Lebanon (all aspects)

[SWJED]

On today's events...


IDF Troops Searching for Two Inside Lebanon (http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1150885976658&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull) - Jerusalem Post
Hezbollah Kidnaps 2 IDF Soldiers (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/737634.html)- Haaretz
'Israel Holds Lebanon Responsible' (http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1150885977735&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull)- Jerusalem Post
IDF: If Troops Not Freed Clock Turned Back on Lebanon 20 Years (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/737687.html) - Haaretz
Hezbollah Captures Two Israeli Soldiers (http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-07-12-voa5.cfm)- Voice of America
Hezbollah Captures 2 Israeli Soldiers (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/12/AR2006071200262.html) - Washington Post
Israel Launches Air, Ground Assault in Lebanon (http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060712/wl_mideast_afp/mideastunrestlebanonisraeloperation_060712084436) - Agence France-Presse
Hezbollah: 2 Israeli Soldiers Captured (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/12/AR2006071200262.html)- Associated Press
Hizbollah Says Abducts Israeli Soldiers in Raid (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/12/AR2006071200281.html)- Reuters
Israel Confirms 2 Soldiers Captured (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/12/AR2006071200295.html)- Associated Press

[SWJED]

SWJ Daily News Links for 14 July (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/news/060714.htm) on Israel, Palestinians, Syria and Iran...

Go there for links to:


IDF Foils Infiltration Attempt on Northern Border - Jerusalem Post
Barrage of Katyushas Hits Bar'am - Jerusalem Post
Israel Blockades Lebanon; Wide Strikes by Hezbollah - New York Times
Israel Steps Up Attacks in Lebanon; Rockets Hit Haifa - Washington Post
Israel Moves to Seal Off Lebanon - Washington Times
Israel Blocks Lebanese Coast - Los Angeles Times
Beirut Airport Blasted by Israeli Fighter Jets - The Australian
Israeli Forces Bombard Lebanon - London Daily Telegraph
Two Sides - One War - London Times
Israel Escalates Military Campaign Against Lebanon - Voice of America
Hezbollah Rains 120 Rockets on Israel - New York Times
Attacks Could Erode Faction's Support - Washington Post
Israel Intensifies Attacks Against Lebanon - Associated Press
Israel Tightens Lebanon Blockade - Reuters
Israel Bombs Hamas Offices in Gaza - Reuters
Israel Hits Beirut Airport Again - Reuters
Lebanese Told to Flee Militant Stronghold - The Australian
Our Aim is to Win - Nothing is Safe, Israeli Chiefs Declare - London Times
Violence Opens Old Wounds From Lebanon’s Past - New York Times
Escalation Ripples Through Middle East - Christian Science Monitor
Iran, Syria Called 'Playing with Fire' - Washington Times
Ahmadinejad Warns Against Syria Strike - Associated Press
Despite Hezbollah's Ties to Iran and Syria, It Also Acts Alone - LA Times
Bush Gives Qualified Support for Israel’s Strikes - New York Times
U.S. Urges Restraint By Israel - Washington Post
Bush Defends Israeli Attacks in Lebanon - Associated Press
Bush Asks Israel Not to Disrupt Beirut - Washington Times
U.S. Vetoes U.N. Resolution on Israeli Offensive in Gaza - Voice of America
U.S. Vetoes U.N. Condemnation of Israel - Associated Press
U.N. Security Council Calls Urgent Meeting on Mideast - Voice of America
Olmert's Political Fate Tied to Israeli Military Campaigns - Los Angeles Times
The Risks of Israel's Two-Front War - Time Magazine
Iran & Syria: States of Terror - Wall Street Journal Editorial
The State of Lebanon - London Daily Telegraph Editorial
The Mideast Erupts - Washington Post Editorial
Israel's Risky Response - Los Angeles Times Editorial
Dogs of War Out Again - Miami Herald Editorial
War on Israel: Iran's Dirty Hands - New York Post Editorial
Voices of Peace Muffled by Rising Mideast Strife - New York Times Analysis
Leader who Lacks Military Pedigree - London Times Analysis
Necessary Steps for Israel - Washington Post Commentary
Utter End of Peace Process - The Australian Commentary
Israel’s Invasion, Syria’s War - New York Times Commentary
Heartland in Greatest Danger Since 1948 - The Australian Commentary
Crisis is an Iranian Smoke Screen - London Daily Telegraph Commentary
Patrons of Terror Forcing the Issue - The Australian Commentary
Behind the Crisis, A Push Toward War - Washington Post Commentary
Middle East's Symbolic Slugfest - Los Angeles Times Commentary
The Same War - National Review Commentary
Israel's Existence at Stake - Real Clear Politics Commentary
Hitting Gaza, Lebanon Targets Simply Self-Defense - Miami Herald Commentary
The Guns of July - Adventures of Chester Blog
The Guns of July Part 2 - Adventures of Chester Blog
The Veto, Fajers and the Road to... - Belmont Club Blog
Something Old, Something New (Bolton's Statement) - Belmont Club Blog
When You Lose The Wahhabis... - Captain's Quarters Blog
Haifa Hit As Hezbollah Wants Iranian Escalation - Captain's Quarters Blog
The Middle East, Where To? - Iraq the Model Blog
Iranian Manufactured Missiles Launched at Haifa - Counterterrorism Blog
CT Blog Experts' Posts on Lebanon and Hezbollah - Counterterrorism Blog
It Already Is a Regional Conflict, Mr. Abbas - Threats Watch Blog
Middle East Full News Coverage - Vital Perspective Blog

[SWJED]

15 July Associated Press - Israel: Iran Aided Hezbollah Ship Attack (http://story.news.ask.com//article/20060715/D8ISG5FO3.html).


A missile fired by Hezbollah, not an unmanned drone laden with explosives, damaged an Israeli warship off Lebanon, the army said Saturday. Elite Iranian troops helped fire the missile, a senior Israeli intelligence official said.

One sailor was killed and three were missing.

The intelligence official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the information, said about 100 Iranian soldiers are in Lebanon and helped fire the Iranian-made, radar-guided C-102 at the ship late Friday.

The official added that the troops involved in firing the missile are from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, an elite corps of more than 200,000 fighters that is independent of the regular armed forces and controlled directly by supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Initial information indicated the guerrillas had used a drone for the first time to attack Israeli forces. But the army's investigation showed that Hezbollah had fired an Iranian-made missile at the vessel from the shores of Lebanon, said Brig. Gen. Ido Nehushtan.

"We can confirm that it was hit by an Iranian-made missile launched by Hezbollah. We see this as very profound fingerprint of Iranian involvement in Hezbollah," Nehushtan said in an interview with The Associated Press.

Another Hezbollah missile also hit and sank a nearby merchant ship at around the same time, Nehushtan said. He said that ship apparently was Egyptian, but had no other information...

[SWJED]

20 July Washington Times - Israeli Arms Overpower Hezbollah (http://www.washtimes.com/national/20060719-114231-3740r.htm) by Rowan Scarborough.


The ongoing exchange of armaments between Israel and Hezbollah is a mismatch in terms of firepower. Israeli pilots are using precision satellite guidance to unleash 500-pound munitions, while the Lebanese terrorist group relies on less accurate rockets, most with smaller warheads.

Israel dominates the airspace over Lebanon, and uses satellite and spy drone imagery to locate targets. Hezbollah is without an air force and owns only a few drones. Hezbollah rocketeers simply calibrate the distance to Israeli cities and then launch in hopes of hitting a populated neighborhood.

Lebanon yesterday pegged the death toll from Israeli air strikes at 310; Israel says 28 of its citizens have been killed by rocket attacks. It says it has destroyed 50 percent of the enemy's military structure.

Robert Maginnis, a former Army artillery officer, said Hezbollah's rockets, if launched successfully, usually can hit a target within a one-mile diameter.

"They aren't accurate enough to hit a building, but you fire them at a small town or village and they are probably going to hit something inside that small town or village. They could go after a police station or hospital, and they might hit one or the other."

Hezbollah is estimated to have a rocket force of more than 13,000, from which it periodically has fired on northern Israeli towns during the past 20 years. This time, the attacks come in waves, with nearly 1,000 launched since July 12.

Hezbollah's arsenal features a hodgepodge of old and newer surface-to-surface rockets, most made in Iran and Syria, with ranges from 10 miles to as far as 200 miles. They include the family of Soviet-designed Katyushas; the Fajr-3 and -5 based on the Katyusha; the Zelzal-2, which can carry up to 300 pounds of explosives and travel more than 100 miles; and the Shahin, which can fly various distances.

They launch them from vehicles, and this shoot-and-run tactic makes it more difficult to track the launch site with counter-battery radars.

"The rocket damage is more psychological," Mr. Maginnis said. "You've seen the damage that has been done. Occasionally, they hit a building. They have killed some people. They want to instill fear."

Mr. Maginnis doubts Israel can destroy Hezbollah's military from the air. He recalled the examination of the Kosovo battlefield after the U.S.-led air war against Serbian army troops. It showed that NATO's claims of knocking out hundreds of weapons were not substantiated.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah can hide its rocket, mortar and small-arms arsenal in residential areas that are not on the Israeli air force target list....

[Jedburgh]

From HRW: Lebanon: Hezbollah Rocket Attacks on Haifa Designed to Kill Civilians (http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/18/lebano13760.htm)

Hezbollah's attacks in Israel on Sunday and Monday were at best indiscriminate attacks in civilian areas, at worst the deliberate targeting of civilians. Either way, they were serious violations of international humanitarian law and probable war crimes, Human Rights Watch said today.

In addition, the warheads used suggest a desire to maximize harm to civilians. Some of the rockets launched against Haifa over the past two days contained hundreds of metal ball bearings that are of limited use against military targets but cause great harm to civilians and civilian property. The ball bearings lodge in the body and cause serious harm...
Israel Must Provide Safe Passage to Relief Convoys (http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/20/lebano13779.htm)

According to news reports, eyewitnesses and official Lebanese sources, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have struck several supply trucks entering Lebanon over the last two days.

In one incident on Monday, Israeli missiles struck a convoy of trucks from the United Arab Emirates near the town of Zahleh as it approached Beirut from Syria, damaging or destroying three of the trucks, as well as four passenger vehicles. Washington Post and Agence France-Press reporters at the scene wrote that the trucks contained supplies of medicines, vegetable oil, sugar and rice. The Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Emirates (UAE RC) said in a statement that the convoy contained medical supplies and medicines, as well as several ambulances...

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 15 July: Iran's Support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060715_hezbollah.pdf)

...AP says that an Israeli intelligence official (Brig. Gen. Ido Nehushtan?)said that about 100 Iranian soldiers are in Lebanon and helped fire the Iranianmade, radar-guided C-802 at the Israeli ship late Friday, and that the Iranian forces were from the IRGC, a force controlled by supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Nehushtan is quoted as saying that "We can confirm that it was hit by an Iranian-made missile launched by Hezbollah. We see this as very profound fingerprint of Iranian involvement in Hezbollah." The strike is also important because the Israeli ship is one of Israel's most modern missile ships. It carries Harpoon and Gabriel missiles, and has one of Israel's most advanced systems for detecting and electronically jamming attacking missiles. Israel states, however, that the ship's missile detection and deflection system was not operating, apparently because the sailors did not anticipate such an attack...

[Stu-6]

I am no expert in navel systems but shouldn’t that missile have done a lot more damage? If that was a C-802 it was very big warhead on a small frigate. It seems like it would have be a near catastrophic hit.

[SWJED]

21 July Washington Times - Inside the Ring (http://www.washtimes.com/national/20060720-113915-8553r_page2.htm) by Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough.


...We asked a former Navy combat pilot to assess the Israeli air force's war against Hezbollah. He told us:

"I'm reminded of the 1982 war with Syria. I was sitting off the coast of Lebanon on the USS Independence. Every day there would be headlines about how the Syrians had shot down another Israeli aircraft. A close look at the news clips showed that they had actually shot down a UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle]/drone — not an Israeli aircraft. This was, in fact, an Israeli tactic. They knew how many SAMs [surface-to-air missiles] Syria had and were counting down the attrition rate. They denied Syria any Soviet resupply of those SAM assets. When Israel had determined that Syria had expended their inventory of SAMs, they launched a tremendous air strike against Syria, which resulted in a victory within about 48 hours.

"So, today, I think the war of attrition is still the plan. Israel really wants the current government of Lebanon to succeed, but know they don't have the wherewithal to accomplish it without getting rid of Hezbollah and ensuring that Hezbollah cannot be resupplied by Iran or Syria.

"Ergo, the bombing/cratering of the runways at Beirut international airport — these Israelis are not dumb — a careful review of their bombing will show you that they carefully, with precision, cratered the runways at intersections so that no runways could be used. The road to Damascus was cratered so that no supplies could be brought in.

