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SWJED
11-17-2005, 05:19 AM
17 Nov. Washington Post - Shortfalls of Special Operations Command Are Cited (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/16/AR2005111602282.html).


...the expanded effort has not developed as quickly or efficiently as hoped, handicapped in part by the continuing demands of conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and also by a lack of experience at command headquarters in developing long-range strategic plans and coordinating with other government organizations, say defense officials, military officers and outside analysts...

SWJED
01-12-2006, 11:07 PM
12 Jan. American Forces Press Service - Commanders: Special Forces Must Evolve to Meet New Challenges (http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/20060112_3910.html).


By Samantha L. Quigley
American Forces Press Service

SAN DIEGO, Jan. 12, 2006 – Special operations commanders know what is needed to meet the ever-changing challenges facing their forces fighting in the global war on terrorism, a panel of special operations leaders said here yesterday.

"We've got to field a warrior or technician that is culturally attuned (and) linguistically capable," Navy Capt. Sean Pybus, commander of Naval Special Warfare Group 1, said. "Those are key requirements in the years to come."

The panel spoke at WEST 2006, a technology, communication and national security conference co-sponsored by the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association and the U.S. Naval Institute. Army Col. Edward Reeder, deputy commander, 7th Special Forces, agreed with Pybus, adding that interpersonal skills, tactical and technical expertise also are musts.

"The Special Forces operator needs to be a subject-matter expert in unconventional warfare," he said. "He must thoroughly understand and be competent in the execution of a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations. A Special Forces soldier is physically fit, mentally tough, politically and culturally sensitive to his region of operation ... and lethal when required."

That expertise, combined with cultural and linguistics training, translates to Special Forces with a special understanding of foreign issues as they apply to the U.S., Hejlik said.

"They ... understand that when they go to a country that any inappropriate action has a severe and adverse impact on the way that country looks ... at the United States of America," Hejlik said. "They're more mature, they're more experienced, better equipped." Supporting these special operations forces isn't as simple as just basic equipping and training, panel members said. While those elements go a long way in creating the type of forces needed, more specific support systems also are needed.

Brig. Gen. Dennis Hejlik, commander of Marine Corp Special Operations Command, said communications is the area in which special operations forces "really hurt the most."

"We always need enhanced capability in comms," he said, noting that as with computers, the best available communications gear becomes obsolete in six months.

Biometrics -- automated methods for recognizing humans based on intrinsic physical or behavioral traits -- is another support system the panel agreed was needed. It's essential for tracking what the call "individuals of interest."

"The biometric piece is critical in an unconventional warfare environment," Reeder said. The biometrics system currently used allows for fingerprints to be lifted from debris left in areas where attacks have been launched, he said. Those fingerprints can then be entered into a data base for comparison to others found, thus providing a method for tracking an individual's movements.

Pybus also voiced his concern about proprietary communications systems. Current systems don't always interface, he explained, and that can hamper the flow of information from one location to another. Communications systems that can talk to each other are essential, he said.

"We've got to figure this out," Pybus said. "And my opinion is to get away from proprietary ... technology, looking instead to services' open architecture so that we can take those Predator or Raven feeds, present them to the guy in the Humvee so he can make decisions that might save his life and certainly help accomplish his mission."

Predators and Ravens are unmanned aerial vehicles used to gather information.

With a combination of the right training and support, special forces will continue to enhance unconventional warfare capabilities to expand the set of options available to policy makers, Reeder said.

Erik Prince, a founder of Blackwater USA, also participated in the panel discussion. Blackwater USA is a North Carolina-based private military contractor and security firm. The company provides support to "military, government agencies, law enforcement and civilian entities in training, targets and range operations," Prince, a former Navy SEAL, said.

SWJED
05-29-2007, 12:25 PM
29 May NY Times - Special Operations: High Profile, but in Shadow (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/world/middleeast/29forces.html?_r=1&oref=slogin) by Thom Shanker.


Every night in Iraq, American Special Operations forces carry out as many as a dozen raids aimed at terrorist leaders allied with Al Qaeda, other insurgent fighters and militia targets. Their after-action reports are the first thing that Gen. David H. Petraeus, the senior American commander in Baghdad, reads the next day.

The missions also are closely watched by senior policy makers in Washington, who differ on whether the small number of elite units should focus on capturing and killing leaders of the group that calls itself Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and foreign fighters in Iraq, or whether the greater threat comes from the Sunni- and Shiite-based insurgency.

In the shadows of the troop increase ordered by President Bush, Special Operations forces conduct between 6 and 12 missions every night across the country. A vast majority — between 80 percent and 90 percent — are aimed at Qaeda-allied targets, while the rest attack other extremist elements, say senior military officers in Baghdad and Pentagon officials...

WVO
05-30-2007, 12:01 AM
Once again, this article raises the (since Vietnam ever-present) question of the appropriate role of policy makers in Washington in determining targeting at the operational and tactical levels. From where I stand, that role ought to be extremely limited. If policy makers and senior, not in theater people are unhappy with Gen Petraeus's results, then they should find somebody else to do the job.

On a related note, any strong feelings about the appropriate level of involvement for national-level, strategically focused intelligence agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan? Should agencies like CIA be concerned with the Iraq HVI list?

jcustis
05-30-2007, 01:13 AM
Should agencies like CIA be concerned with the Iraq HVI list?

They already are, to the point where it's like clownshoes.

Bill Moore
05-30-2007, 02:10 AM
One would think having a highly trained and nimble force that can quickly and effectively respond to emerging intelligence concerning high value insurgents/terrorists is a good and needed capability. However, after four plus years of these decaptitation missions has the security situation notably improved or worsened? I have no doubt that these raids are saving lives in the short run (but perhaps putting more lives in danger in the long run, if the IO campaign can't justify them to the Iraqi population), yet the situation continues to worsen, so I think it is appropriate for those in Washington to question (not directing like LBJ did) if our targeting strategy is correct. I too wonder if we're going after the right people. I think it is possible for those close to the fight to be focused on the trees, and it sometimes helps to have a back seat driver looking at a map suggesting alternative routes to the same end point.

Tom Odom
05-30-2007, 01:34 PM
One would think having a highly trained and nimble force that can quickly and effectively respond to emerging intelligence concerning high value insurgents/terrorists is a good and needed capability. However, after four plus years of these decaptitation missions has the security situation notably improved or worsened? I have no doubt that these raids are saving lives in the short run (but perhaps putting more lives in danger in the long run, if the IO campaign can't justify them to the Iraqi population), yet the situation continues to worsen, so I think it is appropriate for those in Washington to question (not directing like LBJ did) if our targeting strategy is correct. I too wonder if we're going after the right people. I think it is possible for those close to the fight to be focused on the trees, and it sometimes helps to have a back seat driver looking at a map suggesting alternative routes to the same end point.

Excellent points, Bill. The map analogy works well...

Tom

Jedburgh
07-28-2007, 04:15 PM
Journal of Special Operations Medicine Archive (http://jsoupublic.socom.mil/publications/jsom_archive.php); all issues from Spring 2001 to the present.

The Journal of Special Operations Medicine (JSOM) is an authorized official military quarterly publication of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) (http://www.socom.mil/), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOM is not a publication of the Special Operations Medical Association (SOMA). Our mission is to promote the professional development of Special Operations medical personnel by providing a forum for the examination of the latest advancements in medicine and the history of unconventional warfare medicine.

Disclosure Statement: The JSOM presents both medical and nonmedical professional information to expand the knowledge of SOF military medical issues and promote collaborative partnerships among services, components, corps, and specialties. It conveys medical service support information and provides a peer-reviewed, quality print medium to encourage dialogue concerning SOF medical initiatives. The views contained herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the Department of Defense. The United States Special Operations Command and the Journal of Special Operations Medicine do not hold themselves responsible for statements or products discussed in the articles. Unless so stated, material in the JSOM does not reflect the endorsement, official attitude, or position of the USSOCOM-SG or of the Editorial Board.

Content: Content of this publication is not copyrighted. Published works may be reprinted provided credit is given to the JSOM and the authors.

Jedburgh
11-16-2007, 04:39 PM
Special Warfare, Nov-Dec 07 (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/9302473) (AKO Log-In Required)

Articles:

Agile Sustainment
A special-operations task force in Afghanistan uses innovative methods to overcome a number of logistics challenges.

Militias: Is There a Role for Them in U.S. Foreign Policy?
Recognizing the role and the importance of militias could help the U.S. and partner nations deal with problems of security.

GWOT 2.0: Capitalizing On Experience Gained
ARSOF can take advantage of experience gained in the GWOT to make future operations efficient and effective.

