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Granite_State
05-26-2007, 04:49 PM
In the debate about small wars, the long war against Islamic extremism (I'm not a big fan of the "GWOT" label), and where the defense budget should be going, can anyone really point to a plausible peer competitor even twenty years down the line? I'm probably too influenced by Martin Van Creveld, Bill Lind, and the current environment, but I have trouble seeing any state realistically attempting to match the U.S. on the conventional battlefield, given the two Gulf Wars and the obvious supremacy of the U.S. at putting firepower on targets.

Even the Chinese, as much as they're spending, are still decades behind us, some of you guys probably know that better than I do. As much as people were justifiably pissed about the Israeli help in their newest fighter, I think it was the J-10, it was still outdated before it even entered service. If you're scared of Russia, look at their demographics. Not too many future soldiers coming down the pipeline.

Not saying we can ignore conventional warfare obviously, and we have to prepare for the "unknown unknowns," but does it make sense for us to be spending a quarter of a billion dollars per F-22 (not Air Force bashing, just the best example that springs to mind) when we're struggling to fight two small wars and staring at the huge readiness issues SWJED has posted about?

SWJED
05-26-2007, 04:59 PM
... does it make sense for us to be spending a quarter of a billion dollars per F-22... ?

Not only no, but hell no.

Rob Thornton
05-26-2007, 06:25 PM
As a reasonably enlightened "Bo-Tagz" or whatever it was land power component members were referred to in MG Dunlap’s AFJ article, I'd say it depends on who you ask. The Air Force will tell you its worth it, and from their perspective they have some valid reasons. As was pointed out to me recently - the Air Force relies greatly on technology as their environment requires it - you can't get and stay airborne without it.

The question I think is, how much should we invest in maintaining that edge when we are in a fiscally constrained environment, which by the way so are they (the AF) - they have allot of fighters and attack AC in need of refit - not to mention their lift frames.

I'd say it also is in their strategic culture - the theory of Air Power goes back to Douhet and "Command of the Skies" which we translate into Air Superiority. Frankly, like the American Express, I believe its preferable not to leave home without it. It may not be an immediate concern, but given the opportunity, somebody would eventually make you pay for not having it - think of the idea of securing your rear, or route.

It also provides policy makers & war fighters options (go to the "non-cents" thread for that discussion). The trick here is knowing when to play to short term gains vs. long term consequences - its not as cut and dry as just killing folks any more for all kinds of reasons, and ultimately somebody has to take responsibility for the decisions.

The problem as you point out is the price tag - the best technology (or the best of anything) is usually the most expensive. The Chinese example (or you could use Russian subs, or several others) is interesting because the advertisement does not always reflect the end product. Other cultures often come up short for a number of reasons even when they have the blueprints. Our own Defense Industry takes a different tack that seems to be more in line with Capitalism, the "we've run into some difficulties and are going to need more $$$" line seems to drive up the projected costs. They then offer bargains by reducing the amount per copy if the buyer agrees to buy more - think Sam's Club.

My personal opinion is that we require balance, and probably need to adjust the way we do business with the Defense Industry. Allot of the technology we pay for seems to create non-military dividends in other products, so they get additional benefit - if we (the government) invest in the development of a technology, then we should receive some benefits - call it an end of the year return, a discount or what have you. I'd also say that if the seller does not or cannot live up to the terms of the contract, then they are penalized - we are actually getting better at that. We need Industry to better balance their obligation to their shareholders and CEOs with their obligation to the national defense - again personal opinion after working some on "future" technology.

I think often we can gain short term edges by adding new payloads to existing platforms and by investing in people to get more out of an existing technology. However, these are short term gains, and the trick is knowing when to (and when you can) invest in a new technology that provides the long term edge you require to remain viable on the battlefield. Constantly investing in new technologies creates ignorance and expectations that create their own problems though as there are some problems that technology just can't solve, or can't solve without a cost ineffective strategy.

I'm not in favor of ignoring all of one type of advantage in favor of developing out of proportion another. We have four services (5 for you CG types), and they all fulfill critical roles in our national defense, and in the pursuit of winning small wars as well as big ones. What we have to understand is when the tail is in danger of wagging the dog.


Regards, Rob

J.C.
05-27-2007, 08:21 AM
The problem is not the cost, but what is the cost/benifit anaylisis. When weapons systems like the F-22 where developed and some systems that are still being developed the brass where looking to fight conventional battles agianst armies that looked like us, fought like us, and held to similar conventions.

The problem is that senirio isn't around for now or the forseable future. So, weapons system like the F-22 which was developed as a purely air to air fighter in the current sit-temp are stupid when we can't even afford money for training, re-manning units, and weapons systems that we need.

An example: I just recently graduated Ranger School. In ranger school normally you got twice the ammo you requested and then some. Now, we barely had enough to conduct our patrols during each phase i.e. 40 rds 5.65 mm per rifle man, 300 rds 7.76 mm lk, and 400 rds 5.56 mm lk. Further, we were shorted on equipment during mountians training, slashed air assualt missions due to cost, and verious odds and ends throughout the course. But, it's not just happening at ranger school. Its happening at every school I've been to over the past couple of years.

Beyond training look at the state of any units MTOE. Crap, we are balking on better small arms for the cost of one F-22. Where refurbishing Saws and M240B that are in a bad state just to fill units requirments cause their wearing out in the dessert sand. I'm not putting on bitch session. But, it makes no sense. You have to look ahead and keep our military strong, but we can't keep procuring weapons systems for the wars we wish to fight over the ones we are fighting and then sacrifice training dollars to fill the gaps in the operational budget just to keep us going.

Therefore, trying to out-gun a future competitor like a resurgent Russia or trying to counter-act China's surge in weapns programs is a waste. The roll down effects of trying to maintian that kind of attitude are having and could continue to have hurts everybody. We need to fund training for our current operational eviroment, man our forces for the fight were in, and then look to procure the best guess technologies that fit our strattiegic goals and the furture as we see it. Not the other way around.

The better where maintianed, trained, and equiped with mission essiental tools, the better we can intergrate new solutions and technolgies to aid in the fight. However, if we keep straining our forces, equipment, and resources we won't be able to effectively integrate any new technologically weapons system that comes into our forces. Thus, we want be more prepared for future competators, will be less prepared, and then will have endless rounds of debates on why our high tech forces failed us. Just like with our current problems in OEF and OIF.

If the cost/benifit anaylis were different, I'd say go for it, but I just don't see how they are considering the current situation where in and have been put in by that type of thinking and policy.

Steve Blair
05-27-2007, 02:42 PM
I think the key with technology and the AF is that they tend to want "super-systems" or something akin to a silver bullet platform. When they complain about the extended development cycle of their airframes, they really can only blame themselves. And with the F-22, I would have expected that they would have tested the navigation system...remember a few months back when they had to ground the entire fleet for a few days when the nav system went ####-up when they crossed the international date line?:eek:

Once the AF gets its teeth into what it considers a world-beating technology (stealth is the current flavor of the month), they want it on every aircraft built from that point on. I've spoken with some F-22 maintainers, and they have some harsh comments about the plane's actual availability rate. Others have commented on its sheer size (it's slightly bigger than an F-15)...it may not show easily on radar but you can see it coming.

What seems to cause the most confusion is that fact that you don't always need a stealthy, world-beating system to get the job done. Look at the A-10. Or the C-130. Even the F-16 was a program the AF didn't really want at first. They passed on the F-16XL, which had all the makings of a superb ground attack platform (a cranked delta design with more payload than the F-16 and if memory serves slightly better maneuverability). Don't get me wrong...the F-15E is a great attack plane, but I believe the F-16XL would have been cheaper and could have filled some of the roles (SEAD for one) that they've had to stretch the F-16 to fit.

Lift and tankers are two areas that the AF shorted to allow for the F-22 and F-35 (don't get me started on that one), and now they're paying the price for it. Sooner or later there will also be a need for an E-3 follow-on. These assets, which cut across communities and services, strike me as being more valuable than another "stealth" fighter that fills a need that is 20 years old.

LawVol
05-27-2007, 10:23 PM
Crap, we are balking on better small arms for the cost of one F-22.

The Army's Future Comabt System comes to mind...

When the next big war rolls upon us, you'll thank God and the AF for all that new technology. And if that big war never happens, I'll still be satisfied with the insurance. Perhaps we should be complaining about ear marks for bridges to no where and the like rather than technology that could possible be needed one day.

"Flying high, into the wild blue yonder... Oh, I digress:D

Rob Thornton
05-27-2007, 11:56 PM
The Army's Future Combat System comes to mind...

I think the Army is going through its own reality check with FCS. As one who worked it, and was part of COL Roy Waggoner's "Thin Green Line" I can agree that there was a tendency of many to see only what they wanted. Many however fought for balance between reasonable technological improvements and the sacrificing of fundamental, proven, cost effective alternatives that could be trained with. That does not even get into my belief that the best tech can be out-fought with out the best people employing it.

The best example I can think of was how COL(P) Robert Brown grew the SBCT under the premise that the platform and C4ISR payloads was the side show - the real Transformation was an investment in people, or as he wrote, coached, taught and mentored, building agile and adaptive leaders that identify and solve problems under tough conditions with available resources. A SBCT itself is pretty big in terms of people - about a 170 man rifle company, has a great deal of mobility for that much Infantry and relies on placing Combined Arms at the company level.