"Israel knows within a dozen or so how many Katyushka missiles Hezbollah has [and their inaccuracy] and how many other Iran-supplied longer range missiles that could hit Tel Aviv. I suspect they're waiting this attrition out and will then make an effort to destroy Hezbollah. I also won't be surprised when Israel air forces pass unmolested through Iraq airspace [controlled by the U.S.] on their way to and from Iran." ...

[Jones_RE]

This articles makes the usual (and understandable) error of assuming that national policy is driven by a single coherent rationale, with a single coherent goal.

In fact, Israeli policy (like any nation) is drawn up by a contentious procedure of consensus, consultation, backstabbing and suspicion (the same mix that drives every country).

Different actors within the Israeli government (and in Israeli society more generally) have different goals for military action and therefore advocate slightly different actions.

Presently, there is a rare moment of convergence in which most Israelis support fighting Hezbollah. However, it's ludicrous to think that they all support the same kind of fighting for the same reasons. No doubt some Israeli policy makers want to see a reoccupation of Southern Lebanon (even if they don't think the public will support it), others might be backing airstrikes on the understanding (tacit or explicit) that they are a mere prelude to negotiations with Hezbollah. Some may even believe that the current campaign will actually result in Hezbollah's destruction, or the erosion of their morale. Not all of these actors are military men. Even the ones who are may not be particularly good strategists. There's plenty of room for mistakes, misperceptions, personal ambition and wishful thinking in every government.

I think that far too often strategy is something we apply after the fact. Whoever happened to be advocating the right one in his memos is deemed a military genius by the historians and everyone else is sort of ignored or derided. In fact, it would appear that strategy is a process of trial and error (especially error) wherein one side or the other actually wins.

Personally, I believe the Israelis are conducting their strategy based around an appraisal (accurate or not) of the political limits surrounding their use of force. The government's blitzlike attacks in Gaza and Lebanon would seem to indicate a fear that a ceasefire will occur before they can inflict militarily significant damage on their opponents. Given muted Arab criticism (and outright, although unacknowledged, US approval), Israeli decision makers may have re-appraised the true extent to which they may conduct military action. That being the case, they're revising their plans on the fly.

[Jones_RE]

Military operations of any size call for massive, intense planning in order to line up intelligence, forces and supplies in a coordinated fashion. This planning usually takes quite a long time to accomplish (on the scale of weeks). Israeli planners have probably drawn up several plans for use against Hezbollah. Top decision makers probably chose the one that best fit their limitations and resources rather than deliberately crafting their strategy for this exact moment. This whole operation probably combines off the cuff improvisation, an old plan, and the most recent intelligence updates into a strategic mish mash that suits most of the participants. Even then, there will be mistakes in the execution of this plan. Finally, Hezbollah has a seat at this table and can (through its actions) dictate Israeli operations to a degree. As such, speculation about the exact motivation for any given target, bombing or whatever is completely pointless without full access to the records of both sides and a thorough analysis only available after the fact.

[SWJED]

Here are the references contained in the Lebanon (http://smallwarsjournal.com/ref/lebanon.htm) section of the SWJ Library (http://smallwarsjournal.com/reference.htm) on IDF operations in Lebanon...

The Vulture and The Snake Counter-Guerrilla Air Warfare: The War in Southern Lebanon (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/gordon1.pdf) - Shmuel Gordon. Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 39, July 1998. In recent years there has been a growing interest in counter-guerrilla warfare, taking an ever more important place alongside the preparation for High Intensity Conflicts (HIC), though little theoretical discussion of the subject has taken place. Guerrilla strategy and tactics, however, have been thoroughly studied in all their aspects in the writings of Clausewitz, Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, Lawrence, Che Guevara, Giap and Debray. Guerrilla warfare encompasses much beyond the purely military, and so does the struggle against it. This struggle integrates political activity, economic and social policy, ideological and religious confrontation, psychological warfare, the competition for public opinion and for the media. Thus, the results of a struggle between a state and a guerrilla movement are not necessarily decided on the battlefield. However, it is very important to address the military aspect of counter-guerrilla warfare, since, while military victories do not necessarily end the overall conflict, military failures in the struggle against guerrillas are conducive to a guerrilla victory. The major part of the literature in this field concentrates on guerrilla warfare, while, strangely, despite the fact that intellectual centers and think-tanks are largely located in countries that have to fight guerrillas, the literature that addresses counter-guerrilla warfare is quite limited.

“Just War” Case Study: Israeli Invasion Of Lebanon (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/arantz.pdf)- Major Christopher Arantz, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 2002. This essay examines Israel’s overall reasons for invasion of southern Lebanon, and compares them to just war theory’s war-decision law and war-conduct law. This examination will establish that Israel achieved her objectives before war termination, which lead to some unjust actions. Between 1948 and 1982 Israel had engaged in conventional combat four times against Arab coalition forces. In all cases, Israel fought for survival of its state and established a military dominance in the region. In the years leading up to 1982, the Israeli government sought ways to eliminate security problems in its occupied territory and across its border with southern Lebanon. Israel defined its security problems as terrorist excursions that threatened the security of its people and property in northern Israel. This paper will examine Israeli conduct of deciding to go to war and their conduct of war in relation to just war theory. Three areas will be examined; 1) Did Israel have a just cause, use a legitimate authority and the right intention for invading Lebanon as in accordance with Jus ad Bellum? 2) Did Israel conduct the conflict in accordance with Jus in Bello? 3) What are the long-term ramifications for the region since the invasion?

The Israeli Experience in Lebanon, 1982-1985 (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/solley.pdf) - Major George Solley, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College research paper, 1987. On 6 June 1982, the armed forces of Israel invaded Lebanon in a campaign which, although initially perceived as limited in purpose, scope, and duration, would become the longest and most controversial military action in Israel's history. Operation Peace for Galilee was launched to meet five national strategy goals: (1) eliminate the PLO threat to Israel's northern border; (2) destroy the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon; (3) remove Syrian military presence in the Bekaa Valley and reduce its influence in Lebanon; (4) create a stable Lebanese government; and (5) therefore strengthen Israel's position in the West Bank. This study examines Israel's experience in Lebanon from the growth of a significant PLO threat during the 1970's to the present, concentrating on the events from the initial Israeli invasion in June 1982 to the completion of the withdrawal in June 1985. In doing so, the study pays particular attention to three aspects of the war: military operations, strategic goals, and overall results.

Urban Warfare Study: City Case Studies Compilation (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/urbancasestudies.pdf) - Marine Corps Intelligence Activity study, 1999. In 1997, in light of the probability of future operations in urban environments, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) was tasked to provide a preliminary assessment of urban warfare lessons learned in support of the CSEEA Joint Wargame. Three scenarios across the spectrum of conflict from mid- to low-intensity were chosen to represent urban operations. The lessons are drawn from Russian operations in Chechnya, Israeli operations in Lebanon and British operations in Northern Ireland. This study presents strategic, operational, tactical and technical lessons learned from each of those operations.

Attack Helicopters in Lebanon, 1982 (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Spiller/Spiller.asp#5AH)- Dr. George Gawrych. US Army Command and General Staff College Press article, 1992. While the Vietnam War saw the evolution of the helicopter from a troop transport and medical evacuation vehicle to a close air support weapon, Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon witnessed the emergence of attack helicopters as tank killers. In the 1973 Middle East War, the Israelis employed helicopters primarily to transport ground troops, evacuate casualties, and resupply combat units. By 1982, however, both the Israelis and the Syrians had purchased attack helicopters and were developing their own particular doctrines for their employment.

[Tom Odom]

I can vouch for two of the authors, George Gawrych who team taught Mid East military history with me at CGSC and George Solley who was an OGL UNMO with me in 1987.

I would also say look at Depuy's book on Lebanon and some of the more juornalistic accounts.

Best
Tom

[SWJED]

29 July Washington Times commentary - Notes on a War (http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20060728-085310-7801r.htm) by Paul Greenberg.


... With no desire to occupy the south of Lebanon again, and no clear alternative in sight to Hezbollah's rule there, the Israelis might have preferred to conduct a guerrilla war, striking and withdrawing, much like the one Hezbollah has been waging against them.

But such a war could go on approximately forever. Now the Israelis are talking vaguely about establishing a "security zone" in the south of Lebanon. It once was called a "buffer zone" when the Israelis occupied southern Lebanon for a long, draining 18 years. But with Hezbollah's rockets now raining on Israelis, that long ordeal begins to look like a peaceful idyll, and Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon six years ago a big mistake. For Hezbollah has had six years to prepare for this war.

There are no good choices in this conflict, and the Israelis keep trying different strategies. No single one has yet jelled.

Early on, the Israelis seemed to suffer from a modern delusion: that modern weapons have rendered infantry obsolete, and all objectives can be achieved at a safe distance -- by air power, by naval guns and embargoes, by artillery short- and long-range, maybe even by diplomacy.

Call it the Rumsfeld Doctrine, and the Israelis may have fallen prey to it. Slowly they have had to face the obdurate truth that in the end some grunt -- indeed, many grunts -- must actually close with the enemy to win a war. But even now they're thinking in terms of brigades, not divisions -- as if this were a border incident and not the wider war it is. It's one thing to prepare the battleground for the infantry to advance, quite a futile other to believe just tearing up the land can substitute for seizing and holding it.

In a war like this, possession is ten-tenths of victory. That's an old if bloody principle, but not an outmoded, one. And it finally seems to have dawned on the Israeli commanders who, like an American general named Ulysses S. Grant, now propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer...

[Uboat509]

I suspect that the Israelis aren't really sure what to do next. Sure they can push Hezbollah back and seriously damage their infrastructure but then what? Occupation has not worked out for them. A lot of people are complaining that Israel is holding back because of some political correctness or fear of what the left wing says or something. That doesn't seem terribly plausible to me. I suspect that Hezbollah is trying to goad Israel into a large scale invasion of Lebenon in order to possibly spark a larger conflict between Israel and any number of Arab nations. Of course Israel can beat any or even all of the Arab countries but wars are costly, even ones that you win. And there is still that pesky problem about what to do afterwords. Do you create a buffer zone? How? NATO will do a lot of hand wringing but won't help much. The UN will continue on the path of uselessness. We are are their staunchest ally but we are waist deep in Iraq and Afghanistan. Occupying the buffer zone themselves just adds to the cost. So what does a nation do in that situation?

SFC W

[SWJED]

23 August Associated Press report - U.N. Drafts Rules for Force in Lebanon (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/23/AR2006082300273.html) by Edith Lederer.


Proposed rules of engagement for an expanded U.N. force in southern Lebanon would allow troops to open fire in self-defense, protect civilians and back up the Lebanese army in preventing foreign forces or arms from crossing the border, according to a U.N. document obtained Tuesday.

The 20-page draft was circulated to potential troop-contributing countries last week by the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which is trying to get an additional 3,500 troops on the ground by the end of next week to strengthen the 2,000 overstretched U.N. peacekeepers already there.

The rules of engagement for the expanded force - obtained by The Associated Press - have held back some potential troop contributors because of concerns that their soldiers would be required to disarm Hezbollah, which has controlled southern Lebanon.

Some countries have also been concerned that the rules would be overly restrictive, all but preventing commanders from making quick decisions - including using force if needed...

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 21 Dec 06: Lebanon at a Tripwire (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/lebanon/b20_lebanon_at_a_tripwire.pdf)

Lebanon has badly lost its balance and is at risk of new collapse, moving ever closer to explosive Sunni-Shiite polarisation with a divided, debilitated Christian community in between. The fragile political and sectarian equilibrium established since the end of its bloody civil war in 1990 was never a panacea and came at heavy cost. It depended on Western and Israeli acquiescence in Syria’s tutelage and a domestic system that hindered urgently needed internal reforms, and change was long overdue. But the upsetting of the old equilibrium, due in no small part to a tug-of-war by outsiders over its future, has been chaotic and deeply divisive, pitting one half of the country against the other. Both Lebanon’s own politicians and outside players need to recognise the enormous risks of a zero-sum struggle and seek compromises before it is too late...

[marct]

From CBC.ca


Militants fight Lebanese troops outside refugee camp (http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2007/01/25/lebanon-clash.html)
Last Updated: Thursday, January 25, 2007 | 5:10 AM ET
The Associated Press

Islamic militants on Thursday fired mortars and rocket-propelled grenades at Lebanese troops as they deployed outside a Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon, forcing hundreds of civilians to flee, security officials said.

The soldiers fired back at the Jund al-Sham militants in an exchange that lasted about 10 minutes outside the Ein el-Hilweh refugee camp near the southern port of Sidon, the officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to speak to the media.

There was no immediate word of casualties.

It was not clear why the Jund al-Sham, an extremist Muslim group, opened fire. Two weeks ago, there was a similar exchange between members of Jund al-Sham and the national army near Ein el-Hilweh in which two soldiers were wounded.

