The US & Interrogation (catch all)

[SWJED]

2 Jan. Baltimore Sun - Military Aims to Bolster Language Skills (http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.language02jan02,1,1159244.story?coll=bal-home-headlines).


The Pentagon plans to spend hundreds of millions of dollars over the next five years to bolster foreign language skills within the military, a move to correct what is considered a critical handicap as soldiers pursue missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to documents and defense officials.

The effort is part of a broader plan, expected to be unveiled by President Bush this week, that will also include new language programs through the State and Education departments, officials said. There was no immediate estimate on the total cost of the plan, although officials expect it to range in the hundreds of millions of dollars from fiscal 2007, beginning in October, to 2011...

[Jedburgh]

That speaks to my personal nettle - the fact that HUMINT Collectors are no longer required to learn a language at initial entry level (PVT - SPC) and most will be waivered for promotion to SGT without a language, and the requirement only really coming into effect for promotion to SSG.

The demand for HUMINT in the field is very high. However, once again, we are sacrificing quality for quantity. Non-language qualified HUMINT personnel are extremely circumscribed in the missions they are able to accomplish effectively, and require the use of an interpreter as a crutch for much else. I say "crutch" because a HUMINT Collector who cannot speak the language of the operational area is crippled in his abilities (Not to mention the loss of the regional and cultural knowledge the soldier gains during acquisition of the language - especially critical to the HUMINTer).

Instead of taking the hard road to mission effectiveness, and improving language and operational skill training, a critical tool in the HUMINT skill set was simply cut in order to put more bodies in the field.

This will have long-term implications. 97Es used to leave DLI as a PFC or SPC with fresh language skills, and by the time they achieve SSG they matured in their linguistic abilities and became comfortable in using in the manipulative human communications skills that are at the core of HUMINT.

Although there are still a few initial-entry 97Es arriving at DLI, the die has been set. It will take a while for the full effects to be felt, but this was a very damaging decision.

[SWJED]

11 May Los Angeles Times - Army Rules Put on Hold (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-manual11may11,0,2174549.story?coll=la-home-headlines).


The Pentagon has been forced to delay the release of its updated Army Field Manual on interrogation because of congressional opposition to several provisions, including one that would allow tougher techniques for unlawful combatants than for traditional prisoners of war.

The Defense Department's civilian leaders, who are overseeing the process of rewriting the manual, have long argued — along with the Bush administration — that the Geneva Convention does not apply to terrorists or irregular fighters. The United States needs greater flexibility when interrogating people who refuse to fight by the rules, they have said...

[Jedburgh]

The "new" interrogation manual has been under development for far longer than the year that the article states. The supposed "Final Draft" of FM 2-22-3 HUMINT Collector Operations (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/964239) (AKO log-in required for the link) was published back in Apr '04. I also have a "Final Approved Draft" version published in Sep '04 - but it seems to have disappeared from AKO. I haven't seen any '05 versions. In any case, the FM has yet to make it into approved doctrine.

I don't recall any provisions in the drafts that specifically approve "tougher treatment" for unlawful combatants. In fact, the Drafts I saw went into greater detail on the Geneva Conventions than did the previous FM, in a manner I thought was intended to address the concerns raised by Abu Ghraib.

That FM is intended to replace the old FM 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation (http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-52.pdf), published in '92. The newer pub addresses a broader spectrum of HUMINT collection than is dealt with in the previous FM, and updates the role of HUMINT in today's force structure.

What seems to have been completely ignored as a resource by the current writers of HUMINT doctrine is the US Army's Vietnam Era interrogation field manual (published in 1969). It's available for download in two parts:

FM 30-15 Intelligence Interrogation (http://star.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?9py9LDKDDpxn@LArv6@U0HqFGKMW8.bnxz3R 01uL0w3o4q8oqNiBCcDoq9OVzgQRvfxZh42p9FvRlQ94VAw7RI WMatSh.4maM@AZw6l8iOA/1070317001A.pdf)

FM 30-15 Part II (http://star.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?2fj.SnU7pcbBcMkM3DENThF@DS.9g5Ut7.5Y qnvdhJhm2lX5lQuCeJatBvjIwfhloX4GbYWGII4T9syQw4kHhz yetfMKQtMC9U4SKmzM.ls/1070317001B.pdf)

In the second link, Chapter 4, Interrogation Support for Stability Operations is of particular interest - both the Draft FM 2-22.3 and the current FM 34-52 do not go into this subject in the same degree of detail.

[SWJED]

According the LA Times of 6 Sep - Army to Use Geneva Rules for Detainees (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-torture6sep06,0,7581942.story?coll=la-home-headlines) by Julian Barnes.


Bowing to critics of its tough interrogation policies, the Pentagon is issuing a new Army field manual that provides Geneva Convention protections for all detainees and eliminates a secret list of interrogation tactics.

The manual, set for release today, also reverses an earlier decision to maintain two interrogation standards — one for traditional prisoners of war and another for "unlawful combatants" captured during a conflict but not affiliated with a nation's military force. It will ban the use of such controversial methods as forcing prisoners to endure long periods of solitary confinement, using military dogs to threaten prisoners, putting hoods over inmates' heads and strapping detainees to boards and dunking them in water to simulate drowning, defense officials said.

The manual and its related policy directives — the legal framework for interrogations — originally were to be released in the spring. But when State Department officials and Republican senators on the Armed Services Committee raised objections, they were pulled back.

The Pentagon's decision to drop the objectionable provisions appears to mark a victory for advocates of closer U.S. adherence to the protections of the Geneva Convention, an international agreement on the treatment of prisoners and others during wartime. Human rights groups said they planned to study the manual carefully to see what parts of the international treaty it included and what it left out...

[Jedburgh]

The Army states that "The manual has been published in the interest of full transparency, and does not bear "For Official Use Only" markings.". (but when you open the doc, you'll see the FM still has the markings in bold print top and bottom)

FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations (http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf), Sep 06

Edit: Updated the link, and the FOUO markings are now gone, replaced by Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

[SSG Rock]

Three prominent Republicans who either have presidential aspirations or have an axe to grind with the administration disagree with Bush and it is an "Open Revolt?" Sheeesh.

I don't know what all of the hubub is really about. I read this article http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/14/AR2006091400160.html and I'm still not sure what the debate is. The Washington Post dedicates more space to the fact that there is a disagreement between Republicans than the issue itself. Someone who knows about this clarify please?

[Tom Odom]

Quite simply, do we relook Geneva convention statutes on interrogation or not.

Senators and GEN Powell: No

Adminstration: Yes

[SSG Rock]

I tend to come down on the side of the administration don't you? The Geneva Convention doesn't adequately address asymetrical warfare. Obviously it needs to be updated. I think part of the reason Bush has so much trouble prosecuting the GWOT is that we have no precedent for almost anything concerning it.

These arguments make no sense to me. Why should we fear that Islamic radicals would treat our captured troops any worse than they already have? Didn't the SC ruling suggest that the administration go back to the Congress to clarify this issue?

[LawVol]

As I see it, the problem is not how terrorists will treat our troops in response to this proposed program (they do not respect law and that won't change), but how our actions are perceived in the world community. Speeches regarding our fight for democracy and the rule of law ring hollow in the face of legislation designed to strip away fundamental legal rights. Rightly or wrongly, it has been determined that captured terrorists will be tried criminally for their actions. If we are going to do this, it should be done the right way. Our society does not tolerate a kaflaesque trial wherein the accused is merely permitted to show up. If we are to champion the rule of law and advertise our desire to bring it to Iraq and other such places, we must not disregard its tenets simply because it suits our immediate needs. This serves only to weaken our position and support in the world community.

Part of the issue with GWOT is world support. Many countries do not see the legal justification for the war in Iraq and the Bush administration has not adequately confronted this issue. Similarly, the Bush administration often attempts to redefine or invent law to fit particular situations (tribunals, etc.). This has caused a number of countries (and our own citizens) to doubt our sincerity when we profess to come from the side of law and righteousness. The problem with this is that it has a negative effect on our chief center of gravity.

Since at least Vietnam, our enemies have recognized that to beat us, they need to influence US public opinion. This is done a number of ways, from body counts, to spent treasure, to a feeling that we cannot win, to convincing the public that we are on the wrong side both morally and legally. All of these things contribute to what I call the attrition point, i.e. the point at which US public opinion determines that the costs are no longer worth the benefits conferred. By seeking to circumvent law (or create such a perception), we merely step closer to the attrition point.

Yes, it is rather difficult to obey the rule of law when the enemy does not. However, if we are truly in a war of ideology we cannot afford to foresake more than 200 years of being a nation of laws to defeat the current enemy. We must wear the white hat not because others say we should but because it is who we are.

[SWJED]

... let's assume we are not engaged in a "war of ideology" but a "war of civilizations".

Does that change the equation?

One assumption here is that world opinion really does not matter much, as it is inevitable that lines are being drawn and there is nothing we can do in the information operations arena that can change Islamist ideology and its increasing acceptance in the Muslim world.

The only variable is when each Western country will realize they are in a fight for survival of their way of life.

[Jedburgh]

One assumption here is that world opinion really does not matter much, as it is inevitable that lines are being drawn and there is nothing we can do in the information operations arena that can change Islamist ideology and its increasing acceptance in the Muslim world.
I strongly disagree with that last bit. In effect, that mindset condones incompetence and accepts failure. By continuing along such a path the worst case scenario becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The only variable is when each Western country will realize they are in a fight for survival of their way of life.
As others have stated and explained in great detail, it is not the terrorism that truly threatens our way of life, it is the reaction to that terrorism.

The terrorists are not soldiers - they are criminals, and should be prosecuted as such. But even a scumbag that has raped a number of pre-teen girls under his responsibility in a day-care center has to be interviewed, investigated and prosecuted under the rule of law. Terrorists are also criminal scum - and they should be treated no different.

Despite our emotional feelings about the rightness of summary justice for either the terrorist or the child-rapist, following the rules ensures that the rights of innocent people aren't violated (it isn't about protecting the rights of the bad guy - its about ensuring that he is the bad guy). It also demonstrates to the world that we are truly a free country, unafraid to display to the world the bad guys we've captured, the evidence clearly linking them to terrorism, and then try them openly as common criminals. This diminishes the status of the terrorist and enhances our moral standing.

On the other hand, indefinite detention in the absence of evidence, secret evidence, secret tribunals, prosecutions hidden from view are things for which we used to vilify the Soviets and the Eastern Bloc (I'm sure there's a few of you on here that remember those days...). Such methods enhance the status of the bad guys we hold, clearly display a disturbing mix of national arrogance and fear, and then those that are inevitably eventually released spread tales of that system which have a significant negative impact upon our already virtually non-existent IO campaign.

Let's just do this the right way. And I mean that in both aspects: being morally right as well as operationally effective. Believe it or not, we can do it.

[aktarian]

One assumption here is that world opinion really does not matter much, as it is inevitable that lines are being drawn and there is nothing we can do in the information operations arena that can change Islamist ideology and its increasing acceptance in the Muslim world.

Wold opinion matters because it will influence where lines will be drawn.

If western countries will loose it's moral high ground than conflict will be seen as clash of two evils by many. And as many Soviets did, people will choose that evil which will speak their language (I'm not saying west will be evil but if it adopts measures that will make it loose it's moral high ground it will be seen as such).

[carl]

I strongly endorse the sentiments of Jedburgh and LawVol.

It seems to me the Geneva Conventions as they stand are just a codification of simple humanity. For us to "re-define" them will be seen as, and I think is, an attempt to get around doing the right thing. If we stand for the right when it is hard and painful to do so, it ennobles and strengthens us in the long run. It doesn't weaken us.

On a personal note, as an American living overseas, I don't like the Administration placing me in a position where I have to explain this kind of thing.

[SWJED]

... we adhere to all the Conventions - down to the last dotted i and crossed t. But, say in 5 or 10 years, there is little or no progress in defeating the threat we now face. Is there some "line in the sand" scenario where we should throw caution to the wind in reference to the Geneva Conventions?

[Jedburgh]

... we adhere to all the Conventions - down to the last dotted i and crossed t. But, say in 5 or 10 years, there is little or no progress in defeating the threat we now face. Is there some "line in the sand" scenario where we should throw caution to the wind in reference to the Geneva Conventions?
We have made tremendous progress in the broader fight against terrorism in the past five years. This despite continuing turf battles, blinkered parochialism, and plain old bureaucratic stupidity. I tend to agree with the sentiments expressed in the article I posted in the "The Whole News" forum (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1230) earlier today. We are generally on the right path, although much still remains to be done. Dispensing with the questionable procedures under discussion and bringing the processes to light would enhance our current efforts, not impede them.

Where we are having significant problems is with Iraq and, increasingly, Afghanistan. Much of what has been discussed on this board since its inception deals broadly with those two areas of conflict. Although events in both areas certainly have an effect upon the wider GWOT, there is no "line-in-the-sand" where we should throw out the Law of War in the conduct of those operations in a desperate final attempt to maintain control. There may come a time when we have to admit failure and withdraw, from one or both. And that will cause us some significant strategic headaches, should it come to that.

Rather than a line-in-the-sand, the situation where I can see the US throwing out the Conventions and all other restraints, is if there is a massive failure that results in a catastrophic attack on our shores. Say, along the lines of a nuclear explosion at a major US port, as described in the recent RAND pub, Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack (http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR391.pdf). If such a horrific scenario should come to pass, the American public would not accept, they would demand the gloves come off completely.

[zenpundit]

I have to point out that treating illegal combatants -those whose actions preclude being given POW status - humanely in accord with Geneva and the Torture conventions in no way preclude us for trying and executing them for the commission of war crimes.

The USG is fully within it's sovereign rights to try terrorists simply for being members of al Qaida, proscribing it as an outlaw organization as we once did with the SS, Gestapo, SD and other Nazi affiliates. Especially, trials for fighting out of uniform, for deliberately targeting civilians, for the wanton murder of injured American soldiers on the battlefield, streamlined military trials are justified under international law, the laws of war ( as saboteurs) and Ex Parte Quirin. The recent SCOTUS decision pointed, in fact, to Ex Parte Quirin as the appropriate model and not the vague, shifting, arguments offered by the Bush administration..

In the latter examples, the death penalty is both reasonable and an appropriate outcome upon conviction, barring any mitigating circumstances in terms of cooperation on intelligence matters. As this option could not be, legally and historically speaking, more clear, I can only conclude that the Bush administration, as an act of policy, seeks to avoid any kind of trials indefinitely or at least until they can drop the issue in the next administration's lap.

[slapout9]

These two posts have said it all. In my humble or not so humble opinion. Terrorism is a man made concept (problem) and it's counter is a man made solution (Rule of Law). The more we stray from this the more our country will loose the moral high ground. Zen especially points out that there are laws to handle this situation that we have not even begun to use!! Why we haven't done this I don't know, but we need to get at it!!!

As for line drawing that is exactly what the enemy wants, for us to have a half baked policy of you do this and I will drop the big one. If we follow this policy what do we think the enemy will do?? exactly that which will provoke us into killing huge numbers of civilians. Just like they do !!!

One area that we can exploit is non-lethal and less lethal weapons development. Weapons of mass protection!!! I have never seen a detailed study of the Russian experience where they used knock out agents to paralyze the bombers in Moscow. The bad side effects were that there were not enough medical personnel on site ready to deploy the anti-dote which resulted in about 1/3 of the hostages being killed. But this could be overcome I am sure.

The other is the seizure of terrorist financial assets and give them to the victims family!!! They may kill a family member but the family as a whole will become stronger. I believe this would have a dramatic effect on the terrorist. If we can ever figure out a way that terrorism can be turned into a benefit to this country instead of a financial drain, I suspect it will help change their method of operation and push it more toward a political dialog in order to achieve a long term solution.

[Merv Benson]

9-11 was the result of following the lawfare model embraced by some of the comments above. By treating the enemy as criminals, entitled to due process and discovery we revealed intelligence that permitted Osama to hide his plans for the 9-11 attacks. This occurred when evidence was provided to defendents in the African Embassy bombing case that the US was intercepting Osama's satelite phone conversations. Many have mistakenly attributed Osama's halt in using his satelite phone to media stories about the fact he used one, but Osama never hid that fact. He instead used his satelite phone to talk to the media and among otherthing deny that he was responsible for the embassy bombings.

Besides the problems caused by having to reveal intelligences sources and methods, the lawfare approach has another problem. It leaves us on the strategic defensive, mainly reacting to attacks rathr than taking the battle to the enemy and disrupting his plans.

The current debate over what form the trials of unlawful enemy combatants will take is in many ways a result of a flawed interpretation of the Geneva Conventions by the Supreme Court in the Hamdan case. I would take a more passive aggressive approach to dealing with that problem. The unlawful enemy combatants would be told that they will be held until the ened of the conflict like any other detainee in a war. If that results in an effective life sentence so be it.

As for the issue over interrigation techniques, it is clear to me that the President's approach will be more effective at preventing future attacks and that the PR advantages of the alternative approach do not offset the risks of not preventing further acts of mass murder. Supporters of the alternative approach are asking the US to risk paying a high price for some minimal PR brownie points with people who are at best, indifferent to our national security.

[Jedburgh]

Besides the problems caused by having to reveal intelligences sources and methods, the lawfare approach has another problem. It leaves us on the strategic defensive, mainly reacting to attacks rather than taking the battle to the enemy and disrupting his plans.
If we can't convict a bad guy without supposedly compromising a significant source, we obviously ain't got that much on him. Translation: somebody isn't doing a very good job. Look at the record of domestic terror-related cases that have been dismissed for lack of evidence in the past year. There is an issue that needs to be fixed there, but it has more to do with building competencies than with changing the rules.

Your disparaging comment about adhering to the rule of law putting us on the "strategic defensive" is utterly false. We have made a lot of progress in advancing beyond the traditional LE post-incident investigative approach towards leveraging inter-agency intelligence fusion in support of both LE and SOF ops disrupting the bad guys before they can act. There have been many unheralded successes over the past few years, although we still have a long way to go - especially domestically.

I would take a more passive aggressive approach to dealing with that problem. The unlawful enemy combatants would be told that they will be held until the ened of the conflict like any other detainee in a war. If that results in an effective life sentence so be it.
I believe that by treating them as captives in a war, we unjustifiably elevate their status. Treat them as common criminals - with due procedure and appropriate sentencing.

As for the issue over interrigation techniques, it is clear to me that the President's approach will be more effective at preventing future attacks and that the PR advantages of the alternative approach do not offset the risks of not preventing further acts of mass murder. Supporters of the alternative approach are asking the US to risk paying a high price for some minimal PR brownie points with people who are at best, indifferent to our national security.
...and your experience with interrogation is...?

[Merv Benson]

Most of my experience in interrigation has been in depositions where the person being questioned has more to lose in being caught in a lie as he does in telling the truth. I think the opposite is the case when questioning terrorist.

And your experience in prosecuting cases?,,,

[SWJED]

Let's stay on subject. I intentionally provoked a debate because that is what we do here.

I see good points on both sides of this issue. Moreover, each are seeking the same conclusion (successful prosecution of the GWOT) and may not be as far apart as the previous posts might indicate.

No one here is saying to throw out the Geneva Conventions - though some are distrustful as to how they might be interpreted when faced with terrorist prisoners on an asymmetric battlefield.

As far as personal experience and how it might relate to future Small Wars scenario I'll offer this up.

My personal history with interrogations (proper) is limited - cursory training in the Army’s CI/HUMINT course, OJT at a USMC training prisoner of war camp, and OJT at three SOF Robin Sages.

As a Division G-2 OPSO during Desert Storm I also visited our EPW Collection Point to sit in on some interrogations. My CI Team also provided some, though limited, classroom instruction from time to time. I also read the Army’s FM.

What I learned from all that, prior to having to do “real world” field interrogations, is that there is a certain personality trait that makes a good interrogator – something innate that no amount of training or experience can substitute for. First and foremost, we must ensure we have the “right people” selected, trained and deployed as interrogators. We also must insure that when an interrogator is not available in the field and there is a time-critical requirement for info / intel we have the same type of “right people” conducting these ad hoc interrogations.