Jedburgh
11-16-2007, 08:12 PM
Ranger Medic Handbook 2007 (http://www.specopsadvantage.com/news/2007rangmedhb.pdf)

Historically in warfare, the majority of all combat deaths have occurred prior to a casualty ever receiving advanced trauma management. The execution of the Ranger mission profile in the Global War on Terrorism and our legacy tasks undoubtedly will increase the number of lethal wounds.

Ranger leaders can significantly reduce the number of Rangers who die of wounds sustained in combat by simply targeting optimal medical capability in close proximity to the point of wounding. Survivability of the traumatized Ranger who sustains a wound in combat is in the hands of the first responding Ranger who puts a pressure dressing or tourniquet and controls the bleeding of his fallen comrade. Directing casualty response management and evacuation is a Ranger leader task; ensuring technical medical competence is a Ranger Medic task.

A solid foundation has been built for Ranger leaders and medics to be successful in managing casualties in a combat environment. An integrated team response from non-medical personnel and medical providers must be in place to care for the wounded Ranger. The Ranger First Responder, Squad EMT, Ranger Medic Advanced Tactical Practitioner, and Ranger leaders, in essence all Rangers must unite to provide medical care collectively, as a team, without sacrificing the flow and violence of the battle at hand.

An integrated team approach to casualty response and care will directly translate to the reduction of the died of wounds rate of combat casualties and minimize the turbulence associated with these events in times of crisis. The true success of the Ranger Medical Team will be defined by its ability to complete the mission and greatly reduce preventable combat death. Rangers value honor and reputation more than their lives, and as such will attempt to lay down their own lives in defense of their comrades. The Ranger Medic will do no less.

I will never leave a fallen comrade…

Jedburgh
09-09-2008, 02:50 PM
Washington Post, 6 Sep 08: U.S. Teams Weaken Insurgency In Iraq (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/05/AR2008090503933.html)

.....a novel anti-insurgent operation that plays out nightly in Baghdad and throughout much of Iraq. U.S. intelligence and defense officials credit the operation and its unusual tactics -- involving small, hybrid teams of special forces and intelligence officers -- with the capture of hundreds of suspected terrorists and their supporters in recent months.

The "fusion cells" are being described as a major factor behind the declining violence in Iraq in recent months. Defense officials say they have been particularly effective against AQI, which has lost 10 senior commanders since June in Baghdad alone, including Uthman.

Aiding the U.S. effort, the officials say, is the increasing antipathy toward AQI among many ordinary Iraqis, who quickly report new terrorist safe houses as soon as they're established. Fresh tips are channeled to fast-reaction teams that move aggressively against reported terrorist targets -- often multiple times in a single night.

The rapid strikes are coordinated by the Joint Task Force, a military-led team that includes intelligence and forensic professionals, political analysts, mapping experts, computer specialists piloting unmanned aircraft, and Special Operations troops. After decades of agency rivalries that have undermined coordination on counterterrorism, the task force is enjoying new success in Iraq with its blending of diverse military and intelligence assets to speed up counterterrorism missions.....

davidbfpo
04-04-2010, 09:26 PM
Hopefully the right thread for this.

Hat tip to al Sahwa blog for this reflective commentary on continuing US and Iraqi SOF actions - when an Iraqi warrant is required before action.


At the onset of the new year (January 2009), units deployed in Iraq could no longer capture and detain insurgents without a signed warrant from an Iraqi judge. The transition was a painful but necessary process. Collectively, we put our heads together to develop ways to prolong our pressure on the terror network under this new system. Prior to Jan 2009, if we had actionable intelligence on any insurgent, we simply put together a plan and executed it. The exploitation from the detained individual would usually lead us to our next operation. This targeting model became unsustainable post Jan. 2009.

Link:http://al-sahwa.blogspot.com/2010/04/warrant-based-targeting-iraq-model.html

Bob's World
04-05-2010, 01:13 AM
Bill,

Good comments. Often what is sold as "decaptitation" is really much more "kneecapitation" if one really looks at what is going on, targets, effects, etc.

As to debates of if policy types, Battle Space owners, or SOF leadership should have control of these target lists, the answer is probably all of the above, in a very open targeting forum that is constantly looking at the picture from many levels and perspectives and adjusting accordingly.

bradley.whitaker
11-17-2010, 02:13 PM
This weekend Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai, again, ranted in his Washington Post interview about the need to cease special operations raids.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/14/AR2010111404549.html

It is time the US Government stands up to President Karzai.

According to reports US SOF have conducted more than 1000 operations over the past year. On more than half of those raids, no shots were fired. Approximately half of these raids resulted in the capture or death of the individual wanted. Less than half of the operations resulted in shots fired. Finally, very few non-combatants were killed as a result of these operations, most due to being co-located with militants- often used as shield by the militants who place no value on the lives of the innocent- and getting caught in the fight,.

In one week alone the Taliban and other militants kill more than double that number.

Karzai is aware of these numbers, however, Afghan cabinet members who present hard numbers and evidence to Karzai are discounted or dismissed. In June he forced the resignation of Interior Minister Atmar and National Directorate of Security Minister Saleh after they presented compelling evidence of Haqqani and Taliban involvement regarding the attacks on the peace jirga in Kabul.

Special Operations raids have removed several Taliban commanders and sub-commanders, resulting in diminished capability of the fighters. Frustration among Taliban commanders is rampant. And the US is remaining silent.

SWJ Blog
01-09-2011, 01:41 PM
SOF Detachment Civil Military Operations in Iraq (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/01/sof-detachment-civil-military/)

Entry Excerpt:

SOF Detachment Civil Military Operations in Iraq
by Shaun A. Reynolds

Download The Full Article: SOF Detachment Civil Military Operations in Iraq (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/641-reynolds.pdf)

“All the air conditioners are gone,” said the interpreter. The Special Forces Operation Detachment-Alpha (ODA) team leader forgoes the niceties that usually accompany the first few minutes of most meetings with Iraqi citizens. “Ask him where the air conditioners went,” he tells the interpreter, maintaining a no-nonsense look at the boy's elementary school principal. The principal, through the interpreter, explains that due to the threat of theft the air conditioning units were removed and locked in storage for the summer months. Despite the locked security gate and posted security guard, the possibility of losing them when school is out of session is too great a risk for the principal. After a few minutes the ODA is led to a locked class room where the units are stored. A quick count by the team leader ensures that all the units are in fact present, two months after he and his team supervised completion of this major school renovation project.

Download The Full Article: SOF Detachment Civil Military Operations in Iraq (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/641-reynolds.pdf)

Captain Shaun Reynolds is a U.S. Army Civil Affairs officer previously assigned to Special Operations Task Force Central, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Arabian Peninsula as Civil Affairs planner. He is currently assigned to 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).



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SWJ Blog
05-27-2011, 12:02 PM
Going Outside the Wire: Liaising With Special Operation Forces to Rebuild Agriculture in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/05/going-outside-the-wire-liaisin/)

Entry Excerpt:

Going Outside the Wire: Liaising With Special Operation Forces to Rebuild Agriculture in Afghanistan
by Daniel Miller

Download the Full Article: Going Outside the Wire: Liaising With Special Operation Forces to Rebuild Agriculture in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/775-miller.pdf)

Introducing a paper on agricultural development with a quote from the ancient Chinese war strategist, Sun Tzu, may seem like a novel way to begin, but designing effective rural development programs in the mountains of Afghanistan, where an active Taliban and al-Qa’ida insurgency is still taking place, requires innovative, “out-of-the-box” solutions. Counterinsurgency work must involve not only military operations, but integrated civilian efforts. The civilian efforts include programs sponsored by the host nation, international development/relief and non-governmental organizations, and donor nations.

Download the Full Article: Going Outside the Wire: Liaising With Special Operation Forces to Rebuild Agriculture in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/775-miller.pdf)

Daniel Miller is an agriculture officer with USAID. He has worked in Afghanistan, Bhutan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan and the Philippines. He worked in Afghanistan from 2004-2006, spending time in numerous Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and with Special Operations Civil Affairs Teams. He is currently based in the Philippines where he works with the U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines in the southern island of Mindanao.
Disclaimer: The information and views presented in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or the positions of the U.S. Agency for International Development or the U.S. government.



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SWJ Blog
07-28-2011, 11:50 AM
Latest From Special Warfare (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/07/latest-from-special-warfare/)

Entry Excerpt:

Village Stability Operations: More than Village Defense (http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/SW2403/SW2403VillageStabilityOperations_MoreThanVillageDe fense.html) by Colonel Ty Connett and Colonel Bob Cassidy. The authors explain the critical role that village stability operations play in the International Security Assistance Force's counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan.

4th and Long: The Role of Civil Affairs in VSO (http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/SW2403/SW2403FourthAndLong_TheRoleOfCivilAffairsInVSO.htm l) by Captain Neiman C. Young. When the Soldiers of Company A, 91st Civil Affairs Battalion, deployed to Afghanistan in 2010, they learned to adapt their activities to contribute to village stability operations.