[marct]

Another one of those cheat sheets from CNC.ca. This one has a nice timeline in it.


In Depth
Lebanon
Timeline
Last Updated January 30, 2007
CBC News

Lebanon has been the home of civilized cultures for nearly 5,000 years. Phoenicians, originally from Babylon, settled on a narrow strip of land on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean in 2700 BC, and established city-kingdoms in what are now Tripoli, Sidon and Beirut.

The region has been the territory of the Phoenicians, the Assyrians, Persians, the Roman Empire, Arabs, Egyptians, the Ottoman Empire and France, before gaining independence in 1943. As a result, Lebanese culture is rich with influences from them all.

From its independence to the start of the civil war in 1975, Lebanon was the wealthiest country in the region and was held up as an example of co-operation between different cultures and religions. Beirut was sometimes called the "Paris of the Middle East."

More... (http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/lebanon/)

Marc

[Jedburgh]

...a good backgrounder from USIP: On the Issues: Lebanon (http://www.usip.org/on_the_issues/lebanon.html)

Lebanon's internal politics can be baffling to outsiders, even as fresh rounds of assassinations and demonstrations continue to make international headlines. But understanding Lebanon is essential if we are to make sense of the broader region, says Institute Senior Program Officer Patricia Karam. "Lebanon is the barometer of the Middle East," she says. "It has always reflected regional tensions and drawn in outside powers." To help unravel Lebanon's complexities, USIP talked with Karam about the country's past and its prospects for the future. What emerges is a portrait of a nation riven by deep internal cleavages and surrounded by powerful neighbors, a country at the epicenter of ever-shifting geo-political forces, where the hard, precarious work of peace can be upset by sudden, unpredictable tremors....

[Tom Odom]

Here is another good source

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/index.html)

It offers access to the UN research library with mission reports and maps. I just used the mission reports from my time in Lebanon for a paper I am working.

Best

Tom

[SWJED]

22 May Washington Post - Lebanon Confronts A Fierce Adversary (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/21/AR2007052100768.html) by Ellen Knickmeyer.


A little-known Islamic militant group based in a Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon battled government troops Monday in some of the country's fiercest fighting since the civil war ended in 1990, surprising the Lebanese military with the scope of the group's weaponry and financing.

Tank and artillery fire pounded blocks of the Nahr al-Bared camp, creating towers of black smoke, as the second day of fighting pushed the death toll among soldiers and militants to at least 50. Palestinian officials told news agencies that nine civilians had been killed inside the camp Monday, but there was no word of Sunday's civilian casualties...

[SWJED]

22 May NY Times - Lebanese Army and Islamists Battle for 2nd Day (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/22/world/middleeast/22lebanon.html?ref=world) by Hassan Fattah.


Lebanese tanks and artillery pounded a Palestinian refugee camp in this northern Lebanese city for the second straight day on Monday, battling members of a radical Islamist group and raising concerns for thousands trapped inside.

Government officials said at least 60 people had been killed — 30 soldiers, 15 militants and 15 civilians — in the fighting that began when a police raid on bank robbers early Sunday escalated into one of Lebanon’s most significant security crises since the end of the civil war in 1990.

The militant group, Fatah al Islam, which is thought to have links to Al Qaeda, fired antiaircraft guns and mortars and had night vision goggles and other sophisticated equipment. The Lebanese Army does not have such gear.

Lebanese television stations reported that among the dead militants were men from Bangladesh, Yemen and other Arab countries...

[aktarian]

Government officials said at least 60 people had been killed — 30 soldiers, 15 militants and 15 civilians — in the fighting that began when a police raid on bank robbers early Sunday escalated into one of Lebanon’s most significant security crises since the end of the civil war in 1990.

I guess author wasn't paying much attention to news last summer..... :rolleyes:

[tequila]

Well, to be fair a lot more people have died already in this dustup, and it's not over yet.

[goesh]

A UN relief convoy got hit trying to enter the fatah islam camp. I don't know how Intelligence keeps up with all these splinter groups

[aktarian]

Well, to be fair a lot more people have died already in this dustup, and it's not over yet.

Wasn't body count last year around 1.000 dead on Lebanese side and about 150 on Israeli?

Plus arguemnt could be made that last year's fighting led to political confrontation between Hezbollah and rest of government resulting in protests and couple of deaths.

[SWJED]

31 May Washington Post - U.N. Council Backs Tribunal For Lebanon (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/30/AR2007053000227.html?hpid=topnews) by Colum Lynch and Ellen Knickmeyer.


A sharply divided U.N. Security Council voted Wednesday to create an international criminal tribunal to prosecute the masterminds of the February 2005 suicide bombing that killed former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri and 22 others.

The vote will lead to the creation of the first U.N.-backed criminal tribunal in the Middle East, raising expectations that Hariri's killers will be held accountable. But that has stoked fears among Lebanese authorities and some council members that supporters of Syria -- which has been linked to the assassination -- will plunge Lebanon's fledgling democracy into a bloody new round of internal strife...

[Jedburgh]

Posted on the Counterterrorism Blog, 1 Jun 07:

On May 25, 2007, copies of a new video recording were publicly distributed over password-protected Al-Qaida Internet websites after being authenticated by the pre-eminent Al-Fajr Media Center. The seven-minute recording contains a speech by a masked individual identifying himself only as the “military commander of Al-Qaida’s Committee in Al-Shams” (“Greater Syria”). This is the first known occasion that any individual or organization inside of Lebanon has explicitly identified themselves as part of the international Al-Qaida terrorist network....
Video Threat to Lebanon from "Al-Qa'ida in Greater Syria" (http://www.globalterroralert.com/pdf/0607/qaidashams0607.pdf)

[Ski]

AQ has opened up a new front. Damn. I wonder if we are going to let the Lebanese Army handle this alone. I've read we've been shipping ammo over to them.

[SoiCowboy]

It seems it doesn't matter how podunk or backwater your group is.

Say the magic word Al-Qaeda and you get news time.

I'm just surprised its taken this long for it to happen in this area.

[Abu Buckwheat]

It seems it doesn't matter how podunk or backwater your group is.

Say the magic word Al-Qaeda and you get news time.

I'm just surprised its taken this long for it to happen in this area.

This is an excellent observation. AQ has had a supporting Jihadist organization in Lebanon for some time called the Asabat al-Ansar in Southern Lebanon ... they have lost dozens of men, including their senior commander, fighting in Iraq. Somehow this minor group, Fatah-Al-Islam got associated with the words "Al Qaeda" because they are Sunni and militants... now theyare part of AQ Global? ... this works so well in AQ's global IO campaign... AQ may actually start supporting them and they may actually becaome what we say they are.

However a cautionary note: When AQ names a wing with the region behind it, it generally means that they are taking aim at the regime there. Syria now has bigger problems than Israel if AQ plans to operate in that region and with all of those new Saudi "tourists" coming in and out of Iraq with combat experience they may be asking us and the Israelis for assistance with their Salafist problems soon enough. For Israel this is another bad sign of what happens when you don't back the devils you know... as if Hizballah and HAMAS teach them that lesson.

[tequila]

Wasn't body count last year around 1.000 dead on Lebanese side and about 150 on Israeli?

Plus arguemnt could be made that last year's fighting led to political confrontation between Hezbollah and rest of government resulting in protests and couple of deaths.

You're right. I was only thinking of the March 14 vs March 8 political confrontation.

As far as Fatah al-Islam is concerned, it's instructive sometimes to listen to bin Laden's own words (http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=7403):


All that we have mentioned has made it easy for us to provoke and bait this administration. All that we have to do is to send two mujahidin to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-Qaida, in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses without their achieving for it anything of note ...

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus, 12 Jun 07:

Are Outside Actors Funding Sunni Islamist Groups in Lebanon's Camps? (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373461)

...Since the emergence of Fatah al-Islam as an armed jihadi threat earlier this spring, Lebanon's Sunni-led March 14 coalition has been forced to answer charges from the Hezbollah-led opposition and others that it—as well as its Saudi and Jordanian allies—has been funding Sunni Islamist groups like Fatah al-Islam in an effort to counter the strength of Hezbollah's weapons and manpower. Links between Fatah al-Islam and the Syrian regime that emerged following the recent clashes made those accusations easier to counter; with respect to the armed groups in Ain al-Helweh, however, the accusations have been both more frequent and harder to disprove....

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 22 Jun 07: Summer Wars in Lebanon? (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070622_cordesman_commentary.pdf)

Lebanon is already involved in four potential struggles:


A Syrian effort to restore influence, if not control.


The rebuilding and restructuring of Hezbollah military power as both a means to gaining power in Lebanon and as an Iranian and Syrian supported threat to Israel.


Confessional struggles for power reflected in a major division between a Christian-Sunni prime Minister and a slim majority of Parliament and a Presidency with Syrian and Hezbollah ties, and


A struggle against the emergence of Sunni Islamist extremist movements with ties to Al Qa’ida that has led to clashes between the Lebanese Army and extremists in Palestinian Camps, but which involves Lebanese supporters of Al Qa’ida as well.

None of these struggles need turn into a “war,” but all of them can. They also interact, not only with internal developments in Lebanon, but developments in Israeli-Syrian relations, regional tensions with Iran, Palestinian struggles, and conflicts involving Sunni Islamist extremist movements like Al Qa’ida. The question of who will use whom interacts with the question of how far things can escalate, and no one can predict the outcome....

[SWJED]

25 June NY Times - 5 U.N. Peacekeepers Killed in Lebanon (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/25/world/middleeast/25lebanon.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin) by Nada Bakri.


A car bombing killed five United Nations peacekeepers in southern Lebanon on Sunday, opening another potentially disastrous fault line in a country held hostage to violence and political deadlock.

No one claimed responsibility for the attack on the peacekeepers, who were deployed along the border with Israel after last summer’s war with Hezbollah. But suspicion immediately fell on militant Islamists, who are fighting the Lebanese Army in the country’s north. The United Nations force, Unifil, has been on alert for weeks because of that fight and several bombings that are believed to be related to it...

[SteveMetz]

ICG, 21 Dec 06: Lebanon at a Tripwire (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/lebanon/b20_lebanon_at_a_tripwire.pdf)


To put it in a larger perspective, I thought this essay (http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chi-mxahansonjun22,0,124604,print.story?coll=chi-newsopinioncommentary-hed)by Vic Hanson was one of the best assessments I've read for a long time:

Mideast cripples own cause


Victor Davis Hanson, senior fellow and historian at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University: Tribune Media Services

June 22, 2007

'The Palestinian people will never forgive the Hamas gangs for looting the home of the Palestinian people's great leader, Yasser Arafat." So Palestinian Authority spokesman Abdel Rahman recently exclaimed. "This crime will remain a stain of disgrace on the forehead of Hamas and its despicable gangs." Looting? Crime? Despicable gangs?

Excuse me. For years, Palestinian Authority-sanctioned gangs shot and tortured dissidents, glorified suicide bombing against Israel and in general thwarted any hopes of various "peace processes."

Of course, this kind of behavior isn't limited to the Palestinian territories but is spread across the Middle East. The soon-to-be-nuclear theocracy in Iran is grotesque. Iraqis continue to discover innovative ways to extinguish one another. Syria assassinates democratic reformers in Lebanon.

Here's why much of the region is so unhinged -- and it's not because of our policy in Palestine or our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

First, thanks to Western inventions and Chinese manufactured goods, Middle Easterners can now access the non-Muslim world cheaply and vicariously. To millions of Muslims, the planet appears -- on the Internet, DVDs and satellite television -- to be growing rich as most of their world stays poor.

Second, the Middle East either will not or cannot make the changes necessary to catch up with what they see in the rest of the world. Tribalism -- loyalty only to kin rather than to society at large -- impedes merit and thus progress. So does gender apartheid. Who knows how many would-be Margaret Thatchers or Sandra Day O'Connors remain veiled in the kitchen?

Religious fundamentalism translates into rote prayers in madrassas while those outside the Middle East master science and engineering. Without a transparent capitalist system -- antithetical to both sharia (Muslim law) and state-run economies -- initiative is never rewarded. Corruption is.

So, Middle Easterners are left with the old frustration of wanting the good life of Western society but lacking either the ability or willingness to change the status quo to get it. Instead, we get monotonous scapegoating. Blaming America or Israel -- "Those sneaky Jews did it!" -- has become a regional pastime.

And after the multifarious failures of Yasser Arafat, the Assads in Syria, Moammar Gadhafi, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Saddam Hussein and other corrupt autocrats, many have, predictably, retreated to fundamentalist extremism.

Almost daily, some fundamentalist claims that the killing of Westerners is justified, because of a cartoon or a Papal paragraph or, most recently, British knighthood awarded to novelist Salman Rushdie. The terrorism of Osama bin Laden, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Taliban is as much about nihilist rage as it is about blackmailing Western governments to grant concessions.

