HUMINT, Informants and more (merged thread)

[Jedburgh]

Military Review, Mar-Apr 07:

HUMINT-Centric Operations: Developing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban COIN Environment (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr07/Baker.pdf)

...Although HUMINT-centric operations and IO may appear distinctly different in terms of their aims, they are closely linked; in fact, they are mutually supportive. HUMINT-centric operations target the insurgent and the terrorist, but in doing so they produce precise and timely information that allows our Soldiers to locate and attack insurgent forces with surgical precision, minimum violence, and minor collateral damage. A corollary benefit is that our actions result in minimal harm and inconvenience to the local population, helping us to convince them that we have the intent and capacity to improve their security and daily lives by eliminating the insurgent threat.

Likewise, IO synergistically supports our intelligence efforts by convincing the local population that it is in their best interest, personally and nationally, to tolerate and even support our efforts to improve their lives. Through IO, we share with the population the progress that is being achieved politically, economically, and socially, and we ensure that they know about the violence and harm the insurgents are wreaking upon their fellow citizens and their nation.

Similarly, through IO we are able to let the population know that we can separate and protect them from insurgent-terrorist threats when they have the confidence to share targetable information with us. The more adept we become at conducting IO and influencing the population, the more information the population will provide to enable us to target the insurgents and terrorists. It’s a win-win dynamic....

[Tom Odom]

...Although HUMINT-centric operations and IO may appear distinctly different in terms of their aims, they are closely linked; in fact, they are mutually supportive. HUMINT-centric operations target the insurgent and the terrorist, but in doing so they produce precise and timely information that allows our Soldiers to locate and attack insurgent forces with surgical precision, minimum violence, and minor collateral damage. A corollary benefit is that our actions result in minimal harm and inconvenience to the local population, helping us to convince them that we have the intent and capacity to improve their security and daily lives by eliminating the insurgent threat.

That is precisely why CALL Newsletter 05-27 Company-level Stability Operations and Support Operations Vol 3 Patrolling, Intelligence, and Information Operations states that at the company-level IO and INT are one and the same.

Tom

[Jedburgh]

AKO Log-In and BCKS MI Net registration required

The Fundamentals of Islamic Extremism: Psychological Considerations for Developing and Managing Counterterrorism Sources (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/GetAttachment.aspx?id=388023&pname=file&aid=29347)

In this paper, several psychological considerations that may affect source development and management are identified and described. While a host of factors will influence any operation, the focus in this paper is only on the psychological factors that may be useful to those engaged in counterterrorism operations....

[Jedburgh]

AKO Log-in Required

FM 2-91.6 Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/7997525), Revised Final Draft, June 2007

This publication establishes the Army's doctrine in support of the Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) initiative. The need for soldiers to be aware that basic observations are an important part of operations has led to the development of this manual....

...This manual is a compilation of tools to help all soldiers collect information through surveillance, reconnaissance, patrolling, interacting with the local populace, tactical site exploitation, tactical questioning and detainee handling, briefing, debriefing, and reporting in offensive, defensive, stability operations, and civil support operations. Most of the text was developed specifically for patrols and to conduct traffic control points (TCPs) or roadblocks and other missions where soldiers will interact with the local populace including site exploitation and tactical questioning after a planned or hasty raid.....

[sgmgrumpy]

Is this FM 2-91.6? a replacment for ST 2-91.6 SMALL UNIT SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE Mar 2004:confused:

[marct]

AKO Log-in Required

FM 2-91.6 Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/7997525), Revised Final Draft, June 2007

Argh! Another AKO restricted one that I'd like to read. Oh well, I'll just wait a couple of days and see if I can download it off one of the irhabist sites :rolleyes:.

[Jedburgh]

Is this FM 2-91.6? a replacment for ST 2-91.6 SMALL UNIT SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE Mar 2004:confused:
Here's what the manual itself says:

This manual expands on the information contained in ST 2-91.6 and provides a foundation for developing tactical questioning and reporting and supersedes all other tactical questioning handbooks produced by the United States Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), specifically the Tactical Questioning Soldier’s Handbook and ST 2-91.6.
However, the new manual is still a Draft (even if it is Final and Revised). So, despite that paragraph in the Preface, it won't officially replace the others until it becomes approved doctrine.

[Steve Blair]

Argh! Another AKO restricted one that I'd like to read. Oh well, I'll just wait a couple of days and see if I can download it off one of the irhabist sites :rolleyes:.

Yeah...gotta love some of the stuff they put behind AKO these days (Armor magazine...come on....:wry:).

[Jedburgh]

AKO Log-in Required

Note: Also requires access to the Draft MI Doctrine KC.

TC 2-22.306 HUMINT Support To Targeting in COIN (Initial Draft) (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/8464465)

[Jedburgh]

SSI, 21 Aug 07: Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons from Iraq (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB792.pdf)

U.S. soldiers in Iraq—from junior to senior leaders—conduct thousands of negotiations with Iraqi leaders while pursuing tactical and operational objectives that affect the strategic import of the U.S. mission in that country. As long as U.S. troops operate under conditions like the ones they currently face while at the same time conducting a counterinsurgency and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operation in Iraq, negotiation will be a common activity and an important part of achieving mission objectives. Lessons from experience negotiating in Iraq can be helpful in future operations.