The Nuts and Bolts of Village Stability Operations (http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/SW2403/SW2403TheNutsAndBoltsOfVillageStabilityOperations. html) by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Stephen N. Rust. An overview of the principles and challenges of village stability operations.

Taking a Stand: VSO and the Afghan Local Police (http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/SW2403/SW2403TakeAStand_VSOAndTheAfghanLocalPolice.html) by Lieutenant Colonel Basicl Catanzaro and Major Kirk Windmueller. Through village stability operations, members of U.S. SOF team with Afghan police to achieve security and stability and pave the way for political and economic improvements.

The Green Beret Volckmann Program (http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/SW2403/SW2403TheGreenBeretVolckmannProgram.html) by Colonel Eric P. Wendt. The author proposes a strategy for countering multiregional insurgencies by employing culturally astute SF Soldiers who would serve repetitive rotations to a specific country.

Regimental Training Facility Brings Unique SOF Resources Together (http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/SW2403/SW2403RegimentalTrainingFacilityBringsUniqueSOFRes ourcesTogether.html) by Major David S. Clukey. A dedicated site at Fort Bliss, Texas, provides realistic pre-mission training for members of special-operations task forces.



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SWJ Blog
08-20-2011, 12:01 PM
More Special Operations Not the Answer (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/more-special-operations-not-the-answer)

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SWJ Blog
09-23-2011, 11:53 AM
Special Operations Leaders Outline Budget Concerns (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-operations-leaders-outline-budget-concerns)

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SWJ Blog
11-10-2011, 10:30 PM
In Afghanistan, Special Units Do the Dirty Work (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/in-afghanistan-special-units-do-the-dirty-work)

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SWJ Blog
03-13-2012, 01:13 AM
The Test Case in Afghanistan for Special Operating Forces (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-test-case-in-afghanistan-for-special-operating-forces)

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SWJ Blog
07-12-2012, 09:00 AM
The Future of Special Operations Forces (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-future-of-special-operations-forces)

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SWJ Blog
09-08-2012, 12:30 PM
Special Ops and the Future of American Foreign Policy (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-ops-and-the-future-of-american-foreign-policy)

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SWJ Blog
10-23-2012, 09:30 PM
Relationship Between Conventional and Special Operations Forces in Transition (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/relationship-between-conventional-and-special-operations-forces-in-transition)

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SWJ Blog
04-03-2013, 06:10 PM
Military Sees Broader Role for Special Operations Forces, in Peace and War (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/military-sees-broader-role-for-special-operations-forces-in-peace-and-war)

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SWJ Blog
04-08-2013, 12:20 PM
The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-future-of-us-special-operations-forces)

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SWJ Blog
04-16-2013, 08:12 PM
Special Operations: What New Powers They Need (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-operations-what-new-powers-they-need)

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SWJ Blog
04-22-2013, 08:13 AM
Interoperability: Merging the Organizational Cultures of Special Forces and the Infantry (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/interoperability-merging-the-organizational-cultures-of-special-forces-and-the-infantry)

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SWJ Blog
05-01-2013, 09:54 PM
Special Ops Bravado Hurts National Security (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-ops-bravado-hurts-national-security)

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SWJ Blog
07-22-2013, 10:13 PM
Special Operations Officials Emphasize Capacity Building (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-operations-officials-emphasize-capacity-building)

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SWJ Blog
07-31-2013, 12:01 PM
Post-Afghanistan, Special Operations to Shift to Conflict Prevention (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/post-afghanistan-special-operations-to-shift-to-conflict-prevention)

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SWJ Blog
08-11-2013, 01:43 AM
Lawmakers Skeptical of Global Special Operations Plan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/lawmakers-skeptical-of-global-special-operations-plan)

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SWJ Blog
08-12-2013, 12:40 PM
Unconventional Warfare Does Not Belong to Special Forces (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/unconventional-warfare-does-not-belong-to-special-forces)

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SWJ Blog
09-26-2013, 10:45 PM
US Special Ops Are Starting To Look A Lot Less Special (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-special-ops-are-starting-to-look-a-lot-less-special)

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SWJ Blog
10-19-2013, 01:29 AM
Tampa to Become Epicenter of International Special Operations Coordination (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/tampa-to-become-epicenter-of-international-special-operations-coordination)

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SWJ Blog
10-31-2013, 07:50 PM
Thoughts on the Future of Special Operations (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/thoughts-on-the-future-of-special-operations)

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SWJ Blog
11-03-2013, 05:26 PM
Thoughts on the Future of Special Operations (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/thoughts-on-the-future-of-special-operations)

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SWJ Blog
01-14-2014, 08:11 PM
US Special Operations in PACOM (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-special-operations-in-pacom)

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SWJ Blog
01-30-2014, 12:50 PM
Peace, Art and … Special Operations (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/peace-art-and-%E2%80%A6-special-operations)

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SWJ Blog
03-12-2014, 06:14 PM
Elite Special Forces in Danger of Cracking as Demand is ‘Outpacing Capacity’ (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/elite-special-forces-in-danger-of-cracking-as-demand-is-%E2%80%98outpacing-capacity%E2%80%99)

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SWJ Blog
03-24-2014, 06:00 PM
In Afghanistan, A U.S. Special Forces Major's Meteoric Rise And Humiliating Fall (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/in-afghanistan-a-us-special-forces-majors-meteoric-rise-and-humiliating-fall)

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SWJ Blog
03-26-2014, 06:21 PM
U.S. Special Ops Planning for Action in Globe’s ‘Dark Areas’ (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-special-ops-planning-for-action-in-globe%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98dark-areas%E2%80%99)

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SWJ Blog
04-07-2014, 10:51 AM
Village Stability Operations and the Application of Special Warfare across the Contemporary Global Operating Environment (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/village-stability-operations-and-the-application-of-special-warfare-across-the-contemporary)

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SWJ Blog
04-08-2014, 07:30 PM
Special Forces Language Training: What Would It Cost To Do It Right? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/special-forces-language-training-what-would-it-cost-to-do-it-right)

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SWJ Blog
04-11-2014, 02:11 PM
Inside FBI’s Secret Relationship with the Military’s Special Operations (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/inside-fbi%E2%80%99s-secret-relationship-with-the-military%E2%80%99s-special-operations)

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SWJ Blog
04-29-2014, 12:33 PM
Check Out This New Wish List for U.S. Special Ops (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/check-out-this-new-wish-list-for-us-special-ops)

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SWJ Blog
05-26-2014, 04:15 AM
Special Operations - An Army Core Competency (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-operations-an-army-core-competency)

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SWJ Blog
06-23-2014, 11:01 PM
Can General Linder’s Special Operations Forces Stop the Next Terrorist Threat? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/can-general-linder%E2%80%99s-special-operations-forces-stop-the-next-terrorist-threat)

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SWJ Blog
06-24-2014, 04:11 AM
Special Issue of Small Wars and Insurgencies on U.S. Counterinsurgency (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-issue-of-small-wars-and-insurgencies-on-us-counterinsurgency)

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SWJ Blog
06-24-2014, 07:12 PM
Special Operations Forces in Unlit Spaces (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-operations-forces-in-unlit-spaces)

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pjb
07-02-2014, 03:34 PM
The Special Operations Research Association is pleased to announce the 2014 SORA conference, Special Operations and Strategic Implications, 24-25 October 2014, at Fort Leavenworth, KS. Our keynote speaker will be Linda Robinson, RAND Senior International Policy Analyst and author of One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare. ​

This year’s conference has the theme of Special Operations and Strategic Implications, and proposals for papers, panels, and roundtables on issues surrounding this theme are encouraged.