Meanwhile, millions of others simply flee the mess, immigrating to either Europe or the United States...

[SWJED]

7 July NY Times - Chaotic Lebanon Risks Becoming Militant Haven (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/07/world/middleeast/07lebanon.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin) by Souad Mekhennet, Michael Moss and Michael Slackman.


... One year ago, this country found itself in the middle of a war between Israel and the Lebanese militia Hezbollah after Hezbollah fighters crossed the border and seized two Israeli soldiers. Although the war’s catastrophic damage drew Lebanese together, they quickly turned on one another politically. Killings, bombings and political protests have become routine.

Political forces find themselves stalemated, with no one firmly in charge. Neighborhoods of rubble from last year’s war remain uncleared, and politicians on each side accuse those on the other of blocking reconstruction to prevent them from getting credit.

Parliament has to select a new president in September, but with the governing coalition and the opposition hostile to each other, that could set off an unraveling of what remains of the system of governance.

“If you are in a hole, at least stop digging,” said Ali Hamdan, foreign affairs adviser to Nabih Berri, speaker of Parliament, leader of the Shiite Amal movement and a close ally of Hezbollah. “Unfortunately, the Lebanese keep digging.”...

[Jedburgh]

GEES, 12 Jul 07: The Lebanon: What Comes Next? (http://www.eng.gees.org/english/pdf/218/)

The Current Context

1.- The political crisis in the Lebanon is still unresolved and seems to be worsening: The pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian factions are still in stand-off position, the institutional system is paralysed and sectarian-religious rivalries have done nothing but increase over the last few months. This crisis will simply become more acute between now and the presidential elections next September....

2.- Syria poses an increasingly complicated challenge both within the political panorama and with regard to the security situation. Its first objective is to prevent the inquiry into Hariri's death from implicating persons close to the regime headed by Bashar al-Assad, if not the Syrian President himself. However, at the same time, Damascus aspires to break out of the position of international isolation to which it has been consigned in recent years....

3.- The deterioration of security conditions is evident and, quite possibly, impossible to reverse. Over the last month we have witnessed ever-worsening sectarian violence and terrorist attacks in the north of the country, in Beirut and now in Southern Lebanon.....

4.- Israeli Uncertainty. On Sunday 17th June, Israel suffered a strike from two Katyusha missiles fired from Lebanese soil (specifically, from the area controlled by the UN Interim Force in the Lebanon, UNIFIL, and the Spanish contingent). The attack was condemned by Hezbollah and responsibility was assumed by a hitherto-unknown group that called itself the Jihad Badr Brigade. The Israeli authorities did not respond to this attack because they believed that any attack on their part would seriously compromise the fragile position of the government headed by Prime Minister Siniora in Beirut, which was already under attack from Hezbollah and Syria.....

[davidbfpo]

I like 'The Intelligence & Terrorism Information Center' www.terrorism-info.org.il and receive their newsletters. They recently featured a lengthy review of UNIFIL and the security situation in Southern Lebanon. Has some nice photos too, some maps are a little confusing.

Have a peek: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/un1701_0807.htm

davidbfpo

[Granite_State]

Bibnine, Lebanon - Mustafa Borghol stares solemnly out from one of dozens of "martyr" portraits stuck to walls in this village in northern Lebanon. The 24-year-old Lebanese Special Forces soldier is the 10th resident of Bibnine to die in three months of bitter fighting between the Lebanese Army and the Al Qaeda-inspired militants of Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp, just three miles from here.

"This village used to be famous for fishing and carpentry," says Mohammed Borghol, Mustafa's father, while sitting in his butcher shop. "Now it is famous for its martyrs, and we are very proud of them."

http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0828/p06s02-wome.html

Good to see increased esteem for a national institution there.

[Rex Brynen]

There is now doubt about the new-found esteem for the military (also related to its deployment to the south after last summer's war). One now often sees in Lebanon the entirely new phenomenon of billboards extolling the Army, put up by private companies.

However, the Lebanese Army has had a very tough job of it in Nahr al-Barid (against what are now only a few dozen Fateh al-Islam combatants), and I'm not sure that a lack of modern weapons systems is really the problem. Particularly striking has been the ability of Fateh al-Islam to fire off the occasional rocket barrage against nearby villages or the power plant, something that ought not to be happening when they're reduced to a small area, completely overlooked by Army positions.

That being said, the refugee camp is a nightmare to fight in: it is essentially a now-abandoned densely-build town of 32,000, with one road, 2-4 small lanes, and otherwise a maze of very narrow (1.5 m) zig-zagging alleyways.

Google Earth users can find a rather good view of it at 34º30'43.38" N 35º 57' 37.55 E

[Rex Brynen]

Lebanese troops crush Islamists in siege camp
2 September 2007

NAHR AL-BARED, Lebanon (AFP) — Lebanese troops on Sunday took full control of a devastated refugee camp that had been besieged for three months and held by diehard Islamist militants of Fatah al-Islam, the military said.

The Palestinian camp, a honeycomb of tunnels and houses reinforced against possible Israeli air attack, finally fell to a mass assault on Sunday after troops killed at least 37 Islamist militants as they made a desperate pre-dawn bid to break the siege, army and security sources said.

Another 15 Islamists were arrested, some of whom had managed to make it to nearby villages but were caught in the manhunt that included troops searching roofs and watertanks.

More than 220 people, including 158 Lebanese troops, were killed during the standoff which started on May 20 near the sprawling camp outside the northern city of Tripoli.

Now the hard part starts.

More than 32,000 people were displaced from Nahr al-Barid refugee camp, most of them fleeing to nearby Baddawi camp where they've been put up in refugee homes and UNRWA and Lebanese government schools since May 20. Nahr al-Barid is, from the UNOSAT (Ikonos) satellite imagery that I've seen, very badly damaged. UNRWA will need to find space for temporary accommodation for the displaced Palestinians (a sensitive issue in Lebanon), and then will have to reconstruct the camp (another sensitive issue, complicated by a host of land ownership and other questions). The costs will be significant, with camp reconstruction possibly running well over $150 million (equivalent to about one-third of UNRWA's annual budget for all 4.5 million refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the West Bank).

The Lebanese government was at pains to signal to refugees that the camp would be reconstructed, and that (in contrast to all previous governments) it was also committed to improving their general standard of living. However, given both the costs of continued reconstruction after the Israel-Hizbullah war last summer, high levels of government debt, and a Lebanese view that responsibility for the Palestinian issue is international, the funds for doing so will have to come from external (especially Gulf) donors.

Failure to reconstruct will not only prolong humanitarian suffering of the displaced, but will also be seen as confirmation of constant rumours that the Nahr al-Barid fighting was somehow engineered by the Siniora government and the US to destroy the camp, liquidate the refugee problem, etc.

Moreover, while the current government's position on Lebanese-Palestinian relations has been much more positive than past governments, the loss of so many Lebanese Army personnel (plus Fateh al-Islam rocketing of the Tripoli power station and nearby villages) has hardly improved relations at the popular level (despite few of the militants being Palestinian, and the government's emphasis that this was NOT a Lebanese-Palestinian conflict).

[goesh]

Personally, I think they will continue to be used as pawns by all factions in the ME. From the PLO expulsion by Jordan to Sabra and Shatila, to hamas attemtping to usurp the legitimacy of the palestinian authority to the intentional squalor of the refugee camps left unchecked by palestinian officials, their pawn status continues unabated. Little of the oil wealth of the ME will be donated, save but a few token million. Rich 'donors' know all too well the graft that occurs in ME. I was reading the other day in a local paper the fiscal analysis of our own 'charities', well regulated and monitored as they are, and I was quite amazed at how very little of the donated money actually is applied to the needy. Out of every 1 million given to the ME, my guesstimate would be 50-60K of it actually gets to the needy.

[Rex Brynen]

By global standards, very few Palestinian refugee camps are truly "squalid" by global standrads--in most places (Syria, Jordan, the West Bank) only a minority of refugees live in the camps, which have simply become low-income housing areas. Refugee incomes and standards of living in those areas are equal to those of the non-refugee population.

Gaza is slightly different because it is overcrowded, much poorer, and most of the population are refugees.

Lebanon is even more different still because refugees have, in the past, been barred from using government social services, from working in most professions, and even from owning property. (The Siniora government would like to change this.) Moreover, ever since the civil wars refugees have tended to cluster in camps for security. All of this reflects the enormous demographic and political sensitivity of the refugee issue in Lebanon, where the constitution explicitly forbids permanent settlement of the Palestinians there.

UNRWA--the UN agency that deals with Palestinian refugees--generally does an excellent job, as the social indicators suggest. (Donors have sometimes criticized the agency for budgetary planning and management/reporting issues, but not for corruption and waste.)

Gulf money financed the reconstruction of destroyed refugee housing in Jenin and Rafah/Khan Yunis (Gaza)... I suspect it will be the same in Nahr al-Barid.

[goesh]

http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1023/p7s1-wome.htm


Refugees grasp at bin Laden's words

Palestinian groups in Lebanon's Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp have little sympathy for US battle.

By Nicholas Blanford | Special to The Christian Science Monitor

AIN AL-HILWEH, LEBANON
Ali Al-Ali, a former Palestinian fighter, resides deep inside the slums of Lebanon's largest Palestinian refugee camp.

Living in appalling squalor and surrounded by 70,000 Palestinian refugees, many of whom long ago lost hope of returning to their former homes in what is now Israel, Al-Ali has seen how his neighbors are desperately seeking to salvage some hope from Osama bin Laden's speeches of support for the Palestinians.

They may disapprove of his methods, and most condemn the Sept. 11 attacks, but for some in Ain al-Hilweh, Mr. bin Laden has become a symbol of defiance to the US, Israel's main ally.

Al-Ali has lived for nine years in the Ozo district of the refugee camp. Ain al-Hilweh is Arabic for "Sweet Spring," the waters of which once irrigated the orange groves surrounding the coastal city of Sidon, 20 miles south of Beirut. But today, the only running water is the raw sewage trickling down open drains. Barefoot children play in the filth outside Al-Ali's front door.

His wife and four children sleep on the floor of his cramped home. "I get the bed," he says, pointing at a rickety iron bedstead next to the glassless window. The tin roof lets in clouds of dust in the sweltering heat of summer, torrents of rain in the bitter winter.

[Rex Brynen]

By global standards, very few Palestinian refugee camps are truly "squalid" by global standrads

Ugh, I need to learn to proofread.


http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1023/p7s1-wome.htm
Al-Ali has lived for nine years in the Ozo district of the refugee camp. Ain al-Hilweh is Arabic for "Sweet Spring," the waters of which once irrigated the orange groves surrounding the coastal city of Sidon, 20 miles south of Beirut. But today, the only running water is the raw sewage trickling down open drains. Barefoot children play in the filth outside Al-Ali's front door.
.

As I noted earlier, conditions in all of the camps in Lebanon are much worse than those in Syria, Jordan, and the West Bank. Until fairly recently, Palestinians (and often even the UN) were prohibited from taking building materials into the camps by the Lebanese army--again, out of fear of "tawtiin" (permanent resettlement). That policy has now been changed.

Ayn al-Hilwa is the largest camp in Lebanon (about 45,000), has particularly bad conditions, and appalling local security conditions: as with all camps (except now Nahr al-Barid) there is no Lebanese security presence in the camps, which instead is full of myriad armed factions, including various militant Islamist ones (notably Jund al-Sham). You'll find a camp profile here (http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/lebanon/einelhilweh.html).

In addition to UNRWA statistics, the best source of information on Palestinian refugees is FAFO (http://www.fafo.no/ais/middeast/palestinianrefugees/index.htm).

The very informative website of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (despite its name, a Lebanese government policy unit) is here (http://www.lpdc.gov.lb/index.php). Full disclosure: I worked as a policy advisor for these folks this summer.

[Sarajevo071]

DNA tests on body thought to be Abssi's come back negative


The Lebanese Army continued on Thursday to hunt down fleeing members of Fatah al-Islam, killing one and capturing seven within the vicinity of the battered Northern refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared as DNA tests came back negative for a body earlier identified as that of Shaker al-Abssi-leader of the group.
...

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=85098

[Jedburgh]

GEES, 27 Sep 07: Fear Factor: Lebanon and the European Way of Peacekeeping (http://www.eng.gees.org/english/pdf/231/)

The European-led United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon known as UNIFIL is proof positive, if any were needed, of why Europe is unlikely to ever be a global superpower. When the 13,400-member force was scratched together following last summer’s 34-day war between Israel and Hezbollah, Europeans said their kinder, gentler “soft power” approach to peacekeeping would teach the United States a thing or two about global politics. While the United States starts wars, Europe ends them, or so they claimed (http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1855958,00.html).