This monograph argues that the negotiations conducted in Iraq have tactical importance, operational significance, and strategic implications because of the daily role they play in the missions U.S. soldiers conduct while attempting to secure neighborhoods, strengthen political institutions, acquire information and intelligence, and gain cooperation. The aggregate effect of so many successful or failed negotiations has an impact on the ability of the U.S. military to accomplish its operational mission there efficiently and effectively as well as meet American strategic goals.

The armed services have centers for lessons learned, combat training centers, and a variety of schools for continued training and development of their soldiers and leaders, but there has been no formal study of the negotiating experience that U.S. military officers and noncommissioned officers have gained and the lessons they have learned over the course of their tours in Iraq or Afghanistan that applies the broader field of negotiation theory and its literature to the practical needs of the U.S. military in conducting those negotiations. This monograph attempts to fill the gap by (1) analyzing negotiations described in narrative interviews with U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers recently returned from deployments to Iraq, and (2) examining the predeployment training currently conducted at the U.S. Army’s National Training Center....
I put this under HUMINT because for several years this was a pet project of mine - the applicability of negotiation skills to military ops. As a HUMINT NCO operating in the MidEast, on too many occasions to count I found myself involved in negotiations with the indig; sometimes pushed forward by the commander simply because I spoke the language, sometimes by request of the indig as an American rep in an otherwise isolated area, and other instances simply by the exigencies of the situation.

My opinion then, as now, was that negotiation is simply another facet of the key HUMINT skill of manipulative human communications - negotiation falls right in with interrogation, interview, debriefing, elicitation, mediation, etc.

In-between deployments I sought out training and educational opportunities to explore that relationship in depth - business negotatiation and "alternative dispute resolution" courses along the lines of Harvard's Program on Negotiation (http://www.pon.harvard.edu/), attending the Bureau's Crisis Negotiation course, and service as a volunteer on crisis hotlines and a community victim-offender mediation program as time and optempo permitted. My command supported me to a degree; but on a couple of occasions they just provided me time through permissive TDY, but all costs came out of pocket. I even wrote a couple of papers linking negotiation skills to operational HUMINT, but they just disappeared without substantive response. In the end, at no point during my time in service did I find real support for inclusion of negotiation training with other HUMINT skills.

[Tom Odom]

The armed services have centers for lessons learned, combat training centers, and a variety of schools for continued training and development of their soldiers and leaders, but there has been no formal study of the negotiating experience that U.S. military officers and noncommissioned officers have gained and the lessons they have learned over the course of their tours in Iraq or Afghanistan that applies the broader field of negotiation theory and its literature to the practical needs of the U.S. military in conducting those negotiations. This monograph attempts to fill the gap by (1) analyzing negotiations described in narrative interviews with U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers recently returned from deployments to Iraq, and (2) examining the predeployment training currently conducted at the U.S. Army’s National Training Center....

Hmmm we have been doing negotiations STX lanes for 5 years now and we were doing similar exerciese for the Balkans MREs. He went to NTC versus JRTC so he went to the wrong place. So now he wants more training? Everyone wants more training on everything...

The thing he misses completely is the same thing most miss on this subject:

There is a very real difference between consult and negotiate. Most try and say negotiations cover consultations. They do not. Consultations may or may not have an agenda. I may want to sound some one out but I am not tring to win points in the process. That is a consultation or a conversation.

The problem with negotiations "fits all" is that too many leaders do it by the numbers and on the negotiations "checklist" it says "get want you want." It is an art and it takes some time to develop one's style.

Tom

[Jedburgh]

Hmmm we have been doing negotiations STX lanes for 5 years now and we were doing similar exerciese for the Balkans MREs. He went to NTC versus JRTC so he went to the wrong place. So now he wants more training? Everyone wants more training on everything...
I was also able to include effective operational scenario-based negotiations exercises during various types of training exercises conducted at unit-level where I was assigned at different times. However, my point is that (in my personal, biased opinion) I feel that this is an integral part of the HUMINT skill set, and thus deserves to be covered by formal training at the schoolhouse.

...The problem with negotiations "fits all" is that too many leaders do it by the numbers and on the negotiations "checklist" it says "get want you want." It is an art and it takes some time to develop one's style...
As I stated earlier, negotiation being just one facet of manipulative human communications, it shares that key characteristic of interrogation and all the other related skills - not everyone can do it effectively. There are plenty of people that can go through all the training available, but when it comes down to it on the ground, they just can't do it effectively. And far too many with responsibilities working with the indig in this area tend to fall back on the worst type of positional negotiation - just hammer away and intimidate until you "get what you want".

[Tom Odom]

I was also able to include effective operational scenario-based negotiations exercises during various types of training exercises conducted at unit-level where I was assigned at different times. However, my point is that (in my personal, biased opinion) I feel that this is an integral part of the HUMINT skill set, and thus deserves to be covered by formal training at the schoolhouse.

As I stated earlier, negotiation being just one facet of manipulative human communications, it shares that key characteristic of interrogation and all the other related skills - not everyone can do it effectively. There are plenty of people that can go through all the training available, but when it comes down to it on the ground, they just can't do it effectively. And far too many with responsibilities working with the indig in this area tend to fall back on the worst type of positional negotiation - just hammer away and intimidate until you "get what you want".

