an impact at the strategic level? I think so. The enemy's efforts to gain strategic success through tactical IO actions is most definitely working. Consider some of the comments made by those that attempted to attack Fort Dix: these guys clearly stated that they observed videos on the internet showing insurgents' success in attacking us in Iraq/Afghanistan and therefore felt they could do the same. And it's widely known that insurgent videos from Iraq/Afghanistan are used to support the global jihad recruiting effort. I think it would be great if instead of focusing our PAO/IO efforts on preventing bad news from getting out to the public, we instead focused our efforts in taking positive videos/pictures from tactical actions and flooding insurgent websites with them, while at the same time doing our best to transmit them to the American public.

[goesh]

If you want a cultural breach, show me some GIs in a mosque, show some foot washing and barefooted GIs sitting in the back of a masjid and show them sitting barefoot with some Iraqis in that environment - that's about the only IO that can't be easily counter-tuned by the opposition. Show me a school being built and I'll slap an arabic title on some Stills to the affect of 'infidels tear down school in search of weapons' and splatter it all over the Islamic world in a matter of minutes. Show me interaction clips and I'll counter-tune it with still subtitles of sexual propositioning. You can reach and touch Muslims via real cultural breaching but not Mom and Pop on the homefront and that's the kicker here. There's no cake with frosting this time around. I'm not saying stop grinding away with IO energy but the bottom line is for every unit of COIN energy directed at the home front or the world at large is energy taken away from the street and village, the only place where COIN really matters and counts.

[jcustis]

Goesh's post captures some of what I was trying to articulate earlier.

[marct]

Goesh's post captures some of what I was trying to articulate earlier.

True but, I would suggest, irrelevant. We really shouldn't be thinking of this type of IO as a "conventional" operation but, rather, more in COIN terms. Can we win, whatever that means, an IO "war"? Probably not - a draw is most likely, but we most certainly can not win it we don't fight one.

What is to stop us from taking some of the irhabi video and ding exactly the same thing? Or Marine video of the aftermath of a suicide bombing attack - change the voice over and post it, spam it actually, on the irhabi sites or the moderate sites?

Cori raised an excellent point about the presentation of death in Western media and, yes, Canada probably does show dead bodies a little more directly than the US. Regardless... I'll toss out an hypothesis that the desensitization of death in North America can be made to work to our advantage. As a symbol, "dead bodies", as Cori notes, are reserved for highly newsworthy stories. Umm, isn't Iraq important enough? Let's stop the sugar coating and show the home populace exactly what the irhabi are doing.

Now, about the IO Czar job... :D

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Agreed, Marc. I would also hazard a guess that one reason our programs don't work is that we don't have the patience to stick with them for more than a month or two.

This whole thing strikes me as a good opportunity for positive IO (like jcustis spoke of) as well as a "gray" operation targeting the networks you mentioned with footage of the aftermaths of suicide bombings and so on. Goesh makes a good point about where the main effort of the strategic corporals should be (with the people they're doing COIN with), but there needs to be a parallel operation (gray or black, take your pick) aimed at the irhabi video stuff. SOG did some of this sort of stuff in Vietnam, but was reined back each time they started making serious progress. We have done it in the past, but there seems to be a deep reluctance to try it again. I really don't know why.

[Tom Odom]

Cori raised an excellent point about the presentation of death in Western media and, yes, Canada probably does show dead bodies a little more directly than the US. Regardless... I'll toss out an hypothesis that the desensitization of death in North America can be made to work to our advantage. As a symbol, "dead bodies", as Cori notes, are reserved for highly newsworthy stories. Umm, isn't Iraq important enough? Let's stop the sugar coating and show the home populace exactly what the irhabi are doing.

I agree that we should have done this from the very beginning. FDR and senior leaders in Washington made a crucial decision after Tarawa to do just that when some said such pictures would hurt morale at home. But given the decisions made on this issue earlier and the context of the current debate and political buzzard fight going on, I think such a step would pretty much guarantee a greater clamor for withdrawal.

Best

Tom

[marct]

Hi Tom,


But given the decisions made on this issue earlier and the context of the current debate and political buzzard fight going on, I think such a step would pretty much guarantee a greater clamor for withdrawal.