But today Lebanon is on the verge of political collapse, a defiant Hezbollah has rearmed to the hilt and rumors of another war with Israel are rife. And as Lebanon slides further into chaos, UNIFIL itself has become a tempting target, so much so that it now spends most of its time trying to protect itself.

Which raises the question: What, exactly, are the Europeans doing in Lebanon?

[Rex Brynen]

...if you ask me.


The European-led United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon known as UNIFIL is proof positive, if any were needed, of why Europe is unlikely to ever be a global superpower.

Despite the somewhat ambiguous content of OP 12 of UNSCR 1701 (2006) (http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1701), no one really thought that UNIFIL + was going to disarm Hizbullah, or stop smuggling across the Syrian border (it is not deployed along most of that border), and it certainly didn't have a mandate or capabilities to somehow stop a potential Lebanese civil war (largely a political issue). Europe also didn't think this was their superpower moment.

The Europeans did think--correctly--that everyone needed a way to climb down from a general war that:



Hizbullah started by accident (they clearly hadn't expected such an intense level of Israeli retaliation to the abduction of IDF personnel)

Israel escalated without any clear game plan (only FM Livni seems to have even raised the question of an exit strategy)

was causing enormous social, economic, human and political damage to post-civil war Lebanon

was also radicalizing public opinion throughout the Middle East.


It was the Israelis who increasingly insisted that if UNIFIL+ was going to be the way of everyone backing down from the confrontation, it needed to have forces somewhat more robust than Fijians (ie, Europeans). Washington, once it was clear that no IDF knock-out punch was in the cards, also belatedly agreed (and certainly wasn't about to volunteer US troops).

Quietly the Israelis have been saying for some months now that, far from performing below expectations, UNIFIL's deployment has shifted much of the locus of Hizbullah rearmament efforts north of the Litani River (although given Hizbullahs popular support in the south and ability to cover its tracks well, its anyone's guess what it has actually done in the UNIFIL deployment zone.)

There is a lot one can criticize about UN peacekeeping, but UNIFIL+ has, more or less, performed the limited task that the UNSC and contributing states set it (most importantly, providing a mechanism for ending the 2006 war). It is hardly fair to criticize it for not doing things that no one seriously ever thought it would be able to do.

[Tom Odom]

...if you ask me.

Despite the somewhat ambiguous content of OP 12 of UNSCR 1701 (2006) (http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1701), no one really thought that UNIFIL + was going to disarm Hizbullah, or stop smuggling across the Syrian border (it is not deployed along most of that border), and it certainly didn't have a mandate or capabilities to somehow stop a potential Lebanese civil war (largely a political issue). Europe also didn't think this was their superpower moment.

The Europeans did think--correctly--that everyone needed a way to climb down from a general war that:



Hizbullah started by accident (they clearly hadn't expected such an intense level of Israeli retaliation to the abduction of IDF personnel)

Israel escalated without any clear game plan (only FM Livni seems to have even raised the question of an exit strategy)

was causing enormous social, economic, human and political damage to post-civil war Lebanon

was also radicalizing public opinion throughout the Middle East.


It was the Israelis who increasingly insisted that if UNIFIL+ was going to be the way of everyone backing down from the confrontation, it needed to have forces somewhat more robust than Fijians (ie, Europeans). Washington, once it was clear that no IDF knock-out punch was in the cards, also belatedly agreed (and certainly wasn't about to volunteer US troops).

Quietly the Israelis have been saying for some months now that, far from performing below expectations, UNIFIL's deployment has shifted much of the locus of Hizbullah rearmament efforts north of the Litani River (although given Hizbullahs popular support in the south and ability to cover its tracks well, its anyone's guess what it has actually done in the UNIFIL deployment zone.)

There is a lot one can criticize about UN peacekeeping, but UNIFIL+ has, more or less, performed the limited task that the UNSC and contributing states set it (most importantly, providing a mechanism for ending the 2006 war). It is hardly fair to criticize it for not doing things that no one seriously ever thought it would be able to do.

Agreed but this is just more of the same when it comes to UN peacekeeping and UNIFIL in particular. The one's who cripple the effectiveness--often the U.S.--then criticize the efforts the most. It has happened repeatedly in the case of UNIFIL, an organization that has suffered plenty of casualties over the past 3 decades. The same thing happened in Rwanda with UNAMIR.

In the case of this author, he appears to be a European version of the Pat Robertson crowd, masquerading as a strategic analyst.

best

Tom

[Jedburgh]

An ICG follow-up to the report that started this thread, taking another look at the premise that Lebanon has badly lost its balance and is at risk of new collapse, moving ever closer to explosive Sunni-Shiite polarisation with a divided, debilitated Christian community in between.

ICG, 10 Oct 07: Hizbollah and the Lebanese Crisis (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/lebanon/69_hizbollah_and_the_lebanese_crisis.pdf)

....Contradictory signs are emanating from Lebanon. On the one hand, the cycle of destabilising violence and inflammatory rhetoric resumed with the 19 September 2007 assassination of a March 14 member of parliament, Antoine Ghanem. March 14 forces, echoed by Washington and Paris, immediately saw Syria’s hand. The Lebanese majority accused Damascus of seeking to erase its parliamentary advantage through the step-by-step physical elimination of legislators; the French foreign minister cancelled a scheduled meeting with his Syrian counterpart, explaining he was “extremely shocked by this latest assassination”. Saad al-Hariri went further, saying the regime in Syria would never stop its killings, because “it is their way”, and concluding that “the solution is not in getting rid of the regime of Saddam only, but of the regime of Bashar also”. Militias also are rearming at an alarming pace, particularly among the various (and rival) Christian groups.

On the other hand, prospects remain for a deal on the most urgent task, electing a new president. Even after the assassination, voices from both sides express hope that a compromise can be found, while external actors (France, Saudi Arabia and Iran in particular) appear eager to find a way out by focusing on a consensual candidate rather than one that perfectly suits their agenda. The initiative, spearheaded by Nabih Berri – in which the opposition would drop its demand for a national unity government at this stage on condition the parties agree on a consensus candidate by a two-thirds majority – was welcomed by parties across the political spectrum. It also certainly had Syria’s benediction, as it is hard to imagine Berri launching such a high-profile initiative otherwise. Contacts between majority and opposition have redoubled....

[Tom Odom]

Agreed on the premise that Lebanon is on the verge again; this is a much better report in that it looks at the Lebanese. The first report looked on UNIFIL as a European failure to somehow "fix" Lebanon's problems. This one does tie the regional players into the equation as well, putting the need to pull in both Israel and Syria into the discussions.

Somewhat disagree in that the "verge" in Lebanon is always present, given the nature of the country, its historical roots, and the ever present need to balance "confessional" politics.

best

Tom

[Jedburgh]

CEIP, 16 Nov 07: The Presidential Crisis in Lebanon Demands Urgent Attention (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/salem_wcomm.pdf)

Lebanon, an important piece of the precarious Middle East puzzle, is threatening to come undone in the coming few days. With the term of the Lebanese president Emile Lahoud coming to an end on November 24, the parliament has yet to meet, rival groups in the country have not agreed on a new president, and the country risks ending up with two governments and a serious breakdown of security and order. Despite a flurry of diplomatic and political activity, the parties—and their international backers—seem dangerously far apart; if a president is not agreed upon in the next few days, the country’s central institutions might soon collapse and the country might spiral slowly into a state of civil war. A high dose of intense international attention to Lebanon right now can save the country and the region years of open conflict and bloodshed. A number of leaders in Lebanon, the region, and around the world are focusing on bringing about a political resolution to the current crisis, but a redoubled effort from the United States and other major players is needed in these remaining days.....

[Rex Brynen]

Unless the Lebanese Armed Forces are the ones to make the attempt, then it doesn't matter.

Reality is, so far as I can tell...Hezbollah is not even remotely subject to the authority of the de jure government of Lebanon.

Until Hezbollah is brought under Beirut's control, and the whole of Lebanese territory is actively under the sovereignty of the government in Beirut, then the situation won't change much.

With the exception of this summer's fighting at Nahr al-Barid, the LAF has never been used domestically in a substantive way without it fragmenting along sectarian-political lines (as it did in 1976). Moreover, roughly c40% + of the Lebanese population is Shi'ite, as are a similar (or larger) share of the LAF rank-and-file. About half of the overall Lebanese population support the March 8 opposition (Hizbullah, Amal, Aoun). With the probable level of support for Hizallah in the LAF (or, at least, a refusal to use force against it), I can't imagine circumstances under which the LAF would even consider trying to forcibly disarm the party (even assuming it has the military capacity to do so)

The most probable outcome of the current presidential impasse is the formation of a national unity cabinet in which Hizballah is directly or indirectly represented, and in which it enjoys (along with its allies) a veto power over major decisions. In these circumstances, disarmament is even more unlikely, although a "moderating" change in the relationship between its political and military aspects might take place over time (although, for reasons I've already posted, I'm not optimistic this will take place quickly or soon).

[Ron Humphrey]

The most probable outcome of the current presidential impasse is the formation of a national unity cabinet in which Hizballah is directly or indirectly represented, and in which it enjoys (along with its allies) a veto power over major decisions. In these circumstances, disarmament is even more unlikely, although a "moderating" change in the relationship between its political and military aspects might take place over time (although, for reasons I've already posted, I'm not optimistic this will take place quickly or soon).

http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1647.htm

Not sure how easily thats going to happen either.

[Rex Brynen]

For those of you who have never seen a Hizballah promotional video, this is a good example (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a67Kw2Okmyk) (from Hizb's al-Manar TV).

Impressive production values, and note the nationalist (rather than Shi'ite-sectarian) imagery, most notably with the frequent display of the Lebanese flag.

There are some that highlight this even more (as well as showcasing their crack bagpipe team!), but they tend to get deleted from Youtube rather quickly (as this one might too).

[bourbon]

Reading this now:


Al Qaeda in Lebanon: The Iraq War Spreads (http://bostonreview.net/BR33.1/rosen.php), by Nir Rosen. Boston Review, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2008

[Rex Brynen]

Nir Rosen's piece is excellent.

So too is Bernard Rougier's Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon (http://www.amazon.com/Everyday-Jihad-Militant-Palestinians-Lebanon/dp/0674025296).

[Jedburgh]

USIP, 12 Feb 08: Facing the Abyss: Lebanon's Deadly Political Stalemate (http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/0212_lebanon.html)

....Today, Lebanon is plagued by a protracted political stalemate between a rump government led by the anti-Syrian March 14th coalition (inheritors of the Cedar Revolution) and the Hezbollah-led opposition. This dangerous deadlock has propelled Lebanon once again toward the abyss of civil war. Despite intensive Arab and European mediation efforts, a political compromise does not appear imminent. Rather, Lebanon seems poised to endure weeks, if not months, of continued paralysis and violence. This USIPeace Briefing examines some of the key issues underlying Lebanon’s current political turmoil.....

[Jedburgh]

Real Instituo Elcano, 12 Feb 08:

Fatah al-Islam: Anthropological Perspectives on Jihadi Culture (http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=334A948B-8799-ECD5-8123-1231E6456943&lng=en)

....This paper argues that the Jihadi culture of FaI is an appropriated and non-traditional culture which must be defended at all costs by its followers precisely because it is an artificial entity. FaI resembles any other Salafi Jihadi group in the sense that the only viable frame of reference is similar Jihadi groups, and this self-contained universe produces self-reference and little else. The appropriated cultural identity of a Jihadi explains the at times absurd insistence and emphasis on details pertaining to cultural symbols of a largely superficial nature. The battle for control of these symbols became FaI’s centre of gravity as a militant group, allowing it to distinguish itself from mainstream society, to which it certainly did not belong, and from other militant Islamist groups as well.....

[marct]

Very interesting article, Ted!

The appropriated cultural identity of a Jihadi explains the at times absurd insistence and emphasis on details pertaining to cultural symbols of a largely superficial nature. The battle for control of these symbols became FaI’s centre of gravity as a militant group, allowing it to distinguish itself from mainstream society, to which it certainly did not belong, and from other militant Islamist groups as well. (page 4)

Which explains part of the porosity within the topological space of Jihadi groups and, also, some of the entry points into that topological space.

[AdamG]

Fearing a War, Lebanese Prepare by Buying Up Arms
Potential for Violence Between Religious Sects Leaves Many Anxious
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/23/AR2008042303433.html?hpid=moreheadlines
http://media3.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2008/04/24/GR2008042400278.gif

(Find the inaccuracy in the graphic, win a cookie)

[AdamG]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7390943.stm

Supporters of Lebanon's Western-backed government and the Hezbollah-led opposition have been involved in fierce armed clashes in the streets of Beirut.

Television reports showed gunmen firing rifles and rocket-propelled grenades in Corniche al-Mazraa and Ras al-Nabaa.