To borrow from Mark O'Neil, you and I are in violent agreement. My concerns are with this study and its clamor for more "negotiations" training when it is not clear what exactly the term "negotiations" means and who actually needs more training.

Again we are are in 110% agreement on the issue of this is an art and it needs indepth training--HUMINT guys are natural candidates for it. Where I would broaden this is what I said earlier about consultations. Damn few officers I meet these days have good listening skills--and that makes them piss poor communicators/negotiators/interlocutors. Too many ask questions and then answer them preemptively without ever listening to the response. That is a CRITICAL skill and it is one fading from our ranks.

Best

Tom

[Jedburgh]

For perfectly understandable reasons, there is not a lot openly available on managing human sources for the collection of intelligence. However, the June 2009 issue of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin does have a decent piece written from the LE perspective that provides some simple, clear lessons with wide application:

(Note: The LEB does not provide links to individual articles; this article is on pages 3-11 of the linked pdf)

It’s All About Them: Tools and Techniques for Interviewing and Human Source Development (http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2009/june09leb.pdf)

.....Because recruiting confidential sources for human intelligence collection constitutes a primary function of the profession and represents the key to any investigation—whether terrorism, counterintelligence, drug trafficking, gangs, or the myriad of other criminal violations—no professional law enforcement organization can succeed in its pursuit of securing the United States from all threats without this valuable commodity. Although the current professionals entering law enforcement are highly educated, technically savvy, and extremely intelligent, some have not had the opportunity to develop the human interpersonal skills that time and experience can provide. Compounding the challenge is the increasing workload that inhibits veteran professionals from devoting the necessary time to mentor incoming personnel.

One solution that can help alleviate the difficulty of having less time to mentor involves breaking down the practice of relationship building into clear, understandable steps and phases. An effective law enforcement professional and leader can take the “art” of relationship building and make it “paint by number.” To illustrate this concept, the author presents a realistic interview and a followup explanation involving a veteran law enforcement professional and his less experienced colleague.....

[Michael C]

(Taken from another thread and reduced to developing sources point)

The hardest part is determining whom to kill. The answer is intelligence. Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given. The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given. And, the best way to get that intelligence is to convince locals you care about the best outcome. The way to do that is to try and wins hearts and minds.

Michael C. at www.onviolence.com

[Uboat509]

Michael C said:


Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given. The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given.

This has certainly become the conventional wisdom but it doesn't square with my experience. Police make extensive use of paid informants and coercion is routinely used successfully in both law enforcement and military circles. My experience in Iraq further lead me to become automatically suspicious of anyone who provided me with "free" information. They usually had an agenda. People like to speak in absolutes like these but, in my experience, they rarely hold up to close scrutiny.

SFC W

[carl]

Police make extensive use of paid informants and coercion is routinely used successfully in both law enforcement and military circles. SFC W

This comment worries me a little. Please define coercion as it you believe it would apply in American police practice.

[davidbfpo]

May drop into this thread comments on informants on the 'Kill Company' thread, before they are lost in that debate on wider issues. Consulting those who have posted first.

davidbfpo

[carl]

An example I was thinking of might take the form of, "If you don't tell me who shot the victim I will charge you as an accessory." That is not the physical type of coercion that I suspect that original poster had in mind but I believe that the principle is the same. You are attempting to gain information from a source by threat of an unpleasant consequence.

It would be nice if more people just did the right thing and freely provided information. It would be nicer still if life were like CSI and the suspect would just admit to everything once they were confronted with the evidence. Unfortunately, life is not like that, at least not in Iraq. We have to find other ways to get people provide information, whether that takes the form of paid informants or threats of greater charges or longer prison sentences, or whatever other means that they have within legal bounds.

SFC W

Ah so. Good. The old "I really want to help you but you have to give me a reason." argument; let the negotiations begin. I would just add that the principle may be similar to physical coercion, but morally the two courses are in different worlds.

I don't know of anyplace where life is like CSI.

[William F. Owen]

It is no secret that every successful UK COIN and CT campaign has been lead by good human intelligence, far more than any "hearts and minds" stuff. No "human terrain teams" either. 90% of intelligence activity was focussed on killing and capturing the enemy. I submit that this is because this is a fundamental premise of all irregular warfare operations.

The UK COIN campaigns that failed (Ireland 1916-22 and Palestine 1946-48) did so to a great extent because the enemy counter-Intelligence was pretty good. In both these particular cases, former British or British trained intelligence officers and policemen were present in the enemy ranks.

Moreover HUMINT techniques used in Malaya, Kenya, South Arabia, and Cyprus would today, be illegal by any measure. The activities of the "Research Unit" in Malaya were, as of 1993, still classified.

[davidbfpo]

Michael C said:

This has certainly become the conventional wisdom but it doesn't square with my experience. Police make extensive use of paid informants and coercion is routinely used successfully in both law enforcement and military circles. My experience in Iraq further lead me to become automatically suspicious of anyone who provided me with "free" information. They usually had an agenda. People like to speak in absolutes like these but, in my experience, they rarely hold up to close scrutiny.