FCS is now partly under the auspices of COL Emmett Schaill (the EBCT CDR down at Bliss), a great leader who knows when Industry is putting the soldier at risk, and is not afraid to hurt feelings, and has a good feel for the future of warfare based on recent experience.

I think in the end what you'll see is the only technologies that survive the first cut of spirals will be those that are reliable and make sense. The rest will probably be put back in the oven. This will happen on reduced funding for R&D and hopefully we'll make use of commercial technologies that make are life easier down the road - hopefully DARPA will pick up some of those monies, since by experience I find them far less interested in profit.

Two things I'd add.

First, the Air Force funding provides allot more then we credit them for off the top. While fighter, bombers and cargo come to mind as the most visual of symbols, their influence in near or inner space and the EW spectrum allows us distinct advantages we enjoy in our "away" games. In fact many of the EWOs who help with ECM technologies to combat IEDs are USAF personnel (many are also USN) - Land components are just taking baby steps in these areas.

Second, not all our problems or decisions come directly from lack of funding. Take the 5.56 debate - what all would go into going to a new battle rifle? Lots I think, consider all the training (from doctrine to ranges), standardization & qualification impacts to re-tooling the ammunition industry. when you are talking about changing what appears to be a small thing, it often turns into a big thing quickly. Consider BRAC - somebody probably said - "what we need is a "maneuver center" - we'll put it at Benning - but then after they'd announced it all sorts of things like, environmental impact studies for moving 400 additional tanks to Benning, new ranges in order to allow both the students and the BCT there to sustain gunnery skills, AHA impacts, Motor Pool space, and the list goes on crept into the plan - friction!

I guess my point is the only way this problem is easy is if you only consider an individual perspective. Nobody has enough money to do what they'd like right now because protracted war is expensive. Law makers have to provide the means from a long term perspective that considers all the possible threats, and they prefer to do it with the constraints of the established budget - we may pass supplementals (and even they are subject to political dispute), but they don't have to renew that or live with the domestic and economic consequences for quite so long. The profiteers and the lobbyers they (Industry and proponents) employ add more friction, and Active Duty parochial heavy weight hitmen and retired senior leaders turned lobbyist/acquisition officer attempt to influence spending as well. Even Industry must be considered - what does it take to create and sustain a military industrial complex that can continue to provide the best technology, or even consitent quality of older tech (once you quit making something, often its just gone)? Anybody who does not think our Military Industrial/Info complex just runs itself does not understand the gears of war. This stuff is complicated.

Where does this leave us? I'd say with the obligation to attempt to understand the problem from multiple perspectives while acknowledging that we won't get everything we want, or cry we need. We live in a world of constraints so we have to figure out how to succeed where others might fail with the means we've been given. This does not prevent us from discussing shortfalls and their impacts, but we need to do so in a constructive manner that provides leaders and lawmakers with good information. It helps if you can acknowledge something other then a singular point of view. The SWJ forum is superb for that (and people know it) because it provides a very public discourse on a wide range of tough, relevant issues by professionals with a diverse background and experience range.

Bill Moore
05-28-2007, 05:32 AM
Our technological advantage gives us an asymmetrical advantage that I would hate to lose. The fact that our Navy and Air Force can dominate the seas and the sky provides a superb level of protection from the more conventional types of attacks, which are still possible. Russia, China, North Korea, and emerging countries in our own hemisphere provide potential examples of possible conventional conflicts. I think States will have to go to war over precious resources whether it be oil or water within the next 20 years, and we'll probably get drug into the conflict, and having a dominating Navy and Air Force puts the Army in a better position to complete its task.

Of course the threat dujour is unconventional/irregular, and it will be around for the forseeable future, but that isn't the only threat. The problem is if you quit making those F22s, fast ships, etc., you lose the industry base, because those workers (high tech, high skill) will migrate to where the money is. The Companies will regear their machines to make something else (commercial not military), etc. and we run the risk 50 years down the road of losing that edge.

All that said, the investment right now needs to be weighted towards the ground forces and strategic lift to get them to the fight.

120mm
05-28-2007, 05:59 AM
Let me be the first to surprise everyone by saying that, "Yes, Virginia, we need the F-22." Precisely because that airframe was designed to fight an unlikely war scenario, we need at least a few of them "as insurance". When we get surprised by an irrational state actor in the future, it will give us the time/space necessary to turn this rig around and face the threat.

But what we ALSO need is for the Air Force to acknowledge the actual, ongoing threat and support it with their heart and soul, and not just treat it as a distraction.

A big +1 for LawVol's pointing out the FCS.

Granite_State
05-28-2007, 06:30 AM
The Army's Future Comabt System comes to mind...

When the next big war rolls upon us, you'll thank God and the AF for all that new technology. And if that big war never happens, I'll still be satisfied with the insurance. Perhaps we should be complaining about ear marks for bridges to no where and the like rather than technology that could possible be needed one day.

"Flying high, into the wild blue yonder... Oh, I digress:D

Great point on the FCS. And it is certainly true that we generally take the Air Force for granted, I think the U.S. and/or its allies have had air superiority in every war since 1914, we've never had to fight without that tremendous advantage.

Granite_State
05-28-2007, 06:37 AM
Our technological advantage gives us an asymmetrical advantage that I would hate to lose. The fact that our Navy and Air Force can dominate the seas and the sky provides a superb level of protection from the more conventional types of attacks, which are still possible. Russia, China, North Korea, and emerging countries in our own hemisphere provide potential examples of possible conventional conflicts. I think States will have to go to war over precious resources whether it be oil or water within the next 20 years, and we'll probably get drug into the conflict, and having a dominating Navy and Air Force puts the Army in a better position to complete its task.

Of course the threat dujour is unconventional/irregular, and it will be around for the forseeable future, but that isn't the only threat. The problem is if you quit making those F22s, fast ships, etc., you lose the industry base, because those workers (high tech, high skill) will migrate to where the money is. The Companies will regear their machines to make something else (commercial not military), etc. and we run the risk 50 years down the road of losing that edge.


Agree with you about the industrial base, and some brief research I did on the subject a couple of years back said they're already facing a significant brain drain as the class of 60s era engineers and scientists retires.

I didn't mean to turn this into an F-22 thread, though my sympathies are with SWJED and the rest of the skeptics. We'll probably face conventional war again in the near future, as you noted, but will it be a peer competitor? Whether it's China, Russia, Iran, North Korea...none of these countries can match us in terms of technology and ordnance delivery. Being able to defeat them strikes me as being vastly different from devoting the majority of our procurement budget, and maybe the majority of the defense budget period, to arming for some Pacific showdown with the Chinese. Can anyone provide a halfway plausible peer competitor within 20-30 years?

Ski
05-28-2007, 01:01 PM
FCS will never see the light of day. It's just way too expensive, and I don't see much applicabilty in a "system of systems" where one BCT will cost more than the entire equipment requirement for the National Guard. Soldiers will always form the backbone of the Army, equipment is tertiary importance.

BRAC - actually, any move of unit requires a massive process to understand the move of a unit. All those things you mention Rob - and many more, BTW - are spot on. Even a single piece of a major end items being fielded requires a ton of analysis. When I was fielding tanks to the Guard, we were about to field a battalion of M1A1's to Michigan, and I went up to the environmental bubbas to see if Camp Grayling had ranges and an environmental impact statement for 120mm ammo. They didn't, so it took a year for the EIS to get approved, and in one of the drafts that I reviewed, the EIS writers stated, "The 120mm round is made of depleted uranium..." and they didn't realize that training rounds were made of steel. The complexity of all this is immense...

Good points about money. There are millions of great ideas, but the ones who can find the keys to the vault for their ideas are the winners.




I think the Army is going through its own reality check with FCS. As one who worked it, and was part of COL Roy Waggoner's "Thin Green Line" I can agree that there was a tendency of many to see only what they wanted. Many however fought for balance between reasonable technological improvements and the sacrificing of fundamental, proven, cost effective alternatives that could be trained with. That does not even get into my belief that the best tech can be out-fought with out the best people employing it.


when you are talking about changing what appears to be a small thing, it often turns into a big thing quickly. Consider BRAC - somebody probably said - "what we need is a "maneuver center" - we'll put it at Benning - but then after they'd announced it all sorts of things like, environmental impact studies for moving 400 additional tanks to Benning, new ranges in order to allow both the students and the BCT there to sustain gunnery skills, AHA impacts, Motor Pool space, and the list goes on crept into the plan - friction!

I guess my point is the only way this problem is easy is if you only consider an individual perspective. Nobody has enough money to do what they'd like right now because protracted war is expensive. Law makers have to provide the means from a long term perspective that considers all the possible threats, and they prefer to do it with the constraints of the established budget - we may pass supplementals (and even they are subject to political dispute), but they don't have to renew that or live with the domestic and economic consequences for quite so long. The profiteers and the lobbyers they (Industry and proponents) employ add more friction, and Active Duty parochial heavy weight hitmen and retired senior leaders turned lobbyist/acquisition officer attempt to influence spending as well. Even Industry must be considered - what does it take to create and sustain a military industrial complex that can continue to provide the best technology, or even consitent quality of older tech (once you quit making something, often its just gone)? Anybody who does not think our Military Industrial/Info complex just runs itself does not understand the gears of war. This stuff is complicated.