The fighting began after the leader of Hezbollah described the government's move to close its telecommunications network as a "declaration of war".

http://smilies.vidahost.com/cwm/cwm/lurk.gif

[Tom Odom]

Hezbollah Ignites a Sectarian Fuse in Lebanon (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/world/middleeast/18lebanon.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&th&emc=th)

...That sentiment has stirred fears that moderate, secular Sunni leaders like Mr. Hariri could lose ground to more radical figures, including the jihadists who thrive in Lebanon’s teeming Palestinian refugee camps. Fatah al Islam, the radical group that fought a bloody three-month battle with the Lebanese Army in a refugee camp in northern Lebanon last year, issued a statement Thursday condemning Hezbollah’s actions. The group also gave a warning: “He who pushes our faces in the dirt must be confronted, even if that means sacrificing our lives and shedding blood.”

A New Kind of Conflict

The Sunni-Shiite conflict is relatively new in Lebanon, where the long civil war that ended in 1990 revolved mostly around tensions between Christians and Muslims, and their differences over the Palestinian presence in the country. But after Iran helped establish Hezbollah in the early 1980s, Lebanon’s long-marginalized Shiites steadily gained power and stature. They have also grown in numbers. Although there has been no census since 1932, Shiites are widely believed to be more numerous than Sunnis or Christians, the country’s other major groups.

This will prove interesting. It is not entirely correct in that the "Muslim" bloc in Lebanon when I was there was hardly a bloc--Sunni versus Shia tensions did exist but they were overshadowed by Muslim-Christian tensions, especially when it came to the Israeli occupied south. A Shia versus Sunni struggle will also echo across the border in Syria with an Alawite (Shia derivative seect) regime and a Sunni majority.

Tom

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 15 May 2008: Lebanon: Hizbollah's Weapons Turn Inward (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=3433&tid=5442&l=1)

....The recent escalation in violence was made possible, in part, by the long-standing ambiguity surrounding Hizbollah’s weapons. Lebanon must find a middle ground between irresponsibly allowing Hizbollah their unfettered use and recklessly seeking its forcible disarmament. Until a broader regional settlement is found – one that deals not only with the Arab-Israeli conflict but also relations between the U.S., Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia in particular – one cannot hope for much more. Still, as Lebanon edges toward civil war, that would be no modest achievement.
ISN Security Watch, 16 May 08: Lebanon Resumes Fragile Dialogue (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=18973)

...Despite a commitment to renewed dialogue, it remains unclear whether the alteration of the strategic balance between the March 8 opposition bloc and March 14 coalition, implicit in the opposition military successes, can precipitate a breakthrough on the key political issues that have separated the two sides since November 2007.

"I think that Hizbollah may have been damaged much more by the violence than the government in the sense that Hizbollah lost a lot of its legitimacy as a resistance movement that claimed that it would never turn its arms against the country," Shehadi said.

Referring to the violence, Haenni said, "It seems that even sources close to Hizbollah recognize that, in terms of popularity, Hizbollah is going to face severe losses."....
The Economist, 17 May 07: Iran's Tool Fights America's Stooge (http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11368030)

....The wonder may be that Lebanon has held together at all, and even maintained a veneer of democracy. But this veneer has grown steadily thinner since the end of the 2006 war, which, aside from leaving 1,200 Lebanese dead and 100,000 homeless, also widened the central fissure in Lebanese politics.

This division is often defined, for simplicity's sake, as a split between Hizbullah, backed by Syria and Iran in the interest of confronting Israel and blocking American influence, against the Western-backed, democratically elected government of Fuad Siniora, the Sunni prime minister. The reality is more complicated.....
CEIP, 21 May 08: Syrian/Israeli Peace Talks and Political Deal in Lebanon (http://carnegieendowment.org/files/0521_transcript_lebanon_syriaisrael.pdf)

.....I don’t think it’s quite correct to say this is a defeat for the Siniora government. What this is is a recognition of a situation that has been
existing for a long time. And in fact, by recognizing the situation—that is, the real power of Hizbollah to block what the government was doing—it’s an agreement that might allow, in fact, the government to govern a little more than it has been able to do so far. Now, concerning the issue of Hizbollah and whether it has, in fact, suffered a strategic loss, in many ways we will only know with the result of the next parliamentary election.....

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus, 24 Jun 08:

Fighting in Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugee Camps Result of Increased Islamist Influence (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374261)

Approximately a year has passed since the outbreak of violence between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF (http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/?ln=en)) and the armed Islamist group Fatah al-Islam in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared in Northern Lebanon; and yet—one year later—the situation in the camps is far from being stable. On the contrary, episodes of violence have spread to the Ain al-Hilweh camp, and the conflict has broadened to include other Salafist factions, such as Jund al-Sham, or Asbat al-Ansar.

In the past few months fighting has resumed in the Ain al-Hilweh camp (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?issue_id=3148), the largest Palestinian camp in Lebanon, located near the southern city of Sidon. Accordingly, Ain al-Hilweh—traditionally a foothold of Fatah and the former operating base of Yasser Arafat in the 1980s—is now increasingly under the control of Islamist groups. Among such factions, one of the most active has certainly been Jund al-Sham....

[Jedburgh]

ISN, 16 Jul 08: UN Peace Keeping in Lebanon: A Case Study (http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=9AFD60D1-9BA3-6691-E8A6-6EB2837DA325&lng=en)

This case study assesses the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/)) and the obstacles it faces. It argues that the current UNIFIL force has yet to overcome serious obstacles to achieving its mandate. This in turn is linked to broader national and regional political and security issues that need immediate attention in order to facilitate a resolution of the problems confronting Lebanon as a whole.

[Rex Brynen]

A new and very useful report on an understudied topic:

Aram Nerguizian (and Anthony Cordesman), The Lebanese Armed Forces: Challenges and Opportunities in Post-Syria Lebanon (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090210_lafsecurity.pdf), CSIS, working draft 10 February 2009.

For those of you interested in the historical evolution of the LAF, I would also flag Oren Barak's forthcoming The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in a Divided Society (http://www.amazon.com/Lebanese-Army-National-Institution-Divided/dp/0791493458).

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 19 Feb 09: Nurturing Instability: Lebanon's Palestinian Refugee Camps (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/84_nurturing_instability___lebanon_s_palestinian_r efugee_camps.pdf)

The vast Palestinian refugee population is routinely forgotten and ignored in much of the Middle East. Not so in Lebanon. Unlike in other host countries, the refugee question remains at the heart of politics, a recurrent source of passionate debate and occasional trigger of violence. The Palestinian presence was a catalyst of the 1975-1990 civil war, Israel’s 1982 invasion and Syrian efforts to bring the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) to heel. Virtually nothing has been done since to genuinely address the problem. Marginalised, deprived of basic political and economic rights, trapped in the camps, bereft of realistic prospects, heavily armed and standing atop multiple fault lines – inter-Lebanese, inter-Palestinian and inter-Arab – the refugee population constitutes a time bomb......

[Rex Brynen]

In ruins for 18 months, a Palestinian enclave languishes in disrepair (http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0311/p04s01-wome.html)

Lebanese officials worry that Gaza has overshadowed efforts to help Palestinian refugees there rebuild from a 2007 battle between the Army and militants.

By Nicholas Blanford | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
from the March 11, 2009 edition


NAHR ALBARED REFUGEE CAMP, LEBANON - Rebuilding Gaza isn't the only effort under way to improve the Palestinians' plight. Eighteen months after it was wrecked in fighting between the Lebanese Army and Islamist militants, this impoverished refugee camp is just beginning to be put back together again in a project hampered by a political crisis, slowed by donor apathy, and overshadowed by the war between Hamas and Israel.

"We are telling donors if you really want the camps improved and to end the misery, which makes these places fertile grounds for extremism, then we need resources," says Khalil Makkawi, a former Lebanese ambassador and chairman of the Lebanon-Palestinian Dialogue Committee.

Even though Lebanon has been trying to raise funds to improve conditions for Palestinians across the country, it may not even have enough money to rehouse some 30,000 refugees left homeless after the 2007 battle in Nahr al-Bared.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which is responsible for the welfare of Palestinian refugees, only has sufficient funds to rebuild homes for a quarter of the camp's population.

[Rex Brynen]

Re-Imaging the Lebanon Track: Toward a New U.S. Policy (http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/Noe.pdf)



Executive Summary

In the Century Foundation report entitled “Re-Imaging the Lebanon Track: Toward a New U.S. Policy,” Beirut-based political analyst Nicholas Noe argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, a viable roadmap for disarming Hizbullah through domestic peace-building exists within Lebanon itself—and that it should be pursued vigorously by the Obama administration.

Recognizing the deep challenges confronting both a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement as well as any “grand bargain” between the United States and Iran, Noe suggests these efforts can and should be explored concurrent with US-led efforts in Lebanon, but that the prospects for failure on both tracks, as well as the fast approaching elections this summer, means a new, Lebanon-focused policy is needed in the immediate term.

Based on his reading of Hizbullah and the multitude of limitations it faces, Noe concludes that Obama administration policymakers can better serve U.S. and Lebanese interests by breaking with their predecessors’ inflexible, often needlessly aggressive, approach.

Instead, he urges that they work toward undermining the rationale Hizbullah relies upon to justify its independent weaponry by driving a wedge between it and its vital political alliances and soft supporters across the spectrum of Lebanon’s confessional system. To do this, Noe suggests the following steps:...

View the full Executive Summary and Webcast - released December 10, 2008 - at: http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=EV&pubid=243

[William F. Owen]

Just read the paper once, but it seems written entirely from the perspective that even a really bad plan is better than no plan at all. It might be the starting point for a discussion, but only if you have a Hezbollah that is close to the one the paper supposes.

It really starts from the view point that if my mother had wheels, she'd be a steam engine.

It also makes a number of very groundless assumptions about how Israel views it's security dynamic with both Hezbollah and the Lebanese Government. Other than that, good effort.

[Danny]

This is a perfectly logical white paper, following the demands of its presuppositions to all of their necessary conclusions. But as the saying goes, input = garbage means output = garbage. Presuppositions mean everything.

If you can ignore what Hezbollah has said about itself for the last two decades and why they do what they do and the reason for their existence, and 220 dead Marines, and all of the globalist, jihadist rhetoric, and so forth, and simply focus on the notion of them being relatively placid chaps that really just want to be heard and respected by their countrymen and have a voice in government, then the report has some salient findings. Sure, if you activate the economy and do some "reconstruction," then their rai·son d'ê·tre as a military organization will end. Presto! No more guns!

But unless you take drugs before reading it, then you're going to come to quite different conclusions.

Smith out. No more time on that report for me.

[Jedburgh]

USIP, 1 Jun 09: Lebanon’s Parliamentary Elections: Anticipating Opportunities and Challenges (http://library.usip.org/articles/1012243.1113/1.PDF)

Executive Summary

• Neither of the two key competing political alliances—the governing March 14th coalition and the opposition March 8th bloc—will decisively win the June 7th parliamentary elections.

• The election provides an important opportunity to place Lebanon on a positive trajectory toward greater reform and reconciliation.

• The stakes are high, but the election is not an existential battle for Lebanon’s identity.

[Rex Brynen]

Building a better relationship: Palestinian refugees, Lebanon, and the role of the international community (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/retrieveattachments?openagent&shortid=MYAI-7T38NJ&file=Full_Report.pdf)

Source: International Development Research Centre (IDRC)

Date: 15 Jun 2009


Summary

In recent years, official Lebanese policy towards Palestinian refugees in Lebanon has undergone major changes. Increasingly, Lebanese officials have voiced their support for improved social and economic conditions for the refugees, while at the same time maintaining staunch opposition to their permanent resettlement (tawteen) in the country.

These policy changes have been marked by the formation of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC), by limited policy reforms in areas ranging from employment to the issuance of ID to unregistered refugees, as well as an unparalleled change in the tone of official pronouncements. The government has also been an essential partner with UNRWA in efforts to reconstruct Nahr al-Barid refugee camp (NBC), destroyed in fighting between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the radical Fateh al-Islam jihadist group in 2007. Just as important, LPDC has sought to change the narrative of Lebanese-Palestinian relations in a way that holds out greater promise to all communities.

These changes in policies have profound implications for the humanitarian circumstances of the refugees, as well as the economic and security interests of Lebanon. Improved Lebanese-Palestinian relations could also pay significant dividends for the region and international community too.

The continuation and deepening of the reform process is far from certain, however. It could be derailed by political changes following the recent June 2009 elections, local and regional developments, and limited Lebanese government policy capacity. A failure to deliver on promises of NBC reconstruction (due to insufficient donor support) could prove especially damaging.

...