Potential topics include:
• National Strategy Implications of Special Operations
• Unconventional Warfare and International Relations
• Special Operations and Non-State Actors
• Special Operations and International Diplomacy
• Comparative Perspectives on Special Operations Policies and Capabilities
• Diffusion, Transformation, and Future Trends in Special Operations
• Special Operations as a Foreign Policy Tool
• Special Operations and Coercive Diplomacy

For more information, and to see the complete call for papers, please visit the website: http://www.specopsjournal.org/conference.html

SWJ Blog
08-30-2014, 12:00 AM
Retiring SOCOM Chief: ‘We Are in the Golden Age of Special Operations’ (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/retiring-socom-chief-%E2%80%98we-are-in-the-golden-age-of-special-operations%E2%80%99)

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SWJ Blog
09-15-2014, 11:32 AM
A Precarious Balance: Preserving the Right Mix of Conventional and Special Operations Forces (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/a-precarious-balance-preserving-the-right-mix-of-conventional-and-special-operations-forces)

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SWJ Blog
10-10-2014, 05:34 AM
The Common Service: A Response to David Maxwell’s “Thoughts on the Future of Special Operations: A Return to the Roots - Adapted for the Future” (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-common-service-a-response-to-david-maxwell%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cthoughts-on-the-future-of-special-operati)

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SWJ Blog
11-20-2014, 03:40 PM
Special Warfare: The Missing Middle in U.S. Coercive Options (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-warfare-the-missing-middle-in-us-coercive-options)

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SWJ Blog
11-20-2014, 08:40 PM
Special Operations For the 21st Century: Starting Over (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-operations-for-the-21st-century-starting-over)

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SWJ Blog
01-19-2015, 07:20 PM
Global SOF Symposium 2015: Anticipate the Future (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/global-sof-symposium-2015-anticipate-the-future)

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SWJ Blog
03-13-2015, 10:13 PM
Teaching Conflict Resolution: Building on the Strengths of Special Operations Forces (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/teaching-conflict-resolution-building-on-the-strengths-of-special-operations-forces)

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SWJ Blog
03-13-2015, 10:13 PM
SOF Support to Political Warfare (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/sof-support-to-political-warfare)

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SWJ Blog
04-25-2015, 02:02 PM
Saturday SOF three-fer (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/saturday-sof-three-fer)

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davidbfpo
05-16-2015, 07:52 PM
The BBC amongst others report a long range raid into eastern Syria to get a Daesh logistician:
The US says its special forces have killed a senior Islamic State (IS) member and captured his wife in a rare ground raid in eastern Syria.Abu Sayyaf helped direct oil, gas and financial operations for IS, as well as holding a military role...
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32764995

Clints Watts at FPRI writes that:
This daring U.S. raid and its great success likely signal a turning point in the fight against ISIS.
Link:http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/2015/05/why-us-raid-abu-sayyaf-and-isis-eastern-syria-may-be-game-changer

Yes there maybe an intelligence gain, it may disrupt funding via oil & gas production (IIRC mainly sold to the Syrian regime) and affect the confidence of Daesh supporters / fighters. I am doubtful from this armchair that it is 'game changer'.

Bill Moore
05-16-2015, 09:13 PM
Too early to tell what the impact will be, but I tend to agree that it could be a game changer for the following reasons. These raids tend to provide a wealth of intelligence that enabler further targeting, often at a fast clip. More importantly perhaps, it now appears that the U.S. has the political will to publically put boots on the ground on a very high risk mission. If we let the network targeting machine loose again, it will significantly reduce IS's capacity to operate, and may lead to local uprising against IS as the tide begins to turn against them. It will take a few weeks to see if a positive trend emerges.

Of course this doesn't provide answers to the underlying issues, but it could significantly reduce IS's ability to terrorize other Muslims in the region and reduce their ability to continuing destroying historical sites. These items alone make it worth killing as many IS members as possible.

Most importantly for now, congratulations to the men who pulled this raid off.

OUTLAW 09
05-17-2015, 08:16 AM
Too early to tell what the impact will be, but I tend to agree that it could be a game changer for the following reasons. These raids tend to provide a wealth of intelligence that enabler further targeting, often at a fast clip. More importantly perhaps, it now appears that the U.S. has the political will to publically put boots on the ground on a very high risk mission. If we let the network targeting machine loose again, it will significantly reduce IS's capacity to operate, and may lead to local uprising against IS as the tide begins to turn against them. It will take a few weeks to see if a positive trend emerges.

Of course this doesn't provide answers to the underlying issues, but it could significantly reduce IS's ability to terrorize other Muslims in the region and reduce their ability to continuing destroying historical sites. These items alone make it worth killing as many IS members as possible.

Most importantly for now, congratulations to the men who pulled this raid off.


Again proves the DA role of SF--BUT and there is always a but in anything--the common JSOC targeting cycle of 24 hours which is/was at the height of Iraq and to a degree also in AFG--may have had an impact on high value targets BUT it did nothing to change the flow of the Iraqi and AFG insurgencies.

With a breathing living ecosystem such as an insurgency-- when do you stop the kill or capture processes?--so you shot your way through the third generation leadership or through the fifth generation leadership --there is always a replacement leadership generation--AND here is the key they analyze like crazy to understand their previous failures and the OPSEC on the insurgent side just keeps getting tighter and tighter to the point that you have a Baghdadi in your midst that you never fully realized his position and you had him in Bucha for five years and still did not know his position in IS.

If JSOC is honest with itself as I had privy to their targeting even in AFG they were basically running out of HVTs and still it made no impact on the Haq or the Taliban. A second issue also starting showing up--targeting mistakes due to the speed and mis-targeting due to by target analysts usually by defense contractors who changed out frequently. Serious mistakes started showing up in the last phases of Iraq and actually the same failures were also being seen in AFG--so it was a systemic problem in the processes.

This raid if anything was a "political will" show of force--the question is--was it driven by DoD or CIA and did the "political will ie DC" just sign off on it?

I am suspecting DoD/CIA as events on the ground will be further reinforced by this raid.

What though is of more interest is if one has been following the Syrian fighting on a daily basis the last four months--there has been a sudden turn-a-round on the ground by the FSA supported by the US, moderate Islamists also supported by the US/Sunni states and potentially and I use the term potentially al Nursa who is receiving weapons and money from the Sunni states as well. There has been a rather interesting development that all resistance groups have formed a general working alliance regardless of religious or political views and have often taken on and beaten IS head to head and have driven them out of previously held territories.

That is the way IS will be beaten--by Sunni's themselves and no outsider can do that.

The resistance movement has suddenly acquired a more effective command and control, is more deliberate in their attacks and their follow through, AND more importantly TOWs and MILANs are literally flowing "at will" into Syria.

The battle videos coming from the various TOW and MILAN teams are impressive--the targets they select and actually hit are impressive and they are now even being used to attack and destroy fixed bunker fighting points of the Assad military and Assad's military, Iranian IRGC and Hezbollah have been taking massive losses both in manpower and territory--AND along the way they have been just as effective in attacking and taking territory from IS.

The combination of TOW attacks and ground attacks by well trained infantry have started an impressive string of ground successes. There is an apparent structure to them that was not there months ago.

The turning point in the war has been finally reached and Assad's military and Hezbollah are scrambling to just survive. Hezbollah is actually pulling out of the fighting and focusing more on Iraq and their loses as well as IRGC loses are climbing badly for them.

Here is my heartburn with DC--why run to Sochi to talk to the Russians because one wants a "legacy win" for the history books AND one assumes we need Russian assistance to get Assad out--right now Assad is barely surviving and some say his military will force him at some point to run to either Russia and or Iran.

Russia has "lived" off of Assad in order to have a Med. harbor port and Assad has paid Russia well via oil funds for years for Russian weapons which in the end has kept the Assad military in the field especially their AF which is bombing cities and towns into the ground--yes Russia claims to have helped with eliminating chemical weapons but their GRU knew for years about the capacity AND now the West never even utters a lost word when daily chorine bombs are still being dropped on civilians.

AND it has not been Russian TOWs that made the turn-a-round but IMO the CIA is the unsung group in the sudden improvement--so why does DC need Putin--can anyone explain that to me?

So while a great "demonstration of political will" do we see the same "political will" being "expressed" in the Ukraine-no.

Again my question why is that?--it is because someone wants a "legacy" and the Ukraine is being left for 2017 for the next "legacy".

So again is it really "political will" or really a military necessity to get a "military win on the ground and force out Assad"?

Brings me back to a statement often heard in DC--"you can't win militarily in the Ukraine"--actually right now even though it appears weird the Ukrainian military is actually "winning militarily" on the ground.

So much for the failed statement--"you can't win militarily in the Ukraine"--when you the weaker fighter can actually stymie a far strong fighter is that not in effect "winning"--Sun Tzu would agree it is "winning"--it is all about perceptions.

In a tank target rich environment of eastern Ukraine--what a field day TOW/MILAN teams would have with 700 targets if Syria is the example.

Bill Moore
05-17-2015, 10:21 AM
That is the way IS will be beaten--by Sunni's themselves and no outsider can do that.

Concur, but for that to happen they need to believe they can win, and a demonstration of real political will (something airpower can never provide) on our part can provide significant motivation and hope in that regard. The impact of a raid, or any military operation, is rarely limited to its tactical effects in today's world. I haven't seen any evidence in the media of positive trends in Syria or Iraq. If you want to call a stalemate positive, then maybe an argument can be made that ISIL has lost its forward momentum in several locations.

I also agree that HVI targeting had limited impact in Afghanistan, but the fact of the matter was we confused anyone putting an IED next to the road as a HVI, so HVI in reality was just a term in vogue, it didn't actually mean the individuals were HVIs. In Iraq, they went after HVIs and just as importantly they killed a lot of foot soldiers, which greatly suppressed, not defeated, AQI. Any arguments to the contrary is simply twisting history around. It created so called political space to reach a more enduring solution, which we all know how that turned out.


