View Full Version : Strategic Culture - one for Marc & others
Rob Thornton
05-21-2007, 09:53 PM
Marc (and all those interested),
Reading Colin Gray's Modern Strategy and discussing the idea of Strategic Culture and Strategic Military Culture. At first I was limiting myself, but Gray brings up the concept of using strategic behaviour to examine Strategic Culture. I'm now find myself broadening my thinking:) What are your thoughts?
Thanks, Rob
Rob Thornton
05-21-2007, 10:22 PM
Marc,
I guess I should provide at least where I'm going - If strategic behaviour reflects strategic culture then do U.S. values, ethics and morals (this one should be fun for a Canadian) play into how we perceive our strategic role? Do they manifest themselves into policy? How do those outside the U.S. perceive our motives?
This could lead us down a number of interesting lines of thought regarding what Gray describes as Strategic Performance and how that gets to Strategic Effects.
sullygoarmy
05-22-2007, 02:30 PM
Jeez Rob, we've got to get a life! I'm reading the exact same book based on it being mentioned quite a bit on the plans list server. The book comes highly recommended, especially with the big debate started by LTC Yingling. There has been a big debate raging back and forth on whether we need to look to a german-like "Imperial Staff" to fill the gaps in our strategic thinking and planning. Its been interesting to watch alot of the retired big wigs and the younger active duty crew weigh in on the subject.
Gray's book, however, kept coming up in the discussions so I grabbed a copy and started into it. Personally, I'm a big Clausewitz fan so Gray's book, at least for me, is a modern explantion of a lot of old Karl's writings. Gray does a great job breaking down the different elements of strategy, what influences how we create strategy and good historical examples of how what we normally think about strategic influences is basically wrong.
With regards to your question, I 100% believe our values, ethics and morals as a nation affect our perceived strategic role. The latest national security strategy reads like an American manifesto: spread democracy, freedom and equal rights for all, preemptive strikes, etc. If the NSS is the cornerstone document for how we develop our strategic vision and plans, then there is little doubt (at least in my tiny tanker mind) that our national strategy is a direct result of our national values, or perceived national values.
Steve Blair
05-22-2007, 03:42 PM
Looks like I've got something else to add to the reading list....
Rob Thornton
05-22-2007, 06:16 PM
Sully,
We had a good disussion today which took us from considering our strategic culture and the strategic culture of others then on to strategic culture's impacts on the application of deterrance, coercion and compellance. I like Gray's thoughts on the penalties (risks might be better) for acting outside your strategic culture. What flies for one state or group may not be viable for another (and vice versa). Understanding that in the context of our own goals may provide clarity (but maybe not make it easier)
Steve, the guy is Colin Gray, an English (with US dual citizenship) professor. The book is Modern Strategy. He has also written some on Chaos, and I understand he has a new book coming out at the end of the month.
Well, back to the books:wry:
Jimbo
05-22-2007, 06:24 PM
Nerds.....ha ha. See you in week or two Sully. I am prepping the PZ around here in DC (Thank God).
Rob Thornton
05-22-2007, 09:07 PM
I was thinking about what Troufion wrote in regards to the SWJ VOL 8 article and how it relates to strategic culture and military culture. I bolded the piece that sticks out in my mind and gets to the heart of the difficulty in stepping outside both your own culture and even individual relevant experiences.
From T
MAJ Thornton does an excellent job discussing, from his own experience, the difficulties that US Forces have building Iraqi security forces. From cultural dissimilarities and technology shortfalls to the problems of building a force under fire. His suggestions for the command and control structure deal head on with the differences between US and Iraqi forces. His conclusion that the structure of local forces must be based off the local needs is right on and seems obvious enough, of course that is until you try to do it. A good discussion for anyone heading into this environment.
