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SWJED
05-23-2007, 03:12 AM
22 May Small Wars Journal Blog - "Non Cents" (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/05/non-cents-1/) by Frank Hoffman.


Air Force Major General Charles Dunlap, a respected but frequently provocative author, has critiqued the Army/Marine counterinsurgency manual in a commentary titled “We have a COIN shortage” in the May Naval Institute Proceedings. I would have normally dismissed General Dunlap’s observations as a rare but poor example of discourse, as I have a lot of respect for him personally. But this commentary reflected more than just an inadequate grasp of irregular warfare. Having recently returned from a counterinsurgency symposium at Maxwell Air Force Base, it is clear that a broader misunderstanding exists about the nature of irregular conflict and FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 that needs to be cleared up...

As always, appreciate comments on the blog as well as here - thanks!

Dave

Sargent
05-23-2007, 03:31 AM
Great commentary. I loved the "the people live on the ground" line. Made me laugh out loud.

I would say this: USAF, as an institution, is not interested to see airpower operate as a support element. I worked USAF QDR in 2001, and I remember getting the stink-eye when, in a brain-storming session of things we could suggest to them as pieces for their report, I suggested various ways that extant platforms could be used to support the ground element. (Note, I didn't _mean_ to work the air side, it just happened that that was the project I got put on -- distinctly difficult for this ground-centric, airpower as a great supporting element gal.) I remember putting together a slide (from open source materials) that showed the air elements over Afghanistan once OEF kicked off -- it was insane what it took to put together that effort. And all I could think was, gee, look at all those targets. Try it one day, but be prepared for head spinning insanity.

Another thing that bothers me is this notion that we can depopulate the battlespace of our people and fight wars without loss. The enemy won't allow it. If our troops aren't there, then they will just come here to get them -- or the civilians. You can't fight -- let alone win -- a war without putting people at risk. It's the sad reality of war.

TROUFION
05-23-2007, 03:38 AM
I was listening to a NPR report yesterday of Airmen training in infantry squad tactics at McQuire AFB NJ. The commentator made an interesting final comment: paraphrased-the pentagon sees 350k airmen as a pool of trained personel in uniform capable of supplementing the ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The commentator had no military background, he was stating what appeared to be an obvious conclusion. I see articles like the one by MGen Dunlap as a direct reaction to this type of thought in the general US (and particularly Congress) population. It is an unfortunate byproduct of the war that the AF is relegated to a supporting role. The USAF is great, they can destroy just about anything anywhere and they want the lead in all things warlike and budgetary. But you can't shake hands and drink chai with a Mayor or Sheik from 30k ft. Maybe you could air deliver a VTC set and a generator, it could even be self deploying and unmanned, if done right it could have an automatic coffee maker and cigarette dispenser until then ya gotta be proud to support the guy on the ground in Small Wars. -T

Sargent
05-23-2007, 04:13 AM
I was listening to a NPR report yesterday of Airmen training in infantry squad tactics at McQuire AFB NJ. The commentator made an interesting final comment: paraphrased-the pentagon sees 350k airmen as a pool of trained personel in uniform capable of supplementing the ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The commentator had no military background, he was stating what appeared to be an obvious conclusion. I see articles like the one by MGen Dunlap as a direct reaction to this type of thought in the general US (and particularly Congress) population. It is an unfortunate byproduct of the war that the AF is relegated to a supporting role. The USAF is great, they can destroy just about anything anywhere and they want the lead in all things warlike and budgetary. But you can't shake hands and drink chai with a Mayor or Sheik from 30k ft. Maybe you could air deliver a VTC set and a generator, it could even be self deploying and unmanned, if done right it could have an automatic coffee maker and cigarette dispenser until then ya gotta be proud to support the guy on the ground in Small Wars. -T


I've actually thought that, at least as an interim solution, the Army could "draft" folks who had enlisted in the AF. But I don't mean having USAF folks TAD to the Army, I mean make them soldiers. They signed up, after all, and there is an element of "you'll go where we need you" included in that. They're taking individual augments from the Navy and putting them on the ground in a number of functions.

It's crazy -- back in the summer of 01 they thought they were going to own the world. The opening phase of OEF was a tease, but Tora Bora was the first nail in the coffin. Even "shock and awe" was... not. Another Marine (then LtCol Phillip Ridderhof) wrote this piece, which was quite good.

http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-War&month=0304&week=a&msg=iPFhkGb4vvxgoImeJS5Usw&user=&pw=

It's been downhill ever since.

Jimbo
05-23-2007, 11:15 AM
sergeant,

Uh, NO!!!!! I have plenty of time working with airmen in ground tours, beyond the usual ETAC types, and no way. It is kind of like teaching a first time shooter. It is better to deal with raw material than those who have already developed "bad habits". I have worked with some great airmen and such, but I would rather deal raw recruits from the street than and airman that was mandatorially reclssed into the Army.

Sargent
05-23-2007, 11:32 AM
sargent,

Uh, NO!!!!! I have plenty of time working with airmen in ground tours, beyond the usual ETAC types, and no way. It is kind of like teaching a first time shooter. It is better to deal with raw material than those who have already developed "bad habits". I have worked with some great airmen and such, but I would rather deal raw recruits from the street than and airman that was mandatorially reclssed into the Army.

You wouldn't even be able to break them down in recruit training? Alternatively, you could just take every other person who enlists and just divert them. Akin to how the Marine Corps would take "volunteers" out of the Army draftees.

In any case, it's not a long term solution, and it's mostly a comment on the USAF role in OIF. But wouldn't it be better reduce the tension on the Army now with an emergency stop gap rather than continuing to grind it down? Is it better to get recruits via a reduction in the enlistment standards? Where are you going to get a large mass of people fast? A tactical retreat is often difficult to swallow, but sometimes it's the thing you need to do to get some breathing room to regroup and organize for an effective counter-assault. So yes, it's a suboptimal solution, but the Army is in a suboptimal situation.

Tom Odom
05-23-2007, 12:09 PM
Well if the good MG feels that the FM is too ground centric and not Dr. Strangelove enough, he would really like my article on civilian casualties in COIN. That he would even surface strikes in Somalia as related to COIN shows where he is coming from.

Best

Tom

PhilR
05-23-2007, 12:15 PM
Another Marine (then LtCol Phillip Ridderhof) wrote this piece, which was quite good.



...And I thought nobody read those things. Its still LtCol USMC. Heading to MNF-I Strategy and Plans in a month. I've spent the last 3 years on the III MEF staff in Okinawa and I've been in numerous joint and combined exercises. Airpower is great, but the impression I'm getting is that the Air Force considers it a parallel campaign, not an integral part of the overall campaign. In the Tsunami Relief operation of 2005, the JFACC, which remained firmly emplaced in Hawaii, was sure it was in a better positioned to coordinate the helo sorties from a Navy carrier and the daily C-17 flight into the small airfield in Banda Aceh Indonesia--Of course all of the NGOs and other nations with their many types aircraft were doing the daily coordination in a shack at the airfield--it ended up being best run by a South African Air Force BrigGen "on loan" to the UN who wore shorts and flip-flops. Just another case where personal presence and human interaction mattered more than technical capability.
On Dunlap, he wrote a piece with similar sentiments a few months ago in Armed Forces Journal. The key thought that caught my eye was his assertion that the US shouldn't even involve itself in wars that can't be won by precision fires. As if we have the luxury...

jcustis
05-23-2007, 12:33 PM
Bravo Zulu to Frank Hoffman. What is the USAF thinking?

Steve Blair
05-23-2007, 01:34 PM
They were reacting in their standard fashion. You see this any time the AF senses a "threat" to its traditional positions or roles.

There are people within the AF who do understand COIN and would like to see the AF make a distinct contribution to the effort. That said, the institution as embodied in its senior leadership tends to respond in a "burn the heretic" manner any time such discussions surface. We see that reaction in Dunlap's piece, as well as some others that have been discussed before. It's a semi-religious response to any discussion, and it does them no favors.

You have to remember that the early foundation of the AF (strategic bombing) was a myth; one that later grew into "airpower can win any war." The danger of dealing with any institution that is founded on a myth is that parts of the organization can easily slide into this sort of response when they sense a "threat" (real or imagined) to their foundation myth. There are some good ideas in the AF, and much that they could and should contribute to COIN efforts. But until they outgrow this myth-centered reaction to discussion I'm afraid that most of their good ideas will die a slow death in the Air University files of student papers.

J Wolfsberger
05-23-2007, 01:53 PM
What is the USAF thinking?

In fairness, I think the AF is looking at cuts to their procurement programs and thinking "How the hell can we do our job if they won't buy us the tools?"

The problem, for the AF, is that COIN IS "protracted, costly, manpower intensive, and inherently a 'traditional land component solution.' " However much they may hate it, their role will be recon, surveillance, and the occasional strike when the insurgents are obliging enough to concentrate in meaningfull numbers. Unless and until they can develop a precision munition that takes out the insurgent when he's surrounded by women and children, and NOT mess up the civilians hair or disturb their sleep, the AF will be in a support role.

I also hate to have to add this, but we have a similar problem on the ground side of things: the large number of people who persistantly fail to distinguish between MOUT and COIN. But that's for another time and thread...

sullygoarmy
05-23-2007, 02:26 PM
I think the biggest problem is the Air Force failing to realize as Mr. Hoffman mentions that COIN is all about winning over the population. The Air Force will always have an important role in supporting the COIN fight with not only direct support for troops in contact but the rapid moving of humanitarian supplies, medical evacuations and other lift capabilities no other force in the world can accomplish. As a ground pounder, I LOVE knowing we've got big brother in the sky to help us out if a fight gets too ugly. A pair of A-10s or F16s is the ultimate equalizer in a COIN fight. That being said, the fighting in COIN should be limited in both scale and frequency, especially once the COIN forces are well established on the ground.

While disappointed in the comments of the AF general and their overall attitude, I'm not surprised. All the services lash out when they feel their budgets may be threatened and rapidly try and justify their primacy regardless of the actual situation. The air force will always be both needed and greatly appreciated by the ground pounders...but they just can't win a COIN fight on their own. Neither can the Army or Marines. It requires an entire team effort. But while the air force may be the "special teams" its the guys on the ground interacting with the population every day who are the main players on the field.

Sargent
05-23-2007, 03:08 PM
...And I thought nobody read those things. Its still LtCol USMC. Heading to MNF-I Strategy and Plans in a month. I've spent the last 3 years on the III MEF staff in Okinawa and I've been in numerous joint and combined exercises. Airpower is great, but the impression I'm getting is that the Air Force considers it a parallel campaign, not an integral part of the overall campaign. In the Tsunami Relief operation of 2005, the JFACC, which remained firmly emplaced in Hawaii, was sure it was in a better positioned to coordinate the helo sorties from a Navy carrier and the daily C-17 flight into the small airfield in Banda Aceh Indonesia--Of course all of the NGOs and other nations with their many types aircraft were doing the daily coordination in a shack at the airfield--it ended up being best run by a South African Air Force BrigGen "on loan" to the UN who wore shorts and flip-flops. Just another case where personal presence and human interaction mattered more than technical capability.
On Dunlap, he wrote a piece with similar sentiments a few months ago in Armed Forces Journal. The key thought that caught my eye was his assertion that the US shouldn't even involve itself in wars that can't be won by precision fires. As if we have the luxury...

Perhaps I'm biased, as an H-Warrior myself, but of course your message was widely read! The piece stuck out in my mind, as it came right back to me when I read the initial article in this thread. Of course, I take a certain perverse pleasure in works that knock at the big airpower myths, so they're easily remembered.

Our paths keep crossing ... I believe that it was with you that I exchanged phone calls back in 01 or 02 while you were at HQMC, about a new-style regimental team the Marine Corps was considering putting together (I think, but it's hard to remember those days as a consultant -- I think too much powerpoint causes the brain to freeze up), and exchanged some emails over Centers of Gravity (H-War) and the CAP. (I only know that because I am mildly obsessive compulsive about keeping emails and happened to notice them in my contacts folder while I was trying to find the Shock not Awe message.)

By the way, you must have passed my husband on his way out of Okinawa -- he left in June of 04. He's made it back to the Fleet -- amazingly, he will spend the majority of his time as a Major in the Fleet -- and is CO of a MiTT in OIF. A vast change from normal O-4 experience.

Anyway, good to run into you again.

Jill R.

marct
05-23-2007, 04:23 PM
Hi Steve,

I really couldn't let this one pass ;).


There are people within the AF who do understand COIN and would like to see the AF make a distinct contribution to the effort. That said, the institution as embodied in its senior leadership tends to respond in a "burn the heretic" manner any time such discussions surface. We see that reaction in Dunlap's piece, as well as some others that have been discussed before. It's a semi-religious response to any discussion, and it does them no favors.

Yup. Sounds like some Anthropologists I could name :rolleyes:.


You have to remember that the early foundation of the AF (strategic bombing) was a myth; one that later grew into "airpower can win any war." The danger of dealing with any institution that is founded on a myth is that parts of the organization can easily slide into this sort of response when they sense a "threat" (real or imagined) to their foundation myth. There are some good ideas in the AF, and much that they could and should contribute to COIN efforts. But until they outgrow this myth-centered reaction to discussion I'm afraid that most of their good ideas will die a slow death in the Air University files of student papers.

Okay, I really do have to make an observation here - all institutions are founded on myths. The real trick is to "tweak" or "re-interpret" the foundation myth to meet current operational needs. For an historical example, think about the Battleship debate in the navy vs carriers (or COIN vs "real combat" in the Army). In many ways, it's too bad that the USAF doesn't have the "Knights of the Air" myth as strongly as other air forces which fought more heavily in WW I (Top Gun aside). That would let them use a cavalry anology rather that the elephant-esque analogies that seem to dominate the Strategic Bombing myth (i.e. we can stomp anything).

Marc

Jimbo
05-23-2007, 05:18 PM
Sergeant,

Once again I stick with no!!!. I have dealt with the AF at the tactical and operational levels. NO, NO, NO. We can talk about AF Security Police serving as MiTT's to Iraqi Base Defense Units (Base defense is a core competency fro AFSP's, good fit in theory nightmare execution complete with phrases like Title 10 USC states). The Army accepts volunteers from the AF and Navy these days, and have nothing wrong with volunteers, but to pull from them (which implies involuntary) no the cultures between the two are too different.

Steve Blair
05-23-2007, 05:34 PM
Okay, I really do have to make an observation here - all institutions are founded on myths. The real trick is to "tweak" or "re-interpret" the foundation myth to meet current operational needs. For an historical example, think about the Battleship debate in the navy vs carriers (or COIN vs "real combat" in the Army). In many ways, it's too bad that the USAF doesn't have the "Knights of the Air" myth as strongly as other air forces which fought more heavily in WW I (Top Gun aside). That would let them use a cavalry anology rather that the elephant-esque analogies that seem to dominate the Strategic Bombing myth (i.e. we can stomp anything).

Marc

I understand that all institutions are founded on myth, but in the case of the AF they appear all too often to allow those myths to clog their perception of what's really going on. I tend to compare them to the Army during Vietnam in that sense (the Army as an institution, not individual segments that adapted well).