So, now it is 1991 and on G + 1 in the middle of the burning Al Burqan oil field and just after our DIV FWD CP had almost been overrun I get word that we have captured an Iraqi BDE commander. It was my responsibility to interrogate him as it was a fluid sit and there was no time to send him back and wait. Earlier I had conducted several field interrogations of other prisoners – but they had nothing of value to offer.

My only two worries at this point were Iraqi use of chemicals and any potential for another counterattack prior to our seizure of Kuwait International Airport. Bottom line – my previous training, PME and experiences made me comfortable that I had many “legal” options in interrogating this commander. I opted on ‘ego-up’ – gave the colonel a smart salute when I met him and he proceeded to spill his guts – no chemical attacks – not worth the risk – no more counterattacks as they shot their wad earlier – and on a map the entire Iraqi army disposition (though dated by a day or two due to our offensive) - an OOB that very closely mirrored our enemy sit overlay in the 2-shop.

Okay, what does all that have to do with this discussion? In 1991 I had many tried and true interrogation techniques available for my use and more importantly I had no worries about a possible UCMJ action against me should I utilize any of those techniques.

Now fast forward 15 years to 2006 to a hypothetical situation. Let's say I am back in SWA, but this time in support of a relief column that is slugging it out along an IED and ambush-laden LOC. A captured al-Qaeda (not Iraqi) terrorist with possible time-sensitive intel / info is captured and once again I am responsible for a field interrogation. “Ego-up” won’t provide jack. Probably the direct, incentive, emotional, etal approaches won’t either. Now I am faced with the gray area – as could very well be interpreted by those who take the Geneva Conventions to the extreme – can I or can I not use fear up without “my fear” of possible charges. Moreover, can I stray from the established interrogation techniques, short of torture, based on my judgment of the criticality of the information I may receive.

Don’t just dismiss those of us who question the Conventions – we do not fear them – we fear how they may be interpreted and the consequences.

[slapout9]

Dave, In Police world two concepts offer protection against just such a hypothetical situation you mentioned. One is exigent circumstances. A situation is so critical and the loss of life is so great that normal due process is suspended. No need for a warrant, no need for Miranda, no need for permission,etc. (physical torture is out).

The other is qualified immunity. A police officer can make the most drastic mistakes possible (killing an innocent person) if he shows he was acting in good faith. An example would be shooting an innocent person during a hostage rescue. Under qualified immunity he could NOT be prosecuted!!!

I think your issues would be better served by changing the UCMJ to allow for such situations as opposed to trying to change the Geneva Convention.

My experience with interrogating POW"s none, zero.

My experience with interrogating and prosecuting every low life,robbing,rapping,stealing,murdering,drug dealing,dope smoking son of a bitch out there, more than I like to remember.

[Jedburgh]

I think I've already gone over all I'm willing to discuss on an open board in this previous thread:

A Lesson About Torture, Half Century On (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=287)

However, if anyone wishes to discuss interrogation methodology, issues and problems, please contact me off-line.

[selil]

I won't make a mistake on thinking law enforcement and military circumstances are the same, but the UCMJ should provide protections as much as punishments.

I can perceive points in a militiary campaign where summary execution could be used (never leave an enemy at your back?). Any lesser asault against a human is just quibbling with degrees of abuse.

Civilized-War is an oxymoron, and to many people worry about perceptions of comabt. Deal with the enemy with honor and good judgement whether they would with you or not. Terms like terrorist, infidel, revolutionary, etc.. are the talismans of politicians and soldier should define the enemy in the terms of their mission orders.

Just some late Saturday night thoughts.

[SWJED]

17 September Voice of America - Bush Defends Push to Clarify Geneva Convention (http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-09-16-voa29.cfm) by Scott Stearns (reposted in full per USG terms of use).


President Bush says Congress must act to save a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) interrogation program that he says has helped disrupt terrorist plots, including planned strikes inside the United States and on a U.S. Marine base in East Africa, an American consulate in Pakistan, and Britain's Heathrow Airport.

Mr. Bush says the previously-secret program is in jeopardy because of a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that military commissions the president wants to use to put suspected terrorists on trial must be authorized by Congress.

So the president is pushing legislation to allow classified evidence to be withheld from defendants during their trials. He wants coerced testimony to be allowed as evidence, and he wants U.S. interrogators to be protected from prosecution for using methods that might violate the Geneva Conventions.

But some senior Republican senators disagree. They say those rules do not meet constitutional standards outlined by the Supreme Court and could endanger U.S. troops overseas if other countries choose to reinterpret the Geneva Convention in their own way.

In his weekly radio address, President Bush said legislation approved by the Republican-led Senate Armed Services Committee this past week would force the CIA program to close because it does not protect U.S. interrogators from possible prosecution for violating international treaty obligations.

"There is debate about the specific proposals in this bill, and my Administration will work with Congress to find common ground," said Mr. Bush. "I have one test for this legislation: The intelligence community must be able to tell me that the bill Congress sends to my desk will allow this vital program to continue."

Republican senators opposed to the president's plan, led by former prisoner of war John McCain, have been joined by former Secretary of State Colin Powell who this past week wrote that the president's actions would encourage the world to doubt the moral basis of America's fight against terrorism.

[aktarian]

I believe GC provide distinction on who is entitled to it's protection and who is not. What US should do, instead of considering modifying GC, is to determine who falls outside os it and what to do with them.

This is why I have troubles with terms like "unlawfull combatant". What the hell does that mean? If you are combatant you get GC protection, if you are not you don't. It seems this is just something that's neither terrorist nor soldier so you can treat them as neither so you don't have to put them on trial with fair trial (as you would do if they were terrorists) or put them in POW camps and allow RC visits (as you would do if they were soldiers).

[Bill Moore]

A subject worth debating, but I tend to side on protecting our laws and maintaining the moral high ground. Those of us in the service took an oath to defend the constitution, and the constitution is a body of laws that governs the greatest nation in the world. While the GC has little to do with our constitution, the principle of following the law does. We're defending principle and a way of life, not a piece of land. We shouldn't throw that out in an attempt to achieve a short term "tactical" victory.

For one I used to enjoy wearing the white hat and preaching the values of human rights from the moral high ground as a U.S. soldier. That high ground is getting tougher to defend when our government kidnapps and illegally detains "suspects" for years on end that are then too frequently found to be incident. We haven't declared a war of civilizations, if we do it will look more like Baghdad on a global scale. Battle in this conflict is an extension of ideas, and the moral high ground is our virtual center of gravity that only we can destroy.

In short I don't think the military should comprise its professional values for short term gains as a matter of policy. We should continue to represent the promise of something better.

I hear a lot of spin relating the terrorists to Nazi's, which I think is off the mark, but regardless we didn't sacrifice our values as a matter of policy to deal with Nazi's. Of course there individual atrocities and violations, because we're human and sometimes act on emotion, but it wasn't policy.

There may be extreme cases where the information we need isn't tactical in nature, such as a WMD plot unfolding, and I think the Executive Branch should be able in very select cases be able to implement an all measures necessary to pre-empt the attack, but that is far from a blanket policy.

[LawVol]

... we adhere to all the Conventions - down to the last dotted i and crossed t.


In light of the proposed legislation regarding tribunals, I'm not sure I agree with this statement. Art 99 of Geneva Convention III says that no POW can be tried without having an opportunity to defend himself (although we call these guys detainees rather than POWs, the same rule applies given the prevailing winds right now). By not allowing these guys to have access to the evidence against them, we disregard this article.

That being said, my issue is not so much whether we adhere to the letter of the conventions, but whether we are perceived as doing so. Basically, whether we adhere or not is irrelevant if we are perceived as not doing so or as manipulating the law to our advantage. What may be seen as necessary or even heroic by a criminal law attorney on TV does not play well with world opinion when it comes to GWOT. I think this feeling that we do not adhere to international law and play fast and loose with the rules, causes us to lose support (e.g. Turkey would not allow us flyover rights in part because they viewed the was as illegal). This takes us closer to the attrition point. Once we reach that point, i.e. the point at which we lose public support for the war effort, we've lost. We have to do it right and be viewed as doing it right.

As for the line in the sand, I sincerely hope there isn't one. A nation of laws is what we are. Isn't that what we fight for? I think this quote sums it up quite well:


Roper: “So now you'd give the Devil the benefit of law!”
More: “Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get to the Devil?”
Roper: “I'd cut down every law in England to do that!”
More: “Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you -- where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat. This country’s planted thick with laws from coast to coast -- man’s laws, not God’s -- and if you cut them down -- and you're just the man to do it -- do you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of the law, for my own safety’s sake.”

[slapout9]

This is an essay I found that covers a lot of issues we are and have discussed. “Just War Theory” vs. American Self-Defense (http://www.theobjectivestandard.com/issues/2006-spring/just-war-theory.asp) by Yaron Brook and Alex Epstein.

[Merv Benson]

Andrew McCarthy, (http://www.opinionjournal.com/federation/feature/?id=110008966) who prosecuted the first World Trade Center bombers, gives some of the details of what al Qaeda learned from the process.


Under discovery rules that apply to American criminal proceedings, the government is required to provide to accused persons any information in its possession that can be deemed "material to the preparation of the defense" or that is even arguably exculpatory. The more broadly indictments are drawn (and terrorism indictments tend to be among the broadest), the greater the trove of revelation.

In addition, the government must disclose all prior statements made by witnesses it calls (and, often, witnesses it does not call).

This is a staggering quantum of information, certain to illuminate not only what the government knows about terrorist organizations but the intelligence agencies' methods and sources for obtaining that information. When, moreover, there is any dispute about whether a sensitive piece of information needs to be disclosed, the decision ends up being made by a judge on the basis of what a fair trial dictates, rather than by the executive branch on the basis of what public safety demands.

It is true that this mountain of intelligence is routinely surrendered along with appropriate judicial warnings: defendants may use it only in preparing for trial, and may not disseminate it for other purposes. Unfortunately, people who commit mass murder tend not to be terribly concerned about violating court orders (or, for that matter, about being hauled into court at all).

In 1995, just before trying the blind sheik (Omar Abdel Rahman) and eleven others, I duly complied with discovery law by writing a letter to the defense counsel listing 200 names of people who might be alleged as unindicted co-conspirators--i.e., people who were on the government's radar screen but whom there was insufficient evidence to charge. Six years later, my letter turned up as evidence in the trial of those who bombed our embassies in Africa. It seems that, within days of my having sent it, the letter had found its way to Sudan and was in the hands of bin Laden (who was on the list), having been fetched for him by an al-Qaeda operative who had gotten it from one of his associates.

Intelligence is dynamic. Over time, foreign terrorists and spies inevitably learn our tactics and adapt: consequently, we must refine and change those tactics. When we purposely tell them what we know--for what is blithely assumed to be the greater good of ensuring they get the same kind of fair trials as insider traders and tax cheats--we enable them not only to close the knowledge gap but to gain immense insight into our technological capacities, how our agencies think, and what our future moves are likely to be.

...

Some of our best information is obtained from foreign intelligence services. Naturally, those services are much less forthcoming if they think that what they tell us will have to be revealed in court because of U.S. legal rules. Historically, that was not much of a problem when dealing with the CIA; it is, however, always a concern for a country weighing whether to share some sensitive or potentially embarrassing information with the FBI.

The Saudis' infamous obstruction of the FBI's efforts to investigate the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing is an exquisite example.

In the Clinton years, no matter how many times we were attacked, all the world knew that our approach was to have the FBI build criminal cases.

Indeed, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, issued in June 1995, announced that prosecuting terrorists and extraditing indicted terrorists held overseas were signature priorities of the administration.

Nearly three years later, after several other attacks and public declarations of war by bin Laden, Clinton issued a press release that both trumpeted as a ringing success his strategy of having terrorists "apprehended, tried, and given severe prison sentences" and announced a new directive, PDD 62. This purported to "reinforce the mission of the many U.S. agencies charged with roles in defeating terrorism," including by means of the "apprehension and prosecution of terrorists." The embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed less than three months later.

There is much more analysis of intelligence failures of all types, but it is hard to deny the importance of the damage done to our efforts when we have to give the enemy our sources and methods of collecting intelligence on enemy operations and operatives.

[Bill Moore]

Yep, the whole process is self defeating and it presents us with a strategic dilemma. We either follow our laws and suffer the consequences or we break the laws and suffer the consequences. I agree with the President that terrorists don't deserve legal protection, but there must be some degree of legal protection (presumed innocence) until they are proven to be a terrorist, and that appears to crux of the matter. Locking up a suspect for potentially years on faulty intelligence, and providing him or her no legal protection is definitely going too far. Any of us, or our family members, potentially could be arrested under suspicion of being a terrorist or a facilitator based on a set up, and we wouldn’t want to surrender our legal rights to prove our innocence. However, if proving our innocence somehow equates to Bin Laden and his ilk getting the latest dump of our intelligence products it will obviously encourage administration officials to look for ways to bypass the law. The law makers got us into this mess, and they need to get us out of it. Americans will accept special measures for known terrorists, but for the most part they don’t accept surrendering our legal principles. We have to be careful that the fix doesn’t start us down going down the wrong road where there may not be an opportunity to make a U-turn.

[SWJED]

23 September Washington Post - As Army Adds Interrogators, It Outsources Training (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/22/AR2006092201486.html)by Walter Pincus.


Since the Iraq war began, the U.S. Army has quadrupled the number of soldiers it trains each year to be detainee interrogators, according to Army officials involved in the program.

Next year, 1,200 interrogators are set to be trained at the Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., up from about 300 in 2003. "The number being trained is based on the current need of interrogators in theater," said Angela Moncur, deputy public affairs officer at the intelligence center...

The Army is gearing up for the effort by hiring private companies to handle the training. Last month, the service awarded contracts that could grow to more than $50 million in the next five years to three private firms to provide additional instructors to the 18-week basic course in human-intelligence interrogation at Fort Huachuca.

"If you are qualified as interrogator, you now are either in Iraq or teaching others how to do it when they go there," said Pat Gromek, who spent 23 years as an Army intelligence officer and now handles business development for Integrated Systems Improvement Services Inc. in Sierra Vista, Ariz., the site of Fort Huachuca. ISIS is one of the firms selected to supply interrogation instructors.

The contracts call for the companies to provide outside instructors who would train "selected enlisted soldiers in the skills and knowledge required to perform . . . tactical human intelligence collection," said a government notice published earlier this month. Subjects to be covered include how to interrogate and debrief enemy personnel, potential threat forces, warrior skills, intelligence analysis, and military justice and intelligence law, according to a statement supplied by the center. "The laws of land warfare and the Geneva Convention" are specifically listed in an article on the course in Military Intelligence, an Army publication...

[Jedburgh]

The issue has obviously been decided for the Army HUMINT field:

Updates as of 11 OCT 2006 (https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/Active/epmpmilang/mi/97e.htm)

ATTENTION: THE LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT FOR MOS 97E HAS BEEN SUSPENDED FOR ALL RANKS AND WILL BE REVIEWED ON AN ANNUAL BASIS. ALL SOLDIERS RECLASSIFYING INTO THE MOS WILL NOT PCS TO DLI, BUT WILL INSTEAD BE DIRECTLY ASSIGNED INTO A PRIORITY UNIT. DURING THE SUSPENSION PERIOD, DLI WILL REMAIN AN OPTION FOR 97Es WITH SIGNIFICANT TIME IN THE MOS, BUT ONLY AS A REENLISTMENT INCENTIVE.

ALL 97Es WHO CURRENTLY POSSESS A LANGUAGE ARE STILL REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN PROFICIENCY IAW AR 611-6. ALL SOLDIERS RECLASSIFYING INTO THE MOS MUST STILL EITHER PASS THE DLAB IAW DA PAM 611-21, OR HAVE A CURRENT, PASSING DLPT SCORE IN A FOREIGN LANGUAGE.

SEE MILPER MESSAGE 06-159 FOR FURTHER DETAILS.
Long-term capabilities were already significantly affected when the language requirement was done away with for entry level soldiers (and junior NCOs were able to obtain waivers). This will have a truly crippling long-term effect upon the HUMINT field.

[Steve Blair]

And a shame they went this route. This isn't a field where technology can substitute at all for the actual human being with the right skills and training.

[SSG Rock]

More dumbing down of the Army, so to speak. Sending Soldiers inadequately trained out to the field......amazing, amazingly stupid.

[Jedburgh]

Army News Service, 29 Mar 07: NCOs Sought for Human Intelligence (http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,130540,00.html)

..."Our goal is to quickly infuse 100 staff sergeants and sergeants first class to our HUMINT force from all other career fields," said Sgt. Maj. Fernando Martinez-Irizarry, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2.

"They will be provided accelerated training on basic and advanced HUMINT skills and be assigned to units deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom," he said....
Piss poor post-Cold War reductions led directly to current critical supply and demand problems with tac HUMINT, which - as this additional measure illustrates - continue to be addressed by knee-jerk quantity over quality short term solutions.

You can't shake and bake a senior HUMINT NCO in 24-27 weeks, then immediately deploy him to Iraq or Afghanistan and expect him to effectively manage HUMINT collection ops or conduct any of a myriad of other HUMINT missions, let alone that most critical task of any senior NCO - mentor and train junior soldiers.

The 97E field has already suffered in quality of NCO leadership recently by too-rapid promotion of soldiers as the previously-tiny field has expanded so quickly. So now the Army is fixing the problem of filling mid-to-senior NCO positions by inexperienced personnel within the MOS by filling them with NCOs from outside the field with zero experience....

[Bill Moore]

There are principles, truths, and there is reality.

A close parallel to Jed’s point is one of our SOF truths: You can't mass produce SOF in response to a crisis.

Of course SF, Rangers, and SEALs are doing just that. The pipelines are spitting the kids out in large numbers. I can only speak for SF, the training is still high quality, but as everyone knows the training is only the first step, then you enter the seasoning phase where you are mentored by the gray haired fox for a few years. That doesn’t happen when you change the demographics of the force this quickly. Some think a rotation into OIF or OEF-A will make up for that, but I don’t see that happening. You don’t make up for years of COIN, UW, SASO (old term) earned lessons with one or two rotations into OIF.

Obviously the MI world is experiencing a similar challenge with their HUMINTers. MI was devastated after Desert Storm. I worked closely with MI at the time and I recall a number of experiences Officers and NCOs getting their walking papers. We also starting deactivating units (this was under Bush Senior), and it only got worse under Clinton. The current administration, until relatively recently, didn’t see the need to start expanding the force, so now we’re faced with the reality that we have to mass produce and put a lot of young guys and gals on point without mentors. Life will be their mentor, and “eventually” they’ll get good.

[Jedburgh]

...MI was devastated after Desert Storm. I worked closely with MI at the time and I recall a number of experiences Officers and NCOs getting their walking papers. We also starting deactivating units (this was under Bush Senior), and it only got worse under Clinton...
I still remember quite clearly how the drawdown affected 97Es - they were offering NCOs generous bonuses to get out for a few years in the mid-'90s. NCO promotions were also virtually frozen for quite a while; one or two token promotions a year at the senior levels. Not to mention unit deactivations and reduction of slots overall significantly affecting assignment options. At the time I didn't care; I was sufficiently engaged with deployments for OPC and UNSCOM. It wasn't until the period just before 9-11 that the stagnation of the field reallly started hitting me.

...The current administration, until relatively recently, didn’t see the need to start expanding the force, so now we’re faced with the reality that we have to mass produce and put a lot of young guys and gals on point without mentors. Life will be their mentor, and “eventually” they’ll get good.
Bill, I agree with your last statement. There are already a few natural talents shining amongst the chaff. Unfortunately, the "mass production" mentality produces a helluva lot of chaff, much of'em unable (or prevented by command misuses) to learn the right HUMINT lessons from the COE, and thereby ending up perpetuating the wrong ones. Hopefully the good ones will rise to the top, and have the necessary influence over the field in the long term. I have doubts about that, however, being all too familiar with the MI TRADOC bureacracy. If the future ends up being a reflection of the past, the good ones will end up slugging away operationally, while the incompetent parasites end up running the schoolhouse. In any case, it will be too late to affect the current fight.