We've hit on "mirroring" and other useful concepts in a few other threads, but understanding why we might be pre-disposed or biased is probably fundamental. Not all pre-disposition or bias is necessarily bad either, it just reflects our experiences - a type of "cultural selection"?. What might be bad though is an inability to contrast successes or failures against a new environment and make adjustments. his could be a mind set, or it could be resource issue. While I had made a case for a certain organizational structure for an indigenous force in a certain set of conditions, that organization might be a misapplication of resources given another set of conditions (for ex. sparsely inhabited areas where civilians are less of a factor).
Not only does cultural innovation require a catalyst to detour or depart from
cultural norms, but it requires reinforcement to strengthen and sustain it, as well as the need to place it in its proper context - i.e. what works in Iraq may not work somewhere else dependent on the circumstances and conditions. The ability then to step outside your cultural experiences then is a powerful, useful tool.
slapout9
05-22-2007, 11:59 PM
Here is an article on Strategic perfomance by Colin S. Gray.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/0910.pdf
Another Why Strategy is Difficult by Colin Gray
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/0422.pdf
sullygoarmy
05-23-2007, 01:53 PM
Rob,
Your quote about "easy enough until you try and do it" is just dripping my with my pal, Clausewitz and his famous writings about friction. Of course Grey is a fellow worshipper at the Clausewitz alter, just like me!
Jimbo, after spending six frustrating months, can probably give us a better, in house look as to why strategy at the interagency level is broke. From my outsiders view looking in, there seems to be a widening gap between the military strategists (all you FA 59s and 6Zs out there) and the political reality of the inner beltway. After taking a few limited courses in strategy, I am more convinced that Clausewitz nailed it talking about the responsibilities of BOTH the stateman and commander when it comes to developing strategy. Until we can find a way to get our interagency process then we will continue to struggle finding a balance in strategic plans and policy between DoD and the rest of the government.
(if you haven't yet, read DoD is from Mars, State is from Venus at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/dod_from_mars_state_from_venus.doc)
marct
05-23-2007, 02:49 PM
Hi Rob,
Sorry I didn't respond sooner, but I was in an all day seminar yesterday.
I guess I should provide at least where I'm going - If strategic behaviour reflects strategic culture then do U.S. values, ethics and morals (this one should be fun for a Canadian) play into how we perceive our strategic role? Do they manifest themselves into policy? How do those outside the U.S. perceive our motives?
I'll admit that I have some problems with the concept of "Strategic Culture"; mainly because it comes from the rather archaic conceptualization of "National Culture" popularized by Mead and Metreaux in the 1950's. Leaving that aside, however, I do think that certain cultural "myths" play out through specific institutions that operate strategically and, since myths encapsulate values, beliefs and morality, I would have to say that there probably is a heavy lacing of influence on how the US' strategic role is portrayed.
Honestly, they would have to manifest themselves in policy - I don't see any way around that. And, in a lot of ways, it's not the overt values, beliefs and morality that become embedded in policy that bother me but the covert ones.
Let me take a rather egregious example - Afghanistan. The US has an almost mystical belief in "democracy" - which is kind of funny since the US isn't a democracy, it's a republic. The covert side of this is a rejection of monarchy in almost any form, even if the actuality is more "democratic". Where this comes from is pretty obvious - the charter / foundation myth of the US (i.e. your Revolution). So, embedded right in your political charter myth is what Claude Levy-Strauss called a "binary opposition":
"democracy" = "good" vs. "monarchy" = "bad"
Think of this as a covert or hidden definer of cultural values or "morality".
Now, historically, this decision worked out pretty well for the US, although a lot of that was, IMHO, pure luck (i.e. bounded by two oceans and we certainly weren't going to bother attacking you :D). When you ad in the fact that there was very little effective opposition from the Amerind nations, that the Spanish Empire was falling apart, and that the land area of what became CONUS has some incredible resources, I don't think it is surprising that the US did so well economically. So, for most Americans, it is pretty much "proven" that "democracy" is the "best" system that automatically leads to reduced conflict and greater prosperity. It is one of those self-evident truths that nobody really bothers to examine because, for most people in the US, it does work. Not only that, but doesn't the fact that so many people came to the US (and continue to flood in) to "find freedom" and "escape tyranny" show that this is the best system?