Another factor with the AF is the legacy of both the breakaway from the Army and the dominance of Curtis LeMay and SAC for many years within their own organizational structure. This left them wedded (at least in terms of presentation) to high tech and certain mantras (if you will). I'm not sure why they have proven so unable to tweak their own myths (as the navy managed to do with steam power, the carrier, and so on), unless it's part of their short history as an organization and limited leadership "generations" that they can draw from, but it's really going to end up doing them more harm than good in the long run.

The call for joint doctrine isn't surprising, either, considering that there are segments within the AF who are convinced that they are the only service that "gets" joint warfare. It will be interesting to see what community ends up dominating their leadership corps once the current fighter generals disappear. That might be what it takes to break their public rhetoric in COIN.:wry:

And as an aside to Jimbo's post, I would fall into the NO category here as well. People join the services for different reasons, and each attracts a certain personality type in many cases. Just as some of the folks who join the Army would go nuts in the AF, there are some who join the AF that aren't suited for other work. We have some here who are on the officer track that I wouldn't trust with an M-16 if my life depended on it. And that's not what they join for. So it would be a bad fit all around.

Rob Thornton
05-23-2007, 05:42 PM
Does his (MG Dunlap's) view show service culture or service parochialism? I think picking up something Marc's comment hit on is worthwhile:


The real trick is to "tweak" or "re-interpret" the foundation myth to meet current operational needs. For an historical example, think about the Battleship debate in the navy vs. carriers (or COIN vs. "real combat" in the Army).

Why is the AF not looking at their changing role and making bold adjustments, one could argue that the other services are also having a tough time, but necessity being the mother of re-invention..... Are we (in my case the Army) doing enough re-evaluation of the role of land power and making changes fast enough to provide advantages? If not, why? Is rapid change always possible; if so is it always wise?

I think MG Dunlap's comments are just the latest (amplified) version of public cultural bias we see in some leaders (military and political - active or retired). We all have it - sometimes its a good thing (since I believe it grows out of experience as much as environment).

What could be bad though would be a senior leader who is unaware of the impacts of his bias, or worse does not care. It takes us back to LTC Yingling's article and the focus of our leadership - what matters to them most? Is it solutions or distractions?

It may not be sexy to discuss the lift requirements or the number of sorties flown in support as much as kinetic targeting, but its certainly relevant. The USAF plays a large role in our ability to conduct COIN in a given location for a protracted period of time. In addition to actively flying men and materials (how'd all that stuff get over there anyway?), bombing (includes the AC 130 kinetics), shows of force, reconnaissance, they (and the navy) also provide deterrence in the region, and keep open the LOCs for projected forces. Their is some significant overhead associated with those missions. Its also worth mentioning their growing contribution to specialty jobs on the ground - lots of BOS guys out there from other services - filling OGA and backfilling DA jobs.

If part of our current strategy is one of employing limited means in limited wars to a political end, then certainly the USAF plays a vital role in that, two important questions are: do they understand it, and are they willing to accept it?

SWJED
05-23-2007, 06:18 PM
To "Non Cents" in the comments section (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/05/non-cents-1/#comment-196)...

Steve Blair
05-23-2007, 06:29 PM
More of the same, it seems.

TROUFION
05-23-2007, 06:55 PM
"It is not the critic who counts: not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles or where the doer of deeds could have done better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly, who errs and comes up short again and again, because there is no effort without error or shortcoming, but who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, who spends himself for a worthy cause; who, at the best, knows, in the end, the triumph of high achievement, and who, at the worst, if he fails, at least he fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who knew neither victory nor defeat."
Theodore Roosevelt,
"Citizenship in a Republic,"
Speech at the Sorbonne, Paris, April 23, 1910

I say one thing here to the MGEN and to the rest of the USAF, with all do respect, get in the game or go home. The current fight is in Iraq and in Afghanistan and around the globe, the AF has a role, it may be a lead it may be in support. But if you have a suggestion let's hear it. Critique time is over, weigh in and get your hands dirty.

marct
05-23-2007, 07:18 PM
Hi Steve,


I understand that all institutions are founded on myth, but in the case of the AF they appear all too often to allow those myths to clog their perception of what's really going on. I tend to compare them to the Army during Vietnam in that sense (the Army as an institution, not individual segments that adapted well).

I think that's a good analogy. What I was trying to get at, in my ham fisted way, was that at some points in time, all institutions founding myths get them in trouble with reality.


Another factor with the AF is the legacy of both the breakaway from the Army and the dominance of Curtis LeMay and SAC for many years within their own organizational structure. This left them wedded (at least in terms of presentation) to high tech and certain mantras (if you will). I'm not sure why they have proven so unable to tweak their own myths (as the navy managed to do with steam power, the carrier, and so on), unless it's part of their short history as an organization and limited leadership "generations" that they can draw from, but it's really going to end up doing them more harm than good in the long run.

Honestly, it may be a result of too few generations. I'd also forgotten that your AF started out as, what was it called, the Army Air Corps? I've noticed the tech mantra as well, which was certainly appropriate during the LeMay Imperium but, I have serious duobts about it's current validity.

On that note, I just finished MG Dunlap's Comment and I feel I have to point out something that he slipped in


and by "airpower" I mean air, space, and cyberspace

Since when is cyberspace part of the USAF Imperium? As we about to see a raft of articles on "The usage of Strategic Bombing (DDOS) in Cyberspace" and new Hollywood / USAF productions such as "Top Mouse"?

The internalization of a Technology mantra should not, to my mind, include an automatic assumption that one technology equals another and that, therefore, cyberspace is part of the USAFs balliwick.


The call for joint doctrine isn't surprising, either, considering that there are segments within the AF who are convinced that they are the only service that "gets" joint warfare. It will be interesting to see what community ends up dominating their leadership corps once the current fighter generals disappear. That might be what it takes to break their public rhetoric in COIN.:wry:

I agree.


And as an aside to Jimbo's post, I would fall into the NO category here as well. People join the services for different reasons, and each attracts a certain personality type in many cases. Just as some of the folks who join the Army would go nuts in the AF, there are some who join the AF that aren't suited for other work. We have some here who are on the officer track that I wouldn't trust with an M-16 if my life depended on it. And that's not what they join for. So it would be a bad fit all around.

Me too - one of my brother-in-laws is a 22 year USAF veteran and I would not want to see him running around with an M16 :eek: (beer bottles at the Oak island beach are bad enough!).

Marc

LawVol
05-23-2007, 07:45 PM
I've read everything in this thread, but have yet to find a link to Maj Gen Dunlap's article. I like to read the actual article being critiqued before forming my own thoughts. I assume from the comments here that everyone else has read it. I'd appreciate anyone providing me a link. Thanks in advance.

Steve Blair
05-23-2007, 07:48 PM
I was commenting on the blog on MG Dunlap's response to Hoffman's blog entry, as well as Hoffman's entry itself.

BTW, someone calling himself/herself USAF Insurgent just posted a pretty hard reply to Dunlap.

ETA: Just looked at the USNI site, and the feature in question isn't available online (at least through them). It was in the May 07 issue.

marct
05-23-2007, 07:54 PM
Hi LawVol


I've read everything in this thread, but have yet to find a link to Maj Gen Dunlap's article. I like to read the actual article being critiqued before forming my own thoughts. I assume from the comments here that everyone else has read it. I'd appreciate anyone providing me a link. Thanks in advance.

Their server seems to be slow right now. I'm trying to get it for you.

Marc

SWJED
05-23-2007, 07:57 PM
I've read everything in this thread, but have yet to find a link to Maj Gen Dunlap's article. I like to read the actual article being critiqued before forming my own thoughts. I assume from the comments here that everyone else has read it. I'd appreciate anyone providing me a link. Thanks in advance.

I've read it - hard-copy - it is not online.

Steve Blair
05-23-2007, 07:58 PM
Since when is cyberspace part of the USAF Imperium? As we about to see a raft of articles on "The usage of Strategic Bombing (DDOS) in Cyberspace" and new Hollywood / USAF productions such as "Top Mouse"?

The internalization of a Technology mantra should not, to my mind, include an automatic assumption that one technology equals another and that, therefore, cyberspace is part of the USAFs balliwick.
Marc

They latched onto this a few years ago, though I don't think anyone else has really conceded that it's USAF property.

marct
05-23-2007, 08:00 PM
I've read it - hard-copy - it is not online.

Frustrating <sigh>. I had to open an IE tab to get into the site. If this is an example of "technological sophistication"....

Maybe MG Dunlop would agree to post a copy here so that we can all read it?

Marc

marct
05-23-2007, 08:02 PM
They latched onto this a few years ago, though I don't think anyone else has really conceded that it's USAF property.

Maybe they just aren't running their recruitment campaigns well enough. Hmmm, they could always "nationalize" Geek Squad :eek:.

On a more serious note, have they actually done anything in this area directly related to the current conflicts, or are they just saying "come to me my precious...."?

Marc

Steve Blair
05-23-2007, 08:05 PM
Maybe they just aren't running their recruitment campaigns well enough. Hmmm, they could always "nationalize" Geek Squad :eek:.

On a more serious note, have they actually done anything in this area directly related to the current conflicts, or are they just saying "come to me my precious...."?

Marc

Aside from jacking up their own internal networks in the name of security, I don't think they've done much. Of course, I'm not an IM-type or anything close to that, but from what I've heard and seen their efforts are more related to security (albeit their own version of same) and not really IO or any sort of active cyber-operations.

My vantage point is pretty narrow, though. There may be others who've seen more and have opinions informed by more experience.

LawVol
05-23-2007, 08:26 PM
I appreciate the attempts at locating a copy of the Dunlap article. I'm pursuing other avenues as well.

I agree with Gen Dunlap on one point I took from his rebuttal. I do not think we'll be in any extended COIN campaigns in the near future although I am unwilling to put a time frame on it like he did. We can't even keep 125k (give or take) on the ground for four years without an uproar. Do you really think Congress and the American public would go for a 12 year campaign like Iraq? I would imagine we'd take casualties exceeding 10k over that period of time. Maybe some of you with more experience can extrapolate a better casualty number based on past COIN episodes (although given technology I'd assume we'd be higher now).

Another point I see some AF trying to make (and one in which I agree) is the danger in focusing too much on COIN. If we cast aside our big war, technological advantage in favor of what wins in COIN are we dooming ourselves to fighting the last war again in the future? I'm all for doing what it takes to win this one and have written on how airpower can help, however, we need to be aware of, and be ready for, all potential threats not just the ones we want to face. I don't propse to speak for Gen Dunlap (although I have spoken with him), but maybe that's a point he's trying to make.

Here's how Gen Moseley put it: http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=18841

Oh, and one last point in reference to USAF Insurgent's post. To argue that an AF guy can't offer a critique of FM 3-24 because AF leadership chose not to perticipate is disingenuous. First, they didn't ask me to participate. Second, of those they did ask to participate, how was this presented? Was it truly full participation or we they simply checking a box? I don't know.

TROUFION
05-23-2007, 09:04 PM
"I agree with Gen Dunlap on one point I took from his rebuttal. I do not think we'll be in any extended COIN campaigns in the near future although I am unwilling to put a time frame on it like he did. We can't even keep 125k (give or take) on the ground for four years without an uproar. Do you really think Congress and the American public would go for a 12 year campaign like Iraq?"

One issue here, that both LAWVOL and the MGEN miss, yes it is four years on since the Iraq war started, there are nearing 150k troops in country filling many different roles. While there is debate over withdraw timelines and benchmarks troops are still flowing in and out of country. The Army and Marines are growing in size adapting to the war and the flow of troops. The current administration has and will continue to resist withdraw. The next administration will be faced with the same issue withdraw or stay. How long will that take? What will the situation on the ground be? By the time it is all said and done it is concievable that 12 years will have passed before the war will be over, ending most likely in a similiar vein to Malaya: with the closure of a logisitics clerks ledger book and a standing independent government in charge. My main issue with the AF arguments has been that it has already assumed defeat and the critique of FM3-24 is a post mortem not a constructive dialogue. Lastly small wars, COIN, happen in many ways all the time, note that Senator Biden (dem from Deleware) has just called for a U.S. troops on the ground response to Sudan-Darfur. -T

Tom Odom
05-23-2007, 09:06 PM
I agree with Gen Dunlap on one point I took from his rebuttal. I do not think we'll be in any extended COIN campaigns in the near future although I am unwilling to put a time frame on it like he did.

That is all a question of definition. Even if we do drawdown OIF we are still in OEF. Meanwhile the GWOT/Long War or whatever we call it is a COIN campaign and it is most definitely happening on the ground in the Phillipines, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere.


Another point I see some AF trying to make (and one in which I agree) is the danger in focusing too much on COIN. If we cast aside our big war, technological advantage in favor of what wins in COIN are we dooming ourselves to fighting the last war again in the future? I'm all for doing what it takes to win this one and have written on how airpower can help, however, we need to be aware of, and be ready for, all potential threats not just the ones we want to face. I don't propse to speak for Gen Dunlap (although I have spoken with him), but maybe that's a point he's trying to make.

I certainly would not disagree with what you say on this. Where it all gets lost in the current debate is not focusing too much on COIN but rather ignoring COIN altogether or seeking to modify COIN thinking into a kinetic targeting effort.

Best

Tom

LawVol
05-23-2007, 09:21 PM
Troufion: I think its a stretch to say the AF has admitted defeat. Even the hardcore airpower folks don't say that. As for your Darfur example, I did not say we wouldn't be involved somewhere, I just said America wouldn't go for an [I]extended[I] COIN campaign. I specifically chose this word to account for what I do see us getting into.

Tom Odom discusses this with his reference to the continuing "long war." Darfur would also be an example. Darfur, however, is more of a humanitarian effort at this point. I wonder what public opinion would be in 3 years (after a withdrawal, substantial or total, from Iraq) if the President proposed overthrowing the Sudanese government to accomplish Darfur relief? That would approach the scale of Iraq.

The continuing "long war" is also different than Iraq because of its scale in individual locations. We don't hear much about HOA or the PI because our forces are small there. Someone (Max Boot,maybe?) recently wrote something about how keeping our engagements small helped maintain public support simply because the public was basically unaware. Maybe there is something to this.

Tom: I wholeheartedly agree with you. We cannot completely toss COIN out the window or attempt to solve it with kinetic solutions. I firmly believe that the AF can offer alot in a COIN environment in non-kinetic ways. We obviously need more focus on this, but by the same token we (i.e. AF) cannot foresake our own mission of air superiority and that requires money, lots of it. Many of my AF bretheren focus on China as a rationale for ignoring COIN and focusing on kinetic solutions. I however, am not so sure that a war with China wouldn't involve conventional-style tactics and COIN-style tactics. Their "total war" concept, combined with recent military buildup and satellite tests, would seem to support this.