SFC W

The police can make extensive use of informants, but in the UK use appears to have reduced. Partly as there is no extensive legislation and procedures to follow. Secondly informant handling is now for specialists only. At one point experienced handlers were referring old informants to use Crimestoppers, as it was far more secure and paid just as well. In Northern Ireland, many of the police handlers have left and it is a moot point if the coverage Wilf refers to now exists.

An important point - for all law enforcement - is that everyone understands what to do when someone offers to help; usually referred to as "walk-in's". Many in the informant handling field refer to these being the best sources, usually as their motivation is easier to identify and develop.

It can also work in an opposite way. In Northern Ireland a UK Customs officer accompanied a friend to an Army base to complain about his friend being roughed up. The officer he spoke to was offensive and rude (understandably as his regiment had lost men in the days before). The Customs officer became the local PIRA intelligence officer, with an ideal cover to be in the South Armagh area and legally carried a gun.

davidbfpo

[Uboat509]

This thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7338&highlight=talk+police)demonstrates the problem that LE in this country runs into all too frequently. Sure it's great when a walk-in comes in and provides useful information. The success of police tip lines and shows like America's Most Wanted certainly demonstrate that valuable information can gained from "walk-in sources." But there are limits to that. The type of people who report information because it is the right thing to do aren't typically the type of people to be directly involved in the activities they are reporting on. They can only report what they see from the outside. That means that in order to get "inside" information LE still has to get people who are directly involved to give that information up, either by the carrot (money, shortened prison terms etc.) or the stick (lengthened prison terms, higher charges etc.)


It can also work in an opposite way. In Northern Ireland a UK Customs officer accompanied a friend to an Army base to complain about his friend being roughed up. The officer he spoke to was offensive and rude (understandably as his regiment had lost men in the days before). The Customs officer became the local PIRA intelligence officer, with an ideal cover to be in the South Armagh area and legally carried a gun.

Wasn't it James Connelly or perhaps Michael Collins who bemoaned the fact that Irish Republican movement was shot through with informants? In fact, if memory serves, part of the reason that the Easter Uprising of 1916 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Easter_Uprising)was such a debacle was that British Intelligence used their network of informants to spread some disinformation.

SFC W

[jmm99]

The intelligence war between the British and Irish Intelligence Services (http://cryptome.info/cia-collins.htm), CIA Studies in Intelligence, V13:1-69-78 (Winter 1969)

[Alsultani]

Michael C said:


This has certainly become the conventional wisdom but it doesn't square with my experience. Police make extensive use of paid informants and coercion is routinely used successfully in both law enforcement and military circles. My experience in Iraq further lead me to become automatically suspicious of anyone who provided me with "free" information. They usually had an agenda. People like to speak in absolutes like these but, in my experience, they rarely hold up to close scrutiny.

SFC W

Hello. I did outside the wire HUMINT in Iraq for 16 months, attached in direct support to a combat arms BN. For us it was a matter of finding people whose interests (self, family, tribe) coincided with ours at enough points to carefully time a pitch to cooperate. Sometimes this required the application of subtle but effective pressure. Arabs in general, but especially in Iraq, are experts in looking at angles for self preservation and are quick to detect bull####, while smiling to your face and telling you what they think you want to hear. Authentic self interest is the best motivator. Information in our AO was never given for altruistic reasons, or because it was the right thing to do. Ever. This is the hardest cultural lesson for beginning HUMINT folks to learn. In addition, less people over time will come forward to give accurate information to a unit whose actions derive from "movement to contact" command philosophy rather than "think to contact." Surgical and accurate kinetic operations, snatch and grabbing the right people with as small a footprint as possible, which begets more intelligence, which leads to more surgical ops....etc.. That's part of what gets people off the fence. I know S3's like to plan these large cordon and search operations, because they make great powerpoint presentations and have cool sounding code names, but shouldn't be done if smaller targeted ops are available. Again, just my experience: operations planned for the sake of operations. I've seen it. People won't risk coming forward if they don't think the unit can effectively act. 95% of our BN's kinetic operations were based on intel from my team, and were very targeted. The use of money: no problem. I don't mind paying thousands of dollars (MNCI Rewards program) to a source who is delivering HVT's. I have enough checks and balances in my AO to know when or if that is a bad idea and how to deal with it accordingly if it becomes a negative. I knew where my sources lived and who their enemies were. I wouldn't call it coercion, but we did eventually reach that point in our relationship where the source realized it might not be a good idea to screw us over. Like I said, mutual points of interest. It didn't have to be said, it was understood.

Knowing where to put pressure in a family/tribally oriented society can reap rewards, including getting members of the insurgency giving you information. Schoolhouses tends to teach in terms of black and white, which is a natural CYA motivated behavior. Counterinsurgency and, I would imagine, LE street intelligence operations should be seeing shades of gray. It was surreal at times meeting covertly with people on our HVT list, and we always made sure we had the right leverage, but the bigger payoffs are what we were looking for and what we got. I would imagine that much of what works best isn't talked about or formally taught. One tends to look at things a little differently when soldiers are dying around you.

I don't say my experience is normative for every HUMINT experience. I operated in a unique, isolated tribal area for 16 straight months, which gave me the opportunity to really master my AO and who was who. After we had proven ourselves, we had 100% support from our supported BN Commander. I'm talking in the context of actionable intelligence developed over months, which is a luxury I know many units do not have. I also had two very squared away CAT II American citizen interpreters who spoke native Iraqi Arabic - again, something that might not be normative.