AND it has not been Russian TOWs that made the turn-a-round but IMO the CIA is the unsung group in the sudden improvement--so why does DC need Putin--can anyone explain that to me?

Perhaps, but there are so many actors in Syria, both internal and external, I would be very hesitant to identify any particular actor the unsung group in the alleged sudden improvement. Sudden improvement of who exactly?


So while a great "demonstration of political will" do we see the same "political will" being "expressed" in the Ukraine-no.

I think we have plenty of political will for dealing with Ukraine, Ukraine is Putin's biggest strategic mistake (it is our OIF) that has backfired in almost every conceivable way. We have no obligation to defend Ukraine, yet we are providing significant support throughout DIME, and Putin is not making progress. Furthermore, Putin exposed his hand, so a repeat of this strategic approach against an actual NATO country will be very difficult if not impossible.


Again my question why is that?--it is because someone wants a "legacy" and the Ukraine is being left for 2017 for the next "legacy".

So again is it really "political will" or really a military necessity to get a "military win on the ground and force out Assad"?

From a policy perspective, I thought we dropped the idea of removing Assad? That is now a long term goal to be achieved through the political process, because we realize if it is done militarily it will look like Libya (not that it doesn't look that way already).


Brings me back to a statement often heard in DC--"you can't win militarily in the Ukraine"--actually right now even though it appears weird the Ukrainian military is actually "winning militarily" on the ground.

You hear this statement about every conflict in D.C. lately. As you point out, it is only a partial truth. In reality it all depends upon how you define winning. As you pointed out yourself, our military successes in Iraq didn't lead to the desired end beyond removing Saddam from power. Most countries struggle with how to translate military power into desired political effect. I think that has been true throughout time. If you extend the logic on this thinking, if war worked, it would seem we would get to a point where we didn't have wars anymore. That hasn't happened, and it doesn't look like it will, so maybe we just need to accept the fact that war is a messy business that can achieve temporary aims, but it won't achieve an enduring utopia.

At the end of day, I still think this raid can signify a significant change in our approach to IS/ISIL, which in my view is a significant near term threat to our interests.

OUTLAW 09
05-17-2015, 01:23 PM
Concur, but for that to happen they need to believe they can win, and a demonstration of real political will (something airpower can never provide) on our part can provide significant motivation and hope in that regard. The impact of a raid, or any military operation, is rarely limited to its tactical effects in today's world. I haven't seen any evidence in the media of positive trends in Syria or Iraq. If you want to call a stalemate positive, then maybe an argument can be made that ISIL has lost its forward momentum in several locations.

I also agree that HVI targeting had limited impact in Afghanistan, but the fact of the matter was we confused anyone putting an IED next to the road as a HVI, so HVI in reality was just a term in vogue, it didn't actually mean the individuals were HVIs. In Iraq, they went after HVIs and just as importantly they killed a lot of foot soldiers, which greatly suppressed, not defeated, AQI. Any arguments to the contrary is simply twisting history around. It created so called political space to reach a more enduring solution, which we all know how that turned out.



Perhaps, but there are so many actors in Syria, both internal and external, I would be very hesitant to identify any particular actor the unsung group in the alleged sudden improvement. Sudden improvement of who exactly?



I think we have plenty of political will for dealing with Ukraine, Ukraine is Putin's biggest strategic mistake (it is our OIF) that has backfired in almost every conceivable way. We have no obligation to defend Ukraine, yet we are providing significant support throughout DIME, and Putin is not making progress. Furthermore, Putin exposed his hand, so a repeat of this strategic approach against an actual NATO country will be very difficult if not impossible.



From a policy perspective, I thought we dropped the idea of removing Assad? That is now a long term goal to be achieved through the political process, because we realize if it is done militarily it will look like Libya (not that it doesn't look that way already).

.

You hear this statement about every conflict in D.C. lately. As you point out, it is only a partial truth. In reality it all depends upon how you define winning. As you pointed out yourself, our military successes in Iraq didn't lead to the desired end beyond removing Saddam from power. Most countries struggle with how to translate military power into desired political effect. I think that has been true throughout time. If you extend the logic on this thinking, if war worked, it would seem we would get to a point where we didn't have wars anymore. That hasn't happened, and it doesn't look like it will, so maybe we just need to accept the fact that war is a messy business that can achieve temporary aims, but it won't achieve an enduring utopia.

At the end of day, I still think this raid can signify a significant change in our approach to IS/ISIL, which in my view is a significant near term threat to our interests.

Bill--actually we did drop the get rid of Assad because the ground fighting was going nowhere and Hezbollah and the IRGC were so heavily involved the US never figured the ground fighting would reach a culminating tipping point which has now has been achieved and the Assad military is defacto now actually losing the fight all because someone is training and shipping a large number of TOWs into the fight--last rough count--there have been well over 300 fired with a high success rate--ie it has decimated the Assad armor and artillery and is being now used to crack open critical defensive Assad military positions.

Am a firm believer that the TOW is the great equalizer when armor is in play--even during the Cold War in Europe TOWs were mounted on just about anything that could shoot and scoot.With COIN it simply fell out of favor due to civilian loses when it was used.

The more interesting question--who are the trainers and who in the US is signing the purchase orders and more importantly who is flying them into country--SF or CIA??

Now that it appears Assad is actually losing the US feels they need Russia to figure out that he is losing and come up with an exit plan in order to save face basically for the Russians --while we seem to be so involved in "Russian face saving in Syria" we seem to be letting Putin continue along the lines of "let's let the Ukrainians fight 700 tanks even if the TOW is the critical weapon of choice" and can make a "non military win" or at least keep Russian troops and her mercenaries bottled up and allow no further territorial gains at the expense of the Ukraine--that is the least the US can do under the impression that the Budapest Memorandum really meant nothing even with a US signature.

I would argue that even Iran after watching the US basically run from their responsibilities on really what was a nuclear disarming memorandum fully understands they can violate the ongoing nuclear deal any time they want to with no back lash.

Just as long as we do not get involved and it does not cost us to much and it appears we really are involved in Europe--a kind of on the cheap approach that is basically not working after Sochi or why else is Nuland now in Moscow after Sochi?--did not Putin get the message the first time around in Sochi?

That is if we even provided a message--if we did then he did not understand it based on the massive shellings and ground attacks since Sochi costing the Ukrainians 17 KIA and 50 WIA in just this week alone.

BTW the supplier of choice for the more critical defensive systems ie night vision and counter battery radar/drones has been the Canadians----.

Just a second thought--WHAT the US is not noticing is in fact among the fighting groups and that includes FSA the US supported guys, moderate Islamists and al Nursa they recently held a joint planning council and have largely started taking on a form of council government without outside help--that has led to their suddenly attacking IS and basically pushing them out of previously held territory. After four years of fighting and largely losing and constant AF bombings they discovered the strength of a joint council---again who influenced that ---SF or CIA or actually the KSA? My tip is the KSA.

Something no one thought possible--defeating IS inside Syria his home turf.

Something missing from the conversation is the role of the young Saudi "hawks" ---Ft. Irwin trained officers now in the COL and early General ranks who feel that the KSA has to break out of the US shadow and formulate their own foreign policy and use force is necessary to back up that policy--really what we are seeing in the push back of Iran in Yemen and KSA support into Syria.

Next to Israel the KSA no longer trusts Obama to hold to anything he states--the Saudi snub to the Obama during the meeting he called for is a clear sign of the "hawks" taking control of Saudi FP--and the clear and distinct statements from them that we will go down the nuclear path as well simply because we do not trust the Iranians from our experiences to hold to the agreements. Notice that the Obama push to say the US will protect them in that event fell on deaf ears in the KSA--basically since the US has not backed up anything they have stated in the last six years the KSA simply no longer trusts them.

One cannot blame them.

OUTLAW 09
05-17-2015, 02:51 PM
Bill--actually we did drop the get rid of Assad because the ground fighting was going nowhere and Hezbollah and the IRGC were so heavily involved the US never figured the ground fighting would reach a culminating tipping point which has now has been achieved and the Assad military is defacto now actually losing the fight all because someone is training and shipping a large number of TOWs into the fight--last rough count--there have been well over 300 fired with a high success rate--ie it has decimated the Assad armor and artillery and is being now used to crack open critical defensive Assad military positions.

Am a firm believer that the TOW is the great equalizer when armor is in play--even during the Cold War in Europe TOWs were mounted on just about anything that could shoot and scoot.With COIN it simply fell out of favor due to civilian loses when it was used.

The more interesting question--who are the trainers and who in the US is signing the purchase orders and more importantly who is flying them into country--SF or CIA??