[Ski]

The other problem, and I saw this from my time in Afghanistan, is that everyone wants more 97E's. At one point I had to call every command that was under our umbrella and tell them not to request any more THT's or 97E's..there weren't any to go around.

[Jedburgh]

An interesting collection of essays, published by NDIC in Dec 06:

Educing Information: Interrogation Science and Art (http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/educing.pdf)

...Educing Information is a profoundly important book because it offers both professionals and ordinary citizens a primer on the “science and art” of both interrogation and intelligence gathering. Because this is a book written by and for intelligence professionals, it starts exactly where one might expect it to start – with Dr. Robert Coulam’s superb discussion of the costs and benefi ts of various approaches to interrogation. For those who are (like me) unschooled in the art and science of intelligence gathering, careful study of the table of contents is perhaps the best way to decide which of the papers would provide the most convenient portal through which to enter a realm that is, by the admission of the authors themselves, both largely unexplored and enormously important to our national security. Steven M. Kleinman’s excellent paper on the “KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Review” provided just the historical and theoretical background I needed to feel comfortable with the other papers. This book “works” either way....

[120mm]

I remember getting the "you may want to look at getting out" letter in 1991. I was still Armor/CAV, but was scheduled to go to the MIOAC.

[Bill Moore]

They will be provided accelerated training on basic and advanced HUMINT skills and be assigned to units deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom," he said....

What exactly is accelerated advanced training anyway? Doesn't advanced training normally imply learning advanced skills and concepts, which normally acquire more time to learn, and then much practice to really learn?

You look at all the posts on this great council and most address the complexity associated with small wars and the requirement for strategic corporal and Lts, and the Army's answer is shake and bake courses and lower recruiting standards?

There seems to be a serious disconnect between the war fighters and those developing these polices.

[marct]

Pretty much every group of 40+ has one or two, sometimes more, guys who can just chat with everybody. I mention this, because it is the "talent" that underlies what makes a good Anthropologist or qualitative Sociologist. If a unit does not have "official" HUMINT people, then you can made do with people who like to chat. Toss in someone who is a musician or mathematician, i.e. they have the "talent" for either (or both - they are genetically linked), and you have an untrained analyst who has a "pattern recognition" skill. Like an IED, it is not "official", but it will work in a pinch.

Marc

[Bill Moore]

Marc,

I am partially joking, but I did sort of admire one of aspect of the USSR system, and that was their screening process for aptitude (perhaps not genetic screening, I don't think we had the technology or knowledge at the time) screening for their athletes and some of their academics. They produced some of the world’s best athletes. There is a parallel to what you are suggesting, although not a palatable one in the free world, and that is picking the best guy/gal for the job based on their aptitude whether they want to do it or not. If you could coach us on how to identify these people we could use a mentoring approach to persuade them to move into a career field more suited to their skills. However, I wouldn't confuse the gift of gab with a good human intelligence operator. The more important skill is the ability to listen without prejudice, and skillfully get the other guy to talk using empathy and other techniques. I noticed sometimes our gifted talkers are not the best listeners. They are also the ones most likely to give up our secrets inadvertently.

[tequila]

The Sovs also juiced their athletes. Not the best comparo. Also our system produced nearly as many gold medalists and we didn't necessarily cheat to do it, though perhaps it is best to say we outsourced our cheating to the private sector. ;)

[marct]

Hi Bill,


I am partially joking, but I did sort of admire one of aspect of the USSR system, and that was their screening process for aptitude (perhaps not genetic screening, I don't think we had the technology or knowledge at the time) screening for their athletes and some of their academics. They produced some of the world’s best athletes.

Believe me, I' not a genetic determinist by any means :D. The comments about a talent for mathematics and music going together is, however, quite well documented in the genetics literature and has been for about 40-50 years. You're quite right that we don't have the technology to do the screening and, to be perfectly honest, even if we did I would be against using it. A "talent", even if it is genetically based, is just a predisposition and doesn't replace actual skill, although it may make it easier for someone to acquire the appropriate skills.


There is a parallel to what you are suggesting, although not a palatable one in the free world, and that is picking the best guy/gal for the job based on their aptitude whether they want to do it or not. If you could coach us on how to identify these people we could use a mentoring approach to persuade them to move into a career field more suited to their skills. However, I wouldn't confuse the gift of gab with a good human intelligence operator. The more important skill is the ability to listen without prejudice, and skillfully get the other guy to talk using empathy and other techniques. I noticed sometimes our gifted talkers are not the best listeners. They are also the ones most likely to give up our secrets inadvertently.

I agree with you about the listening component. The thing about people who can talk to anyone is that it's usually pretty obvious to a skilled listener whether or not they are talking to hear themselves talk or whether they are actually listening and engaging the other person. The other type to look for is who do people go to with their problems?

I suspect that both types of people could be identified back in basic training. If so, it might be worthwhile to consider creating something like a para-HUMINT training course. In fact, as I write this, I believe that a course already exists, or at least the syllabus for such a course, done by Phil Agre (http://polaris.gseis.ucla.edu/pagre/) in the mid-1990's. If I remember correctly, and it's been years since I talked with Phil, he created a "How to do Ethnography" course and ran it very successfully. Since it was one class a week, I suspect that the entire thing could be reduced fairly easily to a 3 week course.

NB: This would give you trained HUMINT people, but it would give you people who have some training in participant observation techniques and analytics that could as as para-HUMINT people. If they like it, then I'm sure they would also like the 30k signing bonus currently being offered :wry:.

Marc

ps. to Tom and Stan: $30,000! And you were willing to acept a mere $2,000 to get me in boots?!? Let's just say that the price of frozen Canadians has jumped radically!

[Jedburgh]

...I suspect that both types of people could be identified back in basic training....
"Could", in an ideal world. Unfortunately, it ain't so, and basic training cadre in any given locale are both under-manned and over-worked. As is the rest of the Army. Hell, as Bill mentioned earlier, the Army doesn't do a very good job of selecting those for its dedicated special skill positions. SF does much better than the general run, of course, but HUMINT is damn near stuck with whoever signs up - despite utter and complete lack of talent. Especially these days.

...If so, it might be worthwhile to consider creating something like a para-HUMINT training course...
Not a formal training course, but the doctrine of Every Soldier a Sensor (ES2) (http://www.ausa.org/pdfdocs/IP_Sensor08_04.pdf) promulgated a few years back pointed in that direction. TRADOC picked out two ideal goals:

• Soldiers trained to actively observe details related to Commanders’ Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) in an area of operations and competent in reporting their experience, perception and judgment in a concise, accurate manner; and,
• leaders who understand how to optimize the collection, processing and dissemination of information in their organization to enable the generation of timely intelligence.
It has been implemented to a varying degrees at different training locales, with both high-tech simulations and field exercises.

For those of you with AKO access, in Aug 04 MNC-I published a handy little TTP on Passive HUMINT Collection (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/GetAttachment.aspx?id=316419&pname=file&aid=25398), intended for the non-HUMINT trained soldier. Its useful.

[wierdbeard]

the only problem i have seen crop up from the every soldier a sensor is well, Soldiers that are not HUMINT tend to overstep the program when not properly advised. Knowledge of CCIR's is great but knowing what NOT to say when attempting to be sensor, too often i observed non-MI folks divulging CCIR's PIR's etc to foreign nationals in an attempt to answer them. basically giving alot more than they get. Personally i found that instruction on Tactical Questioning for squad leaders and PL's was beneficial for the limited HUMINT assets in a given area. those that took the instruction to heart so to speak gave great leads to be followed up by HUMINT personnel. As they can't be everywhere at once. On a personal note i made it a point to be able to speak to elements returning from outside the wire and those elements that that had a higher percentage of good leads i accompanied on patrols, granted I also had my own missions and it made for very long days but as far as i was concerned whatever it takes to get the job done.

of great concern to myself is the decision to bring in SNCO's to the career field, i can foresee some problems at the team level if you have team members that have spent considerable time in the field and a newly qualified Team leader that well is qualified on the theory but not practice. in effect its reducing the amount of collectors in a given area if the TL is "learning the ropes". Its one thing to be close to the "flagpole" for suuport and guidance but another when teams are in "BFE" and contact with the command can be infrequent or virtually non-existant.

thats just my 2 birr's worth.

[Tom Odom]

For those of you with AKO access, in Aug 04 MNC-I published a handy little TTP on Passive HUMINT Collection, intended for the non-HUMINT trained soldier. Its useful.

yep and Ft Huachuca disavowed it almost immediately. As for the every Soldier a Sensor, that is directed not so much as a HUMINT team substitute but to get back to basics in recce, int, and observation--those would be called basic skills in another era, especially for scouts.

Personally I too thought the MNC-I guide was great because it "de-mystified" the HUMINT cult, and that is probably why Huachuca did not like it. I ran into the exact same attitude when dealing with HUMINTers sitting at desks in DC when I was collecting on the ground in Africa.

And I understand fully Wierdbeard's concerns because I saw many of the same things happen in training and in operations when someoine starting winging it. Your concerns on senior transfers into the field are also valid; I have seen some of the same thing happen when it came to the "dual track" FAOs who had very little time in their AO but looked great on paper.

Best

Tom

[John9867]

I am a SSG currently reclassing to a 97E. I have read all of these posting and have found them most useful. I also can see where the 97Es are finding this a bad judgement call as well. It does make me a little nervous to know that once I am school trained and at a unit I will have some knowledge and no job experience. I am however a quick learner and have been deployed to OIF and OEF, at least thats a little in my favor. Anyways, even though I am a SSG and will not have the experience and knowledge of other Soldiers in the MOS I am willing to listen and learn. If a PFC ot SPC has the knowledge I need I will soak it up from him/her. The point Im trying to make is when I get to my unit I hope that there are seasoned NCO's and Soldiers there who will help me grow into my new MOS......not make me feel like a "shake-n-bake".

If you have any advice that will help me prepare and make my transition smoother please provide it...I go to school in March 08 and have started reviewing the Regs that pertain to the MOS.

[Jedburgh]

I am a SSG currently reclassing to a 97E....
Welcome to HUMINT, John.

HUMINT is critical at all levels in the current fight, and there is certainly plenty of opportunity to excel operationallly for a good NCO. However, historically the field has suffered from more than a few who are outstanding HUMINT'ers when operating at the strategic level or if kept where they only work with sources, but who fail miserably whenever they are placed in a tactical unit or are placed in any sort of leadership position. On the other hand, those who are good NCOs as regards tactical skills and basic leadership, but who understand little more than -10 level skills of their MOS, are still seriously lacking in that critical factor that all junior soldiers look to their senior NCOs for - the knowledge, experience and technical skills in their career field necessary to train and mentor their subordinates.

To be effective in the current fight, a good HUMINT NCO must strive for excellence in both areas - as is right and necessary if he ever wants to be a true intelligence professional, and not just change his MOS. As an NCO who is about to change career fields, I'm glad you recognize the professional challenge ahead of you this far out.

I'll only mention a couple of references in passing, that I don't believe I've mentioned in other threads here on SWC that you pull up with a simple search for "interrogation" (or "torture"). (I'm taking for granted that you are currently fully exploiting AKO, BCKS, CALL, MCCLL etc. for HUMINT AARs, lessons learned and emerging doctrine)

First, look at the Laboratory for Scientific Interrogation (http://www.lsiscan.com) website and take some time to read through the Reports section. Although SCAN is all about statement analysis, the basic methodology is a key element in cognitive interviewing - which is, in my personal biased opinion, the most effective interrogation methodology there is (when implemented by an experienced professional).

Take some time while you have it and look through some of the academic writings on Social Network Analysis. If you grasp the concepts and can put in operational context, it helps to provide a rock solid foundation for the conduct of HUMINT analysis of the non-conventional organizations that most are struggling to understand.

But HUMINT collection missions cover a broad spectrum, of which interrogation is only one piece. No one is going to discuss the finer details of running sources here. Yet the human communications skills that are integral to effective interrogation are also effective - with contextual modification - in debriefing, elicitation, negotiation, mediation - the entire spectrum of manipulative communications skills that are absolutely vital to a professional HUMINTer. However, keep in mind that they cannot be gained through reading - only by putting them into practice. And, in the end, only a fraction of those who attain the MOS will ultimately find that they have a real talent for putting those skills into practice in the operational environment. I don't really want to be potentiallly demotivating at the end, but this has always been the case.

Finally, here on SWC, you will find much that will directly and indirectly help you understand your future mission. I wish you luck.

[120mm]

Welcome. You didn't state what you were reclassifying from, but just in case you come from a "high speed" or even "medium speed" tactical background, be prepared for a "culture shock". MI guys can be maddening to work with. On one hand, some units are very informal, and they do not take their military bearing very seriously. On the other hand, some units are extremely anal about "playing soldier" to the detriment of common sense.

As an NCO, pick your battles on the things that drive you up a wall. Most MI guys are good folks and with a firm and reasonable hand will turn out well. My greatest challenge when I went over to the "dark side" was continually refocussing MI types from the arcane to the relevant.

Remember, whatever your former MOS, you have developed some Knowledge, Skills and Abilities that will be relevant to your job.

Advance apologies to the many good MI guys who post here.

[John9867]

Thanks to you both. I will be sure to check the site out. I look forward to the challenges ahead. Just one more question....Arabic is the language to know right now......but what about Polish, is it ever needed?

Thanks again!!

[SWJED]

30 May NY Times - Advisers Fault Harsh Methods in Interrogation (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/30/washington/30interrogate.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin) by Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti.


As the Bush administration completes secret new rules governing interrogations, a group of experts advising the intelligence agencies are arguing that the harsh techniques used since the 2001 terrorist attacks are outmoded, amateurish and unreliable.

The psychologists and other specialists, commissioned by the Intelligence Science Board, make the case that more than five years after the Sept. 11 attacks, the Bush administration has yet to create an elite corps of interrogators trained to glean secrets from terrorism suspects.

While billions are spent each year to upgrade satellites and other high-tech spy machinery, the experts say, interrogation methods — possibly the most important source of information on groups like Al Qaeda — are a hodgepodge that date from the 1950s, or are modeled on old Soviet practices...

[Jedburgh]

....a group of experts advising the intelligence agencies are arguing that the harsh techniques used since the 2001 terrorist attacks are outmoded, amateurish and unreliable....
Wonder how much they paid those "experts"? All they needed to do was ask a few old, experienced HUMINT NCOs. The best advice in the world, for free. Read my posts on interrogation.

[sullygoarmy]

Kind of apples and oranges trying to compare interrogating German prisoners of war versus Al Qaeda terrorists. I agree, however, that the military can learn alot from good police interrogaters and polygraphists. A good polygraphist can get more information from a suspect with a broken polygraph machine just from the way questions are asked and responses are given. Of course we have to integrate culture and language when dealing with AQ but the techniques are similar.

[Merv Benson]

Jed, do you have a link?

[Jedburgh]

AKO Log-In and BCKS MI Net registration required

Interviewing & Interrogating Militant Islamists: A Law Enforcement Perspective (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/GetAttachment.aspx?id=388165&pname=file&aid=29364)
The paper is unclass, and not even FOUO or LES - but it is not generally available. It is uploaded on BCKS MI Net, but I'll go ahead and repost my comments here regarding the paper.

The perspectives presented here reflect the collective input of professionals with backgrounds in the fields of law enforcement, intelligence analysis and operations, psychology, and psychiatry, and who have conducted interrogations or otherwise been involved in interviews with militant Islamists. The strategies and practices described have been used effectively in interrogation with militant Islamist terrorists and their supporters. These approaches are offered here to law enforcement personnel, not as a prescription or a cookbook, but as a springboard for thoughtful planning and execution of successful interviews and interrogations.....
This is a good paper, broadly covering interrogation methodology in the COE. As the title states, it is written for a LE audience, but it is applicable to all whose mission encompasses interrogations of this nature. If I have a criticism of this paper, it is that it touches on certain key areas too briefly and doesn’t clarify the subject adequately before moving on. The following are just some rambling thoughts on the authors’ work…..

The premise of this paper is the effectiveness of the empathetic approach in interrogation, and they repeatedly emphasize that an overly aggressive/forceful approach tends to be counterproductive. This was also stated clearly back in 1969 by the Army Vietnam-era FM 30-15 Intelligence Interrogation (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=2338&postcount=2) in Chapter 4, Interrogation Support for Stability Operations.

The paper continually mentions, but never clarifies, the individual elements of the triad of factors essential to effective manipulative human communications: the cognitive, emotional and kinesic elements. The authors also allude to the use of control and repeat questions (which every Army interrogator is quite familiar with) but they are never clearly discussed. I agree with the authors’ conclusions within the paper, but I feel by failing to sufficiently amplify the narrative they leave a chunk of the target audience in the dark.

The sections on “Foundations of the Rapport-Based Interview Approach” and “Preparing for the Interview” are fairly solid, and contain many elements with which most professional HUMINT’ers are well aware. However, as many of us have experienced, operational constraints such as time, manpower (both simple numbers and capabilities/experience), language ability/translator availability, area characteristics, etc. all can negatively impact the ideal scenario the authors envision.

For those who haven’t read it, I highly recommend Oreste Pinto’s “The Spycatcher Omnibus”. Lt.Col. Pinto was a CI officer who debriefed/interrogated refugees from WWII continental Europe as they arrived in England. Many statements in this paper are faint echoes of the detailed instructional tales Lt.Col. Pinto relates in his book.

The observations on associative vs linear thought processes are very important, as are those on shame vs guilt in Middle Eastern culture. These two issues certainly deserve a much more detailed study in the context of interrogation.

The paper touches on “developing themes”, as is taught throughout the LE community in the Reid technique (http://www.reid.com/) (it is also a course that is often made available to Army HUMINT’ers). But this is something I’ve long had mixed feelings about. Sure, a capable, experienced interrogators can subtly blend in a “theme” to help leverage his cognitive interrogation skills to effectively extract information. However, in lesser hands this methodology is nothing more than a longer narrative version of a leading question. And we all understand that’s a no-go.

Finally, I strongly concur with the statement that “the interview may even assume some characteristics common to a negotiation”. After all, interrogation and negotiation are both forms of manipulative human communications. Regarding negotiation, keep in mind that there are two distinct aspects of negotiation, which tend to be separate fields of study. Interest-based negotiation for business and politics, as exemplified by Roger Fisher and William Ury in “Getting to Yes” (http://www.amazon.com/Getting-Yes-Negotiating-Agreement-Without/dp/0140157352) provides a wealth of value for those smart enough to understand the principles and shift the context. The skills of LE crisis negotiation (hostage/barricade/suicide) also will provide you a significant return on investment the next time you’re sitting down with a source.

[Abu Buckwheat]

Wonder how much they paid those "experts"? All they needed to do was ask a few old, experienced HUMINT NCOs. The best advice in the world, for free. Read my posts on interrogation.

I wasn't one of those experts they consulted but I have worked as an interrogator/translator/analyst and on the other side of the coin ended up running a SERE program to defeat these tactics when used by AQ or a threat military and I am ashamed to think that our government and military commanders think this works.


Many of the techniques that have come in for such criticism were based on those used in the military’s Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape training, or SERE, in which for decades American service members were given a sample of the brutal treatment they might face if captured.

Because the training was developed during the cold war, the techniques later adopted by the C.I.A. and Special Operations officers in Iraq were based, at least in part, on how the Soviet Union and its allies were believed to treat prisoners. Such techniques included prolonged use of stress positions, exposure to heat and cold, sleep deprivation and even waterboarding.

A report on detainee abuse by the Defense Department’s inspector general, completed in August but declassified and released May 18, gives new details of how the military training was “reverse engineered” for use by American interrogators. It says that as early as 2002, some SERE trainers and some military intelligence officers vehemently objected to the use of the techniques, but their protests were ignored.