Ironhorse
05-23-2007, 09:49 PM
In running react drills for Marines in embassies, I learned how much harder it was for them to deal satisfactorily with less lethal intruders. They were far better prepared (mindset, equipment, posture, etc.) to deal with the fantasy deadly ninja teams than with a relatively harmless hooligan or activist. The Kent State flowers-in-rifles picture always came to my mind. And it froze them. We're reacting to having similar things happen to us on a much larger and deadlier, higher stakes scale.

We have seen that good capabilities in COIN are not lesser included capabilities for major theater war (MTW). They are different capabilties. In many ways, more complex and more challenging for the individual and small unit than MTW. But that doesn't mean that the reverse is true, that MTW is a lesser included capability of COIN. I happen to believe that the individual who can do COIN well can more readily adapt to MTW than vice-versa, but the scope and scale of the equipment, organization, and realted collective skillsets for MTW prevent a true two-fer in that direction. For a tiny window into that, picture a 1990s Bn from 1st Marines, all MEU(SOC)'d up, trying to do a CAX -- about as painful as 7th Marines in boats.

The sole remaining superpower is, almost by definition, not going to go toe to toe with a peer competitor. So we need to continue to adjust the "loaded for bear" idea that dominated the last decades, and reload for squirrel. History shows that our military's subsistence diet is squirrel, even when there are other bears out there.

Unfortunately, we don't need a peer to have a MTW requiring conventional skills, and the consequences of losing a MTW are at least as painful and probably far more immediate than of being neutered in our inability to successfully prosecute a small war or COIN. Even the baby bears have claws and teeth, and the cornered squirrels bite like hell.

So, we can't afford to suck at either, and it isn't good enough to optimize one since there is no two-fer. But we can't afford to field the dream team for either type of war, let alone both. It is a vexing problem.

Rob Thornton
05-23-2007, 10:02 PM
While not directly COIN, I'd say the AF and Navy are going to be in Iraq and the area around Iraq for sometime after we've assisted them (the Iraqis) in attaining internal security.

Somebody is going to have to provide cover for the Iraqi military as it shifts the bulk of its security efforts from defeating threats from inside its borders, to securing its borders from other aggressors in the region. The USAF and the USN will probably continue to do that job - enforcing no fly zones, etc, while the Iraqis restructure to meet those challenges. This will continue to tie up lots of planes and frames, and will go largely unnoticed by the public - along with the advisors, ground units and others who rotate through.

We won't abandon Iraq to the ambitions of its neighbors after the investment we have made. New administrations will try and minimize it, but it will tax our air forces (much like the enforcement of the "No-Fly Zones" in the interim of Desert Storm and OIF 1), and the OPTEMPO of the other services for a long time to come.

Meanwhile, most here agree that small "limited" wars are on the rise and we are not optimally equipped to respond in a compelling manner if the political objective requires it. Our requirements (both real and predicted) for "mass" (not effects, but people) has exceeded the ability of technology to compensate for a lack thereof. This was not brought about by the publication of the COIN manual; it was brought about by an enemy strategy for protracted war. The COIN manual is doctrine to help us deal with the challenges of this war.

MG Dunlap is correct that is not chance that decisions on land power increases coincided roughly with the publication of the FM. There was a strategic epiphany at about the same time across the board as we began to realize the value of people again. To equate the FM as the catalyst for troop increases is bad logic. There is no smoking gun.

Towards funding, I'd say its not just a question of what we need, but what we need right now. The Army just took a big chunk out of its modernization plans to ensure dominance against the 2015 and 2025 time frames. It did so to fund things right now like MRAP, refitting key platforms, and hopefully investing in people! It (the Army) is understanding that it can't do everything it would like to, and as much as we'd like the quick kill and come home, which does not appear to be our lot in life.

TROUFION
05-23-2007, 10:07 PM
As you say you chose your words carefully, as did I. I said the AF has 'assumed' defeat not 'admitted.' Meaning the AF or at least MGen D has assumed that FM3-24, the troop surge and all current activity will fail if not altered towards the Axiological Air Operations or some other as yet undisclosed AF designed COIN concept. -T

phil b
05-23-2007, 10:22 PM
It's not his most recent article, but here's a link to the Dunlap's article "America's asymmetric advantage" (http://www.afji.com/2006/09/2009013/) from the September 06 Armed Forces Journal.

Rob Thornton
05-23-2007, 10:31 PM
Here (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/win00/szafranski.pdfhttp://)for info on Axiological

Here (http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB71/index1.html) for a Rand study on the effects of Air Power in Milosovic's decision cyle

The problem I have with systems theory (of any flavor) is people and what they value, and how they pecieve that ( or how you perceive it through your specific cultural lense).

Rob Thornton
05-23-2007, 11:11 PM
It's not his most recent article, but here's a link to the Dunlap's article "America's asymmetric advantage" from the September 06 Armed Forces Journal.

Wow - "Earth to Buck Rogers", "Buck we have a situation down here - a human one - and well, we are going to be off the net for awhile, but don't worry." "Oh and Buck, one of the mission tech says he left a couple of things loose on your craft, and .....

War is about people - often its about killing them and compelling them, but its a human endevour. Any formula that tries to mimimize that into a technological one ignores the obvious, and risks the political objectives. Wouldn't life be simple if it were a parking lot?

slapout9
05-23-2007, 11:32 PM
I think Kaiser So-say should speak at the Air War College and explain things to them.

John T. Fishel
05-23-2007, 11:45 PM
Major General Dunlap's rebuttal to Frank Hoffman's critique is well written and smooth - what might be expected from one of the USAF's top lawyers. But it is well to remember that General Dunlap has a track record, or perhaps a better term is paper trail. It is one that goes back to his brilliant, well received, and extraordinarily clever 1992 article, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012." In that piece, Dunlap argues that focusing the military on non-big war operations leads to disaster that in the worst, and very unlikely, case would put the military in charge of the government doing tasks that it is not qualified to do and unable to do its core missions of fighting the big wars. There is much of that view underlying his rebuttal of Hoffman's comments on his piece. It is, therefore, not an overstatement to suggest that Dunlap has never shown himself to be a supporter of COIN and its related missions.

tequila
05-24-2007, 12:00 AM
The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012 (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/1992/dunlap.htm).

Jimbo
05-24-2007, 12:16 AM
Well,

The issue at hand is fighting the war you are in while being aware that there is going to be another war down the road (what it will look like who knows) that you have to prepare for. The Air Force brings up valid arguments about paying the bill in potential future needs for todays fight, but I also counter with that these programs were leveraged against needs identified ten years ago (airlift/tankers come to mind). The Army is going to have to come to grips with this as well. I think it is an ineteresting article and debate, but its premise has "issues"

To put some perspective on this in the late summer of 2000 the USAFE commander issued a statement that he did not want to see BDU's being worn in the headquarters because he felt it made the USAF look too much like the Army.

the USAF is going to be the lead service on "cyber space" so yeah, the Geek Squad is going to be USAF.

wm
05-24-2007, 01:50 AM
Since when is cyberspace part of the USAF Imperium? As we about to see a raft of articles on "The usage of Strategic Bombing (DDOS) in Cyberspace" and new Hollywood / USAF productions such as "Top Mouse"?

Within the last year or so, USAF redfefined its mission to include the cyberspacw piece you reacted to. I'm not sure it is statutory or reflrcted in any JCS/DoD literature however.

A somewhat different take related to the same subject--A mission for USAF assets:
The USAF used to have this wonderful IO weapons system named Compass Call. It would make a wonderful platform and could turn the tables with a "voice from on high" proclaiming the "safety and security" that would then be guaranteed by the friendly ground forces in the Compass Call's mission orbit/footprint--sort of a hi-tech version of leaflet dropping. If the Air force wants cyberspace warfare, then let them execute the cyberspace piece of the IO campaign

John T. Fishel
05-24-2007, 11:07 AM
WM, as an old Psyoper I thought that you were referring to Commando Solo rather than Compass Call. I Googled and found 3 versions of the EC-130 platform.
1. The EC-130 ABCCC
2. The EC-130 Compass Call for electronic countermeasures against enemy C2
3. The EC-130 Commando Solo, airborne radio and TV station that can deliver its PSYOP message from on high.

It is a great AF COIN mission but its low density - one unit - and location - the Pennsylvania Air National Guard - as part of the Air Force Special Operations Command gives an idea of USAF priorities. Even more than the Army, the USAF doesn't see PSYOP, let alone the rest of AFSOC, as part of the real Air Force:rolleyes:

Cheers

John

John T. Fishel
05-24-2007, 12:55 PM
I was particularly struck by Frank Hoffmann's statement on the dearth of COIN doctrine in his blog piece. "It
fills a 25 to 30 year void in our doctrinal library thanks to the Vietnam Syndrome and the Pentagon’s insistence on only preparing for wars we would like to fight instead of those our enemies are prepared to wage."

This is simply incorrect. The Army published FM 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict which focused primarily on COIN in 1981. In 1990 it published a revised and better version of FM 100-20 (with the USAF under General Larry Welch who had created with his Army counterpart the Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict) called Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict which retained the cOIN emphasis. In the interest of full disclosure, I worked on that document from the USSOUTHCOM Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD) which, along with the CLIC had significant input to the document drafted at Leavenworth by the cell headed by LTC Jerry Thompson.
This version of COIN doctrine was incorporated into both FM 100-5 Operations of 1993 and Joint Pub 3-07 Military Operations Other Than War.
There was nothing wrong with our COIN doctrine except that few military people read it. Certainly, even fewer civilians read the doctrine.

What makes FM 3-24 important is that it is being read and discussed both within and outside the military.

Tom Odom
05-24-2007, 01:12 PM
I was particularly struck by Frank Hoffmann's statement on the dearth of COIN doctrine in his blog piece. "It
fills a 25 to 30 year void in our doctrinal library thanks to the Vietnam Syndrome and the Pentagon’s insistence on only preparing for wars we would like to fight instead of those our enemies are prepared to wage."

This is simply incorrect. The Army published FM 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict which focused primarily on COIN in 1981. In 1990 it published a revised and better version of FM 100-20 (with the USAF under General Larry Welch who had created with his Army counterpart the Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict) called Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict which retained the cOIN emphasis. In the interest of full disclosure, I worked on that document from the USSOUTHCOM Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD) which, along with the CLIC had significant input to the document drafted at Leavenworth by the cell headed by LTC Jerry Thompson.
This version of COIN doctrine was incorporated into both FM 100-5 Operations of 1993 and Joint Pub 3-07 Military Operations Other Than War.
There was nothing wrong with our COIN doctrine except that few military people read it. Certainly, even fewer civilians read the doctrine.

What makes FM 3-24 important is that it is being read and discussed both within and outside the military.

I agree Frank overstates that point in his post. I remember Jerry Thompson at Leavenworth and the work he did, I would say what makes this latest effort in COIN doctrine so remarkable was its high profile both inside the military and in the general media--almost like we went up the mountain and a burning bush said "write this down if you want to win in Iraq."

The problem as you state it remains--see John Nagl's comment last week on getting commercial prints of the FM. And I am already hearing very familiar phrases such as "this COIN stuff" hurts our real mission--just as we have heard so many times before. That is where MG Dunlap's rebuttal is ludicrous at best; he infers that the COIN manual was a marketing effort to get the size of the Army and Marine Corps increased. Hardly and in all probability 180 degrees off azimuth because them that want "this COIN stuff" to go away, want a bigger force, and one tied to FCS (and "real Army" stuff).

Best

Tom

wm
05-24-2007, 01:36 PM
WM, as an old Psyoper I thought that you were referring to Commando Solo rather than Compass Call. I Googled and found 3 versions of the EC-130 platform.
1. The EC-130 ABCCC
2. The EC-130 Compass Call for electronic countermeasures against enemy C2
3. The EC-130 Commando Solo, airborne radio and TV station that can deliver its PSYOP message from on high.

It is a great AF COIN mission but its low density - one unit - and location - the Pennsylvania Air National Guard - as part of the Air Force Special Operations Command gives an idea of USAF priorities. Even more than the Army, the USAF doesn't see PSYOP, let alone the rest of AFSOC, as part of the real Air Force:rolleyes:

Cheers



John

John,
Thanks for refreshing my failing memory. As an old EW guy, I knew the Compass Call variant and knew it also came in a Psyop version, but I could not remember the name of the Psyop variant. I was thinking that a well-run Commando Solo effort might provide an interesting counterpoint to Al-Jazeera, et. al.
I know what you mean about prioritizing mission capabilities. I think the "new" Air Force mission statement was largely an attempt to justify efforts to snap up more dollars in the POM process--insert snappy buzzwords to be able to ask for more money for systems that support precision strategic strike targeting / C2, not for systems that support a full spectrum joint warfighting capability.

John T. Fishel
05-24-2007, 01:39 PM
Hi Tom--

You hit the nail on the head;) The real issue for small warriors is not Army/MC v. Air Force but rather between those who see small wars as real wars likely to consume us pretty much forever and those who only want to fight the big wars. Frank Hoffman said as much in the overstated quote I took issue with. But I do not take any issue with him on that point. The traditional Army - the Army of Tommy Franks (I don't hink I am doing him a disservice) - likes small wars about as much as the traditional Air Force epitomized (at its intellectual best by General Dunlap).

The question is one of balance. We need to be able to fight a peer competitor when one comes along but at the same time we need to remember that we will always be fighting small wars. I don't recall who said it - or on which thread - but I was intrigued by the idea that big wars are a lesser included element of small wars. Not sure I really agree but I was intrigued - I will have to ponder that one. That said, one of Max Manwaring's insights is that insurgency is total war; it bears heavily on this point.

Cheers

John

Ironhorse
05-24-2007, 01:42 PM
Commando Solo, great piece of gear that it is, is at the end of the day a delivery platform for a message. You still need to have the message to deliver. Tightly integrated with the whole operation. So maybe it's one aerial platform, but it is not an aerial op.


John,
Thanks for refreshing my failing memory. As an old EW guy, I knew the Compass Call variant and knew it also came in a Psyop version, but I could not remember the name of the Psyop variant. I was thinking that a well-run Commando Solo effort might provide an interesting counterpoint to Al-Jazeera, et. al.

wm
05-24-2007, 02:03 PM
Commando Solo, great piece of gear that it is, is at the end of the day a delivery platform for a message. You still need to have the message to deliver. Tightly integrated with the whole operation. So maybe it's one aerial platform, but it is not an aerial op.

True, the EC-130 with its various payloads is simply a delivery mechanism, but then so is a B1 or an A10 (and so is a C-141 or C-130 loaded with a contingent of 82d Abn Troopers). With its revised mission statement, the Air Force has taken it upon itself to be the lead DoD Cyberwarrior. Cyberwar is, IMHO, Info War, and Infor War includes Psyop. I think I was suggesting that if we want to redivide the "mission pie," we might give the folks in blue the service proponency for IO/Cyberwar. If the new Air Force mission statement is more than just that service shooting off its mouth, this redivision has already occured. The rest of the services need to enable the USAF effort by supporting them in IO operations of all types. And that means working together to get a well crafted message that supports the operation, as you note, tightly.

marct
05-24-2007, 02:04 PM
Within the last year or so, USAF redfefined its mission to include the cyberspacw piece you reacted to. I'm not sure it is statutory or reflrcted in any JCS/DoD literature however.