I suspect you are right - at least as far as Iraq is concerned. Then again, the clamor for withdrawal is pretty load right now anyway. Hmm, maybe I'm just in a vicious mood, but how does the following strike you


[camera pan to bodies and destroyed property littering a local marketplace]Today, the irhabi fighters of Al Quaida sent a message to Iraq. We want the Iraqi people to have another message from the Coalition
[camera pan to school shots, reconstruction work, etc.]
[split camera with destruction on one side and school children on the other]
Iraqs future is up to you
We can stay [screen fade to school children shot]
Or go
[screen fade to image of body lying on ground]
The choice is yours
Marc

[jcustis]

IO czar it is marct...I was saying something along those lines in a PM to Cori


If I had my way, as well as the $$$ to do it, it would come down to a simple matter of airtime. By the spots during primetime, and keep buying them until there is a perceptible change. I'd steer clear of any references to the administration, the Pentagon, or Dept of State.

It would be simple and to the point, much like a campaign ad. the images of civic and humanitarian action are played...the really good stuff of the barefoot children getting shoes, food, and clean water. A school being built and backpacks, pens, and paper distributed. Cut away at the end and have a volunteer servicemember (or maybe even shift through all races and services in the process) make a very clear statement: "The people of Iraq are indeed the future of Iraq. My struggle isn't about bringing victory to the American people, but victory for every citizen of Iraq and freedom from the tyranny that continues. Please help me continue my mission."

It's subtle and implicit, and could avoid the PR landmines that are out there if we just don't try to think too much about it. Call it appealing to the apple pie base if you will, because it is that base that continues to erode every day. Few folks who are on the fence have the time to immerse themselves in the imagery, so we would need to take it to them, then push it to liveleak and youtube, NPR and PBS. Make it something household that people chatter about. That's what I believe happens when a new Marine Corps recruiting commercial comes out. People buzz when the images, background music, and message are important and right.

Has the clamoring for withdrawal reached a crescendo? Perhaps, but I agree with you now that it shouldn't mean we don't try.

[marct]

Has the clamoring for withdrawal reached a crescendo? Perhaps, but I agree with you now that it shouldn't mean we don't try.

I like that phrase - the "apple pie base". That really is who needs to be influenced on the home front. I think the tactic of steering away from anything overtly political is also appropriate, and an appeal to people's inherent desire to help others (usually as long as we don't get killed doing so) is a good way to go - certainly better than the more guilt ridden rhetoric that shows up in a lot of disaster relief advertisements!

Marc

[tequila]

I suspect you are right - at least as far as Iraq is concerned. Then again, the clamor for withdrawal is pretty load right now anyway. Hmm, maybe I'm just in a vicious mood, but how does the following strike you
[camera pan to bodies and destroyed property littering a local marketplace]Today, the irhabi fighters of Al Quaida sent a message to Iraq. We want the Iraqi people to have another message from the Coalition
[camera pan to school shots, reconstruction work, etc.]
[split camera with destruction on one side and school children on the other]
Iraqs future is up to you
We can stay [screen fade to school children shot]
Or go
[screen fade to image of body lying on ground]
The choice is yours

Is this IO aimed at the United States population or the population of Iraq?

If aimed at the U.S. population, I think it founders on two main points. (1) Generally speaking, Americans do not care about the death of foreigners. If given the choice between having American soldiers blown up and Iraqi civilians blown up, Americans will pick the second every time. (2) The message acknowledges the success of irhabi terrorism in striking repeatedly despite the presence of American troops. It feeds the narrative that Americans are dying without being able to prevent terrorism.

If aimed at the population of Iraq, it will have difficulties because it does not take into account the fracturing of the Iraqi population into very disparate media audiences, who will likely interpret such a message in very different ways.

[marct]

Hi Tequila,


Is this IO aimed at the United States population or the population of Iraq?

I was thinking of it more for the North American audience. Then again, it was only a very rough cut :cool:.


If aimed at the U.S. population, I think it founders on two main points. (1) Generally speaking, Americans do not care about the death of foreigners. If given the choice between having American soldiers blown up and Iraqi civilians blown up, Americans will pick the second every time.

Hmmm, I would, tentatively, agree with your second point, but I would disagree with your first one. I think that there is a large segment of the American population that does care about foreign deaths. As evidence of that belief, I'll point to the massive amounts of money that have been raised over the years for disaster relief.