Where does this leave us? I'd say with the obligation to attempt to understand the problem from multiple perspectives while acknowledging that we won't get everything we want, or cry we need. We live in a world of constraints so we have to figure out how to succeed where others might fail with the means we've been given. This does not prevent us from discussing shortfalls and their impacts, but we need to do so in a constructive manner that provides leaders and lawmakers with good information. It helps if you can acknowledge something other then a singular point of view. The SWJ forum is superb for that (and people know it) because it provides a very public discourse on a wide range of tough, relevant issues by professionals with a diverse background and experience range.

Ski
05-28-2007, 01:03 PM
Define peer competitor first. Then a comparison, if any, can be made.



Agree with you about the industrial base, and some brief research I did on the subject a couple of years back said they're already facing a significant brain drain as the class of 60s era engineers and scientists retires.

I didn't mean to turn this into an F-22 thread, though my sympathies are with SWJED and the rest of the skeptics. We'll probably face conventional war again in the near future, as you noted, but will it be a peer competitor? Whether it's China, Russia, Iran, North Korea...none of these countries can match us in terms of technology and ordnance delivery. Being able to defeat them strikes me as being vastly different from devoting the majority of our procurement budget, and maybe the majority of the defense budget period, to arming for some Pacific showdown with the Chinese. Can anyone provide a halfway plausible peer competitor within 20-30 years?

Rob Thornton
05-28-2007, 01:24 PM
I thought about this last night since I think this is a much bigger question then on of F-22s or new riflemen – I believe it gets to the question of technology vs. people. Its not that this is an either or, but is a question of how much you invest into one vs. the other to meet our security needs now and for the future (for the sake of defining the future, lets stay inside the 2025 time frame).

Before considering that question though let’s consider the way in which military (and if you want to, you can include diplomacy and economics) force is applied toward policy ends. If you are a state (& I think these days we can include non-state) there are three agreed upon uses for behavior modification of people we can’t get along with, or whose own policy or goals are at odds with your own – you can deter, you can coerce, and you can compel. We’ll define deter by saying you have taken actions which portray your strength and indicate that your interests will support your willingness to cross from passive to active. Coerce is more difficult because for me it floats between deter and compel – but these are actions that can be rescinded more easily but still hold the potential that you are willing to compel behavior. In my mind air and sea power are great tools for coercion. Compelling someone has to offer the threat of physically removing them – this is where I’d argue that to compel requires a robust land component capability. Some will take issue with the definitions – that’s healthy, and certainly different advocates & acolytes may put their services’ capabilities in all three blocks – but I believe in order to take and hold ground indefinitely requires physical occupation of it – not with a sensor and not the airspace above it. Put simpler my physical size can deter, my anger might coerce, but to compel I need to lay hands on somebody.

Now let’s consider Iraq, Iran, small wars & big wars. Personally if we have to have wars then I prefer small wars as an alternative to big wars – there is historical evidence that big wars kill more people and destroy more stuff then small wars. So limited wars with limited means kill less people. This is not to say they don’t have big consequences, especially for the people involved.

Is it coincidence that the White House is exploring the possibility of reducing troops as early as 2008? I’d submit that while Senator Reid is willing to call it a political victory brought about by Democratic pressure, it is probably more of a national security concern. I’ll come back to this at the end.

By our own writings on this site, writings in the press by retired and active duty military professionals and civilian security experts, our land component (and the other components in supporting them) capabilities are stretched to a great degree in their policy role (compelling the insurgents, terrorists and our enemies) in Iraq, Afghanistan and other places around the globe. We can go back to the decision to request more troops and the request and subsequent decision to increase the size of the Army and Marines to acknowledge that. I’d propose that our enemies and friends can read and come to their own conclusions, and that our ability to compel is constrained at the moment by our policy objectives in Iraq (I use Iraq since sustaining significant troop levels there raises OPTEMPO and induces strain on every aspect of our means & will to compel). Our current object of policy – a stable Iraq that is U.S. friendly and can ease the strain on global energy needs by both producing and not destabilizing the Persian Gulf region is worth the effort in terms of preventing larger security concerns in the future. It also speaks to the moral aspect of war and our commitment to our ideals – an ally that is not willing to see it through is kind of a self-interested fair weather friend.

So, what are the tools available currently to deter, coerce or compel the Iranians from realizing and employing a nuclear weapon (or acting through a third party like Hezbollah), other states seeking advantages, or even non-state organizations seeking to exploit the current situation? If we look at Iran, which components would we rely on right now to move from deter to coerce? Is it a ground component that is sprinting to maintain its current commitments? Or, is it the USAF and USN who we’d task to conduct limited strikes against targets deep within Iran in order to signify our intolerance for their goals?

Following that line – don’t you think Iran knows that? What has been one of their largest investments in military acquisition recently (we are speaking conventionally, not nuclear)? The answer is, front line, state of the art (by anybody’s technological standards but perhaps our own) Anti-Aircraft technology in massive amounts and phased throughout the country enroute to their dispersed nuclear sites to deter us from that option (I'd add that they include curring favor through trade benefits with powerful states, cooperation on Iraq, and an immense IO campaign for the will of the U.S. Public by denying their true reason for pursuing nuclear power). They understand that in order to get to their sites we’d have to invest an awful lot of something to make it credible. They understand that as we weigh that out, it may not be worth it for us – all they have to do is show us the stakes to make it a difficult decision. To remove the ADA threat will require massive amounts of sorties by survivable A/C to first neutralize the ADA threat – to that end the Iranians are also investing in other capabilities. To know for sure if the ADA is neutralized I think you’d have to occupy the ground for SAM sites surrounding the Air LOCs with ground forces to (something we’d be hard pressed to do right now without changing the scope of our commitment to Iraq). I think DoD understood that when they were pursuing the use of ICBMs with conventional war-heads as a deterrent – its hard to defeat an ICBM – but that has its own problems – how do you know what’s inside if you are say Russia, China or India trying to decide on a reaction?

Given that line of thought – and the likelihood that we are going to be caught up in small wars, COIN & COIN like activities in order to prevent extremism and other Non-State threats which are also national security issues of prime importance, then the USAF and USN require the best technology to mitigate the lack of being able to commit a credible ground component to that action. In my view having to compensate for lack of fully rounded capability with technology is a tough row to hoe, but at least it is an option. On the other hand, ignoring the use of technology to gain an advantage by solely investing in a large ground component is also very dangerous – go back to comparing armor in WWII, or how we deterred the Soviet numbers in the Cold War.

This is not an easy question, but we do have to look beyond the moment and consider how we employ military force and to what ends in order to decide what capabilities to invest in. We have competing requirements – mass and technology. As I’ve said before, I believe the best investment is in quality people because without them you get a mass of automatons and technology that is unusable. Without quality people the reason we use military force is subject to being lost for want of a nail. What we need to do is look for innovation where possible and feasible, and uses that adapt existing materials and technologies in ways that offers us advantages and cost less then pursuing a totally new line of thought. It is not always the case – you can only adapt on old idea so far, but in many cases it is possible. This provides us options where we can pursue other technologies or COAs at a more affordable rate. To use a great planning cliché, perfect is often the enemy of good enough.

tequila
05-28-2007, 01:43 PM
Of note: Annual Pentagon report - Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2007 (http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-final.pdf).

LawVol
05-28-2007, 01:49 PM
Whether it's China, Russia, Iran, North Korea...none of these countries can match us in terms of technology and ordnance delivery.

They can't match us now, but they continually invest in this technology. If we don't stay ahead of them, they will match or beat us in 20-30 years.

Rob makes good points. If we don't invest now, the technology will go elsewhere. The point is that our enemies have not only adapted their strategies (think COIN and China's "total war" concepts), but they are also trying to catch us in the technology realm. Why do you think China keeps trying to steal our information? If we ignore this, then we may one day be playing catch up in the conventional war sense like we are now in the COIN sense. Only when it comes to conventional war, we may be risking our very existence (or at least the world as we know it).

Perhaps the problem is that DoD needs a bigger piece of pie? I think funding is under 4% of GDP, why couldn't it be higher?

Rob Thornton
05-28-2007, 02:46 PM
Hey there LV,


Perhaps the problem is that DoD needs a bigger piece of pie? I think funding is under 4% of GDP, why couldn't it be higher?

Great question. Your back to two concrete options - cut from somewhere else to raise the %, or increase taxes - both of which have side effects.

Here is something else to chew on - if COIN and COIN like functions/operations are going to be required (I beleive they are), then they are going to consume resources. Does COIN/and like operations fit into a strategy of detering unwanted behaviour by demonstrating our commitment and resolve - i.e. we have successfully done this before and are willing to risk the consequences of having to do it again - so the threat of regime change is an expensive, but viable option/consequence. We are dabbling in the strategic OODA here.