By the way, sorry for jumping in here. You guys all seem to know what you're talking about and I know some of you have a lot more experience and historical perspective than I do.

[davidbfpo]

Alsultani,


By the way, sorry for jumping in here. You guys all seem to know what you're talking about and I know you have a lot more experience than I do.

We are all still trying to learn and some of our experience is rather dated, 10-20yrs plus. Yours is fresher, even if old "lessons" appear - as indicated - and few here until recently worked so hard in an Arab culture.

davidbfpo

[rborum]

AKO Log-In and BCKS MI Net registration required

The Fundamentals of Islamic Extremism: Psychological Considerations for Developing and Managing Counterterrorism Sources (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/GetAttachment.aspx?id=388023&pname=file&aid=29347)

Ted: Our paper is obviously a bit dated now. One of the challenges writing about this stuff is that it's a moving target. By the time you get something written, security reviewed and disseminated, the landscape or actors have already changed/evolved or adapted. We have had some preliminary discussion about the need to update some of this stuff, and whether such an effort would even be useful. If you're interested, I'm happy to let you know if it goes anywhere. Thanks - Randy

[Valin]

This comment worries me a little. Please define coercion as it you believe it would apply in American police practice.

While I don't wish to speak for others...
Example
Give up your connection/boss...etc. or you're going to jail...for a very very long time, give him up and we'll see what we can do. Happens all the time, all the way from low level street thugs to (say) Sammy "The Bull" Gravano.

[Alsultani]

Ted: Our paper is obviously a bit dated now. One of the challenges writing about this stuff is that it's a moving target. By the time you get something written, security reviewed and disseminated, the landscape or actors have already changed/evolved or adapted. We have had some preliminary discussion about the need to update some of this stuff, and whether such an effort would even be useful. If you're interested, I'm happy to let you know if it goes anywhere. Thanks - Randy

I for one will definitely be reading this paper. This is a very much neglected part of the curriculum. It's also an area of weakness in army HUMINT recruitment - vis a vis people having any interest in or capability to understand these issues is not any sort of prerequisite. But that's another thread.

Have you guys read _The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs by David Pryce-Jones? His chapters on shame/honor and power challenging are worth the price of the book. Helped me out tremendously over "there."

[Alsultani]

(Taken from another thread and reduced to developing sources point)

The hardest part is determining whom to kill. The answer is intelligence. Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given. The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given. And, the best way to get that intelligence is to convince locals you care about the best outcome. The way to do that is to try and wins hearts and minds.

Michael C. at www.onviolence.com

Sir,

Are you specifically addressing LE source operations? I've written a few posts above on what I consider the appropriate application of coercion and paying intelligence sources in counterinsurgency, but locals in the countries in which we are currently "doing" counterinsurgency do not consider the best outcome altruistically. The best outcome is what is the best for them, usually at the expense of someone else. It's also a trick to win the hearts and minds while maintaining their respect and without seeming naive, i.e. weak. I can give numerous examples of coalition forces trying to win the hearts and minds through reconstruction projects and good neighbor policy that got in the way of intelligence collection and our units mission, and that in part financed the local insurgency, that were done by well intentioned but not "tuned in" civil affairs and chaplains. But they got to say at the end that they were able to spend 20 million dollars in an AO, so somebody was happy (Damn those Powerpoint presentations again - they are hindering the war on terror). (Another thread, I know)

Winning the hearts and minds of your neighbors is a concept that does not appear anywhere in their internal sociology, to my knowledge. Societies in which we are doing counterinsurgency have not traditionally organized themselves in ways that best outcomes are arrived at truly consensually and for the "common" good, outside one's kinship or tribal/clan entity. By now, after years of exposure to us, they know to smile and nod their heads when we talk like this while thinking what idiots we are and how they or their cousin can personally profit from it. I would be interested in any counterexamples you might have.

Is it any different in the microcosm of square block LE intelligence ops dealing with chronic criminal organizations?

I'd ask for your continued patience with my posts. Lots of fodder for thought, lots of tough memories of lessons hard learned, and blood of friends shed.

[Dayuhan]

Arabs in general, but especially in Iraq, are experts in looking at angles for self preservation and are quick to detect bull####, while smiling to your face and telling you what they think you want to hear. Authentic self interest is the best motivator.

Interesting comments overall.

I think you might find that the above description does not apply only to Iraqi Arabs. I suspect you'd find similar phenomena wherever people have experienced extended periods of anarchy, or rule by violent and capricious dictatorships, or by sequential invaders or warlords, or other conditions of long term instability and violence. Under these circumstances there is little loyalty beyond the immediate: self, family, clan or tribe. Survival becomes the first interest and self-interest the second, and abilities like detecting bull#### and turning a situation to your own advantage become key survival skills.

Not saying this is a good or bad thing, only that it's something you can expect to find in places where insurgencies flourish.

[Alsultani]

Interesting comments overall.

I think you might find that the above description does not apply only to Iraqi Arabs. I suspect you'd find similar phenomena wherever people have experienced extended periods of anarchy, or rule by violent and capricious dictatorships, or by sequential invaders or warlords, or other conditions of long term instability and violence. Under these circumstances there is little loyalty beyond the immediate: self, family, clan or tribe. Survival becomes the first interest and self-interest the second, and abilities like detecting bull#### and turning a situation to your own advantage become key survival skills.