So, now we come to the part about strategic culture, policy and my example of Afghanistan. Once the Taliban where smashed in the initial campaign, what would replace them? The closest equivalent to "Congress" that could be found was the Loya Jurga and, since a new regime needs some type of legitimacy, one was called to create a new government. Now, a touch of Afghan history here. Before the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan had operated as a form of parliamentary democracy under a king. If we want a Western parallel, probably the closest would be the UK in the 17th century under James I (the Afghan king had a fair amunt of power).
Of course, it was self-evident to the US who, after all had the majority of firepower in Afghanistan, that "democracy" (read republicanism) was infinitely superior to anything as archaic as a monarchy, so the monarchy had to go (i.e. never be re-established). This caused a ig problem for many of the Afghan leaders, since the king had operated as a stabilizing force amongst the various tribal leaders - a primus inter pares with enough fire power and moral authority to pretty much swot anyone who acted up too badly, but not enough of either to become a despot. Going into the Loya Jurga, there was a lot of broad spectrum support to re-establish the monarchy with most of the attention focused on the old king's grandson. He had the moral authority (actually "blood right" or what Weber called herrenschaft; usually translated as "traditional authority").
"Of course", the US policy makers "knew" that a monarchy was "bad" and a "democracy" was "good". This led to a series of backroom deals, many of which were leaked to the press although I don't think most of them got into the US press, that showed how the US State department and the White House forbade the re-establishment of the monarchy. What wasn't realized was that Afghanistan desperately needed a primus inter pares with both kinetic force and moral authority. Karzai ended up with the kinetic force, but he lacks most of the moral authority, the herrenschaft, that the kings' grandson has. By rough analogy, it would be as if the Secretary of Agriculture proclaimed themselves to be the chief executive of the US with only a totally rigged election to provide legitimacy.
Rob, I hope that this somewhat rambling example gives you some sort of an answer :wry:.
Marc
tequila
05-23-2007, 03:05 PM
OK, I think this is Marc's covert acknowledgement of my earlier comment about inherent Canadian slavishness to crowns? :D
FascistLibertarian
05-31-2007, 06:56 PM
I think it is also important to look at the results of nationalism on national culture. For the US nationalism worked in WWI and II; they therefore came to the conclusion that nationalism is 'good' and continue to be a nationalistic nation.
Compared to France (nationalism bad WWI) and Germany/Japan (bad WWII) which respectively recieved different results and therefore drew different conclusions.
America has that swagger that all great powers but can often come off as cocky, unilaterial, and over confident.
Canada on the other hand is a smaller country who tries to do its part to help its allies and tries to make a significant contribution.
And not all Canadians love the crown. ;)
sullygoarmy
05-31-2007, 07:06 PM
Grey's newest book, Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace and Strategy (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0275991318/104-3075668-4435162?ie=UTF8&tag=smallwarsjour-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=1789&creativeASIN=0275991318), has a great section on the influence of culture in developing national strategy. This new book is like strategy in Dan Brown Chapters. Grey breaks down different aspects of strategy into forty Maxims, each about 5-7 pages long. Makes for an easy read and you end up stopping after each chapter going "Wow".
Tom Odom
05-31-2007, 07:29 PM
Here is a cultural dynamic/thesis I have been playing with for years. Consider the linkages between countries with a martime, Mahan sea control focus and those countries that make effective use of strategic and operational aviation. The immediate examples that I have long considered are:
Effective Sea Control/Effective Strategic Air
a. The Brits and the Commonwealth Countries as inheritors of the British military and naval cultures
b. The United States first as a former colony of the Brits and then as a maritime power in our own right
The Middle Ground
a. the Japanese albeit with the limitations that Japanese Air as a strategic arm was limited to that of its Naval Air Arm and Carrier force
b. The Soviets in the Cold War--the Red Fleet was still a surge operations force not a sustained operations force. Their use of strategic air mirrored that tendency.
c. The Chinese now in the 21st Century--this is certainly a developing story.