Having said that, I think you are right about the relative weighting of American vs. "foreign" lives. Put the way you did, I would agree. At the same time, there are certainly sufficient historical precedents for Americans supporting operations that may cost American lives but will, at the same time, reduce "foreign" suffering. I honestly don't know if that motivation would work after 4 years of war in Iraq.


(2) The message acknowledges the success of irhabi terrorism in striking repeatedly despite the presence of American troops. It feeds the narrative that Americans are dying without being able to prevent terrorism.

Yes, it does. At the same time, it contests the narrative of despair that is currently being pushed by not abandoning the IO field to the irhabi and their opportunistic allies. Look, part of my thinking in all of this is pretty long term and contingency based. Let's suppose that we don't contest the IO field; what then? Basically, the Coalition will probably be forced to pull out of Iraq within 12-18 months and of Afghanistan within 24 - basically loosing both wars. If we do contest it, then we might stay longer, which increases the likelihood of winning (obviously no guarantees).

If we win, great, but what if, even with contesting the IO field, we loose? Think back to the aftermath of Vietnam and its effects on the US military. Giveb a "loss" scenario, what is better for the military: a scenario where the IO war was fought, or one where it wasn't?

I'm certainly not saying that the script I tossed up is a magic bullet or that a properly conducted IO campaign is one either. What I am saying is that if such a campaign isn't even attempted, then the potential repercussions are rather grim.

Marc

[tequila]

First off, I suppose I am against IO campaigns done by the military on the American population in general. I think that military-run IO ops aimed at the American population will, in the long run, only destroy the American population's faith in the military as a truth-telling institution. The military as an institution must remain both apolitical and subordinate to civilian control at all costs --- it cannot advocate its own policies to a civilian audience.

The responsibility lies with the civilian political authority that chooses and advocates a particular war policy. If the President cannot make a convincing case, then frankly I have a hard time supporting the idea that a war, especially a foreign war, must be fought against the countervailing will of the American people.


Think back to the aftermath of Vietnam and its effects on the US military. Giveb a "loss" scenario, what is better for the military: a scenario where the IO war was fought, or one where it wasn't?

I doubt that the repercussions of a withdrawal from Iraq will be similar in their institutional effects on the American military. The U.S. as a whole was undergoing wrenching transitions at all levels, and the military was no exception --- such a transition was ongoing while the military was still engaged in Vietnam. Today's military is professionalized and will IMO not encounter the same issues with regards to indiscipline and breakdown as occurred then. The principle damage, IMO, will occur in further disintegration of trust between civilian leadership and the military.

[marct]

Hi Tequila,


First off, I suppose I am against IO campaigns done by the military on the American population in general. I think that military-run IO ops aimed at the American population will, in the long run, only destroy the American population's faith in the military as a truth-telling institution.

Okay, I can certainly understand that position. Maybe, as a Canadian, I am more used to being bombarded by government propaganda :confused:. Personally, I wouldn't advocate a campaign that lied or distorted the truth, but I don't really see much wrong with a campaign that gives its best guess as to what will happen.


The responsibility lies with the civilian political authority that chooses and advocates a particular war policy. If the President cannot make a convincing case, then frankly I have a hard time supporting the idea that a war, especially a foreign war, must be fought against the countervailing will of the American people.

On that, I do agree with you. I have to wonder, however, how effective the "civilian political authority" can be in this current age of 'net based media and "instant gratification". Maybe I'm being overly pessimistic, but I have serious doubts about he way we (aka democracies) have traditionally measured the "will of the people". Given what I am seeing going on south of the border (aka in the US :D), I think if the issue of us electing our senate comes up, I will campaign strongly against it.


I doubt that the repercussions of a withdrawal from Iraq will be similar in their institutional effects on the American military. The U.S. as a whole was undergoing wrenching transitions at all levels, and the military was no exception --- such a transition was ongoing while the military was still engaged in Vietnam. Today's military is professionalized and will IMO not encounter the same issues with regards to indiscipline and breakdown as occurred then. The principle damage, IMO, will occur in further disintegration of trust between civilian leadership and the military.