3. The EC-130 Commando Solo, airborne radio and TV station that can deliver its PSYOP message from on high.

It is a great AF COIN mission but its low density - one unit - and location - the Pennsylvania Air National Guard - as part of the Air Force Special Operations Command gives an idea of USAF priorities. Even more than the Army, the USAF doesn't see PSYOP, let alone the rest of AFSOC, as part of the real Air Force:rolleyes:

Anyone mind if I add an "oye vei!!!!" here :wry:. Television? Radio? Umm, how about Youtube and LiveLeak? Oh, yeah, and who legislates the RF transmissions in Iraq? If they want to play in cyberspace, then they need to get some really good hackers to teach them how.

If the USAF is going to get into the COIN game in other than their "traditional" roles, the really do need to start thinking out of the box rather than trying to legislate the box. As a start, they may want to examine light cavalry tactics, especially those of the Khazaks and Mongols (probably best in Afghanistan.

Marc

marct
05-24-2007, 02:07 PM
Honestly, I think itis a major mistake to task cyberwarfare to the USAF. Think about the mindset required to be a really good hacker and you will see that there will be a major culture clash. About the closest match I can think of, in cultural terms, would be with the Special Forces - although the relative differences in emphasis, physical vs. non-physical, wold be a problem.

Marc

Steve Blair
05-24-2007, 02:20 PM
Honestly, I think itis a major mistake to task cyberwarfare to the USAF. Think about the mindset required to be a really good hacker and you will see that there will be a major culture clash. About the closest match I can think of, in cultural terms, would be with the Special Forces - although the relative differences in emphasis, physical vs. non-physical, wold be a problem.

Marc
I would tend to agree, Marc. For all its talk, there's a fair chunk of the USAF that simply CAN'T think outside any box. Obviously that statement applies to other services as well, but the AF as it exists today isn't culturally suited for this kind of operation. For example, did you know that their standard (actually mandated) desktop setup requires people to use MS products exclusively? Never mind that many of them are very vulnerable to cyber-attack.

Now before LawVol jumps me for AF-bashing (;) just joking, LV), there are younger elements within the AF that see the need for change and a flexible response to world situations. The group we just commissioned here is well aware that the "next war" won't be the force-on-force run against the Chinese hordes. I do what I can with the exercise I've mentioned elsewhere to prepare them for a "fight as you come" world with lots of variables and no "school solution" or silver bullet systems. They face the same resistance to COIN that other services grapple with, but I think the difference here lies in the fact that the AF has no real COIN heritage that it chooses to remember. AFSOC is a dynamic organization, but it's really kept hidden from the main AF.

As I've said before, hopefully this will all change. The AF has good systems and some good ideas to go with them. They just need to climb out of the shadow of the F-22 and B-2 and find some daylight and a good audience.

Ironhorse
05-24-2007, 02:48 PM
I might agree, or I might be even more freaked out, if I knew what "lead" or "proponency" meant in this context. What are the authorities and responsiblities of the lead? What can the non-lead expect, demand, or have to suck up?

The information domain is mission critical across all services and most ops. We can no more give all of Cyber to the Air Force (or let them take it :rolleyes: ), than we can give all FP to the Army or all beaches to the Marine Corps or all C2 to guys named Sparky. Hell, we don't even give the Air Force all the air or the Navy the water. And IO, whatever that is ;) , is much more than Cyber.

There sure are reasons to pin the rose on some folks to produce results needed by all or services available to all. But the Chinese walls behind an awful lot of lead and proponency have proved to be a lot higher and more dysfunctional than that.

marct
05-24-2007, 02:50 PM
Hi Steve,


I would tend to agree, Marc. For all its talk, there's a fair chunk of the USAF that simply CAN'T think outside any box. Obviously that statement applies to other services as well, but the AF as it exists today isn't culturally suited for this kind of operation. For example, did you know that their standard (actually mandated) desktop setup requires people to use MS products exclusively? Never mind that many of them are very vulnerable to cyber-attack.

Okay, that in and of itself should be enough to bar them from anything to do with cyberwarfare! Even MicroSoft doesn't require its people to use solely MicroSoft products!

Marc

LawVol
05-24-2007, 03:04 PM
Nice one, Steve. I don't see AF bashing here, but I think when the topic of the AF comes up here many start acting like politicians. Think about those pols you see on TV; they never have a good thing to say about the other side, there is always a negative (although curiously, I do have MS on my AF computer, hummm...). Oh well, we still like you guys.:D

I think one of the benefits I have as a "retread" is that I'm not institutionalized into one specific service. I can see the benefits of them all. For example, I see that the AF constantly tries to justify new gadgets in its budget -- just as the Army was sold on the Future Combat System which, acording to a recent articel in Government Executive "has become on of the Pentagon's most costly and problem-plagued weapons programs." So there's blame to go everywhere. If we could skip all the parochial BS and look at what is needed to win now and in the future, we'd all be better off. Maybe we should just get a small group of NCOs from each branch to figure it all out. They'd get it done.:)

One comment says that the AF is likely to be in (or above) Iraq for some time after the ground pounders leave. This is likely true and our airframes are already very old and taxed. It takes money to upgrade these things. We have planes that are 50 years old! And even with upgrades, keeping the technological edge is a constant battle--one we can't afford to lose. I bet the Army would have a problem using weapons and radios from the 1950's. All I'm saying is that in fighting this war, we can't forget about the next one and it will likely be different from what we see now.

marct
05-24-2007, 03:06 PM
Hi Ironhorse,


The information domain is mission critical across all services and most ops. We can no more give all of Cyber to the Air Force (or let them take it :rolleyes: ), than we can give all FP to the Army or all beaches to the Marine Corps or all C2 to guys named Sparky. Hell, we don't even give the Air Force all the air or the Navy the water. And IO, whatever that is ;) , is much more than Cyber.

That is an excellent point! I think it would be a very good exercise to break down the different forms of "cyberwarfare" into what Abbott called "Tasks" (think of that more as operations types). In general, we would have something like

Offensive capabilities
Standard (e.g. script attacks, viruses, agents, etc.)
PSYOPS
Defensive capabilities
Firewalls, blocking strategies, etc.
Anti-spyware, anti-virus, cleaning, encryption, etc.
IO
Tracking
Spiders, bots, agents
"Special ops" (think about the hunt for Kevin Mitnick (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kevin_Mitnick))
Intelligence gathering
Site identification & Monitoring
User identification, etc.
Decryption
R&DSelil should add / modify this since he's the expert <grin>. However, even with such a limited a list, you can see that the type of mindset required is really quite different from most military groups (hence my comments about SF). If the USAF were serious, then they should hire back Jerry Pournelle (http://www.jerrypournelle.com/) to advise them aided and abbeted by William Gibson, Selil and yours truly :D.

Marc

wm
05-24-2007, 03:31 PM
For all its talk, there's a fair chunk of the USAF that simply CAN'T think outside any box. Obviously that statement applies to other services as well, but the AF as it exists today isn't culturally suited for this kind of operation. For example, did you know that their standard (actually mandated) desktop setup requires people to use MS products exclusively? Never mind that many of them are very vulnerable to cyber-attack.
As I've said before, hopefully this will all change. The AF has good systems and some good ideas to go with them. They just need to climb out of the shadow of the F-22 and B-2 and find some daylight and a good audience.

Honestly, I think itis a major mistake to task cyberwarfare to the USAF. Think about the mindset required to be a really good hacker and you will see that there will be a major culture clash. About the closest match I can think of, in cultural terms, would be with the Special Forces - although the relative differences in emphasis, physical vs. non-physical, wold be a problem.
All I can say is that these comments reflect the old chestnut," The pot calling the kettle black." I submit that my proposal was thinking outside the box and was shot down by you guys using what I consider to be "horse and buggy" thinking and ad hominems.

I suggest that the type of mindset it takes to be an effective fighter jock is probably much more similar to that of an effective hacker than you seem to want to admit--for example: self-reliance/operating independently or alone for extended periods, extensive multitasking and human-machine interfacing, reluctance to follow authority, etc. etc. In any case, cyberwarfare is much more than some punk hacking a system to find root or wardriving a wireless network. But, to adopt your tactics, why would we expect a sociologist and a historian to know anything about computers and information technology?;)

BTW, I dispute the MS-only programs claim. I am looking at the programs listed in my Air Force issued desk top computer (I only contract to them--20 years as a Green Suiter). It includes programs from Roxio, Symantec, Adobe, and several no-name software companies as well as the basic MS Office Suite which is pretty much de rigeur across the entire business world. We just migrated our web design application from FrontPage (MS app) to Dream Weaver (non MS app) and no longer have any support for FrontPage.

marct
05-24-2007, 03:49 PM
Hi Wm,


All I can say is that these comments reflect the old chestnut," The pot calling the kettle black." I submit that my proposal was thinking outside the box and was shot down by you guys using what I consider to be "horse and buggy" thinking and ad hominems.

No intention to do so :D.


I suggest that the type of mindset it takes to be an effective fighter jock is probably much more similar to that of an effective hacker than you seem to want to admit--for example: self-reliance/operating independently or alone for extended periods, extensive multitasking and human-machine interfacing, reluctance to follow authority, etc. etc. In any case, cyberwarfare is much more than some punk hacking a system to find root or wardriving a wireless network.

Actually, those are excellent qualities for a really good cyber warrior. I suspect that these could be morphed into something along those lines pretty quickly. Part of the point I was trying to make by saying the the SF would be a better match, IMHO, was that the organizational culture was more supportive of this type or "style" of activity. I suspect that the idea of a cyber-fighter-jock would, despite the mindset similarities, lead to a lot of organizational internal conflict - especially because a really good cyber-warrior needs to think like a sniper or an assassin. I tend to agree with both Pournelle and Gibson on this that the "best" model is closer to the Ninjas, at least for those operating outside of the "standard" computer security fields.


But, to adopt your tactics, why would we expect a sociologist and a historian to know anything about computers and information technology?;)

Anthropologist, please (the specialization was in Social Anthropology) :D.


BTW, I dispute the MS-only programs claim. I am looking at the programs listed in my Air Force issued desk top computer (I only contract to them--20 years as a Green Suiter). It includes programs from Roxio, Symantec, Adobe, and several no-name software companies as well as the basic MS Office Suite which is pretty much de rigeur across the entire business world. We just migrated our web design application from FrontPage (MS app) to Dream Weaver (non MS app) and no longer have any support for FrontPage.

I'm glad to see you are moving to a real web design application :D. Just out of interest, are you allowed to install programs on it? If you've got Dreamweaver installed, I assume that you are doing some design work and I know that I use a fair number of DW extensions and about 15-20 freeware programs in my own design work.

Marc

Steve Blair
05-24-2007, 04:16 PM
The MS-standardized desktop was pushed out last year if memory serves, and applies mostly to things like web browsers and anything that might be remotely open source. Since most of the AF computers we see here are made by HP (except for some ThinkPad laptops) they come loaded with all the junk HP normally puts on their machines (Roxio, AoL links, etc.). Luckily I get to use a University-issued Dell and can run pretty much whatever software I like (which means OpenOffice, Firefox, etc.).

John T. Fishel
05-24-2007, 04:32 PM
Marc, forgive an old guy who hasn't progressed much beyond late 20th Century technology:) I readily concede that there is a whole raft of new media that could be delivered by Commando Solo or from a much greater distance by other means. I would also argue that small wars thinking - as most of us would - goes way beyond info war. As in all war, we still have to put steel on target at the same time as we win hearts and minds and disrupt C4I++++.

Some of this obviously means thinking outside the proverbial box (although we better not forget what is inside the box in our newfound enthusiasm). Two of the most innovative strategic thinkers whose work is emminently adaptable to small wars are Air Force - Boyd with his OODA Loop and John Warden with his "inside out warfare" and 5 strategic rings. One can, of course, use these ideas in a purely conventional sense or apply them to small wars in innovative ways - as, indeed, one can with Clausewitz.

Although this story comes from Desert Storm, I think it is applicable to this discussion. My good friend, the late AF Col., Ben Harvey worked for Warden in Checkmate. Ben told me that in planning for the air campaign, they had come up with a bombing approach to taking down the Baghdad power grid that would be only temporary and it could have been restored in a very short time. Had it been employed (it obviously was rejected) a significant amount of civilian hardship could have been avoided. The short term psychological impact would have been enormous but think of the possible long term effects given the current civil war and insurgency in Iraq.

LawVol
05-24-2007, 04:37 PM
I just read Dunlap's article ("We Have a Serious COIN Shortage") and I believe Hoffman's critique is off base. Hoffman centers his objections to the article on the future use of FM 3-24 and concedes Dunlap's point regarding its utility in Iraq. However, Dunlap specifically states that the manual "will surely prove invaluable in many future situations." Thus, his point concerns the application of the manual to Iraq, not the future.

The point of Dunlap's article is that the doctrine set forth in the manual will not work in Iraq given the present situation, both there and at home. He argues that we do not currently have the type of COIN skills needed in our military (e.g. experience building civil institutions and commercial enterprises) and are not likely to get them any time soon. He does use this point to take a swipe at the Army's recent lowering of recruitment standards, but I've seen plenty Army-types take this stance as well.

He further argues that the minset of Iraq does not allow for a successful hearts and minds campaign since "the mindset of entire generations of Iraqis is already poisoned by, among other things, Abu Ghraib and related scandals, not to mention Islamic extremism's innate antagonism to people and ideas from the West." He then cites a poll indicating that 61 percent of Iraqis approve of attacks on US troops.

While the length of his piece does not permit details (something he says is to be addressed shortly), he argues that we need innovation that "calls for devising techniques that avoid exposing thousands of young Americans to the hazards of combat." How could anyone oppose this idea? He also calls for "out-of-the-box solutions beyond merely adding troops."

So contrary to popular belief, the article is not merely a sales pitch to Capitol Hill, but a call for dialogue on today's war. I would think that Hoffman and other COIN advocates would welcome this dialogue. After all, no one has a monopoly on solutions to Iraq. Just five years ago, the Army essentially ignored COIN and looked to the big war, now it is a COIN expert?? The AF is routinely lambasted for what some perceive as an attempt to exert complete control of a function of war (the UAV argument comes to mind), but Hoffman's piece is more of the same. Many are predisposed to think that the AF will automatically seek a kinetic solution to the problem (as Hoffman does), but that is not what Dunlap said.

It's a long and costly process fighting these things. If we can truly find a way to avoid COIN situations, why wouldn't we do so? Or is this attempt to suppress an AF contribution to the dialogue simply more parochialism?

Steve Blair
05-24-2007, 05:02 PM
Hopefully Dunlap will take up the SWJ offer to publish at least part of his thoughts on the subject (at least it sure looked like an offer on the blog comments). I'm very curious to see what he's come up with. I must admit to some skepticism, though. And I wouldn't consider being skeptical an attempt to suppress AF dialog.:D What I do want to see is what exactly this approach is based on, not word counts or bullet point titles. I'd expect the same thing from anyone who says he has a solution or possible technique for COIN.