Now that it appears Assad is actually losing the US feels they need Russia to figure out that he is losing and come up with an exit plan in order to save face basically for the Russians --while we seem to be so involved in "Russian face saving in Syria" we seem to be letting Putin continue along the lines of "let's let the Ukrainians fight 700 tanks even if the TOW is the critical weapon of choice" and can make a "non military win" or at least keep Russian troops and her mercenaries bottled up and allow no further territorial gains at the expense of the Ukraine--that is the least the US can do under the impression that the Budapest Memorandum really meant nothing even with a US signature.

I would argue that even Iran after watching the US basically run from their responsibilities on really what was a nuclear disarming memorandum fully understands they can violate the ongoing nuclear deal any time they want to with no back lash.

Just as long as we do not get involved and it does not cost us to much and it appears we really are involved in Europe--a kind of on the cheap approach that is basically not working after Sochi or why else is Nuland now in Moscow after Sochi?--did not Putin get the message the first time around in Sochi?

That is if we even provided a message--if we did then he did not understand it based on the massive shellings and ground attacks since Sochi costing the Ukrainians 17 KIA and 50 WIA in just this week alone.

BTW the supplier of choice for the more critical defensive systems ie night vision and counter battery radar/drones has been the Canadians----.

Just a second thought--WHAT the US is not noticing is in fact among the fighting groups and that includes FSA the US supported guys, moderate Islamists and al Nursa they recently held a joint planning council and have largely started taking on a form of council government without outside help--that has led to their suddenly attacking IS and basically pushing them out of previously held territory. After four years of fighting and largely losing and constant AF bombings they discovered the strength of a joint council---again who influenced that ---SF or CIA or actually the KSA? My tip is the KSA.

Something no one thought possible--defeating IS inside Syria his home turf.

Something missing from the conversation is the role of the young Saudi "hawks" ---Ft. Irwin trained officers now in the COL and early General ranks who feel that the KSA has to break out of the US shadow and formulate their own foreign policy and use force is necessary to back up that policy--really what we are seeing in the push back of Iran in Yemen and KSA support into Syria.

Next to Israel the KSA no longer trusts Obama to hold to anything he states--the Saudi snub to the Obama during the meeting he called for is a clear sign of the "hawks" taking control of Saudi FP--and the clear and distinct statements from them that we will go down the nuclear path as well simply because we do not trust the Iranians from our experiences to hold to the agreements. Notice that the Obama push to say the US will protect them in that event fell on deaf ears in the KSA--basically since the US has not backed up anything they have stated in the last six years the KSA simply no longer trusts them.

One cannot blame them.

Bill--these events today out of the Ukraine and one comment out of Syria from yesterday in fact shows an indication that the rag tag Ukrainian Army on their own are actually holding on well and are starting to use their version of our TOW--all without US assistance as we stand on the sidelines trying to "rescue Putin's image because we think it is the right thing to do"??

AND the comment out of Syria is indicating that the current fighting is decimating IRGC and Hezbollah--both incidents are getting absolutely no US news media coverage.

Photo-op with General Qasem #Soleimani shows four IRGC top commanders killed recently in #Syria.

Bob's World
05-17-2015, 03:03 PM
Few US foreign relationships have been more dysfunctional and out of date/balance in recent years than those with Israel and the KSA. There will be a bit of back and forth until we find a new balance with these important partners, but change in general can only be a good thing in the long run.

As to the dramas in Syria and Iraq (or more accurately, "states formerly known as..."), we will get to a better perspective as to what we should do, and how we should do it once we are able to shift our focus from trying to preserve the Band-Aid of governance and security we slapped onto Iraq to give us time to withdraw and the naturally emerging threats to that poorly conceived solution; and focus more on what our truly vital interests in the region are, and how to guard against those things that are truly a threat to our interests, and to facilitate events gently toward a zone of self-determined solutions that are not likely to be too adverse.

Control is overstated and overvalued - we need to end up with influence with who and whatever emerges once the dust finally settles.

Oh, and SOF? General Votel is spot on when he is making the return to "Quiet Professionals" a central theme to his command of USSOCOM. We need to get our civilian officials on board with that as well. Stop bragging about big, tactical kills as if they were some game-changing strategic event. Bad form at a minimum, and historically these types of event shape, rather than define, outcomes.

OUTLAW 09
05-17-2015, 03:44 PM
Ah......the speed of social media----one has to like it----wonder if the US IC is this fast--concerning Russian Spetnaz POWs and the Assad Army taking a beating. Wait long enough and social media will have their entire life histories if they placed it into the net.

On another battlefield, things are suddenly looking bad for Assad. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11610482/Tide-of-Syria-civil-war-turns-against-Assad-as-rebels-make-sweeping-gains.html …

davidbfpo
05-18-2015, 12:33 PM
The Soufan Group's e-briefing on the raid has several good points, including just who exactly is the target and ends with:
As important as the killing of ‘Abu Sayyaf’ is, as long as the group’s foes remain incapable of defense and offense outside of their comfort zone, and the ground reality remains one of poor governance and persistent grievance, the group will remain a serious threat to the region and beyond.Link:http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-targeting-islamic-state-leadership-in-syria/

This short ISW briefing is harsh and ends with:
Partnership is also essential, because the U.S. is no longer a legitimate ally in the eyes of many populations in the regionPartnership is also essential, because the U.S. is no longer a legitimate ally in the eyes of many populations in the region.
Link:http://understandingwar.org/report/isis-defense-iraq-and-syria-countering-adaptive-enemy?

Bill Moore
05-18-2015, 02:11 PM
The Soufan Group's e-briefing on the raid has several good points, including just who exactly is the target and ends with:Link:http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-targeting-islamic-state-leadership-in-syria/

This short ISW briefing is harsh and ends with:
Link:http://understandingwar.org/report/isis-defense-iraq-and-syria-countering-adaptive-enemy?

Not overly helpful when the ISW report states this:


The only way to defeat ISIS, which is necessary for U.S. national security, is to guarantee a ground force that will occupy, secure, and rebuild Syria, and Iraq to a lesser extent. More limited solutions are insufficient to shape ground conditions that promote stability and reduce the opportunity for groups like ISIS to remain.

Then goes on to list all the countries that shouldn't be considered included Arab countries, Iran, and the U.S. Who then? Maybe Russia or China?

The TSG makes this no brainer comment:


While the killing of Abu Sayyaf is important, the group remains stubbornly lethal in both Syria and Iraq, having just taken over most of the important Iraqi city of Ramadi this weekend.

Followed by,


All of this high-level personnel loss comes amidst an undeniable push by the Islamic State in both Iraq and Syria. The group has reportedly taken near complete control of the important city of Ramadi in al-Anbar Province, after threatening to do so for weeks. The collapse of the Iraqi security forces in the face of a determined extremist foe continues to be a problem, and U.S. airstrikes have begun in Ramadi to help drive off the Islamic State. As important as the killing of ‘Abu Sayyaf’ is, as long as the group’s foes remain incapable of defense and offense outside of their comfort zone, and the ground reality remains one of poor governance and persistent grievance, the group will remain a serious threat to the region and beyond.

I frequently wonder who funds these whiz kids/adults to develop these assessments. Did anyone in officialdom anywhere claim that the removal of Abu Sayyaf would cause ISIL to collapse? One would think that a think tank could consider the potential longer term consequences on the conflict's outcome if the West increasingly targets ISIL's leaders via SOF raids. Making an argument that it will have limited impact is fair, but so is the argument that this potential change in U.S. will could serve as a catalyst for resistance forces in the region against ISIL to act with greater confidence. Of course any analysis at this point is completely speculative, it will take weeks or longer for a trend to emerge that is worth discussing.

AdamG
05-19-2015, 11:51 AM
IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Release No: NR-175-15
May 16, 2015
Statement by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter on Counter-ISIL Operation in Syria

Last night, at the direction of the Commander in Chief, I ordered U.S. Special Operations Forces to conduct an operation in al-Amr in eastern Syria to capture an ISIL senior leader known as Abu Sayyaf and his wife Umm Sayyaf. Abu Sayyaf was involved in ISIL's military operations and helped direct the terrorist organization's illicit oil, gas, and financial operations as well.

Abu Sayyaf was killed during the course of the operation when he engaged U.S. forces.

U.S. forces captured Umm Sayyaf, who we suspect is a member of ISIL, played an important role in ISIL's terrorist activities, and may have been complicit in what appears to have been the enslavement of a young Yezidi woman rescued last night.

No U.S. forces were killed or injured during this operation.