[Rex Brynen]

Roman ruins put Nahr al Bared camp rebuild at risk (http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090906/FOREIGN/709059885/1002)

Mitchell Prothero, Foreign Correspondent
Last Updated: September 05. 2009 11:56PM UAE / September 5. 2009 7:56PM GMT


BEIRUT // The seemingly endless struggle by Lebanon’s political factions to form a national unity government appears to have spilt over the efforts to rebuild a Palestinian refugee camp destroyed in 2007, as a major political party has filed a lawsuit to halt reconstruction.

A lawsuit filed by the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), led by the former general, Michel Aoun, demanded that the rebuilding of the Nahr al Bared camp be halted in order to protect Roman ruins that were discovered during the clean up of the 2007 siege, much to the anger of the camp’s 20,000 former residents who are still displaced since the fighting.

...

After the lawsuit succeeded last week, Khalil Mekawi of the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee held an urgent meeting with prime minister Fouad Siniora and warned the prime minister that this decision might cause outrage among Lebanon’s estimated 250,000 Palestinian camp residents that could spill out across the country, leading to, in his words, “chaos”.

Depressing news indeed for those who were hoping that a new chapter in Lebanese-Palestinian relations might be forged in the aftermath of the 2007 NBC clashes.

(Also, UAE-based The National (http://www.thenational.ae/section/FOREIGN?profile=1011) is emerging as an excellent source of English-language regional news, for those of you who may not have seen it before.)

[M-A Lagrange]

[QUOTE=Rex Brynen;82024]
A lawsuit filed by the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), led by the former general, Michel Aoun, demanded that the rebuilding of the Nahr al Bared camp be halted in order to protect Roman ruins that were discovered during the clean up of the 2007 siege, much to the anger of the camp’s 20,000 former residents who are still displaced since the fighting.

No so much suprising coming from Aoun. He is aSyria pupet now and all he can do is supporting Hezbollah efforts.
In 2006, during the war, what surprised me the most was the fight inside the muslims between shia and suny on their legitimacy to be protect the palestinians in Lebanon.
The war behind the war was the fight between shia and sunny over palestinians. Soon after, Hezbollah was established in Gaza a 95% suny place.
And Aoun is with them...

[Rex Brynen]

No so much suprising coming from Aoun. He is aSyria pupet now and all he can do is supporting Hezbollah efforts.


He's politically ambitious, and for this reason finds it very useful to ally with Syria and Hizbullah--and for their part, they find the alliance equally useful. I don't think "puppet" captures the interests that lie beneath the relationships.


In 2006, during the war, what surprised me the most was the fight inside the muslims between shia and suny on their legitimacy to be protect the palestinians in Lebanon.

I'm not sure what you mean here.


The war behind the war was the fight between shia and sunny over palestinians. Soon after, Hezbollah was established in Gaza a 95% suny place.

Hizbullah cooperates with Hamas, and for that matter has cooperated with Fateh cells too. It has no real organization/support inside Gaza.

[M-A Lagrange]

Quote:
In 2006, during the war, what surprised me the most was the fight inside the muslims between shia and suny on their legitimacy to be protect the palestinians in Lebanon.

I'm not sure what you mean here.

By that time (july-august 2006), I was working as head of mission for a muslim humanitarian organisation based in UK (Islamic Relief). I did enter Lebanon during the war and conducted humanitarian operations in Tyr/Sour, Nabathiya and long the border with Israel.
I have been able to witness the struggle inside muslim humanitarian NGOs on Palestinian cause. Most of the middle east based muslim humanitarian NGOs are in fact state organisations (more or less). Them flowded palestinian camps with aid while they refused to provide aid to isolated shia populations in the battle field.
With some others (ICRC, Premiere Urgence, MSF), we were the only ones going physically there to deliver food aid.
There were even fatwa given by saoudi arabia respected religious leaders saying that the suny should not help the shia as it was tem who brought war to Lebanon and Palestinian.

I really witnessed an inside battle between shia and suny on their legitimacy to be the voice and the protector of palestinians, in Lebanon and in Palestine. The battle in the camps, just after the war, between lebanese army and palestinian foundamentalist did not surprised me so much. As the divisions inside the suny between "foundamentalists" and "progressists" were deep during the july war. In fact the inside challenge between lebanon state was more about who will stay between Hariri and foundamentalist inside the suny camp rather between Lebanon government and Hezbollah.

[Jedburgh]

WINEP, Nov 09: A Victory for Islamism? The Second Lebanon War and Its Repercussions (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus98.pdf)

....The political fallout of the 2006 war continues to be felt in Lebanon. In November 2006, Hizballah suspended its participation in the Lebanese cabinet, paralyzing the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. Simultaneously, the party erected a tent camp in central Beirut, bringing normal business to a standstill. Hizballah and its supporters then laid siege to the parliament and the prime minister’s headquarters, further undermining the state. Despite these actions, Siniora’s rump government continued to function, albeit without Shiite ministers.

The crisis escalated in spring 2008 when the government demanded an investigation into Hizballah’s security cameras at Beirut airport and its autonomous telecommunications network. Tensions turned to violence in May of that year, when Hizballah took over West Beirut by armed force. The government and opposition struck an agreement in Doha, Qatar, to defuse the crisis, and a coalition government was formed that once again included Hizballah ministers. In fact, Hizballah’s position in the government was strengthened by the Doha Accord, which provided the opposition with a blocking third of ministers and essentially gave the Party of God veto power over all government decisions.

Hizballah’s increasingly obvious influence as a kingmaker in Lebanese politics has allowed the party to emphasize its demands for a more Islamic society and perpetual war against Israel. Its success to date is based on a strategy of adapting to the local political structure while maintaining its long-term regional goals....
USIP, 10 Nov 09: Lebanon's Unstable Equilibrium (http://www.usip.org/files/resources/lebanon_equilibrium_pb.pdf)

Lebanon's recently announced national unity government has eased fears that the country would once again be mired in a dangerous political stalemate. Yet, despite the recent breakthrough, Lebanon's unstable equilibrium -- marked by both internal and regional tensions - - could still devolve into serious violence. Deep seated sectarian animosities persist, raising the prospects for political instability and civil strife if unaddressed. Regionally, mounting tensions with Israel raise the worrisome possibility of isolated border incidents spiraling into more serious conflict. Taken together these two underlying challenges to stability -- internal civil unrest and regional conflict with Israel -- could undermine Lebanon’s fragile peace. This paper will examine internal challenges to Lebanon’s stability.....

[davidbfpo]

I am sure there have been posts - apart from this thread - although SWC's gaze is often elsewhere.

Link to an IISS Strategic Comment:http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/november/lebanon-indictments-set-to-raise-tensions/

[Rex Brynen]

See below for an outstanding CBC investigative report into the Hariri assassination and the subsequent UN investigation:

CBC Investigation: Who killed Lebanon's Rafik Hariri? (http://www.cbc.ca/politics/story/2010/11/19/f-rfa-macdonald-lebanon-hariri.html#ixzz162agmNoY)

Last Updated: Sunday, November 21, 2010 | 10:54 PM ET
By Neil Macdonald CBC News


...

A months-long CBC investigation, relying on interviews with multiple sources from inside the UN inquiry and some of the commission's own records, found examples of timidity, bureaucratic inertia and incompetence bordering on gross negligence.

Among other things, CBC News has learned that:


Evidence gathered by Lebanese police and, much later, the UN, points overwhelmingly to the fact that the assassins were from Hezbollah, the militant Party of God that is largely sponsored by Syria and Iran. CBC News has obtained cellphone and other telecommunications evidence that is at the core of the case.
UN investigators came to believe their inquiry was penetrated early by Hezbollah and that that the commission's lax security likely led to the murder of a young, dedicated Lebanese policeman who had largely cracked the case on his own and was co-operating with the international inquiry.
UN commission insiders also suspected Hariri's own chief of protocol at the time, a man who now heads Lebanon's intelligence service, of colluding with Hezbollah. But those suspicions, laid out in an extensive internal memo, were not pursued, basically for diplomatic reasons.


...

Quite apart from the insight it offers into the killing, it is well worth reading for a detailed account of how SIGINT and network analysis were used to link Hizbullah to the killings.

[Rex Brynen]

Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon becoming less of a hotbed for militancy (http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/1231/Palestinian-refugee-camp-in-Lebanon-becoming-less-of-a-hotbed-for-militancy)
Christian Science Monitor
By Nicholas Blanford, Correspondent / December 31, 2010


The recent murder of a top Al Qaeda-inspired militant and an exodus of other militants may signal increased stability, due in part to cooperation between Fatah and Islamist factions.

The murder of a senior Al-Qaeda-inspired jihadi and the exodus of other militants from here in recent months may herald some welcome stability for this impoverished Palestinian refugee camp.

With some 70,000 Palestinian refugees squashed into little more than a square mile near Sidon, Ain al-Hilweh lies outside the jurisdiction of the Lebanese government and has long been plagued by Islamic radicalism and factional violence.

But a tacit agreement for calm between a coalition of Islamist factions and the Fatah movement of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has left little space for militants seeking to plot and stage attacks against the Lebanese state or foreign targets in Lebanon.

...

[SWJ Blog]

Palestinian Camp Wars: Memoirs of a Fatah Military Commander in Lebanon (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/palestinian-camp-wars-memoirs-of-a-fatah-military-commander-in-lebanon)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/palestinian-camp-wars-memoirs-of-a-fatah-military-commander-in-lebanon) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Holding Lebanon Together: The Lebanese Armed Forces (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/holding-lebanon-together-the-lebanese-armed-forces)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/holding-lebanon-together-the-lebanese-armed-forces) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[AdamG]

(Reuters) - Farmers armed with machineguns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars forced government troops to abandon an operation to destroy their illegal cannabis crop in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley on Monday, a witness said.

No casualties were reported in the exchange of fire but two security force vehicles were hit by bullets, the witness said.

During Lebanon's 1975-1990 civil war, the fertile Bekaa Valley produced up to 1,000 metric tons (1.1023 * 1000 tons) of cannabis resin annually and 30 to 50 metric tons of opium, used to make heroin.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/23/us-lebanon-clashes-drugs-idUSBRE86M0DA20120723

[davidbfpo]

From an observer of the scene:
The Bekaa confrontation is an annual event. If the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are not busy, they provide support to the Internal Security Force (ISF) in the crop eradication programme. However, if there are “problems” in Lebanon, the farmers take a punt that the LAF will not be able to support the police and plant more – as has happened this year, where they made the judgement that the LAF would be more concerned with the border with Syria. The ISF do not have the heavy weapons and helicopter support needed to successfully carry out the operation.

The ISF is a Gendarmerie type organisation and a Beirut paper has a different account:http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Jul-24/181724-army-battles-bekaa-cannabis-farmers.ashx

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to an observer of the scene:
in the coming days farmers will begin harvesting the illegal cannabis that is estimated to be worth $20 million and provides income for more than 3,000 families in Baalbek-Hermel alone.

Nevertheless:
6,615 dunums – out of 30,000 dunums in the northern Bekaa – were razed

A 20% success rate isn't that bad for such programmes.

Link:http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Aug-24/185552-bekaa-farmers-hedge-their-bets-on-cannabis.ashx#axzz24Ph0ziiy

[SWJ Blog]

Why Lebanon Will Not Fall (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-lebanon-will-not-fall)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-lebanon-will-not-fall) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[bourbon]

Lebanese officials say CIA warned them of imminent al Qaida attack on Hezbollah (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/07/15/196755/lebanese-officials-say-cia-warned.html), by Mitchell Prothero. McClatchy, 15 July 2013.

BEIRUT — The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency warned Lebanese officials last week that al Qaida-linked groups are planning a campaign of bombings that will target Beirut’s Hezbollah-dominated southern suburbs as well as other political targets associated with the group or its allies in Syria, Lebanese officials said Monday.

The unusual warning – U.S. government officials are barred from directly contacting Hezbollah, which the U.S. has designated an international terrorist organization – was passed from the CIA’s Beirut station chief to several Lebanese security and intelligence officials in a meeting late last week with the understanding that it would be passed to Hezbollah, Lebanese officials said.

Hezbollah officials acknowledged the warning and took steps to tighten security in the southern suburbs that are known locally as Dahiya.
Strange times we live in.

[jcustis]

It makes me wonder what an "al-Qaida linked group" means to the Lebanese officials referenced in the article, and what it means in true terms. Claiming you are down with AQ doesn't mean anything if you don't glean support in the way of materiel, manpower, or intel to drive operations. As Bill Nagle would often say, it's just putting a bumper sticker on it.

That moniker gets thrown around by the media wayyy to much these days, especially when the desired effect is to scare readers and mask deliberate journalistic integrity laziness. AQ has become the boogeyman catch-all.

Ambassador Stevens was a story where AQIM was thrown around before anyone even knew the scope of the incident.