I wouldn't consider the Army in general a COIN expert. There are some within it who undoubtedly are, but as an institution they are not. They are, however, attempting to make strides in that direction. I'm very familiar with the Army's performance in Vietnam (the good and the bad), as well as its change of focus immediately after 1971. They do not appear to be repeating that trend now, although it is too early to tell for sure.

I should also point out that I believe that the only way the US can avoid a COIN situation is to almost totally disengage from the developing world. We have become such a whipping boy for the majority of the world's ills (real and perceived) that anytime we become involved we risk being painted as a "greedy imperialist power," no matter the reality of the situation. Half-assing COIN is, as we've seen historically, almost always a disaster. So I'll be very curious to see what Dunlap has in mind.

marct
05-24-2007, 05:12 PM
Hi John,


Marc, forgive an old guy who hasn't progressed much beyond late 20th Century technology:) I readily concede that there is a whole raft of new media that could be delivered by Commando Solo or from a much greater distance by other means. I would also argue that small wars thinking - as most of us would - goes way beyond info war. As in all war, we still have to put steel on target at the same time as we win hearts and minds and disrupt C4I++++.

<visual of a 17th century court bow made> Of course! Especially if you will forgive me for constantly using an internal cavalry analogy for AF tactics - it's a habit I picked up from a couple of my great uncle's WW I fighter pilot buddies when I was a kid :).

A lot of my sense of, hmm, what's the right word - "frustration"? incredulity? about halfway between I think - stems from the reliance on using technology (very broadly construed to include things like cavalry vs. machine guns) that is outdated. Just as an example, why load a radio station on a plane when it could be miniaturized (or bought via Circuit City) and sent in on the ground for a fraction of the cost? I'll grant you that TV transmitters would be more expensive, but they could still be mobile and cheaper than on a large air platform. I keep thinking about the old Sheridan tank - it wasn't the best by any stretch of the imagination, but it worked well enough and there were a lot of them. If here is only a handful of Command Silo platforms, then I'll let the fate of the King Tiger make my point...

In a lot of ways, my thinking about cyberwarfare has been influenced by discussions with Rob Thornton and the way he has thought out its place in his latest SWJ article (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v8/thornton-swjvol8-excerpt.pdf). If we can achieve a better effect by using cell phones, laptops and blackberries, let's use them.

On putting the steel on target, Absolutely! I think that the AF has some really good roles to play in that as they have already done.


Some of this obviously means thinking outside the proverbial box (although we better not forget what is inside the box in our newfound enthusiasm).

A really good point, John. And, I have say that I agree with a number of the comments about the USAF needing new equipment - just because we are currently involved in COIN operations doesn't mean that we won't be involved in other, non-COIN ones in the future (this, BTW, is one of my pet peeves about the RCAF - our equipment is so outdated that we are lossing pilots to metal fatigue).


Although this story comes from Desert Storm, I think it is applicable to this discussion. My good friend, the late AF Col., Ben Harvey worked for Warden in Checkmate. Ben told me that in planning for the air campaign, they had come up with a bombing approach to taking down the Baghdad power grid that would be only temporary and it could have been restored in a very short time. Had it been employed (it obviously was rejected) a significant amount of civilian hardship could have been avoided. The short term psychological impact would have been enormous but think of the possible long term effects given the current civil war and insurgency in Iraq.

Which is really too bad - that is the type of application thinking that would have been really great at the start of OIF - I wish it had been implemented.

Marc

J Wolfsberger
05-24-2007, 05:47 PM
SERVICES AGREE TO WRITE JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPS


http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/feature_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=PENTAGON-23-21-1

Steve Blair
05-24-2007, 05:49 PM
SERVICES AGREE TO WRITE JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPS


http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/feature_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=PENTAGON-23-21-1

The link is password/subscription protected...just so folks know.

Here's the clip from their frontpage:
Six months after the Army and Marine Corps published a manual for ground troops on how to conduct counterinsurgency operations -- and following four years of battling insurgents, militias and sectarian killers in Iraq -- all four U.S. military services agreed this week to publish their first joint doctrine for this challenging but indispensable brand of irregular warfare. The Army will lead the pan-service effort, according to military officials.

Front page with article link (http://defense.iwpnewsstand.com/)

marct
05-24-2007, 05:49 PM
SERVICES AGREE TO WRITE JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPS


http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/feature_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=PENTAGON-23-21-1

Too bad I can't get in :wry:.

Marc

Rob Thornton
05-24-2007, 06:21 PM
Hey LawVol,

"calls for devising techniques that avoid exposing thousands of young Americans to the hazards of combat." How could anyone oppose this idea?

I think the danger here is that of people (be they the public, the policy makers, or the administration) buying into the fallacy that technology solves all, and that wars can somehow be reduced to the application of technology. Fundamentally, wars are bloody affairs, or as Sherman put it, "they are cruel."

While perhaps future Americans might be spared the horrors of combat, many non-American civilians would not. From the ground - I can assure you bombs (even PGM/LGB types) do not always hit where they are promised. Technology will always have some PE - but where you are talking "bombs" or 'missiles" you raise the stakes of the consequences. Unless you are willing to take on a separate and equally detrimental set of unintended consequences for the application of using air power to solve every problem in war and conflict, and unless you are willing to kill enough people (I believe many will be innocents) indiscriminately to get your message across, then I'd say you have to inject people/soldiers on the ground.

Since I'm a knuckle draggin "bog -togz" as was mentioned in MG Dunlap's AFJ article, I profess an inclination to live on the ground - the only wings I have are from falling out of an airplane. However I believe the capacity or the use of Air Power is far from realized in COIN, but its greatest unrealized potential in COIN lies outside the 500lb-200lb range. I also think MG's article was not aimed at engaging sister services about COIN, its generally accepted that calling somebody names gets you off on the wrong foot. I think his article was partly aimed at impassioning his on service of the rightness of a parochial view that a hammer is always the tool of choice, and partly aimed at politician purse string holders. I would no more listen to an Army or Marine GO who said they had all the answers, and resorted to calling the others names, war is serious business and not one for playground antics.

I think that if we are going to use war to achieve political ends, then we must be cognizant of the need to win the peace that follows. Sometimes unrestrained use of airpower has been, and probably will be required (certainly in a conventional, force on force) - we certainly have the best outfit to do that. An insurgency though is about people, and involves one(or more) group(s) of insurgents trying to coerce a government and its public to adapt their views or solutions through the use of force - since the insurgent srtategy ivolves the pubic, its likely that the two will be inter-mingled - the insurgent must be with the people to convince them as they few resources. This makes it very confusing and often difficult to kill the right people, the further away you are from the context of the situation the harder it is to get it right.

This is not about servicing targets - even at the tactical level. MG Dunlap points to the killing of Zarquawi as the highpoint of success in an otherwise dismal performance. While I like killing bad guys who kill Americans, it only gets you so far. did we disrupt AQIZ operations, maybe some - but how do you qualify it? To me MG Dunlap's statement shows he does not understand how COIN is different, you can't just finish your problems by killing a leader. AQ and other organizations thoroughly understand the military culture predominant in the US armed forces- the desire and the amount of effort we will expend to kill one person to "show" results knows few bounds. Consequently they have decentralized, and developed a regenerative capability. COIN is about changing the environment in which the insurgent or terrorist lives in - call it ideology if you like, call it "basic human needs", or call it something else. Since killing insurgent leaders has limited utility, you have to change the rules to make the real long term difference. COIN is about changing the rules of the environment, not destroying critical pieces of it.

As hard as it is to swallow it, people are required to do that. I'm not asking MG Dunlap to put on ACUs or run a patrol, the USAF has plenty of great things to do that only they can do. I would like their help in a constructive dialogue in how to employ their service's assets in a manner that both help us win the war and the peace.
Regards, Rob

wm
05-24-2007, 06:41 PM
I think the danger here is that of people (be they the public, the policy makers, or the administration) buying into the fallacy that technology solves all, and that wars can somehow be reduced to the application of technology. Fundamentally, wars are bloody affairs, or as Sherman put it, "they are cruel."

While perhaps future Americans might be spared the horrors of combat, many non-American civilians would not. From the ground - I can assure you bombs (even PGM/LGB types) do not always hit where they are promised. Technology will always have some PE - but where you are talking "bombs" or 'missiles" you raise the stakes of the consequences. Unless you are willing to take on a separate and equally detrimental set of unintended consequences for the application of using air power to solve every problem in war and conflict, and unless you are willing to kill enough people (I believe many will be innocents) indiscriminately to get your message across, then I'd say you have to inject people/soldiers on the ground.
. . .
[Y]ou can't just finish your problems by killing a leader. . . . COIN is about changing the environment in which the insurgent or terrorist lives in - call it ideology if you like, call it "basic human needs", or call it something else. Since killing insurgent leaders has limited utility, you have to change the rules to make the real long term difference. COIN is about changing the rules of the environment, not destroying critical pieces of it.

As hard as it is to swallow it, people are required to do that.

Well stated. I would only add that you can "kill" a leader without ever firing a shot. Leaders need people to lead. A good COIN op would induce those folks who are the current or potential followers of the insurgent leader to give up their allegiance to that leader. I doubt that misplaced air-delivered ordnance, or badly aimed ground fire for that matter, does much to convince the victims of it to change their opinions about whom they will follow.

LawVol
05-24-2007, 07:07 PM
Rob: Please do not take this as flippant, but I'm not sure we read the same article. My read of the 'COIN Shortage' article indicates an openess on the part of Dunlap to explore all techniques and solutions, not just bombs on target. As you would expect, he alludes to the use of airpower (I think we'd expect anyone to go to their experience first) but I don't think he's limiting it to its kinetic effect.


but where you are talking "bombs" or 'missiles" you raise the stakes of the consequences.

Your argument appears to be based on the assumption that airpower generates more collateral damages than ground forces. This is an assumption I'm not willing to concede until I see concrete evidence. Sure, airpower will kill those it does not intend to, but so too does ground power. We see this nearly nightly on the evening news. Images of Haditha, hamnadiyah (sp?) and other places get extended coverage. Airpower's collateral damages gets mentioned but rarely to the extent that ground power's does. Perhaps it has something to do with the personal level with which ground power is applied, I don' know. Additionally, Abu Ghraib cannot happen with airpower. So the collateral damage argument is, at best, a wash.



but its greatest unrealized potential in COIN lies outside the 500lb-200lb range. I also think MG's article was not aimed at engaging sister services about COIN, its generally accepted that calling somebody names gets you off on the wrong foot. I think his article was partly aimed at impassioning his on service of the rightness of a parochial view that a hammer is always the tool of choice

I agree that airpower is used more effectively in COIN in non-lethal ways. And just because a number of AF people default to the kinetic use of airpower doesn't mean you or I have to as well. Someone mentioned Darfur earlier and I think this is a great example. With limited ground-troops (perhaps our own security forces), the AF could use its airlift and BEAR base capabilities (creates a base from nothing) to help alleviate that situation. Add in some medical teams and you're a long way toward making a real impact. However, in Iraq, as Dunlap argues, we are beyond that point. He argues that we can't win their hearts and minds.

My take-a-way from his article (and he can correct me if he reads this) is not that the new COIN manual is an exercise in futility when it comes to future operations, but that is unworkable in the current situation. He may have somethng there. Of course, I think he is also exploring the idea of avoiding insurgencies when possible. This is somehting I'm contemplating as well. For example, suppose we intervene in Darfur. Does it necessarily have to be a large-scale, ten-year operation? Or can we do something to avoid that situation? Or look at Iran, do you really think the American public is going to let us do an OIF I redux in Iran? I don't think so, so we have to come up with something else and, yes, it will involve airpower.

Our discussions tend to presuppose a COIN-type conflict, but it doesn't have to be that way. Just as we look at international relations and agree that military force is typically a tool of last resort, shouldn't we also look at entering a COIN environment as a last resort since it is, as you say and I agree, "cruel?"

Tom Odom
05-24-2007, 07:26 PM
My take-a-way from his article (and he can correct me if he reads this) is not that the new COIN manual is an exercise in futility when it comes to future operations, but that is unworkable in the current situation. He may have somethng there. Of course, I think he is also exploring the idea of avoiding insurgencies when possible. This is somehting I'm contemplating as well. For example, suppose we intervene in Darfur. Does it necessarily have to be a large-scale, ten-year operation? Or can we do something to avoid that situation? Or look at Iran, do you really think the American public is going to let us do an OIF I redux in Iran? I don't think so, so we have to come up with something else and, yes, it will involve airpower.

Counter insurgency as defined by avoiding insurgency? Come on, mate. The general's title was COIN shortage, targeted on what he calls a shortage of COIN doctrine.

As for the collateral damage being a wash, again come on. If you mean a J-DAM versus a 155mm round, maybe so. If you mean collateral damage in a COIN operation like a sweep or search where ROE controls fire there is no "wash" because there simply is no comparison. All of that aside, as we use airpower in COIN it is controlled from the ground by boots on the ground.

That means ultimately the responsibilty for the casualties are the guys on the ground. That makes the reference to Abu Gharaib and airpower was specious at best.

Tom

Rob Thornton
05-24-2007, 07:40 PM
Hi Law Vol,
No, your not being flippant, some of it is how I read it, read the other articles that MG Dunlap had authored, then re-read it. But, perspective does influence what you take away.

As for Bombs - well, I'd say ground fires certainly figure in - particularly large caliber stuff - MLRS, tube artillery, mortars, even 40mm MK-19s. The SDZ for a .50 cal is 6500 meters and over penetration is a concern. Now, like airpower, there is a difference between indiscriminant use and use of the required force. Nobody wants to tie the hand of the war fighter.

My point is that "unconstrained" application of big stuff equates to more damage so people on the ground are in the best position to weigh the consequence of the increase in force - how much scrutiny is a pilot going to be able to apply once he's wings level and cleared hot? These days our use of airpower in the cities in Iraq is pretty judicious, as is the use of artillery - but if the situation requires it, thankfully its there. So our only option for use of force was to back up and let the ETACs (or FSO) bring in the hammer, I think you'd see allot more collateral damage.


Or look at Iran, do you really think the American public is going to let us do an OIF I redux in Iran? I don't think so, so we have to come up with something else and, yes, it will involve airpower.

This one here is interesting - how soon do you think before our passions override historical sense of things. Why is it we are just now writing a COIN manual - shouldn't we have had standing doctrine after 1975? The problem with us is we seldom convince ourselves we will get sucked into a similar predicament as before - everybody hoped that when the president stood on the deck, that'd it be done. It was the proponents of shock and awe and some wishful thinking that led us on more then a 3 hour tour. Will OIF redux happen again somewhere, I'd say undoubtedly as long as our national interests require it - the question is will we have to reinvent the wheel because we looked for a more comfortable way out and declared that what we learned the hard way was not applicable. I don't think it matters which party is in charge, the world will come up with its own set of circumstances - or has been said - you may not have an interest in war, but war has an interest in you.


Our discussions tend to presuppose a COIN-type conflict, but it doesn't have to be that way. Just as we look at international relations and agree that military force is typically a tool of last resort, shouldn't we also look at entering a COIN environment as a last resort since it is, as you say and I agree, "cruel?"