The operation represents another significant blow to ISIL, and it is a reminder that the United States will never waver in denying safe haven to terrorists who threaten our citizens, and those of our friends and allies.

http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=17274

AdamG
05-19-2015, 12:26 PM
U.S. Forces Seize Digital Trove in Syria Raid
Special-operations mission that killed Islamic State finance chief could yield information on group’s operations
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-forces-seize-digital-trove-in-syria-raid-1431905925?mod=e2fb

SWJ Blog
06-17-2015, 01:40 PM
The Only Thing Worse than Misusing SOF is Policy Makers Misusing SOF Operational Methods as a Strategy (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-only-thing-worse-than-misusing-sof-is-policy-makers-misusing-sof-operational-methods-as)

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SWJ Blog
06-29-2015, 11:48 PM
Reorganization is Imperative to Fixing Special Forces’ Bent Unconventional Culture (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/reorganization-is-imperative-to-fixing-special-forces%E2%80%99-bent-unconventional-culture)

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SWJ Blog
07-09-2015, 04:51 PM
Resist the Hype: Prevent SOF From Being the Next Victim of Too Much Attention (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/resist-the-hype-prevent-sof-from-being-the-next-victim-of-too-much-attention)

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SWJ Blog
08-03-2015, 04:00 PM
Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/building-special-operations-partnerships-in-afghanistan-and-beyond)

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Bill Moore
08-16-2015, 04:03 AM
Special Operations Today: FSR Interviews LTG Cleveland (Ret.)

http://www.fletchersecurity.org/#!ltg-cleveland-interview/c7ay


Our thinking at USASOC is that the security problems of the future will not necessarily resemble those of the past. It is in this context that we feel that SOF forces are uniquely capable, through our persistent global engagement, to shape things well before crises develop. The fact of the matter is, that we are in competition with various state and non-state actors for physical, cognitive, and moral security of populations and increasingly, in this hyperconnected world, the notions of sovereignty and identity”. We have to develop a portfolio of new approaches to impose a cost calculus on our adversaries in this space, but first we must recognize and accept that the security paradigm that we grew up with has changed fundamentally.

This is an outstanding interview, while I had my philosophical differences with LTG Cleveland in 2003, he was clearly the right man to lead USASOC and push U.S. ARSOF into the 21st Century. A lot of wisdom throughout this interview.

Bill Moore
08-16-2015, 07:23 AM
Some of they key points:

An emphasis on manipulation of behavior, uses ISIL as example where it is imperative we dominate the influence fight. IMO this points to the importance of the emerging and hotly contested concept of human domain. Yet the fact remains we can dominate the physical domains (space, cyber, land, maritime and air) and still lose the fight the human domain. This is one of the principle changes in the character of warfare that is both tied to ancient history, yet enabled by modern information technology to the point it transforms it relevance, even dominance in modern warfare.

LTG Cleveland discusses the reality of constantly shifting interagency and DOD supported and supporting relationships in response to a question that attempts to limit the military to a traditional stovepipe role of applying conventional military power. The perception by traditionalists couldn't be further away from the truth.

He compares surgical strike (a term that overly limited and doesn't address the unconventional capabilities of our advanced special operations units that focus on direct action) with special warfare. He argues surgical strike is focused on eliminating uncertainty to the extent possible (true enough), while special warfare is conducted in the ever morphing world of uncertainity.


Special Warfare, is one that is defined by uncertainty, and for which we build units such as our Special Forces (or Green Berets) which are specifically designed for this type of operating environment. These teams, with their unique training, linguistic and cultural acuity, are designed to operate amongst indigenous peoples, gain a deep understanding of the environment, shape events, and report back.

He addresses the reality of the so called indirect approach of working through others. In fact, when conditions are not right it won't work no matter how much money and time we plow into it. This approach is not a panacea, it is appropriate when it is, and we need to recognize when it isn't.


What I am afraid of is that often progress is measured by spending a lot of money on equipment and training. You can’t spend enough, really, for training on these problems if the government doesn’t have the credibility. It doesn’t matter what you put on their back, it doesn’t matter how much training you give them, you are going to have serious problems when you encounter a serious enemy who is motivated. And so, I guess my concern is that we have to be very careful that we are judging the motivation and addressing the motivation issue and in some cases that means a different kind of policy. How good is that government on governing, and how respected are they by their people? You can only do so much, and you can’t fight your way out of bad policy.

He discussed the evolution from Field Manuals to real doctrine for Army SOF (ARSOF) as being essential to facilitate ARSOF achieving the vision laid out for them. ARSOF 2022 is the doctrine, and it is being taught to both SOF and conventional army forces to garner support. This seems to be a major step in the right direction, yes it is a step backwards towards our roots, but it is also a sprint forward to the 21st Century, which has different realities. As he stated,


Time will tell.

SWJ Blog
08-16-2015, 05:40 PM
Special Operations Today (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-operations-today)

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SWJ Blog
09-01-2015, 08:00 AM
Special Ops Brace for Release of Tell-all Book (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-ops-brace-for-release-of-tell-all-book)

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SWJ Blog
09-07-2015, 05:14 PM
SOF Mediators: The Application of Understanding-Based Mediation as a Nonlethal Effect (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/sof-mediators-the-application-of-understanding-based-mediation-as-a-nonlethal-effect)

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SWJ Blog
09-07-2015, 05:50 PM
Author Chronicles Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/author-chronicles-secret-history-of-joint-special-operations-command)

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pjb
09-09-2015, 03:57 PM
The Special Operations Research Association is pleased to announce the 2015 Annual Symposium, 11-12 December 2015, at Fort Walton Beach, FL. Events will be held on base at Hurlburt Field as well as at the beautiful Emerald Coast Conference Center on Okaloosa Island.

While we have several interesting events planned for the symposium, the primary focus is on the exchange of ideas through scholarly presentations by researchers, policy makers, and operators on the broad range of issues facing the SOF community today and in the future. We invite papers across the full range of issues related to special operations, both historically and today and in the US and globally. We encourage submissions from a diverse population of those with expertise and interests in special operations, including academic researchers, military practitioners, and policy analysts.

Potential topics include:
• National Strategy Implications of Special Operations
• The Global Proliferation of SOF
• The Debate of Special Operations Theory
• Educating SOF
• Unconventional Warfare and International Relations
• Special Operations and Non-State Actors
• Special Operations and International Diplomacy
• Comparative Perspectives on Special Operations
• Diffusion, Transformation, and Future Trends in Special Operations
• Special Operations as a Foreign Policy Tool
• Special Operations and Coercive Diplomacy

For more information, and to see the complete call for papers, please visit the website: http://www.specopsjournal.org/conference.html

SWJ Blog
09-09-2015, 04:55 PM
Special Operations Research Association 2015 Conference (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-operations-research-association-2015-conference)

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SWJ Blog
09-19-2015, 03:12 PM
Call for Papers - 2015 Annual Special Operations Research Association Symposium (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/call-for-papers-2015-annual-special-operations-research-association-symposium)

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SWJ Blog
10-10-2015, 12:56 PM
Behind the scenes with the commander of Special Ops (CNN) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/behind-the-scenes-with-the-commander-of-special-ops-cnn)

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SWJ Blog
10-28-2015, 11:20 AM
U.S. Weighs Special Forces in Syria, Helicopters in Iraq (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-weighs-special-forces-in-syria-helicopters-in-iraq)

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SWJ Blog
11-13-2015, 12:48 AM
JCLIS Initial Special Topics Issue on Language, Region and Culture Assessment (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/jclis-initial-special-topics-issue-on-language-region-and-culture-assessment)

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SWJ Blog
12-18-2015, 10:33 PM
How a Navy SEAL Controversy Shows the Limits of U.S. Special Operations Strategy in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/how-a-navy-seal-controversy-shows-the-limits-of-us-special-operations-strategy-in-afghanistan)

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SWJ Blog
12-28-2015, 04:01 AM
Obama’s ‘Boots on the Ground’: U.S. Special Forces Are Sent to Tackle Global Threats (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/obama%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98boots-on-the-ground%E2%80%99-us-special-forces-are-sent-to-tackle-global-threats)

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SWJ Blog
01-04-2016, 05:30 PM
Man, Computer, and Special Warfare (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/man-computer-and-special-warfare)

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SWJ Blog
01-06-2016, 07:11 AM
Special Operations Chief is Obama’s Pick for Centcom, Pentagon Says (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-operations-chief-is-obama%E2%80%99s-pick-for-centcom-pentagon-says)

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SWJ Blog
01-07-2016, 07:38 PM
JSOC General Expected to be Next Leader of America’s Special Operations Forces (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/jsoc-general-expected-to-be-next-leader-of-america%E2%80%99s-special-operations-forces)

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SWJ Blog
01-20-2016, 03:40 PM
Reframing the Debate: How Rethinking Special Forces Physical Fitness Standards Can Address the Unconventional Warfare Capability Gap (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/reframing-the-debate-how-rethinking-special-forces-physical-fitness-standards-can-address-t)

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SWJ Blog
01-23-2016, 06:09 AM
How Involved Are US Special Forces in Fight Against Islamic State? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/how-involved-are-us-special-forces-in-fight-against-islamic-state)

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SWJ Blog
01-31-2016, 04:32 PM
New Research Report from Joint Special Operations University (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/new-research-report-from-joint-special-operations-university)

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SWJ Blog
02-26-2016, 11:02 PM
Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/toward-operational-art-in-special-warfare)

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Morgan
03-05-2016, 07:27 PM
Multiple articles have been written about the increased reliance on US SOF, particularly Special Forces, as global affairs continue their unpredictable course, and whether the US military will apply the lessons learned from 14 years of war or discard it as we did after Vietnam.