The Land Centric Powers with limited seapower and largely Tactical Air Forces
a. The Germans
b. The Soviets WWII
c. The Italians
d. The French
e. The Chinese in the Cold War
Put simply, if a national culture doesn't get the role of seapower, it probably does not get the full potential of airpower.
Ok fire away :D
Tom
Tom,
Here's my shot across your bow. Awaiting return fire or the cannonades of other fleets.
Based on my reading of history, I find the analysis compelling. But, some quirks also show up. For example, part of the reason the English became a sea power was due to the effective raiding of the English coasts done by the French during the 100 Years War and the threats of French invasion in support of Scotland during the Wars of the Roses and after. The English use of naval power in the 100 Years War was similar to their ground tactics--they used bowman in ships on the flanks to support an attack by men-at-arms working as boarding parties.
The French had a very powerful navy until the time of Napoleon. Unfortunately for them, the British had much better commanders, like Nelson, who were willing to take risks because of their greater "high seas" seafaring experience. Once their trans-oceanic colonial empire was stripped from them, in their various wars of the 18th Century with England, France only needed a limited, AKA tactical, navy to control access to its colonies across the Mediterranean.
I submit that the real discriminator is in how the various nation states played the hands they were dealt. Those prospered that figured out how to defend their trade routes; those that did not break the trade route defense code became second rate powers over time (Spain comes to mind here). Britain, being an island, had to become a maritime power to maintain its trade networks. The US had a similar requirement, being an ocean away from the majority of its markets for finished goods (Europe). France, Germany, and Russia (Russia less so) were all able to establish effective trade using only land routes--the naval option was not forced upon them. One might even argue that what has kept each of these nations from reaching their full potential as world leaders has been to develop an arm (a navy) for which they really had no need. In the case of Russia, this extends to a strategic air force and missile arm as well.
I think the Japanese would have developed in a much different way had not the US and UK limited their growth as a naval power via the Washington and London Naval Treaties. I suspect that the Japanese had a pretty siginificant strategic air force bombing capability for use in China, but I must admit to being only a dilettante on that theater of operations in WWII.
Steve Blair
05-31-2007, 08:31 PM
Let's not forget the Dutch or Portuguese, both of whom had respectable naval forces once upon a time. The Dutch and British actually fought a series of particularly vicious wars over trade routes and the like.
Japan suffered from having two very separate services in the army and navy (both in terms of doctrine and cultural/social origins), so there was much more conflict between the two services than there was in other nations. Japan never really went for a strategic air force in the sense that the US or Britain did: their military development was influenced by both the Germans and the British (Germans for army and British for navy).
Seapower is also dependent on geography. It could be argued that the Germans in World War I understood sea power but lacked the freedom (or perceived freedom) of movement (defined as ports with clear lines to the open ocean) to exploit it. There's also developed national "instincts" to consider. Using Germany as an example (although this could also apply to France), most of her immediate enemies shared common land borders. In the cases of Britain, the US, and Japan the main threats would be coming over water. Many of the failed naval powers (Spain and possibly France) ended up stretching their resources too far; fighting major campaigns on land and sea at times when they could only realistically afford one or the other.
The air power question is an interesting corollary to this. In the case of the Germans I think in World War II they were only expanding on what they had learned during WW I when it came to the tactical role of air power. And again it goes back to their traditional enemies: continental powers. Makes sense that they'd focus on ways to defeat the enemy at the front (or back) door.
FascistLibertarian
05-31-2007, 08:37 PM
In the case of the Germans I think in World War II they were only expanding on what they had learned during WW I when it came to the tactical role of air power.
I think they wasted their air power on terror bombings because hitler was a nut.
Why bomb ports or airfields when you can bomb london?