[bourbon]

It makes me wonder what an "al-Qaida linked group" means to the Lebanese officials referenced in the article, and what it means in true terms. Claiming you are down with AQ doesn't mean anything if you don't glean support in the way of materiel, manpower, or intel to drive operations. As Bill Nagle would often say, it's just putting a bumper sticker on it.

That moniker gets thrown around by the media wayyy to much these days, especially when the desired effect is to scare readers and mask deliberate journalistic integrity laziness. AQ has become the boogeyman catch-all.

The story references the very specific nature of the intel – intercepts between known AQ in Lebanon and the Gulf – "al-Qaida linked group" is probably what CIA told them. I doubt we are in the practice of passing along vague threats to, or even communicating with, Hezbollah frequently.

No doubt that AQ has become a catch-all bogeyman (probably always has been), but the US government does not get a pass when it comes to fear-mongering and intellectual laziness with regard to AQ. The media does not get a pass either, but fwiw the author of the article – Mitch Prothero – is imo pretty solid with his coverage of Hezbollah and the Lebanon beat.

[Wyatt]

the big question is why alert hezbollah intentionally? are they not our enemies?

To me it shows how powerful hezbollah is. If they we're inconsequential, what would we care if they were harmed? Further, if they were weak we wouldnt care if they viewed us as partially responsible. Maybe we have added their performance in syria to their performance against Israel and have decided that we would rather not kick thats hornets nest at this time and threw them a bone in the form of this intel.

Are we knowingly siding with sunnis and accepting their AQ links because the geopolitical threat of a shia/persian victory is worse?

It seems possible to me.

[davidbfpo]

Wyatt,

From my viewpoint the decision was sensible. It is in our general interest that the civil war in Syria does not affect Lebanon even more and a bombing campaign could be the "spark" for communal violence. There have been clashes already and Lebanon is a fragile, nay brittle nation. An action that binds Hezbollah closer to maintaining the internal safety and security of the Lebanon is a plus.

[davidbfpo]

An IISS Strategic Comment 'Syrian war worsens Lebanon’s malaise':http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections/2013-a8b5/syrian-war-worsens-lebanon--39-s-malaise-e473

[davidbfpo]

A fascinating, horrible Vice documentary from Tripoli, Lebanon's second city which illustrates how a city - in places - has become the fiefdom of the new warlords, barons et al:https://news.vice.com/video/the-warlords-of-tripoli

The Vice summary:
The war in Syria is dragging neighboring Lebanon to the edge of the abyss, and nowhere is the growing chaos more stark than in the second city of Tripoli. Sunni militants aligned with the Syrian rebels frequently clash with fighters from the city's encircled Alawite minority, who support the Assad regime, in bitter street fighting the country's weak government is powerless to stop. With the rule of law no longer in effect in Tripoli, warlords like Sunni commander Ziad Allouki are now the city's real rulers, so VICE hung out with him and his fighters for a week to discover why they're fighting, and whether the country really is on the brink of civil war.I know the politics and human terrain of the Lebanon are complex. In some of the interviews the warlords explain all too well, including the fact the Sunnis fought Syria during its occupation and now support Bashir Assad.

The clip where the Lebanese Army arrive amidst an exchange of gunfire is horrible. The shooting stops and several trapped civilians then escape into the Sunni area, as the Army drive off a 50cal opens up on the Alawite enclave.

Shortly afterwards as night draws in the reporter leaves in a car and within minutes, if not three city blocks, is a very different city, brightly lit, people walking about and no gunfire.

There is an existing thread on the Lebanon (94 posts & 36k views):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2967

[jcustis]

VICE makes for some pretty insightful and powerful reporting. The format definitely shapes the discussion differently than anything else out there I have seen.

But are those guys warlords in the classic sense? It doesn't look like there is much to be gained in those few square blocks.

[davidbfpo]

VICE makes for some pretty insightful and powerful reporting. The format definitely shapes the discussion differently than anything else out there I have seen.

Yes I would agree. I did find their latest offering on ISIS strained credibility, but when you consider the restrictions placed upon them it is easier to understand.

This is reflected in the linked critique, which ends with:
Either way, Vice News has produced the most compelling coverage of this new war so far.

Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/arts/television/9287042/as-a-third-conflict-in-iraq-kicks-off-we-have-a-new-television-insurgent/


But are those guys warlords in the classic sense? It doesn't look like there is much to be gained in those few square blocks.

I couldn't think of a suitable adjective, so yes 'warlord' is not the best term. From the film it was clear they had power to defend and rescue; with an element of pay-back in being charitable. The film did not make clear where the money came from for all their activity.

In extreme civil situations the most unlikely defender can emerge. Often they are people who know violence and recognise an opportunity to become respected. Though the closing segment with a group leader lamenting the situation as his young daughters played with his sidearm indicated self-doubt.

[davidbfpo]

With events in Syria SWC may have overlooked the situation in the Lebanon, which although generally peaceful has VBIEDs, border clashes and communal clashes on a regular basis.

Thanks to the Soufan Group for this, which illustrates how brittle the nation-state is:
Sectarianism’s most prominent victim has historically been Lebanon (http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-momentum-carries-isis-into-lebanon/), which has not been able to avoid the latest tensions that stress its constitutional framework. Putting aside the massive human tragedy inside Lebanese refugee camps that are changing the demographics of the country, the Syrian civil war (http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-save-the-patient-syria-in-2015/) has thrust sectarianism into a country desperate to avoid it. Last week’s twin suicide bombings in the northern Alawite town of Jabal Mohsen (near Tripoli) killed nine and might have ignited smoldering sectarian tensions that have never quite been extinguished. It is appropriate that there are competing claims of responsibility since the term means less and less given the amorphous nature of sectarian motivation. The situation in the area is so fraught with sectarian tension and machinations that the government had to raid one of its prisons—Roumieh Prison—which was beyond the writ of control and whose inmates were allegedly responsible for coordinating the Mohsen bombings.
Link:http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-from-paris-to-baga/

[davidbfpo]

Another short description of the Lebanon by Professor Scott Lucas:http://eaworldview.com/2015/02/syria-analysis-lebanon-cracking-pressure/

It ends with:
Lebanon has managed a complicated local and regional juggling act for years – but all the signs are that, as Syria and Iraq continue their meltdowns, things will only get more difficult to hold together. And the prospect of the collapse of Lebanon for stability in the Middle East as a whole is ominous indeed.

[davidbfpo]

A long explanation of the Lebanese, then UN investigation into the murder of the Lebanese politician, Rafik Hariri, a former prime minister, was killed with 21 others in 2005, when a truck bomb exploded near his motorcade in Lebanon. Allegedly by Hezbollah and now a trial minus defendants in the Netherlands:http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/magazine/the-hezbollah-connection.html?smid=tw-share&_r=2

The case against the defendants depends on years of cell phone analysis. Using techniques now very familiar.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to FP's email on this deal:
The project is being entirely funded by Saudi Arabia, which is keen to see Lebanon’s Army defend its borders against Syria-based jihadi groups, particularly ISIS and the Nusra Front, Syria’s Al-Qaeda affiliate.

France is expected to deliver 250 combat and transport vehicles, seven Cougar attack helicopters, three small corvette warships and a range of surveillance and communication equipment over four years as part of the $3 billion modernization program. The contract also promises seven years of training for the 70,000-strong Lebanese Army and 10 years of equipment maintenance.
Link:http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Apr-20/295034-french-arms-boost-anti-terror-fight.ashx

[davidbfpo]

From Australia's Lowy Institute, the author I note has been "on the ground" and she starts:
Islamic extremism in Palestinian communities in the Middle East is emerging as a significant security threat. These relatively ungoverned spaces are proving vulnerable to radical takeover from without and within.
Link:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/04/24/Palestinian-communities-Levant-vulnerable-to-Islamic-extremism.aspx?

[OUTLAW 09]

LEBANON: Hassan Nasrallah's speech this morning at commemoration ceremony for Hezb fighter killed in #Syria. Some choice quotes:

Hezbollah has fought "for 30 years on the border with Palestine and have now gone to Sahl al-Ghab... to Hama, Idlib, Latakia, and Aleppo."

Hezbollah's presence "is larger than ever before, qualitatively, quantitatively, in equipment, b/c we are in a critical & definitive battle"

Why? Because both projects -- Zionist and takfiri -- want to achieve the same result: destroying our peoples and our societies."

The battle is open & it may be long. But with blessing of our perseverance, we have been able to protect these countries & this region."

Their fate would have been what the people of Mosul, Salahuddin, Anbar, Raqa, and Deir Ezzor are living now."

"Without the resistance on the ground confronting Daesh and its brothers, from Iraq, to Syria, to Lebanon, where would the region be today?"

We began confronting the takfiri project, which threatens the region & the world & wants to destroy everything: humans, life, societies..."

[OUTLAW 09]

Arsal Syrian refugee camps in Lebanon covered with snow need urgent fuel & food supplies.
https://youtu.be/LCSZb4Fj_I0

[OUTLAW 09]

KSA is now using their financial power as a "hard power" and letting Lebanon feel that they are in fact a version of Iran with Hezbollah and Amal existing within it's borders......

Should have been done ages ago, that country has become Iran lite-
Saudi withdraws all assets in Lebanese banks closed all bank accounts

[OUTLAW 09]

KSA now showing their Islamic Army leadership .....they view the Lebanon to be an Iran lite......their own version of KSA non linear warfare hard at work....

[BREAKING/EXCLUSIVE] Top GCC source to me just now: Saudi and UAE are about to withdraw their funds from Lebanese Central Bank.


NNA - Commenting on Saudi Arabia's decision to halt its aids to the Lebanese army and security forces, "Lebanese Forces" chief Samir Geagea on Friday held Hezbollah responsible for "losing billions of dollars" as a result of its permanent attack on Saudi Arabia.

Geagea called in a tweet on the government to instantly convene to take the appropriate measures in this regard, either through officially asking Hezbollah to desist from attacking the Kingdom from now on, or to dispatch an official delegation to the Kingdom to ask Saudi Arabia to activate once more its frozen aids.

[davidbfpo]

Saudi Arabia is halting a $3bn (£2.1bn) military aid package to Lebanon, as part of what one Saudi official called a "reassessment" of relations.The state-run Saudi Press Agency said the money was to be used by the Lebanese army to buy French weapons.A $1bn deal to equip the internal security forces is also being stopped.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35614917

Hardly unexpected.

[OUTLAW 09]

Lebanese Minister of Justice @Ashraf_Rifi resigns from the Government, says he won't be a part of an Iranian statelette in #Lebanon.

[davidbfpo]

A rare commentary on the peculiar relationship between the Lebanese Army (LAF), Hezbollah and UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon by an Australian academic. In summary:
Following civil war, re-establishing the legitimacy of a state’s army is a crucial part of security sector reform and international actors can aid this process. The capacity-building work of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon provides a useful example of this.Link:https://sustainablesecurity.org/2016/12/16/walking-the-blue-line-lebanons-security-sector-reform/

[davidbfpo]

A commentary by a SME I recognise; the Lebanon rarely get such coverage and there is a lot on Hezbollah:https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/neil-partrick/lebanon-in-eye-of-regional-storm? (https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/neil-partrick/lebanon-in-eye-of-regional-storm?utm_source=Daily+Newsletter&utm_campaign=0df56ef95b-DAILY_NEWSLETTER_MAILCHIMP&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_717bc5d86d-0df56ef95b-407365113)

[davidbfpo]

I suppose the official relationship between the USA and Lebanon's Army meant this could happen, plus some of the stranger SOF deployments in Syria between rival factions was a sign.

From an Israeli newspaper and their headline:
U.S. Special Forces in Lebanon Prepare to Fight ISIS – Alongside Hezbollah? The Americans are training with the Lebanese army, while Hezbollah is gearing up to fight ISIS.
Link:http://www.haaretz.com/amp/us-news/1.805446

[davidbfpo]

Updates, first a truce and now a ceasefire after the last post from the mountains along Lebanon's eastern border via the BBC.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-41065305

Plus a very astute PR photo by the Lebanese Army:https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/660/cpsprodpb/514F/production/_97451802_n190820172136.jpg
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-40990487

[davidbfpo]

Not only a strange partnership, replete with promises and then diplomatic obstruction as this article explains:http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/08/lebanon-army-offensive-isis-weapons-hezbollah-syria.html

Curiously the end result is:

The current unspoken partnership between the Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah and the Syrian army is a direct result of the efforts of those who have worked so diligently to keep the Lebanese Armed Forces under-equipped. By doing so, they have also inadvertently strengthened Hezbollah, making it the only viable military force in the country able to repel armed groups along the Lebanese border, and are now creating a reality on the battlefield that everyone is aware of but no one wants to acknowledge.

Yes Hezbollah emerges stronger, as this NYT article illustrates:https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/27/world/middleeast/hezbollah-iran-syria-israel-lebanon.html?