Absolutely right! We have been teaching for four decades that the Geneva Convention and global outrage against countries that don't provide the GC and human rights in captivity would pressure them into providing better treatment. It worked in Vietnam and in Korea and now "according to the press" it appears these techniques were taken stock from our SERE training manuals which DO NOT represent American methods of interrogation or prisoner management - they were simulations of our enemies. I won't get into OPSEC but let me say this ... Torture, Stress and Duress doesn't work to meet our goals. Period. Now we have GURANTEED all of our future PWs will be denied requests followed by "Did you give the prisoners of Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo these same rights?" Truth or lie, it will defeat 50 years of consolidated SERE effort to help our captive PWs. Tens of thousands of Americans endured torture and depravity from the Indian War to OIF to create this deep corporate base of knowledge, this wall of resistance information and we have taken it down with our own hands!

This decision to use coercion and the constant requests for more permission to abuse is a mindless stupidity done without thinking through the consequences!

Torture and duress will get anyone to talk but nothing, and I mean nothing, they say will be worth the spit that produced it or the shame and disgrace that we have gotten from resorting to our enemy's methods. Getting Zarqawi was good Intel work with no (known) use of torture or real S&D, if OSINT is to be believed. But any of those old HUMINT NCOs who think they can beat answers from a prisoner apart from trying a Threat-Rescue technique are fooling themselves. The issue at question here isn't professional techniques ... none of this is professional. Its about conciously selecting activites that are truely coercive and damaging to the prisoner as well as to the interrogator for the fantasy of getting something good. The more he resists the more frustrated the interrogtor gets and then what? You kill him? We've had that happen already. Who here is proud of that?

At SERE we taught our students that resistance was possible and that the more a threat force applied torture or coercion showed that you were winning the small battle between you and an authoritarian enemy.

I guess we are that enemy now and we are essentially running a real-world/Pass-fail SERE program for AQ and the Iraqi insurgents. Let me say this here and now. These 30,000 "terror suspects" from Iraq and the Ghan, gulity or innocent will come out of Camp Buca, Baghram or Abu G as "stress inoculated" people with a GRUDGE against America. Match that with a deep religious belief that Allah has more planned for them and you have a man that will die to avoid in captivity or, if captured can quicky slip into a nether world of insanity ... as we said at SERE "You can't interrogate the dead or the crazy." Now imagine them teaching their experience to hundreds of new Jihadi recruits and running their own resistance programs ... its already happening. We are creating our own professional resistors.

I've read torturer and victim bios from Argentina, Israel, Rwanda, Britain, China, Laos, Vietnam and went to death camps in Germany, Cambodia, Bosnia and Rwanda just to wrap my head around how these guys could do such a thing to PWs. In Cambodia I saw a waterboarding technique perfected to a science ... until I went to SERE. I taught Geneva Convetions as a shield to abuse for four years and Voila! Because of 9/11, my own government is embracing this strategy? I am disgusted.

We as men of honor need to run AWAY from this. Now. ... and use all of the best minds in this country to develop a non-coercive program that makes any captured Jihadi our best friends forever and want to move to Iowa and study agriculture ... there is no "24" taking bomb scenario worth the honor and soul of this great nation. If there was then someone so committed will die before they talk.

[Sargent]

I don't think it matters much how we treat prisoners -- our enemies will do what they do. And I will have to accept the words of people who do this stuff for a living and say that it doesn't work. But what is known for sure, and what I worry most about, are that there will be consequences for the people who will perform these techniques. There will be hundreds, if not thousands of them. Why would we put our own people through that brutality? It is difficult enough to learn to live with having killed someone in combat. But to live with having become a brutalizer? That will be a particular hell that will never leave them. And we will have done that to them ourselves.

Buckwheat referenced the 24 ticking bomb scenario. What I find particularly despicable is that the producers were asked by the command at West Point to tone down the torture, because it was having an effect on the cadets. They said no. Ugh.

[Jedburgh]

....But any of those old HUMINT NCOs who think they can beat answers from a prisoner apart from trying a Threat-Rescue technique are fooling themselves. The issue at question here isn't professional techniques ... none of this is professional. Its about conciously selecting activites that are truely coercive and damaging to the prisoner as well as to the interrogator for the fantasy of getting something good.
I hope you didn't misconstrue my first post in this thread to mean that I support the amateurish methods under criticism in the article. My meaning (and if you read my second post, it should be clear) is that old, experienced HUMINT NCOs have long been aware of the counterproductive nature of the methods that have been coming under fire - and they did not need a bunch of highly paid PhD consultants to tell them what truly works.

But I disagree with you in that I will argue that it is about professionalism. As I've stated before on SWC, resort to torture and questionable/borderline methods are an admission of failure on the part of the interrogator, and an indicator of failed leadership within his chain of command. Both of those most certainly reflect upon the professionalism - or lack thereof - of the servicemembers in question.

And there have most definitely been serious leadership failures at the highest levels - with senior military and civilian decision makers who understand absolutely nothing about interrogation approving such illegal and amateurish methods.

But I agree with you 100% as to the extent of the strategic damage that this had done to us, and its potential for continued impact well in the future. This is an ugly thing that should have been completely stopped a long time ago. Unfortunately, those reponsible are not the ones that will be paying the price.

[Abu Buckwheat]

But I disagree with you in that I will argue that it is about professionalism. As I've stated before on SWC, resort to torture and questionable/borderline methods are an admission of failure on the part of the interrogator, and an indicator of failed leadership within his chain of command. Both of those most certainly reflect upon the professionalism - or lack thereof - of the servicemembers in question.

And there have most definitely been serious leadership failures at the highest levels - with senior military and civilian decision makers who understand absolutely nothing about interrogation approving such illegal and amateurish methods.

Jedburgh, not only do I like your handle but I like the way you think. It appears I was arguing your point. Thanks for letting me clarify that you're right the old NCO's would know this and put professionalism ahead of any orders ... I second your excellent point about leadership. :D

[Armchairguy]

I've been watching a show on television called "Mind control" and it has a brit (Derren Brown) who is able to tell a great deal about people and whether they are lying simply by observing them and listening to them. Whatever he knows should be taught and learned by interogators. He is absolutely amazing and I believe he is legitimate as he tells you how to do some of what he does as well. Let's use psychology and science to get the best interogators and never torture anyone ever again.

[RTK]

I've been watching a show on television called "Mind control" and it has a brit (Derren Brown) who is able to tell a great deal about people and whether they are lying simply by observing them and listening to them. Whatever he knows should be taught and learned by interogators. He is absolutely amazing and I believe he is legitimate as he tells you how to do some of what he does as well. Let's use psychology and science to get the best interogators and never torture anyone ever again.


It's akin to the Reid Interview Technique, which I'm sure Slapout is familiar with.

Interogators know it too.

[Jedburgh]

I've been watching a show on television called "Mind control" and it has a brit (Derren Brown) who is able to tell a great deal about people and whether they are lying simply by observing them and listening to them. Whatever he knows should be taught and learned by interogators. He is absolutely amazing and I believe he is legitimate as he tells you how to do some of what he does as well. Let's use psychology and science to get the best interogators and never torture anyone ever again.
It's akin to the Reid Interview Technique, which I'm sure Slapout is familiar with.

Interogators know it too.
The Reid Technique, although it does have some kinesic and cognitive aspects, tends to focus (overmuch in my opinion) on the development of narrative themes designed to develop rapport with source and lead them into a confession. It is definitely oriented towards LE interrogations, but as I've mentioned before, its resemblance to a long, narrative version of a leading question is a serious weakness.

The Brit Joint Services Interrogation Course on the other hand, has long focused on the kinesic and cognitive aspects of interrogation - with a truly heavy emphasis on recognition of non-verbal indicators. This course has long been a staple of US military interrogators' advanced training opportunities. Both the short version that MTTs have provided here in the US and the full course in the UK.

Although the US Army AIT-level training in interrogation isn't quite as heavy on the kinesic as the Brits, it does focus heavily on the cognitive and psychological aspects of interrogation. However, that is just the beginning of any interrogator's training.

Armchairguy - your statement shows that you have very little understanding of how military interrogators conduct business, and assumes that they aren't doing things the right way. If nothing else, at least please read through the threads discussing interrogation on this board, and perhaps you'll gain a better understanding.

[slapout9]

Hi all, yes I am very familiar with the Reid technique. I also went back to school two years ago to learn the civilian version, which is different and a little softer but generally good stuff, easier to learn too. I also agree 1000% with Jed about theme development. Too much talking and not enough listening and LOOKING in my opinion.

I have never interviewed a POW so their could certainly by cultural differences that you would have to factor in. I had to learn this the hard way with Hispanic suspects, there are differences.


Before REID came along(yea I am Little older than most) the techniques I learned were close to what is in the Old Army FM that Jed has posted here. I use to use what they called the Absent Minded Professor.

Jed also has talked about the Harvard Negation project. I was pushing this back in the early 80's based solely upon reading the book and my experience. Never was able to get it accepted and never got to go to the school, but I would go in a heartbeat if I could or rather I would have.

Jed has also talked about the use of statement analysis. I would be all over that like stink on sh...... The basis that it is founded on is absolutely valid. I used to know a guy with the ABI Alabama Bureau of Investigations that did that and he helped informally and it was rather amazing.


General tips watch the movie "The House of Games" everybody has a "tell" learn what it is and you have got them.
Watch Poker Players!!!! and ask them how they new the other person was bluffing....they can be amazing.

And finally some of the best advice I ever got in order to learn about criminals and how to catch them.....Watch the animal Chanel!!! I kid you not they are just like them. I very much believe this would translate to COIN warfare but it is probably to fantastic for people to believe, but don't believe me try it out yourself especially anything about the predator type animals.

Thats about all folks. Any Questions I will try to help but I can already tell you Jedburgh has it down pat.

[carl]

I was an officer for a few years, (I have a fraction or Slapout's experience) and my interogation training consisted of what I learned in the academy, what other guys told me and a 3 day course given by an FBI agent from Washington. This seemed to be about the average amount of training in this subject patrol officers received at my agency.

The course given by the FBI agent I believe contained a lot of elements of the Reid Technique. It worked pretty well with people who had no experience talking to the police. The real hoods would request a lawyer first thing and that was that.

That is my worm's eye view.

[slapout9]

Hi Carl, how is everything over there? You bring up a very valid point which ties into learning negotiation techniques. When the scumbag asks for an attorney the whole process switches from an interrogation to a negotiation!!!

Which is why I think the Harvard project would be valuable. Further points. I used to negotiate with CI's (confidential informants) because I did not want a confession or a conviction I wanted INFORMATION. That I think is one of the big deferences between an LE interview/interrogation and an Intel Operator talking to POW,etc. he wants information not a confession and conviction and that process to me at least is better served in the framework of a negotiation proces. I can not speak for Jedburgh but I think this is a lot of what he is getting from some of his posts, at least that is my point of view.

Finally send some pictures man, if you can:wry:

[carl]

When the scumbag asks for an attorney the whole process switches from an interrogation to a negotiation!!!

In my agency, the suspect only had to whisper the word "lawyer" and we had to stop the interview immediately. It was frustrating until you accepted the fact that there wasn't anything to be done about it.

One unfortunate byproduct of that was everybody gave up any further attempts to interview. I don't remember anybody doing interviews with a lawyer present. Maybe it was a forlorn hope but I thought it couldn't hurt to try.

The old "If you give me something, I will talk to the DA." line worked real well sometimes, as you know.

I will send you an update and what photos I was able to take.

[slapout9]

Agency SOP's can be a problem. Within a 50 mile radius and depending on which department you have several different SOP's (Alabama) that would or would not allow you to do that or some modified version of it. Also depended upon if your were uniformed patrol officer or detective or task force,etc. Point is their is nothing illegal about it at all and it is done all the time, with and without lawyers present.

The REID organization developed a special program just for this situation called the field interview method. This is more patrol/state trooper oriented /drug interdiction operations and although I have not been to it alot of Trooper organizations use it, at least in the south. It has a lot more of the behavioral analysis in it, again this is second hand information.

I am straying from the point of this thread so I will shut up here with this final point. From my viewpoint the interviewing/interrogation of POW's etc. from and Intel point of view is more along the lines of a negotiation for information than a standard LE type interview. However working an informant for information seems to me to be almost the same, again when I was "working" my snitches and my bitches (hookers) I was after information so I could nail the suspect even if he did not confess in the interview. And I was willing to negotiate for that with my CI's. Trade Small fish for Big fish.:)

[Jedburgh]

.....From my viewpoint the interviewing/interrogation of POW's etc. from and Intel point of view is more along the lines of a negotiation for information than a standard LE type interview.....
I would argue that the statement interrogation is a negotiation for information is true with every type of interrogation, as it ties into the umbrella concept of manipulative human comms that I've mentioned on the board a few times. "Information", in my perception, includes both the self-incriminatory type of info required for a confession you can bring to court as well as the type of info described by the catch-phrase "actionable intelligence".

However, I agree with you wholeheartedly on the difference between a LE "interview" and your average military interrogation. The LE interrogator generally has to meet much stricter legal standards of conduct in obtaining the information in order to build a successful case. A study of precedent relating to Miranda and what is admissable and what ain't is very enlightening to the military interrogator. I'll try to throw up some links later, but I have certainly found methods described in case studies that have proven useful (when slightly modified) in both interrogations and in the conduct of source ops.

I really want to emphasize (again!) that manipulative human communications is a skill set that includes interrogation, interview, debriefing, elicitation, negotiation, and mediation. Any well-trained individual in any one of those areas, who truly understands the triad of cognition, kinesics and emotion, should, with enough experience in actual application, be able to operate effectively across the manipulative human comms continuum.

The key missing link for someone with those skills in the current operational environment is knowledge of language and culture. No matter what spin you put on it, using a terp in an interrogation is not even marginally as effective as employing a skilled interrogator who is fluent in the language. And even considering using a terp for source ops is just plain stupid. That is why whenever I am again reminded of DA's decision to "waive" the language requirement for HUMINT Collectors in order to get bodies into the field my head damn near explodes.

[Coldstreamer]

And even considering using a terp for source ops is just plain stupid. That is why whenever I am again reminded of DA's decision to "waive" the language requirement for HUMINT Collectors in order to get bodies into the field my head damn near explodes.

Bugger. Just as I was putting a plan together to use my 'Terps in producing actionable intelligence.

What's the fastest way to learn Dari in one month?

[Ken White]

That was the short answer; long one is to work at it 24 hours a day and bounce what you learn off at least three different and hopefully unconnected native speakers. Many folks are inclined to have at least a little fun with um, misleading terms, in teaching another their language. I learned more profanity unintentionally than purposely in a couple of languages... :)

[Armchairguy]

Stupid of me to assume that professionals would not be familiar with all techniques of interrogation. I'm guessing it is civilians (like myself) of equal ignorance advocating torture. I'll study up more before posting.

[Jedburgh]

And even considering using a terp for source ops is just plain stupid. That is why whenever I am again reminded of DA's decision to "waive" the language requirement for HUMINT Collectors in order to get bodies into the field my head damn near explodes.
Bugger. Just as I was putting a plan together to use my 'Terps in producing actionable intelligence....
Please don't misunderstand my comments to mean that I don't believe terps can be useful in an intelligence role.

As regards stupidity and using terps in source ops, or any form of collection, this is probably not the appropriate forum to discuss it in a clearer manner. I'll contact you off-line and throw some thoughts out for you.

[Rex Brynen]

From the Washington Post, 6 October 2007 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/05/AR2007100502492.html?hpid=topnews):


For six decades, they held their silence.

The group of World War II veterans kept a military code and the decorum of their generation, telling virtually no one of their top-secret work interrogating Nazi prisoners of war at Fort Hunt.

When about two dozen veterans got together yesterday for the first time since the 1940s, many of the proud men lamented the chasm between the way they conducted interrogations during the war and the harsh measures used today in questioning terrorism suspects.

[Jedburgh]

The WWII interrogation effort at Ft. Hunt was mentioned in the 30 May 07 NYT article that initiated an earlier discussion thread on interrogation (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3041).

...But some of the experts involved in the interrogation review, called “Educing Information" (http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/educing.pdf) say that during World War II, German and Japanese prisoners were effectively questioned without coercion.

“It far outclassed what we’ve done,” said Steven M. Kleinman, a former Air Force interrogator and trainer, who has studied the World War II program of interrogating Germans. The questioners at Fort Hunt, Va., “had graduate degrees in law and philosophy, spoke the language flawlessly,” and prepared for four to six hours for each hour of questioning, said Mr. Kleinman, who wrote two chapters for the December report.

Mr. Kleinman, who worked as an interrogator in Iraq in 2003, called the post-Sept. 11 efforts “amateurish” by comparison to the World War II program, with inexperienced interrogators who worked through interpreters and had little familiarity with the prisoners’ culture....

More on Ft. Hunt:

Fort Hunt - The Forgotten Story (http://www.nps.gov/archive/gwmp/fohu/forgotten.htm)

Interrogation of U-Boat Crews at Fort Hunt (http://www.uboatarchive.net/POWInterrogation.htm)

[tequila]

Two problems with torture (http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07294/826876-35.stm)- COL (ret) Stuart A. Herrington, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 21 Oct.



Recently revealed White House memos have raised the ugly question yet again: Is torturing prisoners captured in the Global War on Terrorism an effective and permissible use of our nation's might?

I served 30 years in the U.S. Army as an intelligence officer, which included extensive experience as an interrogator in Vietnam, in Panama and during the 1991 Gulf War. In the course of these sensitive missions, my teams and I collected mountains of excellent, verified information, despite the fact that we never laid a hostile hand on a prisoner. Had one of my interrogators done so, he would have been disciplined and most likely relieved of his duties.

Since my retirement, I have twice answered the Army's call, journeying to Guantanamo and Iraq to evaluate interrogation procedures. Subsequently, when the terrible tsunami of verified reports of detainee torture by American soldiers overwhelmed the dikes, the Army asked me to assist in training a new battalion of Iraq-bound Army interrogators in non-coercive interrogation techniques ...

[Abu Buckwheat]

Two problems with torture (http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07294/826876-35.stm)- COL (ret) Stuart A. Herrington, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 21 Oct.

Aaarrgh Tequila! You got the jump on my next Blog entry! :D

[Jedburgh]

JMIC thesis from Aug 02, with discovery credit given to a contributor to INTELST (http://www.s2company.com/files/intelst_info.htm):

The History of MIS-Y: US Strategic Interrogation During World War II (http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA447589&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

...Using recently declassified material from the National Archives and Record Administration, this thesis seeks to capture the essence of the strategic interrogation program conducted under the auspices of the War Department’s Military Intelligence Service (code-named MIS-Y) with the mission of bringing selected German POWs from the European Theater of Operations to the U.S. for the purpose of gathering vital intelligence in support of the Allied war effort. This study examines the key elements of MIS-Y, to include the events that led to its founding; the program’s organization and facilities; the training it provided for its interrogation and operational support personnel; its methods for screening and selecting high value POWs; its process for interrogation and exploitation of captured documents; the Allied intelligence requirements that drove its operations; and the nature of the intelligence it produced and disseminated.

A primary objective of this thesis is to add to the Intelligence Community’s body of knowledge about the challenges and opportunities inherent in the strategic interrogation of POWs. It will also search this event in contemporary military history for timeless principles in the conduct of strategic level interrogation operations—principles that would guide a more effective intelligence program in support of future military operations....
Complete 162 page paper at the link.

[SWJED]

SWJ Blog - Waterboarding is Torture… Period (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/10/waterboarding-is-torture-perio/) by Malcolm Nance.


I’d like to digress from my usual analysis of insurgent strategy and tactics to speak out on an issue of grave importance to Small Wars Journal readers. We, as a nation, are having a crisis of honor.

Last week the Attorney General nominee Judge Michael Mukasey refused to define waterboarding terror suspects as torture. On the same day MSNBC television pundit and former Republican Congressman Joe Scarborough quickly spoke out in its favor. On his morning television broadcast, he asserted, without any basis in fact, that the efficacy of the waterboard a viable tool to be sued on Al Qaeda suspects.