I'd also say many of the functions found in COIN can be used in conflict prevention - such as identifying the causes of conflict and applying TTPs and operational concepts to resolve the problems that cause people/states to go to war.

Steve Blair
05-28-2007, 04:16 PM
Let me be the first to surprise everyone by saying that, "Yes, Virginia, we need the F-22." Precisely because that airframe was designed to fight an unlikely war scenario, we need at least a few of them "as insurance". When we get surprised by an irrational state actor in the future, it will give us the time/space necessary to turn this rig around and face the threat.

But what we ALSO need is for the Air Force to acknowledge the actual, ongoing threat and support it with their heart and soul, and not just treat it as a distraction.

A big +1 for LawVol's pointing out the FCS.
I've always through the FCS was a waste of money, at least once the decision was made to turn it into something other than a test case. There's no harm in developing a few systems to see if they work, to push tech forward, and so on...but there needs to be a limit and an understanding that we can't bank the entire force on platforms that take 20 years to develop (that's where in my view the AF is constantly shooting itself in the foot).

Technology isn't always an answer. In fact, it can become a major weakness if taken to extremes. What happens when all your batteries die? How many do you need to lug into the field to remain effective? What would have happened if the flaw in the F-22's nav system hadn't been found during peacetime? Much as I like the idea of the Osprey, is it really worth saddling troops with a helicopter that has had problems since its introduction into service in the early 1960s (the CH-47/46 family) while we wait for the silver bullet to finish development?

I really think that 4% of the GDP is sufficient for defense...provided that the waste is actually CUT and not shifted to other black budgets or areas that don't come under review. Given DoD's poor record in this area, I think the question would be turned to "why SHOULD it be more than 4%?"

Rob makes good points regarding the longer-term benefits of being able to "do" COIN. You would have thought we'd learned our lesson about putting all our strategic option eggs in one basket during the era of Massive Retaliation, but perhaps we didn't.

LawVol
05-28-2007, 05:24 PM
I really think that 4% of the GDP is sufficient for defense...provided that the waste is actually CUT and not shifted to other black budgets or areas that don't come under review. Given DoD's poor record in this area, I think the question would be turned to "why SHOULD it be more than 4%?"

I agree that DoD needs better oversight when it comes to spending money. I'm new to the acquisitions area and I'm constantly surprised by the fact that programs are constantly undervalued when it comes to bidding. It's almost like abait and switch routine. However, this problem does not eliminate the need for new technology. The pols are going to spend money anyway (have you heard some of the promises the prez candidates are making?), so it might as well be on something that could ensure our national security rather than millions for a bridge that 100 people and a few moose are going to use. Maybe defense contractors simply need to diversify their plants when it comes to location (more locations=more votes in congress; sad but true).

BUt I'm digressing again. My point is that I simply do not believe that the overall strategy of increasing our technological advantage is wrong. WHile specific programs, and possibly timing, may be at issue we simply cannot afford to let out potential competitors gain ground. The stakes are way too high.

Maybe we should have two air forces. One could be like the old Army Air Corps, focus on COIN, and work in tandem with the Army (i.e. the Army doesn;t get control, but gets a bigger say) while the other could focus on the big war. I'm sure costs would rule this out, but maybe it's worht considering?

Steve Blair
05-28-2007, 05:48 PM
In terms of the two air component discussion, I'd think we'd do better to either increase Marine or Navy air assets to fill the COIN role. By chopping A-10s to Marine Air, and increasing the amount of medium and light lift aircraft they can operate (airframes of C-130 and smaller size) I think you'd hit a good balance. You could do the same with Navy air, although it would have to be land-based (which would cause a different set of problems to be sure). Giving the Army an increased medium to light lift capability would help, and also free up AF project funds for their own uses.

My fear with splitting the AF in that way is that you'd see the SAC vs. TAC mentality all over again, with MAC left out in the cold to get by with what was left over. If the AF doesn't want to deal with COIN now (and I have yet to be convinced that the majority of the service really DOES want to deal with it...there are of course exceptions), I can't see how splitting the funding between two "branches" of the AF would improve the situation. Keep the AF ready for major conflicts (as in more conventional engagements) and strip some of their small wars capability away and chop it to services (or branches) that have it as a day-to-day concern.

We may have to agree to disagree on some of these points, because I still do think that some of the AF's problems when it comes to airframe age and the like are of their own making (banking the future of the force on high-tech that takes decades to come down the pipeline and is subject to silver bullet design theories...an issue that in all fairness does impact the other services as well...like the Osprey, FCS, and other programs).

FascistLibertarian
05-28-2007, 06:46 PM
There is no reason the US Navy has to be as big as it is. The concept that it must be able to fight two wars at the same time is just there to justify military spending.
The American M.I.C. is big government spending to prop up the economy. I agree America must stay ahead of its rivals but right now there is not arms race.
It makes no sense that the Army is funded less than the Navy and the Air Force when its being asked to do the most.
Think how many infantry could be trained and equiped for one f22.
In general the US M.I.C. needs more oversight, goals, and less pork.
just my 2 cents.

Ski
05-28-2007, 06:51 PM
Agree with Steve - DoD cannot even be audited at this point, so the comparison can (and has been widely) made that it's just throwing more money into a very deep if not bottomless pit.

Personally, I like simplicity and easy maintenance in equipment. I see millions of lines of code in new procurement programs and I shudder. I hear first hand reports of the difficulty in sustaining qualified people on some of the ABCS equipment and I get worried. I see hundreds of private contractors working as maintenance techs on certain pieces of equipment, and I start to wonder if we can sustain a fighting force in a high intensity war. I look at the time it takes to bring new equipment into the line units (especially major end items), and the lack of facilities and factories that actually create the equipment, and I understand why we have backlogs at the few depots that are up and running.

But the bottom line is that if I was to wargame the United States, the absolute last thing I'd do would be to fight us conventionally. You'd have to be a stone cold moron to do that when there is a proven record of success or at least a draw when someone fights the US in a counterinsurgency since the 1960's.

But again, what is a peer competitor?

Rob Thornton
05-29-2007, 12:03 AM
From Facsist Libertarian:

There is no reason the US Navy has to be as big as it is. The concept that it must be able to fight two wars at the same time is just there to justify military spending.

Why don't you think the US Navy needs to be the size it is? There are plenty of arguments that our ship building capability is in danger, and that there are not enough ships and subs to do the work we ask them to do.

The Navy tends to be a bit more low key in their role in GWOT - although the CBGs in the Persian Gulf keeping it from being anything else but a designation for that body of water are related. Their humanitarian role in the Tsunami may have garnered us more positive IO then anything else we've done lately. Their EW and intercept use, their role as a secure base for C2 of operations, their ability to offer bases of operations when the neighborhood is tricky, their role in NEOs whne there are no friendly bases around, many people are still building and buying SSNs and will probably buy/build SSBNs - since everybody wants a nuke. Firing a cruise missile is a handy option for policy. It seems to me the Navy has a strong case for growth with all the foreign policy challenges we have.

Any Navy folks out there want to share their thoughts - certainly from a historic perspective they have played a large role in America's Small Wars. If anybody can do a ship to task list that indicates we need a Jeffersonian Navy - I'd be happy to hear it. Guarenteeing a Sea LOC is available when you need it (and we do allot of shipping) is pretty important for a capitalist economy.

Rob Thornton
05-29-2007, 12:19 AM
Hey Ski -


But again, what is a peer competitor?
Rand Study on peer competitor (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1346/)

Excerpt

The potential emergence of a peer competitor is probably the most important long-term planning challenge for the Department of Defense. This report addresses the issue by developing a conceptual framework of how a proto-peer (meaning a state that is not yet a peer but has the potential to become one) might interact with the hegemon (the dominant global power). ...

Or you can take my Bog-tagz definition - its a guy who competes for the same things you do and threatens to fill your environmental niche using capabilities which can challenge you. There are four types as I understand it - near peer - which speeks to somebody who has exploited niche technologies ("exploited" has a wide definintion) which can offer you pain, and Peer - which means he's in the same grade as you. Also used are regional and global to describe the influence of said peer.


But the bottom line is that if I was to wargame the United States, the absolute last thing I'd do would be to fight us conventionally. You'd have to be a stone cold moron to do that when there is a proven record of success or at least a draw when someone fights the US in a counterinsurgency since the 1960's.

I agree with you, but I'm not sure that stops a potential enemy from building and retaining a conventional capability - they are useful beyond just preparing for us. Most of our enemies have natural enemies in their own neighborhood, and it might be nice to have some conventional stuff around when your own population decides you have stolen enough. I sort of like the Iranian model - You've got a little bit of everything - a well trained, dedicated and fanatic para-military that can also inform on the people and slip across the border to destabilize neighbors, an investment in reasonably good conventional hardware you are getting on the cheap through the promise of providing fossil fuels, and you are developing nuclear weapons so anybody who screws with you must contend with that - oh and as an auxillary you support a powerful non-state terrorist group through a partner state who stymied what most westerners consider to be a first rate military power. These guys have clearly done their homework. Anybody looked at the Zagros mountains as a place to go rock climbing - that is ugly terrain- unless you are defending in them, or using them as a base of operation for an insugency.