Not saying this is a good or bad thing, only that it's something you can expect to find in places where insurgencies flourish.

Exacerbated no doubt by the fact that I was operating in a primarly Shia environment in a country that had been run by Saddam. I would be very interested in any book or paper recommendations from council members on these sorts of sociological considerations. As a current DOD HUMINT training contractor I've requested access to the BCKS MI net system to read the paper listed at the top of this thread. Hopefully there is a lot out there.

[William F. Owen]

The hardest part is determining whom to kill. The answer is intelligence. Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given.

Well source motivation can and does often alter radically, and what he/she says and does may actually conflict with the facts.

The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given.
Operational experience from Malaya, Aden, Kenya, Colombia, Sri-Lanka, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland would not support those statements. Money and sex are huge motivators. Physical and psychological coercion can and work.

And, the best way to get that intelligence is to convince locals you care about the best outcome. The way to do that is to try and wins hearts and minds.
....and between that ideal and the real world is a whole mess of compromises.

[Tom Odom]

Operational experience from Malaya, Aden, Kenya, Colombia, Sri-Lanka, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland would not support those statements. Money and sex are huge motivators. Physical and psychological coercion can and work.

Chickens were quite effective--even skinny thrice frozen freezer burned EU donor chickens bought on the black market--especially when combined with a bag of rice...:wry:

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Chickens were quite effective--even skinny thrice frozen freezer burned EU donor chickens bought on the black market--especially when combined with a bag of rice...:wry:


Add to that coloured pens sets and novelty key chains, for your more discerning members of the SLA!! :)

[Jedburgh]

SSI, 3 Jun 10: Human Intelligence: All Humans, All Minds, All the Time (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=991)

.....In this monograph, I focus only on HUMINT as a broad multidisciplinary endeavor, not on known USIC deficiencies or global data pathologies and information asymmetries not yet addressed by the USIC or the U.S. Government (USG) as a whole. HUMINT is defined as 15 distinct subdisciplinary specializations, all of which must be managed as a whole in order to enable cross-fertilization among overt, covert, and clandestine sources and methods.

I conclude that, in light of the lack of a whole of government decision support architecture, and the clear and present danger associated with the 10 high level threats to humanity, eight of which are nonmilitary, the Department of Defense (DoD) is the only element of the USG able to create a 21st century HUMINT capability—a “Smart Nation.”....

[davidbfpo]

The other day the BBC reported on the video evidence given by Saajid Badat in a current US terrorism trial:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17821854


It is the first time a convicted UK terrorist has entered into an agreement with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to give evidence in a trial against other alleged terrorists....Prosecutors earlier said Badat's "main motivation" in helping had been to prove he had renounced terrorism with actions as well as words....He saw himself and others like him as victims manipulated and exploited by Bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, they said.

This has now been followed up in this wide ranging article:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/9131311/Saajid-Muhammad-Badat-and-the-murky-world-of-the-supergrass.html

Which ends with:
...we should not idealise such figures, nor ignore the injustices that reliance on the honesty of criminals and terrorists sometimes entails. But supergrasses do afford a glimpse into the moral squalor of terrorist organisations, while their existence will surely shake the confidence of al-Qaeda cells and their operations. That is something in itself.

[Presley Cannady]

If there's a reference list for this paper, I'd appreciate a look at it.

[davidbfpo]

Infiltration of an enemy is a well known tactic, it does have unintended consequences sometimes. The story of the Dane Morten Storm has been around awhile and in May 2013 Mark Stout, now JHU and then @ The International Spy Museum, conducted a recommended Q&A:http://www.spymuseum.org/multimedia/spycast/episode/a-western-spy-among-terrorists-in-yemen/

Clints Watts provided a summary a week ago:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=1185

No mention was made of a possible unintended result, which today was given a lurid headline in the Daily Mail, citing a CNN interview:
Was Kenya mall massacre 'mastermind' backed by CIA cash? Disturbing claims by 'double agent who worked with terror suspect for years'

Link:http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2487246/Was-Kenya-mall-massacre-mastermind-backed-CIA-cash-Disturbing-claims-double-agent-worked-terror-suspect-years.html#ixzz2nME8w2l5

[davidbfpo]

With official approval a Muslim community informer for the British Security Service (MI5) was interviewed by BBC Radio Four Today programme. You can listen to the short six minute podcast:https://audioboo.fm/boos/1819839-the-bbc-s-june-kelly-hears-from-a-community-informer

The initial approach to him was made by the police, so the person may not be an MI5 informant, but one run in concert by the police and MI5. He repeatedly refers to the role as providing clarification on a person, whether they are linked to extremism.

[Bill Moore]

This was a good and short interview, but I don' t think most would find this surprising in the least. Police should be doing source work like this, it is expected, and the only sources that will have valuable information will have to be part of the community for the threats emanates from.

I think much of the same happens in the U.S. for the same reason, most Muslims don't want extremists putting them at risk directly and indirectly (anti-Muslim backlash after attacks), and they disagree in principle with the extremist methods and desired ends.