Scarborough said, "For those who don't know, waterboarding is what we did to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is the Al Qaeda number two guy that planned 9/11. And he talked …" He then speculated that “If you ask Americans whether they think it's okay for us to waterboard in a controlled environment … 90% of Americans will say 'yes.'” Sensing that what he was saying sounded extreme, he then claimed he did not support torture but that waterboarding was debatable as a technique: "You know, that's the debate. Is waterboarding torture? … I don't want the United States to engage in the type of torture that [Senator] John McCain had to endure."

In fact, waterboarding is just the type of torture then Lt. Commander John McCain had to endure at the hands of the North Vietnamese. As a former Master Instructor and Chief of Training at the US Navy Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape School (SERE) in San Diego, California I know the waterboard personally and intimately. SERE staff were required undergo the waterboard at its fullest. I was no exception. I have personally led, witnessed and supervised waterboarding of hundreds of people. It has been reported that both the Army and Navy SERE school’s interrogation manuals were used to form the interrogation techniques used by the US army and the CIA for its terror suspects. What was not mentioned in most articles was that SERE was designed to show how an evil totalitarian, enemy would use torture at the slightest whim. If this is the case, then waterboarding is unquestionably being used as torture technique...

Much more at the link...

[Gian P Gentile]

Jedburgh:

Thanks for posting your links. I will use them for future reference.

Didn't know you were an old Humint NCO. The Humint people I had working for me in Iraq in 2006 were top-notch, professional, and I trusted them greatly.

thanks for your service.

[Rex Brynen]

SWJ Blog - Waterboarding is Torture… Period by Malcolm Nance..

Excellent, excellent piece.

[goesh]

~from Malcolm Nance: 10/29/07:

"I’d like to digress from my usual analysis of insurgent strategy and tactics to speak out on an issue of grave importance to Small Wars Journal readers. We, as a nation, are having a crisis of honor."

He goes on to say:

"A torture victim can be made to say anything by an evil nation that does not abide by humanity, morality, treaties or rule of law. Today we are on the verge of becoming that nation. "

In the course of the essay he states:

"Are we willing to trade our nation’s soul for tactical intelligence?"

"Waterboarding will be one our future enemy’s go-to techniques because we took the gloves off to brutal interrogation. Now our enemies will take the gloves off and thank us for it."

In describing enhanced interrogation, he comments:

"One has to overcome basic human decency to endure watching or causing the effects. The brutality would force you into a personal moral dilemma between humanity and hatred. It would leave you to question the meaning of what it is to be an American."

I think the full spectrum of American society needs to be addressed to get us all back on the path of righteous living. In particular, the message needs to get out to this strata of Americans - tell 'em hope floats, help is just around the corner and the full brunt of Public outrage is soon to be unleashed:

http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm05/summary.htm

During FFY 2005, an estimated 899,000 children in the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico were determined to be victims of abuse or neglect.

http://www.rainn.org/statistics/

Key Facts
• Every two and a half minutes, somewhere in America, someone is sexually assaulted.
• One in six American women are victims of sexual assault, and one in 33 men.
• In 2004-2005, there were an average annual 200,780 victims of rape, attempted rape or sexual assault.
• About 44% of rape victims are under age 18, and 80% are under age 30.

I would say the crisis of honor was unfolding some time ago and we were in a waterboard frame of mind long before Mr. Nance hit the print. The 1.2 million victims of domestic torture listed above were already questioning what it means to be an American while Mr. Nance was editing his essay. The selected audience of this forum is ultimately a product of the collective from which they emerge and until the collective is convinced that war is other than death, brutality and pain, this issue is not going away nor will it be resolved.

[Ken White]

. . .

• Every two and a half minutes, somewhere in America, someone is sexually assaulted.
• One in six American women are victims of sexual assault, and one in 33 men.
• In 2004-2005, there were an average annual 200,780 victims of rape, attempted rape or sexual assault.
• About 44% of rape victims are under age 18, and 80% are under age 30.

I would say the crisis of honor was unfolding some time ago and we were in a waterboard frame of mind long before Mr. Nance hit the print. The 1.2 million victims of domestic torture listed above were already questioning what it means to be an American while Mr. Nance was editing his essay. The selected audience of this forum is ultimately a product of the collective from which they emerge and until the collective is convinced that war is other than death, brutality and pain, this issue is not going away nor will it be resolved.(emphasis added / kw)

Unfortunately true. War ain't pretty and isn't going to be...

[tequila]

Despite the ugly statistics quoted above, the fact remains that the vast majority of Americans are personally unacquainted with any form of violence approximating either torture or combat.

Thus the closest most will ever get to the real-life issue is through watching TV or movies. Needless to say most people involved in such productions also have little experience of either war or torture, and depictions of the same are often ridiculously sanitized or presented in the form most palatable for dramatic effect, titillation, and entertainment. Thus the constant reaching for Hollywood creations like Jack Bauer by many pro-torture advocates. This sort of justification by pop culture is perhaps the most outstanding sign of our national cultural decline in the face of terrorism.

[Sarajevo071]

There are rules to this game. The Geneva Conventions try to be explicit. Article 3 forbids “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture.” It also bars “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.” The atrocious behavior of American troops in Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison is the most recent, and perhaps horrific, example of how things can go terribly wrong.

I do not think I will ever understand how fellow soldiers could do what they did. It may also be impossible to grasp fully how destructive their actions were — to the reputation of the intelligence corps, to our country, and to a world hoping for better from those who wear the army’s uniform. It doesn’t matter that those accused so far are mainly MPs. All soldiers, and to a greater extent, intelligence soldiers, are tarnished, if only by our proximity.

The abuses at Abu Ghraib are unforgivable not just because they were cruel, but because they set us back. The more a prisoner hates America, the harder he will be to break. The more a population hates America, the less likely its citizens will be to lead us to a suspect. One of our biggest successes in Afghanistan came when a valuable prisoner decided to cooperate not because he had been abused (he had not been), but precisely because he realized he would not be tortured. He had heard so many horror stories that when he was treated decently, his prior world view snapped, and suddenly we had an ally.

"The Interrogators"
Chris Mackey (pseudonym) & Greg Miller

[Uboat509]

I am so sick of Abu Ghraib being dredged up every time the subject of torture comes up. What happened at Abu Ghraib had nothing to do with intelligence gathering. It was a group of jackasses tormented prisoners because they thought it was funny and because they knew that they could get away with it because they were working in a closed area where no one could show up to check on them unanounced. Holding POTUS accountable for this is a bit like holding Mike Eisner accountable because the guy in the Goofy costume at Disneyland got grabby with somebody's mom.

SFC W

[Sarajevo071]

I am so sick of Abu Ghraib being dredged up every time the subject of torture comes up. What happened at Abu Ghraib had nothing to do with intelligence gathering. It was a group of jackasses tormented prisoners because they thought it was funny and because they knew that they could get away with it because they were working in a closed area where no one could show up to check on them unanounced. Holding POTUS accountable for this is a bit like holding Mike Eisner accountable because the guy in the Goofy costume at Disneyland got grabby with somebody's mom.

SFC W

I knew you wish to justify all this somehow and all of you wish to forget and pretend that this never happened, and more seriously that didn't have major influence on many other things that are here or they still coming, but my point (again) was this:


It may also be impossible to grasp fully how destructive their actions were — to the reputation of the intelligence corps, to our country, and to a world hoping for better from those who wear the army’s uniform.


The more a prisoner hates America, the harder he will be to break. The more a population hates America, the less likely its citizens will be to lead us to a suspect.

Wasn't relative autonomy trying to make that same point!?

[Sarajevo071]

Guantanamo military lawyer breaks ranks to condemn 'unconscionable' detention

An American military lawyer and veteran of dozens of secret Guantanamo tribunals has made a devastating attack on the legal process for determining whether Guantanamo prisoners are "enemy combatants".

The whistleblower, an army major inside the military court system which the United States has established at Guantanamo Bay, has described the detention of one prisoner, a hospital administrator from Sudan, as " unconscionable ".

His critique will be the centrepiece of a hearing on 5 December before the US Supreme Court when another attempt is made to shut the prison down. So nervous is the Bush administration of the latest attack – and another Supreme Court ruling against it – that it is preparing a whole new system of military courts to deal with those still imprisoned.

The whistleblower's testimony is the most serious attack to date on the military panels, which were meant to give a fig- leaf of legitimacy to the interrogation and detention policies at Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. The major has taken part in 49 status review panels.

"It's a kangaroo court system and completely corrupt," said Michael Ratner, the president of the Centre for Constitutional Rights, which is co-ordinating investigations and appeals lawsuits against the government by some 1,000 lawyers. "Stalin had show trials, but at Guantanamo they are not even show trials because it all takes place in secret."
...

more here:
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/article3102574.ece?service=print

[Uboat509]

I knew you wish to justify all this somehow and all of you wish to forget and pretend that this never happened, and more seriously that didn't have major influence on many other things that are here or they still coming,

At what point did I try to justify what happened at Abu Ghraib, pretend it didn't happen or pretend that it had no effect? My point was that what happened at Abu Ghraib was a criminal act not a matter of policy, certainly not national policy.

SFC W

[tequila]

Uboat - So you do not believe what GEN Taguba found regarding GEN Miller bringing in Gitmo tactics, where MPs were asked to essentially soften up detainees for interrogators as having anything to do with the resulting abuses?

[Uboat509]

Tequila, I do not have time to read that entire report but I did skim through it and I did not see any thing that said that what actually occured at Abu G was authorized or condoned by the command. Yes, they were supposed to "soften up" the detainees but even before this whole thing blew up there were guidlines as to what was and was not authorized. I am going to go out on a limb and say that bringing your girlfriend (who is not a guard and has been specifically directed to stay out of the cell block) and acting like a bunch of drunken frat boys on pledge week was not written in those guidelines.

SFC W

[Sarajevo071]

At what point did I try to justify what happened at Abu Ghraib, pretend it didn't happen or pretend that it had no effect? My point was that what happened at Abu Ghraib was a criminal act not a matter of policy, certainly not national policy.

SFC W

My apologies for making this sound like I was talking just to you... I was not.

But, talking about "matter of policy" I will not agree with you (big surprise, right!?). See, for me it's simple. If it was NOT approved policy why then no one was really punished or put it jail!? Simple because they couldn't punish anyone that way since all of them defended they actions saying or they was ordered to do that or command was not clear or upper military echelon know what's going on and they let them do it... It was organized, controlled and un-punished torture and killings. Echo of those actions by U.S. military and political leaders will sound for long time.

[Uboat509]

My apologies for making this sound like I was talking just to you... I was not.

But, talking about "matter of policy" I will not agree with you (big surprise, right!?). See, for me it's simple. If it was NOT approved policy why then no one was really punished or put it jail!? Simple because they couldn't punish anyone that way since all of them defended they actions saying or they was ordered to do that or command was not clear or upper military echelon know what's going on and they let them do it... It was organized, controlled and un-punished torture and killings. Echo of those actions by U.S. military and political leaders will sound for long time.

Umm...All seven of them went to jail.

SFC W

[RTK]

Umm...All seven of them went to jail.

SFC W

And not only were they sent to jail, they were discharged with Bad Conduct Discharges. That means the only job they can get is performing sexual favors under overpasses for beer money. That's pretty powerful.

[Ken White]

Uboat - So you do not believe what GEN Taguba found regarding GEN Miller bringing in Gitmo tactics, where MPs were asked to essentially soften up detainees for interrogators as having anything to do with the resulting abuses?

decision to go into Iraq in the first place. As did the decision to ram airplanes into buildings. The failure to correctly react to the Embassy siezure in Tehran in 1979 had an effect also. So too did Sanchez well meant but stupid directive to the Intel fokks to "Get more intel!!!"

None of which has anything to do with the fact that a bunch of poorly trained Reserve MPs who almost certainly should not have had the job they had were assigned that job (whose fault was that?) went overboard and got stupid -- and all acknowledged at their trials that they essentially knew what they were doing was wrong (does that make it their fault?). You forgot to mention the senior NCOs and the Officers of that Battalion and Company who did NOT check on their people and allowed that to happen (Surely you don't want to let them slide?). Or former BG, now Colonel Karpinski who got dropped a grade for failure to supervise (ala Martha Stewart, this is a good thing...).

There's plenty of blame for many -- but the bottom line is those kids screwed up, got caught and most got punished. The system worked.

The good news is that both Sanchez and Miller were quietly retired. The Armed forces of the US, all of them, rarely punish active component Flag Officers for errors. I don't agree with that either but neither you nor I will get that changed -- thus I'd ask, what's your point?

Serious question.

[tequila]

Tequila, I do not have time to read that entire report but I did skim through it and I did not see any thing that said that what actually occured at Abu G was authorized or condoned by the command. Yes, they were supposed to "soften up" the detainees but even before this whole thing blew up there were guidlines as to what was and was not authorized.

As soon as you ask untrained MPs to "set the conditions" for interrogation, you are essentially asking for them to do a job beyond their training and expertise in an environment begging for abuse. The MPs testified that the detainees in the AG incident were specifically those for whom MI personnel asked for special treatment, and for whom special rules had been prescribed by MI personnel.

Too many (http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1108972,00.html)of these incidents (http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/un/2005/0520bagramdeaths.htm)where MI personnel essentially ask unqualified junior soldiers to set the table for interrogations have occurred for this to be solely a "Bad Apple" phenomenon - this bright idea came from on high, specifically those who asked for looser rules at Gitmo which migrated to Bagram and around the world.


And not only were they sent to jail, they were discharged with Bad Conduct Discharges. That means the only job they can get is performing sexual favors under overpasses for beer money. That's pretty powerful.

I'm pretty sure they got dishonorable discharges - Big Chicken Dinners are handed out for things like assault and so on.


There's plenty of blame for many -- but the bottom line is those kids screwed up, got caught and most got punished. The system worked.

Disagree.


The good news is that both Sanchez and Miller were quietly retired. The Armed forces of the US, all of them, rarely punish active component Flag Officers for errors. I don't agree with that either but neither you nor I will get that changed -- thus I'd ask, what's your point?

That's the point. The system did not work when command responsibility no longer functioned. SECDEF Rumsfeld approved and pushed for more bareknuckle interrogation tactics. GEN Miller worked to loosen the rules at Gitmo then set them loose in Iraq - GEN Sanchez pushed this along. These men were entrusted by the U.S. with its honor and they chose the path of Hollywood tough-guy behavior. In doing so, they set the conditions for the abuse and unnecessary deaths to follow, not to mention handing the enemy an enormous IO victory. Yes, blame Karpinski and the various SNCOs who should have been doing their jobs, but bad SNCOs exist in all armies - that's why universal high standards for things like prisoner treatment should exist and be enforced, not kicked to the curb in the name of "taking the gloves off."

[Ken White]

say in what way it did not. Could you clarify that?

If you meant that the GOs not getting more than a rushed retirement was a miscarriage of justice, we can agree but your point is then fallacious because, as I said and you should know, that doesn't happen in the US. It should but it generally does not and that is historical fact. You and I are not going to change that so you're living in a dream world on that score.

Your last paragraph is essentially correct though your "Hollywood tough guy" comment is both telling and incorrect. It is also irrelevant. We can agree on what should not have happened, however we all have to live with what did and does happen -- mistakes are made in wars. Many have been made in this one, the whole interrogation effort is just one of them. Like many of the other mistakes, that one was rectified. You can disagree that the system worked but you'd be wrong.

It's also easy to take the moral high ground in hindsight and sitting here in CONUS, isn't it? :rolleyes:

[tequila]

If you meant that the GOs not getting more than a rushed retirement was a miscarriage of justice, we can agree but your point is then fallacious because, as I said and you should know, that doesn't happen in the US. It should but it generally does not and that is historical fact. You and I are not going to change that so you're living in a dream world on that score.

The system did not work in the critical phase of meting out justice to the responsible. This only encourages further errors in the future. You regard this as a fundamental flaw(?) in the system, I regard it as a breakdown.

, in that it punishes the misdeeds of the lower but allows the higher ranks to pass on to well-funded retirements? I guess you are just more cynical than I.


Your last paragraph is essentially correct though your "Hollywood tough guy" comment is both telling and incorrect. It is also irrelevant.

What is telling, incorrect, and irrelevant about it? Please explain.


We can agree on what should not have happened, however we all have to live with what did and does happen -- mistakes are made in wars. Many have been made in this one, the whole interrogation effort is just one of them. Like many of the other mistakes, that one was rectified. You can disagree that the system worked but you'd be wrong.

The system appears to have resolved the issue as far as military detentions go, but although it failed to properly allocate justice to the guilty. Yet continued justifications for waterboarding by civilian intelligence agencies seems to indicate that the system certainly has not fully resolved its interrogation issues across the government as a whole.


It's also easy to take the moral high ground in hindsight and sitting here in CONUS, isn't it?

Sure. I've never been the man in the arena tasked with getting intel out of a detainee. Then again, I'm sure every torturer who ever put hands on an American POW would say the same thing.

[Ken White]

The system did not work in the critical phase of meting out justice to the responsible. This only encourages further errors in the future. You regard this as a fundamental flaw(?) in the system, I regard it as a breakdown.

I too regard it as a breakdown but it it indeed also a fundamental flaw. You've identified the problem, now suggest a solution -- not one that would be nice but one that can realistically be applied and work.


...I guess you are just more cynical than I.
Yep. Your turn will come... :wry:


What is telling, incorrect, and irrelevant about it? Please explain.

Telling is the choice of words; there was no 'hollywood' about it nor was there any question of 'tough guy' or any macho BS. Those are typical progressive or collegiate talking point words used in an attempt to belittle any non-metrosexual behavior in this touchy feely era.

It was incorrect because the interrogation rules were a calculated response to an extant problem. People who have been trained to resist ordinary interrogation measures and who are aware of our normal methods (all available in open source as are 90% of our doctrinal pubs) can and will resist ordinary measures and harsher methods can be effective. The major error was in applying that ability to use harsher measures to DoD. We can probably agree that was dumb -- we can probably disagree on the use of harsher terchniques by non-DoD agencies. I have no problem with that (and my cynicism again comes out because we, the US of A, have been operating that way since long before I went in the Corps in 1949...). Rumsfeld and Miller were simply applying needed rule modifications in Guantanamo and they should never have been applied to Iraq. That was one error, one of many.

Sanchez's error was in pushing too hard on Pappas for results when he knew or should have known the possible results of that push. I have no doubt about the culpability of all three but I submit that their goofs do not excuse the actual perpetrators who, as mentioned earlier, all acknowledged they knew what they were doing was wrong. Nor IMO, does their stupidity rise to the level of criminal activity; doing dumb things is not a crime -- may be grounds for action but not necessarily for criminal prosecution. Action has been taken in all cases. May not be what you or I would prescribe but it has been taken.

All that is irrelevant IMO because it has happened, is history and we're unlikely to learn much more from the events than we have to date and I see little sense wasting thought or effort on bemoaning things that can't be changed.


The system appears to have resolved the issue as far as military detentions go, but although it failed to properly allocate justice to the guilty...

In your opinion? Possibly in the opinion of some others? I think it did all it could do within its own parameters (and would point out that some of the investigations are STILL ongoing). I suspect some of those adjudged guilty and serving time might not agree with you. Based on what I read, now Colonel Karpinski does not and obviously Sanchez thinks he got screwed. However, do recall I agree that too many SENIOR people got off too light -- it's the American way... ;)


...Yet continued justifications for waterboarding by civilian intelligence agencies seems to indicate that the system certainly has not fully resolved its interrogation issues across the government as a whole.

I suggest that it is in fact resolved but that you and some others do not agree with that resolution. Your prerogative. I have no hangups on it myself. Cynicism again...:wry:

Been my observation that one can certainly have and state an opinion on anything but it's best not to go into prime judgment mode until one has all the facts and that one should always recall that if one hasn't had to do the job, it's probably too easy to judge excessively harshly. Wars tend to be brutal and messy and there's a whole lot of gray out there. Absolutes are rare indeed...


Sure. I've never been the man in the arena tasked with getting intel out of a detainee. Then again, I'm sure every torturer who ever put hands on an American POW would say the same thing.