LawVol
05-29-2007, 01:12 AM
I agree America must stay ahead of its rivals but right now there is not arms race.
It makes no sense that the Army is funded less than the Navy and the Air Force when its being asked to do the most.
Think how many infantry could be trained and equiped for one f22.
In general the US M.I.C. needs more oversight, goals, and less pork.
just my 2 cents.

I'm not so sure I buy into your statement that there isn't an arms race. Certainly it is not in the same vein as during the Cold War, but China has increased its military spending dramatically. Recently studies I've read indicate that China is looking beyond a Tiawan scenario. Whether this is global or only regional, it still presents a problem for us. They've increased their ballistic missle capability, are looking into a true blue water navy, and are now seeking to challenge us in space. Now some of this is really years down the road, but I don't really want to give them a head start. However, in the space realm, the anti-satellite shot is a significant development. They've destroyed a satellite with a moblie launcher. Imagine a non-state actor with that capability (it can be sold). Whether in a COIN environment or a big war, knocking out one of our comm or GPS satellites would cause significant problems. The AF is looking into ways to develop mini-satellites that can be more quickly launched to replace destroyed or damaged ones, but guess what it takes? That's right, money. You might have a fully trained division, but what are they going to do with no comm and no GPS?

I don't know how much it takes to train up a division (or what an F-22 costs for that matter) but let's assume they're equal for the moment. What's the shelf life of your division? My F-22 will last about 25-30 years. Sure this really isn't an equal basis argument but it makes my point. Your division requires an influx of new people that need new training. Yes, the F-22 will require upgrades, but in the long run I think we make out quite well. Besides, how many F-22s are you willing to trade? Our F-15s are already approaching the 30 year mark and the Chinese have a new J-10 and something on the way. If we do fight them, do you want to trust air superiority to a 30 year old plane? How effective is your division going to be without that?

And now to the "do the most" comment. While I certainly agree that kicking down doors has much more risk than fueling or maintaining a jet (and my old grunt side has much respect for those guys), let's not lose sight of the fact that everyone has a different job. Quite frackly, I do not want avionics mechanic tapped to an Army line unit. Its a wasted talent. This mechanic, and alot more like him, are needed to keep our aircraft flying. The same aircraft that provides top cover, airlift, ISR, etc.--all the stuff groundpounders tend to take for granted (I did). BTW, alot of these same guys were maintaining the same aircraft back in Desert Storm. Alot of folks like to forget that the AF has been fighting in Iraq since 1991. Sure it wasn't the same as it is now, but our aircraft don't know the difference between flying a routine patrol or actually dropping bombs. Flying is flying and it all provides wear and tear. I don't recall hearing AF guys saying anything about the Army not "doing the most" from 1992-2001. They simply understood that deploying to support no-fly zones was their duty.

As for oversight, goals, and less pork, I couldn't agree more.

Steve Blair
05-29-2007, 01:48 AM
Just to bite onto this one...divisions and F-22s both require the same constant flow of cash. I was at Ellsworth when the B-1 came online, and they had to remodel many of the hangers to accommodate it. I expect that they are doing the same thing with the F-22. Add into that the training of the pilots AND the maintainers (which has to be reaccomplished every time someone leaves the service or there's an upgrade to the systems) and you see the same kind of rolling cost. That same division is most likely using the same equipment (at Fort Riley in the late 1990s an O-6 visited the motor pool and found the same 5-ton truck he'd driven as an O-1 in Vietnam, by way of an example) over the same span as the F-22 is in service. So everyone really faces the same issue when it comes to that. FL's comparison isn't really valid in that sense.

And the navy's been operating at more or less the same clip as the AF during the same period (possibly higher if you consider evacuations and disaster relief efforts in addition to normal cruises). I for one tend to worry about the retirement of things like the A-6 and F-14...all in hopes that the F-35 will be what it's advertised to be. If LV is correct that we take air superiority for granted, I'd say we have the same blind spot when it comes to control of the seas and the ability to project a pretty massive strike into a region (complete with a sizable ground force component) with very little notice.

Granite_State
05-29-2007, 03:21 AM
Agree with Steve - DoD cannot even be audited at this point, so the comparison can (and has been widely) made that it's just throwing more money into a very deep if not bottomless pit.

Personally, I like simplicity and easy maintenance in equipment. I see millions of lines of code in new procurement programs and I shudder. I hear first hand reports of the difficulty in sustaining qualified people on some of the ABCS equipment and I get worried. I see hundreds of private contractors working as maintenance techs on certain pieces of equipment, and I start to wonder if we can sustain a fighting force in a high intensity war. I look at the time it takes to bring new equipment into the line units (especially major end items), and the lack of facilities and factories that actually create the equipment, and I understand why we have backlogs at the few depots that are up and running.

But the bottom line is that if I was to wargame the United States, the absolute last thing I'd do would be to fight us conventionally. You'd have to be a stone cold moron to do that when there is a proven record of success or at least a draw when someone fights the US in a counterinsurgency since the 1960's.

But again, what is a peer competitor?

I like Rob's definition. I'd basically say a peer is someone who is, maybe not an existential challenge, in the sense that I think invading the U.S. is virtually impossible, but someone who can fight you on your level, in terms of both technology and military size and effectiveness. I don't see how anyone is getting to that level anytime soon, and even if they do, I agree with Van Creveld that the advent of nuclear weapons has fundamentally changed the rules of the game. You don't see great power wars anymore, because the stakes are too high.

Granite_State
05-29-2007, 03:27 AM
Hey Ski -

I sort of like the Iranian model - You've got a little bit of everything - a well trained, dedicated and fanatic para-military that can also inform on the people and slip across the border to destabilize neighbors, an investment in reasonably good conventional hardware you are getting on the cheap through the promise of providing fossil fuels, and you are developing nuclear weapons so anybody who screws with you must contend with that - oh and as an auxillary you support a powerful non-state terrorist group through a partner state who stymied what most westerners consider to be a first rate military power. These guys have clearly done their homework. Anybody looked at the Zagros mountains as a place to go rock climbing - that is ugly terrain- unless you are defending in them, or using them as a base of operation for an insugency.

Great observation. Be interesting to see if others (Chavez?) head in the same direction.

120mm
05-29-2007, 06:38 AM
Two of the above posters included the words "more oversight" and "less pork" in a sentence. I wish you wouldn't do that. I would suggest that inverse is more likely. "more oversight" probably equals "more pork".

I am currently embroiled in a "paper scandal". The army is spending tens of thousands of dollars at my place of work, in order to save a few hundred dollars in paper.

Coincidentally, all my co-workers just spent nearly two weeks doing Local Quarters Allowance paperwork that probably saved the government $2000, total. 10 x 80 hours contract labor is considerably greater than $2000.

I would suggest that trusting people to do the best job possible, and prosecuting to the extreme those who violate public trust would be a more cost effective, and possibly just effective way to save public monies.

Rob Thornton
05-29-2007, 04:12 PM
We had DR. Milan Vego from the Naval War College guest lecture this morning on Naval Theory and theorists. As the morning progressed it struck me how relevant the discussions (particularly the sidebars that were generated) were to this thread. One thing that really struck me was the question of: Does our pursuit of means (in our culture this might mean a quantum technological leap forward) determine the limits of our strategy, or should our strategy determine the means we pursue?

One of the things discussed was the Navy’s pursuit of the Littoral Combat Ship and nuclear submarines. Both are very expensive, and both have been debated in regards to futures type strategy – Seapower 21, Airpower 21, Force 21, NCW, etc. The idea that a vastly capable platform has “savings” over multiple technologically inferior platforms – read the LCS, a FCS BCT, JSF/F-22 because they are networked and can leverage technology.

Since we have hit the budget and that the amount of the Nation’s budget spent on Defense is hard to change (you’d probably need an existential threat to convince the public), then you have a choice to make in regards of quality (perceived or real) over quantity (generally proven and more affordable tech – but requiring more people). I think this is an important because while we are very engaged in a single theater, there are other strategic challenges that are evolving – you can call them peer or near peer, but what I think is important is that there are states and non-states who are looking to take advantage and have decided that this is a good opportunity because the one cop that is always on the beat is pretty busy.

We live in a world of finite resources. People covet those resources and as much as we’d prefer to come to an amicable co-usage of those resources, it seems biological to anticipate your greater needs and to try and secure an advantage, if for nothing else, out of fear. While we hope diplomacy and economic benefits will point out the advantages (first among them avoidance of the costs of war), it is a longer road, and there will probably be those who feel disenfranchised, or just don’t want to wait. Some will feel as though they should not have to wait for something they believe is inherently theirs. Some will mistake the reaction of others and see a bloodless gain bought by inability and apathy from others.