One of the primary lessons learned is the need for greater language and cultural proficiency/ understanding. Could SF realize this by aggressively recruiting from minority communities.....1st Group recruiting heavily from Chinese or Filipino groups, 5th Group recruiting heavily from Arabic/ Muslim communities....in essence, our SF becoming a sort of "US Foreign Legion" enabling the Groups to become far more linguistically and culturally savvy than they currently are...?

Thoughts?

Granite_State
03-05-2016, 08:15 PM
Makes sense to me. A return to SF's Lodge Act/American Foreign Legion roots.

Bill Moore
03-05-2016, 08:23 PM
Not exactly a new idea, we had the Lodge Act

http://www.coldwar.org/articles/50s/lodge_act.asp


The Lodge Act was passed in 1951. It was initially intended to enable the military to create a “foreign legion” of Soviet block expatriots to be used against a Russian invasion of Europe. When the Pentagon balked the law was used to recruit Finns and others into the ranks of Special Forces, primarily to create teams that could be dropped into Eastern Europe to organize, train and lead partisan resistance and sabotage of Soviet supply lines.

I can't recall when this act expired, but I recall some of the SF NCOs who came in under the Lodge Act. Some were legendary warriors, while others were problematic. Not unlike our selection today, so I agree the gain is greater than the risk. Also the OSS aggressively recruited French and other European expatriates to man the Jedburgh teams and conduct other operations.

I suspect other government organizations still do this, and they have the lead for UW in so called peacetime.

It is certainly an idea that should be considered seriously. It is a heck of a lot easier to produce a SF soldier than someone proficient in a foreign language with deep cultural knowledge.

On a side note, SF today is much more diverse than when I first entered its ranks over 3 decades ago.

davidbfpo
03-06-2016, 10:03 AM
In 2007 there was a thread'Create a U.S. Foreign Legion' with 22 posts and 4.6k views. On a quick skim it also covered the plethora of contractors already in use. Link:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2510

SWJ Blog
04-03-2016, 11:41 PM
U.S. Special Operations Units Are Using Faulty Rifle Sights (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-special-operations-units-are-using-faulty-rifle-sights)

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04-17-2016, 08:13 PM
This is Where American Special Operations Forces are Helping Advise U.S. Allies (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/this-is-where-american-special-operations-forces-are-helping-advise-us-allies)

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04-17-2016, 08:36 PM
Outside the Wire: How US Special Operations Troops Secretly Help Foreign Forces Target Terrorists (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/outside-the-wire-how-us-special-operations-troops-secretly-help-foreign-forces-target-terrorist)

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04-25-2016, 12:50 AM
Obama to Announce Plans to Grow U.S. Special Operations Force in Syria (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/obama-to-announce-plans-to-grow-us-special-operations-force-in-syria)

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05-13-2016, 06:13 AM
Advancing a Strategic Theory of Special Operations (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/advancing-a-strategic-theory-of-special-operations)

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05-18-2016, 07:19 PM
An Inappropriate Use of Special Forces (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/an-inappropriate-use-of-special-forces)

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05-26-2016, 04:02 PM
Why the U.S. Military Turned a Hipster Tattoo Parlor into A Special Operations Lab (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/why-the-us-military-turned-a-hipster-tattoo-parlor-into-a-special-operations-lab)

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06-10-2016, 07:12 PM
Perception is Reality: SOF in the Gray Zone (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/perception-is-reality-sof-in-the-gray-zone)

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davidbfpo
07-09-2016, 09:30 PM
A short paper, 25 pgs, by a UK academic, Dr. Jon Moran; the actual title is: 'Assessing SOF Transparency and Accountability;The use of Special Operations Forces by the UK, US, Australia, and Canada'.

The paper introduction:
This report has been commissioned by remote control, a project of the Network for Social Change hosted by Oxford Research Group. The project examines changes in military engagement, with a focus on remote control warfare. This form of intervention takes place behind the scenes or at a distance rather than on a traditional battlefield, often through drone strikes and air strikes from above, with special forces, intelligence operatives, private contractors, and military training teams on the ground.Link:http://oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/Special%20Forces_Jon%20Moran_Formatted%20(003).pdf

He ends with:
This golden age for special forces raises a number of issues which are addressed in this report. SOF can play positive roles in preventing violence and limiting violence. But the use of SOF on the scale which is occurring at the moment raises other issues which require attention, particularly due to the secrecy under which they operate.The nature and intensity of modern SOF deployments and their actions effectively constitute a form of long-term warfare. This challenges their traditional exemption from scrutiny. SOF activities require oversight and accountability to ensure both their effectiveness and their compliance with international norms.The author's official bio:http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/politics/people/jmoran

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07-22-2016, 06:35 AM
Staying Small to Stay Feasible: SOF Support in Countering Boko Haram (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/staying-small-to-stay-feasible-sof-support-in-countering-boko-haram)

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07-27-2016, 03:21 AM
Integrating Women into U.S. Army Special Forces: Every Day is a 'Selection Event' (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/integrating-women-into-us-army-special-forces-every-day-is-a-selection-event)

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08-24-2016, 09:39 PM
Special Operations Forces and the Professionalization of Foreign Internal Defense (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/special-operations-forces-and-the-professionalization-of-foreign-internal-defense)

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09-11-2016, 12:20 PM
Video: Special Forces Who Avenged 9/11 (Alex Quade's "Horse Soldiers" Short) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/video-special-forces-who-avenged-911-alex-quades-horse-soldiers-short)

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09-13-2016, 04:15 PM
U.S. Special Operations Forces at 9-11, Today, and for the Future (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-special-operations-forces-at-9-11-today-and-for-the-future)

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09-15-2016, 11:57 AM
Top U.S. Special Forces General: ‘We’re Hurting Ourselves’ With All These Movies and Books (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/top-us-special-forces-general-%E2%80%98we%E2%80%99re-hurting-ourselves%E2%80%99-with-all-these-movies-and-books)

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09-17-2016, 10:16 AM
U.S. Special Forces to Aid Turkish Troops in Syria (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-special-forces-to-aid-turkish-troops-in-syria)

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09-19-2016, 12:25 PM
Special Forces as Military Observers in Modern Combat (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-forces-as-military-observers-in-modern-combat)

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09-23-2016, 06:23 PM
2016 Special Forces Recruiting Video (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2016-special-forces-recruiting-video-0)

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10-31-2016, 03:38 AM
Advice from SOF on the Use of SOF for the Next Administration (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/advice-from-sof-on-the-use-of-sof-for-the-next-administration)

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11-04-2016, 03:50 PM
Report Advises Changes on How Special Operators are Used (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/report-advises-changes-on-how-special-operators-are-used)

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12-19-2016, 09:57 PM
Special Operations Forces in the Gray Zone: An Operational Framework for Employing Special Operations Forces (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-operations-forces-in-the-gray-zone-an-operational-framework-for-employing-special-opera)

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12-22-2016, 05:28 PM
Uncloaking the Dagger: Does Adherence to the Geneva Conventions Betray Special Operations Forces? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/uncloaking-the-dagger-does-adherence-to-the-geneva-conventions-betray-special-operations-fo)

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12-22-2016, 06:06 PM
Colombian Army Counter-Narcotics Brigade Honors US Special Forces (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/colombian-army-counter-narcotics-brigade-honors-us-special-forces)

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12-22-2016, 07:00 PM
Special Operations Forces: Let SOF be SOF (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/special-operations-forces-let-sof-be-sof)

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12-23-2016, 09:10 PM
Lost Opportunities with a New SOF Career Course (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/lost-opportunities-with-a-new-sof-career-course)

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12-31-2016, 11:03 PM
U.S. Special Operations Numbers Surge in Africa’s Shadow Wars (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-special-operations-numbers-surge-in-africa%E2%80%99s-shadow-wars)

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davidbfpo
07-27-2017, 02:01 PM
This thread is the oldest on Special Warfare and a large number of threads have been merged here. A number of threads referring to special warfare remain stand-alone and are mainly closed; on such subjects as logistics and medicine. Plus RFI and threads where the discussion is sufficient to deter merged.:wry:

The title was Shortfalls of Special Operations Command Are Cited and was in the Iraqi arena.

The new thread title is Special Warfare, Special Operations and SOF (US) before Trump.

A smaller thread post-Trump has been created:Special Warfare, Special Operations and SOF (US) under Trump (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/Special Warfare, Special Operations and SOF (US) under Trump)