Probably. Most of the rest of the world doesn't have all the luxuries that we do -- including the luxury to be nice to ones enemies. Even we don't always have that luxury in practice though it can be assumed we do -- if one just reads about it in air conditioned stateside comfort...

[Ken White]

How long? Did those punishments fit the crime? Abuse, torture and deaths!?

No. They did not.

Here (in U.S.) you can get more time if you steal pack of razor blades in 7-11 but what do they get for murder? Or rape? Or torture? Same!?

the Abu Gharaib idiots all got jail time -- the Iraqis they maltreated -- not tortured -- were probably all out of jail before any of the abusers were and most of them will be in jail for some time. Every one caught torturing has been tried, those convicted got lengthy sentences and the murder convictions have ranged from 20 years to life -- about the European norm.


...Ah, yes... I forget. Victims are only Arab Muslims.

What difference does that make? Other than in the minds of those Muslims (and others, a lot of others) determined to make an issue of it...

. . .


And some people are surprised with all this around us asking, "why they hate us"!?

Some may be asking that. I'm not. I've been aware of everything from contempt to dislike to pure hatred directed at the US for over 50 years. Mostly centered in Europe. Nothing new in that.

The last time you started this stuff on this board when I was around, we got to the point where you acknowledged, late or not, the US did more for Bosnia than anyone else did...

What's your point?

[Jedburgh]

Here (in U.S.) you can get more time if you steal pack of razor blades in 7-11 but what do they get for murder? Or rape? Or torture? Same!?

Sarajevo, in your frequent emotional outbursts on this board you have always failed to acknowledge that the United States is really relatively in unique in that it does try and convict its soldiers who are charged with these crimes. They are sentenced within the limits of the law, although that may not be severe enough for your tastes. But I ask you to look at and compare the conduct of nations around the world engaged in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations and observe how they treat their military members who are accused of similar - or worse - crimes.

Really?! They can't go to the "private sector", torture and kill there, and make more money with even less supervision and responsibility?

You do not understand the severity of the impact of a bad conduct discharge on a former soldier's future life. More and more private sector companies are conducting background investigations on their employees. Hell, even Wal-Mart conducts background checks and drug tests prior to hiring an hourly employee at a Supercenter. An individual with a Bad Conduct discharge may not be reduced to crack whore status for life, as RTK implied - but they are unlikely to advance far beyond mopping floors, picking up garbage, flipping burgers or cutting other people's grass.

To repeat myself from above... Did those punishments fit the crime? Abuse, torture and deaths!? No. They did not.

To repeat myself - you are being emotional and subjective. Try to address the subject in a substantive manner. Do you know what the exact sentences were for each of the individuals? Do you know what maximum sentences were possible for each crime? What sentence do you feel should have been imposed? If you are simply venting without being in possession of complete information, then you should probably not be doing it in public on this board.

And some people are surprised with all this around us asking, "why they hate us!?

Again, try to avoid emotional rants and contribute substantively to existing threads in The Information War (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/forumdisplay.php?f=67) section of the OIF forum or the Media and Information Warriors (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/forumdisplay.php?f=80) forum.

Future posts consisting solely of emotional rants of this nature will be deleted.

[Uboat509]

Anybody know what deaths he is talking about? To my knowledge the Abu G seven were not accused in any deaths. Other personnel elsewhere have been convicted of the deaths of detainees and they got even more severe sentences then these assclowns.

SFC W

[tequila]

Anybody know what deaths he is talking about? To my knowledge the Abu G seven were not accused in any deaths. Other personnel elsewhere have been convicted of the deaths of detainees and they got even more severe sentences then these assclowns.

SFC W

Was not restricting myself to the Abu G seven. The loosening of restrictions combined with encouraging untrained MPs to "set the conditions" for interrogation has certainly resulted in the deaths of innocents elsewhere, however.


Telling is the choice of words; there was no 'hollywood' about it nor was there any question of 'tough guy' or any macho BS. Those are typical progressive or collegiate talking point words used in an attempt to belittle any non-metrosexual behavior in this touchy feely era.


Yes, there certainly is a question of Hollywood macho BS. None of the troika of Sanchez, Miller, nor Rumsfeld had any real-world experience with interrogation, coerced or otherwise. They simply believed that getting tougher would produce more good intel in the same way that the average viewer watching Jack Bauer shoot someone in the kneecap to gain accurate, actionable intelligence believes that Bauer's method works. The counterproductive and strategically disastrous results of this sort of "common sense" are plain for all to see and have been denounced by real-world professionals in the craft, including many on this very board.

And did I just get accused of being a metrosexual? I've been accused of being a traitor, a secret Muslim, and a rabid right-winger on various internet message forums, but this is a first. Seriously, I've never even bought hair gel. :D


People who have been trained to resist ordinary interrogation measures and who are aware of our normal methods (all available in open source as are 90% of our doctrinal pubs) can and will resist ordinary measures and harsher methods can be effective.

Real world examples of reliable, actionable intel produced through such methods, please.


I too regard it as a breakdown but it it indeed also a fundamental flaw. You've identified the problem, now suggest a solution -- not one that would be nice but one that can realistically be applied and work.

A solution would have been for the Commander-in-Chief to man up and accept Rumsfeld's resignation when Abu Ghraib broke. A message of command responsibility would have been sent and the idea that the United States was not just going to punish the little fish while letting their enablers swim off to cushy retirement would have been banished forever. Not to mention that the armed forces could have had Bob Gates at the helm that much sooner. Unfortunately, as in many other instances, the CINC chose another path.

[Uboat509]

I was not replying to you Tequilla. I was replying to a post by Sarajevo that seems to have been deleted. You debate the issues. He has a tendancy to just post conspiracy theories and agitprop. This time he was going on about how the Abu G seven were not given enough punishment for the "torture and deaths" at Abu G. Jedburgh did a better job of calling him out than I did.

SFC W

[tequila]

I was not replying to you Tequilla. I was replying to a post by Sarajevo that seems to have been deleted. You debate the issues. He has a tendancy to just post conspiracy theories and agitprop. This time he was going on about how the Abu G seven were not given enough punishment for the "torture and deaths" at Abu G. Jedburgh did a better job of calling him out than I did.

SFC W

Oops, roger.

He may have been referring to this:

Members of the Abu Ghraib 7, including Charles Graner and Sabrina Harman, posed with the corpse of Manadel al-Janabi, who was killed inside Abu Ghraib while undergoing "Palestinian hanging", otherwise known as the strappado. However they had no culpability in his death, which likely came about at the hands of a CIA interrogator (http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/11/14/051114fa_fact?printable=true3), who appears to have gone unpunished.

[Ken White]

...

Yes, there certainly is a question of Hollywood macho BS. None of the troika of Sanchez, Miller, nor Rumsfeld had any real-world experience with interrogation, coerced or otherwise. They simply believed that getting tougher would produce more good intel in the same way that the average viewer watching Jack Bauer shoot someone in the kneecap to gain accurate, actionable intelligence believes that Bauer's method works...

Still a telling phrase IMO. Sorry. Rumsfeld and Sanchez did not, Miller did. All nominally had access to knowledgeable advisors; in Sanchez case, Pappas -- whom I suspect got overruled in his advice to Sanchez...


...The counterproductive and strategically disastrous results of this sort of "common sense" are plain for all to see and have been denounced by real-world professionals in the craft, including many on this very board.

Strategically disastrous? Into hyperbole? Public relations disasters do not equal strategic disasters by a long stretch. True on the expressed disagreement. You did note there were other professionals who disagreed with the disagree-ers? People can disagree on things, that ought to be okay -- and it usually means the real truth is somewhere between the two...


...And did I just get accused of being a metrosexual? I've been accused of being a traitor, a secret Muslim, and a rabid right-winger on various internet message forums, but this is a first. Seriously, I've never even bought hair gel. :D

Nah, you got charged with using cheesy metrosexual-like terminology, not the same thing. I also offered up collegiate (I thought that sounded better than juvenile -- remember I'm a dinosuar :D ).


Real world examples of reliable, actionable intel produced through such methods, please.

Heh. Ask for the impossible. Assuming I do have knowledge of such, should I post it here on an open forum? I will give you one arguable example -- KSM.


A solution would have been for the Commander-in-Chief to man up and accept Rumsfeld's resignation when Abu Ghraib broke...

We can agree on that. I would have, he did not. End of story.


... A message of command responsibility would have been sent and the idea that the United States was not just going to punish the little fish while letting their enablers swim off to cushy retirement would have been banished forever...

That would have entailed turning over many years of tradition. While it would be nice, that's unlikely to happen in your lifetime. Ain't the American way... :mad:


...Not to mention that the armed forces could have had Bob Gates at the helm that much sooner. Unfortunately, as in many other instances, the CINC chose another path.

Or someone else, perhaps far worse. We'll never know because it did not happen and I suggest it's completely futile to play 'what ifs' with the past.

[tolsen]

in the effectiveness and capabilities of the services who use these techniques.

This is not inevitable but it seems to happen fairly consistently with organizations that embrace the use of torture, or even just accept the "necessity".

1. Its always easier to extract a confession via torture than it is to put together a solid case which proves guilt.

2. Interrogators & Investigators who are unscrupulous and willing to quickly resort to torture will meet more performance benchmarks and generally be promoted more quickly and frequently than their more conscientious and professional peers.

3. Over time these unscrupulous people can dominate the hierarchy where they will continue to promote people like themselves and hold back those whose personal sensibilities do not mesh with the priorities and sensibilities of their superiors. Competent professional investigators either quick, drop out, or get stuck in middling positions. Incompetent and unprofessional ones thrive.

4. Eventually the entire organization becomes adapted, not to investigation of real threats, but a self-perpetuating cycle of forcing confessions out of subjects and then using these confessions as "evidence" of the immensity of the plots against us which justify the continued use of torture to stop. In reality, they become less and less able to find, much less stop, real threats to our country. In the end they become entirely odious - cruel, oppressive, and yet unable to do the job they are actually supposed to be doing.




Finally, a question I often ask myself:

Why are the people who most strenuously support the use of torture against "known terrorists with actionable intelligence" also the ones most opposed to the very safeguards that would protect innocent people from being tortured by mistake? Why do we let them get away with framing the discussion as a question of torturing guys like Khalid Sheik Muhammed while implementing a policy of torturing guys like Achmed the corner baker who knows nothing of Al Queda but has a cousin who might know some Jihadis and who once made a phone call to someone whose brother-in-law went to high school with Osama and who ..... (well, you get the idea)?

[Ken White]

in this country at this time. Things can change but are really unlikely to do so. We have a national tendency to go too far in one direction and then to over correct and go back too far in the opposite direction -- yet we generally end up after some oscillation in getting it about right. We don't torture -- some people may do so as an exception but we, as a nation don't buy it. The Armed forces certainly don't and punish where they can when it is discovered.

I do not -- and do not know anyone who -- supports torture for all the reasons you state. I possibly would not agree with you on what constitutes torture but I might. Regardless, I do agree with harsh interrogation techniques short of torture -- and I use the US statutory description thereof. Anyone indulging in such torture IMO deserves the harshest possible punishment.

Which leads to to your final paragraph. I'm not at all sure what you're trying to say? Are you implying that we have done that or is that merely a hypothetical based on some things you've seen on blogs written by people who have little real knowledge of the topic?

[Jedburgh]

tolsen, this ground has been tread before. Whether it is your intent or not, you appear to be conflating all interrogation conducted at various levels in support of the GWOT.

Prior to posting again, please read existing threads on the subject, attempt to understand the differing situations, services and agencies, and then post a substantive response or query in the appropriate location. I have moved your most recent post into the rendition thread.

A Lesson About Torture, Half Century On (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=287)

Army Interroation FM Put On Hold (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=755)

Republican Revolt Over Interrogation Techniques (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1224)

Interrogation Meets T.E. Lawrence (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2695)

Waterboarding: A Tool of Political Gotcha (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4230)

Extraordinary Rendition (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3132)

[tolsen]

Allow me to explain a bit more:

1. I am not referring to prisoners taken on the battlefield or even people detained in the course of operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. I am NOT advocating giving pows (both real and the Iraqi/Afghanis civilians who inevitably get detained during the course of counter-insurgency operations) lawyers. I'm referring to much smaller number of those taken outside of warzone during law-enforcement operations in the GWOT (even if the capture is effect by military forces) - especially citizens of the US like Padilla and those of close allies like David Hicks - and otherwise facing years of detainment in places like Gitmo.

2. I do understand that each of the legal protections I mentioned (lawyers, no secret evidence) have inherent "dangers" that could result in a terrorist getting away or otherwise thwarting our efforts. However, I think its worth the small risk to achieve a radical reduction in the collateral damage we inflict on innocents. Do you disagree? Do you think we really wont hurt that many innocent people? I've yet to hear a supporter of harsh interrogation seriously address the concept of innocence (almost always they restrict their arguments to cases where guilt is assumed and give only token admissions that "of course I dont want to hurt innocent people, but lets assume the guy is guilty for now..."). My opinion is also based on assumptions though (one of which is that all large organizations and beauracracies screw up...a lot) and they may be wrong.

[tolsen]

I started writing that before you posted your message. Sorry, I thought we were talking about interrogation in all the circumstance. I guess you were focusing on military ones. Pardon.

[Sarajevo071]

Anybody know what deaths he is talking about? To my knowledge the Abu G seven were not accused in any deaths.

Of course they didn't. Cover up, anyone!? BTW, since you never heard about deaths in U.S. custody here is couple of links...


Iraqi Died While Hung From Wrists

An Iraqi whose corpse was photographed with grinning U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib died under CIA interrogation while suspended by his wrists, which had been handcuffed behind his back, according to investigative reports reviewed by The Associated Press.
...
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0217-09.htm


Trial Starts in Abu Ghraib Death

An alleged Iraqi insurgent, Manadel Jamadi, died under intense CIA questioning at the notorious Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad about 19 months ago. On Tuesday, the government launched the first criminal trial in the case -- but none of the CIA agents who were involved is facing charges.

Rather, the Navy court-martialed Lt. Andrew K. Ledford, a Navy SEAL whose platoon had captured Jamadi and delivered him -- alive, kicking and shouting, witnesses say -- to CIA interrogators on the night of his death.
...
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/24/AR2005052401428.html



Manadel al-Jamadi (Arabic: مناضل الجمادي) was an Iraqi prisoner who was tortured to death in United States custody during interrogation at Abu Ghraib prison in November 2003. His name became known in 2004 when the Abu Ghraib scandal made news—his corpse packed in ice was the background for widely-reprinted pictures of grinning United States Army Specialists Sabrina Harman and Charles Graner each offering a "thumbs-up" gesture.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manadel_al-Jamadi

[Sarajevo071]

I was replying to a post by Sarajevo that seems to have been deleted. You debate the issues. He has a tendancy to just post conspiracy theories and agitprop. This time he was going on about how the Abu G seven were not given enough punishment for the "torture and deaths" at Abu G. Jedburgh did a better job of calling him out than I did.

SFC W

Yeah. Jedburgh did a great job... Like always when I start posting and asking real and true question, someone will swoop in to calm my "emotions" :rolleyes: and hush all that talk so you can go back to patting each others back for "great jobs" and "knowledge". Another thing to sweep under the rug?

[Sarajevo071]

Future posts consisting solely of emotional rants of this nature will be deleted.

Who ever said that you don't have sense of humor was wrong. You are funny !

:D :D :D

[Sarajevo071]

Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Ghraib_prisoner_abuse


Iraqis furious at 'lenient' Abu Ghraib abuse sentence

Iraqis have reacted furiously to the three-year jail sentence imposed on Lynndie England, the US soldier pictured holding a naked Iraqi inmate on a leash at Abu Ghraib prison, provoking outrage across the world.

England, 22, was convicted on six counts of abuse while working as a prison guard, but was acquitted of a charge of conspiracy.

Last night she was jailed and dishonourably discharged from the US Army, but ordinary Iraqis said that it was not enough. They said the sentence exposed American hypocrisy, as it would have been more harsh had she been convicted of abusing Americans....

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article572264.ece


Reprimand Is Sentence For Officer at Abu Ghraib

Army Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan, the only officer to face trial over the Abu Ghraib detainee-abuse scandal, was issued a reprimand yesterday by a military jury, a punishment that spares him all prison time after he was convicted this week on one count of disobeying an order....

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/29/AR2007082900391.html


Abu Ghraib sentence: 90 days of hard labor

Letting a dog get within inches of an Abu Ghraib prisoner's face means 90 days of hard labor and a reduction in rank for an Army dog handler.

What is hard labor? When a 2004 article in Army Lawyer examines the punishment, it first looks at what it's not. Unlike the Bobby Fuller Four song says, it's usually not breaking rocks in the hot sun. But the article makes the case that such work is permissable.

The best definition of the punishment comes midway through the report, quoting Army materials: "Hard labor without confinement is performed in addition to other regular duties and does not excuse or relieve a person from performing regular duties. Ordinarily, the immediate commander of the accused will designate the amount and character of the labor to be performed. Upon completion of the daily assignment, the accused should be permitted to take leave or liberty to which entitled."

http://blogs.usatoday.com/ondeadline/2006/06/abu_ghraib_sent.html


Abu Ghraib officer acquitted of failing to control soldiers

The only US Army officer to be tried over the Abu Ghraib scandal was today acquitted of failing to control soldiers who abused inmates at the infamous Baghdad jail.

But Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan still faces up to five years in prison after being found guilty of guilty of disobeying a general's order not to discuss the investigation into the abuses....

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,2157741,00.html


Second prison sentence in Abu Ghraib trials

A U.S. military court in Baghdad sentenced an American soldier to eight months in prison after he pleaded guilty to abusing inmates at the notorious Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

Specialist Armin J. Cruz is the first military intelligence soldier to stand trial. The spotlight in the prisoner abuse scandal so far has been on prison guard reservists....

http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2004/09/11/cruz040911.html



8 years for Abu Ghraib soldier

The highest-ranking U.S. soldier charged in the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal in Iraq has been sentenced to eight years in prison.

Staff Sgt. Ivan "Chip" Frederick, a U.S. Army reservist from Virginia, also was sentenced Thursday to a forfeiture of pay, a dishonorable discharge and a reduction in rank to private.

Frederick pleaded guilty Wednesday to five charges of abusing Iraqi detainees. Under a plea agreement, he admitted to conspiracy, dereliction of duty, maltreatment of detainees, assault, and committing an indecent act....

http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/21/iraq.abuse/


Abu Ghraib soldiers plead guilty

Two of those charged in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq entered guilty pleas as part of plea agreements that were accepted Tuesday by a military judge at Fort Hood, Texas, an Army spokesman said.

Sgt. Javal Davis pleaded guilty to three charges while Spc. Roman Krol pleaded guilty to two charges stemming from an October 25, 2003, incident, said Army spokesman Tom Whitmire.

Krol was immediately sentenced to 10 months in military prison; the sentencing process for Davis will begin Wednesday....
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/02/01/abughraib.plea.deal/index.html


Abu Ghraib Dog Handler Gets 6 Months

An Army dog handler was sentenced Wednesday to six months behind bars for using his snarling canine to torment prisoners at Abu Ghraib.

The military jury handed down the sentence a day after convicting Sgt. Michael J. Smith, 24. He could have gotten 8 ½ years in prison....
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/22/iraq/main1430842.shtml


Abu Ghraib Sentence: Six Months

An Army reservist who appeared in several of the most infamous abuse photos taken by guards at Abu Ghraib prison was sentenced Tuesday to six months in prison for her role in the scandal that rocked the U.S. military's image at home and abroad.

The sentence for Spc. Sabrina Harman came a day after she was convicted on six of the seven counts she faced for mistreating detainees at the Baghdad lockup in late 2003. She faced a maximum of five years in prison, though prosecutors asked the jury to give her three years.

With credit for time served, Harman's actual sentence will be just more than four months.
...

Whoa!? Such a harsh punishments for the murder, torture and abuse of jailed human beings... For those who are defending all this, can you tell me what is punishment for SAME crimes by U.S. criminal and/or military law? When victims are americans, of course. And. isn't true that they will serve only 1/3 of sentence?