What would be refreshing to see is an overt movement of Muslims actively opposing the extremists, shaming them, making it undesirable for their children to be attracted to their narrative. Until that happens the significant threat of Islamic extremist based terror will persistent.

[davidbfpo]

A curious public information film aimed at US students planning to visit and study in China, in part for the methods, but also the timing of the release now - as teh subject was arrested in June 2010:
The "Game of Pawns: The Glenn Duffie Shriver Story" video dramatizes the incremental steps taken by intelligence officers to recruit Shriver and convince him to apply for jobs with the U.S. State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Link to YouTube film (28 mins):https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R8xlUNK4JHQ

Or the official FBI link:http://www.fbi.gov/news/news_blog/students-abroad-warned-of-foreign-intelligence-threat

Or Wiki:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glenn_Duffie_Shriver

[davidbfpo]

Just started to watch this 48 minutes long documentary, the focus is on FBI informants:
Al Jazeera's Investigative Unit takes you inside the shadowy world of FBI informants and counterterrorism sting operations. Following the 9/11 attacks, the FBI set about to recruit a network of more than 15,000 informants. Al Jazeera's investigative film tells the stories of three paid FBI informants who posed as Muslims as they searched for people interested in joining violent plots concocted by the FBI.

Link:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CMRns4ViuEY&feature=youtu.be and the summary:http://webapps.aljazeera.net/aje/custom/2014/fbiinformants/index.html

Three informants are shown, alongside FBI photos and audio - presumably from court trials, such as the 'Liberty City Seven'.

Not sure what to say so far.

[davidbfpo]

A Sunday NYT review of Morten Storm's book '‘Agent Storm: My Life Inside Al Qaeda and the CIA' by Scott Shane which ends with:
In the end, his loyalty to the intelligence agencies proved no more lasting than his allegiance to Al Qaeda. Nearly as fed up with the spies as with the jihadists, Storm decided to go public and says he turned down an offer of $400,000 to keep his mouth shut. The result is a valuable window on both sides in a lethal underground war.

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/books/review/agent-storm-my-life-inside-al-qaeda-and-the-cia-by-morten-storm.html

Jason Burke, of The Observer, hada review in July 2014:http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/jul/02/agent-storm-al-qaeda-morten-storm-review

See for more reviews:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Agent-Storm-Life-Inside-al-Qaeda/dp/0241003776 and http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss_1?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=morten%20storm&sprefix=morten%2Cstripbooks

[davidbfpo]

A new review of the book, it first appeared a month ago in The Washingon Times and now in the online journal Perspectives on Terrorism:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/380/html

It ends with:
The drama of "Agent Storm" will no doubt attract Hollywood's attention (it's already an hour-long CNN documentary), but bright lights aside, the book is an indispensable guide to how the West can counter the appeal of violent jihadism and its al Qaeda terrorist groupings. Today, when so many young Western Muslims are flocking to Syria and Iraq to join the ranks of genocidal insurgents such as the al Nusra Front and ISIS/Islamic State, this book's insights could not be more important.

[davidbfpo]

A review on WoTR, which ends with:
Today, when so many young Western Muslims are flocking to Syria and Iraq to join the ranks of genocidal insurgents such as the al Nusra Front and the Islamic State, this book’s insights could not be more important.
Link:http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/joining-and-betraying-al-qaeda-a-how-to-guide/#_

[davidbfpo]

A fascinating book that crams in so much, even if it has an overwhelmingly Anglo-US focus - the Soviet era KGB and East German HVA get a mention. The historical setting is good, using Russia in 1917 as one and Northern Ireland for another. Oddly very little from Israel.

Then the 'new world' intrudes with the demise of the 'Cold War' and the 'new jihadist terrorist' threat taking centre stage.

A few puzzling references appear to non-warfare threats, notably multinationals moving billions and whether in the future there is a national political requirement to spy on them. What would have been the impact of a spy in some of our banks prior to the 2008 "crash" ?

The interplay between HUMINT and TECHINT (in all its varieties) is covered well.

I have made a lot of notes to think further about and some online, anonymous research in 2016.

Yes the author is a journalist and his Amazon bio states:
Stephen Grey is a British writer, broadcaster, and investigative reporter with more than two decades of experience reporting on intelligence issues. He is best known for his world exclusive revelations about the CIA's program of "extraordinary rendition," as well as reports from Iraq and Afghanistan. A former foreign correspondent and investigations editor with The Sunday Times, he has reported for The New York Times, The Guardian, BBC, and Channel 4, and is currently a special correspondent with Reuters. Grey is the author of Ghost Plane.

"Insiders" on both sides of the Atlantic have expressed their admiration for the book, including details they thought were not in the public domain.