I think there is more economics involved then philosophy. While Sherman had the character right, I think he said it with the sarcasm only a warrior could. The use of last resort is clearly subjective. What you and I see as a travesty does not bother a good many folks in the world, for them violence is handy tool and the road to last resort is awfully short. On the other hand, those with the most to lose are often those most shrewd in its use - particularly if there are more available tools with less consequence. Those with little to lose - have few qualms about the costs others may incur for their actions. That what makes non-state actors stirring up trouble in dirt poor, have not states such a problem for us - they see themselves as having little to lose and much to gain - life is cheap on their side of the tracks.

I think a big part of our problem is forming a unified strategy on what all this means. Even if we find common ground between the USAF and ground services, we have a long way to go with the OGAs.
Regards, Rob

LawVol
05-24-2007, 08:34 PM
Tom: I took the "COIN shortage" to mean one of two things and probably both. First, the shortage is in the approach to COIN that the manual uses. He argues that its approach of simply adding more troops isn't the answer. While it may be the answer for future operations, we're past that point in Iraq now (this is his argument, I'm leaning his way, but need to think it through a bit more). Second, that there may be more of a "shortage" of future COIN operations than ground power proponents think.

Your dismissal of my "wash" statement presupposes a strict adherence to ROE, something that isn't a given (on the ground or in the air). I stand by my statement. I'm a lawyer, bring me facts and I'll rethink the issue.

Rob: define "unconstrained." The attack on Zarqawi was not unconstrained. If you mean carpet bombing, yes I agree. But we don't do that anymore; we still can however :D . We're pretty accurate and are working to increase that accuracy if given the proper funding (shameless plug right?:wry: ).

Steve Blair
05-24-2007, 08:56 PM
Your argument appears to be based on the assumption that airpower generates more collateral damages than ground forces. This is an assumption I'm not willing to concede until I see concrete evidence. Sure, airpower will kill those it does not intend to, but so too does ground power. We see this nearly nightly on the evening news. Images of Haditha, hamnadiyah (sp?) and other places get extended coverage. Airpower's collateral damages gets mentioned but rarely to the extent that ground power's does. Perhaps it has something to do with the personal level with which ground power is applied, I don' know. Additionally, Abu Ghraib cannot happen with airpower. So the collateral damage argument is, at best, a wash.

There could be a number of reasons for this, the first being that airpower simply isn't being used currently as much as other forms of fire support. I also seem to recall a fair amount of press coverage about the IAF's collateral damage in Lebanon, as well as some friendly fire incidents in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Not trying to be snide here, just pointing out that there is collateral damage from airpower and that it does have an impact on operations. And to the local whose house is destroyed by a smart bomb (or an artillery shell), that's an unacceptable level of collateral damage.

Abu Ghraib may not be possible with air power, but mistakes in targeting and the planting of other bodies in bomb craters certainly is. We shouldn't forget that an important VC/NVA tactic was to fire on patrols from villages then pull back and wait for the inevitable airstrike so that they could may some hay from the resulting damage. I would submit that air power's collateral damage lies more in the fact that many fires are not directly observed (artillery fire is similar, so it's not just an airpower issue) and thus much more open to hostile IO manipulation. The only precision weapon in COIN is a sniper with his rifle. Anything else has a margin of error that can prove unacceptable in certain circumstances.

Rob Thornton
05-24-2007, 10:35 PM
LawVol -


Rob: define "unconstrained." The attack on Zarqawi was not unconstrained. If you mean carpet bombing, yes I agree. But we don't do that anymore; we still can however.

Concur, the general use of Air Power in OIF right now seems about right and is being used IAW with the discretion of the ground CDR, or in the case of HPTs like Zarqawi where the shots are called higher up measures are taken to mitigate risk. I'm not talking about carpet bombing, I am talking about the notion that COIN can be reduced to an air campaign, or that an air campaign can replace COIN operations regardless of the conditions. Are there times that an air campaign with minimal use of U.S. boots on the ground might be a good call - sure, within the last 10 years we've seen some great ones - many non-kinetic.

We're not pushing COIN because we think its the end all be all, we are pushing COIN and COIN like thinking because we see it as a growing core competency due to world situation (lots under that umbrella because it leads to the conditions for an insurgency, but lump in global terrorism, humanitarian and disaster relief, FID, problems caused by global warming, resource wars etc). Remember for us, doctrine is descriptive and not prescriptive. There are lots of other doctrinal manuals in the Joint and Army library.



We're pretty accurate and are working to increase that accuracy if given the proper funding (shameless plug right? )

This brings up a good point. I heard this argument today - remember the Chinese Embassy hit? Why did so many say it had to be intentional? The argument was that we'd built unrealistic expectations about our technological capabilities through our own IO that people determined it had to be a deliberate action. Diplomatic SNAFU? There have been other instances where a glitch in the system - timing, data in-data out, bad linkage for data, etc. caused an unexpected result. Industry will promise you that if you throw enough $$$ at a problem you can overcome it - its our national culture. Some things though are not problems to be overcome, they are just conditions in which other problems exist.

I really think we should up our taxes and/or spend a greater amount of money on defense. It is not just the Air Force that needs the Air Force to refit its planes and equipment, and maintain pursuit of our technological edge; the other services require the AF to maintain superiority - we prefer to fight away games. Likewise, the ground services are going to require more money then anybody probably really is able to forecast inorder to achieve the role policy has crafted for it. We have not even broached the subject of the USN and OGAs.

My personal view is that you either invest more, or shrink your expectations. However, that does not seem to be the view of our elected officials who cannot afford to have my simplistic view and must balance domestic and foreign affairs, maintain a strong economy and deal with a host of other issues while providing the means to defend the United States. We (the people) will not be willing to bear the additional burden of a significant, permanent increase in military spending until you can present a public argument that is simple and straight forward - but its a complicated world - not much is simple anymore. I listened to the President explaining the Immigration Bill, and I recognized that every issue that gets to the congress and the President is complicated - else it would get resolved at the local or state level.

To a degree I can empathize with MG Dunlap even wile disagreeing with his argument and method. Its tough to look around and see what you believe in hanging in the balance. His thoughts have the very positive reaction of stimulating debate on the proper roles of the services under a number of scenarios. We have the various services because we have decided we need them, we have adjusted them likewise, but without discourse the decision process would be flawed.

Regards, Rob

LawVol
05-24-2007, 11:30 PM
I'm going to find some time to look into this issue of ground power v. airpower vis-a-vis collateral damage. I'm sure someone has done a study.

Don't put me in the same camp with those who believe airpower can be used in place of COIN.:) I've read alot of stuff on the old British theory of air control and agree that it can't work. However, airpower might assist in preventing COIN, especially when used in conjunction with a small ground force in a punitive expedition (I've discussed this in other posts so won't go into it here).

I agree that COIN is a necessary skill set and it may very well solve the Iraq problem (it is certainly a topic I am interested in learning about). I'm just open to Dunlap's argument that it might not. Maybe there is a better way; I'm open to suggestions and willing to hear just about anyone out.

slapout9
05-24-2007, 11:52 PM
Some of this obviously means thinking outside the proverbial box (although we better not forget what is inside the box in our newfound enthusiasm). Two of the most innovative strategic thinkers whose work is emminently adaptable to small wars are Air Force - Boyd with his OODA Loop and John Warden with his "inside out warfare" and 5 strategic rings. One can, of course, use these ideas in a purely conventional sense or apply them to small wars in innovative ways - as, indeed, one can with Clausewitz.

John, this is absolutely true EBO of which the 5 rings is just the targeting part works better from a ground perspective than it does from an Air perspective. Example during the fracas between Israel and Hezbillah I saw a guy on TV from the Air Force explain how they bombed just the ends of a bridge to lessen damage and create the effect of usage denial to the enemy. He never understood that he also denied use for his side plus somebody would have to pay for it to be rebuilt. Only!!!ground forces could have created the situation by seizing the bridge that would have denied it to the enemy, plus they could use it for their side and nobody had to pay to repair it. EBO also has a targeting concept that is not talked about much called positive an negative energy. Positive energy to effect a target is good like building a school. The part that the Air Force always wants to talk about is negative energy..taking energy away from a target ie bomb it.




Although this story comes from Desert Storm, I think it is applicable to this discussion. My good friend, the late AF Col., Ben Harvey worked for Warden in Checkmate. Ben told me that in planning for the air campaign, they had come up with a bombing approach to taking down the Baghdad power grid that would be only temporary and it could have been restored in a very short time. Had it been employed (it obviously was rejected) a significant amount of civilian hardship could have been avoided. The short term psychological impact would have been enormous but think of the possible long term effects given the current civil war and insurgency in Iraq.

John, they did do this in a very limited area it was called a carbon graphite bomb or something like that. Tiny fibers shorted out the electrical grid but as soon as they were wiped off the electricity came back on, very labor intensive to fix which was the idea behind it, to turn the power off but not do any real damage.

Rob Thornton
05-25-2007, 12:49 AM
LawVol


Don't put me in the same camp with those who believe airpower can be used in place of COIN.

Of course we don't - you've been here a long time and I and many others have benefitted from your posts.


Maybe there is a better way; I'm open to suggestions and willing to hear just about anyone out.

I think that is one of the best things about our military culture - a disbelief in the inability to improve.

Best regards, Rob

Tom Odom
05-26-2007, 12:51 AM
Tom: I took the "COIN shortage" to mean one of two things and probably both. First, the shortage is in the approach to COIN that the manual uses. He argues that its approach of simply adding more troops isn't the answer. While it may be the answer for future operations, we're past that point in Iraq now (this is his argument, I'm leaning his way, but need to think it through a bit more). Second, that there may be more of a "shortage" of future COIN operations than ground power proponents think.

Your dismissal of my "wash" statement presupposes a strict adherence to ROE, something that isn't a given (on the ground or in the air). I stand by my statement. I'm a lawyer, bring me facts and I'll rethink the issue.

Rob: define "unconstrained." The attack on Zarqawi was not unconstrained. If you mean carpet bombing, yes I agree. But we don't do that anymore; we still can however :D . We're pretty accurate and are working to increase that accuracy if given the proper funding (shameless plug right?:wry: ).


Law,

If we are discussing OIF and COIN, you maybe correct on the futility of adding troops. The current FM came about after much water had flowed under the proverbial bridge. With regards to future operations, I would caution both you and the general against thinking that insurgency and counter insurgency is not in our future. In discussing future operations as relating to COIN, the examples of recent ops in Somalia and earlier in Kosovo were not COIN-related. In the first example they were largely strike operations in support of a conventional operation to push the Muslim extremists out; that worked, The results afterward are much less clear. As for Kosovo, that again was not COIN. It was peace enforcement using strikes as coercive tool.

You are 100% correct that I presuppose strict adherance to ROE on the ground and in the air. That is the only way to compare risks for varying levels of force on an equal plain. Troops out of control or a fighter jock determined to put steel on target against standing ROE are not the issue here. The issue is levels of force and the secondary effects of using force; In the case of Zarqawi, I believe our interests would have been better served by a precision ground operation. I also agree with Rob that OIF seems to have the airpower balance under the correct guidelines; I am more concerned, however, with use of air in OEF, where aerial fires are used as a substitute for troop density.

Finally I would also say that this is not an Air Force versus Ground pounder issue. Much of the aerial fires on the battlefield come from rotary wing A/C. The debate as I see it is over COIN as a manpower instensive, human centric form of conflict and its conflation with non-COIN, limited strike or even full conventional operations in which technical superiority is crucial. Whe we confuse the two we get "shock and aw s#$@." The latter is what happened to the Israelis in Lebanon last year.

Best

Tom

Smitten Eagle
05-26-2007, 12:55 PM
he argues that we need innovation that "calls for devising techniques that avoid exposing thousands of young Americans to the hazards of combat." How could anyone oppose this idea?



I'm opposed to selling the idea that we can merely "avoid exposing thousands of young Americans to the hazards of combat" precisely because to do so is will only bloody them more. COIN fighting means controlling populations, and populations are controlled with presence, security, paybacks, politics, and force protection. Air certainly has something to add to this. COIN is not about lobbing a few cruise missiles at asprin factories in the Sudan and hoping they do some good.

It would seem that this zeal to rely on technology/airpower is a throwback to Rumsfeld circa 2000, when Transformation was the key buzzword in the beltway. Or perhaps a throwback to the 1994-2001 time period when the US embarked on random cruise missile crusades throughout the globe, often to little effect. (remember when Pres. Clinton ruled out a ground invasion of Kosovo, telling the 1990s enemy du jour, Milosovic, that our resolve is only as deep as our quantity of PGMs and the will of the KLA).

Bottom line, wars are bloody affairs. Anyone who says otherwise is trying to sell something.

In the end, after the shock-and-awe decapitation of a government, we'll still have to send in ground forces. And we're heard it before that "you go to war with the army you have." So what kind of army are we going to have? One that "avoids the hazards of exposing thousands of young Americans to the hazards of combat?" I sure hope not. Such an army, when employed, would certainly shatter upon contact with the enemy.

LawVol
05-26-2007, 01:10 PM
I agree that we'll see some form of COIN in the future, probably sooner than we think. However, I do not see it in the form of large troop deployments. This is where I agree with Dunlap that the American public and politicians won't stand for it. In other words, I don't think the pols will do it even if they think it is necessary because they don;t have the backbone to go against public thinking. That being said, I do see smaller versions as becoming the norm (e.g. Philippines, HOA, etc.). Maybe I'm wrong, but we went through a similar thing after Vietnam and I don't think its a stretch to say we'll likely face the same thing again.

I do not see airpower as the solution to all. I happen to agree that when you're objective is to install a friendly government or instill democracy (or whatever we call it), it is manpower intensive. You have to deal with people face-to-face to win friends and a fly-by doesn't do that.

One questions comes to mind that relates to whether Dunlap is correct in his argument that COIN won't work in Iraq. From some of my reading, I've seen that the COIN force typically chooses a side. Have we made a mistake by not doing this? It seems as if we're trying to do peacekeeping between the Sunnis and Shiites. WOuld we be better off just picking a side and getting to stability? Maybe I'm off base here, but just trying to thinking broadly.

S.E.: I'm not so sure we always have to enage in COIN. You are correct that lobbing missles isn't COIN. COIN happens after we enter a country. My questions involves whether we actually need to enter the country. Perhaps another method of dealing with a problem will enable us to avoid COIN by not going in somewhere. For example, there as several books out that indicate that our policy of containment was working against Iraq. Assuming in a future and similiar situation that faulty intel wouldn't lead us astray, why not continue to pursue that option rather than enagge in COIN. I don;t necessarily subscribe to the school of thought that says the US has to spread it brand of democracy (and I'm not saying you are either), so I look at things from a more realist perspective.