Why build jet fighters when you can build jet bombers with a tiny payload?
Why focus on antiaircraft measures when you can build v rockets which have tiny payloads compared to US and UK heavy bombers?
Steve Blair
05-31-2007, 08:41 PM
I think they wasted their air power on terror bombings because hitler was a nut.
Why bomb ports or airfields when you can bomb london?
Why build jet fighters when you can build jet bombers with a tiny payload?
Why focus on antiaircraft measures when you can build v rockets which have tiny payloads compared to US and UK heavy bombers?
Hitler's direction wasn't doctrine. I was talking about doctrine. The development of the Luftwaffe prior to 1939 was a direct reflection of what the Germans took from World War I. What he had to work with (and mess up) was in no small measure developed from what the Germans learned in 1917 and 1918...and his obsession with bombing London might come from that time as well, since the Germans tried terror raids then, too (as did the Allies...it was all part of the air power kit back back then, and many thought it would be successful).
Tom Odom
06-01-2007, 01:39 PM
Based on my reading of history, I find the analysis compelling. But, some quirks also show up. For example, part of the reason the English became a sea power was due to the effective raiding of the English coasts done by the French during the 100 Years War and the threats of French invasion in support of Scotland during the Wars of the Roses and after. The English use of naval power in the 100 Years War was similar to their ground tactics--they used bowman in ships on the flanks to support an attack by men-at-arms working as boarding parties.
Steve, I admit the idea is not absolute. It is, at least to me, compelling enough that it has tugged at me for years. And I would also say that I am looking at the relationship of seapower thinking to airpower thinking at the critical junction in time when airpower began to emerge. For those reasons, I did not offer anything about the Portuguese, the Spaniards, or for that matter the Phoenicians, Greeks, etc.
The French had a very powerful navy until the time of Napoleon. Unfortunately for them, the British had much better commanders, like Nelson, who were willing to take risks because of their greater "high seas" seafaring experience. Once their trans-oceanic colonial empire was stripped from them, in their various wars of the 18th Century with England, France only needed a limited, AKA tactical, navy to control access to its colonies across the Mediterranean.
Quite true--gratefully or Cornwallis might never have surrendered. But by the time airpower came on the scene, the French Navy suffered all the same ills as the French Army. To a certain degree the French still have that problem. They have over the years attempted to maintain a place as an international power through their self-declared hegemony over Francophone Africa. They have never developed the airlift to really support it. Shaba II and Kolwezi was a slapped together operation. Operation Turquoise in 94 was even worse as it used former Warsaw Pact gas guzzling aircraft to get 'em there and they really needed the US to get 'em home.
Japan suffered from having two very separate services in the army and navy (both in terms of doctrine and cultural/social origins), so there was much more conflict between the two services than there was in other nations. Japan never really went for a strategic air force in the sense that the US or Britain did: their military development was influenced by both the Germans and the British (Germans for army and British for navy).
Agreed and that is why I put them in the middle group--because like the US and the Brits and unlike the Germans, the Japanese did exploit the carrier as a strategic arm. Once we crippled their carrier arm at Midway, they never again mounted a strategic threat.
Hitler's direction wasn't doctrine. I was talking about doctrine. The development of the Luftwaffe prior to 1939 was a direct reflection of what the Germans took from World War I. What he had to work with (and mess up) was in no small measure developed from what the Germans learned in 1917 and 1918...and his obsession with bombing London might come from that time as well, since the Germans tried terror raids then, too (as did the Allies...it was all part of the air power kit back back then, and many thought it would be successful).
Absolutely correct. Hitler never understood the role of a strategic bomber just as he never understood the capabilities or limitations of the U-Boat force. But neither did the General Staff, especially considering the potential role of the strategic bomber on the Eastern Front, ever really get beyond seeing the aircraft as flying artillery. As for naval strategy, the U-boats were Germany's strategic naval force but Hitler started the war short of the necessary numbers. They--like the German air forces--were absolutely brilliant for the early years of the war and largely irrelevant by 1944.