[Jedburgh]

I had to edit your post; I only refrained from deleting it because you did include links to articles on specific sentencing information. However, consider this your second warning on posting inflammatory commentary and accusations without substance.

Whoa!? Such a harsh punishments for the murder, torture and abuse of jailed human beings... For those who are defending all this, can you tell me what is punishment for SAME crimes by U.S. criminal and/or military law? When victims are americans, of course. And. isn't true that they will serve only 1/3 of sentence?
None of the sentences you linked to were given for a charge of murder.

Your accusation that different punishments would be handed out if the prisoners would have been American is pure conjecture on your part, and completely unfounded.

That different punishments are handed out for similar offenses by officers and enlisted is a different story, and has been discussed elsewhere on this board.

I am not going to lay out UCMJ and US Criminal law for you. Look it up yourself. You are obviously able to search the internet. Thus far it appears you only look for things that support your personal biases and judgments.

I am tired of your rants. Make a point, make it brief and back it up with substance. Or refrain from posting. The other option is to push it to a point where your posting priviledges are taken away. Your choice.

[SWJED]

In all fairness, we have tolerated politically driven posts by you that in the past we have not tolerated from many of our U.S. and coalition partner as well as non-Muslim Council members. That said, and we have been through this before, you have a one-month "time-out". Use that time for reflection on how to best contribute to a true dialogue on this site. Thanks, Dave.

[Jedburgh]

A WWII-era piece on interrogation (despite the use of the term "interpreter" in the title) by a Marine Major in the Pacific theater:

Suggestions for Japanese Interpreters Based on Work in the Field (http://triptronix.net/ishbadiddle/ebooks/SFMoran_on_interrogation_1943.pdf), 17 Jul 43

First of all I wish to say that every interpreter (I like the word "interviewer" better, for any really efficient interpreter is first and last an interviewer) must be himself. He should not and cannot try to copy or imitate somebody else, or, in the words of the Japanese proverb, he will be like the crow trying to imitate the cormorant catching fish and drowning in the attempt ("U no mane suru karasu mizu ni oboreru"). But of course it goes without saying that the interpreter should be open to suggestions and should be a student of best methods. But his work will be based primarily upon his own character, his own experience, and his own temperament. These three things are of prime importance; strange as it may seem to say so, I think the first and the last are the most important of the three. Based on these three things, he will gradually work out a technique of his own, - his very own, just as a man does in making love to a woman! The comparison is not merely a flip bon mot; the interviewer should be a real wooer!

What I have to say concretely is divided into two sections: (1) The attitude of the interpreter towards his prisoner; (2) His knowledge and use of the language......
Major Moran's 1943 memo, despite its age and brevity (just eight pages), remains an insightful and useful read for those interested in interrogation methodology and techniques. As seen in the quote above, Moran focuses on two aspects of interrogation (although he never uses that term in the memo): the attitude of the interrogator towards the source, and the interrogator's knowledge and use of language.

As he states, the attitude of the interrogator is of primary importance and is critical to success or failure in the interrogation. The discussion of attitude in this memorandum is specifically focused on Japanese prisoners of war, but this is worth the time no matter what area of interrogation the reader may work or have an interest in. Considerations of environment, culture, physical condition of the source and the nature of the interrogator's character as perceived by the source are critically important to any interrogation.

Dividing and defining language used in the conduct of interrogation into "knowledge" and "use" is an important point for interrogators to consider, even when working in their native language, but obviously more so when working in a second language. Regarding "knowledge" of language, Moran stresses the importance of idiomatic language, as opposed to technical vocabulary, for rapidly developing rapport and initiating conversation with the source. (Oreste Pinto is another WWII interrogator who has written useful material on the understanding of language in interrogation)

As for "use" of language, Moran discusses in a simple and general manner concepts of rapport, cognition, questioning methodology and leveraging aspects of culture in questioning. He also describes the difference between empathy and sympathy, and the dangers of the latter, although not in such precise terms.

[John T. Fishel]

is Eric Maddox's MISSION BLACKLIST # 1 (http://www.amazon.com/Mission-Hussein-As-Soldier-Masterminded-Capture/dp/006171447X). It is the story of and by the interrogator who worked with the JSOTF to find Saddam Hussein. The final interrogation - and the only one of the source who knew where Saddam was - took only an hour and forty five minutes without the use of any "enhanced interrogation techniques."

I had the honor to moderate the panel at OU where Eric Maddox was the featured speaker - other members included a former Deputy DDO, David Edger, Dr. Chris Howard (Lt. Col. USAFR who served at the interrogation facility in Bagram), who is the next President of Hampton Sidney U. Maddox is a 1994 OU political science grad who is now a civilian interrogator for DOD. The book is excellent as was his presentation. He is a thoughtful young man who's service both as a soldier and a civilian is a credit to the Army, DOD, the great state of Oklahoma (he's a Sooner to the core:D), and the United states of America.

Cheers

JohnT

[Boot]

Really interesting stuff, it may have been noted already, and I haven't read through it all, but my questions is who was being interrogated today vs. WW II. Remember the Germans were "western" w/Christian roots so I would guess (just a guess) that the approach for them is different than today. Also even in the Japanese case they are still a nation w/a military and country structure that could be understood. Any thoughts?

[jmm99]

on interviewing Japanese prisoners (Jedburgh's last post) seems applicable to AQ-Taliban detainees, who have a very definite and very structured viewpoint - including their Laws of War (as KSM, for instance, has told us (http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2009/03/10/gitmofiling.pdf)).

I can't imagine doing that myself (with any hope of success) without fluency in the detainee's language and culture. Others may be more able to work via an intermediary.

Besides that, this from Jedburgh's first post:


... prepared for four to six hours for each hour of questioning ...

seems as important - not a bad trial prep vs trial time ratio on average.

[Stevely]

This also seems very pertinent:


The questioners at Fort Hunt, Va., “had graduate degrees in law and philosophy, spoke the language flawlessly,”

Do current interrogators have qualifications approaching these? I honestly have no idea, but I would suspect not. That's a rare combination, and necessarily expensive. Also I expect people holding these kind of credentials today would be less inclined, on average, to volunteer for this sort of work than those from the 40's.

[Jedburgh]

This also seems very pertinent:

The questioners at Fort Hunt, Va., “had graduate degrees in law and philosophy, spoke the language flawlessly,”

Do current interrogators have qualifications approaching these? I honestly have no idea, but I would suspect not. That's a rare combination, and necessarily expensive. Also I expect people holding these kind of credentials today would be less inclined, on average, to volunteer for this sort of work than those from the 40's.
The focus at Ft. Hunt was strategic interrogation/debriefing, often of an S&T nature, which is quite different from tactical interrogation. Some of the people today who are working comparable strategic HUMINT do possess advanced degrees or equivalent high-level knowledge of the subject matter. Some don't. However, the ability of a HUMINT professional at the strategic level to attend intense short courses on pertinent subject matter, and to reach out to the IC for planning & prep, far exceeds anything available during WWII.

And, yes, it is unquestionable that the substantial difference in national focus on the mission is far less today than it was during WWII, with the result that we're not pulling in the best possible people from across the civil spectrum into military mission areas in the same manner that we did back when the entire nation was at war. However, although it seems at times we have far too many amateurs working critical missions of this sort, we do have some very bright and talented young men and women doing great work out there.

[davidbfpo]

The article appeared in 2006 on the CIA's website and published journal website (which I occassionally check) and does not appear to have found its way here before: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no1/article06.html

The POW was held by the South Vietnamese and USA, who used different techniques and is worth reading IMHO. I note Frank Snepp was his last US interrogator.

Yes, an old thread comes back again.

davidbfpo

[jmm99]

an interesting conclusion:


This brings me back to my college classmate's question. The answer I gave him--one in which I firmly believe--is that we, as Americans, must not let our methods betray our goals. I am not a moralist. War is a nasty business, and one cannot fight a war without getting one's hands dirty. I also do not believe that the standards set by the ACLU and Amnesty International are the ones we Americans must necessarily follow. There is nothing wrong with a little psychological intimidation, verbal threats, bright lights and tight handcuffs, and not giving a prisoner a soft drink and a Big Mac every time he asks for them. There are limits, however, beyond which we cannot and should not go if we are to continue to call ourselves Americans. America is as much an ideal as a place and physical torture of the kind used by the Vietnamese (North as well as South) has no place in it. Thus, extracting useful information from today's committed radicals--like Nguyen Tai in his day--remains a formidable challenge.

Snepp, in Decent Interval (http://www.franksnepp.com/decent/index.html), gives us his perception of his interrogation of Tai. Have to re-read that one when I get back home tonite.

[davidbfpo]

An ex-FBI interrogator has appeared in a NYT op-ed: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/opinion/23soufan.html?_r=2&ref=opinion and a Time article: http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1893679,00.html

davidbfpo

[Ken White]

tale. Not least, the DOJ Inspector General Report and Mr. Soufan are at variance. LINK (http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0805/final.pdf). Start at PDF Page 110. Gibson and Thomas were pseudonyms. No way to tell which was actually Soufran but either way the dates do not match. There are other inconsistencies. Both the IG Report and Soufran could be telling the truth as they know it; either or both could be obfuscating for various reasons. Regardless, the dichotomy raises questions. Or should.

Mr. Soufran has a checkered history. He's doing well today, though LINK (http://www.observer.com/2008/giuliani-g-man-buys-manhattan-three-bedroom-spread-1-7-m). I can thank him for his service, wish him well -- and still be skeptical. For several reasons.

The long running FBI - CIA feud among other things...

[Presley Cannady]

tale. Not least, the DOJ Inspector General Report and Mr. Soufan are at variance. LINK (http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0805/final.pdf). Start at PDF Page 110. Gibson and Thomas were pseudonyms. No way to tell which was actually Soufran but either way the dates do not match.

"Gibson" reportedly underwent US Army SERE. Ali Soufan, to my knowledge, never served. Do the service SERE schools accommodate other agencies?

[Ken White]

"Gibson" reportedly underwent US Army SERE. Ali Soufan, to my knowledge, never served. Do the service SERE schools accommodate other agencies?As do other nations. The services also cross feed each others schools, primarily with to be designated instructors in a share the wealth effort but there a few others for various reasons.

The 'But' is that I do not know of any FBI types attending the Army school though several other agencies do. That doesn't mean no FBI types did attend, just not to my knowledge. Yet again an indicator I do not know more than I do know... :D

[davidbfpo]

An intriguing, short article (with no Google research) that adds to the insight available: http://blogs.cqpolitics.com/spytalk/2009/04/repetitive-interrogations-reve.html#more

davidbfpo

[goesh]

The civilian, tax paying jury is still out on some of this especially when a high value, known operative is taken and real time operational intel can be gleaned. We don't cotton to soft beds, soothing music and warm hugs insuring our national security and we have the luxary of turning a blind eye to the activities of the Syrians, Jordanians and Egyptians as they lend a 'helping hand' - we sleep quite well at night in this respect.

[Jedburgh]

Redacted version of the formerly TS 7 May 04 CIA IG Report on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities, September 2001 - October 2003 (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torture_archive/20040507.pdf) is now released to the public.

[Someguy]

So what do you take out of that report Jed?

[MikeF]

Fear was no excuse to condone torture (http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/other-views/story/1227832.html#none)
CHARLES C. KRULAK and JOSEPH P. HOAR
Miami Herald (H/T to Tom Ricks)


In the fear that followed the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Americans were told that defeating Al Qaeda would require us to ``take off the gloves.'' As a former commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps and a retired commander-in-chief of U.S. Central Command, we knew that was a recipe for disaster.

But we never imagined that we would feel duty-bound to publicly denounce a vice president of the United States, a man who has served our country for many years. In light of the irresponsible statements recently made by former Vice President Dick Cheney, however, we feel we must repudiate his dangerous ideas -- and his scare tactics.

[jmm99]

was posted by Fuchs (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=82470&postcount=375) in War Crimes - and my two centavos in response is here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=82521&postcount=376).

Hey Mike, not a cross-posting, since the article applies to both threads.

Cheers

Mike

[MikeF]

was posted by Fuchs (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=82470&postcount=375) in War Crimes - and my two centavos in response is here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=82521&postcount=376).

Hey Mike, not a cross-posting, since the article applies to both threads.

Cheers

Mike

Thanks Mike. I just read through your replies. For the record, I'll add this to my newly generated list of Mike's Rules:

Torture is a tool for the intellectually challenged. Torture be dumb.

v/r

Mike

[marct]

To which you could add my corollary:


Torture is a tool for the intellectually challenged. Torture be dumb.

"Which is why it is used by bureaucrats in an endless series of forms rather than physical - Attack the soul, not the body!"

[Presley Cannady]

I wasn't one of those experts they consulted but I have worked as an interrogator/translator/analyst and on the other side of the coin ended up running a SERE program to defeat these tactics when used by AQ or a threat military and I am ashamed to think that our government and military commanders think this works.

Coming in a few years late, but I have some comments on this matter. Based on the public history, I don't see how anyone can accuse the previous administration of reaching any definitive conclusion on the effectiveness of EIT. For one, the authorized use of techniques occurred in a very limited sample, with the most severe technique authorized for only three detainees. Two, once you cut through the polemics and moralizing, the ISB report (www.seas.harvard.edu/courses/ge157/educing.pdf) leaves us with only one lesson of value--there is ZERO scientific basis for ANY form of interrogation. Not just a half-century lapse in systematic study, but NONE whatsoever. The last credible body of new literature on the subject was principally historical, lacked much in the way of prescribed method, and offered absolutely no foundation in theory backed by empirical evidence. As I understand it, subsequent literature at best regurgitates this previous experience, prescribes anecdotal methods, ponders endlessly on the well trodden legal landscape, defends the Geneva ethic, and does nothing whatsoever to advance interrogation from art to science.

I find this disturbing for two reasons. One, the belief that coercion achieves desired results quickly--whether it amounts to torture or not and whatever form it may take--is common throughout the world, whether officially sanctioned or not. The lack of any scientific credulity to the claim provides adversaries with few qualms about breaking fingers with a refuge in ignorance, and provides real torturers with plenty of room to innovate. Two, if a genuine theory of interrogation yields coercive methods that actually do work reliably--even if only conditionally--then America needs to understand the hows and whys if for no other reason than to prepare effective countermeasures.

[Presley Cannady]

Two Cold War pieces on interrogations:

The Manipulation of Human Behavior (http://ia341227.us.archive.org/3/items/TheManipulationOfHumanBehavior/mohb.html)

The Methods of Interrogation and Indoctrination Used by the Communist State Police (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1806200/)

[Jedburgh]

....Two, once you cut through the polemics and moralizing, the ISB report (www.seas.harvard.edu/courses/ge157/educing.pdf) leaves us with only one lesson of value--there is ZERO scientific basis for ANY form of interrogation. Not just a half-century lapse in systematic study, but NONE whatsoever....
Although its a good read, take Educing Information with a grain of salt.

Look at the claim in the bibliography, for example: This selected, annotated bibliography accompanies the Intelligence Science Board Study on Educing Information. It includes the most useful items in English covering the theory, research and pragmatics of interrogation over the past 50 years.

That's a load of crap. The bibliography is actually very weak, not to mention appearing to have a few too many periodical opinion/journalistic pieces listed for the nature of the work. More importantly, it doesn't include Pinto, Tourison or a few other valuable works in the field of intelligence interrogation, and it completely glosses over the extensive works available in the field of LE interrogation, listing only a few representative samples. Not to mention key, related works in other fields of manipulative human communications (i.e. crisis negotiation)

There has been substantive and significant study and evaluation in recent years of the cognitive, emotional and kinesic aspects of interrogation, and of tighter integration of intelligence support to interrogation (it takes info to get info) - to state that there has been no systematic study of at all for decades of interrogation methodologies and their relative effectiveness may be true in the armchair academic world, but such a statement does a great disservice to a number of intelligence professionals, departed, retired and current.

[Presley Cannady]

Although its a good read, take Educing Information with a grain of salt.

Indeed, but I still have to point out that Educing Information is not unique in this fashion. If I were to consider the document alone and its included bibliography, we have at best a review of the existing literature. In fact, I'd credit the authors for largely avoiding the informal synthesis typical of works dealing with the art of practice rather than scientific foundation. This still doesn't leave me with a good impression of the state of the interrogative profession.


That's a load of crap. The bibliography is actually very weak, not to mention appearing to have a few too many periodical opinion/journalistic pieces listed for the nature of the work. More importantly, it doesn't include Pinto, Tourison or a few other valuable works in the field of intelligence interrogation, and it completely glosses over the extensive works available in the field of LE interrogation, listing only a few representative samples.

I'm sure Educing's bibliography misses a ton of memoirs and advisories, but adding more doesn't change the fact that we're still dealing with a subject that lacks a serious empirical basis. And yes, there is an extensive library on interrogation in the LE literature, but it suffers from the same problem as its little brother in the national security space--it is filled with work that is either prescriptive, autobiographical, or a synthesis of the two (with maybe a proposed application of actual scientific knowledge). Take a look the FBI's bibliography (http://fbilibrary.fbiacademy.edu/bibliographies/interviewing&interrogation.htm). Certainly, it's target audience is the operator, but there isn't a single work there that deals with models with roots in testable theory.


Not to mention key, related works in other fields of manipulative human communications (i.e. crisis negotiation)

I'm all for building on existing scientific knowledge, but why is it five decades after John Reid started preparing his techniques we're still evaluating their effectiveness (http://www.cfehouston.org/events/Seminars/ACFE%20Houston%20Seminar%2011-18-2008.pdf) by self-reported practitioner satisfaction and conviction rates? Sure, it's a great, but indirect way to feel comfortable about the righteousness of some informal theory, but it's a poor means of rejecting alternatives.


There has been substantive and significant study and evaluation in recent years of the cognitive, emotional and kinesic aspects of interrogation, and of tighter integration of intelligence support to interrogation (it takes info to get info) - to state that there has been no systematic study of at all for decades of interrogation methodologies and their relative effectiveness may be true in the armchair academic world, but such a statement does a great disservice to a number of intelligence professionals, departed, retired and current.

Look, I'm not knocking the artful approach, didactics or anything that's not strictly positivist. I don't believe war was a useless trade employing ignorant people for millenia before man started applying the scientific toolkit. Ken White is absolutely right when he points out that professionals can't afford to blindly follow models or let quantitative uncertainty lead them to ruin or inaction; they're obligated to form the best theory of action they can with what information and experience they have. I imagine the same holds true for interrogators. That's not the issue. The question is whether a certain set of techniques are bad ideas. Unless we can say EIT is ineffective by simple inspection, we have to admit that the research in this area is woefully inadequate to the task of finally answering the question. And that's why there's political controversy in the first place. You can't say the science is settled when there's no science to begin with.

[bourbon]

Lemonade Boarding (http://www.comedycentral.com/videos/index.jhtml?videoId=256106&title=lemonade-boarding)

[Jedburgh]

The question is whether a certain set of techniques are bad ideas. Unless we can say EIT is ineffective by simple inspection, we have to admit that the research in this area is woefully inadequate to the task of finally answering the question.
Enhanced Interrogation is a puerile term, used to clothe techniques that are illegal or at least highly questionable. The question whether they are a bad idea, from a strategic standpoint, has been answered. Certainly from my personal, biased perspective, as a professional HUMINTer and interrogator with over two decades of experience, I see absolutely no need to compromise ourselves further with "testing" methods that have shown themselves to be strategic liabilities.

In sum, there is no need to waste resources answer the question of the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of what you refer to as "EIT". What is needed, is more effective selection of personnel, combined with better training and professional leadership in fostering the very effective methods that rest on the human communications triad of cognition, kinesics and emotion. We have a lot of interrogators, but we have very few effective interrogators.

To quote Forrest, that's all I have to say about that.

[Schmedlap]

Enhanced Interrogation is a puerile term, used to clothe techniques that are illegal or at least highly questionable.

I largely agree with the gist your post, but on this narrow issue of terminology, it is not as simple as engaging in word play. "Torture" is illegal and has a legal definition. Until one makes a legal determination of whether the techniques used fit that definition, calling them torture can have the effect of prematurely asserting that interrogators were breaking laws (a question of law, not a question of personal preference in terminology).