JAK
05-30-2007, 11:24 PM
All -

The Dunlap piece in debate here & at the SWJ Blog:

Title: We Have a Serious COIN Shortage., By: Dunlap Jr., Charles J., U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 0041798X, May2007, Vol. 133, Issue 5
Database: Military & Government Collection

We Have a Serious COIN Shortage

Nobody asked me but…
Recently the U.S. Army, with help from the Marine Corps, touted a significant counterinsurgency (COIN) success. No, it was not an announcement of the extermination of another major terrorist as happened when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in an airstrike last summer. Nor was it about yet more debilitating air attacks against al Qaeda havens in Somalia.

Rather, it was the unveiling of the "new" COIN doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 3-24. With magazines such as Newsweek declaring it "The Book" on Iraq, it quickly became a public relations triumph for boots-on-the-ground advocates.

FM 3-24 does exploit the brilliance of respected warriors such as U.S. Army Colonels H. R. McMaster and Peter Mansoor, and other ground-force experts. It also effectively captures scores of lessons-learned from COIN history, and will surely prove invaluable in many future situations. Still, it is not the solution for the U.S. military in today's Iraq.

Why not? At its core FM 3-24 calls for a traditional, land-component solution: pour lots of Soldiers onto the problem. How many? An astounding ratio of 20-25 counterinsurgents per 1,000 inhabitants. As an otherwise fawning article in a January 2007 issue of Time magazine concedes, this means deploying 120,000 troops to Baghdad alone. To pacify all of Iraq? According to U.S. News and World Report, 500,000 or more.

Wow. With that large a force, the Coalition would enjoy as much as a 25-to-1 advantage over what the Brookings Institution has reported as the insurgents' strength of 20,000-30,000 fighters. Such lopsided superiority over any opponent ought to ensure victory regardless of the doctrine employed.

Besides sheer numbers, FM 3-24 requires counterinsurgents who are not only effective warfighters, but also highly trained in language, culture, and history. Moreover, they must be ready to perform such sophisticated duties as building civil institutions and commercial enterprises.

Such specially-talented people do not exist in uniform in anywhere near the numbers FM 3-24 wants. Nor is there any likelihood of recruiting them. As retired General Barry McCaffrey points out, the Army is already lowering standards just to find enough volunteers to meet existing recruiting goals.

To acquire the kind of scholarly, versatile soldier FM 3-24 insists on in the numbers the doctrine demands, the only option is to grasp the electrified third rail of national security politics: the draft. This alone dooms FM 3-24 as a solution for Iraq.

Real innovation for 21st century conflicts calls for devising techniques that avoid exposing thousands of young Americans to the hazards of combat. Achieving this often requires the creative application of America's technological genius, much of which is in the air and naval components' way of war.

Strangely, the innovative high-tech/low-cost approaches that worked in Kosovo and toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan are shunned. For example, airpower is marginalized into a mere five-page annex in FM 3-24's lengthy 282-page text. Instead, the doctrine insists that only masses of troops on the ground can defeat insurgents. Thus, it is much premised on conventional COIN theory of winning hearts and minds through ground-level engagement of the population by thousands of U.S. troops.

Whatever merits that approach may have in other settings, it is much too late for the United States to implement in Iraq. The mindset of entire generations of Iraqis is already poisoned by, among other things, Abu Ghraib and related scandals, not to mention Islamic extremism's innate antagonism to people and ideas from the West. How bad is it? A recent poll by World Public Opinion.org shows that 61 percent of Iraqis actually approve of attacks on U.S. forces. Sadly, more personnel in theater simplifies the enemy's ability to do just that.

This raises another key point: the tragedy of each U.S. death erodes what is left of American support — and the enemy knows this and exploits it. Accordingly, while a short-term troop surge might give some needed breathing space for Iraqis to solve their own problems, the long-term presence of American ground forces as FM 3-24 suggests is not the answer, as inevitably rising casualty figures will generate insuperable political difficulties.

Given such grim realities, it is imperative that we think out-of-the-box and look to solutions beyond merely adding troops. The complexities of counterinsurgency require the talents of the full joint warfighting team, and not just the designs of the ground component. Despite real merits, FM 3-24 regrettably falls short of a practical strategy for winning in Iraq.