Hmmm, I don't think we would see the same problems re: indiscipline and general breakdown. I do agree that it would probably increase the level of institutional mistrust. What is leading me to the conclusion that not attempting such a campaign would have disastrous effects on the military is, strangely enough, the problems with retention and the disaffection with many senior officers.

Marc

[tequila]

Personally, I wouldn't advocate a campaign that lied or distorted the truth, but I don't really see much wrong with a campaign that gives its best guess as to what will happen.

Historical evidence indicates that lies inevitably seep into any public relations campaign. Even simple error would inevitably be seen as and would be indistinguishable from outright deceit in the eyes of the public.


I have to wonder, however, how effective the "civilian political authority" can be in this current age of 'net based media and "instant gratification". Maybe I'm being overly pessimistic, but I have serious doubts about he way we (aka democracies) have traditionally measured the "will of the people". Given what I am seeing going on south of the border (aka in the US ), I think if the issue of us electing our senate comes up, I will campaign strongly against it.

Today's media environment is polarized and segmented, but this is hardly rare in American history. We have returned, in a way, to the earlier days of the Republic when there were far fewer institutional controls on media. This is, I believe, a relatively healthy development. The bully pulpit of the Presidency still commands a megaphone, but must make a far more convincing argument nowadays than in previous times. That this Administration has pissed away its moral authority, frankly, is its own fault and not that of either the mediaspace or the American people.

As for the inherent faults of democracy, it's the worst system but all the others. But then you Canadian bootlickers did choose the happy slavery of the British Crown when it counted, so maybe you haven't absorbed that lesson properly? ;)


What is leading me to the conclusion that not attempting such a campaign would have disastrous effects on the military is, strangely enough, the problems with retention and the disaffection with many senior officers.

Hmmm, I doubt we'd see any worse retention problems than if we stayed in Iraq another five years. Imagine the issues when today's lieutenants and captains begin coming up on their 5th or 6th tour, and the Marines start going back for the seventh or eighth time?

[marct]

Hi Tequila,


As for the inherent faults of democracy, it's the worst system but all the others. But then you Canadian bootlickers did choose the happy slavery of the British Crown when it counted, so maybe you haven't absorbed that lesson properly? ;)

I'm booking off for the night, but I couldn't let this one pass :D.

What can I say but "Sigh". We believe in democracy tempered by tradition rather than the blatant mobocracy that seems to run rampant in some countries :rolleyes:. When it comes to lessons in democracy, all I can say is that it's to bad you folks revolted before you could have more than two parties :D.

Marc

[Tom Odom]

you folks revolted

Who you calling revolting? :D

Check your pockets, Tequila, you might have a spy coin or two slipped in...:D

Marc and Jon,

I thought about all of this last evening.

Here is where I see your IO not achieving its noble aims: that it will not move the Amrican public when it comes to keeping troops on the ground or spending MORE money. That last point is critical; you cited disaster relief as a prompter for donations. It is but it works because it is not constant. Iraq regardless of viewpoint has been constant since 2002 (yes 2002 not 2003). Disasters flare up and pocket books open; Iraq has gone well beyond that stage.

The other point is one Tequilla also stated above; that foreigners dying compared to Americans dying is a distant second or third tier concern. Look at the Virgininia Tech killings and compare the numbers to the Iraquis whoe were killed that same day--I believe that was the day VBIEDs took some 150-180 in Baghdad. Virginia Tech drowned all that out.

Look at Rwanda where there was accurate news coverage showing the slaughter and we did not act. It lasted 100 days and later we appologized--although we virtually ignored the larger slaughter that still affects the Congo.

Again I trully appreciate the motivation and the goals. I am sceptical of the results.

Tom

[Cori]

Two very quick pts (sorry to have been out of the conversation; it's commencement weekend here, and a bit crazy.) And again I apologize for my failures re. the quote function. First, I agree that there are real concerns regarding the military running an explicit IO campaign in an attempt to persuade the American people. I know PAOs who are absolutely adamant that the line between IO and PA must be an absolutely bright one because otherwise PA loses its credibility, but that might be somewhat "inside baseball," I'm not sure the public will make that distinction -- all they'll know is that people in uniform are advocating a position. I don't have a good answer for that (yet), beyond keeping this to the informal channels such as YouTube, where, of course, material is seen by fewer people unless a particular video either "goes virual" or is picked up by the mainstream media.