A lot of terms rub a lot of people the wrong way - "undocumented worker" being another example that many people think is just a PC term for the crude label of "illegal immigrant." A dispassionate look at the reasons why these terms are used reveals that it is not just CYA or PC run amok. Sure, people favoring the antiseptic labels often have an agenda, but if their label is more appropriate, then their agenda is irrelevant.

[Jedburgh]

...on this narrow issue of terminology, it is not as simple as engaging in word play.
As a practitioner, I can't help but see it as word play. What we do is either interrogation or torture. There is no such thing as "enhanced" interrogation.

In the conduct of interrogation we use all of our skills and accepted legal methodologies to obtain the maximum amount of information in the minimum amount of time. Its hard work - and not a matter of simply asking a few questions. There's no half-assing it - unless the interrogator is simply incompetent (which goes back to the fundamental issues of training and leadership).

Thus, the term "enhanced" interrogation implies that an interrogator is holding back and not doing all he can to accomplish the mission. As a mindset, of course, this is common with some in leadership/command positions - ignorant of interrogation methodologies - who think that if the interrogator would just push harder and use those iffy techniques the source would break. Therein lies the path to ruin.

Torture, on the other hand, is easy. Any monkey can apply physical and psychological coercion until the source breaks and tells him what he wants to hear. Short of the popular perceptions of torture, stress positions and what is referred to as "enhanced interrogation" do not fall within the realm of professional interrogation methodologies, but are just the easy fallback tools of incompetent interrogators and reflect very poorly on their leadership/command.

[Presley Cannady]

Enhanced Interrogation is a puerile term, used to clothe techniques that are illegal or at least highly questionable.

No argument here, but we could start a whole new forum if we spent time cataloguing all the terms the security field has generated in order to sanitize its work. I use the term to refer specifically to methods, known and unknown, employed by the United States from 2001 to 2005 subjected to OLC scrutiny in the same time frame. I'm neither a lawyer nor a psychologist, so forgive me for sticking to the literature.


The question whether they are a bad idea, from a strategic standpoint, has been answered. Certainly from my personal, biased perspective, as a professional HUMINTer and interrogator with over two decades of experience, I see absolutely no need to compromise ourselves further with "testing" methods that have shown themselves to be strategic liabilities.

I won't argue whether or not EIT was a strategic blunder, just that some day a theory will emerge regardless of whether or not America or the West is uniquely disadvantaged in the race to discover it.

[Schmedlap]

What we do is either interrogation or torture. There is no such thing as "enhanced" interrogation.

Not being a practitioner myself and knowing less than squat about it, I'll take your comment as 100% accurate. Nonetheless, you must realize that torture has a different meaning in your field of practice than it does in a court of law. Just as most people don't understand your practice, they also don't understand the law. If you, as a subject matter expert, declare "this is torture" that is not a legal conclusion. But to the unwashed masses, they see that an SME declares it to be torture, they see that torture is illegal and then they conclude that the law was broken.

Sadly, much of the scream-fest surrounding this issue is not occurring for the purpose of determining best practices. Rather, it is a political battle being waged to determine how history will be written. That is why EIT was put forth as an alternative description to torture.


Thus, the term "enhanced" interrogation implies that an interrogator is holding back and not doing all he can to accomplish the mission.

While not a justification for the word "torture" I do think that is a very good explanation for why EIT is also misleading.

Perhaps "non-traditional" or "non-standard." Now I'm starting to sound like people I dislike.:confused:

[Presley Cannady]

Thus, the term "enhanced" interrogation implies that an interrogator is holding back and not doing all he can to accomplish the mission.

I doubt that was the intention when they came up with the label. That said, social science methods are not ranked along a single measure of effectiveness. Their utility varies depending on the sample condition, time frame, even the type of answer sought after. I thought interrogators thought much the same of their own toolkit, whether it includes coercion or not. Tricking a resisting subject into revealing something and jogging a cooperative one's memory are two different problems, no?

[Jedburgh]

Tricking a resisting subject into revealing something and jogging a cooperative one's memory are two different problems, no?
Different, but closely related. As I believe I've stated on the board elsewhere, the manipulative human communications skills involved in interrogation, mediation, negotiation, elicitation, interview, debriefing, or in handling sources are essentially the same, differing only for context.

Whether facilitating the extraction of information from a non-cooperative source or eliciting details from a cooperative one, we're dealing with the same fundamentals of cognitive awareness (and more broadly, the triad of cognition-kinesics-emotion that I keep mentioning), although the context of the interaction is significantly different.

However, just as not everyone trained as an interrogator is cut out to actually conduct interrogations effectively, some of those who are broadly competent HUMINTers are not all fitted by nature to operate effectively across the spectrum of operational HUMINT missions, and tend to shine in one or two areas. Unfortunately, in the real world there is no substantive assessment and selection process and the types of missions a given individual works is due entirely to the chance nature of his duty assignment and not at all due to knowledge, skills or abilities.

[jmm99]

Hi Ted and all,

In going back to the start of this thread, I came upon this suggestion (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=17192&postcount=2):


from Jedburgh
Wonder how much they paid those "experts"? All they needed to do was ask a few old, experienced HUMINT NCOs. The best advice in the world, for free. Read my posts on interrogation.

Not being one to lightly disregard your advice (:D), here are the threads I found (using Advanced Search on interrogation and Jedburgh as poster):

A Lesson About Torture, Half Century On (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=837)

Profusion of Rebel Groups Helps Them Survive (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=245)

Terrorism in Indonesia (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=737)

U.S. Army Adds Interrogators (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1261)

Republican Revolt over interrogation techniques? (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1224)

It's the Tribes, Stupid (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1321)

Battlefield Ethics (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2806)

It's Our Cage, Too (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2931) - links to three threads on torture and interrogation in this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=16223&postcount=8).

Advisers Fault Harsh Methods in Interrogation - this thread

Extraordinary Rendition (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3132)

HUMINT-Centric Ops (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2354)

Fort Hunt's Quiet Men Break Silence on WWII (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4086)

Semantic Search Engine as a model for Intel Analysis tool (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4274)

Rendition in the Southern Cone: Operation Condor (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4579)

"Face" among the Arabs (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4644)

Iran in the News (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3191)

Stalin World? (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4802)

Gitmo and the lawyers! (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2367)

Revising FM 3-24: What needs to change? (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5707)

Screening for Interrogation (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5812)

Hamas in Gaza (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6020)

Iran and Iraq (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=249)

35M school, Camp Williams UT (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7488)

Interrogation in Afghanistan (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7708)

Not to turn this into a Jedburgh Appreciation Page (;)), but the above threads contain multiple good links and comments by Ted and others.

------------------------------
Different topic


From Jedburgh
What we do is either interrogation or torture.

I'd suggest there is a spectrum: non-coercive interrogation > coercive interrogation > torture. The test for "coercion" is based on the totality of circumstances measured in the specific context of the interrogation. Yes, there may be artificial legalisms (e.g., Miranda warnings) which disregard the totality of circumstances.

The three basic contexts for interrogations are:

1. Military and intelligence community interrogations

2. Law enforcement interrogations

3. Civil litigation and investigative interrogations (including talking with clients and interested parties in your office).

Different purposes and rules for each context, although all involve a search for reliable information (data) and then analysing that to generate an intelligent output.

Regards

Mike

[Jedburgh]

I'd suggest there is a spectrum: non-coercive interrogation > coercive interrogation > torture. The test for "coercion" is based on the totality of circumstances measured in the specific context of the interrogation. Yes, there may be artificial legalisms (e.g., Miranda warnings) which disregard the totality of circumstances.
Mike,

You're absolutely correct - I was being too starkly simplistic, but with a simple intent. Essentially, if a method or technique under consideration for being used on a source must be run through legal channels first, then don't bother. You're right in that what is under consideration may just be "coercive" in the legal sense as opposed to "torture" - but the mere fact that it has to be approved by higher prior to implementation calls its use into question.

For me, it also raises the question of the interrogator's competence. If he can't exploit the source without resorting to what I referred to earlier as an "easy fallback tool" then perhaps what really needs to be done is get someone else in with the source.

Of course, what I've been discussing primarily is in the context of intelligence interrogations. Thankfully, this means I've never really had to deal significantly with obstacles like Miranda. There exists a substantive body of literature, very interesting, on eliciting admissible information outside of the interrogation context within the bounds of Miranda. That all adds a level of complexity to LE interrogations that I'm glad to have avoided most of my career.

Mike - do you really consider #3, Civil litigation (including talking with clients and interested parties in your office), to be interrogation? Personally, I would have thought that fell in the interview category. LE also conducts extensive investigative interviews with victims, witnesses etc.; they are not interrogations, although an interview may turn into an interrogation. In the context of intelligence interrogation, the screening of sources is also really an interview that can turn into an interrogation. This screening can take place at the interrogation facility or during any tactical operation that involves interaction with the indig.

Finally, I'd like to bring up the niche field of crisis negotiation again. The context is unique, as the negotiator avoids much of the adversarial tone of interrogation because of the need to maintain calm and prevent the hostage/barricade situation from descending into violence. But at the same time, its much more than just a negotiation to end the stand-off, as the negotiator must also attempt to subtly elicit information on the environment, the hostages (if any) and other details. In doing all of this, the negotiator is challenged much more than your average interrogator by having to do his job at a distance - thus completely losing out on the opportunity to observe and exploit the kinesic leg of the communications triad. There is much to be learned from this field by interrogators who take the profession seriously.

Damn, I'm rambling now. Its Friday, and its been a long, cold week.

[slapout9]

Mike - do you really consider #3, Civil litigation (including talking with clients and interested parties in your office), to be interrogation? Personally, I would have thought that fell in the interview category. LE also conducts extensive investigative interviews with victims, witnesses etc.; they are not interrogations, although an interview may turn into an interrogation. In the context of intelligence interrogation, the screening of sources is also really an interview that can turn into an interrogation. This screening can take place at the interrogation facility or during any tactical operation that involves interaction with the indig.



That is absolutely correct you Interview witnesses....you Interrogate Suspects. Each is differant and each can turn into the other.

[jmm99]

I do think this:


Mike - do you really consider #3, Civil litigation (including talking with clients and interested parties in your office), to be interrogation? Personally, I would have thought that fell in the interview category.

and you can toss negotiations, and friendly and unfriendly confrontations into the mix - they all involve talking with folks and getting information that you need in order to understand the situation (the analysis part).

If you walk into my office cold as a new client, you will be interrogated. I won't call it that; and hopefully you will leave thinking that we have had a pleasant conversation, albeit at times meandering (I usually have a method in my apparent meanderings). The realistic facts are that some clients are nuts, some are liars and some are simply confused (in fact many are simply confused). You have to find that out in the office, not in the courtroom.

Can't attest to hostage negotiations (an arena demanding great expertise), but I can attest that lawyers trying to negotiate settlements often give away the seams and gaps in their cases.

Now, Slap is right that "you Interview witnesses....you Interrogate Suspects." But, I would suggest that distinction arises from artificial legalisms. Once a person becomes the focus of an LE investigation, the legalisms change. What surprises me is that, after all the legalisms are uttered, how many suspects spill out their guts where the conversations could not in any way be considered "coercive". Of course, "well-trained criminals" are a different breed of cat - they ask for a lawyer and talk about how the Tide won the NC.

Everyone has their own style (whether it be called "interrogation", "interviewing", "negotiating" - or handling a witness or party in a formal examination, pre-trial or trial). I always liked the Columbo (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbo_(TV_series)) (Peter Falk (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Falk)) approach. I always felt I had an advantage where the other party to the conversation thought he or she was smarter, more clever and more devious than I. Columbo was the ultimate technician, which has its own artistry.

And that, Ted, is really rambling. :)

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

Now, Slap is right that "you Interview witnesses....you Interrogate Suspects." But, I would suggest that distinction arises from artificial legalisms. Once a person becomes the focus of an LE investigation, the legalisms change. What surprises me is that, after all the legalisms are uttered, how many suspects spill out their guts where the conversations could not in any way be considered "coercive". Of course, "well-trained criminals" are a different breed of cat - they ask for a lawyer and talk about how the Tide won the NC.


Mike

they also usually want a cigarette and a cup of coffee.....or something else if they could get it:wry:

[Jedburgh]

....Now, Slap is right that "you Interview witnesses....you Interrogate Suspects." But, I would suggest that distinction arises from artificial legalisms.
From my perspective, the difference between interview and interrogation is simply the adversarial context of the communication. In an interview, the subject is cooperative. Now that doesn't mean he tells the whole truth, but he is willing to engage in the communication and his general intent is to cooperate. In an interrogation, the source is uncooperative, at least in the initial stages, and he is often in custody or otherwise required to engage in the communication whether he wants to or not.

Everyone has their own style (whether it be called "interrogation", "interviewing", "negotiating" - or handling a witness or party in a formal examination, pre-trial or trial). I always liked the Columbo (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbo_(TV_series)) (Peter Falk (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Falk)) approach. I always felt I had an advantage where the other party to the conversation thought he or she was smarter, more clever and more devious than I. Columbo was the ultimate technician, which has its own artistry.
Well, personally I look at interrogation-interview-negotiation as distinct methods used in very different contextual settings, not as styles. The skills certainly overlap a great deal, but the manner and purpose of interaction is quite different for each. But, again, I'm only speaking from the perspective of an old MI guy, the perspectives from the LE and private sector vary a great deal.

By the way, I'm also a Columbo fan, and that style of questioning can be practical and effective in the right context. I've often used Columbo examples in training.

[jmm99]

than disagreement. E.g.,


From my perspective, the difference between interview and interrogation is simply the adversarial context of the communication. In an interview, the subject is cooperative. Now that doesn't mean he tells the whole truth, but he is willing to engage in the communication and his general intent is to cooperate. In an interrogation, the source is uncooperative, at least in the initial stages, and he is often in custody or otherwise required to engage in the communication whether he wants to or not.

I definitely focus on the adversarial vs non-adversarial; and the cooperative and non-coperative. I've no problem if you want to distinguish between interviews (non-adversarial and cooperative) and interrogations (adversarial and non-cooperative) as working definitions. But, I try to turn "interrogations" into "interviews".

E.g., a deposition of an adverse witness. I want that guy or gal to talk and talk lots - and people usually do want to prove their case. In the process they disclose seams and gaps. Essentially, it's a question of who can last longer, the witness or me. Of course the idea is to tie down the seams and gaps so they can't be covered - and can be exploited later.

Also agreed that situations do call for different TTPs:


Well, personally I look at interrogation-interview-negotiation as distinct methods used in very different contextual settings, not as styles. The skills certainly overlap a great deal, but the manner and purpose of interaction is quite different for each.

but personality is fairly constant. A "bulldozer" is going to be that in interrogation-interview-negotiation situations. So, "style" is really the interviewer's personality.

Also agreed that your world is different from my world (and both from Slap's). That's what I meant by this (using "interrogations" very broadly):


The three basic contexts for interrogations are:

1. Military and intelligence community interrogations

2. Law enforcement interrogations

3. Civil litigation and investigative interrogations (including talking with clients and interested parties in your office).

Different purposes and rules for each context, although all involve a search for reliable information (data) and then analysing that to generate an intelligent output.

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

jmm99,for me the legalism entered into the picture when a person or persons become the focus of the investigation, that is when you have to do the Miranda thing.:(

Pretty good movie to watch about how people lie.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Games

[jmm99]

from JMM (above)
Now, Slap is right that "you Interview witnesses....you Interrogate Suspects." But, I would suggest that distinction arises from artificial legalisms. Once a person becomes the focus of an LE investigation, the legalisms change.

and


from Slap (above)
jmm99,for me the legalism entered into the picture when a person or persons become the focus of the investigation, that is when you have to do the Miranda thing. :(

Miranda entered the picture just as I was getting into the game . Before that, confessions and admissions were governed by the "totality of circumstances" test. Under that test, warnings were but one factor to be considered. The FBI and Michigan State Police gave them.

The "totality of circumstances" standard (IMO) was a good one. I suppose that some disparities in results did occur - e.g., a pro-LE judge might find the "totality" OK; a pro-defense judge might find the "totality" NOK. But, the same disparities happen today, except that the rationales are legalistic and technical. The "totality of circumstances" standard looked more to the spirit of the law; Miranda and the other "brightline" tests look more to the law's letter.

It is interesting that the MCA (Military Commission Act) adopted the "totality of circumstances" standard for confessions and admissions. The DTA (Detainee Treatment Act) incorporates FM 2-22.3 (http://www.army.mil/institution/armypublicaffairs/pdf/fm2-22-3.pdf) as the standard, and the Exec. Order (http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1873897,00.html) (Jan 2009) applies the manual to all US interrogations. A Wiki on the Field Manual (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FM_34-52_Intelligence_Interrogation) and another on Enhanced interrogation techniques (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enhanced_interrogation_techniques).

Regards

Mike


One of my major "ghost-written" appellate briefs while still in law school was to the Michigan Supreme Court, People v Doverspike 382 Mich 1 (1969), affirming People v. Doverspike, 5 Mich App 181 (1966), using the "totality of circumstances" standard. The confession was after Escabedo and before Miranda. A lost cause - the cops did a pretty good job, even if the warnings they did give were not quite Miranda. The case is not online free; you need a WestLaw or VersusLaw account to access it.

[Pete]

I grew up in the vicinity of Fort Hunt and am a 1970 graduate of the old Fort Hunt High School. The old fort was then a park administered by the National Park Service, as it is now. The post was named for Gen. Henry J. Hunt, one of the chiefs of artillery in the Army of the Potomac. When I was there in the 1960s nothing remained of the World War II installation except for the roads and sidewalks. Concrete gun emplacements from its coast artillery days were still there, still bearing faint NO SMOKING signs painted in red. There was also a two- or three-story masonry observation tower that I believe was part of the original coast artillery fort. In around 1980 there was a minor Army scandal when the son of a general officer was involved in a vandalism and fire-setting incident at my old high school, which was closed about 20 years ago because there were no longer enough teenagers in the area to justify its remaining open. To read more about Fort Hunt Park click here (http://www.nps.gov/gwmp/fort-hunt.htm).

[Jedburgh]

Well, I finally got around to reading The History of Camp Tracy: Japanese WWII POWs and the Future of Strategic Interrogation (http://www.amazon.com/The-History-Camp-Tracy-Interrogation/dp/0578029790), which is a history of Fort Hunt's west coast counterpart. Unfortunately, I found it quite disappointing.

Near the beginning the author states: "By looking at how the United States conducted interrogations against the Japanese, valuable lessons can be distilled and applied for prosecuting the GWOT both today and in the future."

I agree with that statement, but the author fails to even scratch the surface of accomplishing what he supposedly set out to do with this piece. Its an interesting read, but disappointing. Especially considering that he had the opportunity to personally interview several of the surviving interrogators who worked at Camp Tracy.

The greatest disappointment was in his section on 'Findings' - which is where you would think to find a narrative of his perspective of how the lessons learned from Camp Tracy could be applied to interrogation today. But the author presented those findings simply as a purely descriptive narrative of the direct lessons in the WWII context, and completely failed to provide any analytic discussion of how those findings apply or could influence current interrogation operations. That, in my jaundiced eye, is a significant failing of this book.

I would also like to have seen a bit of comparative discussion of how the interrogation methodology used at Camp Tracy compared with existing interrogation doctrine in WWII (FM 30-15) and how it compares with current doctrine (FM 2-22.3 (http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm2_22x3.pdf)). I must emphasize that, despite the author's attempt at the outset to link his study with interrogation in the GWOT, there is no comparative analysis of anything in this book. This is a purely descriptive book discussing interrogation at Camp Tracy - and even in that narrow context, it lacks depth.

More broadly, the book suffered from what seems to be a rushed publication from thesis to book, and lacks any attempt at refining the basic structure of the text and form of the narrative. The publication is also low quality, and the many illustrations are of very poor resolution and further detract from what could have been a decent volume covering a little-known piece of intelligence history.