PHOTO (COLOR): The author believes that the main drawback of FM 3-24 is that it focuses too much on traditional techniques of winning hearts and minds by using ground forces such as U.S. Army Major Jennifer Bailey of the 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion, here reading to Iraqi childern in Tikrit.


~~~~~~~~

By Charles J. Dunlap Jr.


Major General Dunlap is the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Air Force and a Distinguished Graduate of the National War College.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright of U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings is the property of United States Naval Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

Ski
05-31-2007, 01:04 AM
Every time this guy writes something, my contempt for the Air Force grows a little bit stronger.

120mm
05-31-2007, 06:42 AM
Is he related to the three star that doesn't think "collateral damage" includes any civilians in Afghanistan? I mean, HE hasn't seen any "proof?"

WVO
05-31-2007, 06:51 AM
It seems that many air power theorists are comfortable with the idea that victory is as simple as toppling the ancien regime. Without a doubt, air power has played a primary, sometimes exclusive, role in destroying opposing governments as seen in Kosovo 1999 and Afghanistan 2001. However, air power cannot control populations. By 1999 Serbia was already significantly weakened and a formidable resistance existed in Kosovo. Air power turned the tide against the Taliban in 2001, but again a significant resistance already existed. Furthermore, both have required significant, long term presence of foreign troops (16000 are currently deployed in Kosovo and however many tens of thousands in Afghanistan). True believers in air power love to point at Kosovo as the model of success. Maybe I'm just not at a high enough altitude to see the whole picture, but it seems to me it's another example of why air power is not the solution to all our problems.

wm
05-31-2007, 11:04 AM
This excerpt is from a story is on the BBC's web site

Afghans' anger over US bombings

. . .

"When the Americans came the people started fighting them back, and then the planes came and started bombing us.

"Even under the Russians we haven't witnessed bombardments like it before."

The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) investigated the accounts and identified that at least 25 of those killed in Shindand were women and children.

But the commander of US operations for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Brig Gen Joseph Votel, denied these reports.

"We have no reports that confirm to us that non-combatants were injured or killed out in Shindand," he said, justifying the use of 2,000lb bombs against mud houses.

"If there are insurgents that are effectively engaging our forces and they happen to be coming from a building we would make every use we can of technology we have, and precision weapons, to eliminate the threat and minimise the effects of collateral damage."

. . .

Full story is here:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6705607.stm


. . .

Tom Odom
05-31-2007, 12:44 PM
At the risk of sounding like a pompous pundit, I offer the last 2 paragraphs of my article in Vol 8 SWJ magazine.


In contrast, collateral damage has remained the word of choice for civilian casualties. As it is used in FM 3-24, the term collateral damage largely reflects the idea of non-combatants or "civilians" wounded or killed in military operations. In a realm of conflict where the civilian population is the objective for insurgent word choice is more than a matter of semantics. Going back to Dr. Sepp's admonition that "priority to "kill-capture" enemy, not on engaging population" as a key indicator for unsuccessful COIN operations, describing civilian deaths or injuries as "collateral" damage only confirms that the COIN forces were focused on killing or capturing the enemy and the civilians were in the way.

Put another way, strategists have long warned that military forces are in support to diplomatic, political, and police forces in COIN operations. No police force in the Western world would try to kill a gang leader in a housing complex with a Hellfire missile. Why? Because the action against the gang leader is to protect the people in the housing complex from him. It is not to kill him at whatever cost to those same people. Any loss of civilian life is a friendly loss. The same rule applies to COIN.

I would also repeat what I said earlier in this thread: that the debate on COIN is not a ground pounder versus air power issue, because both sides of that debate get wrapped up in the issues of lethal versus non-lethal when it comes to COIN. Ultimately the correct or incorrect decision is the responsibility of the commander on the ground because COIN is inherently ground-centric.

Best

Tom

jcustis
05-31-2007, 12:48 PM
Why not? At its core FM 3-24 calls for a traditional, land-component solution: pour lots of Soldiers onto the problem. How many? An astounding ratio of 20-25 counterinsurgents per 1,000 inhabitants. As an otherwise fawning article in a January 2007 issue of Time magazine concedes, this means deploying 120,000 troops to Baghdad alone. To pacify all of Iraq? According to U.S. News and World Report, 500,000 or more.

Call me ignorant or slow, but I never got to "the core" and came away with the same understanding. The emphasis is on developing those internal security structures as well, not just front-line forces.


Wow. With that large a force, the Coalition would enjoy as much as a 25-to-1 advantage over what the Brookings Institution has reported as the insurgents' strength of 20,000-30,000 fighters. Such lopsided superiority over any opponent ought to ensure victory regardless of the doctrine employed.

That is unfortunately a very cumbersome analysis. It also speaks to a misunderstanding of the nature of COIN, asymmetric warfare, etc., etc.


Besides sheer numbers, FM 3-24 requires counterinsurgents who are not only effective warfighters, but also highly trained in language, culture, and history. Moreover, they must be ready to perform such sophisticated duties as building civil institutions and commercial enterprises.

Such specially-talented people do not exist in uniform in anywhere near the numbers FM 3-24 wants. Nor is there any likelihood of recruiting them. As retired General Barry McCaffrey points out, the Army is already lowering standards just to find enough volunteers to meet existing recruiting goals.

Such qualifications are certainly the objective, but we can get by with the threshold. I'm confident I can get by with a grasp of 50-100 control words during kinetic ops. And as problematic as they are, linguists (even if contracted) can suffice during those softer times if employed properly.


Strangely, the innovative high-tech/low-cost approaches that worked in Kosovo and toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan are shunned. For example, airpower is marginalized into a mere five-page annex in FM 3-24's lengthy 282-page text. Instead, the doctrine insists that only masses of troops on the ground can defeat insurgents. Thus, it is much premised on conventional COIN theory of winning hearts and minds through ground-level engagement of the population by thousands of U.S. troops.

Hmmm. The last time I checked, our opponents in Kosovo tended to mass themselves and their equipment, making for lucrative targets that could be planned against. And as for the Taliban being toppled...isn't the jury still out on that? We still have a long row to hoe even there.


Given such grim realities, it is imperative that we think out-of-the-box and look to solutions beyond merely adding troops. The complexities of counterinsurgency require the talents of the full joint warfighting team, and not just the designs of the ground component. Despite real merits, FM 3-24 regrettably falls short of a practical strategy for winning in Iraq.

I'd enjoy learning about the "solutions" proposed to counter (or is it enhance?)
the ground component's designs. And last I checked, FM 3-24 and its doctrinal progeny weren't written to be the silver bullet for Iraq. Their concepts have wide application across all COIN environments. Some are more relevant than others, but it's the smart leader who takes what he needs from the doctrine, employs it to shape his force's thinking, and builds a roadmap from it.

It sound like someone wants to take their ball and go home because they were picked last on the pitch.

Steve Blair
05-31-2007, 01:12 PM
Strangely, the innovative high-tech/low-cost approaches that worked in Kosovo and toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan are shunned. For example, airpower is marginalized into a mere five-page annex in FM 3-24's lengthy 282-page text. Instead, the doctrine insists that only masses of troops on the ground can defeat insurgents. Thus, it is much premised on conventional COIN theory of winning hearts and minds through ground-level engagement of the population by thousands of U.S. troops.

One time-honored tactic for some airpower enthusiasts is to declare victory when they wish and go home. Hence the Afghanistan reference above, which it should be noted doesn't mention the guys on the ground marking targets for those lovely high-tech approaches. And innovative? Many of the techniques used in Kosovo were pioneered in Vietnam (airborne FAC and so on), and the main platform was the A-10 (which the AF doesn't like in the first place). This struck me as a very snippy piece. And I have yet to see any real solutions put forward by the author. Our own LawVol has done more in that regard, and he's published less (I believe...correct me if I'm wrong, LV).

I have yet to see anything worthwhile regarding an airpower solution to COIN. "Bombing 'em all back to the stone age" doesn't work.

LawVol
05-31-2007, 02:53 PM
Our own LawVol has done more in that regard, and he's published less (I believe...correct me if I'm wrong, LV).

I have yet to see anything worthwhile regarding an airpower solution to COIN. "Bombing 'em all back to the stone age" doesn't work.

Thanks for the plug Steve. Yes, he is infinately more published than I am. But, I'm working on some other things.

Maybe I'm wrong here, but it seems like most of the problem with Dunlap's articel is the perception that he thinks airpower can do it alone. Not only do I not believe this (I think my posts attest to that), but I don't think he does either. JCustis say that FM 3-24 wasn't written to be the silver bullet in Iraq. I agree and I don't think that is what Dunlap is saying. From the media reports, it appears as if there is a campaign to say it is the silver bullet. All he appears to be saying is that we need to keep an open mind and explore all options that every branch brings to the fight. Perhaps there is some form of airpower (or naval or ground power for that matter) that we can use in some novel way that we haven't though of before. Closing our minds simply because the argument comes from an airmen shouldn't be a knee-jerk reaction.

Take this comment from Ski:

Every time this guy writes something, my contempt for the Air Force grows a little bit stronger.

I don't know what AF guy peed in your wheaties, but we're on the same team. It is exactly this sort of parochialism that inhibits a joint response to the fight. Relax.

wm references an article regarding a single incident as apparent support for the theory that airpower causes more collateral damage (sorry Tom) than ground power. One story from the BBC (YGBSM) doesn't prove a theory. I've said this before and I'll say it again: I deal in facts. Show me concrete facts to support this theory and then we can talk. The recent incident involving Marine Spec Ops comes to mind; and there are more examples (the report regarding a slip in ethical thinking by ground troops continually exposed to combat also comes to mind). Sure airpower causes civilian casualties, but some of you want to conveniently apply a standard to airpower that you seem unwilling to apply to ground power. Moreover, recent research and development has allowed the AF to come up with smaller bombs capable of severely reducing blast patterns and thus civilian casualities (oh but we need to cut the AF budget because we just waste it on crap that doesn't help the COIN fight, I forgot).

Okay, I'll sit back and let you guys get in your licks. Maybe I'm just feeling combative today.:wry:

Steve Blair
05-31-2007, 03:29 PM
I'll just repeat something I said earlier: the only precision weapon in COIN is a good sniper with a well-sighted-in rifle. ANYTHING else causes a level of collateral damage. Period. A five-foot margin of error with a precision artillery shell may be acceptable in conventional warfare (in fact it might be considered a Godsend there), but in COIN that's damage you don't need. The same rule applies to air-delivered ordnance. I don't favor either service there: the Army in the past has relied far too much on artillery for COIN-style missions (H&I fire in Vietnam is but one example).

Dunlap's presentation has always appeared to be that there is a better way to do things, and it's normally couched in airpower language. That conveys a message that he may not intend to a general readership. It's a style of writing I've seen from many military writers (both AF and Army) dating back to the 1950s and its goal is usually to corner a level of funding or support for their particular service or branch. I don't close my mind to his ideas...the problem is that I haven't seen any from him. References to past campaigns (that bear little resemblance to Iraq) and word counts aren't the same thing as ideas or proposals.

Tom Odom
05-31-2007, 03:51 PM
wm references an article regarding a single incident as apparent support for the theory that airpower causes more collateral damage (sorry Tom) than ground power. One story from the BBC (YGBSM) doesn't prove a theory. I've said this before and I'll say it again: I deal in facts.

Law,

Again I am not talking collateral casualties as a purely airpower issue. If you insist that you are dealing in facts, then when you mention me in a response to WM, cite me factually.

As for airpower in COIN, I understand that the AF is developing smaller weapons and all that. Even when those weapons are developed, the use of them in COIN will be decided on the ground. COIN is ground centric because its ultimate success or failure depends on human beings looking each other in the eyes and coming to an understanding.

Here I will offer an opinion: General Dunlap's glib writing on this reminds me of an equally glib AF one star I met as a Major one evening in early August 1990. The general was in Checkmate and he gave 3 of us a briefing for how the AF was going to take down the Iraqi regime. I had another Army guy--an Apache driver--and an AF A-10 driver with me. We listened and the general pitched us. I asked one question, that is what airpower was being put against the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. We the Army and Marine forces on the ground--were short on anti-tank munitions and any attacks against Iraq could prompt the heavy Iraqi corps in Kuwait to attack south. The answer to my question was "none," and with a wave of the hand the AF general added he didn't think that was necessary. I told him he was nuts, an opinion supported by the A-10 driver. Needless to say we were not invited to stay longer. General Dunlap offers examples that don't apply to the situation in Iraq or Afghanistan, those being Kosovo and the opening phases of OEF, then waves the reality of COIN away just as dismissively as the one star in 1990 regarding an Iraqi heavy corps.

Regards,

Tom

120mm
05-31-2007, 04:06 PM
As an Army type who has always been fascinated with Aviation, I can't help feeling quite a bit like Charlie Brown, getting ready for Lucy to pull the ball away at the last minute.

The Air Force keeps telling us that "it doesn't matter how many times we've screwed you in the past vis-a-vis CAS, THIS TIME we're really, really, really going to provide the best CAS possible."

Unfortunately, our inter-service history does not support any current assertion that 1. The Air Force will genuinely commit to CAS as a mission, or 2. They have some super-de-duper method for winning "small wars."

Perhaps the answer is to "de-purple" the process and cut CAS back to the Army. I doubt there is any truly satisfactory solution.

wm
05-31-2007, 06:32 PM
wm references an article regarding a single incident as apparent support for the theory that airpower causes more collateral damage (sorry Tom) than ground power. One story from the BBC (YGBSM) doesn't prove a theory. I've said this before and I'll say it again: I deal in facts. Show me concrete facts to support this theory and then we can talk.
Okay, I'll sit back and let you guys get in your licks. Maybe I'm just feeling combative today.:wry:

My post was not meant as an AF slam nor was it meant as proof about what type of attack causes more collateral damage. The point I was trying to get you all to extrapolate was based on the perception presented by the Afghans in the article. Which form of attack causes more collateral damage does not really matter. What does matter are the perceptions of the civilian populace. In a battle for the support of the populace, that populace's perception is reality--it is all that really counts. Anytime that the "defended" do not feel defended, than the mission is not being accomplished.

If the Afghans duck and cover every time they hear a plane overhead (and the Coalition is the only one flying planes in Afghanistan), we have a serious problem in arguing that we are making their country safer for them.

Here are a few non-war related examples on the issue of perception=reality.
--A family could live in a town with the highest crime rate in the nation. But, as long as no one in the family has been a victim, those statistics mean nothing to them. They will be behind their chief of police 100&#37; because he is doing a great job by keeping crime away from them.
--In a town, the high school almost loses its accreditation. Collectively, all of the neighbors are up in arms about the school administration's competence. But, each, individually, also feels that their sons and daughters are getting a great education because they ae getting good report cards.

For what it is worth, I happen to think that in his last piece, Maj Gen Dunlap is arguing for a much more joint approach, one that is less likely to require us to deploy in harm's way those 500,000 ground troops that some cite as what we need to win in Iraq. But the good general does not get off scot free here. I also think that he seems to have misread some of the FM. I never got the impression (as he seems to) that we need all of our deployed forces to be linguists, anthropologists, and generally all-around Jedi masters of cultural sensitivity. What we do need in a COIN fight is a cadre that has those skills. We also need for this cadre to have the ear of the leadership and the planners to make sure our operations build popular suport rather than eroding it. And the leadership needs to listen and heed this cadre's advice. If (and this is a big "if"), for example, BG Votel made the remarks quoted in the BBC article, that is a problem. It would reflect major insensitivity to the defended populace's concerns. I think it represents something akin to the very misguided "bomb them back into the Stone Age" thinking expressed by some during the Viet Nam conflict.

BTW, we have that same problem with perception being reality both in the AOR and here at home. Much of the caterwauling about MSM biased reporting reflects the problem that the ground truth known by warfighters and their supporters is not a perception shared by those who are sitting snugly in front of their 52" plasma TVs, watching the nightly news in Anytown USA.

Ski
05-31-2007, 06:52 PM
Law Vol,

No one pissed in my Wheaties, cornflakes, Apple Jacks or Golden Grahams this morning. :)


He references FM 3-24 as if it was the Magna Carta of counter-insurgency. It's not - it's a manual - a guide so to speak on how to conduct counter-insurgency operations. I could easily take a an Air Force manual on precision bombing (or any other manual from any other service) and say it doesn't act as a COIN winning be all.

He then uses Kosovo and Afghanistan as examples of "getting it right." The last time I checked, there were significant ground forces in both locations, one of which is still an active combat theater. The Air Force bombed both places with significant fire power, and yet we still don't have a decisive outcome in either location. So his examples are flawed to begin with.

I'd offer that using air power helps enhance that 61% of the population against us. It's rooted in historical fact - did the British surrender because of the German Blitz of 1940 and 1941? Did the Germans surrender due to the 8th Air Force firebombing Dresden and other cities? Did the North Koreans, North Vietnamese, or Iraqis surrender because of air power? There is historical evidence to suggest that airpower enhances the enemies morale and will to fight. I don't have time to get into specific details at the moment but they are there.

Finally, MG Dunlap does not offer any solutions other than "let's do what we did in Kosovo and the beginning stages in Afghanistan." Airpower will not create a legitmate government, nor will create services that are needed to sustain basic human existance such as security, potable water and electricity. Humans, specifically ground forces in the case of security, have to be on the ground and defeat the will of the enemy.

It is because MG Dunlap is a 2 Star General that I offer contempt against the Air Force. He should know better. He is obviously an intelligent man, but I think he is seriously misguided in his attempts to label FM 3-24 as a cure all for insurgencies. No one book is ever going to take the place of human interactions and the human experience of war. He seems to overlook the complexities that are required to rebuild shattered nations in the cases of Afghanistan or Iraq.

It's also worth mentioning that you accuse me of what MG Dunlap is guilty of with this essay. He is looking for a technological solution for a decidely non-technological conflict. He will not find one. Do I agree that it would be great if we could reduce the number of casualties on the battlefield? Sure. I've had three friends killed and one crippled in Iraq. I'll be the first to sign up for that solution, but MG Dunlap never provides one that is realistic. He states, "It also effectively captures scores of lessons-learned from COIN history, and will surely prove invaluable in many future situations. Still, it is not the solution for the U.S. military in today's Iraq." I have not heard one senior officer ever state that FM 3-24 was a solution for any conflict, but that is what MG Dunlap is suggesting.

I'm disappointed that he does not offer any solutions to very real, and very ugly situations on the ground, and tries to reduce COIN to a state where war ends once the bombing stops. If we haven't learned this simple lesson yet, I shudder to think what the future holds for our military.

LawVol
05-31-2007, 07:57 PM
I guess when you ask for it, you get it. WooHoo!

Tom: apparently, I've just committed the classic email error of assuming humor is easily conveyed through the typed word. I was not citing you but referencing your comments in vol 8 of the SWJ wherein you discussed word choice for civilian casualties. Since you just posted the comments on this thread, I thought an apology for using the term again would be humorous; maybe it would have been in person.

I've heard you mention the AF general from checkmate before and I agree that his comments were unfortunate. Some AF guys do tend to forget about the grunts and that should not happen. There is more that the AF can do for the Army and there are plenty of us that want to do what we can; so much so that, contrary to the AF party line, we'll volunteer to go ILO ("in lieu of," the term to describe AF filling an Army tasking in case some don't know).

My whole argument here is that many are quick to dismiss AF contributions or ideas and this does nothing but stifle the thought processes. Could it be that some AF guys are loathe to present ideas because they assume they'll be immediately shot down by Army/Marine folks? You guys are clearly aware of the AF party line when it comes to airpower and some of us are challenging at least part of that. Sure we face resistance within the AF, but why give us a two-front war? I'll still hang in there though.:)

wm: your perception vs. reality argument is well taken. If we AF guys can't convince our sister services of the utility of lethal airpower, we certainly won't be able to overcome indigenous perceptions that we're trying to bomb them to the stone age. This is probaly due to our woefully inadequate IO strategy, something we can all improve on.

I'm not sure Dunlap was saying that the manual required all ground troops to be cultural experts or anthropologists, or whatever, but maybe that could have been more clear. Personally, I think having a cadre of area specific experts might be the way to go. If memory serves, I think the Corps is experimenting with this concept. This is an area in which I believe the AF can also help. We could easily strengthen our foreign area officer program that could allow AF "experts" to deploy with Army units to act as liasion officers (sort of like our TAC-Ps go with Army units).

Ski: Gen Dunlap said in the blog section that his proposed ideas are forthcoming. I'll give the man a break and take him at his word. I can wait. Although I don't normally get the Proceedings magazine, the section that published his opinion looked to be more of a shot across the bow piece rather than one for in depth discussion. However, I think that if you reread his article you'll find that he is saying that the manual is being perceived as the solution for Iraq. Like wm says, perception is reality.

Did I cover everything?:D

slapout9
05-31-2007, 08:30 PM
Hi, LawVol send some rain to Alabama we are drying up down here.


Did I cover everything?:D
No, give the Army back it's Missiles!!!! The Air Force has no right being in the Missile Artillery business. That is Army business and they need to get out of it.

LawVol
05-31-2007, 08:33 PM
I have no rain to give brother. We're dry as a bone in my area. I can send those missiles though. You want the business end.:D I'll trade missiles for helicopters. The helo guys always seemed cooler.:cool:

slapout9
05-31-2007, 10:25 PM
LawVol, no.... trade missiles for planes:wry: Actually the air force had a very good helicopter the Hiller. It had angle mounted counter rotating blades so it didn't need a tail rotor. On a more factual note did you read the report that tequila posted about an Israeli Air Force officer and his review of the Air Force in the recent Lebanon fiasco? He explains in detail what is wrong with the basic air force concepts they got from the USA. It is worth the read. I will have to find the link but it was posted by tequila fairly recently.

Here is the paper tequila found.
http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo89.en.pdf

LawVol
06-01-2007, 12:45 AM
Thanks, Slapout, I'll add it to my read pile. It looks like it'll be interesting.

Smitten Eagle
06-02-2007, 07:20 PM
Perhaps the answer is to "de-purple" the process and cut CAS back to the Army. I doubt there is any truly satisfactory solution.

I think there is probably something to this argument.

Already, the agreement which determined the role of aviation in each of the armed service (was it the Key West Agreement?), is coming apart under the strain of combat UAVs. The Good Ole USAF is loath to accept tactical UAVs for units at brigade level and below.

Perhaps a new aviation agreement might be in order, whereby functions of aviation would be delegated to services rather than delegate by type of asset (Naval Aviation to the Navy/Marines, Land-based Rotary wing to the army, and land-based fixed wing to the airforce.)

Perhaps ISR, assault support, and CAS could go to the army. Marines would retain their "6 functions" (ISR, assault support, offensive air support, C2, air defense, tactical EW). I'd be fine with my beloved Corps abandoning the air defense role (our meagre LAAD Bns), and possibly even the EW piece if someone else picked up the slack, reducing the 6 functions to 4.

I think this might help the services to stay in their respective lanes. The answer might be to de-purple-ize and instead to develop services with specialties and actual expertise, rather than pretending that we all do acceptably well and everything.

I understand there is some problems with this (B-1s actually can make acceptable CAS platforms when loaded with appropriate PGMs.)

It would also allow army aviators to fill in as FACs, which would probably be a good thing.

Thoughts?

slapout9
06-02-2007, 07:33 PM
S.E. the whole idea of assigning assets whether they be air,land or sea based upon your mission makes a whole lot of sense as opposed to way it is done now. I think the concepts of Air force, Land force, Sea force are obsolete. As you suggest they should be mission forces and they should have any and all vehicles air,land,sea to accomplish the mission.

SWCAdmin
06-03-2007, 03:02 PM
Recognizing slapout9 was on to something, have move this whole General Purpose vs. Specialized set of posts to a new thread here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3079).

Please continue that discussion there, and keep up the Non Cents here.

JAK
06-03-2007, 10:21 PM
Recent White Paper from HQ AFSOC:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/montgomery-usaf-irwconcept-may07.pdf

enjoy,
jak

Van
06-05-2007, 04:15 AM
Some thoughts that got spun off into the new thread, but are, may be as relevant here, minus some key elements that invite derailment.

Sargeant made some remarks that inspired this chain of thought.

In this forum, I don't think I need to walk to dog explaining that COIN/MOOTW/LIC/SASO/Small Wars are the norm and major conflicts like WW II are exceptional circumstances for U.S. forces.

Following this logic suggests that the U.S. military, including the Air Force, should be optimized for the norm, Small Wars, but ready for exceptional circumstances, mid- to high- intensity conflict. So in air power for example, the priorities should be (roughly) airlift, ISR assets, space-based comms, support to SOF, CAS, bombers, and at the very bottom of the list, fighters. Note that this is pretty much the reverse of the AF's current priorities (culturally, if note doctrinally).

Note the Canadian model for ground forces; duel equiped BDEs, one set of gear with wheels for small wars (usually peacekeeping) and one set with tracks for the mid- to high- intensity scenarios. Drivers get the worst of it, as they need dual quals in very different chassis, while a master gunner who has instructed M1A1 and 25mm gunnery stated that the different weapons are relatively easy to dual qualify/cross train on. Units are capable of operating in the norm and in exceptional circumstances.

But the really important piece is to recognize which circumstance is the norm and whic is exceptional, and keep this in perspective.

Tom Odom
06-05-2007, 01:03 PM
Van

All good ideas and I believe certainly supported by what I have seen and experienced on active duty and as a retired guy analyst. I have come to believe it is easier to unleash a "LIC" soldier for "HIC" than it it is to go the other way. Tougher to get the leash back on the dog when he has someone else's throat in his jaws.

The issue of course like David, wearing a coat of many colors. One is that of culture. John Nagl points out that for all the US military's experience on the frontier, it always modeled and measured itself on European armies it had virtually nothing in common with beyond snappy uniforms. I am not a Civil War buff; I am a contemporary history buff. I have often wondered just how much of the slavish bloodletting that took place on CW battlefields came from this long distance worship of Napoleonic military thought.

The other is money of course--but money coupled to equipment and training. Getting the balance correct wouold be difficult but it would be doable. I will say that I believe you have to fix the culture issue before you can address money, regardless of form.

Best

Tom