So no matter if we are discussing small wars or big wars, the imbalance brought about by pursuing an acquisition strategy which might allow us to gain superiority in a specific location while limiting our ability to respond to multiple challenges forces us into the uncomfortable game of guessing which place is more important to be. Given the multitude of competing state interests in pursuit of resources and given the viral spread of destabilizing non-state entities, are we building a force which we will be too scared to use/commit as an instrument of policy, and which once used will be too expensive (or too difficult) to reconstitute either through loss, or over-usage? I think a force that is too expensive in those terms may not be a very good policy tool, and may put us at a disadvantage as we try and respond to too much with too little.
Dr. Vego had a great observation about WWII. By the destruction of our battleships at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese forced us out of a Mahanian pursuit of a major capitol ship engagement, and into exploiting the advantages of the Aircraft Carrier. This is not to advocate the use of Airpower in the Pacific Theater, but that of breaking away from accepted notions that no longer conform to environmental realities. There is a danger in building your strategy to justify acquisition – it’s a leap of faith of an unknown height. Where national security is concerned, it may be a technological “bridge too far”. I thought about his observation and I wondered if OIF and OEF might be a sort of Pearl Harbor catalyst to consider how we wage war, and how to regain balance between investing in the people who fight war and the technology which provides us advantages.

Rob Thornton
05-29-2007, 06:17 PM
Granite Slate's, Ski's and LV's discussion on "what is a peer" got me thinking along a different track. How do we see the threat, and why? Service cultures play a part in shaping our perspectives, but that does not mean they are irrelevant. In gunnery the crew is taught to engage the most dangerous threat first - there are characteristics given to help qualify that, but it’s still a matter of arbitration. However, let’s say you have a more lethal threat that can engage you, but also have a less lethal threat closer in. Both are lethal. You have some latitude, you can perform a simultaneous engagement, but still, its a divided effort.

The ground war in OIF and OEF has perhaps affected the thinking of the Army and Marines in regards to the nature of the threat more so then the Navy and the Air Force. Why - seems easy enough, but why is it important to acknowledge. In terms of relevancy and treasure, casualty rates and force stress on the Army and Marines are immediate and lasting. They have brought hard lessons to be re-learned about the nature of War, and that it is fought by people. The Army and Marines stand a little closer to the consequences of Ground Combat - so not just our tactical thinking has been challenged, but our operational and strategic thinking has been challenged. OR rates for combat vehicles, CL IX, 4th and 5th tours, armored protection etc. have taken precedence over pursuit of perfect technology to solve problems - give me good enough - COTs over R&D - buy more of these now, I can't wait - We need a larger service to meet our commitments, etc. Its a kind of Maslow's Law for ground components - "we enjoyed our romp with contemplating self synchronization, but right now we have to shoot this guy and convince this other guy to quit blowing things up."

The Air Force and Navy are also affected, but less – it’s the nature of their role in this war, perhaps in warfare. I say the last because wars are about people and of course as stated people live on the ground, not in the air and not on the sea. They may venture into the air or sea for different reasons, and of course from a military stand point they offer advantages, and for our policy they dictate requirements, but people live - on the ground. So the Air Force and the Navy have more limitations in regard to affecting the ground then the Army and Marines. Both the Air Force and Navy offer unique and complimenting advantages in regards to war (and I hope we retain all of them), but I'd say they are more limited (we are all limited in some ways).

So it should be no surprise that the view of the most pressing and dangerous threat should be different. The perception of those threats leads to arguments on how best to spend limited resources.

The challenge for us is to consider our threats and the different ways in which we can counter and overcome them while not short changing the others. Historically this is a very challenging time for us, as we deal with combating Non-State & State enemies, convincing the public of a threat which we ourselves have a hard time agreeing on, waging a war in a near instantaneous information environment, trying to keep the WMD genies in their bottles, practicing and funding Joint, Inter-Agency and Combined warfare, and many other challenges.

As an Army guy I struggle to look outside of my perceptions and biases about the war and what it means to security, but I am an Army guy, so I first have to think about the Army's core competencies and what that means for the soldier trading shots the enemy at hand. I expect the same from LawVol as the USAF guy and the sailors of the USN. However, from a strategic point of view, its prudent to reconsider where we are going in light of what we've learned so far, and what events we see unfolding in the world. Is the technologically brilliant but hyper costly force the way to go? We must find some type of strategic balance between man and machine to be an effective instrument of policy for the long haul in order to preserve the freedoms we've been charged to defend.

Granite_State
05-30-2007, 06:29 PM
...are we building a force which we will be too scared to use/commit as an instrument of policy, and which once used will be too expensive (or too difficult) to reconstitute either through loss, or over-usage?

I tend to think so, we lose just four F-22s (sorry to keep harping on this) at $1 billion, how many more are we going to be willing to commit? Are we going to end up being like the ancient Indian armies whose war elephants were their most devastating weapon, but also their most precious, so they'd surround them with cavalry, and then protect the cavalry by surrounding them with infantry? Kind of defeats the purpose.

My understanding is that the genius of the F-16 is that it was cheap, effective, and versatile, thus we could build tons of them and focus resources and attention on training plenty of top-notch pilots. I've read that John Boyd used to say "People, ideas, and hardware. In that order!"

LawVol
05-30-2007, 08:17 PM
How do we see the threat, and why? Service cultures play a part in shaping our perspectives, but that does not mean they are irrelevant. In gunnery the crew is taught to engage the most dangerous threat first - there are characteristics given to help qualify that, but it’s still a matter of arbitration. However, let’s say you have a more lethal threat that can engage you, but also have a less lethal threat closer in. Both are lethal. You have some latitude, you can perform a simultaneous engagement, but still, its a divided effort.

Threat perception is perhaps what differentiates the air and ground folks. IMHO, the ground guys tend to focus almost solely on OIF/OEF. Now this is to be excepted given the current fight and the fact that the OIF/OEF threat is staring you right in the face. As a result, I think you (generic use of the term) tend to enlarge that threat. However, OIF/OEF is not a catastrophic threat. No matter what al Qeada, et al. does, there is no threat to our existance.

When you discuss a rising peer competitor, however, there is a potential for an existential threat. The stuff I'm reading about China and Russia indicates that they are extensively reinvigorating their military capability. Russia just conducted a missile launch for a system they say will work against our missile defense system. Whether this is true or not is irrelevant; the fact is that they are trying. We air guys see this as a true threat and one for which we must prepare.

That is not to say that the Army doesn't need upgrades or even more people (I reserve judgment on this), but we cannot leverage our future against a short-term solution to a non-existential threat.

Also, I don't know anything about India's war elephants, but I do know that risking the loss of a 16 million dollar jet for an insurgent is not the same as risking one to take out China's air defense system. BUilding tons of them might have been the idea back in the 1970s when they were first produced, but I don't think we can rely on that now. How will one perform against a 5th or 6th generation fighter? Will the enemy simply be shooting fish in a barrel? I'm not willing to risk it.

wm
05-30-2007, 08:37 PM
My understanding is that the genius of the F-16 is that it was cheap, effective, and versatile, thus we could build tons of them and focus resources and attention on training plenty of top-notch pilots. I've read that John Boyd used to say "People, ideas, and hardware. In that order!"

The more things change, the more they stay the same. I seem to remember the same argument being made about why we should have bought the F5 rather than the F16. And back then, we were looking at an adversary that had a huge superiority in numbers of systems. We relied on the technical superiority argument to make ourselves feel comfortable, but the hard fact is that we won the cold war by forcing a meltdown of our opponent's economy. The actual capabilities of what we bought didn't really matter as long as we spent very large amounts of dollars on things our opponents thought were technically superior.

FascistLibertarian
05-30-2007, 08:47 PM
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/spending.htm
US - $466 billion
China – $65 billion

http://www.policyalmanac.org/world/defense_spending.shtml
Summary of the FY 2003 Defense Budget
(signed into law on October 23, 2002)
House Republicans: Committee Central

The bill reported by the Defense Appropriations Conference provides a total of $355.1 billion in new discretionary spending authority for the Defense Department for FY 2003, a reduction of $1.6 billion to the budget request (not including the $10 billion reserve). It is also an increase of $37.5 billion over FY 2002 levels (not including supplementals).
Note only the USN has supercarriers, no other country can touch the US here and really many of the countries with smaller carriers are allied to the US.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Current_United_States_Navy_ships#Aircraft_Carriers
[edit] Aircraft Carriers

The USN has 11 active duty aircraft carriers, all supercarriers: One each of the Kitty Hawk and Enterprise classes, and nine of the Nimitz class. It formerly retained two carriers of the Forrestal class and one of the Kitty Hawk class in reserve (all three were stricken for disposal between 2003 and 2005, with USS Ranger (CV-61) placed on donation hold), and one carrier of the Nimitz class is under construction (USS George H. W. Bush (CVN-77)). The USN's aircraft carriers are its capital ships, and the largest extant example of naval shipbuilding in the world.
Kitty Hawk class aircraft carrier
USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63)
Enterprise class (one-ship class)
USS Enterprise (CVN-65)
Nimitz class
USS Nimitz (CVN-68)
USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69)
USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70)
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72)
USS George Washington (CVN-73)
USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74)
USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75)
USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76)
USS George H. W. Bush (CVN-77) (commission anticipated for 2009)
Ford class
USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) (Awarded)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_carriers#Aircraft_carriers_today

Nine countries maintain a total of 20 aircraft carriers in active service: United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Italy, India, Spain, Brazil, and Thailand. In addition the People's Republic of China's People's Liberation Army Navy possesses the former Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag, but most naval analysts believe that they have no intention to operate it, but instead are using Varyag to learn about carrier operations for future Chinese aircraft carriers.