Amazon (US):http://www.amazon.com/New-Spymasters-Inside-Modern-Espionage/dp/0312379226/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1451170674&sr=1-1&keywords=the+new+spymasters+by+stephen+grey

Amazon (UK):http://www.amazon.co.uk/New-Spymasters-Inside-Espionage-Global/dp/0670917400/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1451170982&sr=1-1&keywords=the+new+spymasters+stephen+grey

[davidbfpo]

A broad brush article by Gordon Corera, the BBC's Security Correspondent, on the future facing primarily MI6 aka SIS, the UK overseas HUMINT agency:http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2016/05/features/spies-data-mi6-cia-gordon-corera

He ends with:
It's becoming ever harder to keep secrets. For spies, this new world means deconstructing everything they do and analysing it for new opportunities and weaknesses, seeking out new sources of data and the latest tools to exploit. Every new trick they use to spy on someone else needs to be tested to ensure it doesn't offer an opportunity to the other side. Nation states are working hard to exploit the insights that data offers in a new arms race of technology-driven espionage. To the victor the spoils. To the loser - as with the rest of the tech-based world, but with greater consequences - defeat and irrelevance.

[davidbfpo]

I rarely spot the FBI's open bulletin, but today via Twitter I caught this article and it is even more topical as the author is a Belgian Federal Police officer. The full title is 'Using Human Sources in Counterterrorism Operations: Understanding the Motivations and Political Impact':https://leb.fbi.gov/2016/april/using-human-sources-in-counterterrorism-operations-understanding-the-motivations-and-political-impact

[davidbfpo]

Via Perspectives on Terrorism (a free on-line journal):
This interview with former undercover agent Mubin Shaikh can help academics and security practitioner sunderstand the key role played and the challenges faced by covert human intelligence sources within domestic terrorist groups. The interview highlights the identity crisis, the personal factors, and the allure of jihadi militancy that initially drove Mubin Shaikh to join a Salafi jihadist group. It investigates Shaikh’s process of disengagement from the Salafi jihadist belief system and his rediscovery of a moderate, inclusive, and benevolent form of Islam. It explores his work as an undercover agent for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team responsible for disrupting domestic terrorist groups. The “Toronto 18” terrorist cell, the key role played by undercover agents in preventing terrorist action, and the challenges posed by entrapment are also discussed.
Link:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/502/990

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to a "lurker" for this pointer to a 2013 article in the CIA's history bulletin, even if the title is rather odd by using two abbreviations:https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-57-no.-1-a/vol.-57-no.-1-a-pdfs/Burkett-MICE%20to%20RASCALS.pdf

[davidbfpo]

A BBC News item on the value and dangers of recruiting an informant in a CT campaign:
The most senior loyalist ever to agree to become a so-called supergrass volunteered to kill a Catholic to cover up the fact he was an informer.....He worked as an informer for 13 years...has pleaded guilty to 202 terror offences, including five murders, as his part of a controversial state deal that offered a significantly reduced prison term in return for giving evidence against other terrorist suspects.
He is said to have provided information on:


55 murders
20 attempted murders
56 conspiracies to murder
24 bombing offences

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-42337250

I will copy this to the Northern Ireland thread.

[davidbfpo]

A fascinating 2016 account by an American who served with the UN in Eastern Congo, in Duke University's journal 'World Politics'. It starts with:
When Daniel Fahey visited eastern Democratic Republic of Congo as coordinator of the U.N.’s Group of Experts, he found a charismatic charlatan known as “Mr. X” under the protection of the U.N. A star witness in a murder trial, Mr. X had convinced the U.N. of his tall tales. Fahey shows how Mr. X’s story sheds light on the emerging role of intelligence in peacekeeping operations and the unpredictable effects of its failures.

Link:https://read.dukeupress.edu/world-policy-journal/article/33/2/91/85058/Congo-s-Mr-X-The-Man-who-Fooled-the-UN#.W_CTlRYQxRw.twitter

The pitfalls of HUMINT amply made out.

[davidbfpo]

Discovered via Twitter from an unknown author, who appears to enjoy writing about intelligence matters, especially counter-intelligence. He explains:
This essay focuses on ethical and CI issues associated with running successful human assets inside terrorist organizations.

His two examples are the Provisional IRA and Black September. There are numerous footnotes. He ends with points about AQ & ISIS.
Link:https://medium.com/@horkos/hard-target-challenges-to-human-penetration-of-terrorist-organizations-5b1e13e53f06

[AdamG]

US officials say China is trying to influence US policymakers, steal secrets and spy on the US government. But how? The story of Kevin Mallory, a man who seemed to lead a typical suburban life in Virginia, provides the answer.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46557096

[davidbfpo]

A 2012 PhD thesis at a USA university by a Turkish police officer, using official data, id'd via Twitter:
Law Enforcement Intelligence Recruiting Confidential Informants within “Religion-Abusing Terrorist Networks
Link:https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://t.co/ejMzT7hMuK&httpsredir=1&article=3716&context=etd
It is 261 pgs and no I have not read it! Someone might find it ueeful.

[davidbfpo]

HUMINT is rarely and rightly not a public topic in an active conflict, so I was interested to hear a short talk on Israeli HUMINT in the Second Intifada (September 2000 – 8 February 2005). Which touched on the relationship between Israel's three agencies with a HUMINT function: Mossad (external intelligence), Shin Beth (domestic) and Unit 504 of the IDF.

I was puzzled to learn that Shin Beth's relationship with the PLO's security agency (or agencies) was so close after the Oslo Agreement (signed in 1993 & 1995) that it affected Shin Beth's stance on what was likely to happen. The PLO strategy changed rapidly from cooperation to confrontation. Given the suddenness and the level of violence involved Shin Beth's informant network fell apart, into the breach went Unit 504, which could operate in harsh environment.