Seapower is also dependent on geography. It could be argued that the Germans in World War I understood sea power but lacked the freedom (or perceived freedom) of movement (defined as ports with clear lines to the open ocean) to exploit it. There's also developed national "instincts" to consider. Using Germany as an example (although this could also apply to France), most of her immediate enemies shared common land borders. In the cases of Britain, the US, and Japan the main threats would be coming over water. Many of the failed naval powers (Spain and possibly France) ended up stretching their resources too far; fighting major campaigns on land and sea at times when they could only realistically afford one or the other.
Here I believe we are in synch, especially on the issue of national "instincts' because that is where I tie the seapower--airpower effectiveness together.
Best
Tom
Steve Blair
06-04-2007, 07:10 PM
Absolutely correct. Hitler never understood the role of a strategic bomber just as he never understood the capabilities or limitations of the U-Boat force. But neither did the General Staff, especially considering the potential role of the strategic bomber on the Eastern Front, ever really get beyond seeing the aircraft as flying artillery.
This quote keeps coming back to me, and I think it again illustrates the impact of geography on strategic thinking. The German high command was arguably brilliant when it came to operational concepts, but their thinking was bordered by the English Channel and the Alps, with some short excursions into Poland. I really don't think they could deal with the concept of the geographic space of Russia. It's one thing to look at a map, but another to actually SEE that much space (drive through Kansas, parts of Colorado, and eastern Wyoming and you understand what I mean). They could look at a map and see the scale, but the sheer distance didn't mean anything to them until they were in the middle of it.
For traditional Continental conflicts the German air force idea was quite sound. But they couldn't think in the distance required. The British could (to a degree) because of their geography and history of far-flung commitments, and of course the United States had the same concept of space. Japan, I think, came on the world stage too late in the day to develop the proper concepts of space for their operations (although they did grasp some concepts based on their seafaring background better than the Germans did...mainly the need for aircraft with range). The Russians, faced with traditionally land-based opponents and fairly limited conflicts (in terms of the fronts of engagement) before the two World Wars, developed a more focused view of conflict (also based on their great strength: numbers or mass).
Interesting stuff.
Japan, I think, came on the world stage too late in the day to develop the proper concepts of space for their operations . . . .
I think the combination of the rise in internal stability (AKA functional nationhood) and geography may have a big part to play in this analysis. Germany, Japan, and Italy all came to the table of internationally-oriented nationhood rather late in the game--somewhere in the mid- to late 1800s. The Russians and French, while they stablized earlier, as noted in earlier posts were not focussed on the seas as a primary means of attaining economic livelihood. Of Tom's list, only England has relatively strong internal national stability by the end of the 17th Century (despite the Wars of the Roses, Scottish issues, and Cromwellian Revolutions).
But, I think a bigger part may be the fact that of the list that Tom started with, the two big air/sea power integrators (US and UK) both have never been on the losing side of a major international confrontation. France was wacked twice--under Louis XIV and Napoleon (and even though victors in WWI and II, they were , as Robert Doughty notes of them in his recent book on France in WWI, winners of a Pyrrhic victory). Germany also lost twice in the two World Wars. While Japan beat the Russians handily, it was humbled in its only other major modern war, WWII. The Western Europeans and Japanese did a number on Russia in the Crimean and Russo-Japanese Wars, respectively. Mongol, Polish/Ukrainian, and Napoleon's invasions set them back as well. They were their own worst enemy in their revolution. Italy did not fare well in either WWI or WWII (like France part of the WWI winning side but badly beaten up in that effort). Spain lost its imperial effort to an international consortium as a result of the 30 and 80 Years Wars as well as the Wars of the Successions (Spanish and Austrian).
And my personal favorite example (which didn't even make Tom's list)--Sweden, hammered, after a great start in the 30 Years and Great Northern Wars.
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