If your seriouse about the Chinese as a threat you have to consider that in a war with them the US could have south korea, japan, australia.
Only two ‘empires’ have tried to run on a deficit, the Romans the the US.
The US needs to cut spending, the miltary is not the cause of this (you have to look at total of GDP). They dont want to end up like the USSR in the 1980's.
How much money has been wasted on projects that don’t work or arent working that could have been used elsewhere.
Another good ww2 compairson is the poor use of production and super weapons the Nazis did. Although it wouldn’t be such a bad comparison if they had won the war.
It is so important the the US stays ahead militarily and technologically of future peer competitors in the Naval and Air spheres. At the same time I think a lot of the spending could be trimmed.

FascistLibertarian
05-30-2007, 09:05 PM
but I have trouble seeing any state realistically attempting to match the U.S. on the conventional battlefield, given the two Gulf Wars and the obvious supremacy of the U.S. at putting firepower on targets.
I agree with this 100%. I think in a lot of cases the military is preparing for wars it they will not have to fight for over 20 years at least.

Rob Thornton
05-30-2007, 09:10 PM
Hey LV,


When you discuss a rising peer competitor, however, there is a potential for an existential threat. The stuff I'm reading about China and Russia indicates that they are extensively reinvigorating their military capability. Russia just conducted a missile launch for a system they say will work against our missile defense system. Whether this is true or not is irrelevant; the fact is that they are trying. We air guys see this as a true threat and one for which we must prepare.

Are you of the oppinion that China, Russia or even Iran would risk a nuclear confrontation & MAD?

Do you believe that AQ or a like organization would be willing to detonate a nuclear device in Washington D.C. if it were available?

The reason I ask is because you bring up existential threats. To be an existential threat goes beyond challenging regional supremacy, and even global supremacy (unless you are referring to a philosophical interpretation). After all Sparta may have torn down Athens’s walls, raped, pillaged and created a power vacuum in the Mediterranean, but Athens is still around today.

Detonation of a nuclear device in D.C. would be something of an existential threat to our government - I think.

My point - States will challenge us, but they will only go so far as the object in view and the risk associated with said object balance each other out - and so will we.

Non-States - are a different matter though. Their risk is minimized at the moment. They may seek a state like status - say a Caliphate, but they have little to lose and much to gain. OIF and OEF are just the most visible incarnations, but I don't believe they are the last


IMHO, the ground guys tend to focus almost solely on OIF/OEF. Now this is to be excepted given the current fight and the fact that the OIF/OEF threat is staring you right in the face. As a result, I think you (generic use of the term) tend to enlarge that threat. However, OIF/OEF is not a catastrophic threat. No matter what al Qeada, et al. does, there is no threat to our existence.

I disagree, ground components are torn - on the one hand we have this irregular war with all its unforeseen twists and turns that we've (all of us) have been charged to win, on the other we know that there are states out there still building tanks, artillery, and other conventional capabilities - since those are the tools by which you fall back own when you can't get what you want on the cheap. We've got enough sense of history to know that.

Now if you want to talk a "philosophical" existential threat to say American ability to move freely in the world without having to resort to military means to do so - say to pursue commerce, or exchange culture, etc. then I'd say terrorism and a peer competitor would be a threat (however, we buy an awful lot from China - so allot of the money they spend on hardware comes from making Happy Meal toys sold in the USA). Why terrorism, because it is often un-attributable to a state making it difficult to respond to. It shrinks from providing a physical target of which to bomb, shoot or shell. It mixes back into the masses and destabilizes from within - it has a viral quality in that it is able to mimic healthy cells while at the same time attacking them. Inciting insurgency using terrorist tactics in an environment where the rule of law and governance are lacking can be thought of as an operation in the context of a strategy to build a caliphate. It also drains our resources from hunting them down when you are trying to bring security and stability through COIN - the quicker we can resolve that and bring a credible HN government to the fight, the quicker we can move on - but this requires people.

In the end, it may not be military force at all that proves the cure, but a combination of economic, medical and diplomatic aid that changes the nature of the environment in which it lives - take away the conditions in which it breeds and it dies or goes sterile. In this way its a battle of ideas - an environment in which those things are possible displace the environment in which instability and terrorism breed.

Unfortunately, it is the largely the ground services (the AF and USN have other important tasks) who have been tasked with providing the representation for both the security in which stability can occur and the other elements required for stability - we don't have an expeditionary anything else, but the military. Perhaps instead of growing the Army and the Marines we should look at growing an expeditionary foreign service corps (we debated the value of such organizations) - but they are still going to have to get their hands dirty & that is what soldiers & marines do well and much cheaper - but the more ends thay are asked to fulfill, the more means they require.

LawVol
05-31-2007, 01:41 PM
Rob: your point is taken. Although a nuclear detonation would be horrible, I do not think it would threaten our existence. We would recover. However, a conventional loss in a war with China might compromise our world position in a big way. It could potentially shut us out of the Pacific and rearrange the balance of power there. Such a loss could lead us to becoming a mere second-rate power, or worse.

While I agree that we need to face down the terrorist threat (and win in Iraq for that matter), I worry that we're sacrificing our future military capabilities in doing so. Our job is to protect against all enemies; that includes potential future enemies.

FascistLib: I enjoyed reading your statistics. I guess I don't trust Chinese transparency as you do. Everything I read says its reported defense spending is not only severely under-reported but growing fast. My point is that we cannot let them catch up not that we shoud maintain pace. I simply do not want anyone to be equal to us on the battle field. We should always bring a gun to a knife fight. It makes me sleep better at night.:D

LawVol
05-31-2007, 03:25 PM
"The People's Liberation Army is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity conflict against high-technology adversaries," the Pentagon report said.

The Chinese government angrily rejected the Pentagon's assessment, saying it exaggerated China's military strength.

here's the link: http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=19019

120mm
05-31-2007, 03:34 PM
[QUOTE=FascistLibertarian;17264
Only two ‘empires’ have tried to run on a deficit, the Romans the the US.
[/QUOTE]

While I agree on the essense of your post, the above stated sentence is simply not true. Financing government debt was one of the reasons the British empire happened. I wouldn't doubt that all modern empires were made through gov't debt and lending.

FascistLibertarian
05-31-2007, 06:04 PM
The British kept their financial house in order! Only in WW1 did they end up spending all their money, cashing in all their chips, and becoming indebted to the US and on the hook for bad debts. In WW1 they had no choice. :(
In the US the British did not allow the Americans to produce certain goods (you Americans probably know a lot more about this than me, I have a feeling they limited printing presses or something like that).
India was able to pay for a lot of British troops and supply lots of Indian Army soldiers. The British supressed Indian manufacturing so India became a net importer of textiles.
When the British had a trade deficit with China (ie China had lots of stuff to sell but only really wanted gold). The British sold them opium and got HK in the war. Britain had to adapt.
These types of economic warfare doesnt seem viable today as the war will be more expensive than any benefits.
The US has to adapt today, they need to cut spending, get their fiscal house in order, and encourage savings at the national and family level. They can still expand their military but have to do it in a smart manner. Expensive projects NEVER seem to be cut. Rumsfeld cut what, one program, the future artillery something, in his time as defense secretary.
The US economic situation worries me far more than any future peer competitor. In Iraq they wanted (and prepared for) an Ashanti campaign and they got a Boer War.
The US is much more dominated in the Naval field than the British ever was. Would it really hurt to shift some of that funding into a larger and better equipped army?

Rob Thornton
05-31-2007, 07:46 PM
Hey LV,
On one of the posts on the site from some Chinese folks (the one about the riots)- there was a link to another vision for China (I have not read it yet - lots on my list these days) about the Chinese transforming their government to pursue a type of modernization that would help it reach its potential. Also there was a piece on the BBC and NPR about Chinese Christians and how the Chinese government is pushing its own brand of Christianity because the moral and ethical values are congruent with getting the most out of a population.
Directly this may seem like white noise to their military spending, but nothing happens in and of its self on that scale. What happens when a Communist state starts to look like a Christian pseudo-democracy with a capitalist theme? I'm not sure, but I think its worthwhile to consider. Lets say instead of invading Taiwan, they just pursued aggressive capitalism ventures to buy out Taiwan - they already own allot of it.
I think the Chinese are cognizant that there are easier ways to get what they desire in regards to the things we'd consider a major catalyst. Consider if China never provokes the U.S., but continues to build its Navy and other military forces while its economic policy puts it at the forefront of regional and perhaps global (way down the road) economics. Was then the right decision to counter growing Chinese influence military one up-manship? Or should we have taken some of our $$$$ and invested them in Diplomacy, Information and Economics.

I'm not sure, but I am sure the right answer is not always the first one we turn to. A future peer competitor will be smart and robust enough that it will not rely on a single element on national power. Consider that the premier Chinese military philosopher might not be Clausewitz, but Sun Tzu who recognized the apogee of art in warfare is to win without destroying your enemy. Now why would that old Chinese guy say that? Well, in destroying somebody else you risk destroying yourself, and in our case - the consumers who fuel a large part of their economy. China is smart, and it is patient. Their military is only one instrument of their military power, and one they will not hazard lightly.