Second, what about foreign casualties? I think the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, opinion polling suggests that the American public finds foreign casualties less of a check against rationales for military operations -- they care more about American combat casualties in determining whether an operation would be a good idea, and in deciding whether an operation is no longer justified -- but that doesn't mean they don't care at all. The idea that there is some kind of "CNN effect," that they'll see certain kinds of images on TV and "demand that the government do something" is completely overblown on the other hand, but that doesn't mean that they can't be convinced that humanitarian military operations are justified (although it is harder to justify American combat operations in such a context.) With Rwanda, the pictures weren't enough (given how sanitized they were, particularly) in a context where the government was making every possible effort to avoid arguing for an intervention, up to and including orders being issued to the White House staff that "the g word" (ie "genoicde) not be uttered in relation to what was happening.

Here's what's interesting: remember I made the point that images of death were heavily sanitized in the American press. Now, that obviously cuts both ways. It means we don't see American casualties, but we also don't see the real price of terrorism -- we see the burning cars after a VBIED is detonated, but not the bodies of the civilian casualties that result. What if we did? Are we sure that Americans would be more likely to demand a swift pull-out? Historically, Americans have justified their participation in wars as going to the defense of the weak. Who's to say that such images wouldn't totally galvanize the public, (given the proper narrative frames, of course) reminding us of the nature of the enemy we fight. I argued that pictures of dead enemy would backfire. I'm not as sure pictures of dead victims would, particularly in Mark's little clip, where they're contrasted with pictures of what we bring -- schools, and healthcare, and hope. I mean, just who are the real occupiers here?

The key is to avoid a narrative where the cause of the violence is sectarianism, and to focus on the narrative where the deaths have been caused by other impulses (not that hard, after all.) The narrative that says it's "just" sectarian violence is read as a narrative of futility, a parallel to one that was argued during the Balkans -- it's a shorthand for an argument that says, look, these guys have been at this for who knows how many generations (even if they haven't been), it's something we Americans will never hope to understand, and can never stop, so what are we doing in the middle of it? The failure here, from an IO perspective, has been the failure to explain AQI's merry little campaign to stoke the flames, their involvement as quite active players in the sectarian side of the violence.

And with that, I'm off to my research assistant's commissioning, and various commencement events.

[Merv Benson]

Cori writes:


... I know PAOs who are absolutely adamant that the line between IO and PA must be an absolutely bright one because otherwise PA loses its credibility, but that might be somewhat "inside baseball," I'm not sure the public will make that distinction -- all they'll know is that people in uniform are advocating a position. I don't have a good answer for that (yet), beyond keeping this to the informal channels such as YouTube, where, of course, material is seen by fewer people unless a particular video either "goes virual" or is picked up by the mainstream media.

This reminds me of the guy on the night compass march who did not want to pull his partner out of a hole he tripped into because he feared losing his azimuth. (Hey, it really happened.)

The enemy has said that half his war effort is in the media battle space and we are not engaging. If PA is worried about losing credibility, why not be worried about the country losing credibility in the war instead, because of our failure to develop a response to the enemy media campaign.

[Cori]

Well, the reason it's so important to keep PA firewalled from IO is because, although this might be "inside baseball" to the public, as I argued, it isn't to the press. It's the PAOs who deal with the press, and there can't be any sense that they are engaging in advocacy, IO campaigns, spin, etc. etc., because then they lose credibility with the press. And there is a pretty good argument that if the PAOs don't have credibility with the press then whatever else is going on in "the media battle," you're in trouble. I know there's a great deal of criticism of the press (I engage in a good deal of it myself) but the best reporters on the military beat have good relationships with the PAOs, both will generally tell you. Those relationships center on trust, going both ways. PAOs have to be "purer than Caesar's wife," in a sense, in this regard, so that if they say, for ex., no, we don't think there were civilians in that building we just hit, the press take that seriously and don't question it because they know those same guys are also involved in IO campaigns, also wearing IO hats. That's the argument, and I think it's a pretty good one, or at least it's one I don't have a particularly compelling answer to myself.

[SoiCowboy]

Just some thoughts:

1) The enemy has a natural understanding of how to use the media whereas the United States military does not.

2) The media is naturally attracted to 'if it bleeds, it leads' because thats what sells rather than 'well dug in africa'.