I'm an Infantryman so this is going to sound funny coming from me, but an economically competitive China may be much better then China as an adversary. Checks and balances yes, but one up-manship - maybe not. These days require a balanced policy, our immediate answer should not be diMe, until after we understand the consequences. As others have pointed out, if China were to become a military threat – means and will that portray intent (not only a build up) on the world scene, then it will not be a threat to only the U.S., but to the other states in the region – Japan, Australia, India. Diplomacy in regards to building lasting relations and like policy objectives in the region, an Information plan that strategically communicates to our allies and neutrals the benefits of working with the United States, and an Economic Policy that invests world wide in order to change the conditions that make states weak and unstable, create victims, breeed anti-Americanism, and keep the US economy strong. From a military perspective we need to be strong enough to meet our commitments and be judicial in the use of force while expressig our national ideals abroad (freedom, justice, equality, compassion).

I understand our role is the “M”, but it must be understood in the context of the whole d-i-m-e. Extremists and terrorists though are a scourge and have no desire or logical reason to pursue a course that avoids conflict. They reflect the worst of human nature (yes there are like people who influence states – just look at Iran), and will not respond to anything but force – they are the threat of our time and dealing with them will require both military force and the use of the other elements of military power to change the environment from which they spawn.

LawVol
05-31-2007, 08:23 PM
Rob: you may be absolutely right and I hope you are. An economically competitive China vs having China as an adversary is clearly preferable. I would dearly love to see us all out of a job and simply have the various countries compete solely in the marketplace. However, I don't think that will be the case. If not China, someone else will rise. After WWI, many thought Germany would no longer be a threat. They failed to consider what could happen and instead focused on what expert said would most likely happen. It sort of like the Iraq preplanning, complete focus on the rosy picture rather than what if-ing the plan. I'm the what if I guess.

I know that I've mentioned China as the next possible peer competitor and it's only because that tends to be the norm. But what if someone else rises up? A resurgent Russia maybe (perhaps it's my Cold War military service, but I'm still leary about them)? All I'm saying is that we need to be ready. I just read something yesterday about China developing a 5th generation aircraft and collaborating with Russia. Who knows what will happen? I just don't want to be caught with our pants down.

Rob Thornton
05-31-2007, 09:39 PM
You know I got to thinking about the different reasons why state's invest in militaries (or anything else for that matter). I think that it is important - what allows for an investment in one area over another? With stable states we can at least assume there is some methodology driving the train, even if we don't understand it or can empathize with it. Unstable states such as N.Korea are driven pretty much by the fears and goals of dictators, but stable states tend to have bodies of one flavor or another. Bodies lead to objectives considered from multiple angles.

China is interesting in that its motives for modernizing its military are not entirely clear. However, if you were going to modernize today, what model would you use? What model would others look to and say their military power reflects their potential as a state? The military is also an effective tool of policy in being - that is the existance of a demonstratable, qulifiable military capability can enhance prestige, or influence decisions without having to do much. China seem to have a knack for using indirect methods to achieve its goals. I would also argue that China understands our strategic culture at least as well as we understand theirs - in fact as global players for the last century, their is a larger body of evidence for them to evaluate. While we concentrate on what has been our most visible role in the world - that of world policemen, they are employing soft power to advance their prestige and influence while also strengthening their economic ties and broadening their opportunities by opening new markets. I would also say that China has learned from us that if you wish to take global risks you can only mitigate them by having the ability to project global security.

If China's goals stay aligned with those United States - within the bounds of peaceful economic competition - then they could actually ease some of our commitments. If they do not- then they could result in an adversarial relationship, and increase our commitments (and requirements).

That's the real challenge, knowing where to accept risk in one area while applying resources in another - since resources are finite. Hopefully we take a balanced approac where even if we're wron, we won't be so wrong from which we cannot recover quickly enough to restore balance.

120mm
06-01-2007, 05:08 AM
The British kept their financial house in order! Only in WW1 did they end up spending all their money, cashing in all their chips, and becoming indebted to the US and on the hook for bad debts. In WW1 they had no choice. :(
In the US the British did not allow the Americans to produce certain goods (you Americans probably know a lot more about this than me, I have a feeling they limited printing presses or something like that).
India was able to pay for a lot of British troops and supply lots of Indian Army soldiers. The British supressed Indian manufacturing so India became a net importer of textiles.
When the British had a trade deficit with China (ie China had lots of stuff to sell but only really wanted gold). The British sold them opium and got HK in the war. Britain had to adapt.
These types of economic warfare doesnt seem viable today as the war will be more expensive than any benefits.
The US has to adapt today, they need to cut spending, get their fiscal house in order, and encourage savings at the national and family level. They can still expand their military but have to do it in a smart manner. Expensive projects NEVER seem to be cut. Rumsfeld cut what, one program, the future artillery something, in his time as defense secretary.
The US economic situation worries me far more than any future peer competitor. In Iraq they wanted (and prepared for) an Ashanti campaign and they got a Boer War.
The US is much more dominated in the Naval field than the British ever was. Would it really hurt to shift some of that funding into a larger and better equipped army?

I have a friend who is a medieval British historian. He routinely asserts that Britain is STILL paying off notes from the 1500s. If this is true, floating debt for eternity is NOT keeping one's financial house in order.

tequila
06-04-2007, 09:35 AM
Defense Officials Tried to Reverse China Policy, says Powell aide (http://public.cq.com/docs/hs/hsnews110-000002523531.html). Congressional Quarterly.



The same top Bush administration neoconservatives who leap-frogged Washington’s foreign policy establishment to topple Saddam Hussein nearly pulled off a similar coup in U.S.-China relations—creating the potential of a nuclear war over Taiwan, a top aide to former Secretary of State Colin Powell says.

Lawrence B. Wilkerson, the U.S. Army colonel who was Powell’s chief of staff through two administrations, said in little-noted remarks early last month that “neocons” in the top rungs of the administration quietly encouraged Taiwanese politicians to move toward a declaration of independence from mainland China — an act that the communist regime has repeatedly warned would provoke a military strike.
The top U.S. diplomat in Taiwan at the time, Douglas Paal, backs up Wilkerson’s account, which is being hotly disputed by key former defense officials.

Under the deliberately fuzzy diplomatic formula hammered out between former President Richard Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong in 1971, the United States agreed that there is only “one China” —with its capital in Beijing.

But right-wing Republicans in particular continued to embrace Taiwan as an anticommunist bastion 125 miles off the Chinese coast, long after their own party leaders and U.S. big business embraced the communist regime ...

Rob Thornton
06-05-2007, 12:27 PM
LV,
Have you read (or listened to on CD) Friedman's book - The World is Flat? He has a chapter in there that deals almost entirely with Chinese Economic strategy. Its important I think. It talks about moving from being a consumer of western goods, to a producer (out sourcer of western goods), to designer of goods (note the lack of designating the West as Chinese consumerism is also targeted) to the conceptual end of the spectrum which really closes the loop. In this model economics becme the driving force (CoG) of new Chinese power. They have a long term plan which starts by recognizing the changing world and preparing their children to succeed better then anyone else's kids. We must recognize the limitations to pursuing a strategy limited to countering gorwing chinese military capability - we must account for how that power is generated and to what ends it might be used. The chinese military is important, but we must not see the problem from the physical manifestation side of it alone, we must consider the parts that are more subtle and lasting. Peer competitor means allot more then military peer competitor.
Regards, Rob

Firestaller
06-07-2007, 12:23 AM
Hey LV,
the Chinese transforming their government to pursue a type of modernization that would help it reach its potential. Also there was a piece on the BBC and NPR about Chinese Christians and how the Chinese government is pushing its own brand of Christianity because the moral and ethical values are congruent with getting the most out of a population.
What happens when a Communist state starts to look like a Christian pseudo-democracy with a capitalist theme?



I doubt that you will see pervasive Christianity in China. The government is actually pushing the Chinese the be more Chinese (Confusianism, Toaism, Buddhisim and other traditional thoughts were banned and are now making a revival in China.)


Buddhism can contribute better than Christianity and Islam to healing community divisions and help believers deal with major changes in Chinese society, this according to State Administration for Religious Affairs director Ye Xiaowen

Other religions such as Christianity and Islam can also contribute to the building of a harmonious society (e pet project of Chinese President Hu Jintao), but Buddhism can make a "distinctive contribution" because its pursuit of harmony is closer to the Chinese outlook.

"As a responsible country, China has a distinctive thinking and forward-looking policy in promoting world harmony. Religious power is one of the social forces China can draw support from," he said.

Mr Ye said Buddhism can help believers cope with a fast-changing society, now plagued by a huge wealth gap and increasing social unrest. Buddhism is China's most important religion in numerical terms, and has been persecuted by the Communist regime like other religions.

What is more, the central government is at ease with Buddhism because the latter has less contact with outside forces, which the authorities often see as meddling in China's internal affairs.

Ties between the faithful and the Holy See are one of the reasons relations between China and the Vatican are difficult since Beijing considers the latter a foreign power.
http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2006/4/11_5.html

goesh
06-07-2007, 12:23 PM
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10779158/

It's going to be interesting to see how well it sells, its reliability and durability and all those factors that go into successful marketing. The price certainly is right