3) The insurgency in iraq has effectively managed most, but not all the big Western media by kidnappings, etc, limiting them to reporting from the green zone or embedding.

4) Anything the US military says or the US government is treated like propaganda, even if its correct the media is unlikely as a whole to endorse it because they don't want to be seen as stooges of the government, and the medias natural sympathys is towards the underdog terrorists because they can provide news that bleeds.

5) There is a perception in the West that war can be clean and sanitized, and this is mainly down to the very successful media operations of Gulf War 1 showing surgical missile strikes.

6) Most feedback is negative. If you ever run a business, you'll always hear when somethings gone wrong, never when things go right. This is probably part of being human and is going to reflect in the media uploaded onto the internet. The 7/7 bombings had a media cycle of detanation -> recorded by mobiles - > uploaded / passed onto the media in what 30 minutes? The terrorists are always going to be setting the media agenda.

7) The only pro-goverment line that is accepted and rewarded is the insider doing a blog or the like on the internet because it is felt that they are 'the real deal'. Problem is their impact is always going to be less than the 'pro-terrorist' message of the other side.

Just some thoughts. What do you think?

[120mm]

Appears accurate, but I would add that, as less and less civilians serve their country as soldiers, due to the professionalization of the military, as well as the military representing less and less the mainstream of America, the more likely they are to believe what is reported in the media, vis-a-vis the military, no matter how incorrect that reporting may be. In fact, the lack of military service within the media will guarantee that media reporting will always be inaccurate.

[tequila]

Iraqi Interior Ministry bans video and photos of bombing scenes (http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070513/wl_mideast_afp/iraqunrestmedia).

[milesce]

...It means we don't see American casualties, but we also don't see the real price of terrorism -- we see the burning cars after a VBIED is detonated, but not the bodies of the civilian casualties that result. What if we did?

I think you are on to something important here. One of the few times the mainstream media has given wide coverage to actual bodies in this war was when the four private contractors's bodies were attacked in Falluja in '04. People were outraged.

Most of the footage I see now, on youtube and elsewhere -- seems to imply one of two things:

a) senseless slaughter -- on the part of US forces.
b) US troops riding around getting blown up

I don't see the message getting out about what the terrorists are doing to ordinary Iraqi people, not in a way people can relate to.

[Cori]

Actually, that's a very interesting example. It's one of the only iconic images that most people wouldn't actually recognize, because (like the Mogadishu images) media outlets believed it's newsvalue trumped the fact that it was so disturbing, and so chose to run it, but unlike those images, they almost all altered it in some fashion, cropping it or pixellating it, so that very few people saw the same version of the image. This article:

http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/04-2NRSummer/71-74V58N2.pdf

includes a chart of which outlets showed which version of the image.

[Rockbridge]

The real challenge faced by the strategic cameraman is that if you're too good at your job, you become a threat to the civilian media, which takes great exception to having an important piece of footage released if they didn't produce it. The operation to rescue Jessica Lynch was meticulously videographed, with footage being released less than 18 hours after the operation. However, the entire event was defamed by the media as being another "Capricorn One." The bottom line is that if the military's news releases don't fit with the media's agenda, they either don't get air time or get "spun" as being self-promoting propaganda.

[Combat.medic06]

There is alot of good that can come out of a soldier posting videos of missions/ training of indiginous forces. Most americans feel that they are being sheltered by the Government (therefore trust issues with elected officials) if say a certain military website were to willingly post all types of videos to better assist personnel on tactics and training, but also allow the average joe access to it I think Americans would feel more secure. I believe they would feel more like they were recieving the full picture. I don't know about you but, I know numerous people who find themselves up late night surfing U Tube looking for new military videos mostly because they are curious and have a feeling that our White House is hiding the facts from them (they are right). I know when journalist's were folowing our MiTT That we were not allowed to say much or show them anything..... As far as driving back and forth taking hits in Iraq. I also volunteered to medically cover Fuel and supply convoys before and after being on my MiTT, and Medevaced quite a few soldiers due to explosions and accidents. The average joe needs to see that and also needs to see how that fuel and those supplies help not only soldiers but the surrounding villages and comunities. America needs the full story, if Washington ever hopes to get the support they need from the American people to make it another seven years for stabilization.